


EDITED BY

GEORGE BOYS-STONES

BARBARA GRAZIOSI

PHIROZE VASUNIA

The Oxford Handbook *of* HELLENIC STUDIES

VISIT…



THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

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GEORGE BOYS-STONES,
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and
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Preface

Hellenic studies is a lively, challenging, and fast-moving field—more so than in days when the study of ancient Greece (twinned with the study of Rome) exerted a more universal dominance over European self-definition. The reason for this is simple: the study of the Greeks always was a means of thinking about modernity too, and what we make of them—and so of their influence on us—is something that itself changes as our own perspectives, preoccupations, and identities change. This is no less true as we move into a world increasingly characterized by intense cultural negotiation, hybrid identities, and the awareness of extreme inequalities. The Greeks no longer dominate the production of Europe's cultural capital, but they still remain important elements in this more complex, multicultural landscape. Indeed, the new contexts of their study only bring to bear on them, and with greater urgency, a whole raft of new perspectives which have revivified their study. New questions and new types of question are being asked about the ancient Greeks—including, for example, those Greeks who traditionally have received very little attention, such as women, slaves, and migrants. The Greeks who have historically been most influential—the poets, philosophers, scientists, historians, and orators who have been intensely studied for over two millennia—are on the move as well, their voices more distinctive and fresher precisely because their authority is less inevitable, more contingent, and more closely linked to specific contexts and people.

One of the consequences of all this has been an extraordinary growth in the size and complexity of Hellenic studies as a field. It always was conceived as a broad and challenging area of enquiry. In an address delivered at the inaugural meeting of the Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies, on 16 June 1879, Charles Newton suggested that the term 'Hellenic Studies' not only applied to linguistic work or textual criticism, but encompassed a wide sample of evidence, including material culture and inscriptions. Chronologically, his vision was ambitious: he insisted on the continuities between ancient and modern Greece, and declared that: 'the space of time... over which our Hellenic Studies may range, may be computed as about twenty-five centuries, or perhaps something more.' He also suggested that the geographical scope of Hellenic studies extended beyond Greece itself and ought to follow the example set by August Böckh, whose vast *Corpus* of Greek inscriptions included Greek documents 'wherever they may be found, not only in Hellas itself, but outside the Mediterranean, and beyond the Pillars of Hercules'. Thus, just as

inscriptions were to be investigated regardless of where they were found, 'so we may study the Greek monuments and language wherever these are to be met with' ('Hellenic Studies: An Introductory Address', *JHS* 1: 1–6). *Whatever*, *whenever*, and *wherever*: Newton's inaugural address called on practitioners of Hellenic studies to show flexibility and openness in dealing with evidence, chronology, and geography, and in making these remarks he set the stage for the best work in Hellenic studies over the next century and more.

One hundred and thirty years later, the field has become so broad, so rich in methodological sophistication and specialized knowledge, that no one person could hope to master it all. This is where the present *Handbook* hopes to lend a hand: to give guidance to readers interested in Hellenic studies as a whole, to those who wish to navigate through difficult regions of the discipline of Classics, and to those who wish to hone their critical tools for further analysis of the ancient Greek world. It does not claim to offer a systematic account of the whole Greek world: such a claim would be foolhardy, even if the aim were not itself undesirable in any case. For a dogmatic overview would not capture what is, in its essence, an open-ended, complex, and dynamic process of enquiry—a process, moreover, that looks radically different depending on one's particular vantage-point. But it is precisely because perspectives change, because specialized research increases in volume and complexity, and because boundaries between disciplines shift, that the reader might appreciate some form of guidance which takes a wide view of the field. These are the concerns we tried to negotiate when we asked contributors to the *Oxford Handbook of Hellenic Studies* to think of the work as less an encyclopedia of the well established and more a research tool that provides inspiration as well as information. What we hope is that the *Handbook* exemplifies the various ways in which evidence can be used, explores the breadth and potential of current approaches to ancient Greece, and encourages informed dialogue between different disciplines, perspectives, and approaches. We hope that, as such, it will cater to graduate students and advanced undergraduates, but will also be found useful by established academics, who can use the collection as the first step into an area outside their immediate expertise, whether for new courses or their own research. All of our readers are advised that they can make good at least some of the deficits in areas thinly covered here by consulting other works in the series—especially the Oxford Handbooks of *Archaeology*, of *Ancient Greek Law,* of *Byzantine Studies*, of *Engineering and Technology in the Classical World*, and of *Roman Studies*.

The material we do cover is divided into four sections, each of which has its own thematic integrity, of which an overview is given in the editorial introduction to each. But they are united by the need to be aware of the *perspective* one is adopting in the study of Hellenism. In the first place, this means considering the many very different perspectives from which the notion of 'Hellenism' itself has been defined: this is the theme of the chapters in Part I. They are complemented by those in Part II, which starts to look at how the ancient Greeks viewed themselves. Its focus is

the classical 'polis', both as a historical reality but also, and no less importantly, as a self-conscious ideal of civilized Greekness which has lasted for as long as Hellenism itself. What participation in this ideal amounts to is something explored in Part III, which deals with various branches of Greek literature, through which the ancient Greeks exhibited, created, and above all performed so much of their culture. The Greeks' attempts to speak to posterity and our own efforts to hear them (to *become* their posterity) are mediated and affected by the methods by which we study them. Our final group of chapters, in Part IV, then looks at the methods and approaches available to us. This section is obviously practical in some sense, and we intend it to serve as a guide to contemporary research and to potentially fruitful approaches in the future; but it has a historical and cultural aspect as well, since it reflects on the methods, practical and theoretical, through which the study of Hellenism has at different times been defined, and the uses to which it has been put. The last section thus completes the circle and points back to the reflections on Hellenism outlined, but really only just begun, in Part I.

An octopus swims on the front cover of our *Handbook*, and stares at potential readers. We chose this image because it seemed to us to speak of tenacity and transformation, which are two key aspects of ancient Greek culture. The painting is very early: it decorates a Minoan vase from Knossos, *c.*1450–1400 BCE, and is now kept in the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford. But the octopus also appears in later Greek contexts, such as Homer's *Odyssey*, where Odysseus is compared to the animal when he clings to a rock after his shipwreck. In Richmond Lattimore's translation (*Odyssey* 5.432–5):

> As when an octopus is dragged away from its shelter
> the thickly-clustered pebbles stick in the cups of the tentacles,
> so in contact with the rock the skin from his bold hands
> was torn away.

Odysseus, like the octopus, wants to survive and (unlike the animal) manages to do so: he is even more determined and adaptable. His literary survival is reflected, later still, in the poetry of Michael Longley, for whom 'Homer's Octopus' becomes a reflection on poetry itself:

> Poetry is like Homer's octopus
> Yanked out of its hidey-hole, suckers
> Full of tiny stones, except that the stones
> Are precious stones or semi-precious stones.

This poem, from *Ghost Orchid* (London, 1995), summarizes many of the concerns of our *Handbook*: it talks about a purposeful act of will, the decision to 'yank out' the octopus—or engage in the study of ancient Greece. And then it speaks of unexpected, precious discoveries.

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Abbreviations

AHB	*Ancient History Bulletin*
AJA	*American Journal of Archaeology*
AJP	*American Journal of Philology*
ANRW	H. Temporini and W. Haase (eds.), *Aufstieg und Niedergang des römischen Welts. Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung* (Berlin, 1972–)
BICS	*Bulletin of the Institute for Classical Studies*
BM	The British Museum
BMCR	*Bryn Mawr Classical Review*
CA	*Classical Antiquity*
CCJ	*Cambridge Classical Journal*
CIG	*Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1828–77)
CIL	*Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* (Berlin, 1863–)
CJ	*Classical Journal*
CP	*Classical Philology*
CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
CR	*Classical Review*
DHA	*Dialogues d'Histoire Ancienne*
DK	H. Diels and W. Kranz (eds.), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker,* 6th edn., 3 vols. (Zurich, 1951–2)
DT	A. Audollent (ed.), *Defixionum tabellae* (Paris, 1904)
DTA	R. Wünsch (ed.), *Defixionum Tabellae Atticae* (= *IG* 3.3) (Berlin, 1987)
EMC	*Échos du Monde Classique*
FGrHist	F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin, 1923–)
G&R	*Greece & Rome*
GRBS	*Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*
HSCP	*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae* (Berlin, 1873–)
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
JRA	*Journal of Roman Archaeology*
JRS	*Journal of Roman Studies*
LIMC	*Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae*, 8 vols. in 16 (Zurich, 1981–99)

ML	R. Meiggs and D. Lewis (eds.), *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century BC*, rev. edn. (Oxford, 1988)
OCD	S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (eds.), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd edn. (Oxford, 1996)
OED	J. Simpson and E. Weiner (eds.), *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1989)
P&P	*Past and Present*
PCG	R. Kassel and C. Austin (eds.), *Poetae Comici Graeci* (Berlin and New York, 1983–)
PCPS	*Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* [continued by *CCJ*]
PGM	K. Preisendanz and A. Henrichs (eds.), *Papyri Graecae Magicae: Die griechischen Zauberpapyri*, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart, 1973–4)
PRIA	*Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*
QUCC	*Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica*
RE	G. Wissowa *et al.* (eds.), *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgart, 1894–)
REG	*Revue des Études Grecques*
RhM	*Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*
RIDA	*Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité*
RO	P. J. Rhodes and R. Osborne (eds.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions, 404–323 B.C.* (Oxford, 2003)
SB	Standard Bablyonian
SCI	*Scripta Classica Israelica*
SCO	*Studi classici e orientali*
SEG	*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* (Leiden, 1923–)
SH	H. Lloyd-Jones and P. Parsons (eds.), *Supplementum Hellenisticum* (Berlin and New York, 1983)
SIG	W. Dittenberger (ed.), *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, 3rd edn., 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1915–24)
SIFC	*Studi italiani di filologia classica*
SVF	H. von Arnim (ed.), *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1903–5); [a fourth volume of indexes, compiled by M. Adler, was published in 1924]
TAPA	*Transactions of the American Philological Association*
YCS	*Yale Classical Studies*
ZPE	*Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*

PART I

HELLENES AND HELLENISMS

Introduction

In the classic Victorian statement of political and social criticism, *Culture and Anarchy*, Matthew Arnold wrote:

> To get rid of one's ignorance, to see things as they are, and by seeing them as they are to see them in their beauty, is the simple and attractive ideal which Hellenism holds out before human nature; and from the simplicity and charm of this ideal, Hellenism, and human life in the hands of Hellenism, is invested with a kind of aërial ease, clearness, and radiancy; they are full of what we call sweetness and light. (*Culture and Anarchy: An Essay in Political and Social Criticism* (London, 1869), 151)

Arnold was not alone in believing that Hellenism contributed to the development of aesthetic, intellectual, and moral abilities of his contemporaries. Yet, Arnold's 'sweetness and light' are not easily or always recognized elements in 'Hellenism' (which Arnold opposed to 'Hebraism'), even in its nineteenth-century versions, and his essay reminds us of the challenges held out to all who seek to comprehend the meaning of the term. As **James Porter** observes, in the volume's opening essay, Hellenism is a controversial concept that has a lengthy history and that ultimately defies all attempts to give it definition. Porter, who also discusses Arnold, suggests that we think of Hellenism as a relationship between a particular past and a perpetually changing present. The ancient Greek world is contested, fragile, and phantasmatic; it is constructed by a gaze that looks intensely back into the past. Thus, while the concept of Hellenism has been extraordinarily fertile, it is also restrictive, and its evasions and exclusions need to be acknowledged. A broader and more inclusive conception, as some have argued, would allow for a more critical and self-aware reception of the Greek past and would engage with the range of diverse traditions that have contributed to the formation of Hellenism since antiquity.

Few places have so fraught a relationship with Greek antiquity, **Yannis Hamilakis** indicates, as the nation of Greece itself. Hamilakis shows how, since the nineteenth century, bureaucrats, intellectuals, and politicians received, recast, and managed the Greek past, especially, though not exclusively, in its material legacy. Through a process of sacralization, classical antiquity was placed at the centre of the emerging modern state, and the material culture of the past (ruins, statues, inscriptions, etc.) gained in status and value. While the new nation of Greece saw itself as the resurrection of an ancient entity, the ideological basis for this national project was provided by a home-grown synthesis of 'western' and indigenous Hellenisms. It was the crucial work of Johann Gustav Droysen that facilitated this synthesis, and it was, in particular, his idea of a continuity between the ancient and modern worlds

that gave Greek intellectuals the impetus to trace their own origins back to the classical past.

Our next chapter, along with some others in this section, considers ways of approaching Hellenism from the perspective of non-Hellenes and invites the reader to rethink some of the fundamental tenets of Hellenism. **Robert Rollinger** argues that ancient Near Eastern sources offer a contrasting picture of cross-cultural contact in comparison with the Greek: for instance, several kinds of evidence from the era of the Persian wars point to Greek involvement in the workforce at Persepolis, Susa, and Pasargadae and in the bureaucracy of the Achaemenids. He does not suggest that the non-Greek sources are necessarily more accurate or less biased than the Greek; rather, he illustrates how Near Eastern sources, which have been relatively neglected in the study of the eastern Mediterranean, cast a complementary light on historical situations that are also described by or impinge upon Greeks. The study of colonies and colonization, **Franco De Angelis** writes, needs to be situated within wider Mediterranean and Near Eastern contexts and to throw off its parochial conception of Greek history. A wider geographical range is not enough by itself to bring the study of ancient colonization out of its current 'crisis', however. Scholars should be rethinking the very terminology they employ, including such words as 'colonization', and they ought to evaluate how modern colonialism and capitalism have shaped the understanding of the ancient phenomena conventionally described as 'colonization'. Such a revaluation would lead not just to a more rigorous analysis of ancient colonization but also to a broader, and more nuanced, consideration of modern empires. Problems of terminology also plague the study of the Athenian Empire, according to **Polly Low**, who draws attention to the many ancient Greek words that have been translated as 'empire'. Arriving at the right terms to describe Athenian 'imperialism' would go hand in hand with the larger process of understanding other features of Athens' hegemony: for instance, while the financial aspects of the Athenian Empire are heavily discussed, the cultural imperialism of the city-state still needs to be analysed more fully. Further study may well show that the major importance of the empire lies in its role as the transmitter of Hellenic culture during the period of Athens' dominance and not in its place as a decisive moment in the history of imperialism.

The centrality of Alexander the Great to the study of imperialism and cultural transfer can scarcely be in doubt. Indeed, the subject of Alexander is so heavily studied, **Pierre Briant** says, that we might well demand a justification for any new discussions of the Macedonian conqueror. Historiography proves to be one element in the scholarship that has been relatively neglected, a situation that is exemplified by the lack of any systematic account of Alexander studies from the seventeenth to the twentieth century. A long-term view of the historiography would show that Droysen's picture of Alexander was less original than previously believed, and that it was prefigured in some significant respects by Montesquieu. Briant also argues that progress in the field is likely to come when historians better account for the

Achaemenid and Near Eastern milieux in which Alexander flourished and ruled. That appeal to broader cultural contextualization is echoed by **Susan Stephens**, who calls on scholars to look at the interactions between Greek and non-Greek cultures in the Hellenistic period, which followed the reign of Alexander and in which he continued to enjoy cult status. She emphasizes contrasting trends that emerge in relation to ethnic identity: non-Greeks learn Greek and adopt Greek customs, while Greeks often marry into local non-Greek populations, speak native languages, and practise native manners and rituals. In the West, however, the centre of power is Rome, and, as indicated by contemporary literature and art, both Greeks and non-Greeks find themselves responding and adapting to its growing cultural and political dominance. In turning to the vexed relationship between Latin and Greek literature, **Alessandro Barchiesi** analyses a series of famous passages about Rome's debt to Greece and calls on readers to be more critical and less accepting of the claims made by elite writers. Latin arguments about cultural indebtedness need to be contextualized in socio-historical terms. What are the stakes in sketching out a literary and cultural 'reconciliation' between Greeks and Romans when Greeks are subjects of Rome's empire? Does competition between Romans and the Italic peoples serve as an incentive for the aggressive and hegemonic promotion, by Romans, of a hybrid Graeco-Roman culture? The search for Greek models is not entirely unrewarding, in Barchiesi's view, but critics also need to be more sensitive to the many different kinds of appropriation by Romans of Greek culture and to appreciate the importance of distinctions within Roman Hellenisms. Shining the spotlight mainly on the literature of the Roman Empire, **Tim Whitmarsh** sifts through the varied kinds of Hellenisms practised by Romans and other non-Greeks. Whitmarsh makes the important point that not all Hellenisms were centred on fifth-century Athens and that some looked for inspiration to archaic Greece. While Hellenism on the part of Greek writers could be interpreted as anti-Romanism, few Greek texts of the empire offer unambiguous criticism of Rome (Christian writings are a partial exception in this regard). We may find both pro-Roman and anti-Roman sentiments in an author, and it is not easy to prove that an author always adopts a particular stance on Rome. If elite Romans themselves championed Hellenism as a cultural legacy, and if Greeks also deployed it to articulate a variety of subject positions in the empire, it appears critically more productive to see Hellenism as one of several modes of interaction available to the colonizers and the colonized during Roman imperial domination over Greece.

Returning to the conjunction made famous by Arnold, **Erich Gruen** observes that the stark dichotomy implied in the expression 'Hellenism and Hebraism' is, in fact, built on methodologically shaky foundations and perhaps stems from tendentious readings of 2 Maccabees. The concepts of Hellenism and Hebraism are complex and cannot be easily reduced to pure essences, though Greeks and Jews may have maintained a distinctive sense of their ethnic identities. As Gruen discusses Greek writings about Jews and Jewish writings about Greeks, he points to the 'comfort'

that each had in forging a link or connection with the other. The ancient writers clearly show that Hellenes and Hebrews should not only be opposed to each other and that they participate in overlapping as well as divergent cultures and traditions. **Gotthard Strohmaier** writes about the attempts of Muslim intellectuals to forge a kind of synthesis between Greek philosophy and Islamic thought, attempts which have parallels in the Christian and Judaic traditions. Classical Muslim culture remained a vibrant and pluralistic phenomenon that often conceived of Greek thought and learning as an indigenous tradition and as a legitimate precursor to Islamic scholarship.

Christopher Celenza's essay, which discusses Hellenism in the Renaissance, illustrates how humanist scholarship laid the foundations for modern philology and the later stages of classical studies. Celenza brings out the hunger for ancient texts and knowledge that fuelled Renaissance intellectuals such as Coluccio Salutati and Leonardo Bruni. A large part of the humanist project was devoted to acquiring Greek texts, translating them into Latin, and studying them with the intense philological precision that was also deployed in the scrutiny of Latin. The humanist achievements cannot be separated from the enhanced status of libraries, the invention of printing, and the political upheavals caused by the fall of Constantinople in 1453, all of which served as an impetus to Greek learning in Europe. **Paul Cartledge** moves us past the Renaissance to the Enlightenment and, in particular, to the French Revolution, which crystallized an important, if not fully understood, moment in the history of Hellenism. He shows how the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the inspiration for so many of the French revolutionaries, were simultaneously proto-democratic and pro-Spartan. In this respect, Rousseau marks a complex breakthrough in the political traditions of Hellenism which were, for much of European history until the eighteenth century, anti-democratic and pro-Spartan.

Turning to the examples of Demosthenes and Alexander, **Luciano Canfora** closes this section by looking at the ideological uses of Hellenism not only in the general sense of the word but also in Droysen's sense of *Hellenismus* (referring to the historical epoch that runs from Alexander the Great to Augustus, now loosely termed the 'Hellenistic era' in English). As Canfora shows, the reviews of Werner Jaeger's study of Demosthenes were symptomatic of wider currents in the history of European thought and politics. Thus, Jaeger's book was condemned by National Socialists and Fascists, who favoured Droysen's conception of a world historical figure, and who, therefore, strongly praised men such as Alexander the Great and Philip over Demosthenes and his 'dubious' politics. If the many examples that Canfora adduces indicate how powerfully alluring ancient Greece has been, they leave open the question of what the ideologies of Hellenism might mean today, and what they might become in the future.

CHAPTER 1

HELLENISM AND MODERNITY

JAMES I. PORTER

Hellenism, as readers of this volume are doubtless discovering either for the first time or again, is a baggy, questionable idea that eludes definition. The reason for this has to do with the cluttered history of the term, which in turn derives from the fundamental problem that underlies all attempts, historically, to claim Hellenism and to convert it into cultural capital. For at bottom, Hellenism is an imaginary way of resolving an insoluble antagonism—the relation of (some) modernity to the ancient Greek past. That is, Hellenism is not a concept, nor is it a substantive thing. It is a *relation* between a particular past, itself differently imagined over time and therefore not very particular at all, and an ever-changing present, which is to say, the succession of modernities that emerge and then retreat from one historical conjuncture to the next. Because this relation is motivated either by feelings of beholdenness or of lying beyond, it is forever fraught with uncertainties and insecurities. What is more, the mere succession of moments along the chain is sufficient in itself either to subvert each new claim to a definitive hold on the past, or else to require suppression and forgetting for any given present to deal coherently with its relation to Greece.

The instability of Hellenism can be traced back to its earliest articulation in Greece (E. Hall 1989; J. M. Hall 1997, 2002). In effect, Hellenism names the ethnic and cultural identity of Greekness, an identity that can be expressed in 'common bloodlines, common language, altars to the gods and sacrifices shared in common, and common mores and habits'—so Herodotus (8.144.2), glossing *to Hellēnikon*, literally, 'the Greek thing', thus 'Greekness'. Language is the most obvious symptom

of Greekness, whence the unintelligibility of non-Greeks (*barbarismos*). Ancient linguistic study (grammar and criticism) was essentially defined as an instrument of Greek identity from its first beginnings. Theagenes of Rhegium, the shadowy figure from the late sixth century who experimented in allegorical defences of Homer, was said to have been the first to develop a theory of Greekness in language (*hellēnismos*), though the term is first attested in Theophrastus. By extension *hellēnismos* came to mean the assertion or adoption of Greek mores. Metalinguistic analysis in Greek antiquity was thus inseparable from questions of national Greek identity and its preservation through the policing of *hellēnismos*. The trouble is that the complex nature of Greek dialects and usages, and the competitive nature of Greek scholarship, made settling on accepted norms of purity virtually impossible. The ancient scholarly literature we have is evidence of the unsettled nature of the question, rather than its agreed-upon normative assertion. But this lack of consensus merely reflects the incoherence of any assertion of racial or cultural identity: it cannot help but appeal to non-provable criteria, to the *je ne sais quoi* that founds any fantasy of pure identity, its sublime object (Žižek 1989).

It is not by chance that the troubles surrounding the concept of Hellenism are mirrored by those that surround the concept of modernity, albeit differently. The baffling indeterminacy of the concept of *modernity* aside (see Jameson 2002), possibly its constitutive indeterminacy at least since Kant (Heller 2005), it is rare to find a definition of modernity from among the plethora of contenders that does not explicitly or implicitly set itself up against antiquity. And thanks to the dominant classicism of the very idea of antiquity in the West, *antiquity* comes to mean *Greek* antiquity in all its inestimable Greekness, while Hellenocentrism effectively translates into Athenocentrism, the focus on the achievements of classical Athens. This bias underlies the early modern *Querelle des anciens et des modernes*, which merely reenacted with greater vigour all earlier such quarrels, from Cassiodorus around 500 CE (the first occurrence of the doublet, *antiqui* and *moderni*) to Bernard of Clairvaux in the twelfth century ('pygmies on the shoulders of giants') to Petrarch and Ficino in the early Italian Renaissance (see Jauss 1970). Plainly, the idea of Greece as a symptom of Hellenism and classicism is not your garden-variety fantasy, but one that has been multiplied and compounded by centuries and even millennia of overlaid reception. If the original Greek notion of *hellēnismos* was an elusive phantom, that of the moderns is a phantom that no longer resembles any original at all: it has been transmuted into a transhistorical ideal. Nietzsche put it well:

> One cannot understand our modern world unless one recognizes the immense influence that the purely fantastic has had on it. Reverence for classical antiquity,... that is, the only serious, unselfserving, self-sacrificing reverence that antiquity has received to date, is a monumental example of quixoticism: and that is what philology is at its best... One imitates

something that is purely chimerical, and chases after a wonderland that never existed. The same impulse [to veneration] runs through classical antiquity: the way in which the Homeric heroes were copied, the entire traffic with myth has something of this [impulse]. Gradually, the whole of ancient Greece was made into an object worthy of Don Quixote.

(1988: vii. 7(1))

Hellenism might be called a weak concept. Not only is it a fragile thing, owing to its tenuous hold on anything that one might wish to call a reality. It is also premised on an inherited perspective that no amount of disclaimers can disavow. It is no small irony that the classical idea of Hellenism is a calque on the usage of post-classical authors—from Isocrates and Demosthenes to the Roman Greeks of the so-called Second Sophistic era, and beyond—all of whom looked up to the memory of a deceased Athens with religious awe, or at least affected this stance. Subsequent partisans of the Hellenic ideal inherited this stance, while self-proclaimed modernists could at best resist it. Hellenism is thus a retrospective category: it refers to what once was, or never was, in the minds of later generations. Constituted *by* retrospection and for strategic deployment, it is burdened with more meaning than it can coherently hold.

In its modern acceptations, the word *Hellenism* has a strangely divided existence. According to the *OED*, the first usages in English, dating to the seventeenth century, mimicked the ancient Greek meanings in confining the term to language. Later usages, chiefly Victorian, shifted the application to Greek cultural characteristics, sometimes with reference to the post-classical spread of Greek culture under Alexander and his epigones, sometimes with reference to Greekness from Homer onward. Did Hellenism pick out a classical or a post-classical phenomenon? This split was already implanted in ancient consciousness, as we saw. In Germany, *Hellenismus* for the most part followed the linguistic model in designating post-classical Greece, what today is called the Hellenistic age, stretching from the death of Alexander in 332 BCE to the end of the first century BCE. But it was J. G. Droysen who first made Hellenism into a discrete, fully characterized historical entity and inserted it into modern consciousness, in his monumental work in three volumes, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* (1836–77). For all its claims to historicity, Droysen's Hellenism stands in a peculiar relation to modernity (see further Canfora in this volume).

His underlying conception is both Hegelian and Christianizing. Mapping Hellenism onto a universal history that was inherited from Herder and others, Droysen sees in Hellenism a paradoxical self-overcoming of pagan antiquity. Classical Greece prepared the ground for Alexander, who unified the disparate Greek tribes, drowning as they were in their own particularism, into a universal imperial power (*Macht*) under one umbrella language, culture, and political system, very much an ancient Napoleon. Henceforth Greece was 'lifted above the confines of the local and familiar (*die Heimatlichkeit*) into a general, world-encompassing power' (Droysen 1998:

iii. 20). A fusion of East and West occurred, albeit under the auspices of the Greek West; syncretism in religion paralleled the blending together of cultures and races; and a new era was heralded: 'The name of Alexander signals the end of one world epoch, and the beginning of a new one' (ibid. i. 1). This new world, a *neue Zeit*, was not merely 'the modern age of pagan antiquity' (ibid. iii. pp. xvii, xxii). It was the dawn of the *modern* world, the current *Neuzeit* (cf. ibid. pp. xx, 416–17; Droysen 1893–4: ii. 70; Koselleck 1985: 3–5, 231–66). Droysen's point would prove influential, from Nietzsche (see below) to the Greek historian Eduard Meyer (the Hellenistic era 'was in essence completely modern', 1924: i. 89; cf. 140–2) to Heidegger ('[what] we call the modern age... is founded on the event of the Romanizing [viz., Hellenizing] of Greece', 1992: 43), but the analogy was basic to modern philology from the start. F. A. Wolf (1759–1824), for example, recognized in the Hellenistic scholars the modern philologist's, and his own, kith and kin. And the same analogy is already found in Wolf's teacher, C. G. Heyne, in his own study of the age of the Ptolemies (cf. 1785: 117 n.).

Usually understood as having 'invented', historiographically, the decidedly unclassical and much-spurned Hellenistic period, Droysen was in fact rewriting the mission of the classical ideal (cf. Droysen 1998: iii. pp. xiii–xxii, 413–15; see Kassel 1987). The age of Alexander was a continuation by other means of the Athenian revolution, which had launched Hellenism: 'thoughts of the new [sc. modern] age (*die neue Zeit*) spread everywhere, radiating out [from Athens] irresistibly; democracy, enlightenment, the doctrine of critique all begin to dominate Hellenic life', much like the French Revolution, but by the same token eating away at the foundations of traditional life (Droysen 1998: i. 9). Polis-based citizenship gave way to cosmopolitanism. Religious beliefs weakened, and then found a higher, more abstract, and universalizing realization. Political structures went the same way, converging now in a single sovereign, a Hellenized barbarian. The result was inevitable: 'If destroying paganism was the highest task of the ancient world, just so did Greece (*Griechentum*) first dig the ground out from under its own feet, the very ground in which it took root, in order next, having colonized the barbarians through the actions of enlightening, fermenting, and undermining, to bring about the very same thing over there' (ibid. iii. 18). Hellenism is the spirit of Greece serving a new global mission.

One consequence of Droysen's rehabilitation of Hellenism is that the concept became a *chiffre* for a historical process, encompassing both Greekness *and* its *Aufhebung* (destruction *and* sublimation), and pointing straight to the Christian and Prussian present (ibid. iii. 424). In Droysen's wake, scholars even now are disputing the word, uncertain as to its meaning, its coherence, and its reach in space and time (see Gehrke's *Nachwort*, ibid. iii. 473; Bichler 1983; Momigliano 1994*b*: 147). No less significantly, Droysen's vision of Hellenism as 'a mirror of the present' (in Droysen 1833: 472), his projection of the (Prussian) present onto the antique past, helped to codify and legitimize a tendency that was in evidence before him but

which now became more or less explicit. It may be that the past can be understood in no other way. The extent of this identification can, however, be unconscious, or simply disavowed.

Disguised by the ideologies of imitation and exemplarity, changing conceptions of the Greeks mirrored the changing dilemmas of being modern. Of particular interest on both sides of the English Channel are the ways in which the Hellenic past stages modern ethnic, racial, religious, and political conflicts. Droysen's Alexander is transparently a figure of Napoleon, spreading Enlightenment in the world, and of a future unifier of the disparate, federated Germany of Droysen's present. K. O. Müller had likewise projected Prussian politics onto his view of the proto-Aryan Dorians in 1824 (see Momigliano 1994*a*: 307). His pupil E. Curtius expressed an ambivalence towards Prussian centralization in his scholarly parable 'Der Wettkampf' ('The Contest', 1875), which both Burckhardt and Nietzsche later adored. A Romanticization, darkening, or, in Schiller's terms, 'sentimentalization' of the Greeks helped facilitate such identifications across the abysses of time.

One of the finer threads running through Droysen's *Geschichte* is the role of the Jews as a 'vanishing mediator' (Jameson 1973) in the multiform Hellenistic era, caught as they were between paganism and Christianity. Their religion, with its abstraction of the divine and its centralization in a monotheistic entity, makes for a perfect model of the Hellenization process—only, it does so in the wrong place. Consequently, the Jews must be 'broken' in their 'ethnic force' and assimilated in the relentless forward march of Hellenic civilization towards the promised land of modernity (Droysen 1998: iii. 424). Momigliano, in a brilliant essay from 1970 (Momigliano 1994*b*), notes how Droysen abandoned his project on Hellenism (the study breaks off at 221/20 BCE), stumbling, in all likelihood, on the Jewish question (and on his own suppressed Jewish heritage), which would have 'meant a radical revision of the original conception'. But it is not at all clear that further analysis of the Hellenistic Jews would have led to anything other than what is already accommodated in Droysen's original conception, namely their erasure by assimilation. Here, Droysen shows himself to be loyal to the modern classical tradition, which is founded on the exclusion of Jews. Greeks are not merely considered to be other than Jewish; they are conceived, as they were by Hegel and by other nineteenth-century scholars, as 'anti-Jews' and 'proto-Christian' (Leonard 2005: 152). Momigliano's more general point is sound, nevertheless: to treat of the Jewish question in its ancient form was (and doubtless still is) inescapably to confront it and all its dilemmas in the contemporary present.

This was as true in mid-Victorian England as it was in pre-Bismarckian Germany. Preparing to note the ambiguities of *Hellenism* in his study of St Paul, F. W. Farrar first defines one of the term's cognates after a fashion that had existed in Europe since J. Scaliger (with a basis in New Testament usage): 'It is to [the] Greek-speaking Jews that the term Hellenist mainly and properly refers' (Farrar 1902 : i. 125; cf.

126–30). Indeed, the 'antithesis' of *Greek*, he asserts, is either *barbarians* or *Jews*, or better yet, 'strict Hebrews' who have resisted Hellenization. All this transpires in a section entitled 'Hebraism and Hellenism', no doubt a nod, and possibly a corrective, to Matthew Arnold's influential essay, *Culture and Anarchy* (1869), which offers its own reading of St Paul, updated for the modern world (and reinforced in Arnold's next major work, *St Paul and Protestantism*, 1870). Where Farrar is content to introduce the Jews as 'a commercial people' (1902: i. 123), Arnold rescues Jewishness by putting it under the aegis of Hebraism, an attitude of mind that balances, and completes, Hellenism. In Arnold's hands, these two concepts barely contain historical content any longer. Instead, they are clichés of history enlisted now in a modern allegory about social class mores and cultural enrichment. A replacement for the faltering force of religion must be found by the dominant social classes in order to fend off the threats of cultural and moral anarchy, which are raging in the present. Arnold brews up a cure-all recipe: the moral rigour and 'strictness of conscience' of Hebraism (the best that the middle classes, steeped in Puritanical and capitalistic self-renunciation, have to offer) infused with the intellectualism and 'spontaneity of consciousness' of Hellenism (tempering the proud potency of the elite).

This is a shrewd pact with improbability. A hybrid of, as it were, Nietzsche's resentful, priestly slaves and his excessively healthy and overweening nobles could never come off. But a blander mix of selected and 'disciplined' traits from each might ('a kind of trinity of strength, sweetness, and light', which is Pauline yet secular—because it is *cultural*). Together, these two 'rivals dividing the empire of the world between them' can resist the degenerate tendencies of the Barbarians (the aloof aristocrats), the Philistines (the mercenary middling classes), and the Populace ('the vast residuum'), and thus bring about a sound new world order. The civilizing mission of Droysen's Hellenism, with its Christian *telos*, is recognizable here. But there is also something startling, if not altogether scary, about Arnold's analysis of contemporary British culture by means of racial profiling. On the other hand, Arnold makes a surprising move in awarding to Semitic Hebraism the traits of energy and action ('fire and strength') and to Indo-European Hellenism an aestheticized intellectualism ('sweetness and light', the 'spontaneous ... free play of thought'—it is virtually a Kantian disengaged mind smiling in the face of beauty). If racial theory is being deployed, its most pernicious aspects are at the same time being subverted—*eviscerated*, a strict Nietzschean would say. '*Pouvoir sans savoir est fort dangereux*', Arnold replies. Arnold's final concession to statism is on a par with Droysen's endorsement of centralized sovereignty.

Fortunately, Nietzsche was not a Nietzschean. His favourite gambit is likewise that of subtle subversion. But in Nietzsche's case this involves a subversion of his own apparent meaning. For Nietzsche, early and late, 'so-called "classical" antiquity' is in the first instance a reliable index of the modern mind, not of the ancient past. In his eyes, classical culture, and especially Hellenic culture, is the

manufacture of modern culture, a recent creation which is of the most insidious kind because it is the least conscious. Modernity actually *requires* the cultivation of antiquity for its own self-definition: only so can it mis-recognize itself in its own image of the past. As Nietzsche puts it in his first and scandalous book, *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), 'without myth every culture loses the healthy natural power of its creativity: only a horizon defined by myths completes and unifies a whole cultural movement' (§23). The myths in question here are those surrounding the Hellenic ideal, but also the very governing principles of *The Birth of Tragedy* itself. If Arnold's mythology of the present turns on the dialectic of Hellenism and Hebraism, Nietzsche's mythology of the present, at least in this early and influential incarnation of it, turns on the dialectic of what he calls the Apollonian and the Dionysian. The pairing—a patent calque on the classical and the romantic—is inherited from earlier German Romanticism, yet remains true to classicism, with Apollo's bright calm filtering Dionysus' dangerous and irrational ecstasy. Through this device, Nietzsche can invoke the Hellenism of Winckelmann, Humboldt, and Schiller, or else Hölderlin's engagement with the ancient and modern *Querelle*—and indeed an entire tradition of thinking that stretches from the Schlegel brothers to Franz Liszt.

Nietzsche's thesis in 1872 entails subscribing to the narrative of post-classical Greek decadence, but also reinscribing that decadence *within* the classical ideal, while privileging in its place its other polar opposite—not Droysen's belated Hellenism, which Nietzsche knows how to deploy in great detail (a neglected fact), but the prior, archaic world of Hesiod, the lyric poets, the Presocratics, and Aeschylus. A notebook entry from 1869/70 reads:

> The 'Hellenic' since Winckelmann: an intense superficialization [*Verflachung*]. Then the Christian-Germanic conceit that one was completely beyond it [viz., beyond antiquity in its classical form]. The age of Heraclitus, Empedocles, etc. was unknown. One had the image of a Roman, universal Hellenism, of Alexandrianism. Beauty and superficiality in league, indeed necessary! Scandalous theory! Judea! (1988: vii. 81)

The last unfortunate and possibly misleading expletive aside (see Porter 2000*a*: 280–3), the classical ideal is here being subsumed *under* the classicism of the post-classical age. The results are drastic. The image of a so-called classical Greece turns out to be no more than 'the image of a Roman, universal Hellenism, of Alexandrianism', the point being that the classical ideal, the myth of classical age, is the product of the post-classical era. (Cf. Droysen 1998: iii. 414–15, mocking the modern construction of the 'classical' era as an 'enthusiasm for the lovely conjuring tricks of one's own imagination [*Phantasie*]' and as a sheer 'unhistorical' idealization.) There is a good deal of truth in this counter-claim, as we saw (further, Porter 2006*b*), though it is hardly the whole story, as Nietzsche was well aware.

If the classical ideal is a product of the degenerate post-classical age (and, effectively, the threshold of the modern age, as Droysen had argued), then the

classical ideal is itself irreparably infected with degeneracy and with modernity, a troubling anachronism: it is the product of modernity's nostalgic yearnings for a purer past, and of a disavowal of the known contradictions within the very heart of the classical—its darker moods, its tyrannical acts of violence, its fixations with death, slavery, and the mysteries, and its innumerable incoherencies. All these traits of the classical were self-evident at the time (cf. Droysen 1998: iii. pp. xxi), but even more to the point, they were at once shunned and secretly sought after as an object of fascination. *The Birth of Tragedy* models this nostalgia, while catering, seductively, to all it would deny. What Nietzsche's work stages is thus a modern '*German* myth' (§23), namely the myth of Greece, which is shown by him to be one of the constitutive illusions of modern cultural life. And because none of the terms of Nietzsche's analysis is finally free of modern contamination, the whole of his conceit amounts, in the end, to a mythological critique of a modern myth about Greek antiquity.

How inescapable is this modern myth? Nietzsche leaves the question open, but others are less inclined to do so. Some, like Baudelaire, would seek to 'overcome' the Hellenic ideal by declaring themselves unrepentantly modern. But to do so is frequently to encounter the same ideal in a different form. Baudelaire's influential concept of *modernité*, tilted against the academic, Beaux-Arts vision of the past, is in fact structured very like the classical ideal: in it, 'the ephemeral, the fugitive, and the contingent' reveal an inner core of 'the eternal and the immutable' which looks back and ahead to its own 'antiquity' (Baudelaire 1995: 13; cf. Prettejohn 2005: 102–9). So, for example, 'dandyism', one of Baudelaire's figures of hypermodernity, turns out to be 'of great antiquity, Caesar, Catiline and Alcibiades providing us with dazzling examples' (1995: 26). For Baudelaire, antiquity made vivid becomes an instance of modernity, one that can be *experienced* again, while the present aspires to the condition of the transfigured past.

Whether turning away from antiquity or hearkening back to it, exponents of modernity took ancient Greece as a benchmark by which to measure their age. At the end of the eighteenth century Hellenism in Europe was a way of revolting against, but also a way of accommodating, the values of Christianity, in addition making new claims about class, national identity, sexuality, and Enlightenment values, above all freedom and autonomy (Cassirer 1951; Hatfield 1964; Potts 1994). Cruder acquisitive and exploitative interests were a factor as well, given the economic attractions of the classical and its direct ties to market activity, not to mention the politics of symbolic control and domination as powerful motives in their own right. The desire to possess the ancient past, or rather parts of it ennobled as a kind of fetish, took any number of forms, from imaginary identification to the rise of the museum, organized around an Athenocentric ideal (Vickers 1987; Marchand 1996; Beard and Henderson 1995; Beard 2002; Porter 2007). This trend persisted in the next century even when neoclassicism, having become the new

orthodoxy and branded as humanistic and aesthetic, fell out of favour. Positivist historiography sought to create its objects from a loftier distance, opposing itself to the earlier faded humanism, and at the extreme seeking to banish the Hellenic ideal altogether. The model of Greece as the child of the adult civilization no longer prompted a nostalgic, if ambivalent, desire for a return to lost origins.

Speculative and political philosophy followed suit, seduced by the modern ideology of progress. Hegel saw Spirit marching forward past a discarded Greece. Marx, like Hegel, absorbed Aristotle's ethics, but capitalism was for him incomparable to the ancient economy, as it would later be for Weber. Modern alienation meant alienation from the past, from its mythologies, and from the very myth of a Golden Greece: 'What chance has Vulcan against Roberts & Co., Jupiter against the lightning-rod and Hermes against the Crédit Mobilier? All mythology overcomes and dominates and shapes the forces of nature in the imagination and by the imagination; it therefore vanishes with the advent of real mastery over them' (Marx 1993: 110). Disenchanted modernity had no time for the mystifications of ancient Greece.

This dialectic of Enlightenment led to a simultaneous critique and affirmation of the very principles of Enlightenment ideology, a kind of negation of the negation, in which Hellenism was again centrally located (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002). Even so, the attractions of Hellenism continued to haunt modernity, almost like a compulsion, its vast otherness serving as a promised land of untapped possibilities. Freud was unable to establish the modern split subject without first reproducing it in Oedipus (cf. Bowlby in this volume). Heidegger often seems to be *writing* in Greek, the language of purest authenticity, even if his tone and purpose have Christian overtones (Most 2002). But pure Greek for Heidegger means Greek prior to the era of Hellenization (Spanos 2001). His pupils, Gadamer and Arendt, revert to classical Greece as a font of modern secular humanism and virtue ethics. Foucault's critique of bourgeois subjectivity lands, eventually, in a retrieval of the Greek and Roman alternatives, though not without the admission that his version of the Enlightenment project, grounded in a Humboldtian aesthetics of the self and nineteenth-century views of Hellenism, is in fact a way of retrieving a *proto-Christian* morality (Foucault 1984: 254; see Porter 2005, 2006*a*).

The attractiveness of any return to the ancient Greeks in today's 'liquid' modernity (Bauman 2000) ought to give pause. If the protracted history of modernity's entanglement with Hellenism shows anything at all, it is how narrow, self-involved, and provincial this relationship has actually been. A 'provincializing' critique (Chakrabarty 2000) of modernity's Hellenism has only just begun (Lambropoulos 1993; Gourgouris 1996; Hamilakis 2007). Whether future modernities, in striving after self-definition, will find inspiration in the Hellenizing traditions of the West or will reject them out of hand, remains to be seen.

Suggested Reading

This chapter has focused mainly on German and British Hellenism, the two most formative traditions in modernity. For in-depth discussions of various aspects of these traditions, see Ruprecht (1996), McCarthy (1997), Morley (1999), Ferris (2000), Porter (2000*a* and *b*), Bassi and Euben (2003), and Armstrong (2005). For the recent French tradition, see Leonard (2005). The Italian perspective is treated in Momigliano's various writings (1955–90). For a more advanced look at the *Völkermischung*, or multiculturalism, of the Hellenistic age, see Momigliano (1975). In addition to Bravo's (1968) searching study of Droysen, there is Canfora (1987). For a general overview of 'modernity' from the medieval period through Baudelaire, see esp. Jauss (1970). For a varied treatment of classics and modernity, see Martindale and Thomas (2006).

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CHAPTER 2

INDIGENOUS HELLENISMS/ INDIGENOUS MODERNITIES

CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY, MATERIALITY, AND MODERN GREEK SOCIETY

YANNIS HAMILAKIS

WHAT does it mean to live in a country that is at the same time symbolically at the centre of the western imagination and at the margins of the current geopolitical nexus? To be asked to carry the immense symbolic weight of the classical tradition, while being a modern, western European nation-state? To be subjected to constant surveillance on whether you have performed your duties as a worthy steward of the material classical past, and to various tests on whether you are a true descendant of Pericles or a 'bastardized' mix of Slavic and Ottoman cultures? To have to become the object of the patronizing epithet 'Philhellenism', as if you were a rare species in need of protection? To be the only country in the world that needs the prefix 'modern' in front of its name? To have to deal with both Orientalism, and its local and peculiar variant, Balkanism (Todorova 1997)? Welcome to Greece!

If the other chapters in this section deal with the Hellenism in the western sense, in this chapter I will attempt to briefly highlight an alternative Hellenism, *indigenous Hellenism* (in its various forms) as performed by intellectuals and state bureaucrats, politicians and citizens, poets and ordinary people, in Greece since the nineteenth century. In other words, I will deal with the reception, management, and recasting of the classical heritage by those people who, as the Nobel laureate poet Giorgos Seferis put it in *Mythistorima*, 'woke up with this marble head in [their] hands', a marble head that exhausts their elbows but which they do not know where to put down (Keeley and Sherrard 1981: 88). The evocation of the marble head is not accidental: my brief survey will place particular emphasis on the materiality of classical antiquity, its agency, and its embodied engagement with humans, through its physical and sensory qualities.

For people living in the southern end of the Balkan peninsula, classical antiquity was never purely an abstract entity, a concept that scholars and western travellers would evoke in their writings and travelogues. For them, it always was a material and physical presence, a visible and touchable reality, in the shape of ruined buildings, scattered objects, shattered fragments of pottery and stone; and in some cases, and more poignantly, in the shape of human bodies, either skeletons emerging out of the ground while ploughing the fields, or men and women made of marble or bronze, most naked, some with their heads or limbs missing, some complete, some so real and alive that you 'could see their veins', as Makrygiannis, the enigmatic nineteenth-century author and fighter of the Greek War of Independence put it (Vlahogiannis 1947: 63). For them, these were the feats of people who were there before them, different from themselves, *other* people, not their ancestors, but still admirable in their abilities to construct large and elaborate buildings and works of immense beauty (Hamilakis 2003). In folk stories from the nineteenth century, tales that reflect local attitudes before the ideas of nationhood became widespread, these people were the *Hellenes*, and their time was the 'time of the Hellenes', *o Kairos ton Ellinon* (Kakridis 1989). But in other stories, it becomes clear that this time is not conceived of in terms of a linear chronological sequence, that is as time past, linked genealogically to their own time. Some of these Hellenes are still alive, and they often engage with contemporary people in contestations of physical strength. Times past and times present, therefore, seemed to coexist in the folk imagination, prior to the establishment of western modernist temporality and its chronometric devices. Moreover, in some of the descriptions of Hellenes in these stories, it becomes clear that the marble statues *themselves* are the Hellenes, not just the feats of past people. The statues had become entities with animate properties, human beings that even without heads could walk, and even without eyes (when marble statues were missing their painted eyes) could see. These stories, but also many other stories and practices involving antiquities (some recorded by travellers), such as those that attribute emotive reactions to ancient, especially anthropomorphic objects, and the practice of reusing ancient architectural parts and objects such

as reliefs and inscriptions in contemporary buildings, be it churches or houses (the tradition of *spolia*), often in places of prominence, such as the outer walls of churches or above the entrances of houses, speak of an intimate relation with the material past (Papalexandrou 2003). This is an *alternative indigenous archaeology*, involving practices of recovery, care, exhibition (in houses and churches and other places of worship, *not* museums), interpretation; an archaeology that also included 'destruction' (when using marbles as raw material to produce lime, for example), or rather reincorporation into the web of daily life; an archaeology based on a non-western conception of temporality and materiality, although the increasing number of western travellers to Greece who were seeking antiquities, especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the impact of western Hellenism through the work of local intellectuals, would have, no doubt, influenced and shaped this native archaeology.

Yet, things were destined to change, as Greece was incorporated into the western European world-system. The nation-state of Greece was founded at the intersection of a number of historical contingencies. Since the mid-fifteenth century CE, the area we now call Greece was under the Ottoman Empire, composed of many ethnic and religious groups which were organized on the basis of the *millet*: the system whereby the basic form of identification was religion, not language, and certainly not any national or even ethnic self-identification. The Greek language, however, enjoyed a privileged position, partly because it was the language of the Gospels, partly because it was the lingua franca for many administrators, but also because it became the language of the new social class which emerged in south-eastern Europe from the seventeenth century and whose economic base was trade and seafaring, rather than the land. In the Babel of languages, religions, and ethnic groups of the Balkans at the time, Greek provided a convenient medium of communication for the physically mobile and upward moving new social classes (Stoianovich 1960; Roudometof 1998). Christian Orthodox people belonged to the *millet-i Rum*, and progressively, Greek became the dominant means of communication amongst the members of the *millet*, who were called by others and were calling themselves *Romioi*. Interestingly, the term 'Hellene' still signified for most people the pagan classical tradition, and it was a term that especially the clergy was keen to eliminate. Certain evocations of the term 'Hellene' by Byzantine scholars (e.g. in the twelfth century) contained some elements of contemporary ethnic identification, but it never acquired widespread currency, it 'never really "caught" on' (Beaton 2007: 93).

The Hellenes were destined to become ancestors in the decades prior to the Greek War of Independence, through the concentrated effort of the Greek-speaking merchants and scholars who were educated in the West or were involved in trade and financial transactions with western countries, and of western Hellenists and travellers, combined with the political desires of European powers to expand their zone of influence into the territories of the Ottoman Empire. The Greek speaking merchant-intellectuals (and the roles were often combined, as for example

in Adamandios Koraïs, the most prominent intellectual of what would come to be called the Greek Enlightenment: Dimaras 1977; Jeffreys 1985; Clogg 2003) came into contact with western Hellenism and started identifying themselves as Hellenes, the direct descendants of ancient Greeks, so admired by the western intellectual and political elites. These Greeks imported into the area of present-day Greece, together with trade goods and financial capital, the symbolic capital of Hellenism, and dreamed of the new imagined community of the Hellenic Nation as the resurrected Hellas of classical times. In translating ancient Greek authors, in naming their merchant ships with ancient Greek names, in training teachers who would teach pupils their true destiny, and in baptizing children with ancient Greek names (Politis 1993), they forged a future for the area: a future of a national state, a community based on ethnic self-identification and on ancestral glory, a homogenized national community, in place of the multi-ethnic and multilingual communities structured around religious faith. The fighters of the War of Independence now started calling themselves Hellenes, rather than *Romioi*.

While prior to the foundation of the nation-state the Hellenic homeland was imagined in diverse ways, with some focusing on Herderian biological and cultural allegiance and continuity with ancient Greece, and some on a Rousseauian, more inclusive self-ascription and self-definition, a republic that would include various ethnic groups and religions (as, for example, in the declaration of an unrealized 'Hellenic Republic' by Rigas Velestinlis, a 'canonized' national hero, published in Vienna in 1797; Beaton 2007: 82)—it was the first version that would dominate in the period from the nineteenth century to the present. While early national intellectuals would often evoke ancient Athenian democracy and its ideals, the new state, apart from a brief interlude of a few years, would become a kingdom, with a Bavarian king, Otto I, imposed upon it by western European powers. He would bring with him an entourage of Bavarian diplomats and intellectuals who would establish the modernist structures of the new state, from a legal framework, to education, and, interestingly for the present discussion, structures for the management of the material classical past: the first Ephor of antiquities and the first university professor of archaeology was Ludwig Ross, the first systematic archaeological legislation was drafted by a member of the regency, Georg Ludwig von Maurer (Petrakos 1982, 1987), and the person who came up with the idea of transforming the Athenian Acropolis from a military fortress into an archaeological site and monument was Leo von Klenze, the Bavarian architect who was responsible for many neoclassical buildings in Munich (Papageorgiou-Venetas 2001).

The material manifestations of classical antiquity were, even before the War of Independence, at the centre of attention for national intellectuals, and measures to declare them national property and subject them to the jurisdiction of and protection by the state were taken while the war was still raging (Hamilakis 2007). Literary and historical references may have provided the initial impetus that attracted

westerners to Greece, and may have formed the basis of the symbolic capital upon which the nation-state was founded, but it was the material traces of that classical heritage that would prove crucial. These material remnants of the 'golden age' provided a direct, physical, visible, and touchable proof of continuity between past and present, they linked contemporary people with the earth and territory. It is no coincidence that in the first years of the state the material objects that received most attention were stone inscriptions from classical times (Voutsaki 2003). The Greek language, a form of which was still spoken by many, was of course seen as a direct link with the classical past, but stone inscriptions acquired such importance because they combined the symbolic power of the language with the physicality of the medium, a medium that could be seen and touched, and one which evoked permanence and eternity; put in another way, they were the sacred words of illustrious ancestors, cast in stone.

So classical antiquity, especially through its material manifestations, became a sacred entity. This was a process of sacralization that was the result of many and diverse factors: western travellers and intellectuals often evoked the sacredness of classical antiquity; national fighters, intellectuals, and politicians likewise would call classical antiquities sacred, partly as a result of this western discourse, and partly as a result of antiquities' national role; after all, national imagination often acquires sacred connotations and properties, and various national projects with their emphasis on sacrifice, destiny, and eternity, rework and reshape pre-existing religious beliefs and ideas (Anderson 1991: 10–12; van der Veer and Lehmann 1999; see Hamilakis 2007: 84–5, and Hamilakis and Yalouri 1999 for more references). In the Greek case, an additional factor was the role of Greek Orthodoxy in the national process. While originally against the War of Independence and the ideas of national liberation, the Church in Greece, after acquiring autocephaly in 1833 (signifying its autonomy from the Patriarchate at Istanbul), was incorporated into the national project, thus helping to fuse the ideas of national imagination with the ideas of Greek Orthodoxy through a complex process of religious syncretism (Kitromilides 1989, Matalas 2002): the 'resurrection' followed the 'fall', both in Christian *and* in national doctrine. Folklorists (specialists of *Laographia*, a field of study which, together with archaeology and national history, helped create the intellectual and material foundations of the Greek national imagination; Herzfeld 1982; Kyriakidou-Nestoros 1978; Politis 1993) would engage in attempts to find 'survivals' of ancient tradition in the lives and lore of pure folk, and to establish links between ancient ritual practices and cult localities, and modern religious rites and places of worship, so bypassing the fundamental differences between ancient religion and modern Greek Orthodoxy (Stewart 1994).

Archaeology was one of the first institutions of western modernity to be firmly established. Once it was, it did not simply manage a pre-existing archaeological past, it created one, the national archaeological record as the materialization of

national imagination based on classical antiquity. This process of creation involved a series of practices: practices of demolition, which I prefer to call practices of ritual purification: the removal of all the matter that was deemed out of place, such as all the non-classical buildings of the Athenian Acropolis, for example, a process that was initiated by Leo von Klenze and continued by several Greek archaeologists (Mallouhou-Tufano 1998; Hamilakis 2001, 2007); practices of rebuilding and re-creation, by attempting to reconstruct a number of classical buildings, especially temples, and restore them to their supposed original state in the fifth century BCE; practices of demarcation, by fencing-off sites and thereby divorcing them from the fabric of daily life; and practices of exhibition, by framing buildings and objects as exhibits to be admired primarily through vision, in specially assigned monumental sites and in museums. The most sacred icon of the secular religion of the nation, the Athenian Acropolis, was transformed into a monumentalized landscape, a landscape of oblivion, a locale where re-created classical glory obliterated all other phases of its life, be it medieval, Ottoman, or other. The emphasis in the first decades of the state was primarily on classical antiquity, very narrowly defined (the Athenian fifth century), whereas other phases were seen as belonging to the dark stages of conquest and barbarity, starting with the ancient Macedonians and continuing with the Romans, and even the Byzantines, whose theocratic state was seen as against the democratic ideals of classical antiquity, and as responsible for the death of classical civilization (cf. papers in Ricks and Magdalino 1998). This sacralization of both the national project and of the national material classical past, however, had significant social-political effects, and not only in the way material antiquities were treated: most importantly, the new nation became a nation apart, an entity out of time, not an outcome of social, economic, and political contingencies that were under way in many parts of Europe at the time, but rather a resurrection of an ahistorical entity, Hellas, which was awaking from its centuries-long sleep (Skopetea 1988). Social critique and political struggles, present throughout, were thus masked and neutralized within this discourse of national sacralization.

By the first decades of the nineteenth century, therefore, the classical past had been transformed from an otherness into selfhood, and was placed at the centre of the national psyche. The awe and admiration felt by many ordinary people towards material antiquities had been now transformed into ancestor worship. But it was a transformation that was less radical than it seems. While the modernist national discourse brought about a fundamental change by establishing a genealogical link between classical Hellenes and contemporary Greeks, and by instituting new ways of managing and exhibiting the material past, pre-modern attitudes towards antiquities were incorporated into this new framework: ancient classical things would still maintain their agency and power, not simply as national objects but as fellow national subjects, and, as before the establishment of the nation-state, they would be invested with emotive properties and human feelings. The example

of the caryatids from the Erechtheion on the Acropolis is a case in point: these statues are often described as mourning for the 'abduction' of their 'sister' by Lord Elgin, an official and popular discursive topos that is still alive and evocatively powerful, more than 200 years later (cf. Hamilakis 2007 for examples). Thus, since the nineteenth century, many or most people in Greece view classical heritage with a sense of dual responsibility: a responsibility towards ancient Greeks to prove worthy of them (implicit comparisons with ancient Greece abound in the media), and a responsibility towards western Europeans to prove worthy managers and true descendants of ancient Greeks, an aspiration that western Europe often treated with ambivalence.

Modern Greece was thus founded at the intersection of the two powerful processes of western modernity, colonialism and nationalism, as a peculiar inheritor of the classical heritage. This was not simply an ideological colonization, that is, the imposition upon that part of the Ottoman Empire of the ideas of the nation, and of the idealization of the classical heritage, as the ideological cornerstone of the western imagination. It was also a material and political colonization, as evidenced in the imposition upon Greece of political leaders, of institutions, of legal frameworks, of modernist European apparatuses. Material classical antiquities were at the centre of this process, not simply as the objects of desire that brought western travellers to Greece in the first place (the hold that things have on people, which is at the basis of colonialism; cf. Gosden 2004), but also as the physical and material truths, the facts on the ground for the national imagination, the landmarks in the topographic dream of the nation (Gourgouris 1996; Leontis 1995). Classical ruins and the nation were involved in a process of mutual constitution: they helped shape the nation but at the same time they were shaped by it, becoming a purified and re-created national material record through the modernist device of archaeology, which has now replaced local, indigenous archaeologies. But this ongoing process was and still is one of hybrid modernity, whereby objects and artefacts are not simply the inanimate entities that prove the truth of the nation, but animate and emotive beings, members of the national body, often in pain, as the exiled and imprisoned Parthenon marbles in the British Museum (Hamilakis 1999, and 2007: ch. 7). As was shown above, this process of hybridity characterized the whole Greek national project, not simply the attitudes towards antiquities. In Greece, therefore, and contrary to the statements of some commentators (e.g. Anderson 1991), nationalism did not replace pre-existing cultural systems, but it was grafted onto them.

If western Hellenism was crucial in shaping the modern Hellenic nation at the end of the eighteenth and during the first decades of the nineteenth century, it was indigenous Hellenism that triumphed from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards. The impetus for the radical transformation and reshaping of the national narrative was given by the Austrian scholar and diplomat Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer, who in 1830 claimed that there was no genetic or cultural allegiance

between ancient and modern Greeks, whom he saw as more linked to the Slavic populations that had occupied Greece in the Middle Ages (Thurnher 1993; and Veloudis 1982, Skopetea 1997 on the reception of his work in Greece). His claim, the target of which was German classicists more than modern Greeks (Skopetea 1997: 17), caused a stir in Greece and engaged national intellectuals in a ferocious battle. Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, who would become known as the national historian par excellence (Dimaras 1986; Kitromilides 1998), was at the forefront of this battle. In a series of publications, and mainly in his monumental *History of the Hellenic Nation* (published between 1860 and 1874), he would respond by emphasizing the cultural, *not* the biological, ties with ancient Greeks, focusing on what he saw as the ability of indigenous Hellenism (*Ellinismos*) to absorb and transform foreign elements. A by-product of the Fallmerayer affair was the invention of a scheme that bridged the chronological gap between classical and modern Greeks, by inventing multiple Hellenisms: in addition to the ancient, there were Macedonian, medieval, and modern Hellenisms. In this way, the ancient Macedonians and Byzantines, seen until recently by Greek intellectuals as arch-enemies of Hellenism, became an integral part of the national narrative and continuity. This change helped fuse further classical antiquity and Orthodox Christianity through Byzantium, a fusion that would be expressed in 1852 with the term *ellinohristianikos* proposed by S. Zambelios, another key protagonist in this bridging project. National narrative is thus emancipated, producing a home-made synthesis which dominates to the present day.

It will have been obvious that a key factor in the bridging process described above was the appropriation and modification of Droysen's *Geschichte des Hellenismus* (Sigalas 2001; Koumbourlis 1998), which was translated into Greek in 1897, under the influence of Paparrigopoulos, and with the revealing title: *History of Macedonian Hellenism* (Sigalas 2001: 32). Droysen offered to Greek national intellectuals of the mid-nineteenth century not simply the opportunity to rehabilitate ancient Macedonian Hellenism, but much more: the idealization of an expansionist imperialist regime, at a time when Greece was under the irredentist dream of the 'Great Idea'; the adoption of a concept of spiritual (Hegelian) rather than racial continuity; a multitude of essentially similar Hellenisms; and last but not least, the belief in the absorbing power of Hellenism, its civilizing mission, and ability to culturally transform and incorporate other cultural influences. Since then, this indigenous Hellenism, *ellinismos*, would be closely associated with *exellinismos*, the Hellenization, through language and culture, of all 'foreign' elements.

Since the mid-nineteenth century this reshaped national narrative underwent various modifications and reworkings: for example, the Mycenaean material past, which achieved prominence in the late nineteenth century, added historical depth to ancient Hellenism, especially when in the 1950s the deciphered Linear B script proved to be an early form of Greek; or, in the 1970s, the discoveries at Vergina in Greek Macedonia by Manolis Andronikos led to the further valorization of the

ancient Macedonian past and the glorification of its materiality (Hamilakis 2007: ch. 4). But the basic outlines of the national narrative remained more or less stable. Cultural continuity with the ancient Hellenic past was never seriously challenged, even by the 'others' of the nation, such as the persecuted leftists and communists of the pre-war and post-war years (Hamilakis 2007: chs. 5 and 6). The absorbing power of indigenous Hellenism was put into practice in the forceful Hellenization of ethnic minorities, especially in Greek Macedonia, following the resettlement there of Asia Minor refugees after 1922 (Danforth 1995; Karakasidou 1997; Kostopoulos 2002; papers in Mackridge and Yannakakis 1997). The symbolic capital of classical antiquity would often operate as an authoritative resource in legitimating authority and political roles, mostly by autocratic regimes and governments, but it would also serve anti-authoritarian agendas of subordinate groups. The supreme moral authority of classical antiquity often acquired the surveillance properties of panopticism: 'Your ancestors are watching you', politicians and intellectuals would declare, especially to dissidents. It is thus tempting to see the most important material signifier of this moral authority, the Athenian Acropolis, as the tower of the all-seeing but unseen guard in this panoptic scheme (Doxiadis 1995; Hamilakis 2007: ch. 6).

At certain historical moments, some groups would project an alternative version of this indigenous Hellenism, as for example in the leftist discourse of *Romiosyni* (most famously championed by the poet Yannis Ritsos and the composer Mikis Theodorakis; cf. Leontis 1995), an anti-western discourse aimed at critiquing the right-wing deployment of indigenous Hellenism. But more often than not these challenges were and are taking place inside the parameters of the national discourse rather than outside it, and dissidents would often critique the management and mismanagement of the symbolic capital of classical antiquity rather than its basic premises (Hamilakis 2007). Modern Greek society continues to deploy the ancient Greek past in many and diverse ways, from staging modern performances of ancient dramas to disseminating widely translations of ancient Greek authors—which are often given away with newspapers—to finding inspiration for jewellery design, and discovering what is thought to be ancient Greek culinary delights (as in the chain of restaurants called 'Tastes of the Ancients'). Other, more peripheral readings of indigenous Hellenism either come close to the original Droysenian meaning (cf. Canfora in this volume), as for example when it is used to describe diasporic Greeks (called *Apodimos Ellinismos*), or they take a neo-pagan character and call for the worshipping of Olympian gods. At the same time, Greek society continues to grapple with the tensions, paradoxes, ambiguities, and ironies arising from this relationship, as for example in the fact that classical heritage functions as both national and 'global' (i.e. western) heritage, or the fact that its material objects will have to continue being both sacralized and commodified: continue being the sacred relics of ancestors while at the same time being employed as commodities in the global cultural economy, from archaeo-tourism to advertising. As for the colonial

undertones of the relationship between Greece and classical heritage, they remain largely unacknowledged, turning Greece into a crypto-colony (Herzfeld 2002). The narrative of continuity is still going strong and finds support both on the Right and on the Left, as recent debates have shown (e.g. Beaton 2007; Hamilakis 2007). Several voices, however, working primarily within a post-colonial framework, and coming largely from the intellectual diaspora, have attempted to redefine the Neo-hellenic, focusing more on its hybridity and ambivalence (Tziovas 2001; cf. Lambropoulos 2001). At the same time, Greece, due to recent immigration from the Balkans, Asia, and Africa, is fast becoming again a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multicultural country. Is this diversity and plurality going to challenge the official national discourse on Hellenism? It remains to be seen. In any case, I hope to have shown that contemporary Greece offers a unique and fascinating case in studying a diverse range of important topics such as: the various local configurations of Hellenism; a peculiar form of colonization; the fates of western modernity in the periphery and its reshaping into alternative modernities which often include the pre-modern; and the multifaceted entanglement of materiality with national imagination.

Suggested Reading

On the broader issues of the role of the ancient past in Greek society, see the papers in aa. vv. (2004); on the 'Minoan' past, Hamilakis and Momigliano (2006) and on the Aegean prehistoric past, Darcque, Fotiadis, and Polychronopoulou (2006). On the role of the past in general, Brown and Hamilakis (2003). On the creation of the monumental landscape of the Athenian Acropolis and of Athens more broadly, see, in addition to Mallouhou-Tufano (1998), Tournikiotis (1994), Bastéa (2000), and Beard (2002). On anthropological discussions of classical heritage in Greece, see Herzfeld (1982) and (1987), and in relation to the Athenian Acropolis in particular, Kaphtantzoglou (2001) and Yalouri (2001). On literary discussions of Hellenism, especially from a post-colonial perspective, see Leontis (1995), Gourgouris (1996), and Calotychos (2003).

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CHAPTER 3

NEAR EASTERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE GREEKS

ROBERT ROLLINGER

3.1. TERMINOLOGY

FROM the eighth century BCE, 'Greeks' are known to us from texts of the ancient Near East. There appears in Assyrian and Babylonian cuneiform sources, in addition to the place name Yaman (pronounced 'Yawan'), an ethnic name Yamanāya (pronounced 'Yawanāya') or Yamnāya (pronounced 'Yawnāya'), which does not refer to 'Greeks' in the modern sense but rather to a people from the far-removed Aegean region, where Greek-speaking elements are likely to have constituted an essential component (Rollinger 1997, 2001*b*, 2003, 2006*a*, *b*, *c*, 2007*a*).

It is evident that the ethnonym Yamanāya (Yamnāya) is connected linguistically with the 'Ionians' in Greek sources who appear for the first time in Homer, *Iliad* 13.685 (*c*.700 BCE). Scholars have discussed whether this single testimony might be a later interpolation; if it is, then the first attestation of the 'Ionians' would be in the *Homeric Hymns* (3.147), which may approximately be dated *c*.600 BCE (Rollinger 2007*a*). Be this as it may, in both Greek sources the 'Ionians' appear in a linguistically old form as 'Iaones' (originally pronounced 'Yawones'), which shows their close relationship to the terminology of the ancient Near East. (This terminology is still evident in recent languages of the Middle East; cf. e.g. the following translations: 'Greece' = Yunanistan (Turkish),

al-Yūnān (Arabic); 'Greek' = Yunanli (Turkish), Yūnānī (Arabic).) But this relationship on a linguistic level does not imply that the meaning of these terms was totally congruent. It is difficult to determine exactly what was meant by these 'Iaones' and where they should be located. The conception of the 'Ionians' as related to a Greek tribe of the Aegean and Western Asia connected with a specific form of Greek dialect seems to be a late development that clearly evolves from the fifth century BCE onwards (Rollinger 2007*a*). So we should bear in mind that these terms were not static, but developed and changed. This can be demonstrated within the Near Eastern texts where the conception of the Yamanāya (Yamnāya) was a quite dynamic one. We can clearly distinguish between three phases of evidence: the Assyrian Empire (750–612 BCE), the Neo-Babylonian and Early Persian Empire (612–520 BCE), and the Achaemenid Empire (520–321 BCE). With Alexander, the cuneiform documentation does not come to an end but 'Greeks' (and Macedonians) cease to be classified as foreigners (Joannès 1997; Boiy 2004).

3.2. The Neo-Assyrian Empire (750–612 BCE): 'Greeks' as Westerners from Afar Acting as Marauders and Pirates

The attestations range from the time of the Assyrian king Tiglath-pileser III (744–727) to King Esarhaddon (680–669) (discussion of the evidence in detail: Rollinger 2001, 2006–7, 2008; see also Lanfranchi 1999). Most of them are Assyrian royal inscriptions written in a literary Babylonian dialect called 'standard Babylonian' and exhibiting specific ideological patterns. Only a few testimonia reflect a different context. One of them, the oldest one of all, is a letter written by an Assyrian official who is known as the author of other letters and who obviously carried out some official function in the areas of Tyre and Sidon to Tiglath-pileser III (744–727) around the year 730 (Rollinger 2001):

> To the king my lord,
> your servant Qurdi-Aššur-⌜lāmur:
> The Yamnāya have [a]ppear[ed].
> They have battled at the city of ⌜Sams⌝[imuruna?],
> at the city of Hārī ⌜sū⌝, and at the ci[ty of...].
> A ca[valryman] [c]ame to the city of ⌜Dana⌝[bu?] (to report this to me).
> I gathered up regular soldiers and conscripted men
> and went after them. Not anything

did they (the Yamnāya) carry away. As soon as they [sa]w
my soldiers they [fled] on their boats. In the midst of the sea
they [disappeared]. After my [...]
... ...
... at the harbour of the city of...
Just me (?), before I go up to...
The city of Danabu
I shall accomplish. The Itu'ayans
who are at my side and the Itu'ayans
who [are coming?] I shall settle therein.

It is obvious that the Yamnāya were treated as enemies by an official of the Assyrian Empire, and that they constituted a threat at least to the district of which Qurdi-Aššur-lāmur was in charge. It also seems pretty clear from the other letters of the official that this was somewhere near the Phoenician coast and at the fringes of the empire. The cities of Samsimuruna and Harīsū also belong to this geographical area (for a map see Parpola and Porter 2001: 8). The Yamnāya seem to have appeared suddenly and to have been fairly mobile. The letter gives only one clue to their origin. They came from the midst of the sea. This is the earliest instance of this terminology, which reappears later in the inscriptions of Sargon II (721–705) and Esarhaddon (680–669) as a familiar quotation. The Yamnāya do not look like unknown plunderers appearing for the first time in this area. Qurdi-Aššur-lāmur mentions the ethnonym like a well-known entity without further explanation, so he might already have had some experience with these people (Rollinger 2001).

In addition to the small set of archival documents, Yamnāya are mentioned in Assyrian royal inscriptions from Sargon II until Esarhaddon. The texts are very short but, notwithstanding minor variants, they present the same conception concerning these peoples. So Sargon says in one of his texts (Rollinger 2001):

(Sargon) experienced in battles who in the midst of the Sea as a fisher (does) caught the 'Ionians' like fish and provided peace for the land of Que and the city of Tyre.

And Esarhaddon boasts (Rollinger 2001):

All kings of the midst of the Sea, from the land of Cyprus (and) the land of Yaman to the land of Tarsisi, bowed down at my feet. I received [their] heavy tribute.

Yet, the above-mentioned inscriptions exhibit a completely different point of view than the letter of Qurdi-Aššur-lāmur. Whereas the latter is a report pointing to the emergence of a well-known enemy and to Assyrian counter-action, the Assyrian monarchs show, in self-praising style, how such a situation was definitively solved by a brilliant king. From an ideological point of view, it is quite interesting that the Yamnāya functioned in these inscriptions as a kind of marking point of the far west, showing the far-reaching geographical horizon of the king's enterprises. The added explanation—that these people come from 'the midst of the Sea'—picked

up an already existing tradition, as is shown by the letter discussed above, and integrated it into the royal ideology. So this designation should not be understood as an explanatory hint introducing a people who had been unknown until recently, but as a conscious choice of words demonstrating the admirable abilities of the king beyond any borders. These Yamnāya are explicitly connected with the sea and presented as seafarers living in the far west. From Que/Cilicia to Tyre/Phoenicia they threaten the local towns and villages, destroying and plundering. The annals stress that this is not a new phenomenon but has happened since 'faraway days'.

But there is another point of concern. The activities of the 'Greeks' seem not only to be limited to marauding and plundering, but their presence seems also to be restricted to the fringes of the Neo-Assyrian Empire. Yet we have to be aware that this perspective is primarily an ancient Near Eastern one, highly dependent on the ideology of the Assyrian kings, as has already been demonstrated. And indeed, we do have evidence that 'Greeks' were also present in the centres of the empire. An inscription of the Assyrian king Sennacherib (704–681) recounts comprehensively the events of his sixth campaign (694). In one episode, Yamnāya also seem to have played a role (Rollinger 2001, 2006–7):

> 'Hittites', plunder / of my bows I settled in Nineveh. Mighty ships / (after) the workmanship of their land they built dexterously. Sailors—Tyrians / Sidonians and Ya[m]nāya—, captives of my hand, I ordered / at the bank of the Tigris with them. Downstream to Opis / I had them shipped to disembark (there).

Sennacherib had Syrian (i.e. Hittite) craftsmen, who built seaworthy ships in Nineveh, and also used the skills and capabilities of 'westerners' manning these ships. Besides the Sidonians and Tyrians, Yamnāya fit very well into the context because it has been these people who had been known for their maritime skills since the days of Tiglath-pileser III. It is clear that the Greeks—as are the Sidonians and Tyrians—are designated as 'war booty' and that these people are chosen for their seafaring and military knowledge of the high seas.

This picture is further shaped by administrative texts from Nineveh. One of them mentions silver payments in connection with the queen mother. In a fragmentary context, there also appears one (or more?) Yamanāya (Fales and Postgate 1992: 56, no. 48, line 6). It is not clear what function this person (or persons) has, and it has been speculated that he (they) might have been a deportee, but the subject remains open for discussion (Rollinger 2001). The other text seems to mention bowls delivered as tribute from some western regions. Besides the land of Que (Cilicia), the town of Ekron, and the Moabites, the land Yaman (ia-man) is named in a fragmentary context (Fales and Postgate 1995: 31, no. 34, line 9).

Another attestation is probably the most important one, for it sheds light on contact between Greece and the ancient Near East in the first half of the seventh century BCE. An undated Assyrian letter, which has been dated for prosopographical

reasons to the time of Esarhaddon (680–669), refers to fifteen people who were sent from the governor of the city of Der (east of Babylonia and the river Tigris) to two Assyrian officials. These fifteen people are described as fugitives. Some of their names are mentioned, and one of them is called Addikritušu ([I]ad-di-ik-ri-tú-šú; rev. 2), who is obviously a Greek, Antikritos, and who probably originates from Cyprus (Rollinger and Korenjak 2001). We cannot exclude the possibility that he was a mercenary. If so, we must be aware that this kind of activity seems to have been a quite recent phenomenon and developed to high degree only in the decades to come. But what is even more important is the fact that for the first time we have the undoubted example of a Greek individual moving in the eastern parts of the Assyrian Empire in the first half of the seventh century. This means that the existence of Greeks in this time is not restricted to the western fringes of the empire, and we can suppose that at least some of them had seen parts of inner regions, including the capitals.

Finally, the annals of the Assyrian king Esarhaddon, reproduced without modification by his son and successor Ashurbanipal, offer a list of ten Cypriot vassal kings. The list dates from the year 673 BCE. Some of these kings have Phoenician names (Qish of Salamis, Damu-osh of Qart hadasht), but some are obviously Greek (Akestor of Idalion, Philagoras of Chytroi, Eteanthros of Paphos, Aretos of Soloi, Damasos of Kourion, Admetos of Tamassos, Onasagoras of Ledra, Bouthytes of Marion). Besides the aforementioned Antikritos, these are the earliest attestations for Greek personal names in cuneiform sources (Lipiński 1991).

3.3. The Neo-Babylonian and Early Persian Empires (612–520 BCE): 'Greeks' as People from the Aegean Acting as Traders (and Mercenaries)

The situation totally changes over the next 100 years. There is not a single royal inscription mentioning 'Greeks', and this is also true for the beginning of the Persian Empire under Cyrus the Great and Cambyses (from whose reign no Persian inscriptions have survived). But what we have is a relatively broad archival documentation. One group of texts belongs to the only surviving royal court archive of the Neo-Babylonian Empire. The other texts are private documents originating from different cities in Babylonia. Let us start with the royal archive.

The texts were excavated in the so-called 'Südburg' in Babylon, and were only published partly until now. A dossier of these documents dates from the thirteenth

year of Nebuchadnezzar II (592/3 BCE). It deals with monthly rations of sesame oil, and it is interesting to note that many of the receivers are foreigners (probably deportees or exiles). Some of them are Yamanāya, three of whom are mentioned by name. Yet the personal names are not Greek but point to a Luwian and Anatolian milieu. Though three names are not a representative sample, and though one should always be careful in equating the linguistic background of a personal name and the language (or even the identity) of the bearer of this name, the testimony may give us a hint that, from a Near Eastern perspective, non-Greeks with an Anatolian background may be included within the Yamanāya (Weidner 1939: 932–3; Brinkman 1989: 58 f.; Rollinger 2007*a*).

Many of the Yamanāya of this royal archive are obviously specialists. They are classified as carpenters and are organized in gangs of seven to eight persons. Some of them are employed in a dockyard, which reminds us of Sennacherib's inscriptions where 'Greeks' are working in the same fields. Others seem to have acted as official messengers or even diplomats; these would point to the first attested diplomatic contacts between the Babylonian court and Greek poleis in the West. The royal archive demonstrates in any case a multicultural varied milieu where 'Greeks' seemed to have played an important role (Pedersén 2005: 270 f., Rollinger 2006–7, 2007*a*).

The other type of source where Greeks appear is private documents. One document dating from the 2. Aiaru of Nebuchadnezzar's fourth year (29 April 601 BCE) deals with a consignment of $4^1/_2$ minas ($2^1/_4$ kilos) of 'blue-purple wool' from Yamān (Weisberg 1980: 253, Rollinger 2007*a*). A fairly similar picture emerges when we look at Ezekiel 27, where the trade network of the Phoenician city of Tyre is depicted. Mario Liverani has demonstrated convincingly that the historical context of this scenario belongs to the time between 612 and 585 BCE (Liverani 1991). Verse 7 tells us that blue-purple wool was imported from Elîshā, and in Genesis 10 this Elîshā is qualified (together with Tarshîsh, Kittîm, and Rōdānîm) as belonging to the 'sons of Yawān'. Two classical texts shed more light on this subject. The first one is a fragment of Democritus of Ephesus, who may have lived in the third century BCE. The author tells us that special garments coloured with blue purple were produced in Corinth (*FGrHist* 267 F 1 = Athenaeus 12.29, 525cd). Since these garments are obviously Persian ones, the historical context of this report belongs at least to Achaemenid times. Furthermore, Plutarch informs us that when Alexander conquered the Persian city of Susa he captured 5,000 talents of 'Hermionic purple, which was stored there for 190 years' (*Alexander* 36). This means not only that, at least from the second half of the sixth century BCE, there were cities in mainland Greece such as Hermione and Corinth where purple-coloured garments were produced, but that the 'Yamān' of the Neo-Babylonian sources also encompassed mainland Greece. In this respect, a Babylonian chronicle fragment, which informs us about an incursion into Egypt by Nebuchadnezzar in 568, gains significance. In this document, a place or region is called 'Pūtu-Yamān' (Edel 1978; Brinkman 1989:

60). Since this 'Pūtu-Yamān' designates Cyrene/Cyrenaica, the passage shows that from a Near Eastern perspective Yamān was primarily connected with the Aegean (Cyrene was colonized from Thera), for even colonies founded from there were designated as connected to the 'Yamanāya'. And it further demonstrates that the region classified as Yamān had grown in such a way that it had become necessary to distinguish between different regions of Yamān. 'Pūtu-Yamān' is the first attested example for such a differentiation, and is obviously related to a better knowledge of these areas in the far west (Rollinger 2007*a*).

Thus it can be demonstrated that by the sixth century BCE the Near Eastern view of the Yamanāya has changed considerably. We are not dealing any more with pirates and marauders originating from somewhere in the far west and threatening the shores of the Levant, but with persons with whom one has come into much closer contact. They are located in the Aegean, including the Greek mainland and western Anatolia, and are known to be present in the big cities of Syria and Mesopotamia as merchants and specialists. Not only purple-coloured garments are imported from these areas but also raw materials such as copper and iron. In two documents from the Babylonian city of Uruk, Yamān is mentioned as the region from where 295 minas of copper (about 147½ kilos) and 130 minas of iron (about 65 kilos) are imported (Dougherty 1920: 168 and Contenau 1927: 84; see Rollinger 2007*a*). Also, in this case, Ezekiel 27 offers a complementary picture: verse 13 testifies to trade connections with Tubal (Cappadocia), Meshekh (Phrygia), and Yawān. All three are held famous for the consignment of copper items and men (i.e. slaves). The trade with slaves recalls what Qurdi-Aššur-lāmur told Tiglath-pileser about the Yamanāya who seem to have spread terror by kidnapping and robbing. It is noteworthy that in *Odyssey* 15.427–9 exactly the same behaviour is told about the Greek Taphians. They are travelling in faraway countries and acting as robbers and kidnappers. In *Odyssey* 1.180–5 we receive more information about these Greeks. They trade in ore and iron—which means that Ezekiel, the Babylonian documents, and Homeric epic offer the same picture. Some Greeks have become a vital part of ancient Near Eastern societies, whether as traders or robbers, designations which are often just two sides of a single activity (Rollinger 2003, 2007*a*).

But there is one activity that we appear to miss in ancient Near Eastern sources. From Alcaeus we learn that his brother Antimenidas was a mercenary in the Babylonian army. And recent archaeology has excavated strongholds in Palestine such as Tell Kabri and Mezad Hashavyāhu where such mercenaries were stationed (Fantalkin 2001). Do the texts really say nothing about these activities? They do say something, probably. Recent excavations in the oasis of Tayma (Saudi Arabia), where the last Neo-Babylonian king Nabonidus (555–539 BCE) held court for ten years, not only unearthed the king's palace but also hundreds of graffiti of the soldiers and entourage of the Babylonian king (Hayajneh 2001). Though these texts are written in the early Arabic dialect called Taymanic, it is obvious that many persons are not Arabic at all. There are at least two names that may be Greek: one

is written in the form *'nds* which may be Endios/Enodios (or Oineides/Oiniades). This person was an 'overseer' (or 'bodyguard') of the Babylonian king. A second person of the same name is called 'servant' (or 'friend') of the king. Another person's name is *sktrsl*, son of *srtn*. *Sktrsl* is difficult to interpret, but *srtn* may be read as Sraton or Sroton, which is well attested for Straton or Stroton. *Sktrsl* belonged to the inner circles of the Babylonian higher commanders. If these people really prove to be Greeks, the documents of Tayma indicate that some of these westeners had a close relationship with the Babylonian king; they are also the earliest ancient Near Eastern documents to speak of Greek mercenaries in Babylonian service (Rollinger 2007*a*).

3.4. The Achaemenid Empire (520–321 BCE): 'Greeks' as Royal Subjects and Members of the Royal Bureaucracy

With Darius I, a new empire evolved which we call Achaemenid. Texts where 'Greeks' are mentioned are much more numerous than in earlier periods. First, there are royal inscriptions of Persian kings written not only in Babylonian but also in Elamite and Old Persian. Here the Old Persian forms Yauna and Yaunā as well as the Elamite Yauna and Yauna-ip correspond to the Babylonian Yaman and Yamanāya. There are nine inscriptions of Darius I, one of Xerxes I, and one of Artaxerxes III in which Greeks appear. All of these texts deal with the 'Greeks' as royal subjects who have to duly observe the king's command. These 'Greeks' were separated into different groups, thus further developing a conception which we first encountered in Neo-Babylonian times. We find Yaunā takabarā ('Greeks' *takabarā*), 'Greeks of the mainland', 'Greeks who (dwell) by the sea', and 'Greeks who (dwell) beyond the sea'. Since we cannot be absolutely sure to which sea these sources refer (the Aegean or the Marmara), it is still heavily disputed where these 'Greeks' should be located. But it is certain that the terms not only encompass the 'Greeks' of Western Asia but also some of the Aegean islands and probably also the Greek mainland (Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2001*a*, *b*; Klinkott 2001; Rollinger 2006*a*, *b*). The Yaunā takabarā are very difficult to understand, and for a long time, it was thought that these were 'Greeks' wearing a *petasos* (a wide-rimmed hat), and thus that that the terms designated Macedonians and Thessalians. But this view cannot be maintained anymore (Rollinger 2006*c*). Other significations may also include 'Greeks', though in a more neutral sense such as 'countries which (are) beyond the sea', 'the people who (dwell) by the sea', or 'countries which (are) by the sea'. But

this remains open for discussion. The inscriptions do not tell us anything about political affairs in connection with these 'Greeks'. The Persian wars are not mentioned explicitly in words. However, this would not be due to shame arising from a heavy defeat but due to a broader ideological framework. Political matters generally do not play a major role in Achaemenid royal inscriptions (with the exception of the famous Bisitun inscription that relates how Darius I ascended the Persian throne). Instead, the royal inscriptions exhibit a static and eternal world ruled by the Persian king who is favoured by his god Ahura Mazda (Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1999). The list of peoples in the inscriptions shows the extent of the realm and the great king's far-reaching power (Kuhrt 2002). This conception can be further developed.

On his tomb in Naqsh-i Rustam, Darius I presents himself on a throne platform, which is supported by thirty representatives of subject peoples from various locations (Schmidt 1970; Jacobs 2002). These bearers have been identified by means of trilingual inscriptions (Schmitt 1999, 2000). According to the trilingual captions, bearers no. 23 and no. 26 are referred to, in the Old Persian forms, as Yauna (23) and Yauna takabarā (26). This is the first time that a pictorial representation of 'Greeks' is given in a Near Eastern context. To this we may add a further relief located in Persepolis. There we find 'Greeks' on the walls on both sides of the grand staircases leading up to the Apadāna, the Receiving Hall of the Great King, which display the lands and peoples of the empire as they bring gifts or tribute to the king. Altogether twenty-three delegations are portrayed, whose identification in individual cases presents difficulties because the reliefs display no explanations (Schmidt 1953; Walser 1966; Hachmann 1995; Jacobs 1997). Delegation XII, which has often been regarded as a Lydian delegation, however, clearly depicts 'Greeks' (Rollinger 2006*a*, *b*). A high Persian official presents seven delegation members, who wear half-boots and have beards and shoulder-length hair that is curled at the ends. Three delegates carry gold and silver vessels, two folded cloths, and two bundles that have been identified as wool. The last item is very important because it reminds us of the Babylonian documents of the sixth century BCE in which 'Greece' appeared as one of the lands from where blue-purple wool was imported (Rollinger 2007*a*).

In addition to these texts and pictures, it is necessary to mention one inscription that integrates an enumeration of peoples into a building report which has as its subject the supplies drawn from the entire empire for the palace of Darius I in Susa. This text records, along with the participating peoples, the part played by each in the construction of the palace (Rollinger 2006–7):

> The cedar which was used here (for building) men principally from Ebir-nāri (Syria) brought from a mountain called [Labnānu] to [Babylon]. From Babylon the Karians and 'Greeks' [brought (it)] to Susa.

Indeed, these 'Greeks' were employed as well-known specialists:

The [stonecutters who] worked [the stone] were ['Greeks'] and [Lydia]ns... The material for the [palace] reliefs [was brought from 'Greece']

The palace represents the great king's realm, and all peoples take part in its building activities. The 'Greeks' are presented as loyal members of the Achaemenid Empire. Beyond the royal ideology with which these texts are imbued, it is evident that we gain another attestation for the importance of Greek specialists in a Near Eastern context. It may be noted that the archaeological record from Persepolis, Susa, and Pasargadae also offers strong evidence for the presence of a specialized workforce of Greeks in the construction of Achaemenid monumental buildings (Boardman 2000; Boucharlad 2002; Rollinger 2006–7). This picture can be completed by means of five short Greek inscriptions, which were found in the quarry at Kuh-i Rahmat, near Persepolis (Pugliese Carratelli 1966: 31).

In addition to the royal inscriptions, we possess an important corpus of private and official documents mentioning 'Greeks'. From Babylonia itself we have some private documents which were published only recently. One (BM 32891) dates from the reign of Darius I, and is an acknowledgement of receipt of barley issued by a certain Bazbaka who is acting in charge of the governor of Babylon. This Bazbaka is introduced as 'clerk of the troops and superior of the Greeks'. He obviously was in charge of a certain number of Yamanāya. These persons may have been related to the Achaemenid organization of the land, which was separated into fiefs often called 'bow lands', the possession of which was connected with tax and service (Wiesehöfer 1999). In general these people carried out military tasks, but in times without warfare they may also have been employed in civil activities, including building programmes. We do not know how these Yamanāya were recruited (were they deportees, prisoners of war, or mercenaries?). Yet, the document offers a further detail. It ends with a list of five witnesses. The fifth one, a certain Iddin-Nabû (or Arad-Nabû), is designated as 'Greek', and he must have been one of the Yamanāya mentioned in the document itself. He has a Babylonian name and was obviously part of the Babylonian society of his time (edition: Abraham 2004: 328 f.; discussion: Rollinger 2007*a*).

Another document comes from the Babylonian city of Nippur and dates from the reign of Darius II. It deals with the field of a certain Uštāna, who has an Iranian name. In a broken context the following line has '[x]ya-a-ma-na-[x...]'. This may be interpreted as a second person called Yamanāya or as a gentilic, 'the Greek', characterizing Uštāna. So lines 2 f. can be read as 'field of Uštāna and Yamanāya' or as 'field of Uštāna, the Greek'. In any case, the document testifies to a Greek as a landowner in Babylonia. The second interpretation would highlight the linguistically multicoloured levels of Babylonian society in Achaemenid times, for it presents a Greek with an Iranian name owning ground in Babylonia (edition: Donbaz and Stolper 1997, 104 f., no. 32; discussion: Rollinger 2007*a*, which also refers to other Babylonian documents where 'Greeks' may be mentioned).

Two court archives from Persepolis show a similar multi-ethnic context. The tablets fall into two large groups, which belonged to the reigns of Darius and his successor, Xerxes. Whereas the Persepolis Fortification Tablets date to between 509 and 494 BCE, the Persepolis Treasury Tablets cover the period from 492 to 458. The prevailing majority of the texts are written in Elamite (Roaf 2004). Besides peoples from all over the empire, 'Greeks' (Yauna-ip) are also included. Many of these 'Greeks' subsist on rations and can be identified simply as 'workers', whose exact function is often left vague. In this context, women played an important role. They often appear collectively, as the following example exhibits (PF 1224):

32 BÁN [1 BÁN equals *c*.9.7 litres] (of) grain, supplied by Ašbašuptiš, Šedda, the *high priest* (at) Persepolis, for whom Abbateya sets the apportionments, received, and gave (it as) *bonus* to post-partum 'Greek' women (at) Persepolis, irrigation (?) (workers), whose apportionments are set by Abbateya and Miššabadda. Nine women (who) bore male children received (each) two BÁN, and fourteen women (who) bore girls received 1 BÁN.

(edition: Hallock 1969: 349; discussion: Rollinger 2006*a*, *b*)

Obviously, there was a difference whether a boy or a girl was born. For the latter there was only half the special ration. In any case, it ought to be clear that we are here dealing with a dependent workforce whose freedom of action was quite restricted (Aperghis 2000). In these milieus, eastern Greeks may have played a dominant role (Miller 1997: 102–3).

Special attention is owed to those Greeks who appear in lofty positions and whose function could be described as 'secretarial'. These people are characterized simply by the person's name 'Yauna'. Administrative duty, which is connected to the writing down of documents, appears in this context as an area of responsibility for one or more of them. This function may not only have included writing rough drafts and dictating documents, but may also have encompassed the responsibility of passing on and writing translations of instructions issued from higher up. We encounter Greeks in high administrative positions, who cooperated closely with the writers of the documents (likewise individually named). Moreover, their occupation also presupposes a thorough knowledge of Elamite, to which Old Persian and Babylonian may also be added. And an elementary knowledge of cuneiform also appears to have been likely among these writers (Rollinger 2006*a*, *b*).

Special weight should be given as well to an administrative tablet from Persepolis that was composed in Greek! This tablet booked the shipment of two *maris* of wine for the Babylonian month Tebet (December/January) at some point between the years 509 and 494: *oinos dyo/ ii/ maris/ tebêt* (Balcer 1979: 280; cf. also Schmitt 1989: 303–5). *Maris* reproduces a unit of measure that may go back to Elamite (about 9.7 litres). The writer of the tablet had, at any rate, a command of Greek and was also active in a central administrative unit of the Achaemenid Empire and made use of terminology that was common within that context. There can be little doubt both

that the milieu of the chancellery at Persepolis was polyglot and that Greeks were integrated into it (Rollinger 2006*a*, *b*).

Compared to the Greek sources that deal with the Achaemenid Empire, the ancient Near Eastern sources offer a completely different picture. Contact is not limited to Western Asia and Cyprus and is not dominated by warfare and diplomatic delegations moving from Anatolia along the royal road to Susa. In contrast, 'Greeks' are presented as loyal subjects of the Persian king. They were not only encountered at the western fringes of the empire but also in royal capitals, where they were employed in many fields. They were engaged in the workforce, but were also included in the bureaucratic network of the royal chancellery. Of course, this image is—especially when we look at the royal inscriptions—biased, as is the image provided by the Greek sources. Whereas Greek sources characterize the Persians as barbarians and the royal court as a place of luxury and decadence, the Persian king presents himself as a commander of the world favoured by Ahura Mazda. The Greeks are members of this world, along with many other peoples. So both sets of sources offer different views on one single historical situation, and are complementary in some way. A Hellenocentric view has dominated ancient history for a long time, and the ancient Near Eastern perspective has generally been neglected, but it is time to draw a more complete picture and consider all sources available (Rollinger 2006*a*, *b*).

Suggested Reading

General: There does not yet exist a comprehensive treatment of the Greeks in the perspective of the ancient Near Eastern sources which is up to date and which includes all relevant sources, and one has to look for each period separately. Nevertheless, an excellent overview on the material is offered by Kuhrt (2002), which also has a special focus on the mental map of the Near Eastern empires. Still useful is Brinkman (1989). The organization of royal building programmes and the involvement of Greeks from Neo-Assyrian through Persian times is the focus of Rollinger (2006–7).

Terminology: A basic treatment of the terminology of the ancient Near Eastern sources including various phonological problems is Rollinger (1997–9).

Neo-Assyrian Empire: All written sources, royal inscriptions as well as the archival documentation, are dealt with in detail by Rollinger (2007*b*). Extensive discussions of the historical background are Lanfranchi (1999) and Rollinger (2001). For the specific problem of Greek mercenaries, see Rollinger and Korenjak (2001). Concerning the view of the Assyrian Empire of the west, see now Rollinger (2008).

Neo-Babylonian and early Persian Empire: All written sources are discussed in detail by Rollinger (2007*a*). For the Mesopotamian world-view of this and later times, one may consult Joannès (1997).

Achaemenid Empire: All written sources as well as most of the pictorial ones are discussed by Rollinger (2006*a* and *b*). An extensive treatment of the two groups of the Greek

throne-bearers at the royal tombs in Naqsh-i Rustam and Persepolis is Rollinger (2006*c*). The best available general treatment of Graeco-Persian matters is Miller (1997).

Archaeology: Concerning Persian–Greek relationships, the most recent and comprehensive study is Boardman (2000) (also referring to the older literature). Very useful and up-to-date is Boucharlat (2002). For Achaemenid art in general, Jacobs (2002) is a basic treatment of the topic. The delegations of the various peoples on the reliefs of Persepolis are treated by Walser (1966). But for all relevant details Schmidt (1953) and (1970) have to be consulted. Very useful is also Hachmann (1995).

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CHAPTER 4

COLONIES AND COLONIZATION*

FRANCO DE ANGELIS

General treatments of ancient Greece usually discuss colonies and colonization. These discussions are usually restricted to some two-and-a-half centuries (*c.*750 to *c.*500 BCE) and to outlining the foundation of the colonies in familiar terms (cf. Wilson 2006: 25–6 on the 'long-established certainties' of Greek colonization). There are two general problems with such discussions: a vagueness enshrouds the colonial world's long-term development, and these discussions are weakly, if at all, connected to ancient Greece's larger narrative, only referred to, out of necessity, to supply just enough context for understanding, say, the Athenian invasion of Sicily in 415 BCE (for recent examples of this kind of approach, see Sansone 2004; Pomeroy *et al.* 2008).

Avoiding vagueness helps to establish a proper connection. Greeks may have founded 500 or more colonies, which represent somewhere between about a third and a half of the total number of ancient Greek poleis estimated in the archaic and classical periods (Ruschenbusch 1985; Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 53–4). The geographical distribution of these colonies was both broad and varied: from France and north-east Spain in the western Mediterranean, through Italy, the Adriatic, and Libya in the central Mediterranean, to the Black Sea and its approaches. In human terms, 10,000 or more Greeks may have moved to colonies by 700 BCE alone (Morris 2000: 257), and overall between 30,000 and 60,000 adult male emigrants

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are hypothesized to have left Greece (Scheidel 2003: 134–5). By 500 BCE Greeks had indeed settled outside Greece far and wide, producing societies which, by the fourth century BCE may have accounted for some 40 per cent of all ancient Greeks (while the absolute number of ancient Greeks is currently debated, the proportion of colonial population is not: cf. Scheidel 2003: 131–5; Hansen 2006: 84). Some colonies also became significant political, economic, and cultural achievers, examples being city-states like Syracuse in Sicily, Taras in southern Italy, and Thasos in the northern Aegean. Attempting to be precise in this way should foreground an important question: why do these colonies play, in light of these developments, a disproportionately small role in the overall narrative of ancient Greece?

Since the 1990s the study of ancient Greek colonization has seen important advances, yet we still have no clear answer to this question and, more seriously, no perceptible change in general scholarly practice to counterbalance the well-entrenched trajectory of putting the focus on the Greek homeland in our accounts. Considerable scope exists, therefore, in developing the study of ancient Greek colonization, especially since, as Nicholas Purcell (2005: 115) has rightly underlined, it is a subject currently in a state of crisis. This chapter will suggest new avenues of enquiry and practice aimed at moving the subject beyond its present intellectual crossroads and to answering the question just posed.

4.1. Analogy and Terminology

It is becoming well established that classical studies are in general bound up in modern colonialism (Goff 2005), and that in particular the study of ancient Greek colonization has sought, for most of its life, intellectual inspiration from, and hence been heavily overwritten by, analogies with modern European imperialism and colonialism (see Owen 2005 for a recent discussion). In consequence, our studies have been infused at their very core by concepts and concerns that have been revealed, thanks to post-colonial perspectives and the independent study of material culture (cf. Greenwood and Whitley in this volume), to have had a limited place in the early Greek world. A more complex picture has emerged, one that had remained hidden for so long. Great strides have already been made in looking critically at the analogies and terminologies we have inherited. But two more particular avenues of investigation can be pursued.

The first concerns the basic terminology that we still use to describe this field of study: 'colonies' and 'colonization' remain mainstay terms, ones which even the most self-reflective and conscientious of scholars continue to use. A decade

ago Robin Osborne (1998) wrote highly critically of this traditional terminology, calling for its complete elimination from our accounts of early Greek history and its replacement with a looser model of privately initiated migrations. Other scholars have followed Osborne's critical line in re-evaluating other areas of early Greek history (e.g. Anderson 2005). But how successful has Osborne's plea been in the field in which he intervened? Scholars have been quite successful in looking more closely and critically at the literary and archaeological evidence, either in combination or alone, as Osborne urged, but they have done so by continuing to use the traditional terminology which they seek to disavow (Hurst and Owen 2005; Bradley and Wilson 2006; only Tsetskhladze 2006: pp. xxiii–xxviii notes that the terminology is in crisis). In fact, the traditional terminology has been expanded with the term 'colonialism', which is now being regularly employed, mirroring a trend in studies on modern imperial history (Howe 2002: 25; cf. also Boardman 1999: 268 on the recent growth of '-ism' concepts in the study of the Greeks overseas). James Whitley (2001: 125) expresses sentiments that probably explain generally the continuing use and expansion of the traditional terminology by ancient Greek scholars: 'we have to call this process something, and colonisation is as good a term as any.'

A certain psychological comfort lies behind these developments over the last decade. The comfort is twofold. The first involves how our subject is increasingly featuring in works that explore colonialism through time and space (Randsborg 2000; Lyons and Papadopoulos 2002; Gosden 2004; Stein 2005). It is psychologically gratifying that we can contribute to important discussions of the human experience beyond our immediate field, instead of being saddled with the customary mindset amongst the public and scholarly community at large that classical studies are mired in questions and approaches which are of diminishing relevance to the contemporary world. It is no doubt stimulating that our subject is being situated in such a wider context, especially since classical scholarship has traditionally shown an 'antipathy' (Trigger 2006: 61) to comparative perspectives. So, recently, Peter van Dommelen (2006: 108) has written of the lessons that we can derive from the bigger subject of colonialism: 'These general principles can be applied equally fruitfully to the analysis of earlier pre-modern colonial situations, such as ancient Greek colonialism.' But there are dangers too in such linkages, dangers which are being averted by some scholars by redefining 'ancient Greek colonialism'. Chris Gosden (2004), for instance, defines colonialism as a relationship humans have to material culture, and on this basis he includes the ancient Greeks throughout his book. But this definition has already been rejected by some (Dawdy 2005; Hargrave 2005; Silliman 2005: 73, n. 1). Tamar Hodos (2006: 19–22), for her part, has recently tried bravely to salvage the terms 'colony' and 'colonization' for an ancient Greek context, redefining these terms and narrowing down their range of meanings. However, the underlying problem will simply not go away with any of these exercises.

Instead, let us turn to the work of Jürgen Osterhammel (1997: 16–17), 'the most systematic' (Howe 2002: 133) study on colonialism available, for the correct definition:

> Colonialism is a relationship of domination between an indigenous (or forcibly imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders. The fundamental decisions affecting the lives of the colonized people are made and implemented by the colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis. Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonized population, the colonizers are convinced of their own superiority and of their ordained mandate to rule.

For the early Greek world, there existed very little true colonialism as just defined, general conditions being not at all conducive (Nippel 2003: 14–15), and it is only in exceptional circumstances, usually after about 500 BCE, that this definition may sometimes be satisfied (Wilson 2006: 51; cf. Bradley 2006: pp. xi–xiii). So why do we continue to label and describe our subject with terms that, technically speaking, generally do not apply? In a modern North American context Stephen Silliman (2005) has called for the reverse of what I am proposing here for an ancient Mediterranean context. Silliman argues that more regular use should be made of the term 'colonialism', in lieu of the bland and less politically charged phrase 'culture contact' that is now dominant, for colonialism was the primary historical reality that native populations faced in North America. In a similar vein, it can be argued that we, as scholars of the ancient Greek world, should be using more frequently the term 'culture contact' to describe the historical reality we study, for that was the main historical reality in our time-periods. The excellent collection of essays edited by James Cusick (1998) demonstrates that a wide variety of historical situations and time-periods can easily be accommodated under the umbrella description of 'culture contact'. The phrase 'culture contact' should serve as the first and general level of description, and then a case should be made to distinguish between the possible types of encounter. The onus must be on those scholars of the ancient Greek world who wish to use the term 'colonialism' to prove its existence, instead of batting the term about because it is fashionable.

Secondly, the term is easy and satisfying to use, for it describes a phenomenon which people the world over are familiar with, given historical developments of recent centuries. Put another way, using a language that speaks of 'colonialism', 'colonies', and 'colonization' readily brings to mind a mental picture that we have been accustomed, often unthinkingly, to accepting over centuries of (ab)use as roughly conveying the subject in all its dimensions. As Wilfried Nippel (2003: 15) has rightly observed, 'es gibt jedenfalls eine ideengeschichtlichte Kontinuität' ('at any rate, there is a continuity with the history of ideas'). Nevertheless, as we all have clearly recognized, to describe most instances of ancient Greek 'colonization'

as colonialism *sensu stricto* is false. The 'word magic' against which Finley (1976) warned will continue to plague this field of study at a very basic level, unless the spell, which has enchanted us all, is broken for good. (For a recent example of this confusion, see Douglas 2007.)

What is needed is the coining of some new terminology and the use of the more acceptable terminology that already exists. The ancient Greek term *apoikia* (pl. *apoikiai*) deserves to be used more in place of 'colony'. The term 'apoikism', derived from ancient Greek *apoikismos*, should be employed instead of 'colonialism'. A new coinage can be suggested, namely, 'apoikiazation', instead of 'colonization'. The verb could be 'to apoikize' in place of 'to colonize' and the adjective could be 'apoikial' in place of 'colonial'. If true colonialism, as defined earlier, is being discussed, then again a combination of ancient Greek and new terminology could be used. Even at the risk of seeing matters through an Athenian and Ptolemaic lens, the ancient Greek term *klēroukhia* (pl. *klēroukhiai*) could generally be used as an equivalent for colony in the proper sense, 'kleroukhism' for colonialism, 'kleroukhiazation' for colonization, the verb 'to kleroukhize' for to colonize, and 'kleroukhial' for colonial as the adjective. In defence of these coinages, it could be observed that since the nineteenth century scholarship has had no problem in creating neologisms like 'Hellenization', 'Romanization', and the now much-vaunted 'colonialism' because of the need it felt to express in words historical processes deemed important enough to require a new coinage (on the coining of the term 'colonialism', see Burke 2005: 82–3). It is in the same spirit that we must approach the present proposals, which can be easily applied to the full range of ancient terminology that builds on these basic ancient word-roots (Casevitz 1985).

A second way to advance discussion in this area is to encourage further study of the modern historical phenomena from which the ancient analogies have been drawn. It might appear that sufficient studies on this topic have appeared since the 1990s, and that, consequently, further study is unnecessary. Nippel (2003: 14), however, has accurately gauged the matter: 'Eine umfassende wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Untersuchung über die althistorischen Arbeiten zur griechischen Kolonisation gibt es ... meines Wissens nicht' ('to the best of my knowledge, there is no comprehensive, scholarly historical investigation on the works of ancient history devoted to Greek colonization'). More individual contributions are needed to make such a desirable work possible. Therefore, we have hardly finished with studies on the history of scholarship. Here are a few possible directions.

Considerable attention has already been paid, for obvious reasons, to the relationship between the British and French empires and classical scholarship; nonetheless, such studies should doubtless continue. But what about the less lengthy and less extensive German and Italian attempts at colonialism? While it is widely recognized that German scholarship laid the very basis of classical scholarship in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, hardly any attention is paid to the relationship between classical Greek scholarship and modern colonialism in Germany.

A very obvious example of such a connection is the lecture 'Die Griechen als Meister der Colonisation' delivered by the distinguished ancient historian Ernst Curtius (1883) to Kaiser Wilhelm I as the 'Scramble for Africa' and other colonial forays by Germany were about to begin. The time is ripe to explore further this modern German context (cf. Gauer 1998). As regards Italy, the place of the ancient Greeks in Italian scholarship from unification to the end of World War II, when, interestingly, ancient Rome was the dominant intellectual model (Mattingly 1996; Barbanera 1998: 97–159), has received some attention (cf. De Angelis, forthcoming *a*). Italian scholarship in this period, it can be noted, was already interpreting ancient cultural encounters with a kind of 'middle ground' model of interaction, an intellectual development which is usually thought only to have emerged in the 1990s (cf. Gosden 2004: 82–113). Greek 'colonies' and their cultural developments were also being treated less dismissively than by British scholars who considered them as mere provincial offshoots (for an overview of the Italian position on ancient Greek art, see Settis 1994). The complexities of the Italian case deserve further attention. Overall, therefore, the full range of modern nations and empires involved in colonialism, whether on the giving or receiving end of it, or both, could be fruitfully studied (one thinks of the Austro–Hungarian empire, Spain, Ireland, Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Russia, and so on).

In any case, the existing studies have, arguably, focused on the more obvious aspects of such faulty analogies and terminologies. Alongside these there must also be close attention paid to the more subtle influences wielded by modern colonialism. As Chris Gosden (2004: 20) has observed: 'nineteenth-century views of colonialism still have a pernicious influence on all our views of colonialism, in a manner which is largely unacknowledged.' Regardless of whether or not we accept Gosden's definition of colonialism, it is crucial to bear in mind that the very questions we ask, the very models we use, the very attitudes we adopt, and the very world we live in are all implicated in some way in our past, present, and future practices (see the recent collection of studies edited by de Polignac and Levin 2006). Gosden (2004: 8–9, 115–16) himself singles out modern capitalism as having profoundly influenced how we look at objects, land, and labour, as well as the social and economic relationships governing them. He rightly questions the application of capitalist thinking to periods of history before the mid-eighteenth century, a concern which Sara Owen (2005: 15–16), following Gosden, has echoed specifically for an ancient Greek context. I could not agree more. Some scholars working on modern capitalism have called for more work on how colonialism is related to the rise of capitalism (Johnson 1996: 209–10; Alavi, forthcoming). We should be attentive to the results of such work, in order to help disentangle how modern capitalism has affected the study of ancient Greece. In pursuing all these histories of scholarship, we can achieve greater clarity of the contrasts, and any common ground, between the ancient and modern worlds, since '[w]e need to

understand a tradition which has shaped Mediterranean historiography, but not to adopt it' (Purcell 2005: 134). In other words, there is no way out of a good understanding of the classical tradition and its relationship with modern colonialism and imperialism. We must continue, therefore, to engage the general discourse of colonialism, as van Dommelen and others have done, but also for a different set of reasons.

Our scholarly practices are also a product of the legacies outlined above, and, again, the shaping has happened in both obvious and subtle ways. Such matters require discussion on their own, if we are to break out, with any success, from the problematic framework we have inherited.

4.2. Reassessing Scholarly Practice

The scholarly practices followed in the study of Greek 'colonization' comprise both ones specific to this field and ones practised more generally by the disciplines of philology, history, and archaeology and their respective handling of the written and material sources available to us.

Before archaeological evidence came to be collected and incorporated systematically into reconstructions of the past, the first modern accounts of Greek 'colonization', such as those of William Mitford (1784–1810) and George Grote (1846–1856), were naturally based primarily on the surviving literary sources. With the development of classical archaeology in the second half of the nineteenth century, efforts were concentrated on corroborating and expanding the surviving written sources, with archaeology occupying a subordinate position in the academy, something which was viewed as natural and normal (cf. Trigger 2006: 62, 79). These developments have implications with which we must deal still today. Archaeology often received its marching orders from issues raised in the written sources (Snodgrass 2002; cf. Whitley in this volume). While there were hypercritical handlers of the ancient written sources in the later nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries, like Karl Julius Beloch and Ettore Pais (Ampolo 1997: 96–9), the trend for the century that followed was always towards a positivistic philological approach, which regularly treated these ancient written sources as 'authorities'. Developments in cultural history in the 1970s to 1990s brought about important theoretical changes (Burke 2004: 30–99), but by then the impact had already been profound and normalized. Timothy Taylor (1994: 374) has drawn attention to this general problem on the heels of praising François Hartog's (1988) now-classic book on Herodotus' representation of the Scythians:

Most archaeologists have read Herodotus with far less sensitivity. The chronicle of historical peoples and events has tyrannized protohistoric archaeology. Archaeological cultures and culture-groups have been uncritically identified with peoples described in the ancient texts ... (whereas the results of excavation have not been allowed to challenge the overall conceptual framework provided by the texts). In south-east European and Soviet scholarship there has been a strong tendency to use partial and simplistic readings to justify particular lines of interpretation ...

There have also been more subtle ways in which ancient writings, often considerably shorter in length than Herodotus' account of the Scythians (sometimes mere words), have shaped the study of the past in equally noteworthy ways. Brief statements made by Thucydides in Book VI, for example, have been used to help formulate the absolute chronology of the archaic period and have been taken as the model of (violent) culture contact between Greeks and natives in Sicily (De Angelis, forthcoming *a*). Closer and more theoretically informed looks at the surviving ancient literary sources have proved extremely beneficial and fruitful (Dougherty 1993; Dougherty and Kurke 1993, 2003; García Quintela 2001; Bernstein 2004; Hall 2007: 93–118; Fauber, forthcoming), and they need to continue. However, they need to continue more in conjunction with, or at the very least with an eye to, the material sources, because historical reconstructions of the early Greek world still tend, in narrow fashion, to privilege written sources (Hall 2007: 17).

In the study of Greek 'colonization', such privileging has a detrimental effect on both Greeks and non-Greeks, in that it silences a whole range of dimensions to our subject. The work of Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1995) is fundamental in understanding how historical narratives and their silences are created and shaped by power. For Trouillot (1995: 25): 'What matters most are the process and conditions of production of such narratives.' Power enters the story at different times and angles: it precedes the narrative and contributes to its creation and interpretation, but power always begins at the source (ibid. 28–9). In Trouillot's framework, it is easy to see how the ancient Greeks are bound to come out ahead in modern scholarly works on account of two interrelated and mutually feeding factors: they have fairly abundant ancient sources, both written and archaeological, for their study, and modern scholars have traditionally favoured the ancient Greeks, giving them a loud and active voice over non-Greek peoples in historical accounts. Jonathan Hall (2007: 288–9) has recently argued that this Hellenocentrism will continue to be inevitable in ancient Mediterranean history, for two main reasons: there are written sources for the ancient Greeks, and archaeological histories for non-Greeks will never be able to make up for that gap. Such statements have the power to encourage further historical reconstructions based only or primarily on written sources, and hence to straitjacket definitions of history, and to stunt the development of archaeological practices that can also benefit immensely the literate ancient Greeks (a review of Hall's book has expressed much the same sentiment and course of action, though in

more general terms: Vlassopoulos 2007). Part of the way forward must surely lie in reassessing our over-reliance on ancient literature in our historical reconstructions and to appreciate the intricacies of oral cultures and the conversion, if at all, of their verbal stories into 'literature' (see Culler 1997: 18–41, on modern ideas of literature, and Goldberg 2005 for a recent analysis of the oral–writing conversion from the classical world). That written sources are somehow more reliable and better than material culture, and by extension that prehistoric peoples are somehow inferior than literate and hence 'civilized' peoples (Gosden 2003: 15–16; Burke 2005: 110), is a problem that has already started to be addressed, but there is still a long way to go (Trigger 2006: 498). Archaeology has helped to correct these prejudices, yet even here more can be done to develop two particular kinds of archaeology: prehistoric and contact.

The concept of prehistory is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, prehistory began as an intellectual concept and pursuit in the nineteenth century, when Europeans sought to measure their progressive development over peoples not regarded as advanced (McNiven and Russell 2005: 11–49). In other words, prehistory was born in the spirit of cultural superiority versus cultural inferiority and justified the place and policies Europeans enjoyed and forged. In this framework, as already said, peoples without written sources for study were condescendingly regarded as lesser subjects left behind in this linear, progressive thinking (Pomian 1984; Trouillot 1995: 7; Duara 2002: 419). The contemporary creation of the concepts of migration and diffusionism as explanatory frameworks compounded the problem, doing so much to rob supposed inferior cultures of any agency or innovation; progress resided in the 'cultural hearth' that was Europe. History could only happen and exist when the two cultural systems came into contact, allowing thereby the supposed inferior culture to acquire the necessary significance (McNiven and Russell 2005: 88–180). The sting of such pejorative formulations will certainly be lessened by considering the other side of prehistory's double edge: all literate societies, including the ancient Greeks and our own and future ones, will always have aspects of life that are not put down into words, hence making them 'prehistoric' in some sense too (this is one of the recurrent arguments made by Gosden 2003; the recent call for the abandonment of prehistory seems unnecessary in this light: Silliman 2005: 74, n. 2). Soviet archaeology's focus on the study of everyday life has been successfully applied to ancient Greek 'colonial' contexts in the Black Sea, for the subject of everyday life is usually not illuminated to any significant degree in our ancient written sources. It is an important approach to essentially prehistoric contexts that, once shorn of its original, underlying ideological aims referred to above (but see also Taylor 2003), can make a very positive contribution to Greek 'colonial' contexts around the Mediterranean (cf. Trigger 2006: 334–41 on this Soviet contribution to archaeology). The growth and development of this sort of prehistoric archaeology should run in parallel with contact archaeology.

The traditional carving up of Mediterranean archaeologies into prehistoric versus classical does not do justice to, and handily avoids, the ancient cultural encounters and overlapping that occurred through contact, as well as the messiness of competing methodologies, terminologies, and theoretical frameworks (Gras 2000*a*: 601). This artificial distinction between different disciplines has also been maintained in other parts of the world with contact-zone history (Lightfoot 1995), but the situation is slowly changing for the better there too (Murray 2004). While the marriage of textual and material sources has been under way in some quarters of Greek 'colonial' studies (see e.g. Gras 1995; 2002; Rolle, Schmidt, and Docter 1998; De Angelis 2003; Owen 2003; cf. Bradley 2006: p. xiii), it is something that can be encouraged even further (cf. Trigger 2006: 65, 502). In particular, regardless of the question(s) asked, the union of textual and material sources has to be balanced and aimed at recapturing as many of the complexities as possible of ancient contact zones, not just to the ancient Greek side of it, or whatever side we might wish to identify with (cf. Wachtel 1977: 2). Therefore, to be done properly, in my view, contact archaeology should be multi-sided and interdisciplinary, and demands that the scholars who practise it have an independent handle on both the textual and material sources of all parties concerned, something which is not for everyone and still in its infancy as a practice in Greek history (Morris 2002: 50, 67), let alone in the history of cultural contact in Greece. No one source should be regarded as subservient or inferior to another in this framework (cf. Trigger 2006: 504).

Both prehistoric and contact archaeology in the ancient Mediterranean have had few practical applications of post-colonial theory to their data (Webster and Cooper 1996; van Dommelen 2006; cf. also Burke 2005: 104–8), though some such studies do exist (see Antonaccio 2003, 2005; Morris and Tusa 2004; Streiffert Eikeland 2006). Here too there are many more possibilities.

Studying ancient Greek 'colonization' is quickly becoming, therefore, an intellectually challenging endeavour, for all the reasons just outlined, as well as for the vastness of time and space encompassed by the phenomenon. As Michel Gras (2000*b*: 230) has rightly urged, a certain intellectual courage is needed to tackle this period of early Mediterranean history, an intellectual courage that is not afraid to experiment or make mistakes. The latter must explain in part why historical narratives are currently stacked against Greek 'colonization' being an integrated part of the ancient Greek story. (This problem continues in the most recent English-language account of the early Greek world: Hall 2007; cf. also the review by Vlassopoulos 2007.) The rest of the explanation must also lie in scholarly frameworks that put the focus on the Greek homeland in the first place as the 'cultural hearth' of a supposed 'colonial' world. The general problem has recently been summed up by Christopher Smith (2003: 213) in reviewing Whitley (2001):

> If there is a disappointing aspect of the book, it is perhaps its self-imposed limitation as an archaeology of Greece ... Arguably, however, the peculiar triumph of Greek art, and

perhaps the most important reason for its claim to art-historical significance, is not its self-sufficient beauty, but its remarkable adaptability to different historical and geographical contexts, and its openness to external influence. The radical fluidity and 'connectivity' of the Mediterranean world ... is only one part of a wider undermining of the conceptual validity of Greece as an object of study separate from its Mediterranean setting.

The ancient Greeks need to be studied more in their Mediterranean setting in order to understand them better (for a still too rare example see Demand 2006), and Greek 'colonization' offers an ideal lens through which to do so (De Angelis, forthcoming *b*). To do so will require the adoption and development of a new set of methods, perspectives, and attitudes. We will all need to move away from the familiar and the comfortable. There is much to be gained in doing so. Some of the benefits have just been discussed, but there are others of contemporary relevance that transcend the field itself.

4.3. Contemporary Relevance

The stories that scholarship told until recently about ancient Greek 'colonization' have served their original purpose: that is, of disseminating a higher and aggressive classical culture to more primitive and passive peripheries. In other words, the ancient Greeks acted as a mirror and precedent for the contemporary aspirations and behaviour of European states and empires (Trigger 2006: 73). Does the study of ancient Greek 'colonization' have any relevance or value today, now that the original contexts that motivated its study continue to disappear? The broad question of the relationship between Hellenism and modernity is addressed elsewhere in this volume (see especially the contribution by Porter); here the focus will be on the future of the study of Greek 'colonization', and in particular what it can teach us in a world that is increasingly becoming integrated and characterized by the migration of peoples (Pagden 2003).

Marc Ferro (2003: 361) has observed that decolonization since the end of World War II has multiplied the centres of historical production in the world. The entry of many more nations into the practice of history-writing, themselves often forged as nations out of European colonial and imperial pasts, has inevitably raised the question of a multicultural past, present, and future (see in general Gabaccia 2002). Multicultural history-writing is no less politicized than homogeneous one-sided views of the past, and nowhere in the study of ancient Greece will the political and cultural views of particular practitioners become more apparent (Ober 2003; cf. also Gabaccia 2002: 442–4). Someone who lives in, say, Canada with its officially bilingual and multicultural policies will certainly have a different take on the past than someone writing in, say, the United States or France, with their policies of

cultural assimilation. Many other contrasting viewpoints could, of course, be cited. Nevertheless, ancient Greek culture contact history is one of those historical case-studies that is, to use that oft-employed phrase, good to think with, especially because of the widespread study of and fascination with ancient Greece around the world, including in non-western contexts (Settis 2004). In engaging multicultural issues in the past, and the interdisciplinary and comparative perspectives needed to understand them, our own world is inevitably thrown into the spotlight. Greek 'colonization' was also characterized by the interplay of local, regional, and global dimensions of the human past, and so it is another example of world history, which is again coming back into vogue (Bentley 2002; Burke 2005: 186–7), and which, as just discussed, will only enrich our understanding of the ancient Greeks. Studying Greek 'colonization' introduces students and scholars alike, therefore, to a multitude of modern scholarly perspectives. This in itself is a good thing, something which should be stressed in the teaching of students right from their first encounters with the ancient Greeks (so Ferro 2003). Greek 'colonization' is a topic that needs to be added consciously to discussions about the future teaching of classical studies (see most recently Bulwer 2006).

The study of Greek 'colonization' was undoubtedly thrown off its traditional course in the 1990s, and Purcell, cited at the outset, is correct in thinking that this is a field currently in crisis. But I suspect that the crisis will not be long-lasting or detrimental to the future growth and development of the subject, for classical scholars have always had a remarkable ability to evolve and adapt (Spivey and Squire 2005: 8), and Greek 'colonization' (or 'apoikiazation'!) provides ample opportunities for this to happen.

Suggested Reading

For recent accounts of the ancient Greek world, the following works can be suggested: Demand (2006), Morris and Powell (2006), and Hall (2007). These works include some discussion of Greek 'colonization', which is more fully treated elsewhere: Hall (2000); Tsetskhladze and De Angelis (2004); and De Angelis (2007*a*). For the wider Mediterranean setting, see De Angelis (2007*b*). Boardman's classic work *The Greeks Overseas*, now in its fourth edition (= Boardman 1999), can also be suggested, although, like all works conceived before the 1990s, it is starting to show its age in terms of theoretical approach. Of all the regions 'colonized' by the ancient Greeks, Italy is home to the best modern collection of ancient primary sources: Nenci and Vallet (1977–). Such coverage is hard to find for other regions. Good starting-points are the older modern accounts of Greek 'colonization' which tend to be, as noted in the text, based primarily on ancient written sources. A recommended place to begin, besides those works cited in the text, is Graham (1982). Once again, readers will need to be wary of the increasingly outdated theoretical frameworks even of such older works based mainly on ancient writings. Regular updates of the material culture of the Greek world, including its 'colonial' regions, can be found in 'Archaeological

Reports', the supplement of the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*. The journal *Ancient West and East* is steadily also becoming the single most important forum for discussions of ancient culture-contact (published in Leiden by Brill from 2002 to 2006, and from 2007 in Leuven by Peeters).

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CHAPTER 5

THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE

POLLY LOW

WHY is the fifth-century Athenian Empire considered worthy of its own entry in this *Handbook*, when the attempts at empire by Sparta, Thebes, or even the fourth-century Athenians are overlooked? In part, the prominence of this particular instantiation of Greek imperialism derives from the nature, and quality, of the ancient evidence available for it. But the special attention which is paid to this period of Greek foreign politics also results from the belief that the Athenian Empire represents a form of interstate interaction which is distinctly different from the relationships typically seen in operation between the Greek city-states. That belief is relatively easy to justify on a quantitative level: the alliance which is the basis of the empire is, in Greek terms, enormous (encompassing 190 cities on even the most conservative estimate), and also conspicuous for its longevity (in a treaty-making world where '100 years' can act as a synonym for eternity, a multilateral alliance that survives, even imperfectly, for almost three-quarters of a century does deserve comment). More interesting, however, and more difficult to assess, is the question of whether the Athenian Empire should also be counted as qualitatively distinctive. Why should this particular alliance be labelled an empire? Can an empire be identified only from its actions, or do aims and intentions also need to be taken into account? In what ways does its impact on the political, economic, and cultural activities of the Greek world, within and between cities, differ from that of any other Greek interstate organization? In the terms of this section, one might ask whether the empire was responsible for the dissemination into the wider Greek world of a distinctly Athenian kind of Hellenism.

5.1. Ancient Evidence

That such questions are still unanswered is largely a consequence of the nature of the ancient evidence for the Athenian Empire which, although extensive, is far from unproblematic.

Literary evidence for the empire could be argued to include almost all fifth-century writing and several texts from later periods: not just historiographical and rhetorical works, but also drama (particularly Aristophanes) and other forms of verse. But this category of evidence is dominated by Thucydides, whose history of the Peloponnesian War can equally well be read as a history of the rise and (partial) collapse of the Athenian Empire (de Romilly 1963). The reliability of that history—not so much in its narrative of events, but in its characterization of the nature and development of Athens' imperial ideology—continues to provoke extensive debate (Osborne 2000: 3–5; cf. de Ste Croix 1972: 5–34; Badian 1993; Huxley 1983), but it remains true that almost every modern account of the Athenian Empire is informed in some way by the Thucydidean model (even if only in attempts to react against it).

This tie to Thucydides is often particularly prominent in studies of the inscribed evidence for the Athenian Empire, which was for a long time treated largely as a set of footnotes, addenda, or occasionally corrigenda, to Thucydides' account (Jowett 1881: i. pp. ix–lxxviii). Because of this tendency it is worth emphasizing one negative characteristic of this material: its usefulness as evidence for the diachronic development of the Athenian Empire is seriously constrained by a long-running dispute over the correct dating of many of the most important documents. The main point of dispute in this argument (namely, the acceptability of using certain letter-forms as a dating criterion) seems now to be reaching a conclusion (Mattingly 1984; Chambers, Galluci, and Spanos 1990; cf. Henry 2001, in favour of the conventional position). But since that conclusion is that these letter-forms do not provide a reliable guide to date, the wider problem has only increased: there is no definitive way of knowing whether certain inscriptions which seem to display a more aggressive approach to the empire should be dated to the 450s or to the 420s/410s. Attempts to use inscribed evidence to correct or confirm the Thucydidean narrative of Athens' imperial development therefore run a great risk of circularity.

But to restrict epigraphic evidence to such a subsidiary role is also to miss an opportunity. Athenian imperialism is marked by, and on some accounts is even considered responsible for, a surge in epigraphic production in Athens, and surviving inscribed documents reflect both directly and indirectly on the ways in which Athens managed her empire. Among direct records, the most famous are the Tribute Quota Lists (Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1939–53); these accounts of the 1/60th of the tribute which was dedicated to Athena can be used as a rich source of information not just about the membership and structure of the empire, but also about the degree of financial exploitation it involved. Other documents

too (regulations for the whole empire; for specific, usually rebellious, cities; or for particular, usually helpful, individuals) provide insights into the ways in which Athens' imperial power was exercised, conceptualized, and represented, to the allies and to the wider Greek world (Mattingly 1996: ch. 17).

Finally, archaeological evidence. This is dominated by one type of material: monumental building. Already in antiquity it was noted that Athens' rise to imperial power was accompanied by a transformation in the physical environment of the city (Thucydides 1.10.2; Plutarch, *Pericles* 12). Recent work (Kallet-Marx 1989; Giovannini 1990) has queried the existence of a direct financial link between the revenues of empire and the building programme of the Periclean period, but the nature of the ideological connection between the two continues to stimulate debate: how does the built environment of Athens foster a sense of civic and imperial power (Hölscher 1998; Raaflaub 2001), and what do sculptural programmes of the Parthenon reveal about Athenian perception of their own role as an imperial city (Osborne 1994), or of Athens' relationship to the Persian imperialists whose defeat had enabled their ascent to power (Root 1985)?

One characteristic common to all the evidence discussed here deserves particular emphasis: this material is, overwhelmingly, produced by Athens rather than by the subject cities of the empire. This can be argued to be something of interest in its own right: while the absence of non-Athenian literary material is not unique to this period of history, the apparent lack of epigraphic and archaeological activity outside Athens is more unusual, and has led to suggestions that one consequence of Athenian leadership is the deliberate or incidental suppression of certain forms of behaviour in the subject cities (Osborne 1999). This is an area which requires further study: the long-standing neglect of the history of the smaller Greek states in the classical period means that it is difficult to undertake a properly comparative assessment of the impact of empire on those states—they tend to attract scholarly attention only when they have some dealings with an imperial power. Attempts have been made to rectify this trend (Gehrke 1986; Hansen and Nielsen 2004), but as things stand it is almost impossible to explore in any depth one of the most productive themes in studies of other, and particularly more modern, empires—namely, the experience of empire from the subjects' point of view.

5.2. The Athenian Empire and the Study of Imperialism

Even when the empire is considered only from an Athenian perspective, however, the nature of the evidence makes certain avenues of research challenging. At the most basic level, many factual details are either unknown or uncertain: the status,

role, and even existence of the council of allies, for example, is largely mysterious; so too is the precise membership of the empire; so too is the degree of direct Athenian control over the subject cities. (Although it is known that garrisons and governors were used, the scope and intensity of their employment is unclear.) The list of unknowns could be extended at length.

The quest to investigate these, and similar, problems has not only absorbed considerable amounts of scholarly energy, but is also at least partially responsible for a widespread reluctance to engage too heavily in more general analyses of the Athenian Empire: a disinclination to construct larger theoretical structures on such an unstable factual foundation is understandable. Where more general approaches have been made, they have tended to revolve around a cluster of interconnected problems, and to retain a close focus on themes arising directly from the interpretation of the ancient evidence.

The first problem is one of definition. Which, if any, of the various labels applied by our sources to this interstate organization (*hēgemonia*, *archē*, *kratos*, *turannia*, and others) should be counted as equivalent to 'empire'? None of the terms are specific to imperialist, or even interstate, activity; and yet there are signs that the choice of descriptor can be significant—*archē*, for example, seems often to be represented as something qualitatively different from *hēgemonia* (Rhodes 1993*a*: 297–8). This conclusion immediately raises another problem. What are those qualitative differences? Are they based on shifting levels of political interference, or economic imposition, or something less tangible (the 'tone' of Athenian imperialism is regularly, if vaguely, appealed to in these contexts: Osborne 2000: 34). This in turn is connected to a third area of uncertainty: if variations in vocabulary do indicate a change in the Athenian conception of their empire, when do those changes occur? Are the essential characteristics of the Athenian Empire already in place as soon as the alliance of 478/7 is put in place (Rawlings 1977), or does an initially benign alliance transform into empire only after the defeat of the Persians (Meiggs 1943), or even only under the strains of the Peloponnesian War (Mattingly 1996: ch. 7)? These questions are absorbing, but offer little prospect of a definitive solution: the sources are either too lacunose, particularly in the case of the epigraphic evidence, or, in the case of literary sources, all of which were written after the empire had reached its most developed form, too compromised by the distorting benefit of hindsight.

Although, therefore, the quest to analyse the Athenian Empire 'in its own terms' is appealing, and although it has produced valuable work, it is also ultimately limiting, particularly for those with an interest in exploring the nature of ancient empires in general, rather than of this empire in particular. Alternative approaches have been explored, although their potential has not yet been fully exploited. Finley's (1978*a*, *b*) exhortation to students of the Athenian Empire to sidestep the problem of imperial origins and intentions in favour of a synchronic, typological analysis represents an important attempt to move the argument into new areas,

but the methodological approach he sets out has not been extensively developed. Political and international theorists have shown an intermittent interest in the Athenian Empire's role in Greek political thought (Balot 2006: ch. 5), Greek interstate politics (Ferguson 1913; or, for a more analytical account, Martin 1940: part 2, ch. 2), and in the longer history of imperialism (Doyle 1986). Doyle's work is also a good example of the dominant methodology of such large-scale analyses of imperialism, namely the comparative approach. Such a method is not new—explicit (and often implicit) comparison is a long-standing feature of the study of ancient empires (Baring 1910; Brunt 1993)—nor is it necessarily any less partial than the empirical approach: the choice of appropriate comparison often already presupposes certain theories about the intrinsic qualities of empires and imperialism. But it does at least offer the possibility of new, and often wider, perspectives on the question of the Athenian Empire's place in the larger picture of interstate politics.

5.3. The Impact of the Athenian Empire

Much of what has been said so far has been negative, focusing on the methodological difficulties that surround the study of the Athenian Empire. But, if attention is shifted away from the wider context of the empire and towards its influence on particular aspects of Greek political, economic, and cultural life, the importance of this subject, and the scope for constructive debate on it, become more apparent.

The dominant approach to the study of the Athenian Empire's effects has always been the political, although that approach can be further divided into several, often intertwined strands. As was noted above, the empire's place in the wider story of interstate politics remains elusive. But its effect on domestic politics has been more productively studied. The link between Athens' empire and its own democratic system was noted by ancient commentators (the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* 24.3; ps.-Xenophon, *Constitution of the Athenians*, esp. 1.14–18), although the precise nature of the relationship is clearly more complex than these sources might imply: both rich and poor in Athens stood to gain from the empire, particularly in financial terms, and it seems likely that such mutual benefit would enhance social cohesion and thereby the stability of the democracy; yet it is also true that democracy in Athens both precedes and survives the empire, and that the most serious challenges to the democratic system (the oligarchic coups of 411 and 404) result, albeit indirectly, from the strains created by Athens' imperial politics.

Outside Athens the picture appears more straightforward, although this apparent simplicity might well be an illusion created by scarcity of evidence. It is clear from ancient material—both literary and epigraphic—that Athens preferred to support democratic government in the subject cities, although it has been convincingly argued by Ostwald 1993 that this preference did not extend to the deliberate overthrow of stable oligarchic regimes; literary sources also suggest that democrats in the allied cities tended to be supportive of Athenian power. The question of the reliability of such claims has provoked one of the key debates in this field: the argument over the 'popularity' of Athenian imperialism. Some (notably de Ste Croix 1954) claim that the attractions of democracy to the majority of citizens in the subject states were sufficient to overcome the disadvantages of Athenian imperial control (and that these disadvantages have, in any case, been exaggerated by ancient writers hostile to democracy); others (Bradeen 1960; de Romilly 1966) argue that the constraints imposed by empire were such that even the introduction of democratic government would not be sufficient compensation. To a certain degree this debate is, at heart, one about the reliability of Thucydides: how far can we accept his claims of the deep unpopularity of the Athenian Empire and, even more tellingly, his depiction of the Athenians' happy acceptance of that unpopularity (visible, for example, in Cleon's speech at 3.37–40)? But it also reflects a fundamental uncertainty as to the nature and scope of liberty in Greek politics, inside and beyond states—an uncertainty which is more clearly articulated in the political writing of the fourth century (Bosworth 1992; Karavites 1984), but which must also be relevant to the fifth-century empire (Karavites 1982; Raaflaub 2004: chs. 4 and 5): to what extent can political freedom be curtailed before it ceases to be freedom at all? And when the freedom of the individual conflicts with the freedom of the polis, which should be given priority?

A second line of enquiry focuses on the economic impact of the Athenian Empire. Again, this interest has a long history: Athens' decision to make the primary obligation of the alliance financial rather than military, by allowing member states to contribute money rather than men or ships, is central to Thucydides' account of the origins of the empire (1.96), and the tribute is also prominent in subsequent, and especially fourth-century, reflections on the Athenian imperialism (e.g Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 98). Indirect financial benefits of empire also feature strongly in both literary and epigraphic sources: Athens becomes a focal point for the interchange of goods and services, and both the city and its residents benefit as a result.

It is hard to know what effect this has on the subject cities, although it must be dangerous to expect the financial impact of empire to hit each of the member states equally hard (Nixon and Price 1990), or, necessarily, that every citizen of a particular city-state would be equally affected by Athenian financial intervention. The economic costs of empire must have been unevenly distributed. And it would be equally dangerous to assume that the financial benefits of the empire were

enjoyed only by Athens: while certainty is impossible, it seems quite likely that burden of tribute was less for some cities than the cost of maintaining their own fleet; and it is similarly plausible that, just as individuals in some cities stood to benefit from Athenian political intervention, so too might Athens' ability to influence the circulation of goods in the Aegean have enabled some non-Athenian merchants, trading with greater legal protection (de Ste Croix 1961), to enhance their own profits (Finley 1978*b*: 11–12).

Nevertheless, the overwhelming impression of the ancient sources (and particularly the literary sources) is that the profits of empire did flow in just one direction—towards Athens—and even if this perception is incorrect it still deserves exploration. It has recently been argued that this accumulation of financial power should be counted as a fundamental, and distinctive, characteristic of the Athenian Empire: for Athens, empire was conceived of primarily in terms of financial gain; moreover, this focus on tangible benefits supplanted more traditional forms of interstate interaction, based on kinship, gift-exchange, and other forms of reciprocal relationship (Kallet-Marx 1993; Kallet 2001).

The use of the empire as a source of financial power clearly is successful to some extent (enabling the city, according to Thucydides 2.13.3, to build up a reserve fund which at its maximum totals 9,300 talents), as is the use of that wealth—channelled into military resources—to exert that power over Greece for a surprisingly long time (Thuc. 2.65.12). But even if ruthless financial exploitation is accepted as a primary goal of Athenian imperialism, it need not follow that this goal was always successfully attained. One example demonstrates the point neatly, namely, the decree ordering that all cities in the empire should use only Athenian coins, weights, and measures (ML 45; Lewis 1997*a*). There is some debate as to the extent to which this regulation represents a serious imposition on the subject states: use of a common currency could be conceived of as something mutually beneficial, although the language of the document, and in particular the penalties laid down for those who continue to use non-Athenian standards, suggest Athens did anticipate resistance to its plans. (Figueira 1998 is the strongest recent proponent of the argument for benign intent, but his arguments have been seriously undermined by the newly discovered fragment published in Hatzopoulos 2000–3.) The point which deserves emphasis here, however, is that, no matter how oppressive or lucrative the Athenians intended this measure to be, its actual impact seems to have been far less awe-inspiring: there is no clear numismatic evidence to suggest that the decree had any practical effect on the types of coinage used in the Athenian Empire. The impotence of the legislation even seems to have become a subject for comedy: a joke in Aristophanes' *Birds* (1040 f.) refers to a decree suspiciously similar to this one, and seems to derive its humour not from the spectacle of allied subservience (cf. the jokes at the expense of the starving Megarians in *Acharnians* 729–835), but from the impotence of the visiting Athenian official's attempts to impose such regulations.

This decree, and Aristophanes' representation of it, can usefully demonstrate a third outcome of Athenian imperial practice: the circulation of cultures. The decree includes instructions for its promulgation, through oral proclamation and inscription, throughout the empire; fragments of the text have been discovered in six (or possibly seven: one attribution is contested) locations in the Aegean, Asia Minor, and even the Black Sea; if the subject cities did as they were instructed and each set up their own inscribed copy of the decree, then hundreds of versions of this example of the Athenian epigraphic habit would have been scattered all over the Greek world. When the more regular, if less spectacular, flow of inscribed proclamations and regulations is added to this (it was standard practice for Athenian decrees influencing specific cities to be set up in the target state as well as in Athens), then another Aristophanic joke becomes particularly telling: the heroes of the *Birds* recall their resistance to Athenian imperial meddling by reminiscing about the night when 'you crapped on the inscriptions' (*Birds* 1054) recording Athenian imperial edicts. Athens' epigraphic reach becomes, therefore, another aspect of imperial power (Thomas 1994: 43–5), and it might be appropriate to consider this phenomenon as a type of 'cultural imperialism'—comparable, for example, to the coerced allied participation in Athenian religious festivals (Parker 1996: 142–51), or to other Athenian attempts to assert shared ethnicity and kinship between themselves and their subject cities (Hall 1997: 51–6).

5.4. The Afterlife of the Athenian Empire

Isocrates (8.82) joins Aristophanes in suggesting that such attempts to include the allied states in a wider Athenian cultural and religious sphere succeeded only in fostering resentment, and these claims are not hard to believe. But this makes it all the more important to note that the cultural cohesion imposed by imperial Athens might be the aspect of empire with the most far-reaching, and long-lasting, consequences.

This is not to deny that the empire has any political legacy, although the extent of its impact on the subsequent conduct of interstate politics is open to debate. On the one hand, it is clear that the activities of the empire continued to exercise a certain fascination over the next generation of Athenians, whether through wistfulness over their lost power (Badian 1995), or commitment to avoid some of the more unpopular measures by which that power had been attained (RO 22). But the Athenian Empire can also be represented as something much more mundane: just another stage in the never-ending process by which interstate leadership

was transferred from one state to another (Demosthenes 9.23–4; Polybius 1.2). On this view, this empire should not be treated as intrinsically different from, or more deserving of study than, the Spartan, Theban, or Macedonian hegemonies of Greece, and certainly not as something unique in the history of Greek interstate interaction.

The influence of the empire on Athens' wider role and standing in the Greek world is, however, easier to detect. While non-Athenian participation in Athenian festivals does decline once compulsion is removed, it does not disappear entirely (Parker 1996: 221–2); and claims to shared kinship with Athens become more prominent, and less exclusively produced only by Athenians, in fourth-century interstate discourse (Curty 1995; Lücke 2000). Even more notable is the fact that practices previously regarded as paradigmatically Athenian expand outwards into the wider Greek world. Certainly, not all such processes can safely be connected, at least directly, to the impact of empire (on the spread of tragedy, for example, see Taplin 1999; Rhodes 2003). But some can. To return to the epigraphic example discussed above: when the empire ebbs away, it leaves behind a residue of Athenian epigraphic, and perhaps also political, practice (Lewis 1997*b*) and of Athenian linguistic influence. The form of Greek which was the written administrative language of the empire spread throughout, and beyond, the states of the empire, and this phenomenon, reinforced by the spread of the form of Attic dialect spoken by Athenian officials and settlers, is credited with hastening the infiltration of these 'Great Attic' forms into the other Greek dialects—a process which culminates in the disappearance of those dialects and the dominance of the Athenian version of the language (Horrocks 1997: ch. 3; some specific examples of Athenian linguistic influence on epigraphic formulae are discussed in Morpurgo-Davis 1999). It is of course possible that such changes would have come about even without the influence of imperialism, but it does seem very likely that the process of diffusion was intensified by the empire, and that, in general, it is the Athenian Empire's role in the transmission of Hellenic culture, rather than as a transformative moment in the history of imperialism, which might most repay further study.

Suggested Reading

Relevant ancient evidence, both literary and epigraphic, is most conveniently collected, in translation only, in Osborne (2000), which also includes useful discussions of key problems of method and approach, as well as helpful bibliographic guidance. ML has Greek texts and a detailed commentary in English on the most important inscribed texts of the imperial period, many of which are translated, without commentary, in Fornara (1983). The clearest brief survey of the history of the empire is Rhodes (1993*b*), while Meiggs (1972) remains the authoritative substantial study of the subject, covering key themes as well as offering a narrative account of the empire's rise and fall.

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CHAPTER 6

ALEXANDER THE GREAT

PIERRE BRIANT
(Translated from the French by Amélie Kuhrt)

6.1. Bibliographical Inflation and Research Strategies

The output of books devoted to the history of Alexander is so vast as to make it increasingly difficult for specialists in the field to master the literature. The quantity is such as to baffle the layman and dishearten students. No less than seven critical bibliographies appeared between 1938 and 1993. To these should be added bibliographical essays on specific themes (e.g. Alexander and the idea of empire; Alexander in Soviet historiography, etc.); four Proceedings of specialized colloquia published between 1993 and 2003; ten compendia of selected articles and collective works published between 1966 and 2007—some were articles published previously, some specifically commissioned for the occasion; hundreds of articles, including dozens of book reviews and review articles; finally, of course, there has been an unending flow of monographs and/or biographies. Nor does the rate of published monographs and manuals show any signs of slowing down; in fact, it has recently gathered pace—almost certainly one of the by-products of Oliver Stone's film *Alexander the Great*, which has been screened worldwide (2005).

This bibliographical inflation explains why no one scholar, since 1971, has dared to try to give a complete list of publications on Alexander. The only available

assessments (e.g. Briant 2005*a*; Wiemer 2005) which allow one to gain an insight into current debates are, of necessity, limited in scope. It is more or less impossible, and it would probably be useless, now or in the future, to undertake yet another critical review of the bibliography which tries to take up where the latest such publications left off. Rereading some of the analyses published some time ago can, however, be very revealing. For example, in 1966 G. T. Griffith explained why he had not included any studies related to the question of whether 'Alexander was a man of reflection and a planner, and not predominantly a man of action in war and of improvization in the arts of peace'. His comment ran thus: 'This approach to him has not yet been made, so far as I know, in any study of a scope for inclusion in this selection (perhaps it is not possible)' (1966: p. ix). When one looks at more recent studies, one is struck by the fact that, despite the forty years which have elapsed, the situation remains more or less the same.

Some authors find it useful to explain why they are publishing a synthesis; others do not find this necessary because, in their view, the subject's intrinsic interest justifies adding yet more to the already bulging shelves of private and public libraries. For readers the situation is somewhat different: very few studies suggest a new approach to the subject so that 'recent' and 'new' are reduced to virtually the same thing. It is not easy to find scholarly justifications for presenting a bibliography that is, more often than not, simply repetitive. Such a work would most likely induce despair in even the most enthusiastic and conscientious student, as well as directing the reader's attention down any number of blind alleys. The (now ritualized) disclaimer of historical subjectivity ('every historian has his/her Alexander') is rather feeble and paradoxical, given the well-known professional demands in all fields of historical research.

Nevertheless, a general assessment need not be reduced to a recitation of sceptical remarks. The last quarter of the twentieth century was marked by a veritable blossoming of key studies. Yet one question above all still remains: what justification can there be for writing books and articles on the history of Alexander at the beginning of the third millennium? Obviously, it is not possible to give a full answer to this question in such a short essay. In what follows I shall try, in a necessarily selective and personal way, to pick out some aspects and make some observations that might provide food for thought and contribute to the debate.

6.2. History and Historiography

In the course of his inaugural lecture at University College London delivered in 1952, Arnaldo Momigliano made the following uncontested statement: 'But all students of ancient history know in their heart that Greek history is passing through a crisis'

(Momigliano 1952: 4). Yet Momigliano's comment was anything but discouraging. He demonstrated, in effect, that a foray into the historiography of the eighteenth century would open up new perspectives. Today we can say the same about Alexander, whose history has also reached a crisis-point as it has not been sufficiently stimulated by the methodological advances that Greek history has, in the meantime, been able to adopt. Using the term 'crisis' is by no means pejorative—bringing the constituent elements of a crisis into the bright light of day implies that there is a possibility of extricating oneself from it by delineating the positive aspects of an assessment that could be made.

In the same lecture, which deserves to be read and reread, Momigliano himself briefly touched on the historiography of Alexander. With his comment on the place that John Gillies' forgotten *History of Ancient Greece* (1786) and *The History of the World from the Reign of Alexander to that of Augustus* (1809: vol. 1) should hold, he reminded the audience that discussions of Alexander and Hellenistic history had begun well before the young Droysen published his *Alexander der Grosse* in 1833. Moreover, he remarked forcefully that is would be useful to undertake research on the 'pre-Droysenian' Alexander. Such an exercise could serve to enlighten historians who are too often tempted to see in the Prussian historian a kind of *prōtos heuretēs* in the area of research on Alexander and the Hellenistic period. Bikerman, for his part, at a time when the history of the world did not encourage concessions, cast doubt on the novelty of 'Droysen's dominant theory, namely that Hellenism prepared the ground for Christianity... This should not come as a surprise to readers, as today's Germanic admirers of Droysen insist. In fact, it was propagated by English deists and popularized by Voltaire, so that this idea was not, in Droysen's time, either "new" or "advanced" ' (Bikerman 1944–5: 382; cf. Briant 2005*b*: 42–4).

Bikerman's and Momigliano's remarks have not received the attention they deserve. Several reviews and articles, and even some books, have of course invoked or studied in some depth this or that great historian of the nineteenth (Niebuhr, Droysen, Grote, etc.) and twentieth (Wilcken, Radet, Rostovtzeff, Tarn, Schachermeyr, etc.) centuries, or even various specific areas of research (e.g. the Hellenistic period in German or British historiography). But when we look at the galloping bibliographical inflation, is it not a paradox to note that, at present, there is not a *single* detailed study devoted to the historiography of Alexander from the seventeenth to the twentieth century? In the same vein, we abstain from updating the phases, logic, and contradictions, and so risk missing the challenges posed to current and future historians.

Historiography does not, by itself, provide immediate solutions to the problems under discussion. However, if research is conducted by historians who are specialists in this field, it is possible for historiography to provide a more effective key, surer indications, and directions that rest on more secure foundations.

As Bikerman and Momigliano already indicated, detailed research on the Alexander of the Enlightenment can provide today's historian, and tomorrow's,

with much food for thought. A specialist in eighteenth-century literature (Vopilhac-Auger 2002) stressed recently that the important role played by the figure of Alexander in historical and philosophical discourse of the eighteenth century seems to have been seriously underestimated, if not totally ignored, by ancient historians. Yet it is crucial to realize that the constituent elements of Droysen's Alexander are in large part inherited from Montesquieu's Alexander (Briant 2006*a*, *b*): a rational hero, bearer of a clear plan and long-term vision, careful to put a policy of collaboration with the Persians into effect, and to open new trade-routes to enhance the empire's unity, in particular the maritime route between the Indus and Babylonia. Like Droysen's Alexander, Montesquieu's Alexander (like Voltaire's, Linguet's, Condorcet's, and others') is a 'progressive'. Further, it is important to understand why and in what context the Enlightenment thinkers developed such an interpretation, and why and how it was transmitted to Droysen, both directly (Droysen was a great admirer of *Esprit des Lois*) and indirectly, through the works and thoughts of William Robertson and John Gillies in Scotland, William Vincent in England, and Arnold Heeren in Germany—not to mention the crucial role played by the geographers (D'Anville, Buache, John Rennel, Konrad Mannert, etc.) and the scholars who linked the critical analysis of ancient texts to geographical and cartographical research (e.g. Baron de Sainte-Croix, who was, in other respects, deeply opposed to the vision developed by Montesquieu, then Robertson and Vincent, about Alexander's grandiose commercial plans). The connection so often explicitly made between Alexander's conquests, geographical discovery, and trade belongs to the period of competition for India among the European powers and that of Russian expansion in the direction of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia (the prelude to the 'Great Game').

We should also seek to define by what route and in what context Droysen's ideas, which were rejected by several of his contemporaries (Niebuhr, Grote), attracted the extraordinary interest they did throughout the twentieth century (cf. Briant, 2008*a*). In part this was due to the role played in the scholarly field by Ulrich Wilcken and his *Alexander der Grosse* (1931), who adopted Droysen's views, partly to their incorporation in 'Orientalist' literature (in the sense the term is used by Edward Said), and, finally, by the way they were used within European colonial discourse. By contrast, with the reaction to colonialism in the years following World War II, Alexander forfeited his prestigious title of 'civilizer'. His figure has suffered so much that, in an otherwise fascinating book, which the author aligns with the views of Niebuhr and Grote, Alexander is described as a butcher of peoples and ravager of lands (Bosworth 1996). The horror of war and condemnation of 'blood-soaked heroes' expressed in this view are shared by many, but, in trying to counter the pacifist vision of Alexander constructed by Droysen and Tarn in the wake of Plutarch, this interpretation becomes its moralizing and anachronistic opposite, which is simply its mirror image (Parker 1998; Holt 1999). Comparative approaches can certainly yield results, but by projecting antiquity into the present, we are in

danger of making the history of Alexander an instrument for our own agendas (Briant 2005*b*: 49–62).

Interestingly, labelling Alexander either as the one who 'killed millions' (Rollin) or as the creator of a political and commercial 'revolution' (Montesquieu) was a subject of lively debate in the eighteenth century. Discussions began at that time which have continued to the present day, including issues such as how Alexander envisaged the empire he conquered and organized, city foundations, and colonization, the outcome of what has been labelled for long 'the Hellenization of Asia'. Even the question of whether the Macedonian conquest had any lasting transformative effect in the countries of the Middle East or if, on the contrary, it merely perpetuated a regime dubbed 'Asiatic despotism' was the subject of discussion. Further, from the end of the seventeenth century on the myth arose of the 'colossus with feet of clay'. It was used to characterize a postulated 'Persian decadence', and the phrase has survived, alive and well, for three centuries in European historiography to describe both the Persian Empire conquered by Alexander and the Ottoman Empire which the European powers were so eager to dismember (Briant 2003*b*: 85–130; forthcoming). The first explicitly argued assimilation of Darius III's empire and that of the Great Turk is found at the beginning of the sixteenth century. In *The Prince* (ch. 4), Machiavelli tried to define structural reasons for Alexander's defeat of the Persians. His thesis was founded on an idea related to the organization of imperial space, which was taken up and elaborated by Montesquieu, and on an analysis of the relationship between the Achaemenid king and the magnates of his kingdom. Given that his explanation is marked by the deployment of a 'despotic' model, which is seen as the eternal, unchanging feature of the 'Orient' from the great Persian kings to the Ottoman sultans, it fails to convince. Yet the arguments in 'recent' books, which repeat the thesis of 'Achaemenid decadence', are one and all direct descendants of the political and ideological model created by Bossuet (1681) and Rollin (1730), and no more convincing.

These observations have consequences for the state of research now. Contrary to the assumption that 1833 marks the obligatory starting-point for Hellenistic history, creating a kind of historical amnesia about the preceding period, it looks as though one of the most promising directions for research is a detailed and thorough historiographical analysis of themes covering the entire period (seventeenth–twentieth centuries). The dialogue between generations of historians established by such an undertaking would allow scholars, first, to understand when such-and-such an interpretation became dominant, and secondly why, at a particular moment, one interpretation replaced another, that is, as a result of what arguments, what source analysis, and within which intellectual and political contexts.

Let me demonstrate this with a concrete historiographical problem: the question of the arrangement on the Tigris of what ancient authors call the *katarraktai* (usually translated into English as 'weirs' or 'dams') and Alexander's destruction of them as he sailed upriver from the Persian Gulf to Opis. On the surface the question seems

trivial; but it masks a fundamental debate about the beneficial or disastrous consequences of the Macedonian conquest, or, perhaps better, about Alexander's capacity to design and put into action a policy of land development in the conquered territories. Beginning with the first translators (sixteenth century) and commentators (end of the seventeenth century), we can track the problem of interpretation in all its ramifications and see when (around 1780) and in consequence of which new observations (comparison between ancient authors and accounts of modern travellers) the balance of the discussion tipped so far that Alexander's image changed from positive to negative judgements of the consequences for countries and peoples of his conquest. Placing this into a historiographical perspective of the period from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries allows the present-day historian to move forward on firmer ground and suggests an interpretation that distinguishes the 'recent' from the 'new' (Briant 2006*a* and 2008*b*).

6.3. Alexander, Macedonian History, and Achaemenid History

It is axiomatic among researchers on Alexander that the sources present a particularly acute problem, given that the surviving authors wrote several centuries after the events, drawing on both primary and secondary sources generally hard to distinguish, and that this corpus of material has shown no significant increase. Nevertheless, one eminent specialist is of the somewhat surprising opinion that Alexander's reign is quite well documented, and goes so far as to say that: '[It] stands out as an oasis of illumination' (Bosworth 1996: 65). But such a judgement only makes sense in comparison to other periods even worse off. Any hope for progress in the future depends on two interconnected factors: first, the close link between Alexander and Achaemenid history; and second, a positive appraisal of research in the field of Achaemenid and Macedonian history.

We can measure the change that has occurred within the last decades by looking again at A. T. Olmstead's posthumous book (1948), which has long, and rightly, served as a reference work. With respect to linking Achaemenid history and Alexander, we can read him in two possible ways. On the one hand, the author presents Alexander and the conquest in traditional mode as a Hellenic 'crusade' initiated by Philip and brought to its conclusion by Alexander (the burning of Persepolis). The structural explanation for the defeat to come of the Persian Empire appears in Olmstead's analysis of the tribute system under Xerxes and Artaxerxes I. The title of the chapter (ch. 21) is unambiguous: 'Overtaxation and its Results.' He presents his thesis simply and clearly: 'From the satrapies a constant stream of silver flowed

in... Little of this vast sum was ever returned to the satrapies... The inevitable result was that the whole period is filled by the story of revolts by oppressed subjects' (1948: 297–9). Olmstead thinks that by 335/4 the situation was such that 'the Near East was being prepared to accept any invader who offered a firm and efficient administration' (ibid. 487). In sum, the system of over-exploitation made Alexander's conquest both necessary and inevitable, and thus he was welcomed as a liberator in Egypt as well as Babylonia (ibid. 509, 517).

But Olmstead's publication also marks a real turning-point in Achaemenid history (cf. Briant 2005*d*). At the end of his final chapter (ch. 37, 'Persepolis. The Crusade Ends'), he draws up with relish a balance-sheet of research to date, and is proud of the achievements of historians, philologists, and archaeologists: 'Achaemenid Persia has risen from the dead' (ibid. 24). To drive his point home he makes a quite unprecedented comparison between the sources available for Achaemenid history and the known sources for ancient Macedon. Olmstead sees this as a revenge for Persepolis, which was being explored at just that time by his colleagues in the University of Chicago, and asserts that, in contrast, 'the Macedonia of Alexander has disappeared, almost without trace... The tombs of the Macedonian rulers... have never been found. [Alexander's] own capital, Pella, is a mass of shapeless ruins' (ibid. 522–3).

Progress in Achaemenid history has continued since 1948—in fact, it has speeded up quite spectacularly. Combining a contextualized rereading of the Graeco-Roman sources with Achaemenid documentation in all its regional diversity makes it possible now to present a different image of the Persian Empire on the eve of the Macedonian conquest (Briant 2002: 691–871, 1007–50), and to reconsider the figure of Darius III without turning it into an absurd exercise in 'rehabilitation' (Briant 2003*b*). Even newer is that, alongside these developments, the lacunae in Macedonian history, epigraphy, and archaeology (somewhat maliciously stressed by Olmstead) have begun to disappear since the 1970s. The Macedonian royal tombs have been rediscovered, and the hunting frescos at Vergina (Saatsoglou-Paliadelē 2004) are fuelling debates about the interrelationship of Achaemenid and Macedonian ideologies of kingship before, during, and after Alexander (Briant 1991; Tripodi 1998; Palagia 2000). As for the social and political institutions of the Macedonian kingdom, they can now be analysed in some detail, thanks to the annual increase in the number of inscriptions (Chatzopoulos 1996), including those from Alexander's reign (Errington 1998). There is also the numismatic material which, placed alongside Achaemenid coinage, now makes it possible to set Alexander's imperial policy into a clearer context (Le Rider 2003).

With such material and advances to hand, the historian engaged in studying the time of Alexander is in a very fortunate position, with his/her research fed by two streams of evidence (Achaemenid and Macedonian) that are constantly on the increase and enhance each other. The perspective is further broadened if

the historian is prepared to accept the fact that the chapter of Alexander's conquests in 334–323 should be set into a historical framework that makes better sense, that is, one beginning *c.*350 and ending *c.*300 (cf. Briant and Joannès 2006). Further, s/he must take into account the Achaemenid past and the Near Eastern setting within which the history of the Persian Empire developed. By using such an approach, this field of study will regain the chronological and spatial depth it should never have lost, while the historian gains access to a wealth of documentation almost unparalleled in ancient history. In other words, no progress in the history of Alexander is conceivable without the deep understanding of the sources and problems of Macedonian and Achaemenid history demanded by the subject.

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CHAPTER 7

HELLENISTIC CULTURE

SUSAN STEPHENS

ALEXANDER's expedition to India followed by his death at 32 ushered in a period of prolonged expansion of Greeks into the non-Greek regions of the eastern Mediterranean and accelerated the expansion of Rome into South Italy and Sicily. The balance of power shifted from the Greece of Athens and Sparta and Thebes to courts of new dynasts and their satellite kings. Athens, the poster-child for Greek democracy, was no longer independent but subject to the authority of Macedon. Greek city-states were required to adapt as relatively few imperial courts interlinked by dynastic marriages came to exert control over part and influence over most of southern Europe, western Asia, and northern Africa. Though we tend to consider Hellenistic kingdoms mainly in terms of the spread of Greek language and culture throughout the Greek East, the age was one of extensive diplomatic as well as cultural exchange between these new kingdoms in the eastern Mediterranean and the older Greek-speaking dynastic establishments in Sicily, South Italy, Epirus, and of course, Macedon. For example, Ptolemy II of Egypt was the sometime brother-in-law of Syracusan Agathocles and step brother-in-law to the Epirote Pyrrhus. He not only supported Pyrrhus, but also maintained good relations with Carthage, and initiated a formal exchange with Rome in 273 BCE (Hölbl 2001: 54–5). We also find similar historical trends shaping both Rome and the Hellenistic kingdoms: for example, the Celts (also called Gauls or *Galatai* in Greek), who had attacked Rome in 390 and again in 367–365 BCE, were on the move and attacking Delphi and Dodona in the early 270s, creating opportunities for new dynasts to distinguish themselves but also for the Romans to move into northern Greece

and Macedon. (See Dench 2003 for cultural identities in Hellenistic South Italy and Sicily.)

Whatever the continuities with earlier Greek civic and social practices, the world of the Successors of Alexander (the *Diadokhoi*) saw distinctive new behaviours: the Successors ruled with mercenary (not citizen) armies over far larger areas than their Greek predecessors, and designated their new possessions 'spear-won land' (Smith 1994: 110–11; Virgilio, 2003: 76–85). Each regional monarch needed to negotiate a modus vivendi between his own military, other dynasts, the established Greek and non-Greek urban centres, and the vast areas of hinterland within his territory. The Seleucids ruled over the former Persian Empire; the Ptolemies in Egypt; the Antigonids originally held Greece and western Asia Minor and Syria before losing western Turkey to an Attalid dynasty in the middle of the third century BCE. Traditional scholarship has tended to assume the imposition of a Greek or Macedonian model onto barbarian peoples, but increased study of local inscriptions written in native languages and increased expertise on the part of Greek historians in indigenous histories has altered the model to one of interaction and adaptability, stressing continuing roles for the native non-Greek aristocracies and strategies to promote assimilation (Billows 1990: 305–12; Sherwin-White 1987; Lloyd 2002; Stephens 2005). In the conquered territories of the East—Asia Minor, Persia, Egypt—land grants to mercenaries opened regions to cultivation and permanent settlement (Chaniotis 2005: 82–8). Well over a hundred new cities were founded, older cities revived, and even non-Greek spaces like Babylon or Memphis took on the semblance of Greek civic communities (Cohen 1995; Fraser 1996). Yet ethnic Greeks would always have been a relatively small percentage of the total population, and intermarriage guaranteed that the very notion of what constituted being Greek changed over time.

Urban centres were prime areas for the process of Hellenization that is often cited as characteristic of the age. New cities will have had large indigenous populations, and they attracted Greeks from disparate regions of the Mediterranean. Many had colonies of diaspora Jews and/or large concentrations of other non-Greek ethnicities like Syrians or Carians. Imperial administrations thus confronted the challenge of ruling both Greek-speaking and non-Greek peoples, and evolved strategies of inclusion and/or privilege to replace the kinds of authority that had belonged to citizens of earlier city-states. Citizens within the Hellenistic cities, however, were no less involved or less zealous in civic activities. Increasing numbers of inscriptions testify to local magistrates' oversight of religious affairs, the upkeep of buildings and roads, sewers, water and grain supply, as well as exchange with other cities and local kings (Billows 2003). Four new foundations—Alexandria in the Egypt of the Ptolemies, Antioch on the Orontes, Seleucia on the Tigris in the kingdom of the Seleucids, and Pergamum in Attalid Asia Minor—saw rapid growth in the range of 100,000 to 300,000 people, which was far in excess of what can be established for previous Greek cities (Scheidel 2005: 3–4, 24–5). These mega-cities had features

of the typical Greek polis (temples, marketplaces, civic buildings), but they also had large areas devoted to the royal quarters and spectacular architectural display that promoted the royal house. The Pergamene altar, for example, boasted two central friezes: a traditional theme for Greeks triumphing over barbarism—the battle of gods and giants modelled on Athens—to celebrate the Attalid victory over the *Galatai*; and the exploits of Telephus, the alleged ancestor of the royal house. Alexandria and Pergamum also staged imperial power by acquiring vast libraries, thus exhibiting symbolic control over the cultural capital that an earlier Greece had produced, and throughout the second century BCE the libraries developed as rival institutions. The new dynasts encouraged the migration of philosophers and poets to enhance the status of their realms, and fostered scientific knowledge, even if (as in the case of Archimedes) more for practical than intellectual goals (Lloyd 1973).

Ruler cult, whatever its earlier Greek antecedents, took on a new prominence during this period. Alexander's remarkable life and career was undoubtedly a stimulus. He received extraordinary cult attention even during his lifetime, and certainly immediately after his death association with him was claimed by all the Successors (Chaniotis 2003: 434–5; Virgilio 2003). Native practices in a few of the conquered regions would also have been instrumental. Even if the practice of the Ptolemies in Egypt was typical, and if dynasts allowed themselves to be assimilated to native divinities as part of a strategy for ruling indigenous populations, Alexander and dead members of the royal family received cult that was separate from the cult that the ruling Ptolemy and his spouse received as pharaoh (Hölbl 2001: 77–124). This would accord well with Simon Price's contention that ruler cult was primarily a Greek urban response to the new and unprecedented powers of these kings: 'cities established cults [to the new dynasts] as an attempt to come to terms with a new type of power. Unlike the earlier leaders and kings the Hellenistic rulers were both kings and Greek, and some solution had to be found to the problem this posed. There was no legal answer and the cities needed to represent this new power to themselves' (Price 1984: 29–30). Kings actively fostered claims to their own divine status both by association with favoured divinities—the Antigonids with Zeus, the Seleucids with Apollo, the Attalids with Athene, and the Ptolemies with Serapis, a blend of Greek Dionysus and Egyptian Osirapis, unique to their kingdom—and by claiming divine ancestors like Heracles, Achilles, or Perseus (Chaniotis 2003: 443). These heroic ancestors then figured prominently in Hellenistic arts and literature. More work needs to be done on the various modalities of divinity within the Hellenistic period (Greek, non-Greek, syncretistic cults) and how they facilitated the exercise of imperial power and/or identity formation within and over disparate cultural groups.

Although there is considerable merit in the general principle, often articulated, that during this period Greek identity came to depend less on civic affiliation than on a shared set of cultural values, or that, to paraphrase Jonathan Hall, a 'Hellenicity' constructed as opposition began to replace an ethnicity constructed

as kinship via fictive genealogies (Hall 2002: 179), identity remained geographically specific for most Greeks. 'Hellene' was only a meaningful category in the aggregate when opposed to non-Greek; Greeks when thinking about themselves still needed to identify with place, as defined by cults, gods, and fictive ancestors. For the Greek-speaking courts and the cities established in non-Greek areas, place was problematic—there were often no local gods or heroes that allowed for easy identification. Thus we see the Hellenistic period evolving its own brand of Greek culture transmitted by creative new festivals like the *Ptolemaia* in Alexandria, established by Ptolemy II in honour of his father, in which Ptolemy I Soter, Alexander, and Dionysus are visually linked (Rice 1983: 190–2), or the *Sōtēria* established by the Coans to celebrate the defeat of the *Galatai* who attacked Delphi in 279/8 BCE. The Panhellenic games continued to thrive, with the new dynasts eager to compete (and stress their Greek ancestry; see e.g. Posidippus' epigrams on the Ptolemies' Panhellenic victories: Austin and Bastianini 2002, nos. 78, 79, 82, 87, 88). New athletic and musical competitions were introduced in cities like Alexandria and Antioch, and the common shrines at Delphi, Delos, Samothrace, Dodona, or Didyma found new and increased patronage (Chamoux 2003: 326–44). Already in the fourth century tragedy and dithyramb were being performed in Syracuse and Macedon. In the third we see professional virtuosi and international superstars performing a standard repertory in more than one location. There are notable consequences for the growth of these groups of professionals (called *technitai* of Dionysus): performance became more broadly available and exportable to whatever locations had the price of hiring the guild; the performance of the same play (or more likely selections from a set of plays) in more than one location reinforced the idea of a common stock of mythological lore, which in turn must have been a significant factor in transmitting a shared sense of Greek cultural identity; while new dynasties might display their generosity and compete for status by supporting what were often quite spectacular theatrical displays. The advantages of a theatre did not go unnoticed by the Seleucids, who had one built in that quintessentially non-Greek space of Babylon (Sherwin-White 1987: 20–1).

Contrasting trends are observable in respect to ethnic identity: on the one hand, non-Greeks assimilated to the dominant culture by learning Greek, while many Greeks who migrated to new cities or served in imperial armies then settled locally and married native women. Greek colonization at all periods must have involved some assimilation of indigenous populations, of course, but the scale was now much greater. Nor was the fact of assimilation a drawback to advancement: Philetairos, the founder of the Attalid dynasty in Pergamon, was at best half-Greek, the product of a Macedonian father and a Paphylagonian mother (Kosmetatou 2003: 159–60). On the other hand, assertions of Greekness, especially when tied to historically Greek *ethnē* and poleis, may have become more important for those who could establish such social credentials. Traditional Greek establishments like the gymnasium and the ephorate persist throughout the period (Billows 2003: 213–14;

Chamoux 2003: 293–8), and in fact the desire to maintain a modicum of ethnic purity may have contributed to the brother–sister marriage of Hellenistic Egypt. In the context of ethnic identity it is worth reflecting that 'Hellene' refers to Greeks in the aggregate, not Greeks locally identified, and the term *Hellenismos*, from which we have the term 'Hellenism', refers not to cultural characteristics as a whole, but to a pure Greek style—a desideratum of the rhetorical schools that prepared young men for social advancement. Thus *Hellenismos* was not limited to those Greek by birth, but was available to non-Greeks seeking advancement by learning Greek as well. An important counter to the general impression that all natives strove to be Greek can be found in Egypt, where ethnic identity seems not to have always been fixed but adaptable to circumstance: we find individuals using Greek names in a Greek milieu, but an Egyptian name in an Egyptian milieu (Stephens 2005: 235–9). There even appears to have been a category of 'tax Greek' in early Ptolemaic Egypt, where 'Hellene' was an administrative fiction uncoupled from ethnic identity (Clarysse and Thompson 2006: 2. 125–48). Future scholarship in the Hellenistic period needs to develop a deeper awareness of the variety and context of ethnic self-presentation, and the implications for interpretation of historical texts.

If in the East non-Greeks could and did become Greek, in the West we find Greeks and non-Greeks both being absorbed by the expansion of Latin-speaking Rome. Just as in the East non-Greeks learned Greek for social advancement and we find Egyptian texts, for example, translated into Greek, in the West we see the obverse: Greeks not only learning Latin, but translating Greek texts into Latin (Livius Andronicus' translation of the *Odyssey* into Latin is generally taken to have been the beginning of Latin literature). The two processes were not entirely equivalent: Greek expansion was the result of a definitive event—the expedition of Alexander. The expansion of Rome was a slower process that led first to the absorption of Greek-speaking South Italy and Sicily, northern regions of Gaul and Illyria that brought it into conflict with Macedon, the subsequent conquest of the Greek mainland, and the inevitable assimilation of each of the Hellenistic states. The temporal boundary for the end of the Hellenistic period—the death of Cleopatra in 30 BCE—reinforces the fact that imperial courts were the shaping feature of the age. At her death the last and most distinctive of the Hellenistic kingdoms was subsumed by Rome. That event led to the ascendancy of Octavian as sole ruler of Rome, and allowed the consolidation of the formerly independent and often warring kingdoms into a unified Roman Empire. Although there were numerous continuities with the older Hellenistic kingdoms (for example, much administration continued in Greek in the eastern Roman Empire), what changed forever was the status of Greeks. They no longer dominated either the political or the social hierarchy, and their subaltern status can be seen in protest literature like the acts of the pagan martyrs from early Roman Egypt (Musurillo 1954). Research on post-Hellenistic Greek culture must take seriously this reduced social status and reckon Greek self-representation, literature, and art-forms in light of it.

The plastic arts and literature were important contributors to the formation of cultural identity, particularly for the large, heterogeneous populations in Hellenistic cities. There was a proliferation of the arts and, given the vastness of the territory and the distinctive earlier cultures in which new Hellenistic kingdoms were situated, the evolution of many regional styles. Kings and cities adorned the civic spaces and sanctuaries with buildings, monuments, and statuary, while the houses and tombs of the well-to-do provided growing opportunities for artistic innovation and display (Stewart 2006: 158–85). The mosaic, for example was a Hellenistic invention, apparently first developed in Macedon, where some of the most famous examples are located. Found usually in private houses, mosaics testify to the increasing role of the symposium as a means of social exchange and status enhancement (Westgate 2002: 221–51). The recently discovered roll of epigrams by Posidippus of Pella, who wrote in the first half of the third century, contains a series of epigrams on bronze statuary (62–70 Austin–Bastianini). These engaging poems nicely exhibit the variety and salient characteristics of Hellenistic art: the epigrams endeavour to capture the essence of the visual experience, and objects selected by the poet range in size from a miniature chariot to the Colossus of Rhodes; they range in subject-matter from the heroic—Alexander, heroic warfare—to the ordinary—a cow, a fly. We find an aesthetic sensibility that declares a natural style or realistic representation to be judged by 'the canon of truth' (63.6 Austin–Bastianini, with Stewart 2005). Finally, there is constant interplay between the contemporary, the mythological, and the mundane. Hellenistic art is known for its expression of emotions and for subject-matter that the supposedly more restrained art of the classical period rejected: the *Laocoon* group or the *Dying Gaul* are easily cited examples. An area of considerable opportunity for new research is the intersection of Greek and non-Greek art in the Hellenistic period: to judge from Egypt, the throne sponsored temples and statuary in the Egyptian style as well as Greek, and there is considerable influence in both directions.

Literature, and especially poetry, flourished within the Hellenistic period, also evolving its own styles. Proper evaluation of the poetry has been hampered by the fact that much is fragmentary, but even more because of its reception. The critical terms most frequently employed to discuss this art—'delicate', 'elegant', 'refined'—fail to capture the boldness of vision, emotional variety, and intercultural awareness that mirrors the plastic arts. The tendency in current scholarship has been to construct the Hellenistic poets as devoid of moral content or universals, in their place elevating formal or aesthetic criteria. Many scholars would position this allegiance to 'art' as a reaction to the distasteful necessity of writing within imperial courts (Schwinge 1986: 76) or to being overwhelmed by the greatness of the Greek literary past (Snell 1953: 276–7), though these readings speak more to contemporary sensibility than to the ancient (see Cameron 1995: 11–23). It is doubtful whether any pre-industrial poet, or theorist of poetry, could have held such views. (Certainly, archaic poets who wrote for hire did not.) It is more productive to consider how the

Greek world of antiquity conceptualized the poet: more often than not as a medium for inspired utterance, akin to the divine (e.g. Plato's *Ion*). The challenge to poetry in the early Hellenistic period was not the coercive state but the devaluation of the poet's status by fourth-century philosophers. Aristotle embarked upon a thorough critique and organization of poetry and linguistic expression that was continued by his school. Such analyses inevitably focused on what had already been written, and necessarily involved judgements about and preferences for certain existing genres and styles, and in this way provided guidelines for the emerging group of scholars or literary critics (whether Alexandrian or Pergamene) to impose order on the diverse inheritance of the literary past. But these activities also guaranteed the cultural belatedness of Hellenistic poetry before it had begun.

It is more productive to consider the ways in which the literature of this period (like the plastic arts) played a vital role in reshaping the world of Hellenistic societies. Poetry remained an efficacious means of aligning new spaces with both old Greece and her colonies (from which the citizens of new cities were being recruited), thus for constructing new frames of reference for a community. For example, Apollonius of Rhodes wrote a poem (now lost) on Canopus. Far from being an exercise in recherché mythologizing, the poem served to link the alien space of Alexandrian Egypt with Homeric myth. Although he does not appear in Homer, in later stories Canopus was the helmsman of Menelaus who fell overboard and drowned when Menelaus, upon return from Troy, detoured to Egypt. The story goes that Canopus was buried near the mouth of the Nile, to which he then gave his name (Strabo 17.1.17). A more familiar example is Heracles. His labours had taken him in the past to virtually all regions of the Hellenistic world. He had already been claimed as ancestor for much of Greece, and could thus be pressed into service to link new establishments to the Hellenic past. He is a frequent figure in both poetry and art of the period, and should not be dismissed as a hollow myth: a decree from Xanthus in Asia Minor, for example, employs the myth of common descent from Heracles to forge a bond between the citizens of Xanthus, Seleucus, and Ptolemy (Chamoux 2003: 209–11). Similarly, the Attalids turned to Telephus, the child of Auge and Heracles who was born in Mysian Teuthrania, and promoted him as founder and first king of the region. Even the Romans participated in these fictive Heraclid genealogies: Dionysius of Halicarnassus (1.27.1) records that 'some say' Tyrrhenus, the son of Heracles and Omphale, was the leader of the people who settled in Italy (the Etruscans), and Heracles' struggle with Cacus in central Rome is featured in Livy (1.7), Propertius (4.9), and Vergil (*Aeneid* 8.184–275). For Callimachus and Apollonius, a central organizing myth for the Ptolemaic Empire was that of Jason and the Argonauts, providing as it did a mythological template for Greek entitlement to North Africa (as was earlier adumbrated in Pindar's *Pythian* 4; Stephens 2003: 173–96). The *Aitia*, like Apollonius' epic, was an origin myth for the new state, one that remapped the Mediterranean in terms of the peoples and their foundation stories, now of importance to the Ptolemies. The poem follows a

trajectory from 'beginnings' (Minos' sea power and the voyage of the *Argo*) to the contemporary world of Ptolemaic Alexandria. It ends with a poem commemorating the marriage of Ptolemy III Euergetes with Berenice II, the daughter of Ptolemy Magas, the king of Cyrene, a marriage instrumental in reuniting the two regions of Cyrene and Egypt.

The intersection of historical events, imperial self-fashioning, and the role of the arts in communal myth-making is well illustrated by the Gauls or *Galatai*. These were associated warrior tribes who, during the fourth century, had migrated from the region of modern France (Roman Gaul) to Illyria (modern Albania) and northern Greece, where they settled for a time. On the move again in the early third century, they attacked Delphi and Dodona, before finally settling in western Anatolia. Opinions differ on whether these peoples posed any real threat to the various kingdoms they passed through or were merely convenient grist for the ideological mill (e.g. Mitchell 2003; Momigliano 1975). Certainly, Elizabeth Kosmetatou (2003: 172) points out that by focusing on the *Galatai* as barbarian invaders, dynasts diverted attention from the fact that dynastic wars more often pitted Greek against Greek. As the Hellenistic kings alternately employed the *Galatai* as mercenaries or fended off their incursions, they found creative ways of celebrating themselves as preservers of the social order. The Attalids, for example, used their defeat of the *Galatai* as a springboard to power, setting up their celebrated Pergamene altar to herald their 'saving' of the Greeks from barbarians. Hellenistic poets celebrated other Galatian defeats: the Alexandrian Callimachus wrote at least one poem on the subject (his lost *Galatea*), and used the example of their defeat at Delphi as a triumph of order over the forces of chaos in his *Hymn to Delos* (185–7); fragments of several other poems exist, including one in which the *Galatai* were imagined as the new Persians (Barbantani 2001: 162–76). Even the seemingly non-political poems of Theocritus featuring the Cyclops, Polyphemus, and his lover, Galatea, take on a less than innocent note when we realize that these were the parents of Galates, the eponymous ancestor of the *Galatai* (Stephens 2006: 104–7). The *Galatai* made a strong impact in the visual imagination as well: representations of these warriors are among the finest examples of Hellenistic art. Usually shown as they lay dying, they evoke pity and sympathy for the nobility of the fallen foe.

Despite its being a period of unique and impressive achievement, the Hellenistic world is unlikely to escape its image as interstitial—a fallow period between what continues to be regarded as the acme of Greek achievement (the fifth and fourth centuries BCE) and the subsequent triumphalism of Rome. For J. G. Droysen (1998), the most significant theorist of the period, it had importance because the blending of Greek and barbarian culture paved the way for Christianity. (Cf. the discussions of Briant and Porter in this volume.) But apart from whatever modern perception of the Hellenistic period we may have derived from Droysen or Hegel, or those who, like Bruno Snell, wrote in their shadow, it is important to recognize that our contemporary evaluation of the Hellenistic world is equally shaped by

the ancients themselves. Even during the period, the Attalids promoted their own 'family values' at the expense of the luxurious living and often shocking marital alliances, such as that between Ptolemy II and his sister-wife Arsinoe in Egypt. Hellenistic dynasts were easy targets to set against the new morality of Rome, and the historian Polybius was among the first to do so (18.41, 22.20). Subsequent writers under Augustus continued the process: Pliny dismissed Hellenistic art as unimportant (*Natural History* 34.52), for example, while Virgil inserted a vignette of Antony and Cleopatra defeated by Augustus as the centrepiece of Aeneas' shield (*Aeneid* 8.685–713). If, as Porter articulates in this volume, the Hellenic world is a view back to the past from a vantage-point that selects one past as typical or representative, then the Hellenistic world was one of those places from which that idealized past was created. There is no doubt that as Hellenistic courts and cities evolved they set out to rival their predecessors and adapted earlier models, inevitably magnifying the past they were seen to appropriate. Strategies of self-presentation for broad cultural consumption and legitimacy, like heralding their triumph over the *Galatai* as 'new Persians', may have worked well within their contemporary frameworks, but viewed in hindsight and often without an adequate cultural context appear trivial in comparison. Equally, imperial policies such as those of a Ptolemy, ruling Greeks as *basileus* and Egyptians as pharaoh, authorizes the wall to remain intact between Greek history and Egyptology, and for Greek historians to continue to write the histories of the period without knowing the languages, monuments, or texts of indigenous cultures.

The fifth century was lucky to have its Herodotus, Thucydides, and Aeschylus; apart from Polybius, the historians of the Hellenistic age have not survived, and Polybius' own narrative is one of Roman order finally imposed on a chaotic Hellenistic period. But even if more Hellenistic historians had survived, the disparities of scale (100 or so years against 300), the relatively small, homogeneous, and thus more comprehensible populations and cities of the Greek mainland and Ionia contrast with the size and diversity of the Hellenistic world and militate against the telling of a straightforward and compelling narrative. The fact that (ancient) democratic or republican forms of government will continue to be privileged, if only subconsciously, by modern western critics, and the inescapable fact that proper understanding of the achievement of the Hellenistic period requires systematic investigation of the non-Greek worlds (Persia, Egypt, India, Syria) out of which it was mainly created and in which it flourished, guarantee that the Hellenistic period will continue to suffer in comparison to what went before or came after. At least one line of remedy within Greek studies would be to adopt a more integrated disciplinary approach that dissolves the barriers between history, art history, archaeology, and literary studies. Imperial courts need to be studied more holistically, their political achievements better acknowledged, nuanced by firmer economic and archaeological data about the spaces in which their urban centres were created, and to which their arts contributed a distinctive style. More comparative work between

Hellenistic courts, including those of Sicily and southern Italy, would be welcome, and in the latter case would improve our understanding of the appropriation of Greek culture by Rome. But the greatest desideratum is a willingness to concede that the political and economic systems, religious beliefs, arts, and values of non-Greek cultures played a non-trivial role in shaping the Hellenistic world.

Suggested Reading

There is a vast literature on the component parts of the Hellenistic period and its culture(s). Therefore, I would recommend starting with one of the several recent 'Companion' volumes and general studies on the Hellenistic period, all of which provide full bibliographies, though with the caveat that all are Hellenocentric. Whenever possible my references are to these volumes. They include Bugh (2006), Erskine (2003), Ogden (2002), and Shipley (2000). Erskine (2003) provides the most comprehensive and thought-provoking coverage; Ogden (2002) offers a selective and informative group of articles; Bugh (2006) short, helpful introductions. Austin (1981) and Bagnall and Derow (2004) provide translations of representative documents. Chaniotis (2005) provides a fascinating glimpse of the ways in which warfare shaped the period, both practically and ideologically. Pollitt (1986) remains the standard on Hellenistic art, but Andrew Stewart's articles in Bugh (2006) and Erskine (2003) are extremely informative and have excellent suggestions for further reading. For a standard treatment of Hellenistic literature, see Fantuzzi and Hunter (2004). Fraser (1976) is the most complete and authoritative treatment of any Hellenistic dynasty.

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CHAPTER 8

ROMAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE GREEKS

ALESSANDRO BARCHIESI

THE day he was assassinated, Caius Gracchus delivered one of the most memorable and moving performances of Roman oratory. Cicero, who alludes to Gracchus' words repeatedly, quotes a passage in his treatise on eloquence and mentions that even political enemies (much as they hated him, as the rest of the day was going to demonstrate) were forced to tears (Cicero, *On the Orator* 3.214; trans. J. M. May and J. Wisse):

> What was it about Gracchus, whom you, Catulus, remember better than I, that was talked about so much when I was young? 'Where can I take refuge in my misery? Where can I turn? To the Capitol? But that is drenched in my brother's blood! To home? So that I can see my mother in misery, grief-stricken and downcast?' People generally agreed that, when delivering these words, he used his eyes, voice, and gestures to such effect that even his enemies could not contain their tears.

Of course, Cicero knew that the occasion and the words had created some sort of moment of truth in the history of Roman oratory, a critical test for the power of expression. Surprisingly for us, this moment of truth must have included—as a significant factor in raising emotions and recalling memories—the reference to a similar dilemma uttered on stage in Euripides' *Medea* (502–5) and recently Latinized by Ennius (*Tragedies*, fr. 104 Jocelyn; see also Norden 1986: 184, n. 12). In the culture of the Roman republic, apparently, there was nothing cold and

calculated in manipulating a Greek model: the achievement of Caius Gracchus was about bringing Medea to bear on his situation without losing the authenticity and credibility of a martyr of freedom. Even if few Romans were up to his standards of courage, comparable examples are ubiquitous in Roman letters and life: they include the Homeric quotations of many of Suetonius' Caesars at critical moments in their careers. It is impossible to study Roman society without some sort of interest in the many reverberations of Greek culture and its effects.

The discipline still labelled as 'Classics' has been built on the foundations of value-judgements and social functions that are now debatable or even extinct. The most insidious and persistent of these foundational ideas is the claim that Roman and Greek cultures need, and deserve, to be detached from Mediterranean contexts and then treated as a unity because Latinity is, for barbarian Europe, the harbinger and mediator of Greek culture. The transition from Greece to Rome, then, is complementary to the later transmission of pagan culture to northern Europe, a barbarian and Christian Europe; and also, implicitly, to the (Droysenian) story of how the spread of Hellenism paved the way for the diffusion of '(Judeo-)Christian' civilization (cf. Porter in this volume). The story of Roman culture, it was believed, was merely, and no less than, a chapter in the history of western civilization, a story in which (as the Germanized Jewish classicist Friedrich Leo, born Levi, mentions at the beginning of the best history of Latin literature ever written) there was a constant flow of civilizing influence from the East: 'Die Kulturbewegung ist von Osten nach Westen gegangen' (Leo 1913: 1). Classics, then, goes back to a narrative of *translatio imperii* ('transfer of power'), and although its practitioners know perfectly well that the intentions and interests of Roman actors on the ground do not stand up to the lofty ideal of *Kulturtransfer*, there is a constant risk that Roman intentions and agendas will be, so to speak, lost in *translatio*. One corrective to this tendency is to study Roman ideas about Hellenization, and to see how literature in Latin is shaped by concerns about the distinctiveness and interaction of Roman and Greek. In the narrow space of this contribution, I attempt a brief panorama from a Romanocentric perspective.

In the generation of Leo, Latin studies were re-founded in Germany, made more rigorous, and based on the idea of a quest for 'originality' and 'imitation'. Latin literary studies have never been fully free of the concepts of belatedness or cultural insecurity and from a sense of dependence on the Greek world. A search for further 'autonomy' and a pre-Greek identity for Roman culture has been attempted many times, but it founders on a problem: the recent turn to material culture, a turn that ought to have produced a sense of a Roman 'core' identity (in opposition to the many accretions and imports from the Greek-speaking world), in fact heightens, not weakens, the idea that Rome—for a long time, an open city—was always already a contact zone exposed to Greek influence. In the words of a historian of the early republic, 'an independent or autonomous Roman culture never had a chance to emerge' (Cornell 1978: 110; cf. Feeney 1998: 5). A hint of a paradox begins to appear.

If we decide to use material culture to clarify the evolution of Italy in the age of Roman expansion, we end up with the following dilemma: 'The spread in Italy during this period of a material culture we call *Hellenistic* is one of the surest measures of *Romanization*' (Wallace-Hadrill 1994: 184–5). Even those who try to reconstruct an independent 'song culture' for Rome (Habinek 2005) cannot escape a feeling of paradox: early Roman song may have been more important than we usually realize, and it must have preceded the formal import of Greek rhythms and melic art, but the whole quest for us hinges precisely on the influence of a Greek model—this time, a Greek model for Latinists, more than for Romans; it is based on the pressure we feel to reconstruct a missing Roman equivalent for early Greek poetry and its social function. A related problem arises: when intercultural influence is so strong, even homespun attempts to define the native Roman, the true Roman, end up being conditioned by Hellenicity: 'There is ultimately no escape from the Hellenic shadow in Rome: from "Rome" at the same time as "Greece" and "not-Greece"... to Greece as the host and parasite of Roman culture' (Beard 1993: 63).

Now some of those paradoxes are actually Roman ways, 'emic' ways, to conceptualize the problem of Greek influence. One could focus on the *Aeneid* of Virgil as an example. The poem promises the Roman readers of the Augustan age an access to 'primitive Italy', but the interpretive frame is offered by Greek ethnographers and their work on the barbarian north. 'The... type of the peasant soldier, here seen in his most harsh and primitive aspects, derives ultimately [!] from the Greek ethnographers' (Horsfall 1971: 1116). The Trojans, who represent the other strand in the fabrication of Roman identity beside the 'early Italians', are not exactly Greeks, yet, as was pointed out by C. G. Heyne (still writing Latin in the Romantic age), in the battle scenes, where names are clustered and we need a clue to differentiate ethnicity, 'Latina nomina Latinos, Graeca Troianos designare videntur' ('It appears that Latin names are for Latin warriors, and Greek names for Trojans': Heyne 1767 ad Virgil, *Aeneid* 10.474). More generally, the comparative literature scholar Thomas Greene points out that the plot of the poem—survivor crosses over from the embers of Troy towards the origins of a new civilization—resonates with the *form* of the poem: both the plot and the formal construction of the work call attention to ideas of acculturation and long-distance transmission:

> The *Aeneid* is the classic statement of the Roman task because Virgil made it an epic of what I should like to call *transitivity*, that is to say of historical mediation, of threatened but preserved continuities... First, it narrates and valourizes a myth of precarious continuity; and second, its minor forms (episodes, descriptions, speeches, similes, characters) call attention to their Greek provenience and specifically to their Homeric provenience.
>
> (Greene 1982: 66)

Greene is chiefly interested in how a third idea of 'transfer' promotes itself through the Virgilian tradition, and this is, of course, the humanist ideology of redeeming

the past and resurrecting ancient Rome. But it is interesting that on this view the entire plot of the Virgilian epic is a reflex, or more exactly a distorted image, of what the poet is actually doing at the level of cultural poetics. Aeneas is not a Greek, although he has many Greek aspects, but by coming to Italy he literally brings the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* to this new territory, and so becomes a trope (not a direct icon) for the idea that Roman culture is 'colonized' by the Greeks.

It has also been pointed out that the poem is an act of reconciliation, and that students of Virgil should worry less about relations between the figure of Aeneas and the personality of Augustus and more about the *Aeneid* as the poem about the reconciliation between Greeks and Romans (Momigliano 1982). The observation comes from a historian, since historians are less prone than literati to forget that the Roman occupation of Greece, from the Macedonian wars to Corinth, from Sulla to Octavian, had been a bitter story of resentment and humiliation. Literary scholars have been more cheerful about 'the blending of Greek and Roman' in Augustan poetry. In any case, the *Aeneid* does not offer a frontal representation of Greek cultural supremacy and of its contribution to Rome. Some scholars have pointed out that the *Aeneid* actually avoids this acknowledgement: 'Nothing in the poem hints that the Greeks of the heroic age have any supremacy in the artistic field... [The hero Aeneas] hears the song of the Salii when he visits Evander, an *aetion* of the Carmen Saliare and maybe a recognition of a native Italian tradition of religious poetry' (Hine 1987: 174, 178). But even if we discount the fact that the poem itself, qua poem, is a statement of the importance of its Greek models, on a scale unparalleled even in Hellenizing Rome, it remains true that the hint of a Salian anthem rising on the Palatine brings us back to the paradox of 'always already', only from a Roman perspective, not one based on archaeological enquiry. In fact, the hymn sung by those ethnic Greeks, or palaeo-Greeks, the Arcadians, is not as archaic (or native) as one would expect from those proverbially early people: it is the equivalent of a Greek paean, and Virgil, not without malice, refers to the site of future Rome as a *Graia urbs* (6.97). The next time Rome is called a *Graeca urbs* in Roman literature will be in a famous xenophobic rant by Juvenal (3.60–1), the definitive statement of Roman Hellenophobia.

The results of literary studies need to be combined with our growing interest for the visual arts as an expression of cultural identity. The art historian Elizabeth Bartman comments on the importance of collections of Greek art and of the replica market in the Roman world:

> Frequently they [the Roman collectors] included copies of well-known masterpieces of Greek pedigree whose prestigious past bestowed the status of erudition upon the owners... A replica of a familiar statuary type ensured social acceptance for its owner and provided the patron with a sense of cultural belonging, of Romanitas... this seems to be so *despite* [my italics] the obvious Greek provenance of most images.
>
> (Bartman 1991: 71, 78, 87, n. 57)

As so often in studies of Roman Hellenism, a 'despite' is simultaneously a 'because of': to be a successful Roman, in a certain situation, means to be able to accumulate, select, and display Greek cultural capital. Most historians seem to argue in favour of a curve, whereby the culture wars of Hellenization come to an end somewhere between the epochs of Domitian and Hadrian, and the result is a Graeco-Roman *koinē*, but a better perspective is to consider the counterpoint of Greek and Roman as a perennial resource of Roman discourses of identity and distinction: 'In general there is something inherently persuasive about the idea that art has the potential to express tensions engendered by the process of acculturation. Yet the distinction between "Greek" and "Roman" becomes increasingly arbitrary, though apparently always possible and lastingly powerful at times of stress' (Stevenson 1998: 53–4).

I hope the example of the *Aeneid* suffices to establish a few viewpoints typical of scholarship on Roman literature. This scholarship has contributed much to a study of intertextuality, perhaps more than studies of Greek texts: evidently the exceptional stimulus provided by 'bicultural intertextuality' has been effective. As a result, if we think of the *Aeneid* or Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, for example, we have a situation where (a) every single point of contact between a Latin text and a Greek model represents both itself (the textual 'allusion') and a gesture towards the unfinished business of 'cultural translation'; and (b) entire narrative plots (for example, the westward journey of Aeneas in Virgil's and Ovid's epic poems) can become illustrative of the work of cultural transference proudly shouldered by the poet. So, if those interested in cultural appropriation reconsider the detailed work done on intertextuality and allusion, they will be surprised to discover that Latinists have been ingenious in devising ways of typifying and cataloguing textual allusions, but remarkably averse to considering monolingual and bilingual intertextuality as separate functions of Latin literary production. This conflation has a rationale, because it shows the remarkable success of the Latin tradition in inventing a Graeco-Roman community of letters: but there is something to be said for emphasizing the difference between the two practices. True, the very fact that allusions to Greek models are recognizable is a homage, not just to Greek achievements, but to the work done by Roman authors in creating their interfaces; but 'Graeco-Roman' allusions often have a different semiotic status from 'all-Roman' allusions. When a Latin text appropriates another Latin text, the allusion is easily recognizable, and needs to stop short of actual repetition: so, for example, elite Latin poets tend to avoid lifting whole lines from Latin predecessors, and strive for variation, not reproduction. When the Latin implies a Greek background, recognizability is the main goal, and maximum similarity or proximity is praised, since translation is in itself an achievement. Thus the Roman poets construct a flexible apparatus for imitation, and every new text, from Ennius to Ausonius or Claudian, is a didactic contribution to the intercultural project, and an implicit comment on Roman Hellenization. (A systematic discussion of allusion to and quotation of Greek models in prose is also needed, since approaches to intertextuality are too biased in favour of poetry.)

However, if we study explicit Roman statements on imitation, we need to get used to a language of irony and constant revision. One famous example from Horace should be analysed before we reach any conclusion. *Graecia capta* is such a famous tag that people have ceased too soon to ask questions about its meaning (Horace, *Epistle* 2.1 [to Augustus], 156–63, with translation by H. R. Fairclough):

> Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artis
> intulit agresti Latio. sic horridus ille
> defluxit numerus Saturnius et grave virus
> munditiae pepulere; sed in longum tamen aevum
> manserunt hodieque manent vestigia ruris.
> serus enim Graecis admovit acumina chartis
> et post Punica bella quietus quaerere coepit,
> quid Sophocles et Thespis et Aeschylos utile ferrent.

Greece, the captive, made her savage victor captive, and brought the arts into rustic Latium. Thus the stream of that rude Saturnian measure ran dry and good taste banished the offensive poison; yet for many a year lived on, and still live on, traces of our rustic past. For not till late did the Roman turn his wit to Greek writings, and in the peaceful days after the Punic wars he began to ask what service Sophocles could render, and Thespis and Aeschylus.

Don Fowler (an exception) cleverly observed (Fowler, forthcoming) that 'sic horridus ille | defluxit numerus Saturnius' presupposes a mythological vision of a vanishing Saturnian age. Brink (1982: 201) seems certain that 'Graecia capta...' must be the reversal of a Catonian hard line, and he mentions the famous speech attributed to Cato the Censor by Livy (34.4.3–5, with translation by E. T. Sage):

The better and the happier becomes the fortune of our commonwealth day by day and the greater the empire grows—and already we have crossed into Greece and Asia, places filled with all the allurements of vice, and we are handling the treasures of kings—*the more I fear that these things will capture us rather than we them* (*ne illae magis res nos ceperint quam nos illas*). Tokens of danger, believe me, were those statues which were brought to this city from Syracuse. Altogether too many people do I hear praising the baubles of Corinth and Athens and laughing at the fictile antefixes of our Roman gods.

Brink says that 'the acknowledgment that Roman civilization is Greek is made memorable by the way in which he [Horace] turns upside down one of the bellicose slogans of Roman anti Hellenism' (1982: 201). This assumes a lot about Cato and his presence in Livy (Gruen 1993: 69–70), but in general it must be true that the tag, consisting in a reversal of victory and defeat and a hint of 'being colonized from within', has a diffusion currency before Horace. The view that Horace is alluding very precisely to Mummius' capture of Corinth and that the *artes* are fine arts is too narrow, and so rightly rejected by Brink, but from Nenci (1978) one could derive the more important idea that *Graecia capta* is the nominative *una tantum* of a syntagm that de facto exists only in the ablative, and exists specifically in reports

of a triumph (ACHAIA CAPTA/AEGYPTO CAPTA, etc.), so that the poetry of grammar creates a reversal of expectations out of trite numismatic and epigraphic formulas. (This fits neatly with *Epistle* 2.1.193, where a spectacle in which *captivum portatur ebur, captiva Corinthus*, 'captured ivory, captured Corinthian ware, is borne', is singled out for its vulgarity.) Once it is accepted that the ideology of plunder and victory is very precisely an issue here, it is curious to observe that commentators are silent about the play of gender, where *Graecia capta* confronts *ferum victorem*. Conquered nations like Greece are normally imagined and represented as women. But so is Rome, and it is the proximity of *ferus victor* ('savage victor') that makes one pause. In the influential formulation of Porcius Licinus (below), we have a Muse, female, joining a feminine *gens fera* ('savage/barbarian nation'). Not surprisingly, our generation is more likely than the previous one to see significance in gender, but this perception can also be historicized. After all, rape and sexual dominance are very close to ancient images of victory. *Graecia capta cepit* ('Greece the captive captured...') could project imaginations of a raped woman who progressively has her master fall in love, like Briseis or Andromache. A similar rhetoric had been used by Propertius for Penthesilea and Achilles (*vicit victorem candida forma virum*, 'her shining beauty conquered her male conqueror': 3.11.16) in a story which combines victory, rape, and falling for a woman enemy (the whole elegy is about the Roman conquest of Cleopatra's Egypt). And the memory of second-century Hellenization combines plunder with sexual exploitation: Polybius (32.10) has a memorable description of young Scipio asking for Greek learning and not the usual Greek pleasure with courtesans and boys.

The other implication is the intertext of Porcius Licinus (late second century BCE; fr. 1 Courtney):

> Poenico bello secundo Musa pinnato gradu
> intulit se bellicosam in Romuli gentem feram
>
> In the time of the second Punic war, the Muse, on her winged feet, warlike, migrated to the barbarian nation of Romulus.

It is important not to mistake Licinus for one of those hidebound militarists whom Brink sees in the background of Horace. All that is known about Licinus—politician, composer of Hellenistic love epigrams, malicious essayist on literary patronage—suggests a lively intellectual. The text is controversial and obscure, but I tend to accept two ideas: that *bellicosam* qualifies the Muse, a warlike Muse, and therefore implies Romanization, not only Hellenization; and that *Poenico bello secundo* is a witty indication of time because it looks like a neutral marker but in fact involves the title of Naevius' *Bellum Poenicum*, a poem of the first *Bellum*, composed during that second *Bellum*. This Muse may be Hellenizing after all, but most of all she looks like a winged female daemon in a context of war—that is, another significant Greek import, a Victoria/Nike.

This tradition, indirectly, helps us to realize what Horace is doing: he sets his Hellenization alarm later than Licinus, speaking pointedly of *post Punica bella quietus*, then explains that the process is still unachieved and ongoing. The important implication is that every new generation in Roman Hellenizing literature revises the tradition and denies the conclusion of the process (cf. Hinds 1998, s.v. 'Hellenization, Roman'). This is certainly true of Horace's relationship to late republican culture: Cicero and the neoterics, not mid-republican culture, are the true enemies in *Epistle* 2.1. Horace is looking for a new cultural authority, and knows very well, just as Ennius and Terence had known, that in Rome this involves leadership in the Hellenizing process and a revision of past achievements. An ironic confirmation comes from Ovid: writing as a successor to Horace in the *Art of Love*, a text very close in time to the Horatian epistle, he picks up the Horatian warning about *Graecia capta* (*manserunt hodieque manent vestigia ruris*, 'for many a year lived on, and still live on, traces of our rustic past': *Epistle* 2.1.160, as quoted above) and caps it (*Art of Love* 3.127–8): 'nec nostros mansit in annos | rusticitas . . .' ('nor has rusticity lived on to our days . . .'). The *Ars* thrusts itself forward as the text that completes the process, and even Horace is now constructed as a not-yet-thoroughly Hellenized predecessor: the new poet shows his credentials by inventing and introducing in poetry a sorely needed Latin equivalent of Greek *agroikia*, which makes Horace's *vestigia ruris* sound rather unpolished.

As for the other famous generalization on Greek *artes* and Roman *imperium*, the memorandum to Aeneas from Anchises (Virgil, *Aeneid* 6.847–53, with translation by F. Ahl)—

> Others will hammer out bronzes that breathe in more lifelike and gentler
> Ways, I suspect, create truer expressions of life out of marble,
> Make better speeches, or plot, with the sweep of their compass, the heaven's
> Movements, predict the ascent of the sky's constellations. Well, let them!
> You, who are Roman, recall how to govern mankind with your power.
> These will be your special 'Arts': the enforcement of peace as a habit,
> Mercy for those cast down and relentless war upon proud men

—leads to an almost automatic reaction in later Augustan poets to deconstruct the opposition. One of them alludes to the purple passage while pointing out that poetry (not mentioned by Anchises) is actually better than lifelike statues, and poetry, unlike statues, can be Romanized (Horace, *Epistle* 2.1.247–50; trans. H. R. Fairclough): 'But Virgil and Varius, those poets whom you love, discredit not your judgement of them nor the gifts which, to the giver's great renown, they have received; and features are seen with no more truth, when moulded in statues of bronze, than are the manners and minds of famous heroes, when set forth in the poet's work.' The other, with elegant economy, explains that Roman victory is precisely the medium for the Greek message of civilizing arts (Ovid, *Fasti* 3.101–2: 'Not yet had Greece, a very verbal but unwarlike nation, transmitted her conquered

arts to the conquerors'), so that you cannot really have *imperium* without absorbing the Greek arts: the more you conquer, the more you become Greek.

As Latinists, we consider Roman perspectives on the Greeks a central concern of our studies: we have explored stereotypes of the Greeks and their functions in Roman discourses, and surely also in Roman interactions with the Greeks, and also (very importantly) in the laborious attempts to create an empire-wide 'Roman citizen identity'. Recent research has made progress in the area by asking questions about function and the intentions of the borrowers, or looters, and by refusing to consider ethnic and cultural identity as a static possession: much can be gained by viewing identity as a process and a laborious construction (cf. Whitmarsh 2001, and in this volume). Two useful slogans have been contributed by Andrew Wallace-Hadrill: 'Greek knowledge, Roman power', and 'To be Roman, go Greek'. Both ideas show that Hellenization and power go hand in hand, because the Roman discourse on power is crucially about deciding who should exercise the authority of regulating the process of acculturation, when, and how. At the same time, this approach has the advantage of helping us with the periodization of Roman cultural history, between a republican situation in which the experimental elite variously combines action and appropriation of cultural capital, and a less impetuous imperial approach, where a number of specialists of knowledge operate as professionalized consultants in the imperial machine.

It is also important to introduce differences in our reading of 'Roman Hellenism', because it is necessary to lump together intellectual and material culture, but Roman discourses on Hellenism should be given a hearing when they strive to re-establish a boundary between the two areas. In one sense, talking about 'appropriation' reduces the difference between practices such as, for example, watching athletics, alluding to Pindar in Latin, walking under a portico with sculptures, wearing a *khitōn*, or displaying vases in a triumph. But in Roman elite mentality there is a difference, and knowing the difference is a way of demonstrating leadership.

Cato, the same man who was famous for resisting the appropriation of Greek material goods and skills as the enemy within (as noted above), was also perfectly able to anticipate one of the main resources of Roman Hellenism. This approach is the contrary move to the ideology of *Graecia capta*: instead of being seduced from the inside out, the Roman wrenches some intellectual capital from the Greeks and shows that he can turn the possession against them, or at least compete with them. This is what Cato the Elder does in a speech delivered to the Athenians: by saying 'Antiochus wages war by mail: he campaigns with reed and ink' (*Antiochus epistulis bellum gerit, calamo et atramento militat*: *Orations*, fr. 4 Cugusi and Sblendorio Cugusi), he deflates the menace of Antiochus, who is, in his view, blackmailing the Greeks and sapping Roman interests; by doing so, he reminds the Athenians about Demosthenes, when the Athenian culture-hero was writing about a dangerous power, Philip of Macedon, and exhorting the Athenians to 'fight him through actions, not just votes and epistles' (*Philippics* 1.30). In spite

of Demosthenes, the Athenians had been weak, but now they must find courage (with Cato's interested help), since Antiochus is not a new Philip but a paper tiger. Cato may have been against excessive Hellenization in daily life, but he already plays the game according to Caius Gracchus' rules. The Greek model is a source of communicative energy.

This is the typical resource of Roman elite mentality in matters of Hellenization: to enforce a difference between 'base' acquisition and intellectual appropriation, although both ultimately, as we realize, respond to a deeper structure of display and performance. When the assimilation of Greek and Roman is approved, Romans can define themselves, without paradox, as the ones who do things *à la grecque*: to have a 'Greek-style cult' (*Graeco ritu*) was a typical and distinctive Roman institution (Scheid 1995). But when power resides in controlling, regulating, and being able to debate and analyse the influx of Hellenism, less frequently discussed is the screening-out or containment of other influences that can be imagined as powerful (Egyptian, Carthaginian, Etruscan, Iranian): yet this asymmetry, sometimes ironically given the cosmopolitan accents of this Hellenism *à la romaine*, is one of the main results of Hellenizing acculturation.

There have been many discussions of Roman Hellenism, but they tend to treat Hellenicity either en masse or as a result of a canon formation. The problem with the first assumption is a certain ethnocentric essentialism: Fabius Pictor tends to be studied as a father of Roman historiography, and the fact that he published his work in Greek is marginal: he was a Roman aristocrat. The second assumption looks dangerous if we remember how the whole business of classics originated—a selection of exemplary texts for the elite schools of European nation-states; but it is also true that classicism is already a Roman and Greek phenomenon, and has an important role to play in the culture of the Empire (Connolly 2007).

Less frequently asked has been the question of how far and in what circumstances the Romans discriminate: are they sensitive to local idioms, do they reflect, contest, or contribute to the cultural unification of the Greek world? Recent work on Hellenism as a plural word and 'the cultures within Greek culture' appears to be interested in precisely this problem. The art historian Ann Kuttner (1995), a scholar of republican Rome, has identified in art and architecture at Rome a strand of influence that can be labelled, and must have been perceived, as 'Pergamene'; others have asked pertinent questions about differences that are perceived as chronological, or local, or both. If we think in temporal terms, we perceive that the Romans tend to contrast a negative stereotype of the contemporary Greek, the *Graeculus*, with a reverent perception of the authority of, for example, Periclean Athens. In general, the Romans are as close as any pre-modern culture gets to developing a coherent sense of historicity: their appropriation of Greek culture is from the very start much more systematic and respectful than the more imaginative and nonchalant approach of the Etruscans. But how far should we push the idea that appropriation incorporates a sense of different periods and styles in the source

culture? For example, one wonders how far the poets' reaction to Callimachus implied a sense of his poetry being prestigious yet post-classical, even modern. Did they respond to Callimachus as an Alexandrian poet, in their own way, and did they care about the sense of a gap in space, culture, and time between him and Archilochus and Sappho, or Herodotus and Xenophon?

We can be sure that if few of the Italici achieved even the shadow of a complete bilingualism, their experience of the language must have told them about a striking and unruly variety of idioms. Plautine comedy is the result of sophisticated work on Attic originals, but if we imagine the author strolling around Rome, the variant of Greek that sounded familiar to him must have been very different, either 'Italiote' Greek or a selection of western and Adriatic dialects. On the other hand, Kuttner herself, apropos the selection made by the Romans within the pool of Greek models and styles, has issued this interesting warning: 'As in Late Republican imitations of Alexandrian poetry, imitation of past styles did not necessarily imply that the politics or civic values of the source culture were to be imitated' (Kuttner 1995: 158).

This is reminiscent of the important, ongoing conversation between Paul Zanker and Tonio Hölscher about Hellenizing art in Rome. Hölscher has proposed a neat functional grid for the reuses of Greek art: just as the Romans differentiate between a 'public' and a 'private' adoption of Greek images, they also assign, in the public hemisphere, a particular Greek style to different social functions. For example, archaizing Athenian processions fit ritualized contexts, Hellenistic portraits suit intellectuals, and an agitated Hellenistic baroque is the perfect, 'swoosh' style for Roman warlords. Zanker has constructed a more nuanced model, one that allows the Romans a considerable degree of sensitivity to the aesthetics of politics. He imagines at times a narrative of styles, with considerable overlap between political agendas and the careful selection of a Greek model: Augustus goes early classical when he turns into *princeps* and leader of a reunified empire, while he had been part of the 'modern Greek', Hellenistic wave in his previous experience as a partisan leader. In Zanker's perspective, the adoption of a different style is not only a functional choice, but a loaded one.

These are open debates, and one would welcome a stronger participation of scholars of literature, but at present there are also areas of stability and consent. There is a growing consensus that studies of Roman Hellenism have idealized the notion of 'appropriation' not only in the age of Mediterranean conquests, but in the long era of the conquest of Italy. In the latter context, what is needed is a focus on the idea of 'competition with the Italic (i.e. non-Greek) peoples'. This is the vested interest that explains the Roman miracle—hegemony through the planned absorption of another culture. If we want to understand republican Hellenism, we should think less about the Greek 'sources' being tapped by the Romans, and more about what other groups in the peninsula (Etruscans and Samnites, Carthaginians, Celts, Oscans, and Messapi) were doing: this is the competition that fuels so many

practices of imitation, in religion, theatre, art, burial, politics, and the imaginary. Romans were simply more consistent and systematic, and therefore successful, in what everybody else was doing at the time (Feeney 2005).

This insight is important because it helps us make sense of the next step: when Rome becomes the sole power in the western Mediterranean, the cultural imperialism that is being irradiated is a competitive package of 'Greek *humanitas*', a hybrid culture combining Latin language and Roman urbanism with elements of Greek *paideia* and lifestyle. Selling those composite *mores* to the accelerated urbanism of the Roman West becomes a key mission of Roman imperialism (Woolf 1998). This hybridization had been prepared in the long centuries of competition with other Italic ethnicities and the Romans' own appropriations of Greek culture. Emphasis on competition with the neighbours also helps us to investigate a parallelism with the function of Hellenism within Roman society, where all scholars agree that issues of self-definition are constantly enmeshed with self-promotion and competition for success and dignity.

Latinists should of course practise the same respect when it comes to the intentions and agendas of Greek cultural mediators, those who made the Hellenizing process work. The example of rhetoric is an instructive one. A scholar of Roman literature often considers rhetoric to be an abstract template, produced by Greeks and then made exportable to Rome, separated from 'live' activity in political contexts, and so easily transportable to Roman society. This is to forget that Greek politics had been continuing (almost) as usual in Greek poleis after the classical age through the agency of oratory and rhetoric: most Greek cultural operators in Rome come from Greek cities and city-states, some of them really tiny, not from glamorous Hellenistic monarchies (Luzzatto 1998). Moreover, when some of the people we consider 'teachers of formal rhetoric' are facing a Roman audience, they are doing this kind of work for a living, as visitors, hired teachers, or much worse, after having been practitioners of 'political' rhetoric on their home turf. The rhetor Diophanes of Mytilene, a mentor of Tiberius Gracchus who was murdered by the anti-Gracchan faction, was a teacher of rhetoric in Rome, but he had also been exiled for political reasons from his polis: most probably, he was not just telling Gracchus how to refine his rhythmic effects and *clausulae*.

The study of Roman Hellenism had been re-founded in Wilhelmine Germany, where Roman appropriation of the Greeks had specific resonances in national identity, but right now the contact zone with modernity is rather the post-colonial situation (cf. e.g. Mossman 2005 and Terrenato 2005), a source of clarifying analogies as well as damaging confusions. For practitioners of scholarship, researchers in western academia, the United States–Europe relationship is also likely to provide an implicit model for the ideology of 'Greek knowledge, Roman power'. This modern analogy enables the great historian Paul Veyne to make interesting comments on Hellenization and on the Romanitas of the United States, but of

course he disregards a few details, such as the Roman institution that corresponds to our modern notion of 'brain-drain' and intellectual emigration-enslavement (Veyne 1995: 252–3):

> Another reason that I love America is more material: my story is the story of those many immigrants who came from old, poor Europe and who quickly made a fortune in the New World. Disembarking in New York for the first time in my life, one day in 1980, by 4 p.m. the same evening (local time) I had made 20,000 dollars, by midnight... America, like ancient Rome, illustrates an idea that is dear to me: civilizations do not have homelands any longer; one adopts foreign models not under the pressure of a 'cultural imperialism', but because one wants to live with the times and 'be civilized', in short... for the Romans, it is the Greeks... Romans are a people who have as a culture the culture of another people, the Greeks... these peoples (Spaniards, Gauls) spontaneously 'Romanized' themselves, that is, they *Hellenized themselves in the Latin tongue* (*se sont mis spontanément à... s'helléniser en langue latine*)...

Suggested Reading

The study of the imitation and appropriation of Greek sources is ubiquitous in work on all texts and periods of Latin literature: a selective bibliography would be impossible within the limits of this volume. Work on Latin translations and imitations from Greek texts turns out to be particularly exciting and representative of wider issues (e.g. Traina 1970). The question of Roman influence on Greek authors has been raised very occasionally: the most helpful context seems to be patronage: *committenti*, masters, and more generally Rome as a market, with an influence on Greek intellectual practice. If we turn to cultural practice, a review of studies of Roman culture where Greek presences are vital to the discussion would be endless and would have to include major studies of e.g. religion, philosophy, sexuality, rhetoric and education, art and architecture, music, science, medicine, material life, with government, the military, and the law slightly below average (therefore in a sense confirming Virgil's sly utterance about 'Greek arts, Roman power'). The sources on Roman approaches to Greece are rehearsed in Petrochilos (1975) and Wardman (1976); on Roman domination of Greece, see e.g. Gruen (1990 and 1993), and Kallet-Marx (1995) on the republican Empire; Alcock (1993) and Goldhill (2001) (the post-conquest situation). For most of what is covered in my chapter, especially in terms of methodology, the fundamental discussions are Wallace-Hadrill (1988, 1994, 1997, and 1998), and now (2008). There would be much more to quote, but a very selective reading-list, oriented mainly around literature in English and on contributions rich in theoretical returns, would include at least Norden (1986), Leo (1913), Kroll (1924), and more recently Adams (2003), Dench (2005), Dupont (1999), Feeney (1998 and 2005), Flaig (1999), Griffin (1985), Habinek (1992), Hallett (2005), Hinds (1998), Holscher (2004), Horsfall (1993), Hunter (2006), Kuttner (1995 and 1999), Millar (2002), Momigliano (1975), Mossman (2005), Rawson (1985), Scheid (1995), Smith (1981), Vogt Spira-Rommel (1999), Whitmarsh (2001), Williams (1968), Williams (1999), Woolf (1994 and 1998), and Zanker (1976 and 1988).

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CHAPTER 9

GREECE AND ROME

TIM WHITMARSH

In 31 BCE the combined forces of Mark Antony and Cleopatra (the last queen of the Ptolemaic dynasty, based in Alexandria) were defeated in a sea-battle near Actium, on the north-western coast of Greece. The victor, Julius Caesar's great-nephew Octavian, united the entire Mediterranean under the rule of one people; before long, now renamed Augustus, he would effectively unite them under one man. For the first time in their history Greeks had to confront the reality that all of their ancient homelands were but provincial territories in a vast, polyglot empire managed by non-Greeks. Cultural interchange itself was nothing new; nor was dealing with enormously powerful foreign despots (already in the classical period numerous Greeks sought success in the Babylonian court: see Rollinger in this volume for early examples). What had changed was that the entire Greek world now looked to one single authority. Political power had shifted irrevocably westwards.

Perhaps paradoxically, the annexation and conquest of the Greek world inaugurated a period of Hellenic cultural self-confidence. The first three centuries of the Common Era—the period, roughly, between Octavian's victory at Actium and Constantine's edict of Milan in 313, paving the way for a Christian empire—saw an extraordinarily high level of prestige attached to Greekness, not only in the traditionally Greek East but also along the North African littoral and in Rome itself. Hellenism of this kind was largely connected with musical, artistic, literary, or intellectual activity, according to the well-known division of labour (discussed further below) that allotted Rome political control and Greece cultural precedence. This was the period of the 'Second Sophistic'—a famous, but also famously vague, phrase usually referring to the intense literary turn of Greek culture at the time.

Across most of the empire members of the elite engaged in Greek literary activities (whether they were ethnically Greek or not), writing or declaiming in the archaic Athenian form of Greek known as 'Attic' (Bowie 1970; Swain 1996; Whitmarsh 2001 and 2005*a*). As literary Greek advanced, so Latin receded: from the period between the early second century and the Christian Empire we only have Apuleius, Aulus Gellius, Fronto, and a few others. Performing or writing in Greek, indeed, became for many a marker of Greekness itself: so much so, that a teacher of rhetoric might refer to his students as his 'Greeks' (Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 531, 564, 567, 571, 574, 588–9, 590–1, 600, 605, 609, 613, 616, 617, 627).

Such was the prestige of Greek that it became the language of choice for intellectual and theological communication across most of the Roman Empire's diverse peoples. A striking example is Flavius Josephus (b. 37/8 CE), an aristocratic Jewish priest, a Pharisee whose first language was apparently Aramaic. A participant in the Jewish military defence against Vespasian and Titus (and a witness to the destruction of the temple in 70), he nevertheless became an apologist of sorts for Roman imperialism and a literary ambassador to the Greek-speaking world: his monumental *Jewish War* and *Jewish Archaeology* are designed to present his people's perspective (refracted, of course, through his own prism) to the world at large. Despite the absence of all doubts over the superiority of Jewish over Greek culture (his *Against Apion* is our best contemporary example of an apologetic against anti-Semitism), he still chooses to style his literary identity after canonical Greek precedents, particularly Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

Numerous other spectacular examples of Hellenizing non-Greeks could be advanced: the Gaul Favorinus of Arles; the Syrian satirist Lucian of Samosata; the Christian apologist Tatian, also from Syria; the novelists Iamblichus of Babylon and Heliodorus of Emesa, both of whose names are probably originally Semitic; the famous gnostic Bardaisān of Edessa, one of the founding fathers of the Syriac literary tradition, but 'skilled in both tongues, the Greek language and that of the Syrians' (Epiphanius, *Against the Heretics* 2.338). Even Roman emperors Hellenized. History has not flattered Nero (54–68) and Domitian (81–96), the first century's apostles of Hellenism, but by the second century Greek values were associated with humanity and civilized values. Trajan (98–117) was primarily a soldier, but is nevertheless the supposed addressee of Dio Chrysostom's lengthy philosophical discourses on kingship. Hadrian (117–38)—famously nicknamed *Graeculus*, or 'little Greeky' (*Augustan History*, *Hadrian* 1.1.5)—was not the first emperor to wear a beard Greek-style, but the smart fuzz we see on his statues is a much stronger statement than Nero's discreet fluff. Hadrian was also, of course, a lover of music and poetry, and boys too: his beloved Antinous, a Greek boy, was just as powerful a symbol of his Hellenism. His successors in the Antonine and Severan dynasties followed suit, fashioning themselves after the Greek style; most spectacularly, Marcus Aurelius (ruled 161–80) himself composed an erudite work of philosophy, known today as the *Meditations*.

9.1. Varieties of Imperial Hellenism

As throughout Greek history, Hellenism in the Roman period was enacted primarily in relation to the past. In contrast to the practice of most modern nation-states, however, there was no systematic, state-led ideology surrounding tradition. Consequently, there was great variance between individuals and communities in the particular pasts fixated upon, or the types of fixation practised. If most could agree that tradition was a central part of being Greek, fewer could agree precisely in what that tradition consisted.

The most familiar form of archaizing Hellenism laid the emphasis upon the classical Athenian past (fifth and fourth centuries BCE), for which the use of the Attic dialect as a literary patois (mentioned above) was only the most visible sign. Young men were taught to emulate the language, rhythms, and cadences of Thucydides, Plato, Xenophon, and particularly the Attic orators. Around the turn of the millennium Dionysius of Halicarnassus wrote a treatise *On the Ancient Orators*, which coupled a detailed stylistic interpretation of the fourth-century Athenians Lysias, Isaeus, Isocrates, and Demosthenes with a scathing attack on the sudden decay of oratory after the death of Alexander the Great (Preface 1). For Dionysius, and other rhetorical theorists like him (notably his contemporary Caecilius of Caleacte), the parameters of 'classical' Greece were clearly hedged by the temporal boundaries of democratic Athens. By the second and third centuries CE the demands of Atticism were exacting. Lexicographers like Moeris and Phrynichus produced lists of words that were and were not *echt*. The use of words not sanctioned in an Athenian author could be perceived as a sign of uncouthness, as the satirist Lucian attests: supposedly, he made a *faux pas* by greeting an acquaintance with the phrase 'good health!' (*hugiaine*) rather than 'joy to you!' (*khaire*) (*A Slip of the Tongue in Greeting* 1). In Lucian's hands, this event becomes an opportunity to satirize (here as elsewhere) the pedantry of his linguistically obsessive peers. Lucian was not alone in his frustration. According to Philostratus' third-century *Lives of the Sophists*, the dyspeptic Philagrus of Cilicia once in anger unleashed an 'exotic' word at a rival sophist. When asked by the latter to identify the canonical text where that word could be found, he replied 'in Philagrus' (578)!

The degree of identification with figures from the classical Athenian past could be close. Sophists (or oratorical performers) routinely used the democratic city as a backdrop, whether vaguely in the mock-legal speeches that some favoured, or more specifically for declamations in the persona of mythological or historical figures (the majority of which were indeed set in classical Athens: Anderson 1993: 103–5; Swain 1996: 92–6). Authors, moreover, could identify themselves strongly with a figure from the Athenian past. The second-century historian Arrian is perhaps the extreme example: not only did he give his *Anabasis* and *On Hunting with Dogs* the

same titles as works by Xenophon, but he even in one work refers to himself, twice, as 'Xenophon' (*Arrangement Against the Alani* 10.22)!

Because it is the most prominent form of Hellenism current in the imperial period, the focus upon the Athenian past has received the most attention (Bowie 1970; Swain 1996: 43–100; Whitmarsh 2005*a*, esp. 41–56). The reasons for the particular choice of classical Athens lie in a mixture of pragmatism, idealism, and political brinkmanship. First, because the Attic dialect of Greek lay at the base of the *koinē* (or 'common') form adopted by Hellenistic bureaucracies and thence bequeathed to the Romans, it was much closer to the forms of the language (varied though these were) in everyday usage across the empire. Second, democratic Athens had actively constructed its own classical status, by promoting its political, moral, intellectual, and artistic achievements as examples for others to follow: as Thucydides' Pericles famously puts it, 'we are ourselves a paradigm, rather than imitating others', and 'briefly put, our city is an education for the whole of Greece' (Thucydides 2.37.1, 2.41.1). Third, Athens stood for a good story about Greek power and independence. The fifth-century city played a heroic role in defeating the Persians, and then became for eighty years the dominant marine power in the Mediterranean; in the fourth century the example of Demosthenes inveighing against complicity with the Macedonian menace (as he saw it) was a powerful one for those living in the shadow of Rome. We shall return to these themes presently.

Athens did not, however, monopolize the attention of Hellenizers. Archaic Greece, the earliest period that tradition could recall, remained an extremely important locus of Greek identity. For some, this phase was the bedrock of Greek culture: the entire intellectual panorama was already reflected in the poetry of Homer (ps.-Plutarch, *On Homer*). For others, promoting the claims of prose to clarity and honesty (Whitmarsh 2005*b*), Homer was a mystifying, unauthoritative guide to historical truth: several accounts survive, of varying degrees of playfulness, promising the true story of the Trojan War (Kindstrand 1973; Merkle 1994). Perhaps the most interesting of these is Philostratus' third-century *Tale of Heroes*, a dialogue, set on the Thracian Chersonnese in contemporary times, between a local vine-grower and a visiting Phoenician (Aitken and Maclean 2004). The vine-grower overcomes his interlocutor's initial scepticism to convince him that the epiphanic heroes of the Trojan War still inhabit the local landscape. There is a certain sophisticated humour in the rejection of Homer's version—the reanimated hero Protesilaus has informed the vine-dresser that the great poet was paid off by Odysseus to whitewash his account—but the overall message is that it is at our own peril that we disregard these ancient heroes. When a Syrian boy mocked a statue of Hector, we are told, the hero drowned him in revenge (19.5–7). When the Amazons began to cut down trees on the island of Leuke, the home of Achilles and Helen, Achilles attacked, and panicked their horses so much that they trampled and even ate their riders (57.14–15). When the Phoenician asks when the heroes 'were seen' at Troy, the

vine-grower corrects the tense: 'they *are* seen, I said, they *are still* seen by cowherds and shepherds on the plain' (18.2). For Philostratus, the sanctity of the distant past still inhabits the landscapes of the present. In contrast to the sober virtues of Athenian classicism, Philostratus' heroes come across as unpredictable, egotistical, and possessed of awesome power.

An excellent instance of this multidimensional approach to tradition is Pausanias' *Tour of Greece*, composed at some point between 160 and 180 CE, perhaps by an inhabitant of Lydian Magnesia (in Asia Minor). The landscape described by Pausanias is extremely complex in terms of its temporal stratification: he describes primeval, aniconic statues, features associated with mythological figures, classical buildings and monuments, and Hellenistic and Roman material too (Habicht 1985; Elsner 1992; Arafat 1996; Swain 1996: 330–56; Alcock, Cherry, and Elsner, 2001). Scholars have tended to assume that Pausanias' preference is for the most archaic, traditional features; but the author is frustratingly reticent on these issues, preferring to leave readers to draw their own conclusions. An important example is the temple of Olympian Zeus in Athens, described at 1.18.6–9. This monumental building was begun in the sixth century BCE and not completed until the second century CE, when the emperor Hadrian stepped in.

Pausanias' description stresses, without explicit commentary, the interpenetration in this space of the archaic, the modern, and indeed everything in between (Arafat 1996: 172–7). In the approach to the cult-site, we travel through an area that is both Hellenistic and mythological: we meet a sanctuary of Sarapis, specifically identified as 'a god whom the Athenians got from Ptolemy' (1.18.4), and also the place where Theseus and Perithous met before travelling to Sparta (1.18.5). The temple itself is framed with explicit markers of Romanness: there are two portraits of the emperor Hadrian, and the statues known (mysteriously) as 'the Colonies'; we are also told that Hadrian dedicated the shrine of Zeus and the cult-statue, which 'exceeds all other statues in magnitude except the Rhodian and Roman colossi'; and that the site was surrounded by more statues of Hadrian, of which the Athenian is the largest (1.18.6). Inside the site, however, all the markers are Greek, and of extreme antiquity: not just an ancient bronze statue of Zeus, but also some primeval cult-objects, including a temple of Cronos and Rhea, and 'some ground sacred to Olympian Earth', where the water is said to have disappeared after the flood negotiated by Deucalion (the son of Prometheus). We are also told that Deucalion was said to have dedicated the original temple. How are we to make sense of this space? Is Hadrian—whom Pausanias seems to like more than most Romans (Swain 1996: 349; Arafat 1996)—to be praised for bringing to completion this temple of extreme antiquity? Or do the Roman demands for colossal building programmes clash inappropriately with the otherworldly antiquity of this hyper-sacred space?

Pausanias' example introduces a further question. By his day Greece's history had, for over 400 years, been irrevocably tied up with Rome's. To distinguish the 'Greek past' from the 'Roman present', as commentators on imperial Greek

culture sometimes do, makes no sense, for a huge stretch of Greece's past could meaningfully be described as Roman anyhow. How did Hellenism assimilate the Roman past? A writer like Pausanias offers no answers, only hints. One such hint comes in the passage discussed above. Two 'secular' features of the cult-site of Olympian Zeus are mentioned: the first is a statue of the Greek rhetorician Isocrates, the second a stone statue-group of Persians holding up a bronze tripod (1.18.7). Both images are resonant with themes of freedom and foreign oppression. Isocrates, we are told, 'died of his grief at the news of the battle of Chaeroneia', when Philip of Macedon's defeat put an end to the autonomy of the Greek states. The precise subject of the Persian group is unclear, but the tripod seems to evoke the attack on Delphi in 480 BCE, when (so Herodotus tells us: 8.37–8) lightning, landslides, and epiphanic heroes colluded to repel the invaders. For those who choose to see them, there are signs here that could indicate that Rome's presence in Greece is to be seen as an invasion as unwelcome as those of the Persians or the Macedonians.

Memories of the Persian wars could certainly resonate with anti-Romanism. Plutarch warns a would-be political speechmaker away from Persian War themes that will stir up anti-Roman feelings (*Precepts on Statecraft* 814a–c). Roman provincial governors were sometimes styled 'satraps', after the Persian fashion (Dio Chrysostom 7.66; Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 524, 592). Commentators have even detected anti-Roman signals in the Greek novelists' representations of Persian luxury and tyranny (Schwartz 2003). There is, however, little by way of direct criticism of Rome in extant Greek literature of the imperial period (except by Christians, whose religious, moral, and political opposition was further honed by sporadic persecution). There are, certainly, criticisms of the behaviour of particular individuals or groups of Romans: many (Pausanias among them) objected furiously to republican generals' practice of looting artworks; Lucian inveighed against the abuse of Greek intellectuals in the pay of rich Romans (*On Salaried Posts*); Philostratus presents Apollonius of Tyana as objecting to governors of Greece who do not speak the language (*Apollonius of Tyana* 3.36), and Greeks who take Roman names (4.5; cf. *Letters of Apollonius* 71). The relative scarcity of anti-Roman sentiment in Greek authors of the period is perhaps unsurprising, given that the successful literary elite were a posteriori those most likely to have benefited from an accord with Rome. The most powerfully anti-Roman views, conversely, are expressed in a sub-literary collection discovered on papyri, namely the so-called *Acts of the Pagan Martyrs* (Musurillo 1954): here we meet an array of evil Roman officials confronting stubbornly heroic local resistance, centred in Egyptian Alexandria, to their predatory actions and taxes. For obvious reasons, this kind of local resistance literature never achieved the international popularity required to allow it to enter the literary mainstream.

In general, the Greek texts we read now are by apologists for Rome, at least insofar as Roman imperial interests coincide with their own. At times the tactics

are extraordinary. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the historian and critic writing in the time of Augustus, wrote his *Roman Antiquities* with the explicit intention of proving that Rome was a Greek city, ethnically and culturally. Like Polybius before him and Plutarch after him, Dionysius believed (or affected to believe) that Rome was providentially ordained to govern the Mediterranean. This belief in divine favour derived partly from a (loosely) Stoic philosophical outlook, whereby human history was directed by the gods, and partly from a conviction that Rome's dominance served Greece's best interests. We have already considered Dionysius' view, expressed in *On the Ancient Orators*, that the death of Alexander saw the decline of oratory; in fact, Dionysius proceeds to claim that the advent of Rome has marked its revival (3). Like Diodorus of Sicily (1.4.3–4) and (implicitly) Athenaeus, Dionysius construed Rome as the new capital of Greek learning. For most of our authors, aristocrats and (in most cases) Roman citizens as they were, Roman imperial values were perceived as aligned with Hellenism, even if—as we shall come to see—not always compatible in every respect.

9.2. Hellenism and the Roman Empire

There is a paradox here. Hellenism in the imperial period represented a powerful expression of continuity with the past, and reflected a confident sense of Greece's role in the new world order created by Rome. In many ways, however, the Hellenism that Greeks of the imperial period engaged in was (as we shall see in this section) the result of Roman imperialist tactics in the previous centuries. Despite the general sense of comfort with Roman rule that we see in many texts from the imperial period, we should remind ourselves forcibly of the imperial context. Hellenism survived, where so many other cultures were annihilated, in large measure because Greek was the language of large parts of the empire that Rome acquired through annexation and conquest in the last three centuries BCE. As Cicero put it in the early first century BCE, 'Greek literature is read in nearly every nation, but Latin only within its own boundaries, and those (we must grant) are narrow' (*Against Archias the Poet* 23). To govern the Hellenistic Greek world in Greek was more efficient and more effective than converting the entire populace to Latin. Nor was this phenomenon narrowly linguistic. Imperialism is a learned, not a natural, state: to style herself as an imperial force, Rome assumed much of the visual, rhetorical, ideological, and monumental aspect of the Hellenistic kingdoms (Whitmarsh, forthcoming), just as those kingdoms themselves had borrowed from Persian and pharaonic predecessors. The story of Rome's emergence in the republican period as an imperial force is also the story of her absorption of Greek-style coinage, art, architecture, and literature (Gruen 1984 and esp. 1992).

This outward-facing, strategic Hellenization also impacted upon personal habits and styles within Rome itself. From the mid-second century BCE in particular, increasing numbers of upper-class Romans 'Hellenized', immersing themselves and their children in Greek literature, language, art, and philosophy. They did so not out of awestruck reverence for an aesthetically superior culture; rather, they were enjoying the fruits of empire, won through their own culture's military prowess. Typically Greek practices—the enjoyment of sophisticated music and poetry, philosophy, art—became markers of refinement, particularly towards the end of the republic when the social hierarchies began to steeple. A prominent example is the venal governor Verres, against whose taste for (among other things) expropriated statues Cicero delivers his coruscating attack.

Viewed synoptically, however, Roman responses to Hellenism in the republican period were deeply ambiguous (Gruen 1992). While Plautus and Terence were rendering Greek comedy in Latin for popular audiences at Rome, Cato the Censor (234–149 BCE; Astin 1978) was inveighing against the evils of Hellenism, and predicting—so a later source tells us—that 'Romans would destroy their state by gorging themselves with Greek letters' (Plutarch, *Cato* 23). Nevertheless, the distinction was not so much between pro- and anti-Hellenists—some critics have spoken of a divide between jingoistic Catonians and Hellenizing 'connoisseurs'—but between different strategies of imperial domination over Greece, to which both sides were equally firmly committed (cf. Barchiesi in this volume). No appreciator of Greek art in republican Rome could have been unaware that it was looted in war: huge, famous processions of artistic booty were held after Marcellus' sack of Syracuse in 211 BCE and Aemilius Paullus' victories against Perseus of Macedon in 168 BCE. Onlookers were admiring not only the Greek artwork, but also the military might that brought it to Rome. Conversely, opposing Hellenism rhetorically did not rule out using it strategically: Cato himself was versed in Greek traditions and even uses Greek phrases (Gruen 1992: 52–83, underplaying Cato's aggression).

The imperial dimension of Roman Hellenism also shaped the form that it took. For Romans, Hellenism was largely confined to the cultural and intellectual sphere, and located in a complementary, dyadic relationship with Roman military and political supremacy. In Vergil's *Aeneid*, the hero's father Anchises famously opines that:

> 'others... shall hammer forth more delicately a breathing likeness out of bronze, coax living faces from the marble, plead causes with more skill, plot with their gauge the movements in the sky, and tell the rising of the constellations. But you, Roman, must remember that you have to guide the nations by your authority (*imperium*), for this is to be your skill, to graft tradition onto peace, to shew mercy to the conquered, and to wage war until the haughty are brought low' (Vergil, *Aeneid* 6.847–53, trans. Jackson Knight)

The 'others' in question are clearly the Greeks, whose facility with sculpture, oratory, and astronomy is contrasted so powerfully with Rome's imperial might. This confinement of Hellenism's significance to culture was part of a larger strategy of denying Greeks any political or military authority. In Rome, Hellenizing activity was conventionally undertaken in leisure-time (*otium*), perhaps in a country retreat such as the Tuscan villa where Cicero sets his dialogues on Greek philosophy, the *Tusculan Disputations*: this was a clear indication that it was not a central part of the serious business (*negotium*) of politics. In the Greek world under Roman dominion, ultimate political authority now rested with provincial governors and their superiors at Rome.

Much more could be said about the complex weft of Roman Hellenism (Whitmarsh, forthcoming), but its common thread can be simply described: it was always a matter of deciding how to place the cultural legacy of a subject people within the Roman imperialist programme. Roman Hellenists had little direct interest in the well-being of real, contemporary Greeks, individually or collectively. This has important consequences for our understanding of the phenomenon sketched at the outset of this chapter, whereby Greeks and others of the first three centuries CE practised cultural Hellenism with an extraordinary vigour. When Greeks defined their identity through *paideia* (learning, civilization), they were reproducing an ideological distinction that was originally intended to subordinate them to their new masters.

9.3. Conceptualizing Imperial Hellenism

The imperial rule by one people of another, as Frantz Fanon influentially argues, operates through the imposition of language and habits of thought: 'to speak a language is to take on a world, a culture' (Fanon 1967: 38). Greek Hellenism of the imperial period reflected the world-view of republican Rome in expansionist mood; and, paradoxically, by celebrating their own culture in a form constructed by the demands of their rulers, Greeks at one level contributed to their own political disempowerment. Yet this does not mean that they always reproduced Roman ideology identically or uncritically. As Fanon also observes, colonial subjects are victims of 'self-division', even a 'massive psychoexistential complex' (ibid. 17, 12): forced to live with the ideological language imposed by their rulers, they schizophrenically attempt to use it to articulate their own subject positions. Greeks may have been wielding the Roman's tools, but they were not always doing so unambiguously in the service of the empire.

How can we capture the complex, multifaceted nature of Hellenism in the Roman period? This question has been the subject of some vigorous debate since the 1960s—perhaps unsurprisingly, given the high-profile political ramifications of colonization and decolonization in contemporary culture. The issue was effectively opened in 1969, when Glen Bowersock (1969) demonstrated that many of the most famous Greek 'sophists' (oratorical declaimers) of the first three centuries CE were socially and politically powerful individuals, whose allegiances lay with Rome. By coincidence, the following year Ewen Bowie (1970; cf. 1982) published an article arguing that the cult of archaism in the Greek world was designed to preserve a pristine image of Greece before the Romans came. Two contrary positions, then, derived from different methodologies: Bowersock's more historical analysis emphasized political complicity with Rome, while Bowie's cultural focus allowed for an interpretation more sensitive to what authors were trying to achieve in their texts. Each position has been influential. In a series of publications on Plutarch (1971), Dio Chrysostom (1978), and Lucian (1986), Christopher Jones has buttressed Bowersock's position, pointing to the evidence we have for deep involvement on each author's part in the Roman world around him. Bowie's view, meanwhile, has been developed by Simon Swain, whose monumental *Hellenism and Empire* in particular seeks to resolve the clash by distinguishing between superficial, public proclamations of allegiance to Rome (in inscriptions, for example) and the 'real attitudes of people under foreign rule' (Swain 1996: 412), which he locates in literature alone.

A different kind of approach is to ask not 'How did Greeks view the Roman Empire?' but 'How did Hellenism interact with Roman imperialism?' The latter question moves away from the practices and conscious articulations of individuals, and towards issues of historical sociology. In a classic article, tellingly entitled 'Becoming Roman, Staying Greek', Greg Woolf (1994) argues that Hellenism and *Romanitas* developed a kind of cultural *pas-de-deux*, whereby each evolved and adapted to complement the other. Woolf's argument is, in summary: (i) Romans treated Greeks as a special case among their subject nations, because they derived their rhetoric of beneficent empire from them; (ii) Roman respect for Hellenism was, however, focused upon the past—rather like the British in India, they viewed contemporary Greece as decadent; (iii) Greeks, conversely, accepted Romanization relatively unproblematically, because the material markers of Romanness (principally, bathhouses and gladiatorial arenas) did not impinge on their own sense of self-identity; (iv) because they were defined in such different ways, Hellenism and *Romanitas* did not threaten each other; indeed, their coexistence was mutually reinforcing, in that cultural identity on either side could be reinforced by the use of stereotypes of the other.

A particularly significant shift in the debate, well exemplified by Woolf's study, is the emergence of the concept of *identity*, which allows Hellenism to be studied in the abstract rather than simply as an aggregation of individual views. Swain too,

despite his overall emphasis upon the subjective perspectives of literary authors, is concerned to identify what he calls a 'cultural-cognitive' identity shared between them, a collective vision of a conservative Hellenism enshrined in the classics of the past. My own position, by contrast, was that imperial Hellenism was vibrant, responsive to circumstances, and creative (Whitmarsh 2001; see also 2005*a* and Goldhill 2001). Building upon contemporary, theoretical approaches, I argued that identity is not inherent in people but socially constructed and forged through dialogue. Elite Greeks under the Roman Empire—those, that is, who produce the texts and inscriptions that come down to us—faced a particular psycho-existential complex (to revisit Fanon's phrase), in that their identities were necessarily compromised by their dual status as both Greeks and Romans. This means that we should expect not only inconsistency (it is no great surprise to find broadly anti-Roman and pro-Roman sentiments in the same author), but also a deep self-consciousness about the fluidity of identity construction.

The argument is premised on the belief that what happened to Greeks in the Roman period involved a similar kind of denaturalization of identity to that experienced in the modern global village (Hall 1992). Fundamental to this view is the proposition that collective identity exists only insofar as it is represented: large-scale societies are 'imagined communities', to use the famous phrase of Benedict Anderson (1983). Now, when a society's traditional self-image is more or less settled and unchallenged, its sense of identity will usually be relatively unified. Thus, for example, few fifth-century Athenians would have had any problem deciding whether they were Greeks or barbarians (although, of course, that dichotomy might be challenged on theoretical grounds). When, however, the collective 'sense of self' is abraded by sudden social change, when traditional identities become overlain with new ones, then we reach what Stuart Hall calls a 'postmodern' state (Hall 1992: 302–4), where the very preconditions for identity formation become exposed and questioned. Much of my book was devoted to showing how self-conscious Greeks had become vis-à-vis the processes whereby identity was formed, particularly through *mimēsis*, or the 'imitation' of models; and also to showing how this self-awareness informed a range of literary texts.

It is striking, as I have already intimated, to contrast the conclusions I reached with those of Swain, for whom the Greek authors of the empire were, broadly speaking, backward-looking, elitist, cultural snobs. This discrepancy is in part a matter of scholarly perspective, but it also springs from the particular authors one takes as paradigmatic. Swain's iconic figure is the Platonist philosopher, voluminous polymath, and Delphic priest Plutarch, from the Boeotian town of Chaeroneia: 'a small town—and I choose to live there to prevent it from becoming smaller still' (*Life of Demosthenes* 2.2). In spite of his apparent provincialism, Plutarch was as informed as any Greek about the world beyond: he wrote about Roman history in his *Parallel Lives*, had visited Rome, read Latin (better than he himself admits), and had many influential Roman friends. Even so, he seemingly avoided all the

opportunities available to him for career advancement (Bowie 2002). For Plutarch, Greece really was the spiritual and intellectual centre of the world: as a number of studies have shown, his writings on Rome consistently evaluate it in Greek ethical terms (Swain 1990; Preston 2001), even to the point of misrepresenting its political structures by using Greek concepts (Pelling 1985).

There are, indeed, numerous figures like Plutarch on the imperial Greek landscape, men whose perspective upon the world was essentially tralatitious. My book, by contrast, places greater emphasis upon figures of cultural hybridity. One such example is Favorinus of Arelate (Arles, in modern France), who famously claims to have 'emulated not only the speech but also the mentality, life and style of the Greeks', becoming pre-eminent in the art of 'both resembling a Greek and being one' (*Corinthian Oration* = 'Dio Chrysostom' *Oration* 37.25). This distinction between seeming and being poses difficult questions about the very nature of Hellenism: is 'seeming Greek' the same as 'being' (i.e. is Hellenism just a matter of appearances?), or are the two being distinguished here? Similarly complex is the case of the influential satirist Lucian of Samosata, from Commagene in Syria. Lucian parades both his skill with the Greek language and his opponents' use of the labels 'barbarian' and 'Syrian', highlighting the tension between his ethnic provenance and his acquired cultural identity. Like Favorinus, Lucian highlights the possibility of creating identity by fashioning one's appearance (Whitmarsh 2001: 247–94): not only does his satire repeatedly zoom in on fakes (rapacious philosophers who hide behind their beards, religious leaders who forge oracles and prodigies, pretentious sophists who conceal their ignorance behind obscurantist language), but also his own literary identity is concealed behind a variety of personae ('Lycinus', 'The Syrian', 'Momus', 'Parrhesiades').

Nor is this preoccupation with hybridity confined to literature. For example, there still stands today (although now badly damaged) on the Mouseion hill in Athens an extraordinary monument built in around 114–16 CE to the memory of a Commagenian compatriot of Lucian's, Gaius Julius Antiochus Epiphanes Philopappus (Kleiner 1983; Smith 1998: 70–3). The monument had two storeys, and indeed two stories. At the top level, the subject was presented in a Greek style: seated, semi-naked, and draped in the cloak known as a *himation*. On the lower level he appeared in a frieze, dressed in a Roman toga, riding in a chariot with twelve lictors, as a Roman consul would be. The blend of identities was further underlined by bilingual inscriptions. On the left of his statue was a Latin epigraph giving his name in the Roman form, and emphasizing his Roman achievements: his consulship (that his was, in fact, only a suffect consulship is not drawn attention to), his membership of the Arval brethren, and his election among the praetorians by Trajan. The column to the right of him was inscribed in Greek, and gave a Greek form of his name ('Antiochus Philopappus'), and proclaimed his ancestry among the kings of Commagene. Under the statue, meanwhile, a further Greek inscription proclaimed a different identity again: 'Philopappus son of Epiphanes, of

Besa.' This referred to his adoptive identity as an Athenian, enrolled into the deme of Besa. One monument, then, embodies three different (if partially overlapping) identities: Roman, Greek, and Athenian. And Philopappus himself was an ethnic Syrian!

Swain's model of cultural-cognitive identity allows him to generalize the Plutarchan paradigm so as to cover (with nuance, certainly) figures like Favorinus, Lucian, and Philopappus: despite their backgrounds, their cultural and spiritual outlooks were scarcely distinguishable from those of ethnic Greeks. My book, by contrast, generalizes the Lucianic paradigm, so that all Hellenism is seen (again, with nuance) as self-consciously fictive. Plutarch, from this perspective, was working as hard as Lucian to construct his Hellenic identity—and he knew it too. A comprehensive account of imperial Hellenism, however, should be able to account for both perspectives. Stuart Hall (1992: 309), the identity theorist alluded to above, presents the effects of globalization on contemporary culture in a way that brings out the striking parallel with imperial Hellenism:

> globalization *does* have the effect of contesting and dislocating the centred and 'closed' identities of a national culture. It does have a pluralizing impact on identities, producing a variety of possibilities and new positions of identification, and making identities more positional, more political, more plural and diverse; less fixed, unified or trans-historical. However, its general impact remains contradictory. Some identities gravitate towards what Robins [another identity theorist] calls 'Tradition', attempting to restore their former purity and recover the unities and certainties which are felt as being lost. Others accept that identity is subject to the play of history, politics, representation and difference, so that they are unlikely ever again to be unitary or 'pure'; and these consequently gravitate towards what Robins . . . calls 'Translation'.

What is distinctive about imperial Hellenism is that both processes, tradition and translation, take place within the same cultural system. For some, Hellenism was a means of preserving continuity with a glorious past. For others, it offered a technology of cultural transformation. Either way, it was fundamentally and irrevocably shaped by the experience of subsumption into the enormous, unprecedented, globalizing phenomenon that was the Roman Empire.

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CHAPTER 10

HEBRAISM AND HELLENISM

ERICH S. GRUEN

THE terms 'Hebraism' and 'Hellenism' constitute a convenient and conventional dichotomy. They serve as a handy metaphor to denote a range of polarities, such as Jew and Greek, monotheism and paganism, religion and reason, faith and scepticism, tradition and innovation. Perhaps its most famous formulation came in Matthew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy*, published in 1869. The phraseology rapidly became entrenched, and the influence of the book in which it appeared was potent (Shavit 1997: 46–7; Stone 1998: 179–97). The resonance continues to re-echo.

Arnold was not the first to frame the distinction in this fashion. Heinrich Heine, a generation earlier, had drawn a comparable contrast between Jews and Greeks, between those who seek joyless religion and those who take pleasure in life, even asserting that all peoples fall into one category or another (Shavit 1997: 40–5). And other precursors too can readily be found (Rajak 2000: 535–48). But Arnold's articulation became the classic one. In his view, 'Hebraism', a stand-in for contemporary Puritanism, evoked a rigid focus on moral conduct, a spiritual straitjacket that underscored sin and conscience, whereas 'Hellenism' represented critical thinking, rationality, and a striving after beauty. Not that the two poles were incompatible. Indeed, Arnold argued for a blend. But the distinction was sharp, and the metaphor holds.

Does the conceptualization help to interpret a clash of cultures in antiquity? 'What does Athens have to do with Jerusalem?' asked Tertullian in the third century CE. The bifurcation has long featured in modern understandings of a fundamental divide between the tenets of Israel and the world of the Greeks, a divide that

became intense and acute when the aftermath of Alexander the Great's conquests brought Hellenism to the lands of the Near East, putting Jews under the sway of Greek rulers in the homeland and setting them amidst a dominant Greek culture in the cities of the diaspora. The presence of Hellenic ideas and practices could not fail to make itself felt in the communities of Syria and Palestine. Archaeological findings in the early twentieth century brought to light the effects upon Jewish art and material culture, as magisterially (though controversially) surveyed by E. R. Goodenough. And even the rabbis did not escape the influence of classical literature, languages, and learning, an influence cogently disclosed by the brilliant work of S. Lieberman (Goodenough 1953–68; Lieberman 1950; Levine 1998: 6–15).

The process, however, in the eyes of most researchers, was no smooth one. Tension and discord prevailed. Matters came to a head in the revolt of the Maccabees during the 160s BCE against the oppressive rule of Antiochus IV, who sought to impose pagan practice and worship upon the tenaciously resistant Jews. In the widely influential reconstruction of the great ancient historian Elias Bickerman, this episode provoked a deep fissure between 'Hellenizing' Jews who opted for assimilation, if not apostasy, and the traditionalists who fought the encroachment of Greek culture upon their hallowed traditions. That milestone produced a split that characterized Jewish attitudes toward pagan society in the subsequent generations of antiquity (Bickerman 1937). A fuller and broader study followed thirty years later by Martin Hengel, whose seminal work demonstrated that Greek learning and material culture had infiltrated Palestine long before the Maccabean era. His researches decisively exploded the widespread notion that a distinction existed between the purer Judaism of Palestine and the 'Hellenistic' Judaism of the diaspora. But the age of the Maccabees proved to be a watershed. Hengel endorsed Bickerman's idea that the clash in the 160s brought about an enduring disjuncture between those who embraced Hellenism and those who clung to Israelite traditions (Hengel 1974; Momigliano 1994: 10–28). More recent studies have questioned this split and challenged the idea of a *Kulturkampf* (Will and Orrieux 1986; Gruen 1998; Levine 1998; Aitken 2004). But the very frame of the discussion, 'Hebraism' (or 'Judaism') and 'Hellenism', presupposes a dichotomy, whether irreconcilable or assimilable, thus begging the question.

A shaky methodological foundation underpins the confusion. The dichotomy depends largely on modern perspectives. The very concepts of 'Hellenism' and 'Hebraism' contain complexities and ambiguities that resist reductionism. The 'Hellenic' culture with which Jews came into contact was no pure strain (if ever such a strain existed). It rested on a Greek amalgam with Phoenician traditions on the Levantine coast, with Egyptian elements in Alexandria, with Mesopotamian institutions in Babylon, and a bewildering combination of peoples in Asia Minor. In Palestine itself the Greek ingredient mingled with indigenous communities in the Galilee, in Idumaea, and even in Jerusalem. Nor would it be easy to identify or isolate a uniform 'Judaism'. A sense of common identity did exist, exemplified,

for example, in a work like the *Letter of Aristeas*, that linked the Jews of Jerusalem to those of Alexandria. But the practices of those who developed a rigid code of conduct in Qumran and those who dedicated synagogues to the Ptolemies in Egypt could hardly have been more different. Ancient Judaism itself was a hybrid, shaped through the interaction of Israelite culture with surrounding societies.

A striking fact needs to be underscored. The terms 'Hellenism' and 'Judaism' rarely surface in the ancient texts as distinguishing concepts. That absence itself is significant. Where indeed do the ancients attest to a clash of cultures? The *locus classicus* occurs in the Second Book of Maccabees, composed in Greek in the late second century BCE, an abridgement of the lost work by Jason of Cyrene, a Jew plainly conversant with Hellenic historiography. 'Hellenism' and 'Judaism' appear there for the first time, in conjunction with the Maccabean upheaval as resistance to the policies of Antiochus IV (2 Maccabees 2: 21, 4: 10, 13, 15, 6: 9, 8: 1, 11: 24, 14: 38; Himmelfarb 1998: 19–40). Unsurprisingly, therefore, these passages form the basis for the construct that the fissure between Jews loyal to their heritage and those drawn to Hellenic culture stems from the Maccabean struggle. The inference is dubious and the methodology faulty. The passages are highly exceptional rather than representative, and none of them actually counterposes the two terms as opposites. The Jews fought against the policies of the king, not against 'Hellenism'. Indeed, Judas Maccabeus, leader of the rebellion, and his successors in subsequent generations engaged regularly in diplomatic dealings with Greek kings, adopted Greek names, donned garb and paraded emblems redolent with Hellenic significance, erected monuments, displayed stelai and minted coinage inspired by Greek models, hired mercenaries, and even took on royal titulature (Rajak 2000: 61–80; Gruen 1998: 1–40). One of them even designated himself as 'philhellene' (Josephus, *Antiquities* 13.318). None was charged with betraying the legacy of the revolt. Embrace of a range of Hellenic customs and institutions was perfectly compatible with maintaining adherence to the traditions of the forefathers.

The dichotomy breaks down. But that does not entail fusion, blend, or a composite entity. Jews retained a strong sense of their own distinctiveness. And Greeks never doubted the difference between Hellenes and 'barbarians'. In what way, then, can one gain a grasp on how Jews conceived their relationship to Hellenic culture and how Greeks regarded the place of Jews in their own society? A selection of texts that speaks to the mutual perceptions (or misperceptions) of Jews and Greeks can offer a pathway to understanding.

Relevant texts are thin on the ground. Greek writers, on the whole, did not exercise themselves much about the Jews. The question of how to conceive the relationship was a matter of greater concern to the Jews. But enough survives to draw some inferences and offer some suggestions. The study of Greek attitudes toward Judaism has too often been mired in the modern drive to search out the causes of anti-Semitism and to find (or imagine) clues in antiquity (Sevenster 1975; Gager 1983; Feldman 1993: 123–287; Schäfer 1997). Hence, comments by Greek

writers tend to be classified as favourable or unfavourable toward the Jews, or indeed as neutral toward the Jews. The categories themselves skew our vision. Hellenic writers who commented on Jews rarely had an agenda. Their observations might be ill-informed, misguided, or erroneous, based on inadequate data (or interest). But they did not, in general, aim to praise or blame. Jews were a curiosity, their practices alien and peculiar, some admirable, some unintelligible. Writings about Jews might take the form of ethnographic excursuses in historical works, like those of Hecataeus of Abdera, or (more often) simply incidental remarks in studies of other matters. They need to be understood in terms of their own mindset, not as a means to determine whether pagans applauded or deplored Judaism. The Hellenes naturally viewed Jews through lenses with which they were familiar: the *interpretatio Graeca.* And, not surprisingly and equally important, Jews possessed their own set of lenses. Their vision of Greeks amounts to an *interpretatio Judaica.*

The process can be illustrated in an intriguing fashion. One of the earliest allusions to Jews in Greek literature identifies them as 'a nation of philosophers'. The statement comes from a Hellenic philosopher of major stature himself, Theophrastus, the greatest of Aristotle's pupils. For Theophrastus, Jews discuss the deity among themselves, scrutinize and speculate about the stars at night, and call upon God with prayers (Theophrastus, in Porphyry, *On Abstinence* 2.26; Stern 1974: 8–17). The remarks come in conjunction with misinformation about Jewish sacrifices (even human sacrifice) and other improbable practices. Theophrastus did not do a serious job of research, but simply picked up and reproduced dubious reports. But the assimilation of Jews to philosophers has a clear Hellenic resonance. People who acknowledged a single deity would most naturally be reckoned as akin to philosophers (Jaeger 1938: 131–4). And that would put them in a category with other eastern peoples to whom the Greeks imputed 'oriental wisdom'.

That perception reappears in another text also stemming from or ascribed to a pupil of Aristotle, Clearchus of Soli in Cyprus. Clearchus claims that Aristotle encountered a learned Jew in Asia Minor, a man thoroughly acquainted with Greek philosophy, having enjoyed the company of those of high cultivation (*paideia*), and more than capable of holding his own in erudite discussions. Aristotle was mightily impressed, according to the tale, and he expressed his respect by designating the Jew as one not only familiar with the Greek language but the possessor of a Greek soul (Clearchus, in Josephus, *Against Apion* 1.180–2; Stern 1974: 47–52). Here is *interpretatio Graeca* indeed.

The Hellenic construct is still more involved. According to Clearchus, Aristotle reckoned the Jews as descendants from the philosophers of India, men called *Kalanoi* by the Indians but Jews by the Syrians (Clearchus, in Josephus, *Against Apion* 1.179). The validity of this citation can be questioned but does not matter. What counts is the association of Jews with Indian wise men. The Greek perception that Jews had a link with eastern wisdom appears elsewhere: Jews as descendants of *magoi*, the philosophic elite of Persia (Diogenes Laertius 1.1, 9).

The equation of Jews with philosophers turns up in yet another Greek source not much later than Theophrastus and Clearchus, Megasthenes, writing in the early third century BCE. A scholar and diplomat, Megasthenes dwelled for several years in India, then composed a work that, among other things, discussed the elite Indian caste of the Brahmans. He obviously held them in high esteem, and made the notable statement that everything said about nature by the ancients (presumably the ancient Greeks) could also be found among those who philosophize outside of Greece, some by the Brahmans in India, and some by those in Syria called Jews (Megasthenes, in Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies* 1.15.72.5; Stern 1974: 45–6). Here again a Hellenic writer conjoins Jews with Indian wise men and sets them in the light of opinions held by Greek philosophers. The significance lies not so much in the fact that this delivers a positive evaluation of Jewish thinkers. More meaningful is the understanding of Jews as part and parcel of a broader intellectual tradition that includes eastern sages and links to the principles of Greek philosophy. Far from resisting Judaism, this strain of thinking reconceived it within a Hellenic universe.

Hecataeus of Abdera composed a work on the history, culture, and institutions of Egypt around 300 BCE. His researches on that land, among other things, led him to include a segment on the Jews in Egypt, in particular a form of the Exodus story and the career of Moses (Hecataeus, in Diodorus 40.3.1–8; Stern 1974: 20–44). The narrative, mediated through Egyptian informants, bears only slight resemblance to the biblical version, and its jumbled exposition carries little authority. But as an index of how Greek writers constructed Jewish history, it carries high value. Hecataeus affirms that the Jews, having been expelled from Egypt, practised a rather antisocial and xenophobic lifestyle—which has led some scholars to see the account as a negative portrait (Sevenster 1975: 188–90; Feldman 1993: 126; Schäfer 1997: 16–17). Yet he also gives high praise to Moses as a man of courage and wisdom, with admirable measures to his credit—thus inducing other scholars to view Hecataeus as favourable to Jews (Will and Orrieux 1986: 92–3; Gabba 1989: 629). But once again the categories of pro-Judaism or anti-Judaism miss the point. The most revealing aspect of Hecataeus' treatment is his shaping of the Jewish story within the frame of the Greek experience.

Moses, in Hecataeus' formulation, was driven from Egypt as the result of a plague in the land, and thus led out a large number of refugees to settle a 'colony' (*apoikia*) in Judaea. The language and idiom plainly evoke tales of Greek colonization, as found in the narratives of Herodotus and elsewhere. Indeed, Hecataeus explicitly juxtaposes the Moses exodus to those of Danaus and Cadmus, legendary founders of Argos and Thebes (Hecataeus, in Diodorus 40.3.2). Further, the historian conceives of Moses in the image of a Greek lawgiver. He has the Hebrew leader as founder of Jerusalem and the man who implemented legislation on its political structure, land-tenure, religious system, military organization, and social customs. Even more tellingly, Hecataeus ascribes to Moses measures that inculcate in the

youth the qualities of manliness, steadfastness, and endurance of all discomfort. That can only conjure up the ideals advocated by Sparta and much admired (even with mixed feelings) among many other Greeks. The analogy becomes still more pointed when the Moses of Hecataeus allocated land in equal portions to all citizens (though the priests got larger ones), and prohibited its resale lest the wealthy buy up property and reduce the manpower available for the military (Hecataeus, in Diodorus 40.3.6–7). The Bible offers no basis for this construct. But the portrait has a close replica in the legislation credited to the celebrated Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus. There too the link between the equality of landholding and military and political success is fundamental ideology (Aristotle, *Politics* 2.6; Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 8). The *interpretatio Graeca* prevails.

These images, in one form or another, evidently endured in the Greek imagination. Diodorus of Sicily, writing in the later first century BCE, lists Moses as a renowned lawgiver who attributed the inspiration for his measures to the deity, just as did Minos in Crete and Lycurgus in Sparta (Diodorus 1.94.1–2). And Strabo, in the next generation, in addition to bracketing Moses with Minos, Lycurgus, and other lawgivers and prophets who claimed communion with the divine, also sees him as leader of colonists who founded and settled Jerusalem (Strabo 16.2.36–9). It was convenient to shape the representation in terms readily intelligible to the Hellenic mentality.

Jews could return the favour. Greek intellectuals, as we have seen, envisioned Jewish erudition in the light of their own philosophic traditions. Their counterparts in the Jewish diaspora turned the perception on its head. Aristobulus, a Jew of wide philosophical and literary interests, writing probably in Alexandria in the middle of the second century BCE, composed an extended commentary on the Torah (Holladay 1995: 128–97; Barclay 1996: 150–8; Collins 2000: 186–90). In the surviving fragments, Aristobulus picked up on the allegedly close connection between Greek philosophy and Hebrew learning—but gave priority to the Jews. In his framing of the narrative, Moses' law-code became the inspiration for Hellenic philosophical and poetic traditions. Hellenic attainments drew their nourishment from that fount. Pythagoras borrowed much from the books of Moses and incorporated them into his teachings. Socrates' claim of a 'divine voice' behind his activities owed its impetus to Moses' model. And none other than Plato was a devoted reader of the Hebrew Scriptures, poring over every detail and faithfully following their prescriptions (Aristobulus, in Eusebius, *Preparation for the Gospel* 13.12.1–4). This, of course, required the availability of a Greek translation of the Torah—which Aristobulus duly pre-dated by some centuries in order to give his line of reasoning some plausibility. And he made an even more grandiose claim. Aristobulus found common ground among all philosophers in the importance of maintaining reverence toward God, a principle enshrined in the Bible and thus providing the central foundation for Greek philosophy (ibid. 13.12.8).

The most celebrated variant of this idea occurs in the *Letter of Aristeas*, composed by an Alexandrian Jew, possibly a near-contemporary of Aristobulus. The pseudonymous author puts into the mouth of the Greek 'Aristeas' the statement that Jews and Greeks worship the same god, only under different names (*Letter of Aristeas* 16).

The *Letter* itself is a composition of exceptional value for the subject of 'Hellenism' and 'Hebraism' (Barclay 1996: 138–50; Collins 2000: 191–5; Honigman 2003: 37–63). Its subject is the translation of the Hebrew Bible into Greek on the instructions of the Greek king of Egypt, Ptolemy II Philadelphus. The narrative itself, with seventy-two erudite scholars coming from Jerusalem at the king's behest in order to produce a Greek version of the Torah for the Alexandrian library, is largely fiction. The author is plainly a Jewish writer cloaked in the garb of an erudite official at the court of Ptolemy II. But historicity is not the point. 'Aristeas' offered verisimilitude rather than history, employing known figures and plausible circumstances to present the picture of mutual benefits enjoyed by Jewish learning and Hellenic patronage (Honigman 2003: 65–91; Johnson 2004: 34–8). The *Letter of Aristeas* provides a showcase for the familiarity of Jewish intellectuals with the features and forms of Greek literature—and Greek philosophy. The Jewish high priest Eleazer, for example, in recounting the significance of Jewish dietary prescriptions, explains them in good Greek style as having either a rational basis or as allowing for allegorical interpretation (*Letter of Aristeas* 128–71). Indeed, he is himself introduced in terms that evoke the quintessential Greek aristocrat: *kalokagathia* (ibid. 3). The text includes learned allusions to Greek intellectuals, and not the most obvious and celebrated of them: the philosophers Demetrius of Phalerum and Menedemus, the historians Hecataeus and Theopompus, and the tragic poet Theodectes. As the narrative has it, Ptolemy, in welcoming his Jewish visitors, organized a full-scale Greek symposium, a seven-day banquet (serving kosher food!) during which the king put a different question to each of his seventy-two guests. The questions, in almost all cases, involved issues of moral philosophy, political theory, or the principles of rulership. The learned Jews responded to each with crisp and unhesitating answers, punctuating each reply with a reference to God, the need to follow his precepts, or the acknowledgement of his benefits. The king generously commends each speaker and pronounces upon the wisdom of each statement (ibid. 182–294). The symposium occupies more than one-third of the entire treatise. It serves notice that erudite Jews are fully familiar with the principles of Greek philosophy—but it sets those principles firmly within the traditions of Jewish piety. The author makes clear that the Hellenism of Ptolemy's cultivated court is in complete accord with Hebraic wisdom, and indeed pays tribute to it. Not only does Ptolemy praise the judiciousness of each Jewish answer, but the Greek philosophers themselves who were present recognize the superiority of Jewish sagacity (ibid. 200–1, 235, 296). The author may be indulging in a bit of mischief here. The emphasis upon the deference of the Greek king and Greek philosophers to the Torah and to Jewish

traditions (including a scene in which Ptolemy bows down seven times to the Hebrew scrolls) borders on parody (Gruen 1998: 218–20). But the message comes through with clarity: Hellenic learning is secondary to, but entirely compatible with, Jewish wisdom.

This line persists in Jewish thinking. The great Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria in the first century CE, a veritable embodiment of the blend of traditions, carried on the theme. He traces the impact of Jewish learning back to the Presocratic thinker Heraclitus and sees its effect in the verses of Hesiod, the teachings of Socrates, and the Stoic doctrines of Zeno (Philo, *Allegorical Interpretation* 1.108; *The Heir of Divine Things* 214; *On the Eternity of the World* 17–19; *Questions on Exodus* 2.6; *Every Good Man is Free* 53–7; *Change of Names* 152; *On Dreams* 2.244). Philo further has Moses outstrip Greek legislators. The Hebrew hero cut a middle path between the austerity of the Spartan system and the laxity of Ionians and Sybarites. Only the code of Moses manages to endure unshaken and authoritative to Philo's own day (Philo, *On Special Laws* 102; *The Life of Moses* 12–14; Niehoff 2001: 137–58; Gruen 2002: 228–9).

The intricate interplay emerges in particularly beguiling fashion in the writings of the Jewish historian Josephus of the late first century CE. Josephus' last work, the *Contra Apionem* (*Against Apion*), ostensibly launches a counter-attack against criticisms of Jews or Jewish practices delivered by Greek intellectuals or those writing in Greek. Whether the calumnies to which Josephus responds actually reflect serious Hellenic displeasure with Judaism and its practitioners can be questioned. The treatise reads more like a rhetorical set-piece in which straw-men are erected to be shot down by Josephus' contrived missiles (Goodman 1999: 52–3; Gruen 2005: 31–51). But *Against Apion* contains important material on how the affiliations between Hellenism and Judaism might be articulated.

Josephus takes up the parallel between Moses and Greek lawgivers adumbrated by Hecataeus and more explicitly expressed by Diodorus and Strabo. But, like Philo, he turns it to the advantage of the Jews. The Jewish historian notes with some verve that Moses preceded his counterparts by a long way. Lycurgus, Solon, Zaleucus, and all the rest of those with great reputations have to take a back seat. By comparison with Moses, they were born the day before yesterday. Why, Homer himself did not so much as know the term 'law' (Josephus, *Against Apion* 2)! When Greek legislators did implement their systems, they were not up to Moses' standards. Spartans and Cretans stressed practical training, Athenians and others concentrated on the articulation of principles; only Moses combined both. He enunciated principles in detail and also made a point of seeing to their implementation (ibid. 2.171–4). Moreover, so Josephus claims, Jews adhere to their laws with a rigour that no Greek can match. Lycurgus, once again, is the benchmark. All acknowledge that Spartan faithfulness to his laws set a record for duration. But that duration does not bear comparison, Josephus observes, with the two thousand years from the time of Moses to the historian's own day. Furthermore, the Spartans held to their traditions

only while all was well, and swiftly abandoned them when matters took a downturn. Jewish laws are far more demanding but are never forsaken (ibid. 2.225–31, 279; cf. 1.123).

The Jews have the better of it. But the terms of the comparison itself constitute the central point. Josephus, like Aristobulus, Philo, and others, employs Hellenic thinkers and the Hellenic intellectual framework to deliver his message. He too adopts the posture that the cream of Greek thinkers, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Plato, and the Stoics, indeed nearly all philosophers, share kindred views about the nature of God—and they can all be traced back to Moses (ibid. 2.168, 281). When Josephus allows himself to stand back for an instant, he makes the notable remark that Jews are more divided from Greeks by geography than by institutions (ibid. 2.123).

The implications here need to be underscored. This is no mere competition or one-upmanship. Reciprocity rather than rivalry takes precedence. A Greek philosopher, Hermippus of Smyrna, an admirer and biographer of Pythagoras, who penned his work in the late third century BCE, strikes the right chord. Hermippus, in his study of Pythagoras, had no hesitation in observing that the Greek sage incorporated much from the laws of the Jews into his own philosophy (Hermippus, in Josephus, *Against Apion* 1.62–5; Origen, *Against Celsus* 1.15; Stern 1974: 93–6). More than two centuries later Philo made a comparable assertion from the reverse direction. As he put it, Moses himself not only learned arithmetic, geometry, music, and hieroglyphs from erudite Egyptians, but progressed through the rest of his curriculum, presumably rhetoric, literature, and philosophy, with Greek masters (Philo, *The Life of Moses* 1.23). So, although Moses' measures may have formed the backdrop for later Greek philosophy, he owed his own education in part to Hellenic teachers. It matters little that these constructs have small purchase on reality. The representations themselves carry real significance for the mutual perceptions of Greeks and Jews. They belie any unbridgeable gap between 'Hellenism' and 'Hebraism'. The ancients saw that supposed distinction as a more complex mosaic. The intertwining receives its most memorable turn of phrase in the words of the neo-Pythagorean philosopher Numenius of Apamea in the later second century CE: 'For what is Plato, other than Moses speaking good Attic Greek?' (Numenius, in Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies* 1.22.150.4; Stern 1974: 206–16).

That Greeks viewed Judaism through their own prism and that Jews reversed the process with Hellenism may cause no surprise. What deserves stress, however, is the comfort that each had in concocting or constructing a connection with the other. As Greeks cast Moses in the mould of Hellenic lawgivers or colonizers and interpreted Jewish teachings in the light of Greek philosophy, so Jews claimed biblical authority for Platonic precepts and had the sages of Jerusalem spout Greek political theory. 'Hebraism' and 'Hellenism' did not constitute adversarial positions or competing systems, but malleable concepts shaped by Greeks and Jews to give expression to their own identity in a world of overlapping cultures.

Suggested Reading

The best starting point for this subject is Levine's succinct study (1998), well informed and accessible to non-specialists. For those seeking a deeper engagement with the material, one cannot do better than Hengel's classic (1974), though it is dense and difficult. Gabba (1989) discusses Greek attitudes toward Jews, and Jewish involvement with the Hellenic cultural world is treated in Gruen (1998). Barclay (1996) contributes a very judicious, even if occasionally over-schematic, survey. Shavit (1997) is not always reliable when dealing with antiquity, but valuably pursues the topic into the modern period and the contemporary scene. Essential collections of evidence can be found in Holladay (1995) on the Jewish side, and Stern (1974) on the Greek side.

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CHAPTER 11

THE GREEK HERITAGE IN ISLAM

GOTTHARD STROHMAIER

ALEXANDER the Great, the founder of a multi-ethnic Hellenistic civilization, has earned an honoured place in the Koran under the name *Dhū l-qarnayn* ('the horned one'). This identification with Alexander has been plausibly explained by coins from the Near East in which he is represented with the ram-horns of the Egyptian god Ammon. Parts of the popular tales taken from the *Alexander Romance* in Sura 18.59–63, 82–98, are, however, also transferred to Moses, the most prominent prophet before Muhammad. The impact of Judaism is also to be seen in a rigid monotheism combined with a very personal notion of God, and further in a ban on making pictures of living beings. With Judaism and Christianity, the Koran shares the belief in the creation of the world in six days and its end in the day of judgement and the resurrection of the dead. This engendered conflicts with Greek philosophy that were similar to the conflicts that occurred in Christendom, and also led to attempts by Muslim philosophers to create some kind of synthesis.

The Arab expansion, which, after the death of the prophet in 632, reached within one century the Atlantic coast in Spain and the borders of India, deprived the Roman Empire of the regions south of the Mediterranean Sea. This situation created one of the conditions for 'Europe', hitherto only a term of Greek scientific geography, and, from the fifteenth century, provided the basis for a definition of a 'European' identity in confrontation with the Muslim Orient, and of Europe as the

only legitimate heir of the Greek mind. Intellectuals of the Muslim Middle Ages had a similar conception of themselves, when they called their Greek masters simply 'the ancients', just as the educated did in the European age of Enlightenment.

The Arab conquests resemble in their cultural aspects the Roman expansion in the Mediterranean region centuries earlier, insofar as in both cases the victors came under the influence of a 'superior' Hellenic culture (cf. Barchiesi in this volume). But while the Romans were mostly interested in poetry, theatre, sculpture, philosophical ethics, astrology, and those sciences with a practical value, the Arabs got hold of the school of Alexandria with its specific syllabus of Aristotelian philosophy in Neoplatonic interpretation, Galenic medicine, and Ptolemaic astronomy—which were no less important and which the Romans had failed to include in their curricula—and transferred these eventually into their language. The Alexandrian school ceased to exist some time after the Arab conquest in 642, but its teachings were firmly implanted in the intelligentsia of the Near East, especially the Syrian clergy. The Muslims, in accordance with their tolerant policy towards 'the people of the book', left intact the Syrian academies, hospitals, and parochial schools.

The first caliphal dynasty of the Umayyads residing in Damascus shows almost no signs of cultural contact with the local population. Only their castles in the desert, with their mural paintings, mosaics, and Greek inscriptions, reveal that local artisans were at work. The cupola of a little bathroom in Qaṣr 'Amrā, a hundred kilometres east of Amman, shows the starred sky with the coloured figures of the Greek constellations. The ban on such pictures could be neglected in a more private sphere, as was the case in these castles. The more liberal attitude prevailing at some courts offered also a haven for the cultivation of the Greek heritage for centuries to come. The iconoclastic attitude prevailed, however, in the public sphere. The decoration of the mosques and other public buildings remained confined to geometrical and floral motifs, among the latter being the so-called arabesque usually seen as typical for Islamic art (and which is already to be found in Pompeii).

With the fall of the Umayyad dynasty in 750 and the founding of the new capital Baghdad by the Abbasids, the situation changed in favour of an open-minded attitude on the part of some members of the Muslim intelligentsia toward certain elements of Greek learning offered by Christian and pagan Syrians. The Christians were constituted by the three denominations: the so-called Nestorians, Monophysites, and Melkites (i.e. the Catholics). The pagans were the so-called Sabians, descendants of the old Babylonian star-worshippers, who had their centre at Ḥarrān in Upper Mesopotamia. Their theology was influenced by Hermetic and Neoplatonic traditions, and they revered Hermes Trismegistus, Agathodaemon, and Pythagoras as their prophets (Green 1992). It was due to their presence that Muslims shared an idea of the pre-Christian religion of Greek antiquity as being some kind of star-worship, as in Harrān.

The Muslims who favoured Greek science were high-ranking court officials, and one caliph, al-Ma'mūn (ruled 813–33), the son and successor of Hārūn al-Rashīd, even sponsored a 'House of Wisdom' devoted to the study of 'the ancients'. It was said that his interests were guided in this direction by Aristotle himself, who appeared to him in a dream. The study of the texts was by no means uncritical. When the length of the earth's circumference, given in stades, was unclear, the caliph provided for an expedition, which repeated the experiment and arrived at a measurement that was within one degree of the figure that had been calculated by Eratosthenes. It remains an open question to what extent translations from the Greek were carried out in the 'House of Wisdom' (Balty-Guesdon 1992). The activity of Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq (808–73), the most prominent translator, and his team appears as a purely private enterprise; he collected the Greek manuscripts that were still available all over the Muslim Near East for his private library. The importation of manuscripts from Byzantine territory, whether as military booty or on a diplomatic level, played a minor role.

Dimitri Gutas has pronounced the thesis that the interest in Greek heritage was ultimately motivated by an old Persian resentment against Alexander the Great, who had not only destroyed the treasures of Iranian culture but allegedly had much of it transferred to his homeland; these treasures now, and in confrontation with the Byzantine enemy, needed to be recovered and restored to their legitimate owners (Gutas 1998). Another and simpler reason can be sought in the fact that Christian and pagan Syrian physicians and philosophers impressed the Muslim elite with their superior knowledge, a phenomenon that in the end resulted in a demand for translations. But one reason does not preclude the other. Regular sessions were held, where intellectuals of all kinds, including Muslim theologians, met for discussions. Lecture courses for students took place in private houses, not only in Muslim theology but also in philosophy and medicine, with the latter subjects also attracting people who would not become physicians but wished to learn something about natural science.

The translators of the ninth century CE had at their disposal Greek manuscripts much older than those in our libraries. The most important translator, Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq, a Nestorian Arab, was very proficient in Greek and was able to recite Homer by heart. He may be called a philologist in the modern sense, as he used to collate as many manuscripts as possible before embarking on the proper task of translating. His versions of Galen reveal a thorough understanding of the content and are not literal, word-for-word translations, which, at any rate, would have been impossible in the medium of a Semitic language. They were destined in the first place for the Christian Syrian physicians at the caliph's court, and were therefore in Syriac. Muslims who commissioned translations into Arabic often had to be content with a secondary version made after the Syriac by Ḥunayn's pupils who did not understand enough Greek. This double translation did not, of course, improve the quality of the finished versions. Half of the Arabic versions that Ḥunayn has recorded in

his famous letter to 'Alī ibn Yaḥyā went through an intermediate Syriac translation. Hunayn could not have known, in his time, that many of these Arabic translations were destined to survive, rather than the Syriac versions (Strohmaier 1994).

The classical scholar who has to rely on such Arabic materials as are nowadays accessible in a European language should bear in mind some peculiarities about the texts. Specific pagan expressions are made compatible with monotheism in an almost arbitrary manner. In the dream-book of Artemidorus, the transformation of goddesses into angels of the male gender seems almost ridiculous. Hendiadys, that is, the replacement of one Greek word by two Arabic synonyms, was practised only due to the literary taste of the time and gives no hint of the wording of the Greek original. Unlike the Syrians and Copts, whose vernaculars show widespread borrowings from the Greek, the Arabs were fond of the purity of their language. Therefore very few foreign Greek words entered the language; some of those that did are *failasūf* ('philosopher'), *falsafa* ('philosophy'), *sūfisṭā'ī* ('Sophist'), *hayūlā* (Greek *hulē*, 'matter'), *usṭuquss* (Greek *stoicheion*, 'element'), and *balgham* ('phlegm'). The Arabic translators did their best to comply with this purism and created many new terms when no suitable equivalents were available. Geographical names sometimes appear modernized, for example the old Scythians as Turks or Slavs. In the case of personal names, transcriptions could not, of course, be avoided; unfortunately, these were liable to be distorted in the process of manuscript copying if the names did not happen to belong to commonly known figures who had put on an Arab dress, such as *Arisṭūṭālīs* (Aristotle, spelled also *Arisṭū*), *Abuqrāṭ* (Hippocrates, spelled also *Buqrāṭ*), *Jālīnūs* (Galen), or *Baṭlamiyūs* (Ptolemy). Other names appear to the present-day reader simply to be unintelligible, and the reader of modern editions may even have reason in some instances to mistrust reconstructions provided by the editor. In special cases, the classical scholar or the historian needs to apply for help to an expert in Arabic palaeography. Arabic star-names as they are still in use today come partly from pre-Islamic star lore and partly represent loan translations from the Greek or skilful equations with Greek names; for example, the head of the Medusa in the hand of Perseus was rendered as *ghūl*, a female demon haunting the traveller in the desert, hence our *Algol* (Kunitzsch 1959, 1961).

The syllabus of translated texts was in the tradition of the school of Alexandria, which had passed through the rather narrow filter of the Syrian Christians. Illustrative of their work is the fact that from the many texts of their compatriot Lucian of Samosata they translated into their own language only one ethical tract about calumny. From fictional literature, we have only vestiges of popular novels, such as the tale of *Parthenope*, but it is not clear where and when these found their way into the oriental languages (Hägg 2004). Such jokes as those contained in the *Philogelos* are also to be found, some identical, some new and no worse (Marzolph 1987).

The texts translated into Arabic in the course of the ninth century belong mainly to Peripatetic philosophy, mathematics, astronomy and astrology, and medicine.

In some cases they replace the original Greek texts that are now lost. Genuine fragments of Presocratic philosophers are found only in quotations of later authors, for example Galen, though reliable information was also offered in the *Placita philosophorum* that went under the name of Plutarch (Daiber 1980). Arabic doxographies, as in al-Shahrastānī or pseudo-Ammonius (Rudolph 1989), are totally impaired by Neoplatonic speculation.

Some of Plato's dialogues were accessible, for example the *Phaedo*, and this was the reason why Socrates became the hero of a philosophical ethos in Islam as well as in the Occident. In his great monograph on India, al-Bīrūnī (973–1048) sees a reason for the inferiority of Hindu astronomy (as compared with the Greek) in the fact that there were no such heroes as Socrates who were prepared to die for the sake of truth. The heretic and great physician Rhazes (854–925 or 935), who rejected all prophets of the revealed religions as impostors, chose Socrates as his imam (Stroumsa 1999). Galen's summaries of the dialogues, unknown in the Greek tradition, were also influential; Averroës (1126–98) used the summary of the *Republic* when writing his series of commentaries on the works of Aristotle, as the *Politics* was not available, and perhaps not even translated.

Aristotle, together with his commentators, became the main authority also in the field of natural science. Philosophers like Avicenna (980 or earlier–1037) preferred even his errors in anatomy over the more exact findings of Galen. Averroës, in his great commentary on Aristotle's *On the Soul*, saw the Greek philosopher as 'the exemplar that Nature created in order to show the utmost perfection in mankind'. A letter by the commentator Themistius to Julian the Apostate, preserved not in Greek but in Arabic, is to be regarded as genuine. Among the pseudepigraphical correspondence between Aristotle and Alexander the Great there is one letter the authenticity of which is still under dispute (Plezia 1998). A pseudonymous *Theology of Aristotle*, in reality an adaptation of the last chapters of Plotinus' *Enneads*, enhanced the Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy that already began with the Alexandrian commentators. A magical *Book of Stones* was also current under Aristotle's name (Ruska 1912), though al-Bīrūnī recognized the falsification.

Some *gnomologia*, popular collections of wise sayings and anecdotes of various ancient authorities, were also received with great interest (Overwien 2005), and were used for the construction of biographies in the manner of Diogenes Laertius, who was, incidentally, not available. Because of the constant reshuffling of material and texts, confusion of the names of wise men was great, as in the Greek collections, so that in the end Socrates would find his abode in Diogenes' barrel (Strohmaier 1997).

In the field of mathematics and geometry, Euclid and many of his Greek followers were translated and gave rise to some new and original achievements. In the first phase of the reception process one observes also an admixture of Indian elements. Merchants readily adopted Indian figures, while scholars adhered for a long time to the Greek method of letter-reckoning.

In astronomy there had been in the beginning of the ninth century a certain influence from India via Persia, but the greatest authority was assigned to Ptolemy's *Almagest*, which remained the basic handbook. Copernicus had to work later with an Arabo-Latin version, as the Romans had failed to translate it into their language. Muslim astronomers had not only the translated texts at their disposal but also the astrolabe, a Greek invention, and celestial globes, reproduced after Greek models (Savage-Smith 1985). Aratus' *Phaenomena* helped in understanding the figures of constellations.

Galen of Pergamon (129–216 CE) became the most important authority in medicine, and was also valued as a philosopher in his own right. When he presented his anatomical research as proof of 'intelligent design' for the animal body, he was, in this respect, fully compatible with Islamic religion. He inserted into his works remarks about his life and his experiences in Roman society, and thus became the only person from classical antiquity of whom the Muslims could have a vivid and reliable picture. Many regarded him as the model of a personality wholly devoted to science. Some of his writings that have disappeared in Greek but are preserved in Arabic are now included into the *Supplementum Orientale* of the Berlin *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum*. Hippocrates was introduced only in the shadow of Galen, whose commentaries on his writings were nearly all translated, among them a commentary on the 'Oath', the Greek version of which was lost and which contained interesting information about Asclepius (Strohmaier 2004). Handbooks for the market-supervisor urged that physicians should take the Hippocratic Oath before him.

Dioscorides' work *De Materia Medica* ('Materials of Medicine') was translated and provided with illustrations; some manuscripts are executed as beautifully as their Byzantine counterparts. The Choresmian al-Bīrūnī regrets that Dioscorides had not come to Central Asia in order to find out about the medicinal use of flora in his home country.

Owing to an intensive commercial and cultural exchange between the regions of the vast empire, the translated texts became available in places from Cordoba to Bukhara, while scholars often combined pilgrimage to Mecca with a visit to renowned teachers or libraries founded by wealthy patrons. The production of paper, taken over from the Chinese, made books less expensive. The further development of the sciences, with sometimes remarkable results, was largely dependent on the benevolence of the courts of local rulers, though these were looked on with suspicion by pious people who took exception even to foreign names ending in '-s'. Al-Ghazālī (1058–1111), who became the authority of Sunna orthodoxy, repudiated Aristotle, Socrates, and their Muslim followers as heretics because of their belief in the eternity of the world, while he nevertheless acknowledged Galenic medicine and Aristotelian logic, which survived in the curriculum of the *madrasa* ('school') up to the twentieth century. Others thought that they must have a medicine of their own, and called it 'prophetic medicine'. The collections of traditional medical lore were,

in the course of time, increasingly informed by the recipes of school medicine; today one finds in the English book market something under the title 'Islamic medicine', which contains little more than an abridgement of Galen's physiology and which is, nevertheless, recommended as 'the medicine of the future' (Khan 1986: 89).

Unlike Sunna orthodoxy, the Shi'a with its various branches, such as Ismailism, entertained a more favourable attitude towards the Greek philosophers, whom the Shi'a regarded as early practitioners of their own wisdom. The late Ayatollah Khomeini depicted Socrates as an ascetic hermit who preached monotheism and was therefore poisoned by a king (Khomeini 1979: 42).

The Greek heritage was, it seems, a minor element within the framework of the rich Muslim culture of the Middle Ages, and was bound to wither in the following centuries. But it was instrumental in promoting secular learning in the West, where Latin translations were on the whole inferior to those made in ninth-century Baghdad, even if they served the needs of the emerging universities. However, as attention in the West turned increasingly to the original Greek texts and the Latin versions made from them, the humanist scholars of the Renaissance, misled by the clumsy Latin of the medieval translators, came to regard Arabic authors as mere transmitters, or falsifiers, of a pure Greek tradition. While a more balanced assessment has taken place today, and the truly original achievements of Muslim scholars of the Middle Ages have come to light, these accomplishments were, as a rule, not taken up by a Latin scholasticism that confined its interest to readily digestible handbooks. In that sense, Arabic letters indeed functioned as mere transmitters of Greek learning.

The impact of Hellenic culture on Islam has been the object of serious historiographical and philological research only since the nineteenth century. Such research was first motivated by the fact that some classical Greek texts had survived solely in Arabic translation. In the twentieth century people also began to ask why the inspiration afforded by the Greeks to Europe since the Renaissance did not bear the same fruits in the Orient, and the question was answered in various ways. Racist explanations were readily to hand in the colonial age, but have now been discarded. Some insisted on the narrow scope of a reception that was confined to philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, and medicine, and that failed to adopt what has been termed the 'humanist' spirit of Homer or Cicero (Schaeder 1960: 116–27). An alleged incompatibility in the long run with Islamic religion also gives no satisfactory answer. Christian orthodoxy in Europe was at odds with some tenets of Hellenic antiquity, but this did not prove to be decisive within the framework of a new liberal economic and civic order. Such socio-economic developments did not, or could not, emerge in the Third World and the Islamic countries, and the very fact that these did not take place in the realm of Islam may be responsible for the ultimate fate of the Greek heritage there (Strohmaier 2002–3).

The theme of Graeco-Arabica has acquired in our time a new importance in the dialogue taking place between non-Muslims and Muslims, who have learned

from modern European historiography about the impact their culture had on the West in the Middle Ages. Many of them see it as the main reason for the technical progress which was achieved in the West and with which they are trying to catch up, while they avoid the ideological implications of such progress that may lead them away from true belief. Still less well-informed fundamentalists cherish also the idea that the secular sciences flourishing in the heyday of their culture were inspired by the Koran and the *sharia*. Others who take an active part in serious research into the history of the sciences in Islam, such as the influential Persian historian Seyyed Hossein Nasr, take notice of Greek origins, but uphold the idea of a unique culture and of a genuine Islamic science. In their view, these took in only foreign elements that were compatible with the Koran and the *sharia* and became in modern times spoiled by a 'colonized discourse' (Iqbal 2002: 278). A less biased view leads, however, to the conclusion that classical Muslim culture was a plural phenomenon, and that Graeco-Arabica had its own lively history, because not only Muslims, but also Christians, Jews, Sabians, and other unbelievers participated in it.

Today, one perceives a general reluctance among Muslim colleagues to be concerned with the Greek impact on their culture. Given the present dependence on Europe in all fields of modern science, they do not want to see themselves as having been equally dependent in the past. But, within the framework of Muslim civilization, the Greek heritage was more the continuation of an indigenous tradition, comparable to Oriental Christendom, and less the reception of something from outside. And the Greeks who settled round the Mediterranean were not Europeans in the modern sense of the word; moreover, there were authors of the Hellenistic age and the Roman Empire who wrote Greek but ethnically were not themselves 'Greek'. All modern European ideologies that left their successive imprint on intellectuals in the Orient conveyed the idea that the Greeks had been the spiritual ancestors of the Europeans only. In this sense, Edward Said, in his scathing attack on Western 'Orientalism', finds fault already with Aeschylus, who lets the Persian chorus sing 'through and by virtue of the European imagination, which is depicted as victorious over Asia, that hostile "other" world beyond the seas' (Said 1978: 56). In Egypt, nevertheless, the magnificent new building of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina is now conceived as a renewal of the old Library of Alexandria, and a reminder to the country's citizens to be proud not only of the Pharaonic age but also the splendour of Hellenism on their soil.

Suggested Reading

Nasr (1976); Rosenthal (1975, 1990*a*, and *b*); Kunitzsch (1989); Rashed (1996); Strohmaier (1996; 1999, 2002, and 2003); Nutton (1999); Strohmaier and Toral-Niehoff (1999); and Urvoy (2003).

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CHAPTER 12

HELLENISM IN THE RENAISSANCE

CHRISTOPHER S. CELENZA

Homerus tuus apud me mutus, imo vero ego apud illum surdus sum. Gaudeo tamen vel aspectu solo, et sepe illum amplexus ac suspirans dico: 'O magne vir, quam cupide te audirem!' (Without your voice, your Homer is mute to me. Or rather, I am deaf to him. Still, I rejoice even to look at him and often, as I embrace him I say, sighing, 'O Great Man, how ardently would I listen to you!')

(Petrarch, quoted in Cortesi 1995: 457)

Maximum beneficium paulo ante haec tempora in universam Europam urbs Florentia contulit, cum primum Graecarum litterarum professores patria pulsos iussit ad se diverti, et non modo hospitio iuvit, sed etiam reddidit illis sua studia, postquam amplissimis stipendiis ad docendum invitavit. In reliqua Italia professores artium e Graecia profugos nemo aspiciebat, et una cum Graecia linguam et litteras Graecas amisisse-mus propemodum, ni Florentia doctissimos homines calamitate levasset, quod absque Florentinis fuisset, futurum fuit, ut prorsus obsolesceret Latina lingua, sic vitiata barbarie conspurcataque. (Somewhat before our day, the city of Florence conferred the greatest of benefits upon all of Europe, when it first took care that professors of Greek literature who had been driven from their homes be called there. Florence not only aided them with its hospitality but also offered them its own studious energies after inviting them to teach and providing them with the largest of salaries. In the rest of Italy no one glimpsed the fleeing arts professors from Greece. We almost would have lost (together with Greece) Greek language and literature, had Florence not saved these men from their

> calamity; for without the Florentines, it would have happened, even as the Latin language languished, corrupted, and stained with barbarism as it was.) (Philip Melanchthon, quoted in Cortesi 1995: 465)

THESE two quotations tell us much about the vicissitudes of Hellenism in the Renaissance. The first comes from Francesco Petrarca, Petrarch (1304–74), the consolidator of early Italian humanism and the thinker who established Italian humanism as the very beginnings of a Europe-wide intellectual movement. He was writing in 1354 to Nicola Sigero, a member of the Byzantine court who had sent him a Greek manuscript of Homer. The quotation shows us Petrarch's plea for assistance, and his joy in having obtained a text so powerfully symbolic that it delighted him even though he could not read it. Petrarch never managed proficiency in the language. Yet Homer was the 'prince of poets' for Petrarch, and the social memory of the Greek intellectual world, so alive in all aspects of ancient Latin literature, touched him to the core. The side of Renaissance humanism that remained intellectually omnivorous, always seeking a new or unknown text, had an important impetus in Petrarch, and he planted a seed that bore fruit in the next two intellectual generations.

The second quotation comes from the pen of Philip Melanchthon, the Lutheran reformer, Protestant educator, and indispensable intellectual companion of Martin Luther during Luther's crucial years at the Wartburg (1520–5). In Melanchthon's statements one recognizes a complex of positions that animated the study of Greek and the general European perception of the place of Hellenism and the Hellenic world. First, Florence held a key position in the social memory of Europe's intellectual elite (with reason, as shall become evident). Second, we see that there existed the perception of a *translatio studii*, a transfer of useful knowledge necessary because of the end of the Byzantine Empire. No one then would have phrased it precisely in that fashion; and the modern myth that Greek intellectual life infused itself into the West only after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 has now largely disappeared, even from textbooks. Still, the more perceptive among Renaissance scholars—and Melanchthon was one of these—realized that a long, slow process of leakage had been under way for a while. The Ottomans had taken large parts of the Byzantine territories long before Constantinople fell, and Byzantines and westerners had been interacting for some time. Third, there is a perception that the two principal ancient languages were inextricably linked; that the fortune of proper Latinity depended, in senses often left undefined but no less truly felt, on the state of the Greek language. While there were periodic debates about the relative superiority of one language over another, it was a rare thinker who could proclaim that one of the two was not, at least in theory, necessary for the expression of a complete culture.

The story of Hellenism's transformation in Europe, from the fourteenth through to the sixteenth century, is a story of acquisition, appropriation, and domestication

that began with Petrarch's early and ultimately unrealized desire. Petrarch's first attempt to learn Greek came at the hands of Barlaam of Calabria, a convert from eastern to western Christianity, who hailed from the southern tip of Italy. There, after early medieval Slavic invasions drove a number of western Greeks further westward, the old Magna Graecia became a place where Greek was spoken again, in some villages even until the early twentieth century. Throughout the high Middle Ages this region remained a centre for Greek-to-Latin translation. Yet Petrarch's multiple cultural pursuits did not leave him enough time to master the language. Though he wrote to the same correspondent, 'if you can, send Hesiod and please, send Euripides', he would remain without fluent reading knowledge. Barlaam's time with Petrarch proved fruitful, however: through Petrarch's intervention Barlaam received a benefice, the bishopric of Gerace, in Calabria, before dying in 1348. Petrarch's friend Giovanni Boccaccio shared the enthusiasm for Greek, and he promoted the career of a student of Barlaam, Leonzio Pilato, also Calabrian. Boccaccio had persuaded the Florentine city fathers in 1360 to endow a chair for Greek at the Florentine university, and Leonzio assumed the position, working out a rudimentary translation of Homer's *Odyssey*, part of which (Odysseus' descent to Hades, *Od.* 11) Petrarch requested be sent to him in 1365. Three years later he had the complete version (MS Paris, Bibl. Nat., Lat. 7880, 1 and 2; Cortesi 1995: 459). Leonzio proved a difficult personality, however, obstreperous, arrogant, and aggressive, according to Boccaccio (see Petrarch, *Epistulae Seniles* 3.6), and Leonzio's Florentine presence did not lead to the permanent establishment of Greek in Florence.

A decisive change in the fortune of western Hellenism occurred in the next generation, under the leadership of the Florentine humanist chancellor Coluccio Salutati (1331–1406, chancellor 1375–1406). Salutati bears primary responsibility for the centring of Italian humanism in Florence. At this point Italian humanism had taken on certain characteristics: unlike the German idealist neo-humanism of the eighteenth century, Italian humanism remained primarily Latinate. The word 'humanism', *humanismus*, was not used, though the word 'humanist', *humanista*, did appear at the end of the fifteenth century. Formally, as then used, the word designated a university teacher of five subjects that were known as the *studia humanitatis*, the 'humanities' of grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry, and moral philosophy (for literature on the problem of Italian Renaissance humanism, see Celenza 2004: 1–57 and Woolfson 2005). Less formally, one can say that the Renaissance humanism that solidified in Salutati's era centred on a classical revival. This revival was buttressed by the imitation of ancient Latin and a tendency to judge the current world against the standards of the ancient world. Imitation of classical Latin had been occurring since the late thirteenth century in Padua, and with Petrarch, humanism acquired its historical sense. Salutati, however, enabled humanism to take root in a specific place: Florence.

A political leader (the chancellor of Florence was in a sense the city's chief diplomat), Salutati was one of those rare figures around whom a circle of pupils

gathers and cultural transformation occurs (see Witt 1983, and Witt 2000: 292–337). He encouraged his younger devotees in their humanistic pursuits, treating them less like students and more like colleagues in a common enterprise. Like Petrarch, whose work he admired, Salutati never thoroughly learned Greek. Yet it was the enthusiasm of the devoted members of his circle that impelled Salutati to have a position created at the university, again, for the teaching of Greek. In February of 1397 a Byzantine diplomat and scholar, Manuel Chrysoloras (1349–1415), arrived in Florence. According to his contract, he was there 'to teach Greek literature and grammar' to any citizen and resident of Florence who desired the lessons (see Cortesi 1995: 464).

Chrysoloras remained in Florence for three years, departing in March 1400. During that time he had a number of enthusiastic students, among whom could be found Leonardo Bruni (1370–1444), the best-selling humanist author of the fifteenth century and the most important Greek-to-Latin translator of the early fifteenth century (Hankins 1990: i. 29–81; 2003–4: i. 177–291; and Botley 2004: esp. 41–62). Bruni went on to be an apostolic secretary to the papal court and then, from 1427 to 1444, chancellor of Florence. In those early years, however, he was studying law, but he broke off his legal studies for the chance to study with Chrysoloras. Reflecting on this moment some forty years later, he wrote that he had asked himself: 'When you have a chance to see and converse with Homer and Plato and Demosthenes ... will you deprive yourself of it? For seven hundred years now, no-one in Italy has been able to read Greek, and yet we admit that it is from the Greeks that we get all our systems of knowledge' (Bruni 1926: 341–2, trans. G. Griffiths, in Bruni 1987: 23–4, quoted in Hankins 1990: i. 30). One can see in Bruni's later, admittedly exaggerated, sentiment the appeal that Chrysoloras' teaching held. Those who were self-consciously seeking to revive the culture in which they found themselves could contribute something truly new to that enterprise: they could learn a language only rarely used in their part of the world but which, at the same time, seemed a key to a storehouse of ancient wisdom.

Chrysoloras taught his pupils that the best translation method was *ad sensum*, that is, that the translator must as closely as possible reproduce the meaning of the text in question without becoming trapped in literalism. (See the testimony of another student of Chrysoloras, Cencio de' Rustici, who wrote: 'He said it was necessary to translate for sense in this way: that whoever turns his attention to these things understands as a rule that the proper meaning of the Greek remain unchanged; for if someone changes the proper meaning of the Greek so that it speaks more ornately and openly to his own people, he is then functioning not as a translator but as an expounder': in Bertalot 1975: 2. 133, quoted in Cortesi 1995: 471.) This method meant different things to different practitioners, but it became an accepted best practice, at least aspirationally. Later, defending one of his own translations, Bruni wrote the first treatise on Greek-to-Latin translation since St Jerome. He wrote that the best translator had to have a thorough, idiomatic

knowledge of both languages. 'In addition, he must possess a sound ear so that his translation does not disturb and destroy the fullness and rhythmical qualities of the original' ('On the Correct Way to Translate': Bruni 1987: 217–29, at 220; for a new critical edition, Italian translation, and ample commentary to this text, see Bruni 2004). Bruni goes on: 'the best translator will turn his whole mind, heart, and will to his original author, and in a sense transform him, considering how he may express the shape, attitude, and stance of his speech, and all his lines and colors' (Bruni 1987: 220). In short, the best way to translate is 'to preserve the style of the original as well as possible, so that polish and elegance be not lacking in the words, and the words be not lacking in meaning' (ibid. 221).

Bruni's early translating projects indicate the aims of Renaissance humanists at the time. He translated St Basil's *Epistula ad Adolescentes*, his 'Letter to the Youth' on why Christians should be unafraid to study the pagan classics (for the fortune of Basil's treatise, see Schucan 1973). Bearing with it the patina of venerable antiquity, Basil's treatise pointed to the continuity of certain virtues from pagan to Christian times and the power of the many positive moral examples found in pagan literature (the examples of vice were to be discarded by the Christian reader). Bruni's translation was immediately relevant, as Salutati was able to cite it in an ongoing polemic on the value of the 'new' pagan texts that the humanists were so ardently reading.

Bruni also translated Plato's *Phaedo*, spurred on by Salutati, as these humanists were seeking to understand what place hitherto unknown secular works might have in the social economy of Christian intellectual life. After translating *Phaedo*, Bruni wrote in a letter that 'before, I had merely met Plato; now, I believe, I know him' ('prius enim Platonem dumtaxat videram, nunc vero etiam, ut mihi videor, cognovi': Bruni 1741: 1.1 = Luiso 1980: i. 8 = Hankins 1990: i. 42, with n. 27). In the dedication of the translated work, Bruni wrote to Pope Innocent VII that the dialogue could be seen as 'a confirmation of the true faith', and that Plato harmonized with Christian thinking not only in the matter of the immortality of the human soul but 'in many others as well' (Hankins 1989: 1. 50). Partial versions of Plato's *Timaeus* had been available early, translated by Cicero and later by Caleidius. Plato's *Mero* and *Phaedo* were available in the Latin translation of the twelfth-century Sicilian Henricus Aristippus; and William of Moerbeke translated into Latin Proclus's *Commentary on Plato's Parmenides*, in which a part of Plato's was preserved. Yet many Platonic commonplaces would have been familiar to the thinkers in the Latin West, Bruni included. The immortality of the individual human soul, rewards and punishments after death, and a form-based ontology: all these were commonplaces of medieval Platonism. Though they are present in the *Phaedo*, they would not have constituted 'news'. More innovatory, however, would have been the dialogical aspect of Plato discoverable in the *Phaedo*, as Socrates, even directly before his death, encourages his young companions not to become 'misologues', haters of inquiring conversation. Socrates' conduct in the dialogue too would have stood out to Bruni's

generation of humanists, alert as they were to find good moral exempla in ancient pagan works.

The ancient world was to be mined for its political wisdom: it is unsurprising that another early Bruni translation was of Xenophon's *On the Tyrant*, a subject of concern to Bruni and his fellow denizens of Florence (a republic under attack at that time from Milan, a tyranny). These early translations are all inflected by the humanists' search to measure their own lives against those of the ancients.

Significantly, they are all also translations of works that were short. Bruni can be singled out because he is exemplary in many ways, but many other early translators shared this propensity in the first few decades of the fifteenth century to confine their translating projects to short works, for two reasons. First, translating was a way of learning Greek, of perfecting the elementary knowledge one had gleaned in one's studies; to translate a short work meant that one would have both a satisfyingly completed task and something to show to others.

This propensity to share work represented the second reason many chose to try their hands at short Greek works: patronage and the social economy of humanist taste. The vogue for a Latinate antiquity grew in Florence and eventually Italy in the first few decades of the fifteenth century; but the number of people who adequately learned Greek remained small throughout the entire Renaissance. Humanists seeking to gain a reputation could further that aim by making available in Latin Greek works that all sought to read but that could only be read once translated. After circulating their products to friends in this era of manuscript publication, receiving critiques, and making improvements, a humanist might then dedicate his translation to a patron, sometimes one who was already supporting him, sometimes a prospective patron. This process of gaining patronage was fraught with concerns and calculations on the part of its practitioners.

One humanist to whom Bruni served as a mentor, Lapo da Castiglionchio the Younger (1405–38), was a prolific and admired translator of Plutarch's *Lives*. In the middle of the 1430s he found himself in the environment of the papal court, seeking patronage and hoping for a more permanent position in the curial apparatus, an ambition left unfulfilled at the time of his death. One of the manuscripts that preserve his translating efforts is what one might call an 'author's book', that is, a final author's version that could then be copied into a more refined manuscript format, whether by the author himself or by a scribe (MS Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale, Magl. XXIII, 126, fos. 19–20^{v}; see Celenza 1997: 121–55). In it, Lapo clearly translated his texts first, leaving a few pages before the text blank, in which he would write a preface once deciding on a dedicatee. Lapo himself clues us in to this practice when he writes as follows in his preface to Plutarch's *Life of Aratus* (Celenza 1997: 152–5, at 152, punctuation altered): 'After I had translated into Latin Plutarch's account of the peacetime affairs and military deeds of the most famous leader Aratus the Syconian and had determined—in line with my customary practice—to send it to some prince, I found myself in doubt and deliberation concerning the man among

our leaders to whom I might dedicate this little work of mine...' Lapo dedicated the work to Cardinal Cesarini, and the choice is telling. At the time, the Church was in the middle of a decades-long struggle concerning the power of the papacy. The struggle played itself out partly at the Council of Basle, which had been called in 1431 by Pope Martin V and would end in 1449 (Stieber 1978). The 'conciliarists' supported the notion that a properly convoked Church Council could exert binding legal force on all Christians, the pope included. Conciliarists saw themselves as defending the rights of international Christendom against the increasing hegemony of an Italian-controlled papacy; the papacy believed that popes held a 'plenitude of power' and that, as all bodies needed to have a head, so too did the Christian body need one supreme member who could guide it effectively.

Tensions were often high, and it is noteworthy that the dedicatee of Lapo's version of the *Life of Aratus*, Cardinal Cesarini, was heavily involved with the Council of Basle for most of the 1430s. Aratus (271–213 BCE) was known as an expeller of tyrants, having been instrumental in the expulsion of Nicocles from his home city of Sicyon. Lapo leaves his dedication vague, saying simply that Cesarini has helped the Church afflicted by unwise 'counsel' as much as Aratus helped a Greece afflicted by tyranny. (The pun between 'counsel' and 'Council' is just as resonant in English as it is in the Latin *consilium/concilium*, and it is clear in Lapo's dedication that he is aware of the possible resonances of his dedication of this *Life* to Cesarini.) Though the dedication recognizes the fact that, at the time of writing—1438—Cesarini was back in the fold of the papacy, the contents of the *Life* itself left open an ambiguity that Lapo, and many other humanists, treasured. A desire for Greek wisdom, carefully thought out ways to make that 'new' wisdom relevant to Christian society, and an ability to bring the mechanisms of acquisition into the give-and-take of the hunt for patronage: in their early stages, the acquisition and appropriation of the Hellenic world proceeded by mingling these cultural imperatives together.

Great impetus accrued to western Hellenism during the Council of Ferrara-Florence of 1438–9 (Viti 1994 and Gill 1959). The goal of the Council was to unify the two Catholic Churches, ostensibly by theological discussions over the nature of the Trinity. Though at its end the goal of unity was announced, the success was short-lived and the Council became the last serious attempt for the two Churches to come together. Yet for cultural exchange between Greece and the West the importance of the Council was monumental. Lapo da Castiglionchio wrote that, when in the presence of the learned Greeks, he felt himself at a revived Academy of Plato, or at the Lyceum of Aristotle (Lapo da Castiglionchio the Younger, *De Curiae Commodis*, ed. and tr. Celenza 1999: 102–227, at 152–3). The Council saw the arrival in the West of a mysterious figure, Gemistos Plethon, who, comparing Plato and Aristotle, made the case for a revived cult of the pagan gods (Woodhouse 1986 and Gentile 1994). Texts were exchanged, and as the Council arrived in Florence the Greek-hungry humanists there avidly devoured every morsel of Greek wisdom they could find. An Anatolian cleric and Byzantine delegate, Bessarion (1403–72), made his debut in

Italy, later to become one of the region's cultural leaders (Monfasani 1995 and 2004; and Bianca 2000).

In short, the middle of the fifteenth century saw the battles over acceptance largely over. Contacts between East and West had been occurring for some time. One of the premier Hellenists of the fifteenth century, Francesco Filelfo (1398–1481), had himself gone to Constantinople in 1420, studying Greek with a relative of Manuel Chrysoloras, John Chrysoloras, and eventually also marrying John's daughter (aa. vv. 1986; Robin 1991). Filelfo remained there for seven years, and upon returning to Italy became a controversial instructor in Florence, eventually establishing himself in Milan, writing a number of Latin treatises, translating Greek works, and writing some Greek epigrams. Young Lapo, among others, had been one of his students in Florence.

In the meantime the papacy had taken an interest in humanistic studies. The pontificate of Eugenius IV (1431–47) saw humanists attempting to work their way into the papal court. During the pontificate of Eugenius' successor, Nicholas V (1447–55), the pope (the former Tommaso Parentucelli) himself became interested in the project of assimilating a Greek heritage into the Latin West (Bonatti and Manfredi 2000). Among other projects that pointed toward his interest in a classically inspired cultural revival (for example, the rebuilding of the city of Rome and the augmentation of the papal library), Nicholas also sponsored translation initiatives. Lorenzo Valla (1405/7–57) was given the task of translating Herodotus and Thucydides; both became the standard Latin translations of the respective works, even though his Herodotus remained unfinished at the time of his death. Valla's Hellenism reflected his personal polemicism (it was he who unmasked as a forgery the *Donation of Constantine* and who was famed in his lifetime for controversy). This penchant for competition even extended into his translating activity, as he saw his role in that realm as translating in such a way that the translated text 'spoke no worse, through me, in Latin, than it did through itself in Greek', as he wrote in his preface to his translation of Demosthenes' *Ctesiphon* (in Cortesi 1995: 482). Valla's Hellenism could even cause controversy, as he wrote a set of *Annotations on the New Testament* that pointed out infelicities or errors in the Latin Vulgate translation of the Greek New Testament (Celenza 2004: 93–5).

Other contemporaries saw their role in a less incendiary manner, often depending on the genre of work translated. Pietro Balbi, translating Proclus' *Platonic Theology*, explicitly said in his 1460 dedication to Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa that he had sometimes deviated from ancient Latinity in his translation, preferring instead to 'use words which are encountered in our day, in the schools of the philosophers' ('que his nostris temporibus in scholis philosophorum frequentantur': Cortesi 1995: 480). Since Proclus was a philosophical text, precision, rather than ornateness, was necessary. Behind the question of translation methods lay a deeper one: how to make the Hellenic heritage speak to present concerns, especially as the number of texts recovered increased.

The middle of the fifteenth century saw three interlinked developments that changed the shape of Renaissance Hellenism, even as they affected most other areas of fifteenth-century cultural life. First, libraries underwent a process of expansion and consolidation, so that it came to seem a sign of prestige for a library not only to be large in terms of the number of texts, but also monumental and permanent. The Vatican Library's development formed part of this process, as did the development of the first 'public' library in Renaissance Europe, Florence's library of San Marco. (On the development of the Vatican Library see Boyle 1991: 65–73, 1993: pp. xi–xx, and 2000: 3–8; Grafton 1993; on San Marco in Florence see Ullman and Stadter 1972.) The creation of ideologically significant places to store texts, places that themselves became indicators of prestige, was buttressed by the second development, the invention of printing with moveable type, which arrived in Italy in the 1460s and quickly gained committed adherents (Richardson 1999). Finally, the fall of Constantinople in 1453 served as powerful symbolic evidence of a cultural transfer that had been going on for some time. As one humanist, Angelo Decembrio, noted in a dialogue written in the late 1450s: 'After the city of Constantinople was devastated by the barbarous infidels, and its ruler, a great man, was slaughtered and the leader's brother along with the rest of his people came to Rome, it is almost unbelievable how many of our own people have gone Greek, as if they had been raised in Attica or Achaia, and along with that have acquired the ability to deal with Greek books' (Decembrio 2002: 1.8.9). Decembrio makes it clear that the fall of Constantinople somehow put the Hellenic heritage into stark relief for westerners.

As these developments fell into place the stage was set for further appropriation. A Latin translation of Plutarch's *Lives*, with translations by a number of different hands (many of them early fifteenth-century Plutarchan enthusiasts), appeared in print in Rome in 1470 (Giustiniani 1961: 3–62). The respected cleric Bessarion had converted to Roman Catholicism and been made a cardinal. His house in Rome became a centre for Greek–Latin exchange, and his private library, stocked with numerous Greek manuscripts, became the basis for the library of San Marco in Venice (Labowsky 1979). The quick pace of translation continued throughout the Italian peninsula, and in Florence a noteworthy development occurred. A number of Plato's dialogues had been translated earlier in the century, but of the two great ancient Greek philosophers Aristotle had ultimately fared better in the Florence of the early fifteenth century. The focus on virtues in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, political concerns in the *Politics*, and economics in the pseudonymous *Economics* all fit well with activist concerns of the Florentine early fifteenth century, with Bruni its leading figure.

The 1460s and 1470s saw the beginnings of the Platonic revival, with Marsilio Ficino (1433–99) leading the way. Ficino became one of Florence's leading intellectual figures during this time, establishing a wide-ranging international correspondence network (Hankins 1990, and 2003–4: vol. 2; and Celenza 2007). Patron-

age of the Medici and other leading Florentine families allowed Ficino to devote himself to Platonic studies, broadly conceived. In 1484 he published his Latin translation of Plato's collected works (including some dialogues now thought spurious). Ficino saw Plato as a treasury of wisdom, one that needed to be explicated and creatively interpreted using any means possible, including a wide variety of hitherto little-known Greek texts. Ficino's Hellenism leaned toward the esoteric, and it is due to him that late ancient Platonism (Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, the Corpus Hermeticum) took its place within the Platonic tradition. Not until the eighteenth century did scholars en masse attempt to disentangle Plato's texts from this larger complex of Platonism that Ficino did so much to animate (Tigerstedt 1974 and Matton 2001: 5–68).

Ficino's contemporary and friendly rival Angelo Poliziano (1454–94) served as the other face of Hellenism in Florence (Godman 1998 and Branca 1983). Poliziano distinguished himself as the best philologist of the fifteenth century, lecturing regularly at the Florentine university on Greek and Latin literature. Like Ficino he was interested in what we would term post-classical literature, but his motive was different. Where Ficino used post-classical material of all sorts to draw out what he believed was the true, eternal, and Christian message of Platonically inspired wisdom, Poliziano appears in retrospect more historicist. His use of post-classical material was intended to gain a full range of the ancient Greek lexicon so that in his philological work he could, like the Alexandrian critics he so admired, make lasting contributions to the critical history of texts. He believed that the 'grammaticus' was far more than a mere grammarian, making it clear in one of his treatises that he conceived of philology as possessing a very wide purview: philology is the one discipline that in a sense stands above all the others, because its practitioners have the ability to read all texts and not imprison themselves within the walls of a disciplinary tradition (Poliziano 1986: 16–17). Though not a 'philosopher' by training, Poliziano took pride in teaching Aristotle (both the *Ethics* and some of the logical works) at the Florentine university, sometimes (to his delight) to the annoyance of those who self-identified as philosophers.

The legacy of the fifteenth-century Italian Renaissance with respect to Hellenism was twofold. First, by the end of the fifteenth century the majority of the entire canon of what we now know as Greek literature was once again available to the West. Many works were not widely available, but they were at least known. Second, it was Poliziano's kind of remarkably thorough philology that became the backbone for classical studies as the centre of study moved, throughout the sixteenth century, northward to France and the Netherlands. But even now, knowledge of Greek remained restricted to an elite. It is indicative that the great printer and editor Aldus Manutius (*c*.1449–1515) ardently believed that he could carve out a market niche for himself by focusing on Greek works alone, only to realize that the market was too small for him to make a viable profit.

Notwithstanding the fact that far fewer Renaissance Europeans learned Greek than Latin, it is nonetheless noteworthy that, by the time of Aldus' death in 1515, the majority of the Greek canon had been printed and diffusion of the texts among scholars throughout Europe made a quantum leap. The diffusion of Greek texts was a two-sided coin: on the one hand, the existence of one text in many basically exact copies meant that scholars could compare one 'standard' text to manuscript variants at their disposal. Not only this, but faraway scholars could also correspond with one another to discuss emendations, and they could do so in the knowledge that they were both looking at the same text. On the other hand, Aldus and other early printers of Greek were impelled, often by financial reasons, to work quickly; doing so meant that, sometimes, an inferior version of a Greek text was printed, diffusing that poor text immeasurably (many of Aldus' manuscript sources have been identified in Sicherl 1997). In any case, it was at the press of Aldus that the first printed edition of Aristotle in Greek saw the light (1495–8), though tellingly, even in 1547 new copies of that original edition were for sale (Davies 1999: 25; see also Botley 2004: 175). The printing and sale of Greek texts over the long run formed a stark contrast to Latin classics, including Christian Latin classics, which remained early modern European printing's most triumphant product.

Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466–1536) represents much that was characteristic of early sixteenth-century Hellenism: the move of high-level humanist Greek scholarship north, increasing precision when it came to editing, and the intersection of a heated religious environment with problems of scholarship. (There is a stimulating recent study of Erasmus and Greek, with literature, in Goldhill 2002.) From Erasmus' early years of study, Greek occupied a special place for him. He saw it as a language for initiates and as offering membership in a restricted club, whose insiders could use it almost as a code. Erasmus discovered a manuscript copy of Valla's earlier *Annotations on the New Testament* and had it printed in 1504 in Basel, and he would go on to use Valla's *Annotations* as the basis for his own wider-ranging ones, an accompaniment to his controversial critical edition of the Greek New Testament along with his own Latin translation (Bentley 1983; Botley 2004: 115–63, 174–7; and Goldhill 2002: 24–43). With his fast friend Thomas More, Erasmus shared a passion for the satirist Lucian, and his best-known work, the *Praise of Folly*, was inspired by Lucian (Marsh 1998: 167–76 and Goldhill 2002: 43–54). The passions of the Reformation magnified debates regarding the orthodoxy of the study of the pagan classics that went back to the era of Salutati. Erasmus' works were eventually put on the Index of Prohibited Books in the 1560s. This tendency on the part of both the Catholic and the widening palette of Protestant churches to fear non-Christian classical works helps to explain the intellectual biography of the best Hellenist of the early sixteenth century (and a correspondent of Erasmus), Guillaume Budé, who lived from 1467 to 1540. (For literature on Budé see Grafton 1997: 135–83; for Budé's correspondence with Erasmus see Garanderie 1967.)

Budé came to the Hellenic world relatively late in life, having been trained as a lawyer and always maintaining connections to the world of high politics in France. It was owing to his inspiration that Francis I was induced to establish three royal professorships outside the institutional ambit of the Sorbonne, in the fields of Greek, Latin, and Hebrew. This set of professorships represented the origin of the Collège de France, and Budé's influence in that project reflects his own particular cultural translation of earlier humanist approaches to the Hellenic and the ancient worlds. From Italian humanists like Valla and Poliziano, Budé inherited philological precision and a penchant to focus on the individual textual example to make sense of a passage. One of his works, the *Commentaries on the Greek Language*, resembled a Greek version of Lorenzo Valla's *Elegances of the Latin Language*. Just as the earlier Latinate work offered a set of 'best practices' in the use of Latin, with examples culled from a wide variety of ancient sources, so too did Budé's work on the Greek language gather together the fruits of earlier Renaissance scholarship. He had a full palette of texts to draw upon. He also possessed an already assimilated cultural translation of centuries of Byzantine scholarship that had earlier been distilled and made over for western audiences in the fifteenth century. Budé delighted in writing Greek letters to his many humanistic correspondents (over 180 such letters survive), in which he addressed matters from the mundane to the erudite, expanding his lexicon through practice by filtering it through the European republic of letters, now so enlarged through the medium of print.

Budé's last major work is indicative of its time. Published in 1535, it was entitled *De Transitu Hellenismi ad Christianismum* ('On the Movement from Hellenism to Christianity'). Its sober piety, deep learning, and confessional timbre reflect, together, the end of the real Renaissance, that of openness to new texts and the ideas they contained. Budé's *De Transitu* also points the way to the beginning of a second cultural moment, classicizing in its priorities but in which one observes more circumspection among humanistic intellectuals, as they negotiated their way carefully in the halls of the powerful new sovereign states of confessional Europe (Budé 1973). Budé does not so much evince regret for his classical leanings as contextualize them, making sure that his readers realize that all scholarly endeavour, in the end, should be directed toward Christianity, the pursuit of Hellenism included. In his dedication he tells his king, Francis I, that he will give up his love of philology for a love of sacred literature (ibid. 1–10).

Budé's professed turn from a possible secular scholarship to a devotion to *sacrae litterae* may have been influenced by the so-called 'Affair of the Placards' of 17 October 1534, in which the public, anonymous posting of anti-Catholic posters throughout Paris caused Francis I to turn from a policy of relative religious toleration to declared enmity of Protestantism. This very possibility is itself a sign of the end of the Renaissance and the beginning of a new age.

Throughout the Renaissance, Hellenism never represented the kind of all-encompassing ideological devotion to an idealized ancient Greece that emerged

among German idealists like Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717–68), Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805), and others, a system that would lead to the Hellenization of German education in the nineteenth century and have a powerful effect on the development of university politics in the German-speaking lands and beyond. In the centuries that preceded the Romantic appreciation of Hellenic culture there would be vigorous defenders of the value of learning Greek in the German-speaking lands, not least Franciscus Irenicus (1494/5–1553), Martin Crusius (1526–1607), and Johann Caspar Löscher (1677–1752), each of whom wrote treatises on the importance of learning and using Greek. They and others like them represented the essential cultural background without which the later German fascination with Hellenism would have been unthinkable (Ludwig 1998). But Renaissance Hellenism remained focused on discovery: first on the Greek texts themselves that lay behind ancient Latin literature, like lost original founts of wisdom; then on unlocking the intricacies of the Greek language, eventually to subject it to the same intense, historically informed philological scrutiny which underlay the humanists' treatment of Latin.

Suggested Reading

An essential starting-point is Cortesi (1995), which provides a synthetic, detailed, and bibliographically rich survey of the topic. Equally important, this time for the impact of Greek émigrés on Renaissance culture, has been the work of John Monfasani; a good jumping-off point for the interested reader can be found in his 'Greek Renaissance Migrations', now Essay I in Monfasani (2004); see also Monfasani (1976) for a detailed study of how one Byzantine thinker made his way in Italian Renaissance culture. The learning of Greek in the Italian Renaissance is expertly treated in Ciccolella (2009). The topic of Greeks in Renaissance Italy was the subject of much of the work of Deno Geanakoplos: see Geanakoplos (1989). Similarly astute and important is Wilson (1992). Weiss (1977) is wide-ranging in scope. Hankins' classic work (1990) presents the most comprehensive survey of how Plato was appropriated by Italian Renaissance thinkers. Hankins 2003–4: i. 273–91 also offers an excellent overview of Greek studies in the Renaissance. Grafton 1997: 135–83 presents a rich case-study of how an important Latinate Renaissance reader, Guillaume Budé, approached a Greek text. Goldhill 2002: 14–59 offers a stimulating introduction to Erasmus and his appreciation of Greek. Finally, Botley (2004) presents a fine study of Greek to Latin translation in the Renaissance, which focuses on Leonardo Bruni, Giannozzo Manetti, and Erasmus.

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CHAPTER 13

HELLENISM IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT

PAUL CARTLEDGE

THE eighteenth-century 'Enlightenment' was arguably a discrete cultural movement, but neither was it a uniform let alone unified current of thought, nor was it entirely an eighteenth-century phenomenon (1650–1750? 1690–1790?). Not only did it assume different shapes and shades in different European countries (Porter and Teich 1981), and different ones again in America, but it was also divided against itself on a number of major moral and intellectual issues. As regards attitudes to the ancient world, Americans typically preferred Rome to Greece (Cohn-Haft 1980; Richard 1994; but note the stout counter-argument of Nelson 2004)—hence their choice of 'Capitol' and 'Senate', and especially their general abhorrence of what they took to be the factionalism that had fatally corrupted ancient Greek city-state polities. Within Europe, the major continental distinction was between the modernizers and the traditionalists. This involved the taking up of positions, no longer as between Athens and Jerusalem, but between Athens and Sparta; and in the most obviously important version of the quarrel, the French Revolution itself, ideas of democracy were often somehow at stake too. This chapter will therefore look forwards as well as back, as it re-examines one of the major intellectual antecedents of that decisive historical turning-point.

In the pro-Sparta corner fought Rousseau, Rollin (Legagneux 1972), Helvétius, and Mably (Rawson 1969 in brief), and on this side of the Channel Adam Ferguson and the playwright Richard Glover (Macgregor Morris 2004). By these writers, Sparta was presented as both a political and especially a moral exemplar, a state whose power rested on her virtue: disciplined, harmonious, obedient, and above

all orderly (Viroli 1987 and 1988; Nippel 1996: 231). But not all Enlightenment intellectuals joined in unison in the eulogy of Sparta, by any means. Voltaire not surprisingly detested a city that had openly affected to despise both learning and luxury (Mat-Hasquin 1981). He was supported for their different reasons by David Hume (pro-learning) and Adam Smith (pro-luxury). But most notably hostile to Sparta was the proto-democrat Cornelius de Pauw in his *Recherches philosophiques sur les Grecs*, first issued in 1787 in Berlin, then reissued in 1788 in Paris (Loraux and Vidal-Naquet 1995: 91–2).

Yet Rousseau too was a proto-democrat, which nicely indicates the complexity of the debate over antiquity. He and his writings can admirably serve us as a microcosm both of the larger debates going on across a wide geographical canvas and political spectrum, and of the multiple twists and contradictions of the story of democracy and its Hellenic roots. For we are all democrats now (are we not?), and according to one popular modern story, or myth, of democracy's historic trajectory, democracy was invented some 2,500 years ago, in Greece, where it flourished until it was stamped out by an unholy conspiracy of oligarchs and imperialists from Rome in the second century BCE, not to rise again, as either a fact or an idea, until the eighteenth century of our era, when Jean-Jacques Rousseau did more than most to reinvigorate the idea of democracy in preparation for its restoration in fact by the French Revolution.

Actually, the story is much more complicated than that consciously crude outline might make it appear. In antiquity, democracy did not by any means triumph altogether over its rivals (oligarchy, aristocracy, kingship, or tyranny), and from antiquity to the nineteenth century the dominant intellectual-political tradition was both anti-democratic and, often precisely because of that bias, pro-Spartan (Roberts 1994). Rousseau, for his part, was both of the Enlightenment and, in crucial ways, against it; and his pro(to)-democratic ideas went together seamlessly, as he saw it, with a pro-Spartan stance. A fair amount, therefore, of the story of Hellenism, democracy, and of our western political-theoretical and practical-political heritage can be seen to hang on the 'Spartan tradition in European thought' (Rawson 1969), and on Rousseau's place within that tradition.

For historians of ancient Greek political thought, and of its post-classical reception, the 'mirage' (Ollier 1933–43) or 'legend' (Tigerstedt 1965–78) of Sparta consists of a startling variety of Spartas offered up as an imaginative or imaginary representation of political virtue in living actuality, as a political model or paradigm. How historically authentic, and therefore how realistic or pragmatic, any of the supposedly Sparta-based political prescriptions in fact are, is a secondary issue. It is the constructions themselves, and their reception(s), that matter. Rousseau was himself a bundle of paradoxes: a supporter of the Ancients in their quarrel with the Moderns, yet also a master of modern sensibility; a *philosophe* who cast himself as a latter-day Socrates in opposition to the Sophists but yet used 'philosophesque' as an insult; a theorist who denied the Enlightenment's fundamental commitment

to the individual and publicly favoured a communitarian, proto-democratic ideal, while at the same time withdrawing as a solitary dreamer to an inner world of self-absorption, a posture or pose that his erstwhile intellectual and political comrades-in-arms found contemptible. Reasonably enough, Rousseau might be considered as un-Spartan in crucial behavioural respects as could possibly be imagined, and yet he remained consistently a devoted laconizer. Against such a background of eccentricity, paradox, and inconsistency, if not self-contradiction, those issues on which Rousseau did *not* change his mind stand out in high relief. Ancient Sparta was one, and a major one.

Arguably, 'no writing on the ancient city has ever been innocent of the burning issues of the day' (Thom 1995: 89; cf. Walzer 1988). Certainly, that was the case with Rousseau's Sparta—a weapon to be wielded by him in any number of battles, against his friends as much as his (many) foes (Guerci 1979: 47). The self-styled 'citizen of Geneva' was a friend in principle to democracy—direct, participatory democracy, ancient-style, not any newfangled eighteenth-century variety of representative democracy (Held 2006 compares and contrasts the ancient and modern 'models'; cf. Manin 1997; Nippel 1994, 1996; Roberts 1994). Consistent with that preference was his privileging of the virtues of mass opinion, the general will, involving democratic knowledge, and a democratic regime of truth (Miller 1984; Wokler 1994). Thomson (1969: 105), indeed, would even father on him 'the democratic doctrine of the Sovereignty of the People, which for the last two hundred years has dominated world history'. We, however, should not, like certain over-enthusiastic French Revolutionaries, rush to co-opt Rousseau as a democrat *pur sang*. Rather, it is his combination of a backwards-looking laconism with the most progressively forward-looking form of political thinking then available that makes him paradoxically a representative thinker of his intellectual moment.

Rousseau read voraciously from an early age (not least in ancient Greek and Roman history) but formally he was an autodidact. His favourable view of Sparta was developed in the course of a raging polemic on luxury, during a period (1749–53) when he was situated 'entre Socrate et Caton' (Pichois and Pintard 1972), somewhere between the Greek sage and the Roman republican philosopher in arms. In his prizewinning *First Discourse* of 1749–50 (Gourevitch 1997*a*: 1–110 translates not only the *Discourse* itself but also a number of related texts; cf. Wokler 1980; Hope Mason 1987) Rousseau celebrated Sparta as 'a republic of demi-gods', as famous for its 'heureuse ignorance' as for the 'sagesse de ses lois'. Then came the fragments of 1751–3, which included not only a parallel between Sparta and the Roman republic but also, more remarkably, the beginnings of a history of Sparta (Rousseau 1964*b*, *c*). Thereafter, in all the major works of his mature political philosophy, from the *Second Discourse* of 1755 (Gourevitch 1997*a*, 111–231; Cranston 1984) onwards, Sparta and its legislator turn up for honourable, if rarely extended, mention.

Rousseau proclaimed himself emphatically an Ancient not a Modern political thinker and reformer. His ideal state was a very small, compact entity conceived

on the lines of the (ideal) Greek polis: a perfectly balanced republic, where men were free because they ruled themselves, and in which every citizen should feel personally involved. But why should he have placed himself firmly in the camp of 'the partisans of Sparta' (Grell 1995: 785), and not those of Athens? A number of reasons may be suggested. Obsessed with corruption and the necessity for moral regeneration or rebirth, Rousseau always associated aesthetic cultivation with moral decadence. Sparta, though civilized, was not excessively cultivated; and her austere, simple, and uniform lifestyle placed her closer than most to the ideally true or pure natural state. Then, Sparta stood for civic morality, patriotism, and devotion to the collectivity, integrating the individual and the collective, and displaying 'satisfying habits, a sturdy group spirit, an inclination to do right by one's fellows' (Miller 1984: 198; cf. Grell 1995: 783; Vernes 1978). In Sparta, especially through public education and within the framework of the citizen-army, the *moi humain* was crushed in the *moi commun* (Shklar 1985: 15—in a section on 'The Spartan Model', 12–21; Hope Mason 1989; Legagneux 1972: 143–5; Loraux and Vidal-Naquet 1995: 115–16). Third, Sparta severely restricted the private arena in favour of the public (cf. Viroli 1987: 173). Finally, and not least, Rousseau iconized Sparta because of Lycurgus 'the legislator' or 'lawgiver'. To such mythic beings he assigned a *mission salvatrice* (Grell 1995: 500), endowing them with the capacity to ensure political order, stability, and durability (Quantin 1989). Of Lycurgus, he wrote approvingly that he fixed 'an iron yoke' and tied the Spartans to it by filling up every moment of their lives. This ceaseless constraint was, Rousseau thought, ennobled by the patriotic purpose it served. In short, his Sparta was the most perfect instantiation of fundamental tenets of his own political philosophy, such as the general will (instantiated in Lycurgus's legislation) and republican citizenship (Mat-Hasquin 1981: 240).

Why, conversely did he reject Athens? First, Athens stood for the 'bourgeois' economic modernization that he rejected in the luxury debate (Loraux and Vidal-Naquet 1995). Second, Athens was not yet available to him as the model of democratic (as opposed to high-cultural) virtue that it did not become until the nineteenth century. And anyhow, Rousseau did not consider Athens a true democracy (Gourevitch 1997*b*: 3–38, at 8; Roberts 1994: esp. 163–8). Third, Rousseau was not in any event a radical egalitarian democrat (Shklar 1978, 1985). He has been dubbed, perhaps with some anachronism, 'the champion of a middle-class property owning democracy' (Thomson 1969: 104, 105); certainly, he advocated a community which knew neither great wealth nor deep poverty, not one in which wealth was equally distributed. Concretely, moreover, freedom—if freedom of Rousseau's peculiar kind—mattered more to him than equality.

Within the white-hot forge of the Revolution itself Rousseau's ideas could not but be modified, and, so far as his advocacy of a return to Sparta was concerned, decisively rejected (with the significant exception of St-Just). Vidal-Naquet, in a wide-ranging account of the 'place of Greece in the imaginary representations

of the men of the Revolution' (1995*b*), singles out four figures who each in his own way took the story on. Camille Desmoulins and Pierre-Charles Lévesque violently favoured Athens over Sparta; whereas Constantin-François de Chasseboeuf, comte de Volney, and Benjamin Constant rejected Antiquity *tout court* in favour of Modernity. Constant, indeed, by his in fact rather slight and historically inaccurate lecture of 1819 comparing 'ancient' (Athenian) and 'modern' notions and practices of Liberty, may be said to have inaugurated the modern political-theoretical debate over political liberty, as well as the relatively parochial issue of the proper reception of Hellenic antiquity. But that is another story.

Suggested Reading

On the Spartan 'mirage' in antiquity, Tigerstedt (1965–78) covered the same ground as Ollier (1933–43), but in enormously greater detail, paying as much attention to the modern as to the ancient bibliography. Rawson (1969) is an elegant and incisive résumé and continuation of Ollier and Tigerstedt, taking the story down to the mid-twentieth century; see also Christ (1986). On the relation between the thought of the eighteenth century and Greek antiquity, see Bolgar (1979), Ampolo (1997: 23–78); for France, my greatest debt is to Grell (1995), a 1335-page *thèse pour le doctorat-ès-lettres* (originally completed in 1990), cf. Guerci (1979). See also on the French and American Revolutionaries, Parker (1937), Grell and Michel (1989), Mossé (1989), Hartog (1993), Vidal-Naquet (1995*b* and *c*), and Nippel (2005). On ancient and modern republicanism: Nippel (1994). On Rousseau's political thought and writings generally (Rousseau 1962, 1964*a*; Kendall 1972), see e.g. Derathé (1950), Shklar (1985), Wokler (1995), and Gourevitch (1997*a*: pp. ix–xli); for their context, Wokler (1996). On Rousseau and antiquity, Leduc-Fayette (1974), Leigh (1979); Rousseau and Sparta, Borghero (1973); Rousseau and Athenian democracy, Miller (1984) and Dawson (1995). Compare or rather contrast the attitude of Voltaire: Mat-Hasquin (1981). On the Enlightenment's reception of ancient Greek material culture, Jenkins (2003).

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CHAPTER 14

IDEOLOGIES OF HELLENISM

LUCIANO CANFORA

Translated from the Italian by Simone and Ilaria Marchesi

It is not Demosthenes, with his ephemeral speeches and his bookish demonstrations against Alexander the Great, who should be remembered, but rather Alexander the Great, who is the founder of that culture out of which were born Christianity and the organization of the Augustan state.

THESE words, perhaps not widely known, may be read in the contribution that Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff made to the *Schulkonferenz* held in Berlin, 6–8 June 1900 (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1901: 90). Promoted by Wilhelm II, the conference aimed at a radical reform of the schools. In its day, Wilamowitz' argument appeared iconoclastic and elicited a strong response from the high-school teachers: 'How can we do away with Demosthenes?' they replied. Yet, insofar as it extols 'Hellenism' and Alexander as its real founder, it conforms to a commonplace. Indeed, in Wilamowitz' phrasing some disquieting elements are present. Why, for instance, does he eulogize Alexander as the one who opened the way to Christianity? After all, Wilamowitz was intellectually far from Christianity, and he made this clear in his autobiography in Latin, edited some time ago by W. M. Calder (1981). Evidently, it is a homage to Droysen. Similarly, how can he claim

that the 'organization' of Alexander's empire was a precedent for that of Augustus? Wilamowitz embraces and exalts Alexander as the spiritual and political factor whose great accomplishments extend to the creation of Hellenism, and in the same breath downgrades Demosthenes (with 'his ephemeral speeches and his bookish demonstrations') as the symbol of everything that Hellenism displaced—especially the old and exceedingly narrow mentality limited to the horizon of the city.

Wilamowitz was alluding here to Droysen's conception of *Hellenismus*, which was broadly based on the Greek term *Hellēnismos* (first attested in the second century BCE: cf. Gruen in this volume, p. 131) and which referred especially to the period beginning with the conquests of Alexander and ending with the rise of the Roman Empire. Droysen believed that it was the fusion of Greek and 'Oriental' cultures that made possible a world-historical event, namely, the introduction of Christianity, and he sought to limit the general sense of the term *Hellenismus* to a particular epoch (now called 'Hellenistic' in English) that facilitated the development of the religion. It is true that Droysen's sense of *Hellenismus* was not always consistent and that the political, spatial, and temporal limits of *Hellenismus* varied in his writings (in one schema he extended *Hellenismus* to the rise of Islam). However, the flexibility of Droysen's angular perspective provides a useful point of departure to reflect on Hellenism more generally—that is, as a term that encompasses the Greek culture, language, and way of life. The specific juxtaposition of Alexander and Demosthenes shows how ideologies of Hellenism, in its general sense, have been constructed and how fraught these ideologies can become.

As a matter of fact, one of the first to suffer the consequences of the essentially Prussian 'discovery' of *Hellenismus* was Demosthenes. It was not, to be sure, a linear process. For example, a few decades before Droysen, Demosthenes' oratory had been used as (rhetorical) fuel for the anti-French rebirth of the 'German nation' (Fichte, Jacobs). At that point in time, and in that perspective, Napoleon was the correlative of Philip of Macedonia; Prussia, on the other side, was the correlative of Demosthenes' Athens on account of the struggle in which it had engaged against Napoleon and the central role it had taken in the national rebirth of *all* Germany (or almost all of it). One of the countless ironies of history is that, in the span of a century, Wilamowitz was to use the *Freiheitskriege* ('wars of liberation') of Fichte's and Jacobs' time to rally the Germans against the Triple Entente. And it was, one should add, a new generation of Prussian historians, especially K. J. Beloch, that dismissed Droysen's book as a lightweight product of Romanticism.

The oppositional pairing Demosthenes/Macedonian kings is of ancient origin. It had already been brought out in the historical works of Theopompus of Chios, the great historian of Philip. Theopompus had conferred upon Philip the distinction of being 'the greatest man that Europe has ever produced', whereas he had framed Demosthenes in a decidedly negative light in the tenth book of his *History of Philip* (*Philippica*), a work that also circulated independently as *On Athenian Demagogues*.

This polarity enjoyed the vitality of all eminently ideological myths. We find it still alive in the Nazi era: it is enough to consider how Werner Jaeger's *Demosthenes* was received in 1938. Remember that the proper title of this work is the one we read in the English edition (*The Origin and Growth of his Policy*): the emphasis it places on policies actually explains why the book advances through detailed analyses until Chaeronea (338 BCE) and only cursorily treats the last phase, that is, the final fifteen years leading up to the deaths of both Alexander and Demosthenes.

As soon as it was released, in 1938 in California and in 1939 in Berlin, Jaeger's *Demosthenes* received two fundamental, if divergent reviews: Kurt von Fritz (1939) and Helmut Berve (1940) reported on the American and the German editions respectively. The former's review was bare-boned and politically in tune with Jaeger's thinking; the latter's review was harsh, at times even biting, but very detailed. Von Fritz argued that Jaeger's central assumption went against received knowledge: Jaeger was convinced that Demosthenes had been essentially right in his politics, 'but that the Athenians did not follow his advice when success would have been almost certain' (Fritz 1939: 583). However, Jaeger's reappraisal of Demosthenes' political astuteness radically diverged from that of the winning side (Droysen, Beloch): Demosthenes was usually presented at best as a dreamer, or at worst as someone in the pay of the Persians.

Von Fritz (1939: 583–4) writes:

> J Belloch... an outstanding representative of the positivistic conception of history, in the introduction to his *Griechische Geschichte* vehemently impugns the view that it is great men who make history. Historical change, in his opinion, is brought about through the subconscious tendencies of the anonymous masses. A man, therefore, who opposed the general tendency of his age, which, in the case of Demosthenes, led from the Hellenic city-state to Hellenistic monarchy, appeared to him somewhat lacking in political insight.

He also added that in modern Germany historians seemed to think 'it is again the great man, the hero, the leader, who makes history, and the judgment on the opponents of the man of destiny—in Demosthenes' case Philip of Macedon—has become still harsher' (ibid.). 'And yet,' he added sardonically, how would the hero, in the absence of any antagonist, 'display his heroism'?

The lengthy contribution by Berve is an authentic indictment: he writes off the book as a 'series of lectures', and he mocks Jaeger's attempt to follow in the tradition of those readers of Demosthenes who were also 'men of action'. Berve's tirade aims first of all at demolishing the 'excessively positive' image of fourth-century Athens. For Berve, to admit that in fourth-century Athens there actually were *ethische Kräfte* ('ethical forces') amounts also to seeing Demosthenes' *Streben und Leistungen* ('efforts and achievements') in a wrong light. Jaeger is even accused of having endorsed Demosthenes' view of the Macedonians as non-Greek (Berve 1940: 466–7). Of course, Philip is central to the argument, and Berve swears that the Greek

origin of Philip's 'clan' was incontrovertibly rooted *in seinem Griechentum* ('in his Greekness'). Jaeger is 'ensnared' (*befangen*) in the 'circle of Demosthenes' thinking' (*Kreis der demosthenischen Gedanken*), notwithstanding the 'harsh critique' that both Droysen and Beloch had levelled against him as a political thinker (ibid. 468). Droysen and Beloch are repeatedly mentioned, and their names accompany the main criticism addressed to Jaeger, that of having abandoned the by now traditional treatment of Demosthenes' politics as it had been developed by the 'German science of history' (*deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft*: ibid. 471).

Fritz Taeger, writing in *Gnomon* in 1941, was just as harsh in his review of Jaeger: his review comes to a rather abrupt close with the same question that Droysen had already posed in the past; namely, whether Demosthenes could really be considered a 'patriot', even in his always acclaimed *Third Philippic*. Wasn't he, rather, a supporter of Persian politics? One should not forget that in the same year that Jaeger's *Demosthenes* appeared, F. R. Wüst had published in Munich his *Philipp* (1938), a work fully in line with a 'Prussian' evaluation of that monarch.

The debate on Demosthenes and Philip, taken almost as a metaphor for current conflicts, was not limited to Germany. In Italy, Piero Treves' *Demostene* (1933) and Arnaldo Momigliano's *Filippo il Macedone* (1934) provide ample proof of the pervasive nature of the dispute. The strongest attack against Jaeger came actually from the milieu of Italy's Fascist intellectuals, and coalesced in the long and harsh review penned by Gennaro Perrotta in *Primato* (1942), the journal founded by the minister of national education, Giuseppe Bottai. The review first indicts the 'classicism' that accorded to Demosthenes 'the veneration of a hero'; it then labels Jaeger's book as 'proof of the malignant resiliency of classicism'; it mocks Piero Treves as the author of a 'haphazard booklet on *Demosthenes and the Freedom of the Greeks*'; it abuses the notion of freedom as self-determination, and it exalts the 'necessity and rationality of History', which is the basis of Philip's triumph over the 'limited municipal freedom of Athens'—all of the above in the name of Droysen, Beloch, and real politics, 'which can easily dispense with rhetoric'. The shrill tone of the review attests to the transparently political agenda that lay behind it: Treves, a Jew, had to take refuge in England because of Italy's 1938 racial laws, and Hitler's wars were bringing 'freedom as self-determination' to naught. These were all clear signs of the struggles surrounding the person who created *Hellenismus*.

Why did this dichotomy arise? The question is a fair one. At the same time that Droysen 'discovered'—or, rather, 'invented'—*Hellenismus* (in his 1833 work on Alexander; cf. Porter in this volume, p. 9), the traditional ranking that saw Demosthenes prevail over his historical adversary was inverted. The ranking had been based on the notion of 'freedom' as independence from foreign domination. At the same juncture in the development of historiography in which Philip overtook Demosthenes, the primacy of freedom yielded ground first to 'the nation' and then, with Philip's son, to the cosmopolitan empire led by two 'leading' peoples (Greeks and Iranians). This was certainly a new way of reading age-defining events; yet it was

also open to dangerous mutations, especially because it could easily fall into 'Aryan' complacencies. While he had a few forerunners, we may safely assume that it was Droysen who actually started the interpretive shift, and that the historical climate following the *Freiheitskriege*, with the promotion of Prussia's key role entailed in them, undeniably influenced it. That in his final years Droysen devoted himself to studying Prussian history should not come as a surprise.

The interpretive shift privileging Alexander over Demosthenes was as radical as it was belated in its arrival in history. How was it possible that the figure of Demosthenes, and with him the ideal image of classical Athens, had enjoyed such good fortune for such a long period of time? After all, the Macedonians had won the war, and it was thanks to them and to their cultural institutions (Alexandria, etc.) that Greek culture had been preserved in the centuries that preceded Roman hegemony in the Mediterranean. The cultural sway Demosthenes and classical Athens held on western culture had been so strong that one had to wait for more than two millennia to find a Droysen challenging and overturning it. Only with him did *Hellenismus* become a 'positive' era—actually, a very long stretch of positive time in World History (*Weltgeschichte*). Although he never developed it, Droysen had envisioned a design of History in which the historical development of *Hellenismus* was to reach as late as the birth of Islam.

One may answer the question posed above by saying that the Romans were responsible for the primacy of classical Athens. In order for them to establish a stable rule in the Mediterranean, the Romans needed to defeat not only Hannibal, but also the iron-willed and heavily armed Macedonian monarchy. Part of their strategy entailed the 'downgrading' of their 'enemy' by exalting Athens, its myth, and its key role. For Athens, the result was a mixture of literary idealization and political neutering; for the Macedonians the *declassement* meant being replaced as an imperial leading power. The end-result was the invention of 'classicism', of which Athens was the focal point, as the opposite of *Hellenismus*. (Incidentally, that Athens could turn into a politically dangerous model was no real risk as it had been when Marcus Junius Brutus, one of Caesar's murderers, was enlisting fighters for the republic among the studious youths who gathered in the schools of the museum-city—one of whom was poor Horace. In Sulla's times, Rome had proved beyond a shadow of a doubt what it was ready to do to Athens were it ever to prove itself a military nuisance, as happened in Athens' last gasp of political autonomy when it sided with Mithridates.) The myth of Athens as a home of literature, a museum-city, and the cradle of classicism was still alive and kicking in Hadrian's day. Caesar's, and most of all, Antony's decision to favour the last Hellenistic monarchy—in the person of Cleopatra—had done little to dent the basic choice. On the contrary, while Cicero could translate Demosthenes' *On the Crown*, students in the schools of rhetoric were engaging in *declamationes* in which Alexander was begged to restrain from crossing the limits of the world (Seneca, *Suasoriae* 1; but see also *Controversiae* 7.7, 19).

As is known, Greek culture has reached us through the Romans. In a way, it has been filtered by them. The role of mediation the Romans played helps us to understand why, in the surviving literature, the heavy-handed praise of classical Athens is unchallenged. In particular, there was no surviving current that hailed *Hellenismus* as the epoch-making power which brought together East and West with consequences that are well known. To be sure, the epitome still allows us to glimpse how Pompeius Trogus' *Historiae Philippicae* was the product of an alternative historiographical project; and we can still read praise of Philip in Theopompus (*FGrHist* 115 F 27) through the harsh criticism Polybius levels against it (8.9.1–4). Acting as an ideologue of Rome's imperial and epochal role, Polybius actually takes apart, piece by piece, and mocks as self-contradictory the judgement Theopompus passed on Philip as 'the greatest man that Europe has ever produced'. Theopompus had attempted to hold in a precarious balance his high historical and political esteem for Philip and his stern moral indictment of the king's character. Until Droysen, Polybius prevailed. In the field of literature, for instance, it is not coincidental that Horace would acknowledge, and even parade, his dependence on the great authors of the classical age (e.g. Alcaeus), but never mention Callimachus, to name only one great model, and one to whom, after all, he owed a substantial debt.

Rome undermined the myth of the Macedonian monarchy and of its expansion into a 'civilizing' entity for one main reason: Rome replaced it *by continuing its work*. This continuity was particularly essential insofar as Rome was able to create a stable form of domination, one that we may call, with a modern label, 'colonial'. Just as the Greek-Macedonians strived to control the ancient civilizations on which they founded their monarchies (first of all, the Seleucids and Ptolemies), so too Rome built its centuries-long domination over a vast number of peoples, perhaps with an even greater ability to assimilate them. Rome conquered and fascinated the elites of the nations that it progressively annexed to the empire, mostly in the West, but in the East as well. The Romans reinterpreted and implemented 'Hellenism' on a larger scale, at the same time fuelling the cultural myth of classicism. Perhaps, and only partly, the British Commonwealth may be taken as a modern analogue of what Rome accomplished.

A 'Hellenistic' continuity links together the history of the worlds that Macedonians and Romans controlled, the main ingredients of which are 'inter-mixture' and 'integration'. This is a field in which Romans went further than their predecessors, even though they did not think twice before committing genocide, at least in the first phases of the struggle—before integration would start. Notoriously, this was the case of the occupation of Gaul. One of the cultural elements that link together these two 'Hellenisms' (the pairing of Alexander in Iran and Caesar in Gaul is Mommsen's) is the dissemination among Roman elites of philosophical currents inspired by the idea of a *cosmopolis*. Among the members of the Roman ruling classes, the widespread intellectual adherence to a potentially revolutionary philosophy such as Stoicism did not conflict with the practice of traditional and

patriotic religion. The equilibrium thus reached between the two, even in the head of a single individual such as Marcus Aurelius, is one of the many testimonies of the ability to rule that Roman leading elites certainly possessed. However, one should not forget that it also was one of the long-lasting effects of Alexander's extension of the cultural hold of sixth- and fifth-century Greek urban culture 'to the limits of the world'.

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PART II

THE POLIS

Introduction

This section begins with a group of complementary papers which take as their focus the historical development of a 'new urbanism' in Greece from the eighth century BCE. **James Redfield** reflects on changes in social structures during this period, while **Sara Forsdyke** looks at the parallel evolution of civic institutions, all of which culminated in the *polis*, the 'city-state' familiar to us as the backdrop to the rich cultural legacy of the fifth and fourth centuries.

Put like this, of course, there is a risk of whiggery, of making the rise of the classical polis sound somehow inevitable. (Aristotle actually believed that it was: his claim that man is a naturally 'political' animal, *Politics* 1253a3, includes the thought that a polis was the natural expression of human social activity.) In fact, of course, it is the result of complex interactions between society as a whole and the individuals and interest-groups of various kinds which make it up. This is something that is especially easy to see where external pressures are concerned, and emphasized here in the discussion of the economic context by **Sitta von Reden**, and of the military context by **Peter Hunt**. But if the polis was not a historical inevitability, the 'natural' expression of human sociability, it is also true that the *idea* of the polis came to acquire a special place in Greek thought that went far beyond the confines of the historical and geographical reality. It became a transhistorical standard for Hellenic identity; as such it remains a central topic in Hellenic studies.

That the idea of the polis came to stand as a reference-point for Hellenic cultural ideals is not, as one might have thought, purely the result of later memory, or memorialization of the political structures that obtained during a rich and productive era in Greek cultural history. This happened, of course; but it built on a conscious attempt by its inhabitants to promote the polis as a centre for cultural identity. **Robin Osborne** looks at how the city developed (that is, how it was developed) physically to reflect an ideal, 'common', identity, cultural and political; and **John Ma** shows how this work of physical construction involved the creation of a history, an ideal past for the polis, which is owned by each individual citizen as much as the corporation. Its history is the citizen's ancestry—and, since the citizen might be memorialized in inscription or statue, he might in his turn aspire to a kind of immortality as part of his city's historical identity.

The burgeoning science of human nature was very sensitive to these developments, and recognized the implications for human identity. In the later fifth or early fourth centuries BCE philosophers started to develop a systematically dualistic account of human beings as composites of body and soul—the body as something

which embeds the person in a particular community, but the soul, the true 'self', as the locus of desires and beliefs which those communities could shape. Personal identity, then, as **Christopher Gill** suggests, is for these thinkers *social identity*, and it is no coincidence that Plato's utopian designs for a polis in the *Republic* are largely structured around rethinking the educational curriculum—or, conversely, that Protagoras assigns the central role in moral education to the city as a whole (Plato, *Protagoras* 326e).

Among other institutions important for displaying and shaping social identity, one thinks particularly of the formalized drinking-party, the *sumposion*, structured as a microcosm of polis life—a 'micropolis', as **Fiona Hobden** explains it. The symposium provides a safe context for what might otherwise be potentially subversive reflection on the city itself, but also, and at the same time, for the individual's reflection on himself as a member of the city. As it happens, the institution also illustrates in microcosm the way in which the historical polis perpetuates itself as an idea, or ideal of hellenicity: for it is quickly elevated from historical contingency to an enduring literary genre, still alive and well in the period of Roman occupation through writers such as Plutarch and Athenaeus.

Hobden compares the symposium to a *Männerbund* ('brotherhood'); and **Claude Calame** too reflects on its role as a backdrop to the discourse of social 'initiation' in his broader discussion of 'rites of passage'—those rituals which more or less explicitly sacramentalize and define the development of the individual as a social being in ancient Greece as in other societies. One aspect of this question, the definition of sexual identity, is given further consideration here in two chapters, by **Eva Cantarella** and **Laura McClure**. Cantarella considers various ways in which sexual norms were constructed as part of a wider pattern of relationships—and the problems, given the social context within which these relationships are understood, to which the evidence for particular relationships gives rise; McClure focuses on specific issues in understanding how individuals could be constructed as sexual beings. But, for all its importance, sexual identity is not an issue apart: the negotiation between biology and culture hinted at in McClure's question is, for example, reflected in an interesting way with the issue of *slavery*, addressed by **Page duBois**. Where society operates to give cultural shape to biological facts in the case of sexuality, it denies cultural identity (or, strictly, cultural significance) to slaves, who become 'mere' bodies. (Aristotle's suggestion that 'ideal' slaves are psychologically impaired is instructive in this context too: *Politics* 1260a12–17.)

Slaves are ubiquitous, yet nearly invisible: central to the functioning of the polis, but 'outsiders' to it as well. In this sense, there is something else that they symbolize: the relationship (or potential relationship) between the polis and other peoples and races; and this is the subject of the group of chapters that follows. This relationship is often conceived in terms of actual or potential hostility. **Benjamin Isaac**, in a piece with implications more generally for how one can talk about topics where the Greeks *didn't* have a word for it (duBois reminds us that 'homosexuality' is

another example), shows that the Greeks might not have known colour prejudice, a defining feature of modern racism, but were no less racist for that. The highly institutionalized character taken on by travel in the Greek world may be explained in part by this suspicion of foreigners and foreign lands. The sea, discussed here by **Kim Ayodeji** as a standpoint offering a neglected perspective on ancient Greek life, is neglected partly because it symbolized for the city-dwellers who dominate our evidence the threat of the foreign: untamed, but unavoidable; a means of travel, yet a means which presented a constant danger to life and liberty. Travellers, then, tried to take their city with them: travel is typically conducted as a civic act, one justified and defined by one's tie to the city: trade, for example, or martial aggression, or—an extreme case—colonization (touched on here by **Maria Pretzler** in her discussion of the range of travel experiences reflected in surviving literature). The nature of Greek religion facilitated the transition to some degree, however; for, as **Julia Kindt** argues here, it is something whose practice might have coloured every aspect of the individual's experience of their polis first and foremost, but whose shared form makes the connection between their local and Panhellenic identity. No wonder, then, that the principal occasions for travel included, precisely, religious festivals, alongside opportunities for patriotic display such as the Panhellenic games (discussed by **Jason König**). But religion is not the only means by which an individual's polis-identity turns out to be as much a bridge as a bar to identification with the interests of 'foreigners' of one sort or another. **Carol Dougherty** reminds us that one did not have to go abroad to encounter them, for every polis is itself somewhere visited, after all—and its visitors become part of its identity. As ever, it turns out that the boundaries of self-definition are rarely as sharp or inflexible as the Greeks, or as we as their interpreters, sometimes try to make them.

In the last chapter of the section, **Christopher Rowe** considers the theoretical perspective on the polis as the immediate context for an individual's flourishing. That ancient political philosophy has such strong roots in the Athens of Plato and Aristotle is no doubt part of the reason for the perpetuation of the polis as idea. The Cynics and, later, the Stoics chafed against the artificial boundaries of the conventional polis; the Stoics in fact lived at a time when its political centrality was over. In them, 'the notion of humanity works itself free from that of the polis', as Rowe says, with the *historical* polis in mind. But it is significant that they rethought their own ideal in its terms. In championing the life of the 'cosmic community', what they call the 'cosmopolis', they from one perspective invite us to bring the ideals of the polis to bear on the universe as a whole. The number of Greeks for whom the polis was a lived reality was relatively small, then; but seen from this point of view, every Greek utopia was in the end a polis.

CHAPTER 15

THE POLIS

JAMES REDFIELD

15.1. The Rise of the Polis

The earliest literary evidence we have for Greek society and politics is in the epic poetry of Homer and Hesiod: here we can already see the basic structures which later developed into that form of urban life we call the Greek polis or city-state. It is well to remember, however, that these poems, most probably composed in the second half of the eighth century BCE, do not stand at the beginning of written history; rather they stand roughly halfway between the present day and the beginnings of urbanism. When we speak of the polis, we are already talking of a second urbanism, a new kind of city.

The first urbanism of the Middle East and Egypt was hierarchical and pyramidal, centring on palace and temple. Authority was held by priest kings at the centre and diffused to the periphery by their subordinates. In principle, everything belonged to the sovereign. Wealth was transmitted to the centre as a token of submission and deference: it was stored there and then redistributed (in part) to the periphery as a sign of royal generosity and care. A man's status depended on his place in the hierarchy, which is to say, on his relation to the man (or occasionally the woman) at the top. During the second millennium BCE a provincial version of this social order flourished in what later became the Greek heartland; we call these societies Minoan and, as they became Greek, Mycenaean.

Mycenaean society collapsed in the grand disturbance we know as the Sea Peoples. For a century or so around 1200 BCE the entire eastern Mediterranean was awash with refugee marauders; some invaded Egypt, others seized a portion

of Palestine and became the Philistines, others made Cyprus for the first time a predominantly Greek island. The sources of this disturbance are an unsolved problem; the destruction in any case was great. All the Mycenaean palaces burned. In the Greek heartland there followed a dark age; population dropped abruptly, life continued in scattered villages, of which only a handful measured as much as a square kilometre. Out of this dark age the Greek polis emerged.

The key period seems to have been the eighth century BCE, not only in Greek lands but in the entire eastern Mediterranean. At this time a new kind of city comes into view, not organized into a pyramidal hierarchy but into a kind of plateau, with a top stratum of free males relating to each other formally as equals, politically on a basis of citizenship, and economically on the basis of private property. We find such communities among the Etruscans and the Phoenicians—indeed, some scholars see the polis as a Phoenician invention, borrowed from them by the Greeks. In Neo-Babylonian documents of the period, also, there are signs of the development of a similar form of society, although here within an inherited framework of hierarchical authority. Altogether the eighth century seems in this part of the world to begin a second urbanization.

Greeks, Etruscans, and Phoenicians, furthermore, were all expansive peoples. During the second half of the eighth century Greeks began founding colonies along the southern coastline of Italy and most of Sicily, all except the western tip, with outposts in northern Libya and southern France. Simultaneously, the Phoenicians were occupying a central Mediterranean triangle, uniting northern Tunisia, southern Sardinia, and western Sicily—with outposts in southern Spain. Slightly later, the Etruscans were also expanding—in the seventh century, southward, confronting the Greeks in the neighbourhood of the bay of Naples, and in the sixth century, northward into the Po valley.

These parallel developments indicate that in the archaic period the eastern Mediterranean was already functioning as a system. The mechanisms and boundary conditions of this system are a virtually unexplored problem. Most historians speak of the relations between these peoples in terms of Hellenization but, while in the long term the Greeks were unquestionably the cultural winners, in the archaic period borrowing evidently went on in all directions. In order to understand this process better we would need to know much more about the early Etruscans and Phoenicians, not to speak of the indigenes in the various colonial areas—as well as making better use of what we do know.

Here, however, we are focused on the Greek polis: the great book on this topic is Aristotle's *Politics*. As the biologist he was, Aristotle treats the polis as a genus including a number of comparable species, each represented by multiple individuals; he is interested in species differences rather than individual cases. Furthermore he describes the development of the polis as if it were an organism, from its infancy as a plurality of independent families, into an immature state as a set of villages, finally achieving its mature organization as a polis. Once the mature condition

is achieved, development, for him, ceases. This is, of course, not the way history happens: the 'rise of the polis' is scores of independent inventions and hundreds of independent histories as each city developed differently. Furthermore, development never ceased. For Aristotle, Athens comes to perfection in the fifth century as a direct democracy, while Sparta was frozen very early as the dictatorship of the military caste. In fact it seems increasingly clear that throughout her history Spartan institutions were constantly changing (each innovation justified as a recovery of some primordial state), while Athens went on in the fourth century to further reforms tending to moderate the direct democracy of the people's assembly and shift power to the lawcourts. Every change produces new problems and leads to further change. As for the hundreds of other poleis, we know virtually nothing about their development, except that in a large number of cases a period of tyranny intervened between an early phase of informal oligarchy and a later phase of more fully institutionalized constitutional government. Tyranny, in other words, looks to have been in the archaic period a critical part of the process of constitution-building—except for those few cities, most notably Sparta and Epizephyrian Locri, which managed to do without it.

The rise of the polis, therefore, is from some points of view a non-topic; it is an aspect of a more general history or it is an aggregate of many histories. Nevertheless certain things can be said about the Greek polis in general, as long as we understand the limits of generalization.

15.2. Characteristics

City-states have formed at various times and places: in early Babylonia, for example, and in late medieval Tuscany. Comparative study begins with the observation that such states develop in sets, as a plurality of communities in communication and competition with each other. As the citizens are formally equal (even though radically unequal in power), so are the cities. Such a plurality stimulates pluralism, even a kind of folk relativism: it is understood that each state goes about its business in its own way. The Greeks said that every polis has its own *nomoi*, its own customary order.

Because the Greeks were constantly founding new poleis, they were constantly establishing new *nomoi*. Usually a new foundation made the (sometimes more, sometimes less) fictional claim that it derived its *nomoi* from a parent city; sometimes this link received ritual enactment, for instance by the transfer of fire from the mother city to the new civic hearth. Always, however, old *nomoi* meant something different in a new location, and therefore evolved. The Greeks of the frontier thereby

became conscious of the plasticity of *nomoi*, became critical and inventive. Some have thought that the whole idea of the polis was invented on the frontier and imported from there into old-world Greece. Certainly the frontier experience was important for Greeks in general. Evidently they adopted first in the West a number of specific urban features: the gridiron street plan, for example, the keystone arch, and the attribution of a written law-code to a single author.

If *nomoi* can be invented, then a polis is a work of art—usually attributed to 'the fathers' but always capable of revision. Every innovation, however, was made within the framework of a fundamental political syntax, and we can make generalizations at this level. The place to start, once again, is Homer: because these epics were created for a Panhellenic audience, they give a generalized, somewhat schematic picture of Greek society.

One basic assumption of Homeric politics lasted as long as the polis itself: that the political community consists of free adult males. 'Speech is for men', says the Homeric proverb (still current in classical times). This principle excludes four groups from governance: women, children, slaves, and strangers. At the same time, the polis had to find ways to govern all these and in this sense include them. Politics may belong to free males, but political society is more complex.

The Homeric poems further divide free males between the leading men and the lower orders. Institutionally this division is represented by the difference between the *agorē* (literally: 'gathering' or 'gathering place') and the *boulē* (both 'council' and 'counsel'). The *boulē* is a meeting of leading men, usually over dinner; in the *Iliad* these are the *promachoi*, those who stand forward from the mass of troops to engage in single combat; in the *Odyssey* these are the *basileis*, the heads of the big houses, those with serfs working smallholdings, also with cattle and flocks up on the mountains beyond the limits of agriculture. *Basileus* is usually translated 'king', but it means something more like 'noble'; it has a comparative: *basileuteros*, 'nobler', and a superlative: *basileutatos*, 'noblest'. In any particular community one man is recognized as *basileutatos*; he is *basileutatos* because he is richest, but he is also richest because he is *basileutatos*. A special piece of agricultural land is set aside by the community to support him in this position. He is expected to be generous, particularly in entertaining at his house the *boulē* as well as distinguished strangers. He is 'king', but all those who join the *boulē* are 'kings'; he is *primus inter pares*. His 'kingship' further is not inherited authority but rather a recognition by his peers of his superiority—although since property was inherited this superiority would often also be inherited.

The king summons the *agorē* and presides over it when it meets. An *agorē* is essentially a meeting of the *boulē* held in public. The same people speak as take part in the *boulē*, but before an audience, the lower orders. In the *Iliad* these are the rank-and-file of the army, the *plēthos*; in the *Odyssey* they are the *thētes te dmōes te*, the dependent smallholders and casual labourers. They hear what the big men have to say and they respond as an audience responds: with applause, noises of protest,

occasionally even a riot. They are the *dēmos*. As a non-voting audience they have no institutional power, but they have considerable moral authority. The *Iliad* begins with an *agorē* in which Agamemnon ignores the shouted views of the *dēmos*; it takes him nineteen books to dig his way out of this procedural error. The *basileutatos* is supposed to hear debate, to listen to the response of the audience, and then make of the result his own decision. He has authority, but only because he represents the community: he does not govern.

From the eighth century into the fourth—and even later—this was the basic political structure of the polis. As society became more monetized, the serfs became smallholders, free from obligation to the great families, and at the same time deprived of their protection. These smallholders began to buy slaves: thus chattel slavery increased. Many of these slaves were liberated in old age; they and their children became freedmen but not citizens. Strangers came to the more prosperous states; they and their descendants were resident aliens. The citizens, the *dēmos*, thus came to be a smaller proportion of the population—in most important cities certainly less than 10 per cent. The elite, a minority of this minority, while it everywhere remained a landholding class, came to hold less and less of its actual wealth in the form of land (it held most of the rest in precious metals). Investment sometimes took the form of the purchase of slaves for mining and manufacture, more often of lending at interest. The economic power of the rich was the power of the potential creditor over the potential debtor. Their political power was shared among them through service on boards of magistrates with rotating membership.

Nevertheless it continued to be the case that a polis consisted politically of a body of citizens called together from time to time in the *agorē*, where they heard from members of a privileged and powerful minority, and by their assent to or compliance with the policies there asserted, granted authority to certain members of that minority. Always, as Socrates says, there were within the body of the citizens 'two cities': the problem of politics was generally understood to be the problem of the relation between these two. And since the theory of the polis was joint action by a group of equals, individual authority was always problematic. The tyrant, the lawgiver, the founder of a colony—all these were held to be both godlike and dangerous.

As early as the fifth century, the Greeks articulated this underlying structure by dividing regimes into three types: oligarchy, in which the 'better sort' held authority; tyranny, in which one man held it; and democracy, in which people in general, which is to say the 'lower orders', exercised authority in the assembly. Since the class structure remained stable, however, social power and political initiative remained everywhere in the hands of a limited circle; therefore every polis was a kind of oligarchy. Tyrants did not change this structure, they managed it—in a manner closer to a big-city boss than to a Third World dictator. And most poleis were explicitly oligarchies: magistracies were passed around within a limited circle of the

most propertied. Tyranny was always thought of as a temporary expedient—even in Dorian Sicily where it became the most usual form of government. Democracy hardly existed except at Athens and, for fairly brief periods, in Syracuse. The ideal type of polis was an agrarian society where the smallholders worked their land individually, relying on the 'better sort' for leadership, gathering in an army when needed for the defence of the frontiers and in an occasional assembly to legitimate the authority of their betters. The Greeks called a polis ruled by a small group *not* responsive to or legitimated by the *dēmos* a *dunasteia*—called by one speaker in Thucydides 'the worst form of government'. A *dunasteia* was an oligarchy that had lost touch with the assembly; therefore its acts were not truly the acts of the state.

The problem of constitutional government in a Greek polis was always that of moderating the behaviour of the limited class—toward the *dēmos*, so that their rule was not so harsh as to incite rebellion from below, and toward each other, so that their competition did not lead to the breakdown of their collective rule. It is hard to know how this was managed in the oligarchies—hard to know, because politics in these states was conducted confidentially and left no evidence. Certainly the oligarchs relied on understandings developed over generations between a few families linked by intermarriage. In the case of one of the most stable of these closed oligarchies, Epizephyrian Locri, the importance of marriage exchange for social stability is particularly evident.

15.3. Athens and Sparta

The two poleis most famous in ancient as in modern times were also the two most atypical. Sparta was, as Xenophon says, 'everywhere admired and nowhere imitated'; it was particularly admired by the philosophers because it alone seemed to conceive the state as an educational institution, creating a new kind of men uniquely suited to the polity which created them. Athens, which was in classical times the largest, richest, and in some periods the most powerful of poleis, was seen by many Greeks as a kind of monster of the species and a danger to Greek civilization. Nevertheless, when we study the Greek polis we mostly study these two: precisely because they were so exceptional we have the most information about them.

The Spartan free males lived subject to military discipline; all their education from the age of 7 was a ritualized military training. The citizens did no work and had no occupation except war, hunting, and sports and rituals of masculine solidarity. Each Spartan's land was worked by his helots; these were a population who lived as serfs in their own villages and paid a portion of their produce to their masters.

The Spartans were indeed excellent soldiers; it was, however, notoriously difficult to get them to go into battle. Their war was at home: annually the Spartan magistrates declared war on the helots. This was no formality; helots were murdered in training exercises and recurrently the state was shaken by helot rebellions. It seems that the Spartans found this a price worth paying for maintaining the social solidarity only war can produce. Spartan discipline evidently was not for the sake of war; rather they remained in a state of war for the sake of the resulting discipline.

Spartan unity was founded on opposition to the others. This opposition extended also to strangers; almost no non-Spartans were ever granted citizenship, and from time to time the Spartan authorities abruptly expelled all foreigners from the territory. In a way it extended also to the young, since Spartan training was always of the younger by the older—not only in childhood: the governing council of the state was called the *gerousia*, the 'elders'; only those over 60 were eligible for election and vacancies were created only by death.

Spartan women are a more complicated issue. The Spartans said that the women were 'outside the law'. Like the men they did no work; like the men they exercised, but being women they were not subject to military discipline. Instead they managed the property and came to own the greater part of it. Spartans indeed had private property: like other Greeks, some were rich and others were poor; but this fact was concealed. At Sparta the sumptuary laws typical of Greek poleis, laws restricting visible consumption, were developed to the point where economic inequality was virtually invisible—except that when a citizen's property fell below a certain level he ceased to be a citizen. Since in Sparta as in all poleis the rich tended to get richer at the expense of the poor becoming poorer, the number of citizens in the classical period continually contracted. Competition on this level, the economic level, was, however, attributed to the women, who thus were labelled as the inner enemy of the state. The Spartan males seem to have felt that they would have been perfect in their selfless patriotism if only the women would let them.

In theory, the life of Spartan males was entirely turned inward, toward their peers. Though they certainly had money, they were supposed to be unconcerned with economic matters. They were not permitted to exploit their property. Helots could be murdered but they could not be evicted, nor could their rent be raised. The competition of the Spartans was supposed to be for honour, for the admiration of their fellow Spartans; their capacity to be Spartan was continually tested. Competition was, however, limited by the Spartan monarchy, whereby the highest position in the state was already occupied. This monarchy furthermore was of a unique type: there were two independent royal families, so there were always two kings, each with full powers. The assembly—that is, the whole body of the citizens—elected 'ephors' (*ephoroi*), who had power over the kings; the assembly also filled vacancies to the *gerousia*, which had power over both kings and ephors. A constitution of this contradictory kind presumes a high degree of consensus.

Every disagreement between authorities is a constitutional crisis: therefore the rigid values transmitted by Spartan education were critical to the working of the constitution.

Sparta was thus an inward-looking, relatively inert society; her foreign policy also was almost entirely defensive, devoted to maintaining a cordon of friendly states on her borders. Because she exemplified key Greek values—the solidarity of free males, competition for honour, and military discipline—she was nevertheless influential, led the defence against Persia, and was able to win the Peloponnesian War. Sparta was, however, nothing like as stable as she claimed to be. Her victory over Athens brought with it a new set of problems, for which she was ill-equipped. In the third century revolution finally came to Sparta.

Athens was in just about every respect opposite to Sparta, given that both were poleis. Athenians sought out strangers and encouraged them to reside; Athenian foreign policy was aggressive and expansive. At Athens women could own no property: while Spartan women were 'free range', Athenian citizen women were always under some man's authority. The competition between the males did not take the form of passing tests, as at Sparta, but of winning contests, especially in politics and litigation. The state was a perfected democracy in the sense that conflict within the elite came before the *dēmos* for resolution.

The Athenian constitution evolved through a series of historically documented revolutions and reforms; the fifth century was its most democratic period. The structure of council and assembly was retained but, as the Athenian *boulē* consisted of 500 citizens drawn by lot from those willing to serve, and as no one could serve more than two discontinuous years, the council was in effect a rotating committee of the assembly. Most other magistrates were also chosen by lot, with only a few especially responsible officers elected. Judges were replaced by large juries who heard debate and then voted without legal guidance and without deliberation. Thus it was said: the *dēmos* is the *nomos* at Athens.

This system, however, presumed careful management from backstage. The Athenian democracy evidently made no effort to alter the class structure: on the contrary, it must have relied upon it in order to make the democracy work. It has been estimated that of 30,000 Athenian citizens no more than 3,000 ever took part in politics or litigation at some time in their lives, and of these less than 100 at any time made politics their principal occupation. These men would all have known each other; evidently the democracy functioned as well as it did because they enjoyed the kind of inherited mutual understandings which made possible elsewhere stable oligarchy—not that they agreed about policy, but that there was consensus about how issues should be settled. It seems that critical procedural issues were settled backstage before the parties appeared in public. In theory, for example, any citizen who wished could address the assembly: with turnouts in the neighbourhood of 6,000 this must have been a fiction. In one of Aristophanes' plays a citizen attempts to intervene from the floor: the presiding officer

tells the police to throw him out. Evidently the speakers were settled before the meeting.

Furthermore, we have no evidence of political organization around voting in elections. Such organization makes sense only when votes are counted, as they were in ostracism and litigation—the two modes by which Athenian politicians went after their adversaries. Elections to office were by show of hands, with no provision for close results. In effect this means election by acclamation: nomination by a recognized political figure then is tantamount to election. Since we can see that various factions were represented, there must have been some careful backstage bargaining concerning nominations.

Then there is the problem of the budget. Appropriations were made *ad hoc*, decree by decree; no one was officially responsible for regulating expenditure in relation to income. Yet somehow the numbers were made to work.

In the fourth century the coherence of this backstage operation is evidently breaking down, and we can see a variety of legal and institutional changes intended to meet this new problem. There is less of a fiction of universal access to the floor; speakers are held accountable like office-holders, and we see the beginnings of a rational budgetary process. The Athenian polity became less democratic as the society became less rigidly stratified.

Overall, the polis was not about equality (or hierarchy) but about stratification. The most egalitarian polis (as to the citizens) was Sparta: it achieved this by rigid controls and exclusions, and by making an exception for the twin kings. The greatest liberty, for citizens and non-citizens alike, was at Athens, but it achieved this only by keeping real political initiative in the hands of a very narrow circle, and by making an exception of the citizen women.

Suggested Reading

Of authors writing in English on the polis I have learned the most from the late M. I. Finley: Finley (1981) is a good introduction to his work. Snodgrass (1980) gives a good account of the origins of the polis; more recently, focused on socio-economic developments, is Tandy (1997). The best brief account of the later archaic period is probably still Andrewes (1956). More recent and more extensive is Murray (1993).

An influential account of the mature Athenian democracy is Ober (1989). Athenian political developments in the late classical period, the fourth century BCE, are well discussed in Hansen (1991). The leading scholar on Sparta at present is Paul Cartledge: see Cartledge (1979) and a wealth of later work. There are a number of good local histories of other poleis—e.g. Figueira (1981); Legon (1981); Salmon (1984); Nielsen (2002).

A good introduction to Greek colonization is Graham (1964). More recent is the work of Irad Malkin, particularly Malkin (1994). Redfield (2003) focuses on one of the western colonies, and also explores the role of women in the Greek poleis in general.

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CHAPTER 16

CIVIC INSTITUTIONS

SARA FORSDYKE

> The man in charge of the *symposion* gives each participant the cup of wine drawn from the common mixing bowl, and gives each man his turn to speak or to sing, just as the sacrificing priest gives each participant an equal part of the sacrificial victim. Practices like these—common to all and shared by all—constitute an essential part of the common domain (the *koinon*) which characterizes city life. *In this sense, I would say that they function as civic institutions: to have a share in citizenship is to share in a banquet.*
>
> (Schmitt-Pantel 1990: 201; my emphasis)

While Schmitt-Pantel is speaking of archaic Greece in her specific claim for an intimate connection between dining and citizenship, her more general argument for the importance of collective cultural practices (e.g. sacrifice, feasting, dramatic and athletic competitions) for the practice of politics holds valid for the entire span of ancient Greek history. As Cartledge puts it (1998: 1): 'Politics in a Greek city... was also a social affair, not something best left to the politicians, and society, conversely, was also political.'

Historians have demonstrated that the formal institutions of the Greek city-state are best understood as emerging from but still very much embedded within a much broader range of collective practices and discourses. Indeed, it may be argued that to limit one's focus to formal institutions alone obscures much of what made the ancient Greek city-state work. This is not to say that formal institutions were

unimportant; clearly they played a vital role in structuring social and political interactions. Nevertheless it is the dynamic interplay between the institutional structures of the state and these broader practices and discourses that has been the focus of much of the most fruitful scholarship on the ancient Greek city-state over the past thirty years.

In this chapter I will first briefly delineate the main lines of argument regarding the emergence and development of civic institutions in ancient Greece. I will then turn to some of the most interesting areas of investigation in current scholarship on the interaction between formal institutions and broader cultural activities and norms in the Greek city-state.

16.1. The Emergence and Development of Civic Institutions in Ancient Greece

Ever since Anthony Snodgrass (1980) drew attention to the eighth century as a moment when the rudimentary outlines of a state could be identified in the archaeological record, scholars have focused on this period as the origin of civic communities in ancient Greece. Strictly speaking (as Redfield notes in the previous chapter), the emergence of the state in eighth-century Greece was an example of secondary state formation, since it had been preceded by the centralized Mycenaean palace-states. When the palaces collapsed and populations declined, the stage was set for the emergence of new social and political formations. The degree of continuity in institutions and cultural practices has been keenly debated, but the current consensus seems to be that real or imagined older social structures (e.g. tribes, kinship groups, and ethnic identities) were adapted or invented to fit the new conditions of archaic Greece (Roussel 1976; Bourriot 1976; Hall 1997).

To what extent did these early communities constitute 'states'? Some scholars have argued that already in the eighth century many of the elements of the classical Greek city-state—in particular, a politically empowered assembly in which ordinary men had an equal right to speak—are present. For example, Morris (1987, 1996) uses burial evidence to argue for the emergence in the eighth century of an inclusive community in which non-elites had equal status as citizens with their wealthier neighbours. Similarly, Raaflaub (e.g. 1997; Raaflaub and Wallace 2007) has argued that behind the poetic and elitist focus on great heroes such as Achilles and Odysseus in the Homeric epics, the poems reveal the importance of the mass of ordinary citizens (*dēmos*) 'on the battlefield, in the assembly and in society' (Raaflaub and Wallace 2007: 32). Other scholars have focused on the role of conflict between elites as a catalyst for the early institutional development of the Greek

city-state. Foxhall (1997) suggests that the archaic polis was little more than a 'ragged bundle of institutions' which were developed to regulate competition between elites and ensure an orderly rotation of power between them (cf. Forsdyke 2005*a*; Osborne 1996). Holkeskamp (1999), moreover, has shown that the emergence of written law in the seventh century was not the product of a centralized state with a clear mandate to create a systematic law-code, but rather an *ad hoc* response to immediate crises. Similarly, Thomas (1992) explores the wide-ranging significance of writing for archaic and classical Greek culture and shows convincingly that we should not assume that written law served primarily to provide greater access to and equal application of the law (although compare Gehrke 2000).

That said, most scholars accept that at some time between the seventh and sixth centuries the basic institutions of a state emerge in ancient Greece, including formal public offices, a council, and assembly (Raaflaub and Wallace 2007; contra Berent 1998, who argues that the Greek polis was a stateless society). Also important is the development of a legally enforceable concept of citizenship, which Manville (1990), for example, suggests emerged in Athens in the time of Solon (*c.*594 BCE). The permeability of the boundary between citizen and non-citizen even in the classical period, however, has often been noted, and scholars have begun to look beyond legal mechanisms of citizenship to the more flexible concept of 'civic ideology'. This term refers to the ways that citizens imagined themselves as a cohesive community through myths and creative representations of their collective past (Boegehold and Scafuro 1994; Loraux 1986). Anderson (2003) has suggested that it was only at the time of Cleisthenes that these collective strategies of self-definition were formalized institutionally. For Anderson, there is little sign that the regions of Attica were integrated into a single political unit until the reforms of Cleisthenes in 508/7 BCE. At this time, the complex system of demes, trittyes, and tribes became the institutional basis of a new form of political life, namely democracy.

While no one would dispute that the institutions of democracy were established in Athens by Cleisthenes in 508/7, most recognize that they did not emerge fully formed from the head of Athena, but were preceded by a long period of gestation as well as equally long periods of further development. As we have seen, Morris and Raaflaub have identified the seeds of democracy already in eighth-century Greece. Wallace (1998, 2007), on the other hand, places emphasis on Solon's formalization of the composition and functions of the popular assembly through which social and economic justice was achieved for all citizens. For Lavelle (2005), the tyrant Peisistratus was the most important forerunner of democracy, since he made the support of the demos the basis of political power. Others, while recognizing Solon and Peisistratus as important figures, speak of a revolutionary 'paradigm shift' in the practice and norms of politics at the time of Cleisthenes' reforms (Ober 1993, 2007; Forsdyke 2000, 2005*a*). Yet others still would place the transformation of early Greek civic institutions into democracy even later, laying particular emphasis on the

changing role of the lowest class of citizens, the *thetes*, in Athenian military might. Thus Raaflaub (1998*a*, *b*, 2007) argues that it was only when Athens became an imperial power as a result of the service of the *thetes* in the fleet that we can speak of fully developed democratic institutions and ideologies in Athens.

Among the institutions of the Athenian democracy, ostracism has received considerable recent attention. The publication, at long last, of the Kerameikos ostraca (Brenne 2002) has provided new information about the candidates for ostracism and the changing uses and meanings of the institution. I have argued that ostracism was the institutional recognition of the people's power over decisions of exile following their intervention in intra-elite conflict during the democratic revolution of 508/7. If this is correct, then I suggest that the institution of ostracism was a powerful symbol of democratic rule and, additionally, that it functioned as a sort of political ritual through which the Athenian masses collectively reaffirmed their control of politics each year and articulated the animating values of their democracy (Forsdyke 2000, 2005*a*).

Another major debate for ancient historians has been the question of whether the character of the democracy changed after the experiences of the late fifth century, in particular Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War and the two oligarchic coups of 411/10 and 404/3 (Eder 1995). Attention has focused particularly on the revision and republication of the laws, the creation of a distinction between decrees and laws, and the establishment of a board of lawmakers whose mandate was to review new laws for consistency with the established laws. Some argue that these changes reflect a shift from popular rule to the rule of law (Ostwald 1986; Hansen 1987), and this view has lead to the suggestion that fourth-century democracy represents an ideal balance between the two, and hence the full realization of the democratic ideal (Hansen 1987; Eder 1998).

So far we have been reviewing debates over the institutions of Athens. But what about other poleis beyond Athens? Concerted efforts are being made to understand the institutional development and political culture of states beyond Athens (e.g. Brock and Hodkinson 2000; Flensted-Jensen *et al.* 2000). Sparta, as always, is an enduring object of scholarly interest (e.g. Cartledge 2001; Hodkinson and Powell 1999; Lupi 2000). Hodkinson (2000), for example, explodes the myth of Spartan austerity and economic egalitarianism by pointing to the evidence for disparity in landownership and wealth among Spartans. Luraghi and Alcock (2003) examine the evidence for Messenian collective identity and show that, despite textual representations of the Messenian helots as wholly oppressed, careful examination of archaeological and textual evidence shows that they maintained a distinctive culture and collective identity of their own (Luraghi 2008). Federal states such as Boeotia, Arcadia, and Achaea have received particular attention (C. Morgan 2003; Heine-Nielsen and Roy 1999; Hansen 1996), as have democracies outside Athens (Robinson 1997 and forthcoming).

As for constitutions of non-democratic form, the tyrannies in archaic and classical Greece (Luraghi 1994; Lewis 2006) and, more emphatically, the uses of the concept of tyranny in the discourse and artistic expression of democratic Athens have been important areas of study (K. Morgan 2003). Despite modern scholarly focus on democracies, moreover, oligarchies were perhaps the norm in ancient Greece. Unfortunately our evidence for oligarchic states such as Megara and Thebes is exiguous. Ostwald (2000) deals with this gap by focusing on the definitions of oligarchy for Aristotle and other fourth-century thinkers. More could be done, however, in studying actual examples of oligarchies, as Robinson (1997 and forthcoming) has done for democracies, to show the great range of constitutions that fit under this rubric.

16.2. Current Debates: Institutions or Ideologies?

In the late 1980s a major debate concerning the nature of Athenian democracy arose between two of its foremost students, Mogens Hansen and Josiah Ober. Hansen (1987, 1989) argued that institutions were of primary importance in understanding the Athenian democracy, and that politics operated in a separate realm from other aspects of social life. Ober (1989*a*, *b*), on the other hand, looked at democracy as a social as well as political structure, and argued that the key to Athenian politics lay less in the detailed institutional arrangements than in the discursive construction of popular power through public speech. For Ober, the assembly and law-courts were sites for a complex two-way communication between elites and masses, where tensions—in particular, the conflict between the political *equality* of Athenians and their social and economic *inequality*—were worked out through public speech.

There is justice to both sides of the debate. Hansen is quite right to point out that the Athenians established an extraordinarily elaborate system of institutions and procedures for the running of their democracy—a fact that alone suggests that the Athenians had a distinctive predilection for formal institutions. Hansen is also right to stress that elites were compelled to operate largely through the formal institutions of the state, rather than through informal networks of private or semi-private organizations such as kinship groups or political parties. Yet, as Ober points out, such organizations 'hardly exhaust the roster of extra-institutional forces that might have contributed to Athenian political life' (1989*b*: 326). Indeed, numerous scholars have recently explored the ways that other spheres of social life were sites for the articulation and negotiation of social and political (democratic) values. In

particular, festivals such as the Dionysia (Connor 1989; Winkler and Zeitlin 1990; Wilson 2000, 2003; Goldhill and Osborne 1999) and the Panathenaia (Neils 1992, 1994, 1996; Philips and Pritchard 2003), neighbourhood and village (deme) life (Osborne 1985*a*; Schmitz 2004), and everyday interactions in the agora (Lewis 1996; Millett 1998; Davidson 1997; Forsdyke 2005*b*, 2008, forthcoming) have been focal points for study of the interaction between politics and society. As Schmitt-Pantel puts it, 'the study of the tribe as an institutional mechanism cannot be separated from the study of the tribe's festival practices' (1990: 207).

Scholarly disputes have arisen as to whether plays in the theatre reflect democratic ideology per se, as Goldhill (1990) has argued, or more widespread civic ideology (Versnel 1995; Griffin 1998; Rhodes 2003*b*). Similarly, the ideological force of athletic competition is debated, with some viewing it as primarily an opportunity for elite display (Pritchard 2003 and forthcoming), and others viewing it as largely democratized, particularly with the expansion of the numbers and types of competition in the fifth century (Osborne 1993; Fisher 1998 and forthcoming). The significance of the Panathenaic procession, as well as the Parthenon frieze, have been subject to equally diverse interpretations, some viewing them as enforcing elitist ideologies (Wohl 1996; Maurizio 1998), while others argue that they articulate democratic ideals (Neils 1994; Osborne 1994). The larger issue hovering above all these debates is whether elite values continued to dominate and hence undermine the democracy even after the reforms of Cleisthenes, as Loraux (1986) suggests, or whether the democracy appropriated and adapted elite values to a democratic agenda (e.g. Ober 1989*a*; Forsdyke 1999).

These debates hinge on some fundamental questions, such as: what is the connection between these festivals and democracy, given that many poleis must have had similar festivals featuring competitions, processions, and feasting? Secondly, why did the Athenian democracy have more festivals than other poleis (if we are to believe ps.-Xenophon, *Constitution of the Athenians* 3.2.8)? Is there a connection between democracy and festivity? Or, to put it in sociological terms, can Athens' much-heralded stability be explained in part by its extensively developed cultural activities? Or is there something distinctively democratic about the explosion of artistic and cultural activity in fifth-century Athens (Boedeker and Raaflaub 1998)?

This all gets us back to the debate between Ober and Hansen, particularly in relation to the question of how to explain the socio-political stability of Athens compared to other Greek city-states. As Gehrke (1985) has documented, instability was typical, and therefore Athens' success in moderating conflict between elites and masses must be explained. Hansen (1987, 1989) and others point to the institutional apparatus of the Athenian democracy, including the checks on radical popular power in the late fifth and early fourth centuries (see above). Ober (1989*a*, *b*), on the other hand, argues that even in the fourth century the people were dominant and that there was no significant difference between the assembly and the law-court insofar as they both, through metonymic relationship with the larger

civic community, served as sites for the articulation of popular power. For Ober, the assembly and the courts, as well as numerous other formal and informal occasions, provided opportunities for the ongoing negotiation of political values and, as such, provided discursive space for the working-out of tensions within the community which might otherwise result in violence. Of course there were occasions when violence did erupt, and the ways that the democracy dealt with the aftermath of these bloody episodes of civil war—particularly through discursive means—has provided another fruitful avenue of research (Wolpert 2002; Ober 2005; Goldhill and Osborne 2006). Here the art of forgetting appears to be as important as the art of remembering (discussed in this volume by Ma), when it comes to the social memories through which the Athenian community continually re-imagined itself.

Another fundamental issue which has arisen in part from the Ober–Hansen debate is the question of whether the Athenians subscribed unbendingly to a principle of the rule of law, or whether they regulated themselves according to flexible and continually renegotiated popular values. Although some scholars (Harris 1994, 1997; Rubenstein 2000; Rhodes 2004*a*; Harris and Rubenstein 2004) have argued for the former, the preponderance of scholarship has adopted the latter approach, pointing in particular to the tendency in fourth-century oratory to subordinate legal arguments to more general conceptions of good and bad citizenship (Ober 1989*a*; Cohen 1995; Christ 2006). Lanni (2006), in particular, has made a strong case for the idea that, although the Athenians recognized principles of legal argumentation such as the concept of a precedent, they consciously adopted a more flexible attitude to the legal process, preferring contextualized justice rather than the strict application of the law. In my own current work, I am exploring how formal legal institutions operated alongside informal collective practices as mechanisms by which the community regulated itself. For example, in Athens and elsewhere, social offenders (e.g. adulterers and traitors) could be punished through formal or informal methods, the latter category including such practices as stoning and ritualized public humiliation (Forsdyke 2008). The flexibility of formal Athenian legal procedures themselves—particularly the fact that the same offence could be prosecuted by many different channels depending on the relative strength of the case and the litigants—has been amply demonstrated by Osborne (1985*b*), as well as others, including for example Todd (1993) and Carey (2004).

Some of the most brilliant work on Greek law has come from scholars exploring the interplay between social and legal norms. Cohen (1991, 1995), for example, explores how widespread attitudes to women, the family, and sexuality served to regulate morality in Athens just as much as, if not more than, legal rules and institutions. Hunter (1994) similarly demonstrates that persons denied a formal political role in the city-state, such as slaves and women, played a crucial role in regulating the social order due to their intimate knowledge of household affairs of male citizens and their highly developed, yet informal, networks of information transfer (i.e. gossip). Other scholars, such as Bers (1985) and Lanni (1997), have

explored the implications of the fact that, in addition to citizen jurors, crowds of bystanders were onlookers and sometimes vocal participants in the proceedings in the courts. This recognition that the audience for law-court speeches possibly included non-citizens (metics), women, slaves, and others who frequented the agora, further blurs the lines between formal and informal institutions. In another study, Bers (2000) has perceptively argued that the complex rules and procedures of the Athenian courts were symbolic rituals designed to reinforce the authority of the popular courts rather than serve as functional means for the prevention of corruption. This approach points to a fertile area for further exploration, namely, the ways that the Athenian political and legal procedures can be understood as rituals with symbolic as well as practical functions (cf. Hornblower and Osborne 1994; Forsdyke, forthcoming).

A final area of particular importance in contemporary scholarship can be found at the intersection of ancient history and political science. This scholarship addresses the importance of ancient civic institutions, and particularly democracy, to current political theory and practice. Answers range from the claim that they are very important (Euben, Wallach, and Ober 1994; Ober and Hedrick 1996; Euben 1997; Wallach 2001; Ober 2005; Balot 2006) to more sceptical assessments (Rhodes 2003*a*; Samons 2004; Hansen 2005). The key question here is not whether modern democracy is like ancient democracy, or even whether it grew out of ancient democracy. Rather these scholars ask whether ancient institutions and values can be used to explore, at least on the theoretical plane, the possibilities and limitations of modern political systems. For example, Frank (2005) argues that Aristotle's focus on 'activity' (*energeia*) in his political and ethical treatises signals his recognition that institutions and individuals are not fixed, unchanging entities but products of dynamic interplay between structures and agents. Frank uses this point to argue that, although Aristotle may not have been a democrat, he can help modern polities achieve a balance between values usually seen as mutually exclusive, for example between respecting individual difference and recognizing an essential equality of persons or between private and public good. Saxonhouse (2006) uses the ancient Athenian practice of frank speech (*parrhēsia*) to explore the tension in democratic polities between free speech and the need for shame (*aidōs*), including, for example, respect for the traditions of the past. In these ways and more, ancient historians and political theorists are using the experience of the Greek polis to think through problems of concern to modern societies.

16.3. Looking Ahead

Between the empirical studies of the Copenhagen Polis Center and the more analytical and theoretical studies of the nature of the Greek polis, the study of

ancient Greek civic institutions is flourishing. Some of the most promising areas of research involve the crossing of boundaries between ancient history and other fields, including anthropology, political science, and the comparative study of other pre-modern and modern societies. Using these approaches, future work will no doubt further illuminate the ways that ancient civic experience intersects with more modern concerns, but also, perhaps more significantly, the ways in which the practice and conceptions of ancient citizenship are desperately different from, but not less instructive for, the practices of modern polities.

Suggested Reading

For an excellent critical examination of ancient sources and modern arguments about the emergence of political communities in archaic Greece see Hall (2007). For recent debate about the emergence and development of democracy in Greece see Raaflaub, Ober, and Wallace (2007) (with chapters by Paul Cartledge and Cynthia Farrar).

The best and most comprehensive treatment of the institutions of the Athenian democracy is Hansen (1987). See also now his much shorter treatment, Hansen (2006). Two useful edited volumes of ancient sources and modern scholarship have recently appeared: Robinson (2004) and Rhodes (2004*b*). The most important ancient text for the institutions of the Athenian democracy is the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians*, which should be read with Rhodes (1993).

The standard work on the deme is Whitehead (1986). For a look at the demes from a (less institutional) social and economic perspective, see Osborne (1985*a*). On the phratry see Lambert (1993). For magistrates in Athens see Develin (1989). On the Athenian legal institutions, practices, and norms see Gagarin and Cohen (2005).

For democracies and other forms of political organization outside Athens see Robinson (1997 and forthcoming), Brock and Hodkinson (2000), and the many volumes published by the Copenhagen Polis Center.

For an approach to the Greek polis that emphasizes ideals and norms expressed through discourse see Loraux (1986), Ober (1989*a*, 1996), Boegehold and Scafuro (1994).

For the overlap between politics and other social practices see Winkler and Zeitlin (1990), Schmitt-Pantel (1992), Cartledge, Millett, and von Reden (1998), Boedeker and Raaflaub (1998), Goldhill and Osborne (1999).

On the ancient Greek polis as a way of thinking through the problems of modern polities see Euben, Wallach, and Ober (1994), Samons (2004), Ober (2005), Balot (2006).

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CHAPTER 17

ECONOMY AND TRADE

SITTA VON REDEN

In a famous passage of the *Laws*, Plato suggests for the ideal city a site away from the sea:

> It is pleasant enough for a country to have the sea nearby for the pleasures of everyday life, but in fact it is a 'briny and bitter neighbour' in more than one sense. It fills the city with trade and money-driven retailing, breeds shifty and deceitful habits in a man's soul, and so makes a community distrustful and unfriendly within itself as well as against the world outside. Still, the fact that the land produces everything will be some consolation for these disadvantages. And in any case, although it obviously does produce every crop, its roughness prevents it from being very productive in all of them. For if it produced a surplus to be exported in bulk, the state would be swamped with gold and silver coinage—and this is, considering what we said before, nearly the worst thing that could happen to it if it aims to develop just and noble habits. (*Laws* 4, 705ab)

The ideological gulf between local self-sufficiency and trade has characterized much of twentieth-century scholarship, and this is why the passage has been so frequently cited. While Plato looked at the tension just in moral terms, being well aware of surplus production and increasing living standards as a result of trade, for economic historians it has been a cornerstone of discussions on the nature of the ancient economy. The revival of the polarity between agriculture and trade goes back to the early twentieth century, when the relationship between classical education and modern, specialized scholarship was renegotiated (Stray 1998: 218–23). In this intellectual environment, two German scholars, Karl Bücher

(an economist) and Eduard Meyer (a classicist), debated the question whether the ancient economy was a self-sufficient household economy (Bücher), or whether by the fifth century it had developed into a capital society characterized by price-setting markets, sophisticated banking institutions, and international trade. Paradoxically, but significantly, it was the classicist who drew a modernizing picture of the ancient economy, while the economist emphasized their structural difference within a theoretical evolutionary scheme (Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 1–8; Cartledge 2002).

The debate was taken up by Moses Finley, who fiercely argued against the modernizing perspective that, in Meyer's tradition, had dominated classical scholarship in the post-war period: the ancient economy was based on a self-sufficient peasantry, towns were political not commercial centres, trade was mostly confined to luxuries, and there were no monetary instruments (such as cheques or bills of exchange) other than coinage (Finley 1999). But just like Bücher, Finley had a methodological agenda. He insisted that individual pieces of evidence for farming, banking, or trade could not be understood (as classicists tended to understand them) without a conceptual framework. Neo-classical models, however, with their focus on markets and the supply-and-demand mechanism, were unsuitable as analytical tools, since exchange was not developed enough to generate real markets of goods. Instead, Finley favoured sociological and anthropological approaches in which the economy was embedded in social behaviour and not treated as an independent social subsystem that could be analysed in its own terms (Manning and Morris 2005*b*: 10–15).

The post-Finleyan era saw a profusion of specialized studies that on the one hand focused on agrarian subsistence strategies, nutritional regimes, and environmental analyses that were now based on comparative data drawn from the Third World and other contemporary rural societies, and on the other on the movement of goods, trade networks, and communication lines reconstructed on the basis of archaeological data and their theoretical contextualization (examples and bibliography in Scheidel and von Reden 2002; Cartledge 2002). A third site of contestation developed over the question of credit and banking, where an anthropological approach emphasizing the social and political function of lending and borrowing developed alongside a modernizing perspective on banking as facilitating long-distance trade (Millet 1991 vs. Cohen 1992; Morris 1994). Despite its unfortunate ideological division, research on the ancient economy made considerable progress over those years, especially by turning from literary evidence to the development of a broader base of archaeological, survey-archaeological, numismatic, epigraphic, papyrological, and comparative data (Cartledge 2002; Osborne 2004: 39–54). This has shifted the focus from exceptional cities like classical Athens and Sparta to other important areas of the Greek economy and the Hellenistic period (Archibald *et al.* 2001; Archibald, Davies, and Gabrielsen 2005; Scheidel, Morris, and Saller 2007). A complex picture of overlapping regional and interregional economies,

often traditional and inward-looking on the one hand but connected on the other, is now emerging, which makes the polarities of the earlier debate less applicable (see esp. Horden and Purcell 2000).

Yet it is only recently that the theoretical focus on the importance of trade in relation to subsistence agriculture has receded into the background. Partly in light of the wealth of new information and approaches which have qualified any extreme position, but also in the light of new concerns in economic and historical theory, scholars have abandoned the project of describing the ancient economy in Finley's terms. Instead, questions of economic development, the interdependence and interaction of different economic systems in the West and East, and a range of institutions other than the market and subsistence farming are taken into consideration (Saller 2002; Manning and Morris 2005*b*). The study of institutions, in the sense of principles or rules of behaviour affecting the economic process (North 1981, 1990), and the organizational context in which economic activity took place, are regarded as especially fruitful ways of looking at the ancient economy dynamically—not only because this offers a new methodology for analysing development, but also because it helps us to think more carefully about the particular structures that underlie the economic system of the ancient world (Morris 2002). Of the many institutions that influenced the Greek economy in different ways at different times, I choose here inter-state connections and markets, warfare, and monetary exchange (see also Reger 2003). These institutions were linked to various forms of state (especially the polis and Greek monarchies) as well as types of agricultural organization (peasant farms, tenancies, and temple domains). I shall deal with each of these aspects in turn, after a brief introduction to the ecological and climatic conditions under which economic activity took place.

17.1. Ecology and Climate

'Dense fragmentation complemented by a striving towards control of communications may be an apt summary of the Mediterranean past': the Mediterranean as a culturally and ecologically homogenous region has recently been problematized in these terms (Horden and Purcell 2000: 25). While the coastal areas of the Mediterranean represent a recognizable climatic zone, soil conditions and rainfall are variable enough to offer a suitable environment for exchange. The Mediterranean climatic zone is characterized by dry and mild summers and fairly wet and cold winters. Rainfall peaks in October and November as well as April and May, which underpins an economic regime of cereal agriculture with, usually, one harvest in late spring/early summer. But annual rainfall varies considerably—not only locally,

with a low of 300–400 mm in some south-eastern coastal areas, and up to 1,200 mm at high altitudes in the north-west (Isager and Skydsgaard 1992: 13; Osborne 1996: 54–5), but also from year to year. Wheat, one of the two principal crops of the Mediterranean region, requires at least 300 mm rainfall per year, barley a little less. As modern comparative data suggest, this level is not achieved in Greece in one out of four or five years (Reger 1994: 86–9). But droughts tend to be local, and in most cases food can be imported from nearby (Reger 1994: 102–4). Moreover, climatic uncertainty combined with a high incidence of crop disease, pests, and violent crop destruction (Garnsey 1988: 20) led to risk-reducing strategies like storage, crop diversification, and the distribution of fields into different micro-regions (Garnsey 1988: 48–55; Gallant 1991; Oliver 2001).

Alongside cereals—supplemented by fruits, pulses, dairy products, and, in small quantities, meat—olives and wine played a prominent cultural role in the Greek world. They were consumed in extraordinary quantities, but do not grow equally well everywhere in the Mediterranean region (Horden and Purcell 2000: 209–20). The high demand for them, which is only explicable in cultural terms, offered another reason for regional exchange from the archaic period onwards.

The Greek world experienced two episodes of significant geographical expansion. One was the period of 'colonization' during the eighth and seventh centuries BCE, when Greek settlements were founded in southern Italy, Sicily, North Africa, the northern Aegean, the Black Sea coast, and western Asia Minor. During this first period of expansion the Greeks stayed largely in the Mediterranean eco-zone, although it introduced them to superior kinds of wheat with higher yield ratios, especially in Sicily, North Africa, and the Black Sea area (Davies 2007). The second happened in the wake of the conquests of Alexander the Great, when Greek military and civil immigrants settled in old and new towns and their hinterlands, from northern Africa and Egypt into the Far East. This expansion confronted them with a new climatic zone where very short periods of rainfall, combined with extremely hot and dry summers, make agriculture possible only with artificial irrigation. In Egypt, the River Nile, with its annual inundation from June to September, was another ecological phenomenon that affected agricultural organization—and did so well into modern times (Bowman and Rogan 1999). In the areas most intensely settled by the Greeks (Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia), wheat and barley were staples as they were in Greece; but in Egypt emmer instead of durum wheat and in Mesopotamia barley instead of wheat were the main crops (van der Spek 2007; Thompson 1999). Moreover, yields were significantly higher here than in most areas of mainland Greece. Whereas yield ratios in Attica, Larisa, and Olbia have been estimated at a maximum of *c.*1:5 (Garnsey 1988: 65–9), in Egypt they were probably close to 1:10 (Rathbone 1990), and in Babylonia under optimal conditions barley could reach a ratio of up to 1:24 (Bedford 2007). Olives and vines do not grow naturally here at all, but, in Egypt especially, the Graeco-Macedonian kings in cooperation with the immigrants made great efforts to expand cultivation of them,

together with other kinds of Greek produce (Thompson 1999). The Greek economy was a mixture of ecological conditions and cultural objectives, which pushed these conditions to their boundaries. The growing amount of theoretical literature from the late fourth century onwards underpinned, and reflects, agricultural experimentation that clearly increased in the Hellenistic period (Thompson 1984).

17.2. Agricultural Organization

From the archaic to the Hellenistic period three forms of landholding can be distinguished (Davies 2006: 79–80; Isager and Skydsgaard 1992: 120–3, 149–54, 181–90). One was that of full property rights over an allotted share (*klēros*) of inheritable family land within the framework of the polis, which put certain political restrictions on its alienability. These were the right of the state to confiscate, redistribute, and reassign part of the land, and the attempt to prevent excessive accumulation of property by means of inheritance laws and social disapproval (Millett 2000: 26–31; Davies 2007). The size of Athenian *klēroi* varied between an average of 5–6 ha. to 25–6 ha. plots in the case of wealthier citizens (Burford 1993; Migeotte 2002: 65), but a certain degree of concentration did in practice take place (Foxhall 2002). *Klēroi* were typically farmed by the members of a nuclear *oikos* ('household')—together with one or more slaves, in the case of bigger properties. Larger farms were managed by a bailiff.

The second category was land leased to tenants, with a range of tenant statuses encompassing contractually employed tenants as well as semi-free cultivators such as the helots, *penestai*, and *perioikoi* (various types of dependent cultivators) in classical Sparta, Thessaly, and Crete, the *hektēmoroi* (sharecroppers) in archaic Athens, the indigenous *oiketai* in the Greek settlements of southern Italy and Sicily, and the *basilikoi geōrgoi* (royal peasants) in Hellenistic Egypt, the Attalid, and Seleucid kingdoms (Rathbone 2002).

The third category, close to the former, was that of land owned by temples, but again worked by leaseholders, sharecroppers, or serfs, sometimes called *hierodouloi* (sacred 'slaves'). These are well attested in Asia Minor (Dignas 2002), Babylonia (van der Spek 1987), Egypt (Manning 2007), and Delos (Reger 1994).

From the perspective of the literary sources, which were mostly produced within the cultural environment of the polis, peasant farmers who worked their own land were the norm, but leaseholds in the latter two categories were much more widespread (Rathbone 2002). A fundamental economic dynamic lay, within these categories, in the transformation of sharecropping and dependent labour arrangements into contractual labour relationships with fixed rental payments or private

landownership. The latter happened in Athens and other poleis during the sixth century, the former in Egypt (and probably other parts of the Hellenistic world) during the third century BCE. Sharecropping regimes and regimes of semi-free labour are economically inefficient (Eggertson 1990), and it is notable that in the Hellenistic period the Greeks did not adopt them on conquered land (von Reden, forthcoming *a*). In Athens, too, the development of a free peasantry, replacing forms of semi-dependent agrarian labour, is thought to have been the background to the economic development of the polis as it was experienced from the late archaic period onwards (Davies 2007). Other ways in which the increasing needs of growing populations were sustained were the expansion of the cultivable area into marginal land, greater exploitation of the uncultivable area (Forbes 1996), and land-reclamation projects such as those attested in the Fayum during the first generations of Ptolemaic rule (Thompson 1999).

17.3. Polis and Empires

The Greek economy is usually seen just through the lens of the polis, but the impact of the polis on economic performance is gauged best when seen as a transient factor in the Greek economy. Clear indications of economic growth, measured in terms of a combined increase of population and living standards (Scheidel 2007), can be seen in Greece from the eighth through to the fourth century BCE (Morris 2005). There are also some indications that the Greek economy developed in the Hellenistic period (Davies 2006; van der Spek 2007; Manning 2007; more cautiously, Reger 2003). If there was indeed development, changing political structures must account for it.

The polis created a form of civic organization in which each citizen participated in relation to his military status, based in turn on the amount of grain produced on his property, perhaps—as in Athens—including an undifferentiated class of citizens with no landed property. Mobility between census groups was limited, and certainly not dependent on economic success, although economic failure and loss of land did lead to a loss of status—if not legally, then at least politically (Ober 1989). While this aspect of the polis is likely to have affected economic performance negatively (*pace* Finley 1999, Morris 1999), other aspects had a more favourable impact. Among these must be considered the close connection of the rural hinterland with urban centres and, in some cases, harbours (Reger 2003); the articulation of clearly defined property rights and boundaries (Isager and Skydsgaard 1992: 120–1); the creation of public law-courts as well as procedures for the settlement of interpersonal disputes; the focus on market places (*agorai*) as civic and commercial centres (von Reden

1995: 105–11); the development of market regulations; and the invention of coined money (Howgego 1995: 1–23).

The polis remained a vital form of political organization in Greece and Asia Minor throughout the Hellenistic period, but the major economic dynamic came from the successor kingdoms, especially Ptolemaic Egypt and the Seleucid Empire. While the capitals and new towns founded in these kingdoms were politically organized like poleis, controlling their own hinterland (Briant 1982: 263–79), they were part of much larger structures characterized by immense territory and differentiated administrative systems in which subjects were counted as taxpayers rather than citizens of a community (Thompson 1997). While status continued to be associated with military rank and landownership (soldiers and top administrative personnel were, at least in the third century, rewarded with *klēroi* depending on their rank), money played a greater role (Aperghis 2001; de Callataÿ 2005), economic units allotted to Greek military settlers tended to be more substantial (in Egypt, 6–30 ha. at much higher productivity than in mainland Greece), and the king as the head of a huge agrarian business or royal *oikos* became a profit-oriented participant in the economy himself (Davies 2006). Whether agrarian productivity in these empires increased as the result of Greek occupation is yet to be shown, but the changing labour regime on large estates, including that on royal land (Rowlandson 1985), an incentive system that rewarded efficient administration (feeding back into agrarian productivity, e.g. Crawford 1971; Bedford 2007), and initiative in agrarian development (Manning 2007) make this a defendable proposition.

17.4. Inter-State Connections and Markets

Greek pottery and the dynamic of settlement demonstrate significant movement of goods and people in the Mediterranean from about 750 BCE (Osborne 1996: 112–29). The earliest evidence of intense Greek contacts abroad are found in the Levante (Al Mina at the mouth of the River Orontes), and in western Italy (Pithekoussai on the island of Ischia). Within Greece, the Hera temple at Samos, for example, shows a large proportion of foreign dedications coming from as far as Egypt, Cyprus, Syria, Phoenicia, Phrygia, and Assyria (Osborne 1996: 93). Fine Corinthian pottery travelled to sites settled by Greeks in southern Italy and Etruria, while the so-called 'SOS amphoras', coming mostly from Athens and containing olive oil and wine, are found both in the East and West (ibid. 225). What precisely these movements represent—whether they reflect sporadic contacts, regular exchange,

or a real market in these goods, as Osborne (1996) argues—is open to discussion (Parkins 1998: 5–10). The poems of Homer and Hesiod suggest that, before the polis, foreign exchange was highly individualized, and engaged people belonging to the highest social level. In the classical and Hellenistic periods it is the trade in grain, agrarian produce transported in amphoras, shipbuilding materials, luxury foods, and slaves that dominates the literary and archaeological evidence, but other perishable goods like papyrus and textiles, as well as iron, copper, tin, and precious metals, circulated freely around the Mediterranean (Horden and Purcell 2000: 343–63). The institutional conditions of this movement are far from certain. Markets and the supply-and-demand mechanisms played an important role, as official market regulations, commercial harbours, maritime loans, maritime law-courts, and the presence of a large contingent of resident aliens in places like Athens suggest (slightly overstated by Cohen 1992). But guest-friendship relationships (*xenia*) between aristocrats, kings, and representatives of poleis provided the background to many transactions, especially in those resources that were vital for the power and prestige of a state (e.g. grain for distribution, timber, and precious metal items: see Hermann 1987: 73–105; Garnsey 1988: 69–86). Public connections guided the direction of trade and interfered with the rationality of trading with places in closer proximity (Gabrielsen 1997: 64–84; Reger 1994: 109–26). In the Hellenistic period the evidence for inter-state cooperation in the movement of goods increases, and is likely to reflect an actual increase. The grant of *proxenia*, a set of honours bestowed by one state on individuals or a group of citizens of another, was mostly of a political nature, but often included economic privileges as well, especially the exemption from taxes on the import and export of goods (Marek 1984; Reger 2003). Conversely, individuals of one state who mediated exports or supported them financially could be granted political honours by another state, and this generated institutionalized exchange networks beyond the market (Gabrielsen 1997: 64–5; Bringmann 2001; Davies 2006: 87–8). The influence of inter-state relationships on the movement of goods renders the political development from independent poleis to leagues and empires an important factor in economic development during the late classical and Hellenistic periods (Davies 2006: 89–90).

17.5. Warfare

Warfare was part of the daily life of any polis (Osborne 1987: 137–64; Hunt in this volume), and affected the economy in several ways (Austin 1986; Garlan 1989; Millett 1993; Andreau, Briant, and Descat 2000): first, by the close interdependence of military rank and landownership. Citizen soldiers, as in the archaic and classical

polis, were ranked according to the amount of their agrarian output; mercenaries, as in Ptolemaic Egypt, could be paid off by the allotment of a piece of land according to their military rank. The emergence of hoplite warfare in the archaic period was the major background to the pattern of landholding in the classical period (Davies 2007). Secondly, the economy was affected by the redistribution of resources which occurred in the aftermath of victory, especially in the form of precious metal, human resources, and warships. Degrees of monetization (use of coinage) and chattel slavery were crucially influenced by the influx of precious metal (Howgego 1992) and slaves (Garlan 1989: 74–92), both having a profound impact on the strength of local economies. Thirdly, it was affected by the costs of war and the redistribution of resources within the community. In the polis, major communal costs of warfare were often, though not always (Migeotte 2002: 41–2), borne by the wealthiest citizens (Gabrielsen 1994). *Epidoseis* (donations), or indirect taxes like the trierarchy (the obligation to equip and pay for the crew of a warship) and *eisphorai* (emergency contributions), were paid by the wealthiest citizens, while the profits of war benefited the citizen body as a whole (Millett 1993). It has been argued, moreover, that one of the major incentives for Athenian citizens to produce cash crops were financial demands on the community such as these (Osborne 2004). And finally, the economy was affected by the infrastructural links of warfare and trade. The safety of sea routes, the installation of harbours, and the establishment of communication lines were crucial conditions for the movement of goods, but always had a dominant military component (best attested in the Hellenistic period: Salles 1987; von Reden, forthcoming *b*). Conversely, army movements influenced the demand for and movement of goods and money, as soldiers required supplies and payment.

Major developments in military history are likely to have caused economic change. The impact of hoplite warfare on patterns of landholding and agrarian production in the Greek polis has just been mentioned. The development of the Athenian Empire, with its effect on the circulation of resources and money in the Aegean, on inter-state cooperation, and on the safety of sea routes, is another factor. The increasing importance of mercenary warfare and military specialization in the fourth century BCE caused, and marks, a third aspect of this interdependence. Mercenary warfare, involving much larger payments for soldiers and war equipment, grew rapidly as the result of larger and longer campaigns (van Wees 2000). It had enormous effects on the production and use of coinage (de Callataÿ, Depeyrot, and Villaronga 1993), as well as contributing to the shift of economic power from poleis to empires which had a greater capacity for mobilizing resources to pay armies, and to making subsidy and indemnity payments (van Wees 2000; Reger 2003; Chaniotis 2005: 115–43 for the financial strategies of poleis). Mercenary warfare also led to greater mobility among people who largely carried out the economic initiatives undertaken in the conquered lands (Thompson 1999; Manning 2007).

17.6. Monetary Exchange

The influence of polis institutions on the Greek economy has been emphasized throughout this chapter: the delineation of territory and the protection of property rights, patterns of landholding and landownership, the development of market laws, market officials, law-courts and the legal protection of citizens, the interdependent growth of political and economic spaces, the role of *eisphora* and elite taxation, and inter-state connections. Another fundamental institution related to the political development of the polis is monetary exchange. Forms of money, most notably bullion, had facilitated exchange since at least the Homeric period, and their impact on the development of coinage is not to be underestimated (Kim 2001; Shaps 2004: 3–17). But coinage was the first form of money by which a range of obligations, both interpersonal and public, could be discharged. Because of its durability, portability, exchangeability, and its other positive effects on transaction costs—such as allowing comparability of prices and accountability of debts and obligations—it stimulated exchange, credit, and probably also a more efficient exploitation of agricultural labour (Bingen 2007: 104–13). Its invention in the seventh century BCE and subsequent spread was due to a combination of political and economic factors (Howgego 1995: 1–23; von Reden 1997). But an economically significant amount of coinage circulated in Greece from the early fifth century, when the Athenians began to build their empire and to exploit their silver-mines more heavily (Rutter 1981; Wartenberg 1995; see also Kim 2002).

Not all Greek poleis had exchangeability in mind when issuing coinage, as can be seen from the fact that several weight standards for individual coinages continued to circulate throughout Greek antiquity, despite their inconvenience for inter-polis transactions. But the dynamics of exchange overcame this inconvenience since, unless prohibited by law, coinages were freely exchanged on the basis of their precious-metal weight (Carradice and Price 1988; Meadows 2001). Particularly acceptable coinages, such as the 'owls' of Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries, dominated regional and interregional exchange in practice, and were sometimes imitated by other states (Figueira 1998; Meadows 2001). Monetization rapidly increased in those poleis that used coinage (Kraay 1976). In Athens by the end of the fifth century, wages, rents, and taxes (liturgies) were monetized (Shipton 2001), although the fact that taxation affected a small elite and resident aliens only makes it likely that many independent farmers had little need for cash (Shaps 2004: 163–75).

Yet instead of asking how much of the Greek economy was monetized—there were probably large discrepancies between poleis as well as within poleis—it is more rewarding to ask how monetization developed. Monetary credit, maritime loans, and banks (used mostly for currency exchange and deposit-keeping) did

increase from the late fifth century BCE (Millett 1991; Cohen 1992), and not only was the Athenian weight-standard adopted in time by a great variety of other states (including Macedonia), but the posthumous Alexander coinage minted after the death of Alexander created in the eastern Mediterranean a de facto unified coin system from which only the Ptolemies defected (Mørkholm 1991; Duyrat and Picard 2005). Bronze coinages struck from the late fifth century, but increasingly in the Hellenistic period, reflect not so much an increasing need for small change (Kim 2002) but the fact that the increasing demand for coinage exceeded the supply of silver (Millett 2000 on Athens; Reger 2003). Yet alongside this monetized economy, spurred by the costs of war and empire, and feeding back into local economies, there was a vast sector of cereal agriculture that remained, with a few exceptions, largely unaffected by monetary taxation and exchange (Migeotte 2002; von Reden, forthcoming *a*; contra, Aperghis 2004). Together with the absence of a real and monetized market in land, this prevented the development of price-setting markets (Reger 1994, 1997), and it prevented the Greek economy from becoming more fully monetized.

Suggested Reading

The articles in Scheidel, Morris, and Saller (2007) offer a comprehensive, detailed, and recent account of the Greek economy divided by region and periods. For a briefer collection of current issues and methodologies see Scheidel and von Reden (2002), which also contains a bibliographical survey. A particularly innovative agenda stands behind the collection of articles in Manning and Morris (2005*a*). Horden and Purcell (2000) offer a wealth of new ideas and information. Very good introductions to the Hellenistic economy are Reger (2003) and Davies (2006). Finley (1999; first published in 1973) is still essential reading.

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CHAPTER 18

WAR AND SOCIETY

PETER HUNT

18.1. Introduction

Recent research on Greek warfare often explores not the battles and campaigns themselves, but the relationship between warfare and other aspects of ancient life. Since war permeated Greek society, culture, and politics, the study of these topics is enriched by understanding the role of warfare; and, since Greek warfare did not occur in isolation, its study necessarily includes understanding, as a whole, the cities that fielded armies and in part determined the way that they would fight. Hence the topic of 'war and society' in ancient Greece is an enormous and complex one. Works on this subject—or more recently on 'war and culture'—have played an important role in the study of Greek history for more than a generation; the field has exploded in the last decade. This chapter does not attempt a survey, but will focus on two exemplary cases: first, attempts to explain the development of Greek land forces exclusively in terms of military advantage, which have been succeeded by theories that place more weight on cultural or social factors; secondly, the notion that military service often brought political power in its wake: the idea is an appealing one, but the theory of the 'hoplite reform' highlights the difficulties of such explanations.

18.2. Explaining the Evolution of Ancient Greek Warfare

Let us begin with a brief survey of the main developments in Greek land warfare, a necessary prelude for their explanation. Soldiers in ancient Greece fought in many ways: as rock-throwers, slingers, archers, or cavalry. They could use swords, throw javelins, or thrust spears. Their defensive armour could vary from almost nothing—light-armed soldiers were sometimes referred to as 'naked'—to full hoplite armour, including metal greaves, helmet, breastplate, and a heavy shield made of wood with a bronze outer layer. During much of the span of ancient Greek history one could probably have found a few soldiers somewhere in the Greek world using every one of these weapons and protected by all varieties of armour. But if we start our story after the controversial period of 'Homeric warfare', two basic stages in Greek land warfare, hoplite and Hellenistic, can be distinguished on the basis of how the main body of infantry fought.

In the early seventh century BCE heavier armour and a new type of shield were introduced and quickly spread throughout the Greek world. The soldiers who were later called hoplites held this shield by sliding their forearms through a strap near its centre and then grasping a handle near the rim. This made it possible to carry a heavier and larger shield, which provided better protection than previous ones. The shield was less mobile, however, and individual hoplites were more vulnerable to attacks from the side and rear than their predecessors had been. Although as a consequence hoplites fought best in formation, the development of the pure hoplite formation was not instantaneous. Vase paintings and the occasional archaic text reveal that archaic hoplite formations may have incorporated some light-armed troops as well as archers, and that many hoplites carried a throwing-spear through the late seventh century. By the classical period, hoplites fought in a close formation by thrusting with their eight-foot-long spears (van Wees 2000*b*). The clash of such soldiers remained the decisive phase of most set land battles from the mid-seventh until the mid-fourth century BCE.

The mid-fourth-century Macedonian armies of Philip and Alexander marked a second transformation, a culmination of earlier trends that put more emphasis on light-armed troops and especially on cavalry. Philip probably also initiated the change that decisively distinguished Hellenistic from hoplite warfare, a new type of infantry that dominated warfare until the advent of Rome. A Macedonian infantryman was armed with a sixteen-foot pike, the *sarissa*, which he held in both hands. He was protected by a small shield strapped to his shoulder and elbow and, if he could afford it, a breastplate. With its array of pike-points extending ten feet in front of the formation, the close-ranked Macedonian phalanx was hard to beat. But, even more than a hoplite army, the Macedonian phalanx was only effective

if it stayed intact; a sixteen-foot pike was hopelessly unwieldy as an individual weapon.

This basic outline is clear. But why did one type of army, one way of fighting, succeed another? Although military historians as a group are not theoretically inclined, the notion of escalation or, to use an oddly positive phrase, 'progress' in military practice underpins many discussions. Since warfare is a competitive activity, the types of force and ways of fighting of a state's opponents largely determine the types of force and ways of fighting it will adopt. Progress occurs because states try to match each other's improvements in technology, organization, training, or mobilization. Despite a tendency towards conservatism in this high-stakes activity—'generals are always preparing to fight the last war'—significant improvements can quickly spread and become permanent features of warfare. This line of thinking implies that over time military forces will become bigger and better, and warfare more intense.

On the broadest scale, this theory does explain important aspects of the development of Greek warfare, especially the sacrifices and societal costs which 'progress' required. The hoplite panoply seems to have spread throughout the Greek world within a generation at the end of the eighth century, despite the costly metal required (van Wees 2004: 49–50; Snodgrass 1999: 48–77). The use of hoplite weapons and thus dense formations probably went hand-in-hand with an increase in the proportion of the population that played an effective role in war (I shall discuss some complexities that arise with this notion below). More certainly, the navies of the classical period required unprecedented expense, mobilization, and training. The classical period saw an increase in military training and professionalism for land forces too. Some cities maintained elite professional units. Especially in the fourth century, mercenaries provided skilled auxiliary land troops to supplement the hoplites, still mainly citizen levies. The large and fully professional Macedonian army of Philip II and Alexander the Great, with its large cavalry, mercenary specialists, engineers, and siege train, represents the endpoint of this process of intensification and diversification in warfare.

The theory of 'progress' in warfare does explain a great deal. Most obviously, the resources devoted to war tended to increase. In contrast, technological advances can only sporadically be detected: most easily traced are the improvements in wall-construction during the fourth century, whose aim was to counter advances in siege tactics; the trireme was superior to the pentekonter and was outclassed by larger ships by the late fourth century; the Macedonian phalangite with his long *sarissa* was more effective than the traditional hoplite with his spear—but just barely. So, although the phalanx of Alexander would probably have made short work of any opposing army from the age of Homer, this would have been a matter more of numbers, organization, and training than of weaponry. After all, the Macedonians eventually went down before the Roman legion—that is, before soldiers armed with swords, also the weapon of choice in the Greek Dark Age.

The period of hoplite warfare is particularly puzzling. Rather than 'progress' or intensification, we have a period, from 650 to 350 BCE according to some estimates, dominated by a single way of fighting, and an extremely limited one at that: the 'hoplite contest'. In purely military terms, hoplites were effective soldiers on the agricultural plains of most importance to agrarian states (Holladay 1982). But to explain the long duration of, and the limits on, hoplite warfare, most scholars have turned to archaic culture and society rather than confining themselves to military goals and competition.

Victor D. Hanson, in particular, has shown convincingly and in detail that hoplite warfare suited, almost perfectly, the well-to-do, but not aristocratic, independent farmers who dominated archaic city-states (Hanson 1989, 1998). Invading armies provoked battle by threatening, or beginning to ravage, the standing grain. Hoplite campaigns took place during a slack period in what was otherwise a busy agricultural schedule, almost as if in order not to interfere with farming. Various rituals, such as the construction of a trophy and the return of the dead by the victors under truce, helped establish a clear winner of a battle. Thus they tended to prevent the continuation of warfare. The reluctance—or inability—of hoplites vigorously to pursue a defeated enemy also limited the cost of war.

Historians disagree about the extent to which hoplite warfare was limited and whether these limits were practical, moral, or ideological in nature. Since walled cities could rarely be stormed and the resources needed to besiege them seem to have been lacking, the relatively low stakes of archaic war—usually fought over some disputed borderlands—may help explain why states for so long resisted the pressure to intensify warfare. Cynics can also point out that most of our information about archaic hoplite battles comes from later periods, perhaps inclined to idealize a bygone era of fair fights (Krentz 2000, 2002). The hoplite farmers on both sides may also have felt more kinship with each other than with the aristocrats or the landless poor in their own city (Hanson 1999: 301). Their fellow-feeling, their cultural proclivity for, and their economic interest in, clear and decisive competition allowed the maintenance, over almost ten generations, of warfare that deserves to be called, if any war does, 'a wonderful, absurd conspiracy' (Hanson 1991*b*: 6).

A final and crucial reason for the limits and stability of hoplite warfare involves the political impact of military service. Hoplite farmers created and sustained a type of warfare that they themselves necessarily dominated (Ober 1991, 1994). This dominance confirmed the central role of hoplite farmers within the state. War involving raids throughout the year, defence of passes, and surprise attacks was as suited to the rough terrain of Greece and the close proximity of the warring states as was the set hoplite battle. But such a type of warfare would have given greater scope to horse-owning aristocrats or to light-armed soldiers, often recruited from a city's poor. The set and decisive battle ensured that the hoplites would monopolize warfare—and the claims to power that fighting for the state brought

with it. Since hoplite warfare, although brutal in its intensity, was limited in time, cost, and casualties, the hoplites bought these claims on the cheap.

Rather than explain the anomaly of hoplite warfare within a model of progress, some scholars take the opposite approach and seek rather a positive explanation for the explosion of military effort and innovation in the fifth century, and especially at Athens (e.g. Pritchard, forthcoming *b*). Pericles' innovative strategy of refusing to fight a hoplite battle against the Spartan forces in the Peloponnesian War is well known, but Athens also had a deliberate policy of improving its forces. The average archaic state relied on that military force which grew most organically from its society: the hoplite phalanx of middling farmers. But Athens created a military freed from such constraints, and consciously designed for effectiveness. Although Athens was a major trading power, the huge navies of the Athenian Empire were not a natural outgrowth of this. The construction and manning of a fifth-century navy of, say, 200 ships was the most complex and costly effort that any polis ever organized. The expansion of the Athenian navy was originally funded by mining profits. Later, state funding derived from tribute exacted throughout the Aegean was supplemented by trierarchies imposed on the richest Athenians. Few of the materials needed to build triremes were local: sails and rope required flax from the Near East, while wood needed to be imported from various areas in the north Aegean. Even the crews were not exclusively Athenian. They included slaves and a large proportion of mercenaries from throughout the empire and beyond (e.g. Graham 1992, 1998).

By the mid-fifth century the usefulness of cavalry had become obvious. The countryside of Attica did not support an aristocracy rich and populous enough to provide a potent cavalry, so the Athenian state conscripted cavalry from among the rich, subsidized the purchase of horses, and kept careful tabs on their condition and training (Bugh 1988; Spence 1993). Athens also established units of archers, horse archers, and light infantry specially trained to fight in conjunction with cavalry. In addition to optimizing its internal resources, Athens recruited mercenaries who possessed skills that the Athenians did not. In sum, the Athenian democracy was radical in its artificial and conscious attempts to optimize the military forces it had at its disposal.

With the establishment of democracy, the involvement of all male citizens in politics, and hence war, was one social and political factor in undermining traditions (Ober 1994). Cultural change also played a part. The classical Athenian tendency to systematize and rationalize affected everything from myth to rhetoric to medicine, government, and history. War was no exception. Rather than considering escalation and military advantage as a constant driving-force which can be constrained for limited periods—as theories of the hoplite contest hold—the long history of premodern warfare is arguably dominated by the long periods during which tradition holds sway and little changes. From this perspective, it is the periods and places of innovation—such as Athens in the fifth century—that require special explanation, and the explanation can be as much a cultural as a political or social one.

18.3. Military Determinism and the Hoplite Reform

Rather than seeking social, political, or cultural explanations for warfare, other historians have investigated the effect of frequent warfare and widespread military service on ancient Greece. A few theorists have given special attention to the role of warfare in the development of societies: 'Contrary to Marx, it is not only the "means of production" that shape human societies, but "the means of destruction" ' (Jack Goody, quoted in Ehrenreich 1997: 143; cf. 117–58, 175–93; Vagts 1959; Andreski 1968). But this approach to 'war and society' owes less to theoretical elaboration than to its plausibility to historians.

Warfare plays a role as the main subject of, or an important context for, much of Greek literature, art, philosophy, and history. It also permeated Greek culture in a more profound and insidious way. Within their constellation of values, Greeks put great stress on military service and prowess. Plato, for example, quite naturally used the hoplite, who steadfastly holds his assigned place at the cost of his life, as an analogy for the philosophic martyrdom of Socrates (Plato, *Apology* 28e). Not only sacrifice, but also prowess was highly valued. Hector's prayer for his infant son is a famous case. He prays that his son should rule over Troy, and continues (Homer, *Iliad* 6.479–81, trans. Lattimore):

> Some day let them say of him: 'He is better by far than his father,'
> as he comes in from the fighting; and let him kill his enemy
> and bring home the bloodied spoils, and delight the heart of his mother.

It was primarily Homeric epic that led A. W. H. Adkins to argue that, in a world so permeated with violence as was Greece, and especially the world of Homer, the 'competitive virtues' such as prowess in battle necessarily and always trumped the 'cooperative virtues' (Adkins 1960). Although scholars have criticized this as presenting a one-sided view of Greek and even Homeric morality (see Cairns 2001, with further bibliography at 203, n. 1), some connection between warfare, violence, and the Greek emphasis on 'competitive virtues' seems undeniable. If we turn to classical Athens, Kurt Raaflaub paints a compelling picture of the primacy of war and military glory in the material culture of that city (Raaflaub 2001). His work goes beyond a unidirectional focus on the influence of war on culture, since he shows also how such a culture made the Athenians more likely to go to war (cf. Hunt, forthcoming).

But it is the theory of the 'hoplite reform' that illustrates most vividly the attraction and the dangers of arguments for warfare's effects, in this case on politics. The essential idea of the 'hoplite reform', put forth by Anthony Andrewes in *The Greek Tyrants* (1956), is a simple one: a change in military technology led to a change in politics. The hoplite shield with its double grip was larger and heavier and thus provided better protection than its predecessors. Since it was less manoeuvrable,

hoplites could not protect themselves well individually and needed to adopt a dense formation. If this formation was not quickly to be outflanked and rendered useless, hoplite formations needed to be as large as possible.

These changes were military, but they had political effects. The poor still did not fight, since hoplite equipment was expensive; but when non-aristocratic, though still affluent, farmers took part in war, they were able to assert a role in politics. The new hoplite farmers possessed weapons, and their shared military service, even if it extended only to a few weeks every other summer, bonded them together more than any other activity in the archaic city could. Fighting in formation fostered the virtue of 'keeping one's place' instead of the Homeric ideal of 'fighting in front of the army'. This new virtue did not admit easily of superior or inferior grades. A non-hierarchical battlefield led to the egalitarian ideology which was a necessary precursor to democracy. Finally, and most directly, hoplites could deploy the argument that, since they too protected the city, they deserved respect and, in particular, a say in its government. This all relates to Greek tyranny, because it was the hoplites' support of popular tyrants that is held to have broken the power of birth-aristocracy.

The sweep and drama of this theory are hard to exaggerate. One can imagine an inventive, early-archaic armourer putting his forearm through the middle grip on a heavier, larger, and stronger shield, grasping firmly the second grip at the edge, and smiling: 'This will work much better.' Never could he imagine that he was setting Greece and the world on the course of constitutional government and democracy and all the developments of high culture that flourished in that setting. The political developments of the archaic period remain poorly attested and controversial, but modern cases where military participation led to political rights made the whole story persuasive. In addition, ancient texts from Homer to Aristotle linked a person's military participation to his political rights and seemed to prove the militaristic ideology behind the hoplites' putative claim to rights. Finally, the 'hoplite reform' helped to explain the development of an egalitarian ethos in a period in which there was precious little other evidence that could be brought to bear—and hence few alternative explanations. Nevertheless, the basic theory could be supplemented by, for example, the argument that the growing wealth that allowed more farmers to afford hoplite armour was an independent source of increased political power. The idea of mutual reinforcement, rather than a simple relation of cause and effect, was another appealing modification: archaic states fought in a way that suited hoplites, because hoplites controlled these states; they controlled the state in part because of their monopoly of military service and the power that came from it.

The devil, however, is in the details. Serious objections have been lodged against almost all of the steps in this sweeping argument. On the one hand, passages in Homer imply the participation of masses of poor and poorly armed soldiers before the putative hoplite reform; Homer's emphasis on duelling aristocrats may serve

his artistic purposes or his political ideology rather than reflecting a time when the tide of battle was determined by a few heroic men. Conversely, hoplite armies may have remained small in the archaic period. In sixth-century Athens, for example, the *zeugitai*, the hoplite class, may have included only a small group of rich farmers (van Wees 2006). Neither of these arguments is quite decisive, but we do not have independent evidence for the growth in military participation posited by the theory of the 'hoplite reform'. And, although one of that theory's main appeals is its ability to explain the participation of more of the population in archaic politics, that itself is disputed as more recent interpretations of tyrants see their genesis in aristocratic feuding rather than as popular bastions against the aristocracy (e.g. Forsdyke 2005: 30–78).

Most interestingly, in a series of important papers and now a book, Hans van Wees has shown how malleable and thus potentially nugatory claims to rights based on military service could be (van Wees 1995, 2001, 2004). For example, previous scholars had often pointed to an exhortation in Homer in which Glaukos tells Sarpedon that they have a duty to fight 'in the forefront of the Lykians' so that their people will admit that they deserve their perquisites as 'lords of Lykia' (*Iliad* 12.315–21). This appeal does imply that military service and privilege were linked already in the early archaic period. On a careful reading, however, it is not merely fighting, but fighting 'in the forefront' that carries weight. Other examples parallel this tendency to rank different types of military service (see Hunt 1998: 185–94). Thus, the subversive potential of military service could, in theory, be entirely negated if political and social power determined how such service was defined and ranked. For example, in the fifth century BCE slaves fought in the Corinthian, Corcyraean, Syracusan, and Athenian navies, but, except in the direst emergencies, they did not have any corresponding rights granted to them (Hunt 1998: 83–101; 2001).

This issue makes the argument that hoplite formations were intrinsically egalitarian crucial to the whole theory. While we do hear of the distinction between the first rank and the rest of the formation, and individual hoplites could earn prizes for their valour, hoplite warfare probably afforded less scope for distinction than did the more open formations depicted in Homer (van Wees 1994). So, upon reflection, I do not think that we need to throw the baby out with the bathwater: hoplites should indeed function best in large formations; if we look at long-term trends, it is clear that a far greater proportion of the population took part in war in the early classical than in the early archaic period; there was less opportunity for aristocrats to distinguish themselves in a tight formation; the argument that military service should bring rights is well attested—though not compelling—throughout Greek history. Historians will have to look more closely at other factors to explain the anti-elitist and eventually, in some places, the democratic direction of Greek politics, now that the 'hoplite reform' will bear less weight; but some degree of 'military determinism' still seems likely.

In the classical period, military determinism also plays a role in explaining political developments, in particular why all male citizens gained political rights rather than just the relatively wealthy hoplite farmers. Pseudo-Xenophon provides our best evidence. Although hostile to the poor, he concedes that 'it is right that the poor and the ordinary people there should have more power than the noble and the rich, because it is the ordinary people who man the fleet and bring the city her power' (*Constitution of the Athenians* 1.2, trans. Moore; cf. Thucydides 6.39.2). The whole dynamic behind this stream of political thought was well explored by Kurt Raaflaub: he describes the argument from their role in Athens' navy and empire as 'the only truly compelling and generally acceptable... justification of democracy and the status it accorded the lower-class citizens' (Raaflaub 1994: 144). Barry Strauss provides a fascinating complement to this approach. Rather than looking at political rhetoric or theory, he considers the day-to-day experiences of the *thetes* who manned Athenian triremes: for them the navy was a site of equality, order, power, and solidarity. Shared naval service 'made *demokratia* and *isonomia* and *eleutheria* into not merely slogans but living realities' (Strauss 1996: 320, 316; cf. Hanson 1996). The role of military service may not have amounted to determinism, but remains clear and important in classical political history.

18.4. Conclusion

No first principles can determine whether a particular connection between war and society will be a fruitful one for scholarly investigation—or even a plausible one. Some general observations are nevertheless possible, and some caveats worth keeping in mind. First, if some aspect of Greek life affects warfare, there is a chance that it is affected in its turn by war. A historian might decide to focus on one direction of cause and effect, but the possibility of the reverse should always be kept in mind. Secondly, ambitious scholars have linked warfare with the most apparently distant aspects of Greek life—with, for example, the way of life and thinking natural to those engaged in intensive agriculture (Hanson 1999: 219–318). Such theories can be bold in the connections they draw, but must be prudent about the weight to place on them: the importance of military virtues does not provide an exhaustive explanation of the *Iliad*, nor does Alexander's admiration of Achilles make it likely that the *Iliad* determined his battlefield tactics—such claims would exaggerate, implausibly, the arguments of Adkins (1960) and Lendon (2005) respectively. Thirdly, close scrutiny of even the obvious, and of apparently close and

natural links can be fruitful: the well-attested principle that military service brought prestige and rights, for example, turns out to have been open to interpretation and thus a matter of ideology rather than accepted fact.

Greek war and society were related, because the same people took part in and thought about them both. The relation of war and society was thus mediated by the symbolic systems with which they thought and by which they communicated: their culture, in the Geertzian sense (e.g. Geertz 1973*a*, *b*). On the one hand, this was why politics or literature—or even right-handedness and Pythagoreanism, according to Vidal-Naquet (1986)—could affect warfare and vice versa. On the other hand, the connective tissue of culture is elastic and slippery stuff: some relationships did not have a necessary and determining force even when it seems they ought to have had: military advantage did not always determine practice; military service sometimes did and sometimes did not bring prestige and political power.

Suggested Reading

Excellent, clear introductions to Greek land warfare include Anderson (1970), Hanson (1989), and Snodgrass (1999). An engaging introduction to naval warfare is provided by Morrison, Coates, and Rankov (2000). Pritchett (1971–91) encompasses meticulous studies of many aspects of Greek warfare.

Turning to 'war and society', Garlan (1975) is a classic treatment with a Marxian slant; while excellent surveys are to be found in Garlan (1994), Raaflaub (1999), van Wees (2000*c*). An entrée into the bibliography on the 'hoplite reform' can be found in van Wees (2004: 273, n. 5). Sundry valuable essays are to be found in Hanson (1991*a*), Rich and Shipley (1993), van Wees (2000*a*), and Chaniotis and Ducrey (2002). Chaniotis (2005) focuses on the connections between war, culture, and society during the Hellenistic period.

I would especially recommend three works for those interested in an entrée into recent scholarship: Lendon (2005) presents a bold argument for cultural, specifically epic, influence on the conduct of war, and includes almost thirty pages of annotated bibliography; van Wees (2004) is an iconoclastic work that subjects a variety of traditional views to searching criticism and also includes extensive bibliography. Sabin, van Wees, and Whitby (2007) contains authoritative chapters on most aspects of Greek warfare.

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CHAPTER 19

URBAN LANDSCAPE AND ARCHITECTURE

ROBIN OSBORNE

> The city of Chalcis has a circumference of 70 stades ... It is all hilly and shaded, and has many springs ... The city is well provided with public buildings, gymnasia, stoas, temples, theatres, pictures, statues, and an agora which is excellently situated for all trading purposes.
>
> (Austin 1981: no. 83, sec. 27)

THIS description, written in the third century BCE, provides a nice example of what a Greek expected of an urban landscape. The checklist operated by this unknown author (sometimes known as 'Heraclides Creticus') could be paralleled in many texts of the Hellenistic and Roman periods, but it is a checklist that would have made little sense earlier than the fifth, or in many cases the fourth, century BCE. Taking the individual items from 'Heraclides" list one by one and tracing their history reveals how the urban landscape developed and changed over time.

The only element in 'Heraclides" list which could be found in the Greece of the eighth century was the temple. Excepting the peculiar tenth-century 'heröon' at Lefkandi (Popham, Calligas, and Sackett 1993), which is in its function unlike anything else known, temples are the first buildings of discrete public and non-residential use which can be identified on Iron Age Greek sites, where, in a pattern which would long continue, domestic and craft activities seem often to have gone on side by side (as e.g. at eighth-century Oropos: Mazarakis-Ainian 2002).

Eighth-century temples come in a variety of forms and sizes, but are commonly apsidal-ended with thatched roofs (Coldstream 2003: 317–27 and 408–9).

From the very beginning, however, temples were not a distinctly urban phenomenon. We do know of temples in a number of Dark Age settlements, for instance at Karphi above the Lasithi plateau in central Crete (Wallace 2005: 260) and at Zagora on Andros, but eighth-century temples are found at the Samian Heraion and at Perachora, both of which are 'out-of-town' sanctuaries. These may indeed have marked the limits of the authority exercised by a town (Samos, across the plain at modern Pythagorio, in the first case, Corinth in the second), but they were not in any normal sense part of the 'urban landscape'.

One of the developments of the eighth century was the marking off of urban space. The earliest city wall we know of is from seventh-century Smyrna (Nicholls 1958–9: 124–8), but already in late eighth-century Athens the distribution of graves and cemeteries suggests reservation of an urban area for the living and the relegation of the dead to the extra-urban area (Morris 1987: ch. 4).

In the later part of the seventh century stone came to be adopted for temples, and with it the particular ordering of architectural elements which came to be known as the Doric order (and then subsequently the Ionic order). Stone temples were, once more, built both in towns, as with the temple of Apollo at Corinth, and in out-of-town sanctuaries, as with the Corcyra temple of Artemis or the temple of Hera at Olympia. Despite the heavy investment of labour required to construct a monumental stone temple, Greek cities were as ready to construct such temples outside as within their main settlements. In Ionia, as at Samos and Didyma, in Magna Graecia, as at Syracuse and Metapontum, and in mainland Greece itself alike, extra-urban sanctuaries continued throughout the archaic period to see the construction of temples which rivalled, in both size and elaboration of decoration, the temples of city *akropoleis*.

The introduction of stone and of the architectural orders revolutionized architecture. The various forms of eighth-century temple had in common that they required only very limited advanced planning. The use of stone, along with the introduction of the tiled roof (Winter 1993), made some degree of advanced planning essential. The development of the architectural orders meant that building design became a technical skill of great complexity. Because of the need, for aesthetic reasons, to have the triglyphs of the Doric frieze placed both directly over the columns and at the very corners of the building, achieving a regular distribution of triglyphs demanded an irregular spacing of columns (the corner column had to be closer to its neighbours), and this in turn demanded that the proportions of the stylobate, on which the columns stood, did not simply reproduce the proportions of the number of columns on façade and flank of the building (Coulton 1977: ch. 3). An architect therefore needed to have decided on the width of the triglyphs and metopes before beginning on the foundations of the temple. This was not a matter of sketching the final result—which would not yield accurate

enough measurements—but of conceiving the temple as a mathematical relationship between elements. There is indeed some reason to believe that, during the archaic and classical period, architects did not draw or model the final result at all, except in order to settle details, but rather thought through the building process, establishing the rules which would regulate the relationship of one part to another. Treatises by architects about particular temples are among the earliest prose works of which we have record.

The origin of the architectural orders remains mysterious (Barletta 2001). There is no doubt that the development of monumental stone sculpture in Greece was influenced by the monumental sculptures to be seen in Egypt, and it may be that the idea of the monumental stone temple came from the same source. But the details of the orders cannot derive from Egypt. We can trace back to antiquity (Vitruvius 4.2) the idea that the details of the Doric order derived from transferring into stone elements that had originally been made of wood, but in detail this idea is unconvincing. Recent scholars have preferred to see symbolic significance in the elements (Wilson Jones 2002).

The language of the orders and the convention of using them in very particular ways developed very rapidly. Major temples on the Greek mainland and in Magna Graecia from the late seventh century onward are almost all peripteral buildings in the Doric order, that is, they have columns on both flank and façade. In the islands of the Cyclades (and on Thasos, settled from the Cycladic island of Paros) a different form of Doric is found, with temples which have columns on the front façade only and are wider than they are long. In Ionia a quite different order was employed, the Ionic order, but the mainland preference for the peripteral temple is repeated—though some large temples here had not just one but two surrounding colonnades (so-called 'dipteral').

Temples seem to have been home to cult statues back into the eighth century (statues, perhaps of Apollo, Artemis, and Leto, beaten out of bronze, survive from the temple of Apollo at Dreros). These became more elaborate during the archaic period (remains of gold and ivory statues have been excavated at Delphi: Lapatin 2001), and at the same time stone sculptures were added to temple buildings, both placed in the pediments and carved in relief on metopes.

By this time, temples were not alone in sanctuaries. They had often been joined by a profusion of more or less monumental stone statues (cf. Ducat 1971), by small temple-like buildings erected to house and keep safe dedications, and by stoas. Stoas were long, narrow structures placed normally along the edge of a sanctuary, with a continuous colonnade at the front and a plain wall at the back. They posed architectural problems of their own—problems of maximizing access and of providing internal supports for the roof that were taller than the external colonnade but not larger in bulk. (Similar problems arose inside the cella of temples.) Stoas were multi-purpose structures, suitable for housing either people or things, so that they could be used for meetings or storage alike. The earliest known stoas

date to the end of the seventh century, at which time monumental stoas more than 60 metres long were built in the sanctuaries of Hera at Argos and Samos, and smaller, but still sometimes substantial, stoas across the Greek world—from Didyma and Smyrna in the east to Foce del Sele and Megara Hyblaia in the west (Coulton 1976).

For our purposes, the most interesting of these stoas are those at Megara Hyblaia (De Angelis 2003: 25–8). In terms of their architectural detail these are not well known, but one thing about them is certain: they were placed on two sides of the open space which seems to have been reserved as an agora from the foundation of the city in the eighth century. These stoas represent the first monumentalizing of civic, as opposed to religious, space of which we are aware. In place of simply providing space for communal activities, Megara Hyblaia begins to shape that space and to offer more specific, if flexible, facilities. From this point on, provision of stoas in agoras slowly became general.

The remodelling of the agora at Megara Hyblaia, which seems to have involved some demolition of private houses, heralded a much more radical remodelling of civic space, which can be seen in particular in a number of Sicilian cities (Di Vita 1990). One of the best-known examples is Selinus, where in 580–570 BCE the original seventh-century settlement was completely replanned, with two separate grids meeting at a trapezoidal agora (De Angelis 2003: 132–4). The desire for regularity at Selinus extended so far that in streets close to the agora the buildings seem to have been given a completely uniform façade, although what is built behind differs in plan, implying centralized control of the street frontage.

Equally drastic remodelling of the city took place in the later sixth century at Akragas and in the fifth century at Sicilian Naxos and at Himera, where we know that the remodelling corresponded to major breaks in the political history (Di Vita 1990: 357). Hieron, tyrant of Syracuse, removed the inhabitants of Sicilian Naxos from the city in 476 BCE, transplanting them to Leontini, and this presumably provided the *carte blanche* that enabled the complete replanning of the settlement. Similarly at Himera, the replanning seems to coincide with the control of the city by Theron of Akragas, who repopulated the city.

There has been some speculation that in some new settlements abroad, including Megara Hyblaia (Tréziny 1999), there may have been equal distribution of land from the beginning. A rectilinear grid plan had the potential for making such equal division of urban space clear and public. In the fifth century the most famous of all Greek town-planners, Hippodamos, who is credited (not entirely plausibly) with the regular grid plans of both the Piraeus and Rhodes, became particularly interested in the social engineering effected by town-planning. Aristotle, in *Politics* Book 2, discusses Hippodamos' political views, though exactly how his division of his ideal city between three groups, skilled workers, farmers, and soldiers, and his division of the territory into three parts, sacred, public, and private, were reflected in his town-planning remains unclear (see Cahill 2002: ch. 1).

One further reflection of the way in which the urban landscape became politicized during the sixth century lies in the provision of specific spaces for the meeting of the city population. The town of Metapontum acquired a wooden theatral structure shortly after 600 BCE, and replaced this with a stone version some fifty years later (Carter 2006: 198–9). This structure, which has become known as the *ekklēsiastērion*, could seat some 8,000 people. Exactly how it was used is unclear, but that the need was felt for such a building implies that major public meetings were a significant part of the life of the town.

No structures specifically designed for public meetings are known from the Greek mainland in the archaic period, but it is at the end of the sixth century that we have our first evidence for the building of theatres. What the theatre looked like in which the earliest dramatic competitions at the Festival of Dionysus in Athens took place is unclear because of subsequent rebuilding, but in the village of Thorikos in southern Attica the remains of the theatre, which was long and thin, rather than circular, date from the end of the sixth century (Mussche 1998: 29–34). This theatre has a temple of Dionysus at its north end, suggesting that it was primarily a site of festal activity rather than of political assembly, although what the nature of that activity will have been *c*.500 BCE is uncertain.

Not all the provisions of the agora facilitated political or religious activities. It is to the sixth century that we can date the earliest fountain houses. At Corinth a number of springs were provided with substantial spring houses (Crouch 1993), and the *Enneakrounos* ('Nine fountain') spring house in the Ilisos valley, not far from the temple of Olympian Zeus, was part of the upgrading of Athenian provisions undertaken by the tyrant Peisistratos (Camp 2001: 36–7). These developments may have been related to increasing population pressure and the unreliability of the wells which had been employed earlier. Painters of Athenian black-figure pottery, who produced large numbers of three-handled water jars (*hudriai*) decorated with scenes of fetching water from a fountain, suggest that one thing that fountain houses brought about was new opportunities for social encounter as members of different households met to fill their pots under the several spouts.

By the beginning of the fifth century, therefore, most of the elements which 'Heraclides' notes in third-century Chalcis could have been found in some Greek city or other. The one structure that has not featured in our account so far is the gymnasium. Gymnasia are something of a puzzle (Delorme 1960; Glass 1988). Classical Greeks certainly assumed that gymnasia had been part of the city from time immemorial. Laws about behaviour in the gymnasium are attributed to Solon (*c*.600 BCE) by the fourth-century orators Aeschines and Demosthenes. The athletic competitions at the Olympic, Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian games, all well established by the middle of the sixth century, must have happened in some protected location—throwing javelins and discuses posed significant dangers to life—although in Athens the Agora seems to have been cleared to hold the Panathenaic games there. But no good archaeological evidence for the existence of gymnasia

has been uncovered, despite excavation on the site of the Academy at Athens. One reason for this may well be that many gymnasia were little more than open spaces surrounded by trees or a hedge. The wall round the Academy constructed by Hipparchus, son of Peisistratos, became proverbial for its expense. Given the large circumference of gymnasia, any form of constructed enclosure was a major undertaking.

Gymnasia remain invisible through the fifth century, although literary mentions of all sorts occur, both at Athens and elsewhere. When the politician Cimon wanted to upgrade the facilities at the gymnasium of the Academy in Athens, he did so by planting olive trees, not by any building activity (Plutarch, *Cimon* 13). The earliest monumental gymnasia and palaistras which survive are those from the great sanctuary sites—Olympia, Delos, and so on. It is only in the Hellenistic period that monumental gymnasia become a feature of the normal urban landscape, as at Priene.

It is a striking feature of the elements discussed above that they are all primarily features of the sanctuary rather than the city at large. Until elaborated with stoas—and at Athens this did not happen in the classical Agora until into the fifth century—the agora was essentially an open space. Theatres were part of sanctuary provision, used in association with religious festivals, not spaces for secular entertainment. The *ekklēsiastērion* did not catch on at all widely: Athenian democracy seems first to have been carried out in meetings held in the Agora, and even when it moved to the Pnyx hill it acquired little in the way of built facilities until the end of the fifth century, and only became monumentalized in the fourth century. Statues too were a feature not of public space generally, but of sanctuaries and cemeteries.

The urban landscape of *c.*500 BCE, therefore, was for almost all Greek mainland cities a landscape in which, within a city wall, unplanned and unregulated domestic houses of irregular plan, built of mud brick, formed clusters divided by open spaces, some of which were devoted to public use, and visually dominated by one or more great sanctuaries featuring substantial stone temples and perhaps a monumental gateway or an associated theatre. The cities of Magna Graecia presented something of a contrast, since their regular street plans immediately identified the city as unlike smaller settlements, and uniform street façades may have presented shocking uniformity, but even in a city like Selinous the urban landscape was dominated by the sanctuaries, where the buildings were on a different scale as well as contrasting in form.

The history of the classical urban landscape is in many respects a history of competition between the different elements. Athens itself never lost the old-fashioned feel given to it by its warren of streets: 'Heraclides' himself comments that the streets 'are narrow and winding, since they were built long ago'. He goes on: 'a stranger would find it hard to believe that this was the famous city of Athens'—would, that is, until he sees the Parthenon and the theatre of Dionysus. Not that Athens had neglected to upgrade its secular facilities. The classical Agora, an area

left largely open in the archaic period and probably not the centre of civic life until the end of the sixth century, was gradually built up with purpose-built civic facilities (Camp 1986: ch. 4). A council chamber for the democratic council of 500, a round Tholos for the council's standing committee of fifty *prutaneis*, a small stoa for the use of the *arkhōn basileus*—all these were built along the west side of the agora in the early fifth century. There followed a further stoa, with paintings—something which seems to have been a new rage, given the more-or-less contemporary Knidian meeting-room at Delphi and the picture gallery incorporated into the Propylaea of the Athenian Acropolis a little later—and then an elaborate marble stoa with wings, the stoa of Zeus Eleutherios, and a long stoa (South Stoa I) almost all the way along the south side of the Agora. Statues also appeared—the statues of the tyrannicides Harmodios and Aristogeiton in the Agora, herms to commemorate the victory of Cimon at Eion on the Strymon nearby, near yet another stoa. But this development of the landscape of the Agora was quickly overshadowed by the building of the marble temple of Hephaestus in the middle of the century above the west side of the Agora, and even more by the all-marble buildings put up on the Acropolis—the octastyle Parthenon, carefully just exceeding the new temple of Zeus at Olympia in its dimensions, with its unprecedented wealth of sculpture (pediments *and* all metopes *and* interior friezes), the elaborate Propylaia, and then the irregular Erechtheum, providing a visual gateway to the Acropolis for those in the Agora, and the little temple of Athena Nike, both with continuous sculpted friezes and both in the Ionic order, bringing a quite new architectural language to Athens (Hurwit 1999: chs. 7–9).

It is not simply that the buildings of the Acropolis were larger, more elaborate, more colourful (including use of dark grey limestone along with marble in the Propylaea and Erechtheum), and more architecturally innovative. The Acropolis also dominated the civic landscape in the fifth century because it laid claim to all the records of civic life. It was on the Acropolis that the city marked its military victories most emphatically—for instance, with the colossal bronze statue of Athena Promachos—and it was on the Acropolis that the decisions of the people and the records of empire were on display (e.g. on the massive stone on which the allies' contributions of a quota of their tribute to Athena were recorded).

From the end of the fifth century there was some change. When the law-code was reinscribed, it was displayed in the Agora. The people took to honouring their own citizens and foreigners with statues, and these statues began to be placed in the Agora. A new council house left the old council house to be used for archives, and the records of civic decisions were now all accessible in the Agora. The Acropolis was essentially neglected, with no new constructions at all in the fourth century. During Lycurgus' period of influence, when the Athenians built more than they had since the time of Pericles, there was reconstruction of the theatre of Dionysus and work on the Telesterion at Eleusis, but the emphasis was on civic not sacred buildings—a stadium just outside the walls at Ardettos, the monumentalization of

the Pnyx, as well as some further building in the Agora (Hintzen-Bohlen 1997). What is more, after a period in the fifth century when the Athenians seem to have denied themselves elaborate funerary monuments, the Kerameikos cemetery was adorned throughout the fourth century with a whole series of private monuments—relief stelai, free-standing sculptures, figures in shrine-like frames—all raised above ground level, which left what Thucydides in the fifth century already described as 'the most beautiful suburb of Athens' even more striking to behold.

As 'Heraclides'' comment shows, the fourth-century building activity left the Athenians with an urban landscape in which the Parthenon remained dominant. But in other cities the pattern was different. Regular street grids turned domestic quarters from quaint private areas to part of the public face of the city. In a city like Olynthus, massively enlarged *c.*430 BCE and abandoned in 348 after attack by Philip of Macedon, the regular grid plan and large house plots made the domestic housing itself a dominating feature of the city, or at least of the lower city (Cahill 2002). So too the city of Priene, re-founded in the middle of the fourth century, displayed its egalitarian housing as almost as much a landscape feature as its central area of public buildings or its imposing natural acropolis. The temple of Athena dominated the central public space both because it was raised on a platform and because of the elaborateness of its architecture and sculpture, but the large agora surrounded by a massive hall and by stoas provided an effective counterbalance.

Every Greek city was different. The urban landscape was formed by the accumulation of historical decisions upon the natural features that selected the place as worth settling in the first place. Those historical decisions were heavily influenced by economics and technology, but they were also influenced by ideology. It is no accident that the innovative architecture of the archaic period was devoted to temples and sanctuaries, nor that interest in planning towns as a whole began in young communities which had to sort out their own constitutional arrangements largely unencumbered by history, and was carried on in explicitly political terms. Whatever ideological commitment it might advertise, however, the urban landscape imposed little constraint on its inhabitants. Regularly planned Sicilian cities proved receptive to tyranny, and Athenian democracy seems never to have been threatened by its winding streets or dominant Acropolis. As 'Heraclides'' description of Chalcis perhaps implies, a good water supply and being well placed for trade had more impact on urban life than architecture and urban planning.

Suggested Reading

A straightforward, if now slightly dated, description of the Greek city by building type is provided by Wycherley (1962). The history of Greek town-planning is outlined by Owens (1991). The process and problems of Greek architecture are well described by Coulton (1977).

Recent scholars have been reluctant to grapple with the details of individual buildings, and the richest sources of data and descriptions remains Dinsmoor (1950). By contrast, domestic housing, little discussed in this chapter, has received much recent attention; see esp. Hoepfner and Schwandner (1994), and Nevett (1999). For individual sites mentioned in the text see Stillwell (1976).

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CHAPTER 20

THE CITY AS MEMORY*

JOHN MA

How do you remember who you are—rather than exist as a collection of contingent moments and *ad hoc* reactions? The question gains urgency, when applied not to an individual, whose consciousness gives the illusion of continuity, but to a human group, made up of individuals but existing beyond their lifespan. 'The collective memory of democratic Athens', 'the shared consciousness of the polis'—are these any more than pompous modern fictions? Stories of origins offered one solution: mythical founders, colonial accounts. Hence the particular attention paid to such foundation stories, and the 'human family' of poleis these stories interwove. Place offered another way of perpetuating identity: foundation myths were attached to specific events, in specific locales. The polis is not simply (about) men (and women), but also about place: a specific territory with its landmarks and settlements, a specific town. However, place is not a natural given, but a human construct: hence it is open to monumentalization. By this term I do not designate size or quality of works, but the deliberate creation of places, buildings, artistic works, that themselves make memory, thus reaffirming identity in the present, and pass it on to the future. Identity is also found in more diffuse 'places of memory', to use the concept developed by the French historian of French national identity, Pierre Nora: ritual, stories, gestures, spaces: French cuisine, the *Marseillaise*, the *Grand Dictionnaire Larousse* are such 'places of memory'.

* This chapter was written in Greece (with support in the form of a Philip Leverhulme Prize, for which I thank the Leverhulme Foundation). Twenty-first century Athens is a wonderful place to ponder the paradoxes involved in constructing collective identity and memory. It is true the experience may not always support my argument about constant self-awareness; it certainly inspired the sense, which informs the end of the chapter, that the processes involved are not always benign. In fond remembrance of Evangelos Martzavos (1915–2008).

20.1. Places of Memory

Here are three examples of communities remembering who they were. In 306 BCE the Colophonians explicitly declared the link between a programme of urbanism with their historical identity (69 Maier):

> With good fortune and for the safety of the whole people of the Colophonians, let it be resolved by the people to build a wall to join to the present city the ancient city—which, after the gods gave it to our ancestors, the latter founded, building temples and altars at the same time, with the result that they became famous among all the Greeks.

The hyper-modern fortifications of Colophon were part of a patriotic project of recovering the glorious past of Colophon; the project was emphasized through collective religious rite, an appeal to individual donations, and the celebratory, monumental forms of epigraphical publication. A decade or so later, the Colophonians vainly resisted Lysimachus' decision to empty Colophon to supply population for his new foundation, Arsinoe (Ephesus), *c.*294. The Colophonians were duly incorporated, but not before burying their war dead in a *poluandrion*, a mass grave. Later, they regained their existence as polis, but Old Colophon, joined in union with Colophon-on-Sea (Notion), gradually waned as an urban site, in favour of its maritime partner town and the shrine of Apollo Klarios.

There are other cases of communities linking their rebirth, survival, or expansion with physical shape. There are some particularly dramatic and well-documented cases: for instance, the re-founding of Thebes (sacked by Alexander in 335, and re-created by Cassander in 316—this is almost certainly the date when the Lion Monument at Chaeronea was set up over the bodies of Thebans who fell in battle against the Macedonians in 338, two decades earlier); the struggle of the city of first-century BCE Abdera, aided by its mother-city Teos, to defend its freedom, as embodied by 'the circuit of the walls, the agora, and the temples of the gods'; or the difficult *palingenesia* of Heraclea Pontica, sacked and deprived of its famous artworks. The case of early Hellenistic Colophon is of particular interest, because the attempt at creating a physical expression of an enduring, powerful, historically embedded civic identity was not particularly successful: what remains clear is the articulacy and deliberation with which the project was laid out, and preserved as narrative: monumentalization as *mise-en-scène*, as political gesture.

Equally instructive is the honorific statue of a tyrannicide, Philites, at Erythrae Next to the statue stood a stele bearing two decrees, dating to the early Hellenistic period (*SIG*^{3} 284: *c.*300 BCE or slightly later?):

> Resolved by the council and the people; proposal of Zoilus son of Chiades. Since the oligarchs removed the sword from the likeness produced by the statue of Philites the tyrant-slayer, in the belief that the pose of the statue was entirely directed against them; in order that the people be seen to take great care of, and to remember, those living or dead who have

done good to it; with good fortune, be it resolved by the people: let the *exetastai* in office contract out the work, after making an inquest with the (public) architect, in order that the statue be restored as it was before; let the monthly treasurer serve their needs; and let the *agoranomoi* take care that the statue be free from patina and crowned always on the first day of the month and on the other holidays.

(The second decree concerns the question of how to pay for the maintenance and the crowns—not trivial matters, but the public enactment of democratic values of accountability and transparency, in contrast to the oligarchical secrecy.) The honorific statue of a tyrannicide was considered so potent that an oligarchy tried to neutralize it by removing its characteristic attribute, the avenging sword, in the hope that the statue would simply become another artwork. The restored democracy made a point of restoring the statue very openly, mobilizing public institutions such as magistrates and civic finance: the inquest concerning the 'pose' of the sword would make citizens remember, in their bodies, the appearance of the statue—of course I remember, Philites swung his sword just *so*—thus actualizing the power of the statue to reproduce itself as paradigm of the good citizen. The restored democracy also invented new habits and rituals, the regular cleaning of the statue and its crowning, to make it present among festive, crown-wearing crowds of citizens and visitors, reaffirming the potency of the statue and the stories it embodied.

Similar (if often less dramatic) stories could be found in the agora (market square) or civic shrines of any Greek polis after 200 BCE: honorific portraits for civic benefactors were clustered around prominent images (such as cult-statues of gods) and landmarks, or arrayed in series in front of porticoes and pathways. These monuments were explicitly meant to make visible the political culture of *eukharistia*, the relations of 'good graces' between the community and its prominent citizens (or foreign friends), the benefactors (*euergetai*) who strove to 'do good' to the city. The dominant narrative was one of services performed and of honorific requital, which affirmed the equivalence between concrete services (diplomatic, financial...) and symbolic honours. The multiplication of statues showed the pervasiveness of civic political culture, and the ways in which this culture acted to ensure the social reproduction of a particular type of human being, the good citizen. This message was emphasized by the particular forms of inscription that served as captions or as accompanying narratives for honorific statues, by their spatial arrangement, and by the stereotyped visual vocabularies used to represent the benefactors. The pervasiveness of *eukharistia* is shown by the way in which the statues of the Eponymous Heroes, or 'retrospective' statues of culture heroes such as Pindar or Epimenides, all in the Agora at Athens, were at some point interpreted as honorific statues.

Monument invents and perpetuates collective identity, by constructing and manipulating memory and truths. What is striking about the examples summarized

above is the explicit recording of the constructedness of the meanings attached to monuments. The polis should not be imagined as a 'traditional' environment, where memory was lived and experienced unproblematically and unthinkingly—the 'Tevye fallacy', to borrow a concept from the musical *Fiddler on the Roof* (where, in any case, the belief in the grip of tradition exists side by side with violent dislocation of family and residence). Pierre Nora, in the introduction to the collection on 'places of memory' in modern France (Nora 1984–92), contrasted 'traditional', living, authentic memory with the constructedness of 'modern' memory. Whether traditional memory ever existed must remain doubtful; what matters here is that the polis invented 'places of memory' to fulfil political purposes.

The citizens of Colophon or Erythrae created, by deliberate acts, 'social memory', lived mediums of memory of precisely the type which Nora would see as traditional. A striking illustration of the deliberate construction of social memory is the whole array of places and gestures deployed by the citizens of Teos, in honour of the Seleucid king Antiochus III and his queen, Laodice III, when the city was taken into Seleucid control again around 203 BCE. They erected cult-statues of Antiochus and Laodice III in the temple of Dionysus; they also set up a statue of the king in the council house, as well as a monumental sacred fountain named after Laodice in the agora. The council house with its new statue lay at the centre of civic rituals: magistrates on taking up office offered sacrifices to the king, Memory, and the Graces (*Kharites*); the ephebes (that is, the young citizens upon their entrance into adulthood: cf. Calame in this volume), in a new *rite de passage*, crowned the statue and offered sacrifice, as did the city's finest, its victorious athletes; a priest of the king made sure that the statue was crowned with offerings from the season's agricultural produce. Likewise, the fountain house of Laodice provided water for public sacrifices, but also private nuptial rites. The Teians thus re-engineered crucial parts of their institutional, monumental, and social landscape to perform important functions: to communicate loyalty to the ruler, but also to configure their symbolical world to make sense of the present political situation. History was dealt with through the deployment of ritual, place, and memory. Yet this memorial environment, carefully crafted at one go, soon became obsolete, when Seleucid power collapsed in Asia Minor after defeat by the Roman republic in 190 BCE. The inscription recording the invention of ritual was discarded, and the rituals probably ceased. In other cases, traces of ruler cult survived, as in Smyrna where Seleucid month-names persisted long after the end of Seleucid rule. Robert (1966: 15), rather earnestly, interpreted this as proof of depth and sincerity of gratitude; his point was to demonstrate the seriousness of the phenomenon of ruler cult. But we could also see the persistence of Seleucid traces in its Smyrnian context, where they became signs of the city's past, and hence its success and continuity in time (beyond its relation with the Seleucid rulers, which eventually, and not at all coincidentally, turned hostile): they formed what Paul Veyne (1971) called *histoire-joyau*, nuggets

from an increasingly remote past, whose existence gave antiquarian pleasure and a sense of self. Another example of the processing of political history into *histoire-joyau* is the long sequence of public sacrifices at Erythrai, as documented on an inscribed calendar. The calendar of sacrifices commemorates important events and historical characters in Erythraean and even world history (Alexander or the Seleucid kings), but on anniversary days, and hence in an oddly jumbled, non-linear sequence which offers fragments of history rather than the context and narrative of high-political history, within which Erythrae was not a great player.

Social memory allowed the polis to present stories about itself, and thus make itself seen, and hence evident: it was constitutive of the collective subject. These constructions, without necessarily being lies, always entailed selectivity and forgetfulness—which imply a form of collective subjectivity. In the case of early Hellenistic Colophon, they recast their identity in terms of continuity with the glorious days of the archaic city, omitting (for instance) the difficult, bloody, and strife-ridden relations between Colophon and Notion, which one day were to tear the 'bipolar' polis apart. In the case of Teos, any form of violence in the relation between ruler and ruled is masked by the repeated and obvious monumental truths of *eukharistia*.

In the polis, memory remained open to constant reworking: honorific statues could be moved or re-inscribed; complex rituals meant to enshrine collective visions of the past and to restate communal identity, such as the money distributions, historical-mythological pageant, and festivities set up by the donor L. Vibius Salutaris in Roman Ephesus (first century CE), could be emended without qualms by the city. The rituals of ruler-cult, illustrated by Seleucid Teos (but also many other cases), show how willing a polis was to tinker with essential constituent parts. In Roman-era Athens, famous monuments were transformed: the Acropolis was a privileged spot for statues honouring the emperor (and the Parthenon itself re-inscribed in honour of Nero); the seating of the theatre of Dionysus was encumbered with thirteen statues in honour of Hadrian. Rather than deploring such gestures as servile and decadent, we should see real, meaningful choices by communities—and also the underlying message that a city's past monuments were its own to rework. The ongoing construction of memory meant that there were no sacred cows for the polis as living community.

To realize this is perhaps to discover the capacity for past communities and individuals to live with the 'inkling of bad faith' (for the concept cf. again Veyne 1971) which modernity all too often assigns exclusively to itself. We might go further, and wonder if constructedness is not the whole point: ritual, memory, and monument were lived as if they were timeless and pervasive, but by historical actors who were aware, constantly if mutedly, of the constructed and plastic nature of memory—such as the Colophonians celebrating sacrifices as they reconquered their past through modern urbanism. The preservation of certain

ancient monuments or buildings within later buildings functions in an analogous way. At Thasos, the seventh-century BCE monument set up for Glaucus, one of the original colonists, was preserved inside a Roman-era stoa (and in fact was probably reassembled as the ground level rose); at Xanthos, a Hellenistic-era temple was built around and enshrined an ancient Lycian temple. Such phenomena are not just about 'religious scruple' or 'respect for tradition': they are antiquarian, and the combination of very ancient and contemporary is a statement or a *mise-en-scène*.

20.2. A History of the Polis as Memory

The focus in the previous section has been on the post-classical polis. The question is whether the traits analysed above—the centrality of the constructedness of memory in the city—are typical of the Hellenistic and Roman periods, and reflect mutations in the nature of the polis. Can they be considered simply as the sign of a deeply changed culture, characterized by post-classical nostalgia and *morbidezza* because of the loss of autonomy and agency? To answer this question, a history of 'places of memory' is necessary.

Late classical Athens (*c*.350–322 BCE) provides a fascinating case of a community reinventing itself in terms of an idealized past: the phenomenon took its most striking forms in the time of the politician Lycurgus (after the Athenian defeat by Philip II at Chaeronea in 338), but starts earlier. Important sites were restored or monumentalized, such as the Altar of the Twelve Gods (an ancient cult-place in the Athenian Agora, and the conceptual centre from which all distances in Attica were measured); the Pnyx (the main meeting-place of the assembly, which was delineated by a massive retaining wall in a unique and peculiar 'fake-ancient' style of enormous rough blocks assembled with archaic-looking joints); the theatre of Dionysus (which was massively extended and decorated with portrait statues of the greatest three tragedians, long deceased: Aeschylus, Euripides, Sophocles). The dramatic works of these poets were standardized, thus constituting a canon (which we still live by when it comes to ancient Greek tragedy) and restaged. As Calame describes (in this volume), military service for the ephebes was formalized, involving service in the forts of Attica and a final graduation ceremony. The oath pronounced by the ephebes has been found inscribed on a stele above the oath supposedly uttered by the Greeks at the battle of Plataea in 479. This latter is a forgery, or a 'reconstructed' historical document, a typical cultural production of Athens in this period: the famous decree purporting to record the Athenian decisions before the historical battle of Salamis in 480, but found only in an early

third-century inscription, is certainly such a fake document, 'reconstructed' from literary sources.

Late classical Athenian antiquarianism took many forms. Scholarship and historiography, or monuments, are obvious examples; the investment of state income in a great fleet of 400 ships of the line and the careful inscription of details pertaining to naval financing and administration are forms of 'public antiquarianism', recalling the glories of fifth-century imperial Athens. This late classical fleet (in fact twice as large as the fleet of imperial Athens, and far exceeding the real manpower capacity of post-Chaeronea Athens) is a good example of a 'place of memory' as defined by Nora.

The widespread refashioning of late classical Athens to correspond to the image or idea it had of itself should not be considered as paralysing nostalgia. The period is characterized by vibrant, diverse, flexible, and effective democratic institutions and discourses; Athens' monumental memories led to assertive foreign policy and resilience in the face of foreign oppression. The real question is that of specificity and rupture: how unique was late classical Athens? Do its cultural practices of monumentalizing and self-fashioning through memory usher in the post-classical practices of constructing and reworking identity and memory?

In spite of the specificity of late classical Athens and the undoubted changes in the broad historical context of the post-classical ages, I would like to argue for basic continuities. The history of the classical and archaic poleis shows many examples of deliberate construction of memory and identity. For instance, after 369 BCE the newly founded city of Messene, freed from three centuries of Spartan domination, needed to invent a whole set of traditions and monuments to embody a communal identity which it had to claim had never been lost: this inventiveness left a noticeable mark in the political culture of the city in the Hellenistic period, when individual heroism occupied peculiar prominence in the commemorative and monumental landscape. Another fourth-century example is the 'reconstructed' document purporting to be the original oath of the Theran settlers of Cyrene, no doubt the same sort of forgery as those produced in late classical Athens. In the fifth century, imperial and democratic Athens provides a rich test-case. To focus on a single site, the classical Acropolis was a 'place of memory' in the modern sense. The column drums of a temple destroyed when the Persians captured the city in 480 were built into a prominent terrace wall on the north side of the Acropolis. The great Periclean temple presented an iconographic summary of Athenian myth and of democratic ideology. It also enfolded, within its columns, a tiny chapel and altar, an ancient cultic building preserved within the modern, just like the Hellenistic and Roman examples mentioned earlier; likewise, the wall of the Nike bastion allowed a view, through windows, of Mycenaean structures. Classical Sparta, with its constant invention of tradition (dominated by the figure of the mythical lawgiver

Lycurgus) to cover adaptation, would provide another fascinating test-case for the construction of identity through memory.

To go back further in time, the sixth-century Peloponnese provides interesting examples of the manipulation of myth, shrine, and festival by the competing actors, the poleis of Corinth, Sparta, Argos, Sikyon. The phenomenon of constructing identity and memory might be traced all the way back to the emergence of the polis, in such memorial gestures as hero-cult in Mycenaean tombs, widespread in eighth-century Greece, or the communal takeover of the tombs of prominent families, as can be seen in late eighth-century or early seventh-century Eretria and Naxos.

The point of this 'fast rewind' though Greek history as the history of memory is to suggest that, for the polis, collective memory was never a given but, by its nature, a creation, political in nature and in function. The concept of 'places of memory' is useful for the study of the polis throughout its history—with all the bad faith, contestedness, and selectivity which the concept implies. Memory was constructed: in turn, it played an important role in constituting community, alongside other, well-studied processes such as power-sharing, deliberation, internal conflict, external aggression, inclusion and exclusion, problem resolution, social bargaining, value negotiation, and decision-taking. Making things up, or making oneself up, were essential to the polis. Remembrance was performative: in other words, the question was not 'how do you remember who you are?' but 'how can you be that which you remember?'

20.3. Approaching Memory

To approach 'collective memory' and the Greek city, this chapter has chosen to look at test-cases, rather than try to define the concept theoretically (as Halbwachs 1952 or Ricoeur 2000 have done). The central postulate has been the applicability of Nora's notion of 'places of memory' to the ancient Greek city throughout its history. The 'cold', anthropological city of ritual, image, and monument is in fact a fiction invented by the 'hot' city of politics and history. (The dichotomy is due to Loraux 1997.)

The malleability of memory probably did not preclude emotional involvement, doublethink, selective forgetfulness, or even sincerity from the participants. The particular evidence I have privileged in this chapter, the epigraphical documents, record moments of memory-making (as in Teos in 203 BCE), but should also make us think of the way in which repetition and monumentality could help to embed meanings: the yearly reading-out of particularly important decrees at assembly

meetings, or the constant viewing of inscribed documents in prominent spots, illustrate the process.

One way, then, to view the construction of memory in Greek communities would be as an act of creativity within a common project, as we have seen in the case of late classical and Hellenistic Athens, but also of classical and archaic communities—a creativity central to the notion of the Greek city-state. The city as memory could perhaps be viewed as a public, multi-generational work of art (as Dow 1950: 54 terms the Athenian democratic polis).

But the risk here is to let a sense of agency—celebratory, as so often when studying the polis—crowd out any awareness of power and competition at work in the construction of memory. The monumental record of shrines shows us an ecology of competition between a variety of actors: this is spectacularly noticeable at great Panhellenic shrines such as Olympia or Delphi, but also at a smaller shrine such as the Amphiaraion near Oropus, where from the fourth century onwards foreign kings, foreign cities, the Boeotian League, the city of Oropus, and aristocratic families of Oropus all competed to leave monumental and epigraphical traces in a restricted space (the north side of the esplanade between the temple and the theatre). Within cities, the construction of memory may have been the means or the prize in power struggles or personal agendas. Again, the story of Athens may bear rethinking in terms of competing political personalities (without having to return to a 'great-man' or 'political parties' mode of historiography). This should act as an invitation to consider that 'collective memory', like other products of the Greek city, may have to be read against the grain.

Suggested Reading

On memory in ancient Greece see Finley (1965 and 1971), Loraux (1997), Alcock (2002). On 'sites of memory' see, in addition to Nora (1984–92), Anderson (1991).

The fortifications of Colophon are treated, movingly, in Robert and Robert (1989: 81–3), where the civic dimension of the Colophonians' urban project is evoked. For parallels see, on Thebes, Knoepfler (2001) (I will study the Chaeronea Lion in a forthcoming article in *JHS*); on Abdera (and *SEG* 47.1646), Marek (1997); on Herakleia, Memnon of Heraclea, *FGrHist* 434 F 32–40 (trans. Jonnes, 1994: 84–93). On the tyrannicide statue of Philites, the meaning of the decree but also the ideological implications are briefly but conscience-alteringly explained by Gauthier (1982: 215–21). On honorific statues: Gauthier (1985), Stewart (1979), Ma (2006). On the 'pseudo-honorifics' in the Athenian Agora, Wycherley (1957: rubrics nos. 240, 708).

The case of Teos and the Seleucid kings is well documented in *SEG* 41.1001–2. These rich inscriptions are studied in Ma (1999). Rogers (1991) is a magnificently evocative and sophisticated study of the construction of memory in a Roman city, combined with the

seriousness of involvement and depth of historical feeling: yet see van Bremen (1993) on the malleability and disposability of civic memories. Some other cases of places of memory are the civic militias of the post-classical polis: Ma (2000); or the statue of the heroic cavalry commander from a small Boeotian city, offering a 'core sample' of civic ideology down the ages: Ma (2005).

On urbanism and memory see, for Thasos Grandjean and Salviat (2000); for Xanthos, des Courtils (2001), Le Roy (2004); on the Acropolis and the Parthenon, Hurwit (1999) (exhibiting, however, much lack of sensitivity when treating the attitudes and behaviour of Athens as post-classical polis).

On classical examples see, for Lycurgan Athens, Mitchel (1970), Habicht (1961 and 1997). On the extraordinary case of Messene, Themelis (2003) C. Grandjean (2003), Deshours (2006). For elements of a history of archaic Greece as (often competing) constructed memories see Adshead (1986), Piérart and Touchais (1996), de Polignac (1995: notably 129–38 on Eretria), Lambrinoudakis (1988 and 2001).

On monument and repetition see e.g. Herrmann (1981: nos. 686 and 688) for examples of honorific statues, inscribed decrees, and ritual reading out of decrees at meetings of the assembly (from Julia Gordus, in Lydia).

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CHAPTER 21

ANCIENT CONCEPTS OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

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THIS chapter will explore analogues in ancient, especially Greek, philosophy for the ideas and debates associated in modern thought with 'personal identity'. The main aim is to chart salient points of similarity and difference between ancient Greek and modern western thinking on this subject. It is also to define certain general features of ancient Greek thinking in this area, which may serve to complement the other chapters on Hellenic identity in this part of the volume.

To begin, what do we mean by 'identity', more specifically, 'personal identity'? The question of 'identity', put very broadly, is that of whether something has a determinate character or belongs to a specific category at any one time or over time. The idea of 'person', in modern philosophy, belongs to the class of normative concepts which are taken to be grounded on natural or metaphysical facts, and are thus able to legitimate, supplement, or revise conventional ethical norms. Modern philosophical debate about 'personal identity' consists of a series of interlocking questions. (1) How should we classify someone (or something) as a 'person', assuming this to be the most advanced or complex form of living thing, typically a human being but not necessarily so and not defined in species-specific terms? (2) How should we conceive someone's identity as a person over time and what kind of

change brings about the loss of this identity? (3) What are the criteria of personal identity, and are these criteria physical, psychological, or a combination of both? (4) If the criteria are psychological, do they consist in subjectivity, self-consciousness, having a first-personal viewpoint, second-order desire or reasoning, rationality and responsibility, or some other features? (5) Is uniqueness (or unique individuality) integral to personal identity?

In thinking about the relationship of these questions to ancient Greek thought, the most difficult, but also fundamental, question is whether there is an equivalent for the notion of 'person', in the semi-technical sense it has acquired in modern theory. Certainly, there is no *single* Greek term which standardly acts as the equivalent of 'person'. On the other hand, there are a number of (more or less well-defined) debates in Greek philosophy which can be seen as analogous to those just outlined in modern theory. Exploring the relationship of these Greek debates to modern ones provides the best way of determining how far Greek theory operates with a notion of personal identity and how that notion relates to modern western ones. This chapter explores three main clusters of debate. The first debate, the largest and most complex, relates to ideas about what is core or essential to us (or what constitutes our 'substance'), on the one hand, and to what makes someone (or something) a rational agent or animal, on the other. (This corresponds roughly to questions (1) and (4) above.) The second, more limited, debate concerns identity over time and corresponds to question (2), with some reference to (5) above. The third debate, which also has analogues in modern theory, is that of the relationship between personal identity (or our nature in some fundamental sense) and social or communal identity. The subject of the criteria of personal identity (or of analogous Greek notions), that is, questions (3)–(4) above, bear on all three clusters of debate, and also provide the basis for drawing a broad distinction between Greek and modern thinking on personal identity. The main point of difference is that subjectivity and 'I'-centred self-consciousness (and also unique individuality defined by reference to these features) have a centrality as criteria of personal identity in modern western thought which is not matched in ancient Greek thought.

21.1. Greek Analogues to Debate about Personal Identity

Perhaps the clearest analogue to modern thought about the criteria of personhood is offered by claims by Greek philosophers about what is core or essential to us. These are claims about our natural or metaphysical status which are taken to have

ethical significance and are in this respect comparable with much modern theory about what it means to be a 'person'. Relevant material includes the assertion in Plato's *Alcibiades 1* that we 'ourselves' (essentially) are constituted by our psyche (*psukhē*), rather than our body or the combination of psyche and body. More specifically, we are constituted by our (godlike) capacity for virtues such as wisdom and self-control (*sōphronein*) (128e–130c, 132c–133c). Similarly, in Plato's *Republic* (611e–612a) a contrast is drawn between the psyche as it is 'in truth' (*alētheia*) or 'in nature' (*phusis*), namely the capacity and desire for gaining (godlike) wisdom, and as it is in its current (tripartite and embodied) condition. In Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* we find several related claims about 'what each of us is' or 'seems to be'. In *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.4 and 9.8, in connection with friendship, this is said to be our capacity for thought or reasoning or our 'mind' (*nous*), or 'the most controlling part' (*kuriōtaton*) of our psyche, which is closely linked with our capacity for virtue. In these passages Aristotle seems to have mainly in mind the capacity for practical reasoning and ethical virtue. But in *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.7–8 Aristotle uses similar language ('what each of us is') to distinguish theoretical from practical uses of our mind, and to distinguish theoretical from practical wisdom. The capacity for theoretical wisdom is presented as the 'divine' (and 'best') aspect of us, whereas that for practical wisdom and ethical virtue (here linked with our emotions and embodied life) is presented as the 'human' aspect (1177a12–18, 1177b30–1178a4, 1178a14–21). This vein of thinking is continued in Middle Platonic thinking (Platonism in the period 100 BCE–200 CE). Here it is often linked with the perpetuation of the call in Plato's *Theaetetus* (175e–177b) to 'become like god' by leading the philosophical life and by combining 'wisdom and true virtue' (Annas 1999: ch. 3), and it becomes a central strand in Neoplatonic thought. This line of thought is, however, de-emphasized in Stoic and Epicurean thought. The focus on what is core or essential runs counter to their more holistic or unified conception of human nature (Gill 2006: ch. 1) and also conflicts with their tendency to see 'wisdom' as combining practical and theoretical functions.

This strand in ancient thought overlaps with two other, relatively determinate, areas of ancient debate. One is that of the relationship of psyche (or mind) to body in constituting our essence or—in Aristotelian terms—our 'substance' (*ousia*) as human beings. Plato's *Phaedo*, for instance, argues at length for a type of claim already illustrated, in which our psyche (more precisely, our rational or contemplative mind) is what we really are and is (essentially) separable from the body and capable of separate existence after death. Aristotle, despite the preference just noted in *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.7–8 for the 'godlike' contemplative life, standardly sees human nature as essentially and not contingently embodied. Our 'substance' or essence, as humans, is that of embodied psyche; this relationship is conceived in terms of matter shaped by form rather than as a combination of two separable types of entity. The Stoics and Epicureans maintain a more radical type of physicalism, in which psyche and its functions, including advanced rational processes,

are themselves understood as physical by nature. In Book 3 of *On the Nature of Things*, Lucretius, presenting Epicurean theory, offers a kind of counterweight to Plato's *Phaedo*, arguing at length for the claim that the psyche is material by nature, inseparable from the (rest of) the body, and incapable of separate existence after death. Galen, a second-century CE medical writer, in *The Soul's Dependence on the Body* (Singer 1997: 150–76), maintains strongly that psychological capacities, including rational ones, depend on physical states (bodily 'mixtures'), even though he claims to take no position on the essential nature of substance of the psyche (Wright and Potter 2000: chs. 1–4; King 2006). As with the strand of ancient thought reviewed previously, there are significant parallels with the modern theory of personal identity, though with certain salient qualifications to be noted shortly.

A third relevant strand in ancient theory is debate about the criteria for regarding someone (or something) as a fully rational agent (or rational animal) and thus as fully capable of responsible action. This line of thought is often couched in the form of a *scala naturae*, a spectrum of psychological capacities which are also correlated with certain natural kinds. Thus, for instance, Aristotle sees belief and reasoning as higher levels of a scale of capacities, whose lower rungs consist of sensations, 'appearances' (*phantasiai*), and memories. The higher capacities are seen as confined to humans while the lower ones are shared with non-human animals (*Metaphysics* 1.1, 980b25–981a1; *On the Soul* 3.3, 428a19–24). The Stoics, similarly, while explaining motivation in terms of a response to 'appearances' (*phantasiai*), see animals as capable only of non-rational appearances while humans are capable of having rational appearances and also of 'assenting' (or not) as a precondition of motivation. They also see rational functions as integrally linked with the capacity to master language as a system (Long and Sedley 53T, U, 57A; Inwood 1985: part 1). This concern to define the criteria for being a rational animal seems comparable with modern attempts to specify criteria for being a 'person'; and the question how far the criteria allow non-human members arises in both contexts (Gill 1991). Aristotle and the Stoics have sometimes been seen as unduly anthropocentric on this topic (Sorabji 1993). For instance, the Stoics recognize, but seek to neutralize, the example of the 'dialectical dog' whose behaviour in following the scent at a crossroads implies a capacity for inferential reasoning (Long and Sedley 36E). However, for the Stoics the borderline between rationality and non-rationality also separates human adults from children, and thus is not essentially a species-specific boundary. Also, the Stoics, like other Greek philosophers, see rationality as shared with gods or as 'godlike', and thus as crossing boundaries between natural kinds. So there are grounds for seeing 'rational animal', in Stoicism at least, as a non-species-specific norm, like 'person' (for some modern thinkers).

But how far, if we press the question further, can we correlate these features of ancient philosophy with the modern theory of personhood and personal identity? One possible point of difference is that these three strands in ancient theory, while overlapping and interrelated, are not explicitly regimented under a single heading,

whereas, in recent years at least, this is the case with the modern theory of personhood. Another contrast, with far-reaching implications, derives from the difference in the psychological criteria used to demarcate membership of the normative group or category in each case. Strikingly absent from these kinds of ancient discussion are the criteria of 'I'-centred self-consciousness and subjectivity and of unique individuality defined in these terms (for instance, as the possession of a uniquely 'first-personal' viewpoint). There is scope for argument about whether these ideas figure as part of ancient thinking about psychology at all (Gill 2006: 391–407); but at any rate they do not serve as criteria for what we are essentially or for being rational animals. The position is less clear-cut with another well-known modern criterion for personhood: namely having desires *about* one's desires or having 'second-order' desires (Frankfurt 1971). But, insofar as this criterion implies a form of 'I'-centred self-consciousness (my having desires about *my* desires) it diverges from the types of virtue (especially wisdom) given prominence in ancient accounts. A plausible explanation for this divergence is that the prominence of these criteria in modern thinking about personhood derives from certain distinctive features in the modern theory of mind since Descartes. It has been argued persuasively (Burnyeat 1982) that Descartes's philosophy introduced a conception of an inner world of ('I'-centred) subjectivity which marked a break with earlier thought and which has been developed in subsequent theory about persons as centres of subjectivity. By the same token, there is a notable degree of similarity between ancient theory about rational animals (in Aristotle and the Stoics, for instance) and the ideas about rationality of modern thinkers such as Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson, who have reacted against the post-Cartesian focus on subjectivity and self-consciousness (Gill 1991). For related reasons, ideas about individual uniqueness (at least as conceived in terms of 'I'-centred self-consciousness) play no role in ancient thinking about psyche–body relations. No ancient thinker seeks to specify the relative importance of psyche or body by posing the question sometimes raised in modern theory: if mind and body are separated, do 'I' go with the mind or the body (Wilkes 1988: chs. 6–7)? Thus, the difference between these otherwise analogous areas of ancient and (much) modern theory turn on what I have elsewhere characterized as the contrast between a 'subjective-individualist' and an 'objective-participant' conception of person, a suggestion pursued later (Gill 1996: Introduction and ch. 6; 2006: 328–44).

21.2. Personal Identity Over Time

One area in which we can especially explore the question how close ancient and modern debates come to each other is that of personal identity over time. The

question what (if anything) makes a person the same as herself over time has formed a prominent strand of modern western thought in philosophers from John Locke to Derek Parfit and Thomas Nagel (Perry 1975). Are we the same persons over a lifetime or beyond—or between—lifetimes, and are we still the same persons if our mind or brain is separated from our body? Did ancient Greek theory give rise to a similar kind of question? Much depends on how precisely we seek to correlate the questions at issue. In one sense, all philosophical theories which claim—or deny—the immortality of the psyche (or mind) can be regarded as falling into this category. However, Plato's *Phaedo* and Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, Book 3, two striking ancient examples, are concerned with continuity or discontinuity of the psyche as a generic category rather than that of the person as a unique subjective individual (or *me*), the question which has dominated much modern theory. Some suggestive comments in Plato's *Symposium* (207d–208a) and *Theaetetus* (160c, 166c), which accentuate discontinuity in our psychological (and physical) states during a single lifetime, come rather closer to this kind of question. (Price 1989: 30–5 links the *Symposium* passage with Parfit's ideas.) But these comments do not add up to a sustained theory.

Closer to modern approaches are two examples from Hellenistic philosophy which seem (like Parfit 1984, for instance) to use 'thought-experiments' about possible or imaginary states of existence to probe questions about our identity as individuals.

In the course of his argument that 'death is nothing to us' (*On the Nature of Things* 3.830), Lucretius argues that, even if we were reconstituted in the future—as is conceivable in the atomic theory—that would be of no concern to us, 'once our self-recollection (*repetentia nostri*) was interrupted' (3.847–61, esp. 851). This example centres on our status as individuals, and raises two relevant questions. One is the nature of the criteria used to determine whether or not 'we' are reconstituted. It might seem at first glance that, as in some modern theory, first-personal memory (self-recollection) is being used as a criterion. But closer inspection suggests that the only criterion deployed is that of a specific conjunction of bodily and psychic atoms (3.845–6). The reference to memory is not designed to provide a criterion of individuality but to show that the existence of the reconstituted self would not affect our happiness (Warren 2001). Thus, here as elsewhere, subjective states such as first-personal memory are not used as criteria for personal identity in ancient theory. The second question is how we should specify the function of this discussion in its original context. Is Lucretius, in fact, concerned to define individual personal identity through this thought experiment? Not quite, I think. As already indicated, his main concern is to discount a hypothetical possibility (our atomic reconstitution) which threatens his core thesis that 'death is nothing to us'. This difference of focus marks an important distinction from modern theory of personal identity, despite the surface similarity (Warren 2004: ch. 3).

The second example derives from a larger debate about growth and identity in the Hellenistic period between Academic (Platonic) Sceptics and Stoics. The Sceptics challenge the Stoic claim that growth is compatible with the retention of identity; they maintain that, if living beings grow, they become new entities or die. The Stoic Chrysippus responds by maintaining that determinate entities are differentiated as individuals not just by their matter (which might indeed change with growth) but also by a unique characteristic (being 'peculiarly qualified'). This is illustrated by an intriguing but bizarre thought-experiment involving two people, one of whom (originally whole) loses his foot and one of whom was always one-footed. Even if amputation makes these two people physically identical, they remain distinct (as individuals), because one retains his one-footed character while one ceases to exist, having lost his two-footed character (Long and Sedley 28P with commentary; Sedley 1982). This example, like the larger debate, displays ancient interest in some of the questions and puzzles about identity and time or change that also animate modern theory. It is also clear that what is at issue in this case is the status of individuals and not just generic categories (psyche or body) as in most other ancient discussions. However, it is not clear that this example centres on *personal* identity. The Stoic thesis about identity illustrated by this example applies to all determinate entities and not just to what we would call 'persons'. Perhaps for related reasons, the example does not—explicitly at least—specify the unique characteristic of its imaginary subjects in terms of psychological criteria. Thus, here too, despite the apparent closeness to modern debate about personal identity over time, different conceptual interests seem to be dominant (Gill 2006: 66–73).

21.3. Personal Identity and Social Identity

The third strand of thought considered here raises a broader type of question, treated here only in general terms. This strand may also serve to underline links between ancient Greek thinking about personal identity and the other aspects of identity considered in this volume. I develop here the contrast noted earlier, between subjective-individualist and objective-participant conceptions of person. A rather pervasive idea in modern western thought has been the belief that our personal identity (or our 'real self') is *fundamentally* different from our social identity. Finding and being true to this 'real self' constitutes a more profound and morally compelling claim than fulfilling the obligations of family and communal membership. This idea is prominent in Nietzsche and Sartre; it has

also been a powerful presence in Romantic and post-Romantic literature and retains its hold in western culture more generally (Trilling 1972; MacIntyre 1985; Taylor 1989; Gill 1996: 125–9). How far can this strand of modern thought about personal identity be paralleled in ancient philosophy or in other aspects of Greek culture?

There are several aspects of Greek thought, at different periods, which might seem, at first glance, to express this kind of idea—or at least to give the materials for formulating it. For instance, in the late fifth century BCE, relevant dimensions include the debate about the relationship between *nomos* ('law', 'custom', 'convention') and *phusis* ('nature'), Protagorean relativism, and the democratic ideal of a way of life that enables people to live (in private) 'as they please' (Thucydides 2.37.2–3; Gill 1996: 410–11). The relationship between philosophers and their surrounding society or state was recurrently fraught or antagonistic throughout antiquity. Striking examples include the trial of Socrates in 399 BCE, the Epicurean critique of many of the values underlying Greek and Roman society, and the opposition by some Roman Stoics to abuse of power by certain emperors in the first century CE. In Hellenistic and Roman philosophical therapy, scholars have sometimes seen indications of an 'inward turn' (towards the self) or of kinds of 'care of the self' that imply the same type of radical disjunction between personal identity and social identity that has played such a powerful role in modern western thought and culture (Gill 2006: 328–35).

However, I think that, on close inspection, important differences remain between the relevant strands of ancient and modern western thought; these differences are related to contrasts already noted here in thinking about personal identity. For instance, ancient philosophical critiques are, typically, of the ethical standards and mode of life in *a specific* society or societies (for instance, the one in which the philosopher lives) rather than in *society* as such. (Hence, the generalized contrast between 'individual' and 'society' has less relevance and resonance than it has in modern thought.) From at least Plato's *Republic* onwards, much ancient political theory takes the form of defining a normative type of community (usually an ideal polis), rather than rejecting communal life as such (see Rowe in this volume). A related move, especially prominent in Stoic thought, is to link the norm of an ideal community with universal human values, and to use both norms as the basis for shaping our lives within the communities in which we live, even if those communities fall far short of realizing those ideals. For example, the Stoic theory of the four *personae* (or 'roles') presented by Cicero (*On Duties* 1.107–21), offers a framework for combining the aspiration to ideal human standards (the first *persona*) with realizing our individual talents and inclinations (the second *persona*), and doing so in a way that matches our given and chosen social status (third and fourth *personae*). In Epicureanism, the rejection of social life based on giving value to wealth and honour is combined with the ideal of a communal life based on Epicurean ethical values. Epicurus'

letters and the treatises of the first-century BCE Epicurean Philodemus (especially his work *On Frank Criticism*) give us a vivid picture of a community united by powerful bonds of *philia* (affectionate friendship) and by the shared desire to live the Epicurean life. (Konstan *et al.* 1998; Rowe and Schofield 2000: chs. 22, 29; Warren 2004: ch. 5).

Hence what might appear, from a modern standpoint, to be a contrast between self-realization and communal norms is better conceived, in these areas of ancient thought, as the contrast between ideal and defective forms of communal participation.

A related point is that, in ancient thought, the standard mode of reflection about fundamental values is that of shared debate or enquiry, directed at achieving knowledge of objective truth. This mode of reflection, exemplified in the Socratic dialectic of the Platonic dialogues, remains the typical pattern within and between the philosophical schools and groups that provide the framework of intellectual life until late antiquity. The motif of turning inward 'towards the self' or of shaping one's life as 'care of the self' in Hellenistic and Roman thought needs to be located within a conception of ethical reflection that remains strongly collaborative in its ideals and modes of enquiry (Gill 2006: 371–91). The contrast noted earlier between an 'objective-participant and a 'subjective-individualist' conception of person is designed to encapsulate the difference between these features of ancient thought and certain dimensions of modern western thought (Gill 1996: 6–16; 2006: 328–44). The fact that modern thought has developed a more radical and extreme form of contrast between personal and social identity reflects, in part, specific features of western philosophy. These include the post-Cartesian idea of the person as an 'I'-centred locus of self-consciousness and subjectivity, and the post-Kantian idea of the person as an autonomous moral agent and source of normativity. It also reflects the cultural fact that, in Graeco-Roman antiquity generally, including philosophical circles, human life was lived in a much more socially embedded form than has become common in much of modern western society. This broad cultural and conceptual contrast underlies and informs the difference between the ancient and modern patterns of thinking about personal identity discussed earlier. It also contributes towards the kind of conceptual challenge that is posed to modern readers by ancient Hellenism.

Suggested Reading

Several of the books referred to above provide guidance on ancient concepts of selfhood or identity (e.g. Gill 1996, 2006) or modern theory on these subjects (e.g. Perry 1975, Taylor 1989, Wilkes 1988). See also Bulloch *et al.* (1993), Carrithers, Collins, and Lukes (1985), Cockburn (1991), Rorty (1976), and Sorabji (2006).

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CHAPTER 22

THE POLITICS OF THE *SUMPOSION*

FIONA HOBDEN

To Herodotus, writing his ethnographic exposition on the customs of the Persians in the second half of the fifth century BCE, eating and drinking were key cultural markers. Feasting patterns, rules of conduct in company, and a propensity for debating important issues whilst drinking distinguished the Persians as much as their religious practices, daily lives, sexual proclivities, education, and funerary procedures (*Histories* 1.131–9). Since then, ancient writers, modern anthropologists, and social historians have largely agreed. But, while Herodotus and his ancient successors, men like Theopompus and Strabo, were content to report the supposed practices of their barbarian neighbours, in recent times the commensal habits of the Greeks themselves have come under scrutiny. The distinctive forms of their gatherings, their associated codes of behaviour, and their conversations are all now subject to investigation. However, whereas Herodotus recalled Persian customs primarily to elucidate and entertain his audience, modern researchers have a more extensive remit: to explore not only the lifestyles of the ancient Greeks, but also the socio-political dimensions of the commensal occasion within its historical milieu and, hence, to learn more about Hellenic society.

Although communal feasting is attested at Minoan and Mycenaean sites, it is for the archaic period, when iconography and literature supplement the archaeological record, that a detailed and vibrant picture of commensality in Hellenic communities takes shape (cf. Whitley in this volume). Within the space of around fifty years, between the end of the seventh century BCE and the beginning of the sixth, three interrelated developments occurred. First, the *andrōn*, a room with a distinctive

offset door and space for seven or eleven couches arranged head-to-toe around the walls, started to appear in domestic and religious architecture. Secondly, scenes of men reclining on couches and drinking from cups—a style of dining attested at a slightly earlier date in Assyrian and Judaic traditions and reflected in the layout of the *andrōn*—began to adorn ceramic drinking-vessels produced in Greece. And thirdly, monodic poems which were sung to the lyre or flute and dwelt on human affairs, including friendship and desire, enjoying the party, and living the good life, were composed, committed to memory, and eventually written down for us to read in fragmentary form today. Brought together, these developments indicated the emergence of a new and distinctive social form: the *sumposion*, as Alcaeus (70, 368 Lobel–Page) and Theognis (298 West) called the small gathering of friends who met in the *andrōn* for wine, music, friendship, and conversation, and who provided the original audience for their poetry. This event dominates investigations into Greek commensality today. In part, this focus arises from the great range of evidence available for studying the *sumposion*. The archaeology, imagery, and poetry of the archaic event are complemented by representations in all manner of art and texts which continue to be produced into the classical period and beyond. But the extent of this evidence, and the primacy of the *sumposion* in scholarly discourses, also reflects its significance within the polis from the seventh century onward.

The centrality of the *sumposion* to matters of polis organization, socio-political identity, and power, as well as to their concomitant rhetorics, has transpired over the past thirty years. It began with the scholarly affirmation of the *andrōn* as the primary location for the performance of lyric poetry, as part of a wider reconsideration of the value of lyric poetry as a source of evidence. On the one hand, surviving verses and fragments now offered insights into the interests and concerns of the symposiasts who sang them. On the other, new readings from the perspective of performance theory highlighted the identities and roles which each symposiast created for himself when he sang (Rösler 1980; Rossi 1983; Vetta 1983; see also Capra in this volume). This rereading increased our appreciation of possible dynamics at play within the sympotic group, amongst its members, and in relation to the wider community. This understanding was supplemented by the analysis of the sympotic experience through the prism of anthropology. Maintaining the anthropologists' concern with social function, Murray (1983*a*–*c*) identified the archaic *sumposion* as a direct descendant of the Homeric 'feast of merit', itself an example of the cross-cultural phenomenon of the *Männerbund*. As the remnants of a heroic warrior band in a political age, the *sumposion* comprised a status group whose communal feasting reinforced its shared superiority in martial prowess and lifestyle. The performances of the *sumposion*, again especially its poetry, contributed to this process. The connection between sociological function and performance was then extended by Lissarrague (1987), whose iconological work drew these components into the visual realm. Where earlier interpretations of Greek banqueting imagery ascertained sympotic practices from the iconography of funerary stelai and pottery,

his interpretation of Athenian black- and red-figure drinking-vessels focused on the interaction between their pictures and their viewers in the *andrōn*. According to his analysis, scenes of drinking and revelry could convey ideas about the *sumposion* to the drinker, leading him to reflect (consciously or otherwise) on his personal experience by presenting an idealized counterpart, jarring opposition, or image of alterity to the immediate occasion. Depictions of mythological scenes and fantasy, as well as scenes of everyday life, could also be read within this reflective and interrogative framework, making the *sumposion* into an occasion for debate about individual and communal identities, conducted through the symposiast's engagement with the imagery surrounding him.

These trends in analysis have produced a solid vision of the *sumposion* as an elite event marked by distinctive discourses and dynamics. Alongside the defining act of communal drinking, it offered a place for competitive male camaraderie, singing, game-playing, advice-giving, and sexual adventure, and a space where the *hetaireia*, or friendship group, could negotiate its coherence and identity, and position itself in relation to the wider polis. This vision has been complemented by the examination of literary accounts of feasting and drinking in epic, history, comedy, oratory, philosophy, and other genres of writing. Often, their evidence extends the picture of sympotic activity gleaned from the poetry and painting. But because their parties are created to meet particular literary, political, or philosophical aims, they demonstrate also how the *sumposion* could be integrated into conversations circulating within the polis. These often relate directly to issues of policy and power. The importance of the *sumposion* within the polis thus continues from its first appearance in the archaic period into the classical period, although the nature of this importance varies across time and, probably, between poleis.

The political significance of the archaic *sumposion* emerges most strongly from its poetry, especially the verses attributed to Theognis of Megara, composed during the mid-seventh to early fifth centuries BCE, but accredited to the Boeotian poet on account of their shared topic, style, and temperament, and the poems of Alcaeus of Lesbos, a member of the island's deposed ruling elite in the late seventh or early sixth century BCE. A good proportion of poems in the *Theognidea* are parainetic, offering advice to a young, stylized addressee, Cyrnus or Polypaides, but also to the listening symposiasts. Guidance concerning their relationships with one another and their conduct within the party is accompanied by warnings about deception amongst friends and encouragement towards good order and moderation in civic life. The shared field of concern for the listener operating in the *sumposion* and in the polis creates continuity between the two arenas, so that the *sumposion* almost becomes a micro-polis, where the conduct, interactions, and anxieties of the sympotic group mirror those envisaged for the community at large (Levine 1985). The man who sings Theognis' advisory poetry addresses his drinking companions as members of the polis community; in doing so, he shapes the *sumposion* into an arena for discussing and learning about political life. Furthermore, amongst all

the talk of negotiating friendships, enduring hardship, and living a good life stand observations on the state of the city: the polis is in disrepair, good men are spurned, and lawless new men are in control; stasis, internecine strife, and monarchical rule lurk on the horizon (39–52, 53–68, 219, 541–2, 833–6 West). Whether these verses were sung in seventh-century Megara or performed by later symposiasts in another city to reflect their circumstances, they carry the sympotic conversation beyond considering appropriate political conduct to contemplate issues of political organization and power. Verses composed by Alcaeus participate in a similar discussion by constructing an image of the immediate political environment for its audience to consume (6, 70, 72, 129, 141, 348 Lobel–Page). Moreover, they present a programme for political action. Alcaeus' audience is encouraged to rise up and attack Pittacus, who once dined with them as a friend, because his usurpation of supreme control threatens the city (71 Lobel–Page; 306g West). Thus, the symposia at which the poems of Alcaeus and Theognis were sung were political events where men concerned with power could communicate their anxieties about changes in the polis, and in the case of Alcaeus' immediate group, formulate hypothetical responses.

The terms in which Theognis and Alcaeus represent the current governmental set-up in their poleis are condemnatory and dissenting, even if Theognis (53–68 West) recommends a cautious and reconciliatory attitude, Morris's (1996) 'middling' position. In Theognis' case, new wealthy men have usurped the ruling prerogative of good men, while for Alcaeus a former friend has broken his allegiances and set himself up in power over his old comrades, supported by the people. Thus, both poets purport to speak on behalf of displaced ruling elites. On this basis, the *hetaireia* has been interpreted as an anti-polis establishment, and sympotic activities have been viewed as an expression of its withdrawal from and opposition to the wider community. Certainly, according to modern thinking, the layout of the *andrōn* and the songs, games, pictures, friendships, and wine enjoyed there marked the *sumposion* apart from the world outside its walls. The distinctive circular and, hence, non-hierarchical arrangement of couches created a closed, inward-looking space conducive to equal and harmonious interaction between guests. Here, by singing of politics or love, offering advice or telling stories of the past, symposiasts could confirm their shared heritage and mutual identities. Even in competitive performances, when poems or excerpts were exchanged in games of poetic skill and wisdom, this spirit was preserved: as Collins (2004) describes, by merely taking part, contributors ultimately confirmed their community with one another whether they were successful in the competition or not. With this inward and self-confirmatory focus, the *sumposion* constituted a coherent community apart from the polis, as well as a subset of it.

Yet, the poetry of Theognis and Alcaeus which helps to construct this unified *sumposion* also reveals its propensity for disruption. For example, a large proportion of the advice to Cyrnus warns of duplicity amongst supposed friends and

recommends that he observe his companions at the party to discover their hidden intents (Theognis 91–2, 117–18, 119–28 West). And Pittacus in part bears the brunt of Alcaeus' anger because he has broken away from the friendship group and now acts against its interests. In addition, Stehle's analysis of poetic performance in the *andrōn* (1997: 213–61) emphasizes the risk that any self-representation entails. An ill-chosen analogy could (deliberately or inadvertently) rupture friendship and trust. In fact, this picture of a more dangerous and disturbing *sumposion* chimes with recent anthropological evaluations of commensality. While accepting the communality of the commensal gathering, anthropologists like Grignon (2001) also recognize the fermentation of opposition, separation, and segregation in its processes.

Stehle's observations highlight the polyvalence of verse and the posturing of those who sing it. On these bases, sympotic utterances need not be accepted as straightforward expressions of shared sentiment, let alone evidence for specific communal dissatisfaction or plotting. The tone of delivery of individual lines is nearly impossible to determine from the fragmentary collections which survive today. Not only are substantial portions of poems lost, but verses which in real life may never have been sung together are presented by the Alexandrian scholars who collected them as part of a cohesive and, by implication, coherent body of work. Certainly, the *Theognidea* is comprised of verses of apparently similar temperament, but how were they delivered in the *sumposion*? As serious comment and instruction reflecting strongly held views, or as light-hearted diversions with little bearing on sentiments actually held? Poems from the wider sympotic corpus depict the *sumposion* as a variably sober, playful, and rowdy occasion. Anacreon (356b Page) calls upon his companions to drink with moderation on this occasion, rather than din and uproar, and in one anonymous drinking song (902 Page) the audience is invited to match the singer's mood, either raving or being sober together. And an unattributed fragment, possibly from the fifth century, recommends indulging in joking, playing, and jesting before speaking on serious matters in turn (*adespota elegiaca* 27 West). Clearly, the tone of the party could vary. When a line was delivered by a symposiast in the competitive *skholia*-game in a bid to display his education and wisdom, how seriously were its sentiments (intended to be) taken? Alcaeus may have incited his immediate *hetaireia* towards revolt, but by singing this poem did men in other poleis or gatherings at a later time use it to incite political action, or merely to convey dismay at the current political setting, or for other reasons entirely? Although any answers must remain speculative, the questions are worth asking, because they emphasize the remove at which our current monolithic vision of the *sumposion* may stand from the diversity of actual experience, and problematize our use of lyric poetry as direct evidence for its conversations.

Questions regarding the status of symposiasts in the sixth and fifth centuries further destabilize the traditional understanding of the *sumposion* as the last bastion of an elite, disgruntled with the new order, and maybe disenfranchised from power.

Murray (1983*c*: 198) noted early on that the very factor causing disruption to traditional aristocratic power, namely the spread of wealth among a wider section of the polis, may also have broadened the range of people indulging in elite behaviours like the *sumposion*. Certainly, Fisher (2000) has demonstrated that in fifth-century Athens sympotic activity stood alongside other forms of conviviality as a pastime for the city's moderately wealthy, in their homes, at religious festivals (*thiasoi*), and private members' clubs (*eranoi*). Meanwhile, a study of the archaeology of Athens' public dining space by Steiner (2002) has shown how the democracy harnessed the practice to its own self-aggrandizing ends. Yet, in analyses of the sympotic phenomenon, these non-aristocratic events are virtually ignored, as if, without aristocratic participation, they were not true *symposia*. However, at the very least, it is worth noting that the men who set up tyrannies in the Greek poleis were by and large members of the aristocratic elite whose power they usurped. It is no surprise, then, to find tales of their participation in sympotic activities. In Herodotus' *Histories*, Cleisthenes of Sicyon hosts a banquet and post-prandial drinking party attended by the sons of the rich and powerful from across Greece at which suitors, including men of aristocratic stock, compete for the hand of his daughter (6.125–30). And Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos, seals his fate whilst reclining on a couch in his *andrōn* alongside Anacreon, a favourite poet of the *sumposion* (3.121). Furthermore, as Alcaeus contemplates the future of the polis under Pittacus, he imagines the lyre continuing to play at the *sumposia* of idle men (70 Lobel–Page). The dynamics of a party attended by a tyrant and his coterie, or a new ruling elite, or simply men of wealth in a polis, would surely be different from those imagined for aristocratic symposiasts who find themselves ousted from power. But recognizing their activities as sympotic on the grounds that their participants recline, drink wine, sing to the lyre, and dance, would enable us to escape the temptation of aligning those who attend the *sumposion* against those who rule the polis. Hence, we might understand how the *sumposion* played a role in strategies of power and self-representation which their new participants engaged in.

To investigate the importance of the *sumposion* within the polis, it is therefore necessary to decentralize the anti-polis sentiments of Alcaeus and Theognis from their defining role. From one perspective, this runs the risk of destabilizing the category of *sumposion* altogether. However, it more accurately reflects the continuum between city and *sumposion*. After all, the poetry of Theognis, with its plethora of advice, indicates a strong engagement with the polis, preparing its audience for living in the new community. Solon too addresses his companions as active participants in Athens' politics. His poetry invites them to consider the city's socio-economic and political problems whilst also justifying his own policies, staking a claim for its singer within the sympotic group and the city. And the epinicean poetry of Pindar and Bacchylides, composed in celebration of athletic victory and in all probability performed in public and private settings, reinforces the achievement and magnificence of the athletic victor in the polis and across Hellas. Thus, the

poems of the *sumposion*—and the event itself—are better viewed in conversation with the outside world than as indicators of aristocratic withdrawal and dissent.

This interconnection between *sumposion* and polis is reflected in the physical setting of the *andrōn* (discussed also by Whitley in this volume). Although the room provided a closed, inward-facing space, it was located not only in *oikos* structures, but also sanctuaries and public buildings across the archaic, classical, and Hellenistic periods. *Andrōnes* have been identified in sanctuaries to Athena at Delphi, to Zeus at Nemea, and to Artemis at Brauron. And in fifth-century Athens, the Asclepeion, Pompeion, and the south stoa of the Agora boasted a number of such rooms (Bergquist 1990: 38). In these settings, sympotic activity could perhaps accrue civic and religious dimensions. This link is developed in the banqueting iconography of Corinthian, Laconian, Boeotian, and Athenian black-figure drinking-ware in which men, drinking from cups, recline in front of tables laden with food. On these vessels, the association between the *sumposion* and the polis is often strengthened by the juxtaposition of banqueting imagery with civic scenes of battle, sacrifice, processions, and chariot parades. On this basis, Schmitt-Pantel (1990, 1992) has argued that a community event rather than a private party is depicted. Her scenes thus emphasize an interchange between civic rituals and sympotic forms of dining, integrating the *sumposion* into wider, much less studied, forms of commensality.

By extending the frame of reference for the *sumposion* to allow for diversity between parties, between poleis, and between symposiasts' wealth and status, it is possible to come to a more diverse appreciation of the nature of the *sumposion* and its place within the polis. However, the aristocratic, anti-polis *sumposion* certainly remained alive into the fifth century, in the imagination of the Athenian *dēmos* at least. By Thucydides' account, during the crisis surrounding the mutilation of the Herms and the alleged profanation of the Mysteries, the *sumposion* became more or less synonymous with the *sunōmosia*, a conspiratorial group intent on harming the democracy (6.27–8). Despite the increased subset of the population who now enjoyed sympotic entertainments, the drinking parties of the elite became hotbeds of subversion as they were integrated into discussions of anti-democratic activity. Whatever the status and sympathies of its real-life participants, the *sumposion* became a way for the *dēmos* to envisage the opposition to democracy which only four years later would produce an oligarchic coup.

This incident offers one example of how the *sumposion* could become part of the public debate about the polis in Athens. The plays of Aristophanes provide another. Sympotic scenes were frequently incorporated into their analyses of democratic practice, war, and the general state of the city. For instance, in *Wasps* (1175–264, 1299–321), Philocleon's raucous performance in the *sumposion* contributes to the playwright's representation of the rascally old juror and his comment on Athens' litigious culture. Or in *Lysistrata*, when the city's affairs are disrupted by war, the conventions of the *sumposion* are also upset: women pass round a large

drinking-cup set like a mixing krater on the ground as they take their oath (194–241). Later the resolution of peace between Athens and Sparta is celebrated in a banquet and *kōmos*, or drunken revelry (1216–70). In these and other comic plays, sympotic practice is a barometer to the city's well-being; a harmonious *sumposion* and *kōmos* reflects the peaceful, well-governed city as envisaged and promoted by Aristophanes (Bowie 1997; Putz 2003).

Elsewhere, sympotic performance offers a yardstick to the talents of a politician. In the *Epidēmiai* ('*Visits*'), Ion of Chios represents two Athenian generals, Cimon and Sophocles, in the *sumposion*. In the first case, Cimon's singing encourages a companion to remark that he was a better man than Themistocles, who once stated that although he had not learned how to play the lyre or sing, he did know how to make a city great. By inference Cimon is accomplished in both, and his cleverness as a statesman is confirmed by an anecdote which Cimon himself retells (*FGrH* 392 F 13 = Plutarch, *Cimon* 9). In the second, Sophocles' cleverness at the *sumposion* is revealed twice: first through his trouncing of an Eretrian schoolteacher in a competition of poetic exchange, and secondly in his seduction of the young serving-boy. Yet, this time Ion remarks that despite his performance in the *sumposion*, in political matters Sophocles was no better than other men of his class (*FGrH* 392 F 6 = Athenaeus 603e–604d). Of the entire work, only a few fragments of the *Visits* remain, so it is difficult to ascertain the significance of this discourse within it. Even so, on this limited evidence sympotic performance could be set up and discussed in relation to political capability, even if Themistocles rejected the connection and Ion himself perceived a disjunction between the two in the person and talents of Sophocles.

In fifth-century Athens the *sumposion* was therefore an active component of the city's analytical vocabulary, although its application is diverse and not always coherent. The connection between sympotic performance and political competency was later developed by Plato, who puts aside his previously ambivalent attitude towards the *sumposion* in the *Laws* (645d–649b). Here, sympotic activity, with its opportunity for testing and promoting virtue by wine, becomes an integral part of the educational process in preparing men for living in and governing his idealized community. Thus, the *sumposion* becomes harnessed to the needs of the polis. Shortly before, Xenophon had effected a similar result with his *Symposium*. Under his guidance, the drinking-party becomes a venue for all kinds of discussions, some relating to virtue and education, and others to creating benefit for the city. In this new prose form, the *sumposion* almost comes full circle, offering a forum for discussing issues of political relevance, not dissimilar to the archaic counterpart known to us through its poetry.

To conclude, the *sumposion* is much more than a cultural marker. It is an integral part of the Greek polis, a meeting point for select members of the city where they can reflect on civic life and, in Athens at least, a tool in the critical apparatus of the city in the public arena of the agora and the assembly, on

the comic stage, and in fifth- and fourth-century prose. Further investigation into the various possible manifestations of sympotic practice within the polis may change our perception of this relationship, but it will also help explain why the *sumposion* retains such an important place within the city's collective psyche.

Suggested Reading

As this chapter suggests, the *sumposion* was a diverse phenomenon, generating an abundant and manifold body of evidence for the historian. The body of scholarship dedicated to its study is equally diverse, with the majority of investigations devoted to one particular type of evidence or aspect of the sympotic experience. The *sumposion* is thus best accessed through a number of edited collections of articles, especially Murray (1990), and Orfanos and Carrière (2003). Between them, these volumes cover a plenitude of areas and together demonstrate developments in sympotic studies over the decades. Slater (1991), and Murray and Tecuşan (1995) also contain a number of pertinent articles. Lissarrague (1987) and Schmitt-Pantel (1992) are among the few scholars to have published extended investigations into aspects of commensal activity, and might be considered starting-points for investigations into sympotic iconography and civic commensality.

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CHAPTER 23

COMING OF AGE, PEER GROUPS, AND RITES OF PASSAGE

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23.1. Anthropological Categories

One area in which anthropological thought has had a clear impact on our understanding of Graeco-Roman antiquity, from its religious institutions to its poetry and literature, is the study of rites of passage. Already in 1724, the Jesuit priest Josèphe François Lafitau, on a mission among the Iroquois and Huron of what would become Canada, took up Cicero's concept of initiation to read the practices of these 'Americans' in the light of the mystery cult of the 'ancients,' which he understood as a 'school ... to teach men to live according to the principles of reason and wisdom' (1724: ii. 221). But it was only in the nineteenth century that comparative anthropology as a discipline elaborated the concepts of the 'peer group' and the 'rite of passage' on the basis of descriptions of religions and religious practices. Heinrich Schurtz's research on social morphology (1902: 83–173) was decisive for the concept of the peer group; among other forms of association, notably the familial, he identifies *Altersklassen* as groups into which young men and young girls are organized

for the transition to adulthood. The 'rite of passage' was given canonical form in the tripartite schema developed by Arnold van Gennep (1909: 13–28) on the basis of a rich body of evidence for rituals of transition and of admission to a new status. Every rite of passage, he argued, includes three phases: separation, marginalization, and integration. These are marked respectively by preliminary, liminary, and post-liminary rites. Among the very different types of rites of passage indicated in the subtitle of van Gennep (1909), transition rituals concerning 'social puberty' occupy a distinct place. Schurtz had already noted that the formation of peer groups, evident in the *Knaben- und Mädchenweihen*, the consecration of young boys and girls, was connected to adolescence and the passage from childhood to adulthood. Hutton Webster, van Gennep's other inspiration in his thinking about 'initiation rites', coined this term to refer to rituals that at puberty mark the separation of a youth from the world of women and children. These 'initiation ceremonies', as 'puberty institutions', serve as the means of admission to the status of an adult member of the community (1908: 20–31).

In the context of practices which we might also call 'rites of institution', to highlight their role in providing access to a new social status, the use of the term 'initiation' is doubly misleading. On the one hand, the concept of an initiatory test that one already finds in Lafitau (1724: i. 220–354) was rapidly extended not only to mystery cults but to all rites of introduction into 'secret societies'. The perspective thus passed from cultural and social anthropology to the history of religion, with traces of the neo-mystical nostalgia for shamanism that one finds, for example, in Mircea Eliade's great, universalizing synthesis (1958: 21–91, on 'rites of puberty and tribal initiations in primitive religions'). On the other hand, the modern notion of 'initiation' does correspond with some ancient categories, appropriate in particular in the case of mystery rites modelled on the cult of Demeter and her daughter Persephone at Eleusis. The word *initiare* itself is used in Latin to designate initiation into the mysteries of Bacchus in particular, while words in the family of *teleō-* ('to achieve') designate in turn initiation into the mysteries of Eleusis, and by extension practices linked with the celebration of Dionysus (along with terms such as *orgia*, 'ritual acts', for Demeter or Dionysus, and *mueisthai*, 'being initiated into secret ceremonies', especially in connection with the cult of Eleusis) (*Homeric Hymn to Demeter* 274, 476, 481; Euripides, *Bacchae* 22, 34, 73, etc.; Aristophanes, *Wealth* 845; cf. Burkert 1987: 1–11; 2002).

These Greek and Latin terms, then, refer to the ritual practices of mystery cults which involve adult individuals passing through a transitory state to enter a status that only adds to their pre-existing social status. This reminds us that we need to balance our own anthropological categories (which are theoretical and 'etic'), with empirical, indigenous, 'emic' categories. For the ritual of tribal initiation involves something else: the formation of a group of male or female adolescents of the same age and their collective access to adult status through a series of educational and

liminary practices that correspond to a symbolic death and rebirth. (In the context of ancient Greece, this ritual brings attention to the different educational processes that characterize the transition to adulthood and that are locally designated by the specific terms that I shall discuss.) This means that the concept of 'peer groups', as well as of 'tribal initiation rites' (as distinct from 'rites of puberty', which are individual rites connected with a girl's first menstruation), are purely operative concepts. But their use as comparative tools—providing analogies and differences from the perspective of social and historical anthropology—will turn out to be indispensable in highlighting what is characteristic of institutions distant from us in time and space (Calame 1999*b*).

23.2. Rites of Passage for Groups of Adolescents

At the turn of the last century, Martin P. Nilsson (1912) compared the educational peer-group system of what he calls 'unzivilisierte Völker' to the 'herds' in which Spartan adolescents were divided at the age of 7. They were brought into an educational system whose name, *agōgē*, is based on the root *ag-*, which suggests the 'leading' of a group. A late commentary points to seven different ranks, each with its own designation. In pursuing this course of education, adolescents were placed under the supervision of a young man (who was, however, older than them) and were subjected to different trials of strength and a very basic way of life, not far removed from animal savagery. Included in these tests was the notorious flagellation at the altar of Artemis Orthia, near the Eurotas on the outskirts of Sparta. In Roman times, this was turned into a dramatic re-enactment of a more ancient ritual which was taken to have involved human sacrifice (though in the end it could only have referred to a symbolic death). The Spartan in Plato's *Laws* mentions acts of (ritual?) theft that provoked physical blows. Like night-time attacks on helots or unarmed combat, these tests of endurance, interpreted as an education in courage, were made part of an operation locally called *krupteia*, 'ambush' (Plato, *Laws* 633b; Jeanmaire 1939: 540–69; Vidal-Naquet 1983: 161–3, 201–6).

It seems that these educational exercises in an asceticism which broke with social norms were linked to the annual celebration of the Gymnopaedia. Under the aegis of Apollo, these 'celebrations of nudity' probably offered not only gymnastic competitions but also musical performances by choruses of youths, adults, and perhaps old men, trained by poets such as Thaletas, Alcman, and Dionysodotos. Owing to the allusion to nudity in its title, this great civic celebration has been

compared to the Apodeixeis of Arcadia (a 'display' of young people before citizens assembled in the theatre), the Endymatia of Argos (a festival of clothing), and the Ekdysia in Crete, notably in Phaistos (a festival in which the youth changed clothes to 'escape' the *agela*) (see the noteworthy testimony of the Spartan historian Sosibius, *FGrHist* 595 F 5, and the later account of ps.-Plutarch, *On Music* 9; for the Gymnopaedia, see Brelich 1969: 139–40 and 186–207). These different cult ceremonies suggest the model of van Gennep's rite of passage because they contribute to the ritual celebration of the integration into the adult community of groups of young people who had undergone various tests connected to a period of marginalization.

The Spartan educational system, which involves practices well known to anthropologists, should be understood in terms of process and not just of ritual. We know that Plutarch attributes the institution of this initiatory type of educational system to the legendary Spartan legislator Lycurgus, while Xenophon insists on the pedagogical character taken on by 'homosexual' relations between an adult *erastēs* and an adolescent *erōmenos* (Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 16.7–17.8; Xenophon, *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* 2.2–13, who also attributes this educational system to Lycurgus; cf. Brelich 1969: 113–26).

23.3. Initiation Processes for Young People

Asymmetrical erotic relations between adults and adolescents seem to play an essential role in the educational curriculum attributed to the Cretans by a fourth-century historian. Intended for the sons of equal-status citizens, this educational system has striking resemblances to the form and function of an initiatory process: adolescents are grouped into *agelai* under the direction of the father of a noble family, while the men have meals together in an *andreia*; there is study of ritual poetry and musical arts as well as a harsh education in gymnastic exercises, and in the use of arms through ritual combat between *agelai*; there are armed dances which follow the example of the Kouretes, or the mythical founder of the Pyrrhic dance; the bravest adolescents were ritually kidnapped by an adult who would train the young man of his choosing for a period marked by shared meals, hunting, and homoerotic relations; then the *erōmenos* returned to the city, where he was offered military gear, an ox (to sacrifice to Zeus), and a goblet (for participation in banquets). Integrated into the civic community as an adult, the 'glorious' young man benefited from a particular status, which was indicated by a specific title and clothing, as well as by

honours in public ceremonies (Ephorus, *FGrHist* 70 F 149, summarized by Strabo 10.4.16 and 20–1; cf. Bremmer 1999: 44–6).

Whatever one thinks about van Gennep's tripartite schema (which does not, for example, represent the *communitas* that Victor Turner (1969: 94–130) ascribes to the period of marginalization found in tribal initiation), the asymmetrical erotic relationship formed between *erastēs* and *erōmenos* has the transitory, liminary, and ritualized character that characterizes an initiation process intended for adolescents. Based on a relationship of mutual trust, these relationships of homophilia are not only an integral part of the Spartan educational system, but are widely celebrated in poetry intended for recital at symposia, where fellow citizens gathered. Assuming different ritualized forms, such as the Spartan and Cretan citizen *sussitia*, these gatherings of 'companions' (*hetairoi*) over wine animated the political life of small Greek cities up to the time of Athens in the fifth century, and took on a decisive educational function. (Cf. Hobden in this volume.) The numerous homoerotic elegiac poems transmitted in the collection of the *Theognidea*, as well as the songs of praise composed by Pindar and addressed to beautiful young nobles, attest to the role played by the arts of the Muses in providing an education in citizenship and its moral values. In a process of veritable 'anthropopoiesis' that was physical, aesthetic, and symbolic, this long, ritual journey included erotic relationships of an initiatory character played out through rhythmic song. It is not by chance that Plato chose precisely the setting of a symposium to propose, through the priestess Diotima, an initiation into Beauty based on the homoerotic relationship between a beautiful young man and an adult philosopher (potentially mirrored in the relationship between Alcibiades and Socrates). (Cf. Theognis 1231–389 and Pindar, frr. 118–28 Maehler, among other banquet songs such as those of Anacreon, with Bremmer 1990; Pellizer 1990; Calame 1999*a*: 91–109, 181–91.)

From cities of so-called 'Doric' culture, Plato takes us to Athens at the very moment when citizen service was probably re-institutionalized for youth between the ages of 18 and 20 under the name *ephēbeia*. In the fourth century this service was divided into various exercises in the palaestra, lessons on cultural and political rhetoric, and military service in the forts on the Attic frontier. Under the direction of a 'master of ceremonies', the ephebes were divided into groups, all of which were overseen by ten 'moderators' (*sōphronistai*), one chosen from each of the ten Attic tribes. Distinguished by a black *khlamus* (a short cloak or mantle) and a *petasos* (a distinctive felt hat), to which a sword and shield were added at the start of the second year, admission to the status of citizen-soldier was marked by the 'oath of the ephebes' and a procession to the sanctuary of Aglauros on the northern slope of the Acropolis. Aglauros was one of the daughters of Cecrops, the first autochthonous king of Attica, who was venerated after her suicide (see further below) (Aeschines, *On the Embassy* 167; Aristotle, *Constitution of the Athenians* 42; *IG* ii^2. 1156, 1189; see Vidal-Naquet (1983), 151–74 with the critical remarks by Polinskaya 2003).

The ephebeia has been interpreted in initiatory terms because the ephebes were located on the Attic frontier and given marginal status that exempted them from taxes and removed them from the judicial system, and it has been understood in relation to the ritual celebration of the Apatouria, which marked the registration of adolescents at the age of 16 in the lists of the *phratria*, the brotherhoods of citizen families. Under the control of Zeus Phratrios, the tutelary goddess Athena, and Apollo Patroos, the adolescents were put through the rite of the 'cutting of the hair' (*koureōtis*), the hair being dedicated to Artemis. Aetiologically, the name of the celebration is explained by a conflict on the border between Attica and Boeotia. The story goes that Melanthos, a hero whose name erokes darkness, under the protection of Dionysus with the skin of a black goat, vanquished his adversary through deception (*apatē*), subsequently becoming the king of Athens (cf. Hellanicus, *FGrHist* 4 F 125 = *FGrHist* 323a F 23; Ephorus, *FGrHist* 70 F 22). It is possible to see in the Apatouria the final phase of an initiation ritual for young Athenians, who were thereafter recognized by the head of a family (himself a citizen). In this case, we can see in the ephebeia an entrance-ritual to a period of service that involves the peer group, and presents some of the distinctive traits of an initiatory form of educational process.

23.4. Choral Education for Young Girls

The division of male adolescents into groups of the same age, and homoerotic relationships with a pedagogic purpose are two of the traits which connect the educational institutions of Greek cities in the archaic and classical eras to the anthropological model of the tribal initiation. Surprisingly, given the asymmetry of relations between the sexes in civic Greek communities, these two distinctive traits recur in the musical and gymnastic educational system for young girls, at least in archaic Sparta.

Reserved for female adolescents and performed by girls from the 'best' families in the city, *partheneia* were sung on various cult occasions. The few fragments of the poet Alcman that have reached us attest to an education in realizing the feminine ideal, in its dual function of erotic seduction and the bearing of future citizens (Alcman, frr. 1 and 3 Page; see also the testimonia of Aristophanes, *Lysistrata* 1296–312, and Theocritus, *Idyll* 18, with Calame 2001: 207–63).

The poet assumed the role of 'choir-master' (*khorodidaskalos*) in an initiatory form of musical and gymnastic education (which included, among other things, ritual races). The young girls were grouped into choruses, and learned through the

rhythms of dance and song the great foundation myths of the community. They participated in various cults in the civic calendar: the more specifically feminine celebrations, such as the cult of the eleven Dionysiades to the Leucippides and Dionysus; the double cult for Helen, heroized as a young girl near the Dromos or deified as a wife in Therapne; the choral dances in front of the temple of the tutelary goddess Athena 'of the bronze house' evoked by the chorus of Euripides' *Helen*; or the choral dances which probably accompanied the male adolescents at the close of their procession in display chariots for the Hyacinthia, celebrated in Amyclae in honour of Apollo and of his young beloved and companion (*paredros*) Hyacinthus (Calame 2001: 174–206; cf. Euripides, *Helen* 1464–77). Even though it is not possible to distinguish in all these cults a precise phase of a tribal initiation rite, the reference to heroes or adolescent gods in each leaves us in no doubt that they celebrate, ritually, a precise moment in which a young girl enters adult status, that is, the mature status of wife and citizen-mother.

The participation of a chorus of young girls is also found in Thebes, attested for example in one of Pindar's *partheneia*, which was sung on the occasion of the celebration of the ritual of Daphnephoria in honour of Apollo Ismenios, the adolescent god of adolescence (Pindar, fr. 94b Maehler; Calame 2001: 59–63 and 101–4). And note that Sappho's biographer makes the young girls associated with her group both companions (*hetairai*) and students. Education in the feminine ideal takes place in the poet's circle on the island of Lesbos through poetic means, inculcated through a culture of song and performance that reflects Greek civic culture. These songs include hymnic poems, intended to bring about the epiphany of Aphrodite in her cult-places, and marriage songs in the traditional, ritual form of the *humenaios* or epithalamium. The choral form of a good number of poems intended for a ritualized performance, as well as the transitory, asymmetrical homoerotic relationship maintained with her young companions by the adult Sappho, gives a strong initiatory character to the musical education provided to these groups of aristocratic young girls (see e.g. Williamson 1995: 95–132; also Cantarella in this volume). If we add to all this the gymnastic component of female education found in Sparta, the curriculum does not fundamentally differ, formally speaking, from the ritualized education given to young men. Gender determines some difference in content, but the arts of the Muses and the arts of the gymnasium were the two pillars of the Greek educational and academic system—a fact represented in the most important Panhellenic cult celebrations through the constant combination of musical and gymnastic contests for adolescents and adults (cf. Marrou 1965: 39–54 for Sparta, 69–82 for Athens, 177–213 for the Hellenistic era).

The Athenian cult calendar included some rituals of an initiatory character for female adolescents which were apparently less connected to the arts of the Muses and choral performance. The iconographic evidence indicates that very young Athenian girls gathered in a sanctuary consecrated to Artemis in Brauron

on the northern border of Attica for 'service as the she-bear' (*arkteuein*), which the ancients already interpreted as a ritual condition prior to entry into adulthood, as marked by marriage. In place of choral dances, the iconography attests to races in which adolescent girls participated, partially dressed and wearing masks representing a she-bear; these races were followed by sacrifice to Artemis (Brulé 1987: 360–98; Giuman 2002; Isler-Kerényi 2002). An inscription mentions a parthenon and a servants' house, in addition to a gymnasium and palaestra, in a sanctuary whose spatial organization seems to lend itself to rites with initiatory relevance. Moreover, we can see this in relation to the space reserved on the Acropolis for Artemis Brauronia, where offerings reflect the different phases of the menstrual cycle: birth, first period, labour and delivery, and danger of death in childbirth (Themelis 2002; Calame 2002; Faraone 2003).

The annual selection of four young Athenians, chosen by the King Archon to serve the priestess of Athena Polias, also seems to have an initiatory character. Responsible for weaving the *peplos* (robe) for Athena Polias, they stayed on the Acropolis near the sanctuary consecrated to Pandrosos (another daughter of the autochthonous king Cecrops), in front of the Erechtheion (a place commemorating the foundation of Attica). Two of the young *arrhēphoroi* celebrated the ritual hinted at in their title: the 'carrying of the dew' or the 'carrying of forbidden objects'. The two girls would go through a secret passageway to the sanctuary of Aphrodite in the Gardens to leave the objects entrusted to them by Athena's priestess, and bring back to the Acropolis an object placed with them under the seal of secrecy. The ritual marked the end of their service for these two *arrhēphoroi*, and has often been interpreted in terms of an initiation into feminine sexuality (Pausanias 1.27.3; Brulé 1987: 79–98).

The status of being *arrhēphoros* or a little she-bear is part of the ritual career outlined by the Athenians who form the choral group in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata*, according to which the young Athenian was *arrhēphoros* from the age of 7, *aletris* for Athena at 10, then a she-bear wearing a saffron-coloured robe, and finally *kanēphoros* as 'a beautiful young girl' (Aristophanes, *Lysistrata* 641–7, with scholia ad loc. at 4.33–4 Hangard; cf. Sourvinou-Inwood 1988: 111–52; Marinatos 2002; Perusino 2002). Whatever element of parody there may be in this system, ancient commentators viewed the stages it set out for achieving the feminine ideal in terms of levels of initiation in the mystery rites. Nevertheless, both service as she-bear and the ritual of the Arrhephoria were connected to heroic tales, to 'myths' which accounted for their institution. Thus the mysterious, pre-matrimonial rite of imitating a she-bear in Brauron dressed in a saffron-coloured robe was (when not linked to Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigeneia: cf. Bremmer in this volume, p. 683) supposed to be demanded by Artemis' devastating rage, as purification and atonement for the murder of a female bear. (This bear, which had been tamed and kept in the goddess's sanctuary, had hurt or killed a young girl who

wanted to play with the animal. The story may be related to the hunting-nymph Callisto, who was metamorphosed by Artemis into a female bear.) With regards to the ritual which concludes the service of the young Arrhephoroi, the aetiological account refers to the heroic origins of the city: born from the soil of Attica and fertilized by the sperm of Hephaestus, who was in pursuit of Athena, little Erechtheus was, as Erichthonius, picked up in a basket and placed in the care of the daughters of Cecrops, Aglauros, Pandrosos, and Herse. In spite of the goddess's prohibition the young girls looked inside, and found a snake next to the newborn child, the sight of which provoked both of them to commit suicide. Needless to say, both the young girl's death at the hands of Artemis' she-bear and the precipitation of the Cecropids from the rock of the Acropolis were interpreted as acts of symbolic death that generally mark the intermediate phase of marginalization in every tribal initiation rite. But what is this exactly about?

23.5. Narrative Logic and Aetiology

At the turn of the last century, Jane E. Harrison (1927: 1–29) proposed a reading of a Cretan cult-hymn whose epigraphic text had just been published and which, according to her, referred to 'primitive rites of tribal initiation'. The hymnic celebration of the birth and adolescence of Zeus Kouros by a chorus assimilated with the Kouretes could be given an initiatory interpretation by means of the analogy traced between the figure of the young Zeus (understood as an avatar of the *Eniautos Daimōn*) and Dionysus-Zagreus (who was, according to Orphic tradition, torn in pieces by the Titans before being returned to life by Zeus). This famous interpretation of a traditional story as a symbolic death constituting the central phase of rites of adolescence conducted in a savage space has been followed by many more initiatory interpretations of myths which focus on the figure of the adolescent. From Hippolytus to Ion via Neoptolemus and Orestes, from Iphigeneia to Antigone via Io and Helen (not to mention the unfortunate fate of many nymphs seduced by gods): intrigues in the great heroic sagas, scenes in tragedies, and even entire plays have been read according to the three-phase schema of a tribal initiation ritual. So, for example, Neoptolemus, after his 'initiatory' test near Philoctetes' grotto (he himself lived there as a sort of adult initiate!), became a famously bloodthirsty hero; Helen, after the adolescent kidnapping she consented to go through, rejoined the husband she left (leading to 'liminal transitions' that were, to say the least, paradoxical). (Bremmer, in his discussion of myth in this volume, links the 'kidnap' to archaic Spartan wedding customs: see p. 681 below.)

However, Hyacinthus in Sparta and the Cecropids in Athens, as well as a good many other adolescent heroes, died without ever acceding to the new status we should have expected for them. In fact, the underlying narrative logic of the plots of most stories of adolescence, far from reproducing the ritual logic of the three-phase tribal initiation, assumes an aetiological function. Unique in time, Hyacinthus' actions explain the repeated celebration of the Hyacinthia, while the Cecropids' mistake and suicide accounts for the Arrhephoria and perhaps the entrance-ceremony for the *ephēbeia*. The aetiological myth enriches the meaning of the rite, but by means that are generally metaphorical (and poetic).

It is a question, then, of not throwing out the baby with the bathwater. The tribal initiation rite, as well as other forms of rites of passage, is an essential operative concept for guiding anthropological comparisons that are indispensible for the study of Greek institutional practices for which the evidence is poor. In this regard, the image of 'crossing the threshold', to mark the transition and entrance into a new status, is essential in understanding the function of both the ritual practices and the aetiological accounts that legitimize them. This could lead us to consider rituals other than those connected to the process of social education: name-giving at the Amphidromia; assimilation into the household through the marriage ceremony; passage into Hades by different forms of funerary rite. Described in accounts which focus on individual heroic figures, as I have discussed, Greek practices of ritual education with an initiatory component are inscribed in a process of 'anthropopoiesis', the (highly symbolic and practical) cultural and institutional instruction of men and women in a given community.

Suggested Reading

On the Gymnopedia and related celebrations see Brelich (1969: 139–40, 186–207). An initiatory reading of the *ephēbeia* is given by Vidal-Naquet (1983: 151–74; but see also the critical remarks by Polinskaya 2003). On the poetic activities and the functions of Sappho's 'circle' see e.g. Williamson (1995: 95–132), Calame (2001: 208–63). Documents and texts relating to the Arkteia are commented on by Brulé (1987: 360–98), Giuman (2002), Isler-Kerényi (2002).

On peer groups and Greek adolescent rites of passage, the classic works are by Jeanmaire (1939) and Brelich (1969). Initiatory readings include Moreau (1992) (Paris-Alexander, Telemachus, the young Odysseus, Heracles, etc.); Padilla (1999) (Hyllus, Hippolytus, Ion, Orestes, and then successively, Iphigeneia, Io, Antigone, and Helen). On heroines, with greater prudence, see Dowden (1989), who adds, among others, the Proitids and Danaids. On Theseus and rites of adolescence see e.g. Waldner (2000: 102–221). The abuses of the projection of the schema of the rite of passage on different stories of adolescence have been noted by Versnel (1993: 48–60), and by Graf (2003); see also Calame (1992, 1999*b*).

On the concept of 'anthropopoiesis' see the various studies published in Affergan *et al.* (2003).

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CHAPTER 24

FRIENDSHIP, LOVE, AND MARRIAGE

EVA CANTARELLA

Friendship, love, and marriage are three different types of personal relationship. The first, main difference to be considered is the fact that friendship and love are emotional bonds, while marriage is a social and legal institution, not necessarily connected with an emotional bond. The first part of this chapter will discuss the nature of the emotional relationship created by friendship and love. The second part will consist in a description of the basic legal and social rules of Greek marriage and will end with some reflections on the relations between marriage and love.

24.1. Friendship

The meaning of the Greek words usually translated as 'friend' and 'friendship' (*philos* and *philia*) has determined a long, ongoing scholarly debate concerning the nature of friendship in the ancient world. As well as the human beings who feel them, emotions and sentiments live in history, that is to say, change through time and between different cultures. According to some scholars, the relationship that today we call friendship emerged only with the Renaissance (Gill 1994: 4600), or even later, in the eighteenth or even the nineteenth century. The Greek terms *philos* and *philia* (and their Latin equivalents) do not, according to this point of view, indicate a bond based on loyalty and affection between persons not belonging to the same family, in the way that modern friendship is generally understood. According

to Simon Goldhill, for example, the word *philos* does not describe just affection, 'but overridingly a series of complex obligations, duties and claims' (Goldhill 1986: 82). Taking into account anthropological research, and studying the role of hospitality (*xenia*) in archaic Greece, Moses Finley interpreted guest-friendship as part of a network of social relations and rules whose existence and status was indispensable in a community which was on the verge of becoming, but was not yet, fully political (Finley 1977; see also Donlan 1980: 24).

Recently, however, David Konstan, while acknowledging that friendship is a cultural concept that changes not only throughout the centuries and in different places, but even in the same place and moment, challenged these interpretations. On the basis of a deeper philological analysis of texts from Homer to the Hellenistic period, he maintained that, while *philia* has a broader sense than modern friendship (a sense that I shall discuss later), the word *philos* indicates—usually, albeit not always—an 'achieved' relationship, that is to say a relationship not based on *status* (as the so-called 'ascribed' relationship), but a voluntary bond of affection independent of pre-existing formal connection, such as citizenship, close kinship, neighbourhood, or military comradeship (Konstan 1997). Among the texts that confirm this hypothesis, suffice it to recall a Platonic dialogue, in which the topic 'Can virtue be taught?' is discussed. In the course of the discussion, one of the participants, Anytus, fears the possibility that someone may consider the sophists good teachers: 'May such a madness never seize any of my relations or friends, nor a fellow citizen or a foreigner!' (Plato, *Meno* 91c). Friendship, then, existed in the classical world as something that contrasted with other, 'ascribed', relationships, 'more or less analogously to the way modern friendship does' (Konstan 1997: 6). Exactly as in modern times, therefore, its existence depended on behaviour, and the behaviour expected from friends consisted basically in providing solidarity and assistance when required or needed (ibid. 1–23, 56–9).

24.2. Friendship or Love? Achilles and Patroclus

Among the many examples of friendly relationships documented by the texts, one of the most interesting and most often discussed is the relationship between Achilles and Patroclus in the *Iliad*.

Patroclus was, beyond a doubt, the person to whom Achilles was most attached. The nature and intensity of his reaction to the death of Patroclus, killed in combat by Hector, was uncontrollable. He did not limit himself to weeping for his friend: he gave him the honours of a princely funeral, including the sacrifice of twelve young Trojan princes (*Iliad* 23, esp. 175–6). With Patroclus dead, his life had one aim: to kill Hector, to avenge the death of his friend, and then lie with

him forever in the same grave. The affection Achilles felt for Patroclus (and vice versa) was far stronger and more intense then the usual bond between comrades. Was it friendship or love (Konstan 1997: 37–42; Skinner 2005: 42–4)? The question is complicated by the ambiguity of the Greek vocabulary of emotions. Though the usual meaning of *philos* is 'friend', in some cases it is also, in a relationship between two males, 'lover'. An example of this ambiguity may be found in the famous complaint about women's condition, pronounced by Medea in Euripides' tragedy: 'Whenever a man feels that he had enough of his home,' says Medea, 'he can always go out with someone who is a *philos*, or someone of his own age. A woman instead must spend all her time with the same person' (*Medea* 244–6). What kind of relationship is indicated by the word *philos* in this case is unclear: is a *philos* a friend or a lover?

In order to answer this question we must understand the Greek idea of love if and how a love bond between two males was socially evaluated, and this requires a preliminary specification. The Greeks had two different words for love: *erōs*, indicating an irresistible and often fatal sexual desire, and *philia*, whose meaning was wider than the broadest meaning of *philos* and indicated, besides friendship, a strong, loving affection that could also include sexual intercourse, both heterosexual and homosexual.

24.3. Love in the Form of Eros

One of the most interesting texts discussing the nature of Eros may be found in Plato's *Symposium*, a dialogue specially dedicated to the discussion of this topic. Among the participants in the banquet are Aristophanes and Pausanias. When his turn comes to express his opinion, Aristophanes tells a myth (189c–193c): originally, he says, there were three sexes. At that time, human beings were different: they had the form of a sphere, and they moved by rolling along on four hands and four feet. Each one had two faces, on opposite sides of the sphere, and, also on opposite sides, two sexual organs. Some had two male sexual organs, others had two female sexual organs, and still others (the hermaphrodites) had one male organ and one female organ. However, one day they became too arrogant and attacked Olympus; as a result, they were punished by Zeus, who cut each one in half. From that moment on each half began to search for its lost half. Those who were originally completely men began to look for another man; those who were completely women began to search for another woman; those who were hermaphrodites began to search for the opposite sex. And they were all happy only when they were able to find their other half, embrace him or her, and be reunited. Eros, then, according to this myth, consists in an irresistible desire to couple with another person, whose sex is sometimes different sometimes the same as that of the person who feels this kind of desire.

How *erōs* between two men was considered is very clearly set out by Aristophanes in the following part of his speech. Those who come from hermaphrodites are lovers of women: in Aristophanes' opinion most adulterers come from this group. The women who seek other women—unsurprisingly—he dismisses with an extremely harsh term: *hetairistriai*. Men who seek other men, on the other hand, enter into marriage for social reasons, but are happy to live among themselves, without women. Of the three categories, this is the only one that is the object of his praise: having been completely men, in fact, they best express virility, and when they become adults, they are the best suited to being leaders. Can we read an ironic intent in this affirmation? In the *Knights*, Aristophanes views the link between politics and pederasty (see further below) as a form of prostitution. Yet it does not seem that Plato's Aristophanes intends this link as ironic. And his praise of love between men as superior to heterosexual love is shared by Pausanias, in whose opinion two types of love exist, one is inspired by Heavenly Aphrodite, the other by Vulgar Aphrodite, and the main difference between them is the fact that he who is inspired by Vulgar Aphrodite loves either men or women without making a distinction, while he who is inspired by Heavenly Aphrodite loves boys (180c–185c).

Of course, Aristophanes' and Pausanias' opinion was not shared by all the Greeks, but love between two men was certainly not a scandal in Greece. It was instead accepted and socially praised, at least insofar as it took the form of the love called 'pederasty'—the love-bond between an adult man, the *erastēs* or 'lover', and a boy, known as the *erōmenos* or 'beloved'.

24.4. Pederasty

The limits on this practice—how widespread it was in terms of geography and social class, when and how it began to be practised, when and why it stopped—are the subjects of much debate among modern scholars. However, the basic fact remains: it was practised on a more widespread basis and with greater public approval than any other form of homosexual relationship at any time in any western culture. However, to define pederasty simply as a 'homosexual relationship' (as was customary at one time) would be to attribute to the Greeks a concept which did not exist in their world. Today it is generally accepted among scholars that an adult man in ancient Greece could express sexual desire for another male and have a sexual relationship with him, so long as the desired male was an adolescent (*pais*) whom the adult loved within the context of the socially codified and positively valued relationship which we call pederastic.

The basic rules of pederasty were the following: the lover had an active, the boy a passive role—though by 'activity' and 'passivity' the Greeks understood not necessarily and not only sexual roles, but also and above all intellectual and

moral roles (Cantarella 2002: pp. xii–xiii; Lear and Cantarella 2008: ch. 1; see also McClure's discussion in the next chapter). The couple composed of two males, in other words, was socially and culturally accepted if it was 'asymmetrical'. How asymmetry was meant, however, is debated. According to the majority of modern scholars, it meant that only one person (the adult) experienced love in the form of desire and sexual pleasure (*erōs*), while the other (the boy) was merely the object of it and felt for his lover the kind of love called *philia*, in the sense of loving devotion and gratitude. According to others, however, the 'asymmetry' consisted of other inequalities within the relationship. The first and most decisive of these (from which the term 'pederasty' derives) was the difference in age between the adult 'lover' and the adolescent 'beloved'. This brought with it another important element of asymmetry: the adult transmitted to the boy, who obviously did not already have it, his experience in every field, assuming in their encounters a formative role at the moment in which the boy—a potential citizen—prepared himself to become an actual citizen, able to exercise his civil and political duties. The *erastēs* taught, the *erōmenos* learned. As has been said, the *paideia* (education) of the Athenian boy was entrusted to his relationship with the *erastēs* (Koch-Harnack 1983: 90–7).

If we go back to the bond between Achilles and Patroclus, we can now understand the reason for the question whether they were friends or a pederastic couple. That they were lovers was taken for granted in the classical period. In Aeschylus' *Myrmidons*, Achilles, in front of his friend's dead body, shouts out his desperation in language only a lover would use (frr. 135–6 Radt):

> You did not respect my pure reverence for your thighs,
> ungrateful for our intense kisses!

Aeschines, in his oration *Against Timarchus* (1.142), also cites the two heroes among the couples celebrated by lovers, as does pseudo-Lucian (*Erotes* 54).

Leaving to one side the question of their sexual roles, much debated among the ancients (which of the two was the lover and which was the beloved?), it is clear that Achilles and Patroclus were not *friends*. Their bond was asymmetrical, in the sense outlined above, while friendship was considered a symmetrical relationship (Konstan 1997: 38). Achilles and Patroclus were a pederastic couple.

24.5. Eros Between Two Women

Eros, of course, was not experienced only by men engaged in pederastic relationship. In the archaic period it was also recognized between two women, as long as it was limited to a certain period of feminine life—namely, during the period which

young women, before getting married, spent together in religious communities called *thiasoi*, where they were taught the virtues of a married woman from a 'teacher'. In tribal societies (such as Greece was before the birth of the city-state), life in a *thiasos* was a feminine rite of passage from impuberty to puberty (Sergent 1996: 342–52; Calame in this volume). The institution disappeared when the city-state was born, but we are informed of its existence thanks to some famous love-poems composed in the seventh century BCE, in the last days of the *thiasoi*. The authoress of these poems was Sappho, the teacher of a *thiasos* located in the island of Lesbos (hence the modern term 'lesbians' to indicate homosexual women—a term that the Greeks never used in that sense), whose poems celebrate her love for her pupils. Among Sappho's poems, the most famous is addressed to one of the girls of the *thiasos*, who had probably left or was going to leave it in order to get married (fr. 31 Lobel–Page):

> He seems to me to be equal to god, that man who is sitting facing you and hearing your sweet voice and your lovely laugh. I swear it, that makes my heart flutter in my breast. For whenever I look at you I can not speak anymore. My tongue becomes silent, a subtle fire runs under my skin, with my eyes I cannot see, my ears ring, and cold sweat possesses me; I tremble, I am paler than grass, and I seem near to death. But all is to be endured since even...

It is difficult to deny that the sentiment felt by Sappho for this girl was love in the form of *erōs* (Dover 1978: 173–84; Skinner 2005: 58–61), an emotion that she explicitly envisages as a violent natural phenomenon in a famous fragment from one of her poems (fr. 47 Lobel–Page):

> And Eros shook my heart
> like a wind in the mountains falling upon oaks.

But as already mentioned, any documentation of this form of love between women disappears in later texts, and in later times met the strongest disapproval (see the passage of Plato's *Symposium* quoted above).

24.6. Eros Between Men and Women

So much for *erōs* in what we call 'homosexual' relationships. As far as *erōs* between men and women is concerned, the first thing to say is that it was not expected of Greek men that they should feel this kind of love towards their wives. Conjugal love, as we will see, took the form of *philia*. Greek men usually felt and lived *erōs* with other women. As stated in a famous passage of a speech attributed to Demosthenes, an Athenian man might have three women: a wife (*damar*) 'for the

production of legitimate children'; a concubine (*pallakē*) 'for the care of the body' (i.e. for regular sexual relations); and a 'companion' (*hetaira*) 'for pleasure' (ps.-Demosthenes, *Against Neaera* 122). The women for whom Athenian men felt passionate love were, at times, *hetairai*, a very special type of prostitute (cf. MacClure in the next chapter), paid for work which included sexual relations but not only this. *Hetairai* accompanied men to social occasions where wives and concubines (a sort of second-class wife) were not allowed, namely to the banquets (*sumposia*) which played such an important role in Greek cultural life (see Hobden in this volume). In order to be equal to their social function, *hetairai* were educated to sing, to dance, and to have a cultivated conversation. As their name indicates, they were not occasional partners—one-night (or one-hour) stands. They had a more stable, even if not exclusive, relationship with their partners, and in consideration of the social role they accomplished they enjoyed, albeit as prostitutes, a certain social status and consideration. An example of a client who fell in love with a *hetaira* and enjoyed with her a loving, passionate relationship is the speechwriter Hyperides, lover of the famous courtesan Phryne.

The most famous erotic love stories between men and women, however, were the prohibited ones, concerning, for example, adultery. The first, inevitable example is Helen of Troy and Paris Alexander. Helen fell in love with Paris and followed him to Troy, his fatherland. She was the victim of Aphrodite, the mother of the god Eros, the goddess of Love herself. Helen could not resist the force of passion. Needless to say, the consequences of such a love were terrible: a decennial war and the death of the best of the Achaeans and of the Trojans. Another famous story of adultery, that concerning Jason and Medea, had equally terrible consequences. In Euripides' tragedy, the danger of *erōs* when too strong is articulated by the chorus (*Medea* 627–33):

> Eros, if too violent, does not bring good reputation
> to men, nor virtue. If Aphrodite comes with moderation,
> she is a divine, incommensurable gift.
> O Goddess, please do not shoot me with the arrow of desire,
> the inescapable arrow from your golden bow.

24.7. *Philia*

As already said, the meaning of *philia* encompasses friendship and love. One of the most interesting authors for understanding the meaning of *philia* is Aristotle, who analyses this kind of love in his ethic treatises. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* he distinguishes *philia* based on equality, such as friendship, and *philia* based on

superiority, such as that between fathers and sons, between husbands and wives, and between rulers and the ruled (1158b1–1159a12). One of these forms of *philia*, then (that between husband and wife), corresponds to an emotion that we qualify as love, and Aristotle offers very interesting reflections on its nature.

Human beings, he observes, are naturally inclined to form couples, but they do not do it only in order to reproduce, as animals do. Human beings form couples also in order to enjoy a pleasant life, organizing work and dividing goods. Conjugal *philia*, therefore, is a sentimental bond which may be based on the virtues of the partners. Both men and women possess different, specific virtues. Children make the bond between husband and wife stronger: it is not by chance that marriages without offspring are more easily dissolved. It is good, then, if between husband and wife exists a bond of love, which may be at the same time useful and pleasant (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1162a16–33).

Philia, the kind of love Aristotle is speaking of, is then very different from erotic love—not surprisingly, indeed. The family (*oikos*) is the central element of Aristotle's political project, so the love he is interested in is a peaceful, quiet, undisturbing sentiment, necessary to the harmony and the order of the household, and characterized by the differences between the partners, differences which Aristotle specifies in his political works: 'Although there may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by nature fitter for command than the female' (*Politics* 1259b2–3); only men possess reason in full, women possess it but without authority (1260a13); as a consequence, command belongs to men, both in the city and in the family. In the family the husband has over his wife 'a constitutional authority' (the authority of a *politikos*) but, while constitutional authority involves an alternation of command among citizens, in the relation between men and women there is no alternation, because 'the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior, and the one rules, the other is ruled; this principle of necessity extends to all mankind' (1254b13–14).

Did Aristotle's theory of conjugal love correspond to the social and emotional reality? Was the relationship between husband and wife inspired by a similar idea of marriage? The answer may come from description of the legal norms concerning this institution.

24.8. Marriage

Marriage was the institution that gave birth to a new family. It was celebrated between a man and a woman who had the legal capacity to become husband and wife. From 450 BCE, according to some scholars, it was (implicitly) forbidden between Athenians and foreigners, in consequence of 'Pericles' Law' (in reality a decree) which was passed in 451/50. This decree stated that, from then on, citizenship would be granted only to children born from both an Athenian father

and an Athenian mother (Aristotle, *Constitution of the Athenians* 42.1–2; cf. *Politics* 1278a26–34 and 1319b8–10). According to other scholars, however, the prohibition on marrying foreigners was introduced only in 403, when Pericles' decree was re-enacted, and this rule was explicitly expressed (ps.-Demosthenes, *Against Neaera* 16, 52).

The main function of marriage was the procreation of legitimate (*gnēsioi*) children—that is to say, new citizens, who would inherit the father's property. Usually, Athenian girls were promised to a future husband when they were very young, by their *kurios*, that is, the man who had personal power over her—in the first instance her father or, if her father was dead, a brother with whom she shared the same father, or her paternal grandfather, or her uncle, if she had no brothers. Upon marriage, the husband became his wife's *kurios*.

The ceremony necessary to promise a girl to her future husband was called *enguē* (or *enguēsis*). It was performed by the *kurios*, who had to say: 'I grant my daughter [or sister, or niece . . .] to you.' The presence of the bride at the *enguē* was not legally required; nor was her consent. Often she was simply informed after the event that she had been engaged (MacDowell 1978: 86; Patterson 1998: 109).

Enguē, however, was different from modern betrothal. In addition to creating an obligation (albeit only social), it had a legal function that modern betrothals do not have: it was necessary for the existence of the marriage. (Discussion in Just 1989: 40–50; Blundell 1995: 122–4; Patterson 1998: 108–9.) Technically, it was a 'condition of legitimacy' for the future marriage. Anyhow, *enguē* was necessary, but not sufficient, to create a marriage. The marital bond was born only if and when the bride went to live in the house of the groom, where the bride was accompanied during a ceremony called *ekdosis* (literally: 'delivery'), which usually took place when the woman reached the age of 13 or 14 (Cantarella 2005: 246–7).

Besides the death of one of the spouses, marriage could be dissolved by three different acts. The first and most widespread was repudiation by the husband (*apopempsis*, or *ekpempsis*). Repudiation was possible without need of justification. The husband who wanted to divorce his wife simply had to give back the dowry. The second act that could dissolve a marriage was the abandonment of the conjugal roof by the wife (*apoleipsis*). This was more complicated, because it had to be recorded by the *arkhōn*, and in this procedure the woman had to be represented by the man who would become her *kurios* once she was released from marriage. Though the sources are silent on this topic, divorce *really* initiated by women was very probably rare: as Medea says in her famous speech denouncing the many injustices experienced by women, if a woman divorces her husband she gets a bad reputation (Euripides, *Medea* 236–7)—which did not happen, of course, to the man who divorced his wife.

Again, the dissolution of a marriage could be the consequence of the decision of a third person. Usually this person was the father of the bride, who could call back his daughter, most often in order to give her to another husband. This act was called *aphairesis*, and was possible only if the daughter had not yet borne a

child. It was the birth of a child, then, and not marriage, which tied the bride to the husband's family. In some cases, when a woman was a so-called heiress, the third person who could interrupt the marriage was the nearest relative in the male line (Patterson 1998: 91–103).

24.9. Marriage and Love

The presence, quality, and intensity of *erōs* in marriages, compared to *erōs* in other types of sexual relationship, has been the object of many discussions. According to some scholars, marriage was the appropriate venue for reciprocal sexual desire (Calame 1996), but this is an idea very difficult to endorse. As Goldhill writes: 'for passionate poetry, profound and soul-searching discussion, great stories and self-aware and sophisticated humour, it's not to marriage we must turn' (Goldhill 2004: 55). Of course, *erōs* was not totally absent from marriages; reproduction requires a minimum of it. And certainly in some marriages a strong reciprocal sexual desire was felt. But if it was, it was a lucky occurrence (Blundell 1995: 121–2). Marriages, as we have seen, were the institution that Athenian society and law had designed for the ordered procreation of citizens, and were often interrupted by persons other than the spouses: such an institution can hardly be considered the most appropriate venue for Eros. The form of love experienced in marriage was *philia*.

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CHAPTER 25

SEXUALITY AND GENDER

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The subject of sexuality and gender in ancient Greece encompasses a broad range of attitudes, practices, and representations that cannot be considered a single subfield, but rather consists of distinct and overlapping strands of enquiry. A glance at the third edition of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, for instance, shows how diverse these studies have become over the last several years: separate entries are found on gynaecology, heterosexuality, homosexuality, marriage, prostitution, sexuality, and women, all topics that might be construed as aspects of the study of ancient sexuality and gender and that a century ago might have been classed, with the exception of homosexuality, under the category 'woman'. That this enormous growth has occurred in the last forty years is due largely to the influence of contemporary critical discourse, particularly psychoanalysis, structuralism, and feminist and cultural theory.

The ancient Greeks themselves had no specific or overarching terms for either gender or sexuality, yet distinctions based on biological sex were deeply embedded in the linguistic, cognitive, political, and social structures of their society at all periods. The words *arrēn* (male) and *thēlus* (female) delineated the sexes and often implied a binary opposition between the two, while the word *genos* (kind) denoted biological sex as a class. The usage implied that men and women belonged to separate generic categories or even species, as in the case of the *genos gunaikōn*, 'race of women' (e.g. Hesiod, *Theogony* 590–1; see Loraux 1993). In Plato's *Symposium*, the comic poet Aristophanes' playful speech about the origins of human desire suggests that the Greeks considered biological sex-difference prior to other characteristics,

since his spherical creatures initially have gender but lack sexuality until split in half (189e):

> In the beginning there were three kinds (*genē*) of human beings, not just the two, the male (*arrēn*) and the female (*thēlu*), as at present; there was a third that shared the characteristics of the other two, and whose name survives, even though the thing itself has disappeared. For at that time one was androgynous (*androgunon*) in form and shared its name with both the male (*arrenos*) and the female (*thēleos*).

Indeed, the triple sex of these creatures is described well before there is mention of their unusual shape and structure. Just as biological sex precedes sexuality in these accounts, so men were thought to come into being before women in Greek mythology; Pandora, the first female, enters a world already well populated by mortal men.

For sexuality, the Greeks used the more literal term *ta aphrodisia* (literally 'the things of Aphrodite') to refer to the range of sexual activities in which they engaged and which belonged to the realm of Aphrodite, while *erōs* denoted sexual desire for a specific person. In Hesiod's *Theogony*, the god Eros is one of the earliest deities to be born, prior to Aphrodite; his presence in the cosmos makes possible the reproduction of its parts through the union of male and female after the initial acts of parthenogenic creation (*Theogony* 120–3). Just as the Greeks had no single word to express the concepts of gender and sexuality, so, too, they had no term for homosexuality. In Aristophanes' speech, however, there is clearly an idea of innate sexual orientation: the so-called androgynous spheres desire the opposite sex when split, while those compounded entirely of male or female parts exclusively seek only partners of the same sex (Plato, *Symposium* 191e–192a). While the general topic of sexuality may have required vague euphemism in the literary tradition, sexual habits and practices are sometimes quite directly described in many other sources, especially in Attic Old Comedy, as well as in the visual tradition of Athenian pottery.

The study of women in antiquity began in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a historical and positivist enquiry into the social position of women in ancient Greece through the examination of literary, juridical, philosophical, and historical texts from antiquity. Probably the most influential work for later scholars was Johann Bachofen's *Das Mutterrecht* ('Mother Right': Bachofen 1861). Examining evidence from many ancient societies, he proposed that the earliest human civilizations were originally matriarchal. The elevated status of the mother was closely linked to agrarian societies in which female figurines and the worship of maternal deities predominated, along with the privileging of the mother–child bond. Matriarchy, in Bachofen's view, gradually yielded to patriarchy through the introduction of social and religious institutions, particularly monogamous marriage and the worship of male sky gods, such as Zeus in Bronze Age Greece. Although Bachofen's views have largely been discredited, his theory influenced the modern study of

women in antiquity in its early years. A few decades later, Ivo Bruns' *Fraueneman-cipation in Athen* ('Women's Emancipation in Athens': Bruns 1900) argued from a more historical, positivist position, for a feminist movement in which women demanded equal political rights and opportunities within the city-state in late fifth-century Athens. These works, however, remained relatively unique contributions to the field for well over half a century, until the late 1960s, when feminism as a social movement in the United States and western Europe began to change the shape of scholarly discourse in classics and other academic disciplines.

The publication in the USA of a special edition of the classical journal *Arethusa* (vol. 6, no. 1, 1973) in the early 1970s both responded to the growing interest of classical scholars in the lives and representations of women in ancient Greece and promoted further discussion. Soon after, Sarah Pomeroy published *Goddesses, Wives, Whores, and Slaves* (Pomeroy 1975). This book had a catalysing effect on the study of women in antiquity, both in the scholarly community as well as in the classroom, attracting the attention of a vast number of general readers. Pomeroy, a historian, wrote the book in response to the question of 'what women were doing while men were active in all the areas traditionally emphasized by classical scholars' (ibid., p. ix). In her view, major works of ancient history simply omitted 'women' as a social category. Pomeroy thus sought to balance the picture by recovering the lives of ancient women despite the challenges posed by the primary sources, most of which were written by men. She argued that literary texts such as plays and epic should not be considered accurate representations of everyday life, although they may shed light on how ancient cultures viewed women. Rather, other types of texts, history, biography, letters, and legal texts, as well as visual materials and papyri, could more reliably illuminate the daily lives of ancient women, particularly those of the elite classes.

Following the publication of Pomeroy's book, several new collections of essays devoted to the subject of women in antiquity appeared in the United States. Foley (1981*a*) grew out of a special issue of the journal *Women's Studies*, and represented the first collection of essays on women in the ancient world to be published in a major women's studies journal. Another early anthology brought a wide range of perspectives to the study of women in the ancient world: Cameron and Kuhrt (1983) had a comparative purpose, providing material on women from many different ancient societies, including Greece, Rome, the Near East, and diverse historical periods, ranging from the classical world to early Christian and Jewish thought, to the medieval era. Finally, Lefkowitz and Fant (1982) offered accessible translations of a wide range of ancient sources on women, some never before published in English.

Whereas Pomeroy and others concentrated on reconstructing the actual circumstances of ancient Greek women's lives, other scholars considered the conceptual structures that informed the literary and mythical representation of women, and how they intersected with social and political institutions. To access these

structures, classicists turned to critical approaches pioneered by scholars in other fields, namely structuralism and psychoanalytic theory. Two essays from the early 1980s on women in Athenian drama, Foley (1981*b*) and Zeitlin (1985), show this new emphasis. Instead of attempting to recover the lives of actual women, they explore the thought-patterns and beliefs behind their literary and mythic representations and its relation to the social and ideological context of democratic Athens. This shift of focus stemmed in part from the influence of structuralist anthropology on classical studies. Structuralist theory holds that the structure of language itself produces reality; linguistic structures, not individuals, produce and determine meaning, since people can only think through language. Thus individuals do not make meaning, as in the Romantic humanist model; rather, meaning is culturally determined. A structuralist approach, therefore, examines the symbolic structures that inform a particular culture, its mental universe, or imaginary, and has a synchronic rather than diachronic focus. In particular, works such as Vernant (1965) inspired more than a generation of classical scholars to consider the conceptual frameworks underlying ancient Greek literature and culture, with particular emphasis on binary oppositions such as nature and culture, female and male, wild and civilized.

French structuralists, however, were not much concerned with questions of gender until Nicole Loraux's explorations of sexual difference in Loraux (1981*a*, *b* and 1985). Her work not only had a lasting impact on both sides of the Atlantic, it also engendered some of the most interesting research today on Greek ideas about the feminine. Some scholars, especially historians of women in antiquity, have criticized the structuralist approach for detaching women as subjects from their historical contexts in favour of examining thought-structures and categories that presumably remain unchanged through time (Blok 1987: 40–1). Other scholars have taken issue with the structuralist tendency to rely on binary oppositions for understanding the ancient imaginary, since, in their view, such oppositions cannot accurately reflect the actual contradictions between ideology and social practice characteristic of any society, ancient or modern (D. Cohen 1991).

Psychoanalytic theory also played a pivotal role in some of the research on women in ancient Greece during the early period. Slater (1968) explored the seemingly hostile relationship between mothers and sons in Greek mythology, particularly in the stories surrounding the house of Atreus. He argued that such accounts reflected the psycho-social reality of the classical polis. Frustrated by her lack of domestic and political power, the Greek mother displaced her ambitions onto her male children, and yet because of her own thwarted desire remained emotionally ambivalent toward them. This psychological dynamic, in Slater's view, explains the pervasive misogyny of ancient Greek culture. His provocative hypothesis, while influential in the 1970s and 1980s, has largely been discredited in recent years, on the grounds that the ancient Greek extended family, living under one roof together with slaves and livestock, bore little resemblance to the Victorian households that produced the subjects of Freudian psychoanalysis.

The study of women in ancient Greece, as well as sexuality (discussed more fully below), was powerfully influenced, and perhaps irrevocably altered, by the first volume of Michel Foucault's *Histoire de la sexualité* (Foucault 1976–84). In Volume 2, *L'Usage des plaisirs*, and Volume 3, *Le Souci de soi*, Foucault examines non-canonical classical texts to understand not only ancient sexual practices, but how they formed part of a complex process of constructing self-identity and negotiating power in the European tradition. Strongly influenced by Kenneth Dover's research on homosexuality in ancient Greece, he sought to understand the role of sexuality in the construction of the western subject and its origins in ancient Greece. Foucault distinguished gender as a socially constructed category separate from biological sex; in his view, a culture produces gender difference through its various social discourses—from the way people dress to the laws that govern them—in order to maintain existing power structures. Gender therefore must be understood not as an absolute category based on biological sex, but as a 'constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes' (Scott 1986: 1067).

Several books concerned with Greek sexuality followed the English translation of the second volume of *Histoire de la sexualité*, including Halperin (1990), Winkler (1990), and the path-breaking collection of essays, *Before Sexuality* (Halperin, Winkler, and Zeitlin 1990). All of these books combined Foucault's theories with varying amounts of French structuralism. Although his work resulted in an explosion of writings by classical scholars, Foucault received a mixed reception from feminist scholars. Amy Richlin argues that Foucauldian analysis, and its subsequent incarnations, new historicism and cultural studies, erases women both as subjects and scholars (Richlin 1991). Foxhall, on the other hand, believes that Foucault's general analysis of power and its transmission through discursive practices provides an invaluable tool to feminist classicists and non-classicists alike (Foxhall 1994; see D. Cohen 1992, Skinner 1996). Classicists in general have argued that Foucault considers only those sources that suit his argument, ignoring many ancient discursive fields, such as that of the novel and other comic genres (Larmour, Miller, and Platter 1998: 25–6).

The publication and widespread use of the textbook *Women in the Classical World* (Fantham *et al.* 1994), a work that gathers together the most important primary sources on ancient women and places them in their social and historical context, attest to the central position of gender and women's studies in the field of classics today. Now that dialogue about women in the Hellenic world and their cultural representations have entered the mainstream, scholarly discourse has moved to other, less frequently considered aspects of gender in sources like the medical corpus, Hellenistic poetry, the Greek novel, and other forms of literary production in the Second Sophistic period. One important area that has attracted more notice in recent years is prostitution, a subject also of interest in understanding ancient Greek attitudes towards sexuality, a topic discussed more fully below. Another trend

has concentrated on the status and history of women in other parts of the Greek-speaking world, such as Graeco-Roman Egypt (Rowlandson 1998) and late antiquity (Clark 1993), or on specialized topics, like the role of women in Greek religion (Dillon 2002; Goff 2004).

The sexual practices of the ancient Greeks attracted the attention of scholars much earlier than questions about the status and position of Greek women. Well before Bachofen, scholars such as Friedrich-Karl Forberg (1770–1848) began to classify and organize information about ancient sexual behaviour. He first edited a collection of obscene Latin epigrams, to which he composed an appendix that listed source material on the sexual practices of the ancient Greeks and Romans and catalogued, among other things, over ninety sexual positions (Halperin, Winkler, and Zeitlin 1990: 8–9). A notable omission in Forberg's work was homosexuality, a central and accepted feature of ancient Greek life and a subject of intense scholarly focus over a hundred years later. Not until the 1920s, when Paul Brandt, published *Sittengeschichte Griechenlands* ('Sexual Life in Ancient Greece': Brandt 1925–8) under the pseudonym 'Hans Licht', did the subjects of male homosexual sex and female prostitution receive full treatment from a classical scholar. For several decades this book served as a comprehensive reference for ancient Greek sexual attitudes and practices.

In a trend parallel to that of women's studies in the academy, research about sexuality in ancient Greece became much more widespread among classical scholars both in the United States and in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. During this period two major works critical for the study of sexuality in the Hellenic world appeared: Henderson (1975) provided a glossary of obscene language in Attic Old Comedy and discussed its significance, thereby bringing to scholarly attention a wealth of material that reflected ancient Greek views of male and female sexual practices. Dover, in *Greek Homosexuality* (1978), examined representations of male homoeroticism and attitudes towards sexuality in Attic vase painting, comedy, lyric poetry, Plato, oratory, and Hellenistic poetry. Influenced by psychoanalytic theory, Dover attempted to unmask the 'truth' of ancient Greek sexuality and did so with unprecedented explicitness, emphasizing the physical element in homosexuality that had been obscured by earlier scholarship.

In what was to become a foundational idea in the field, Dover distinguished between the active and passive partners in homoerotic sexual activity, terming the former the *erastēs* ('lover') and the latter the *erōmenos* ('beloved'), a relationship exemplified in the mythological tradition by Zeus' abduction of Ganymede. Pederasty in its ideal, Platonic form dictated that an older male admirer, the *erastēs*, could pursue a boy, or *erōmenos*; the boy in turn could choose to gratify (*kharizesthai*) his lover's passion in order to acquire social status or material gain, but sexual desire did not represent an acceptable motive, otherwise he could be branded a *pornos* ('whore'; Dover 1978: 2nd edn. 53). Dover also stressed that Greeks believed the appropriate objects of homoerotic desire were youths just at the onset

of puberty, when facial hair first appeared. One who enjoyed being the object of this type of sexual interest was considered to be a *kinaidos*, a passive homosexual who degraded himself by a lack of sexual self-control and a willingness to submit to the dominant partner.

As an example, Dover cites Timarchus, the subject of Aeschines' speech, *Against Timarchus*, which he analyses in the first half of his book. There he makes another move important for all subsequent discourse on the subject: he links the sexual behaviour of Athenian males to the political life of the polis. According to this interpretation, one later promulgated by Foucault, Timarchus suffered the loss of his citizen rights because he prostituted himself, passively offering his body to his customers. Dover also believed that sex between men among the ancient Greeks was a behaviour rather than a psychological mentality or orientation; as such, he believed they practised a form of 'pseudo-homosexuality', a term that he borrowed from George Devereux (Dover 1973: 65–7; Davidson 2001: 10). Thus, sexual relations between persons of the same gender did not constitute a defining aspect of the individual, but rather one of many possible forms of sexual engagement.

In 1982 Foucault praised the French translation of Dover's book as a landmark work in a review for the journal *Masques*, and fully accepted his penetration model of Greek sexuality (see Davidson 2001: 17). Foucault subsequently put activity and passivity at the core of his own ideas about Greek morality and notions of the self, citing Dover extensively in *L'Usage des plaisirs* (Foucault 1976–84: vol. 2). He ruminated on the 'antinomy of the boy', that is, the problematization of the self in the pederastic relationship: how could the boy become a subject in control of his emotions, a master, when he himself functioned as an object of pleasure? For Foucault, the rudiments of the modern western subject could be traced back to the conflict inherent in the Greek practice of boy love. The penetration model proposed by Dover and reiterated through the philosophy of Foucault, only with broad-sweeping consequences for modern notions of the self, engendered an avalanche of scholarship on Greek sexuality over the next three decades, irrevocably changing how classical scholars understand the Hellenic world. Even Foucault's detractors in the field of classics have embraced on some level the model of ancient sexuality that defines sex in terms of sexual penetration and dominance.

Not until the publication of Davidson (2001), which served as the seed of Davidson (2007), *The Greeks and Greek Love*, has there been a compelling critique of this 'zero-sum game' notion of sexuality in which one partner wins at the expense of the other and which puts penetration at the centre of sexual behaviour. In his view, the competitive penetration is 'incompatible with morality of self-mastery' that dominates Greek ethical discourse throughout the classical period (Davidson 2001: 31). Moreover, he finds that a modern heterosexual bias underpins Dover's understanding of Greek homosexuality: indeed, the latter actually states that the *erōmenos* resembles 'the good woman' of respectable British society during the nineteenth century (Dover 1978: 90). In the case of Timarchus, at issue is commerce or sex for

pay, not penetration or passive sexual behaviour. Few, if any, ancient Greek verbs of sexual congress indicate aggression and/or dominance. Rather than an expression of passivity, female sexuality is constructed as an inability to master sexual desire, a limitless infinitude of desire that contrasts the bounded nature of male desire. Therefore the dread *kinaidos* must not be understood as a passive homosexual but as an effeminate adulterer, much like the archetypical philanderer Paris, who was considered weak and womanish because unable to master his desires.

However, what Davidson finds most offensive, albeit paradoxical, in both authors is the almost complete erasure of the concept of male homosexuality from the Hellenic world. In depicting male–male sexual behaviour as 'adolescent horse-play' distinct from psychological homosexuality, Dover promulgates a notion of homosexual sex as inauthentic and unreal, what Davidson calls 'quasi-sexual sex'. According to Davidson, Foucault's 'hostility to the notion of homosexual identity' explains his desire to undermine the notion of a trans-historical gay identity and replace it with an idea of the cultural contingency of sexuality (Davidson 2001: 36). While Dover rescued a taboo subject by making it more palatable to a heterosexual audience, Foucault shielded his sexual identity from homophobia. Davidson argues that the most productive path for new scholarship on Greek homosexuality lies in considering the homoerotic at a distance, the idealization of the male body in sculpture, gymnastic culture, archaic lyric, and friendship, ideas explored more fully in Davidson (2001: 49; see also Davidson 2007).

One other important area of research on sexuality in ancient Greece that deserves brief mention is female prostitution. Apart from courting young boys, citizen males in classical Athens could avail themselves of many different types of sex-worker and entertainer, from dancers and flute-players, to the lowly brothel worker (*pornē*) and her upscale counterpart, the courtesan (*hetaira*). Interest in prostitution in classical antiquity follows a trajectory similar to that of sexuality and the status and position of women. Brandt's *Sittengeschichte Griechenlands* (discussed above) gathered together numerous literary allusions to female prostitution, many of them from Book 13 of Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistai* ('Sophists at Table'), remaining the standard work on prostitution for several decades. Although a few studies of the character of the courtesan in Greek comedy appeared in the intervening years, it was not until the 1980s that scholarship on Greek prostitution began to proliferate. Scholars explored representations of *hetairai* on Attic vases (Peschel 1987), as well as their legal and social position as foreigners, slaves, and independent wage-earners (Reinsberg 1989; Vanoyeke 1990). Again, the work of Foucault would have a powerful impact in shaping this area of research by fostering nuanced and original readings of Greek cultural discourses on prostitution. In 'The Democratic Body: Prostitution and Citizenship in Classical Athens' (Halperin 1990), Halperin, like Dover before him, sought to demonstrate that sexual behaviour had a direct impact on an individual's social and political status in classical Athens through a rereading of Aeschines' *Against Timarchus*. In his view, an understanding of Athenian

political ideology could not be complete without a full consideration of attitudes toward sexuality and gender. The subsequent analyses of Davidson (1997) and Kurke (1999), which consider prostitution as discursive and ideological constructs, rest on a similar set of assumptions about the interrelation of sexuality and political structures.

The subject has also engendered a long and vigorous debate about the terminology for prostitution, particularly the words *hetaira* (courtesan) and *pornē* (brothel worker). Most recently, Davidson (1997) and Kurke (1999) have argued that these terms express a binary opposition between two types of prostitute that in turn reflect competing social and political ideologies. The term *hetaira*, the feminine form of *hetairos* (male companion), denoted a woman, usually celebrated, who was maintained by one man in exchange for his exclusive sexual access to her; typically she did not reside in his home. She participated in and embodied an economy of gift exchange that maintained, rather than severed, the connection between individuals. Alternately seductive and persuasive, providing her services in exchange for gifts, the *hetaira* perpetually left open the possibility that she might refuse her favours; indeed, the word itself is ambiguous (Davidson 1997). The *pornē*, in contrast, belonged to the streets: she was the *hetaira*'s nameless brothel counterpart and participated in a type of commodity exchange that continually depersonalized and reified (Davidson 1997: 118–19; cf. also Cantarella in the previous chapter). And yet the two terms are not absolute: they are frequently applied to the same women in all periods of the Greek literary tradition. As Edward Cohen has recently argued, both types of prostitute may have originated in the brothel, with the name *hetaira* serving to advertise a woman's manumission from sexual slavery and her acquisition of free status (E. E. Cohen 2006).

Suggested Reading

Dover (1978), Foucault (1976–84), Loraux (1981*a*), Zeitlin (1996), Davidson (1997 and 2007).

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CHAPTER 26

SLAVERY

PAGE DUBOIS

In his *Republic*, Plato recounts this exchange (578d–579a, trans. Shorey):

'Suppose some god should catch up a man who has fifty or more slaves and waft him with his wife and children away from the city and set him down with his other possessions and his slaves in a solitude where no free man could come to his rescue. What and how great would be his fear, do you suppose, lest he and his wife and children be killed by the slaves?'

'The greatest in the world,' he said, 'if you ask me.'

The cantankerous 'Old Oligarch', an anti-democratic writer of the fifth century BCE, complained that in Athens slaves had become unruly and unrecognizable (ps.-Xenophon, *Constitution of the Athenians* 1.10, trans. Marchant):

Now among the slaves and metics [resident aliens] at Athens there is the greatest uncontrolled wantonness; you can't hit them there, and a slave will not stand aside for you... If it were customary for a slave... to be struck by one who is free, you would often hit an Athenian citizen by mistake on the assumption that he was a slave. For the people there are no better dressed than the slaves and metics, nor are they any more handsome.

A similar observation was made in Rome some centuries later: a Roman strolling with a friend points out that it has become impossible to tell the difference between slaves and free men, and suggests that slaves should be made to wear a mark, or a costume that sets them apart from citizens. His interlocutor objects, arguing that this would be a grave error, since the slaves themselves would then know how many they were.

These passages bring up issues central to the place of slavery in ancient societies. First, that slaves were numerous and ubiquitous. Secondly, that it is often difficult for modern scholars to evaluate the importance of slavery in ancient life, since

the records we have reflect the perspective of free men. The sources are one-sided, and reveal both that those free men took for granted the presence and ubiquity of slaves, in many circumstances failing to register them simply because they provided an almost invisible backdrop, furnishings to everyday life; and also that they are engaged in a constant and dynamic process of differentiating of themselves as free men from the slaves among them.

Yet another feature of the circumstances of the ancient slave societies pointed to in these passages is the shadow of uncertainty and anxiety about their security under which ancient free persons lived, surrounded by other human beings who were their possessions—often imagined or perceived, accurately or not, to be a threat to the free.

Most of the written evidence from Greek antiquity comes from the perspective of slave-owners. We cannot know what ancient Greek slaves might have had to say about their experiences of enslavement, or of life as a slave or manumitted ex-slave. There are various ways to address this matter: one is by using the analogy of slaves from other historical circumstances who did write about such experiences, in the form, for example, of the slave narratives of ante- and post-bellum America. These texts, though, require caution in their handling. The ante-bellum slave narratives, especially, were produced in the context of the abolitionist movement, and rhetorically appeal to readers involved in Christian anti-slavery debates. There is also the issue of the place of slavery within early capitalism, which is very different from that within ancient economies. How do such differences affect slave identities? How does the racial character of modern slavery limit the analogies with ancient slavery? Other strategies for imagining or representing ancient slaves' experience involve extrapolating from silence, supplying the other side of a one-sided dialogue between master and slave. Another option involves a fuller exploitation of information available from material culture, such as the findings from archaeological excavations, which have focused more and more on everyday life rather than the treasures of the elite, and can add immeasurably to our understanding of the history of ancient slaves (Morris 1998).

26.1. The Ubiquity and Invisibility of Slaves

Slaves figure in every sort of evidence from ancient Greece, in both textual and material remains. Poetry, philosophy, history, domestic architecture, objects of utility, and art all reveal the presence of slaves, though often obliquely. The sources and resources, therefore, for the study of ancient Greek slaves, are vast. Yet their presence

has sometimes been overlooked by scholars of antiquity, who have often identified exclusively with the free authors of texts, and seen the slaves only as shadowy features of the ancient landscape. One of the issues that arises, then, is how much traditional methods of historical investigation and archaeology can add to a purely textual perspective on the problem of slavery in antiquity, since, although interpretation is, of course, always necessary for any evidence from antiquity, material or textual, there may be information in archaeological investigation, for example, that does not penetrate the textual works we have from elite authors. Evidence about slave cults, for example, or slave lodgings in houses, may reveal something of the slaves' places of origin, or the preservation of their indigenous beliefs and practices in the new circumstances of slavery (Davidson 1997: 85–6).

Not enough is known about the relations between Greek colonizers and the indigenous populations they encountered as they founded Greek cities and trading-posts at the edges of the Greek world. Archaeology is addressing these issues, and attempting to discern what forms of unfreedom resulted from these contacts. A related question for Hellenic studies bears on the value of post-colonial studies for such matters (Loomba 1998; cf. Greenwood in this volume). Can the work of scholars engaged in subaltern studies, or the study of colonial and post-colonial societies and their relations with their colonizers (which often involves issues of enslavement, servitude, and unfreedom in general), usefully be deployed by scholars of Hellenic antiquity?

Barbarians, non-Greek-speakers, were an important source for slaves, whether sold, captured in war, or kidnapped. The presence of barbarian slaves, along with native Greek slaves, on the farms and in the workshops and households of citizens, affected Greek notions of identity and ethnicity. Aristotle supports the argument that barbarians are naturally more servile (*Politics* 1.1, 1252b5–9; 3.9, 1285a18–23). The complexities of dialectal or tribal difference compound these ethnic differences, part of the lengthy process which eventually produces what Jonathan Hall has called 'Hellenicity' (J. Hall 2002; cf. E. M. Hall 1989). The ubiquity of barbarian slaves provides a provocative challenge to descriptions of the population of 'Greece', especially in the classical and Hellenistic periods.

The idea of 'the Greeks' is as inappropriate and reifying in relation to the question of slavery as in all other situations of analysis. There are many Greeks, from the slave-owner to the poor peasant citizen and slave; there are Greeks from many geographical worlds, from the furthest reaches of colonization in Asia, Africa, and Europe, to the Athenian on the Acropolis; and there were Greeks of many different historical situations. Slavery in the world depicted by Homer differs dramatically from that of the Greek cities on the verge of conquest by the Romans at the beginning of the Common Era, and generalizations about the Greeks and their slaves serve only to obfuscate important distinctions, in ethnicity, conditions of everyday life, possibilities of resistance, and the social and economic organization of labour.

26.2. Numbers of Slaves, Varieties of Enslavement

It has been difficult to calculate the raw number of slaves in ancient populations and, further, to assess what percentage of those populations were enslaved (Dillon and Garland 1994: 322). Paul Cartledge (1996) has concluded that there were about 80,000–100,000 slaves in classical Athens, out of a total population of 250,000, while Ian Morris (2000: 152) estimates 30,000–100,000, that is, between 10 per cent and 30 per cent of the population. On any estimate, slaves made up a significant proportion of the residents of classical Athens, though they often escape the notice of readers and scholars. One crucial question is how to register their presence, to investigate it, to mark it as significant in every site of Greek antiquity.

Another important question concerns the varieties of enslavement or bondage in ancient Greece. There were not only chattel slaves—persons owned by individuals and used for domestic and agricultural labour, manufacturing, and mining, or as sex-workers. Slaves sometimes lived apart from their masters, or could be sent out from the owner's home to work, their pay coming into the owner's hands with perhaps a pittance allowed to the slave to save for the purchase of his own manumission. There were other forms of domination, too. Sometimes city-states owned slaves and used them for municipal tasks, as did the Athenians, whose police force was made up of Thracian slaves. Xenophon urged the Athenians to lease municipal slaves as miners at the Athenian silver-mines at Laurion (Xenophon, *Ways and Means* 1.14–17). It is difficult to penetrate the hierarchies and forms of distinction there might have been among different kinds of slaves: Greek-speaking, Greek, born in the household, recently enslaved and imported.

There were yet other forms of unfreedom different from the pure form of chattel slavery (Finley 1964). These forms of unfreedom have excited much scholarly debate: the 'helots' of Sparta were an enslaved community, who lived apart as a community and were excluded from Spartan citizenship. They were enslaved en masse, and treated by the Spartan citizens themselves as a considerable threat to the Lacedaemonian city-state. Much of the training of free Spartan youth focused on domination and control of the large subject population of helots (cf. Hunt in this volume). Earlier generations of scholars assimilated these bound people to medieval serfs, in an analogy that has fallen out of fashion. And in fact the helots of Messenia did revolt and win their freedom in the fourth century BCE (Hodkinson 1983; 2000; Luraghi 2000).

Other such populations included the *penestai* of Thessaly; and there was a variety of status on the island of Crete that cannot be equated usefully with the chattel-slave model predominant later. Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1988) also discusses episodes

of temporary slavery, and the mating of free women with slaves when their free warrior husbands were absent in battle.

26.3. Slave Bodies

The perpetuation of slavery must be seen as a process, as a dynamic and unending set of negotiations. To view slavery as a static entity is to take it for granted, almost to naturalize it. That is not to attribute to any and every person a 'natural' striving for freedom, but, like other institutions which perpetuate marked differences of power and mobility, the institution of ancient slavery had constantly to confront the possibilities of resistance, violence, or even stubborn sabotage by slaves. The naturalizing of slavery is a process, engaged in throughout the culture—from the philosophical justifications by Aristotle, to the crudity of most slaves' dress—a process that was necessarily sustained by ideological effort.

Slaves were constantly present, overhearing. Slaves were often seen as stubborn and recalcitrant, and were punished by flogging, if we can rely on representations in texts such as the comedies of Aristophanes and the dialogues of Plato. Slave bodies were at some stages idealized in works of art, but represented as grotesque in others (Himmelmann 1971). They were tattooed, perhaps branded, and always subject to sexual use (duBois 2003: 101–13).

26.4. Slavery and Sexual Conduct

How did the presence of slaves affect the performance of gender, as well as sexual relationships and practices in Greek antiquity? An important debate concerns the representation of the enslaved women of fallen Troy in Greek tragedy, and their relationship to the slaves of everyday Athenian life. Aristotle likens women to slaves, in a familiar trope. How did the availability of slaves, male and female, affect the choice of partners, the need for self-mastery, the status of free women, sex-workers of both genders (Joshel and Murnaghan 1998)? How is the institution of pederasty as practised and understood by ancient Athenians affected by the accessibility of unfree sexual partners to free men? Among the most important sources for information about sexual practices and slavery are the comedies of Aristophanes and the forensic orations, which reveal assumptions about the relations between slave and free persons rarely articulated elsewhere. Another valuable source is Athenaeus'

Deipnosophistae, which contains a revealing miscellany of details concerning slavery, touching on questions of sexual behaviour as well as on the history of slavery.

26.5. Slavery as Analogy

One of the most fertile areas for further research on the question of slavery involves the deployment of slavery as metaphor in rhetorical, historical, and philosophical texts (Serghidou 2004; duBois 2003: 117–30). Scholars differ concerning the degree to which citizens were concerned, or even haunted, by the possibility of real enslavement through war or capture, but the threat of metaphorical enslavement to demagogues, to other cities, or to one's own passions recurs in texts and needs to be brought closer to the everyday realities of the institution of slavery in ancient Greek societies.

Students of Hellenic antiquity for many centuries identified with the elite thinkers and writers and artists of Athens. It is only with changes in the field of history, with new interest in the silenced, the invisible, the illiterate, the labouring poor, in slaves and women and in everyday life, that scholars have looked beyond, or beneath, the elite texts and objects inherited from antiquity. This too is an intriguing problem: to analyse that identification, call it into question, see its political effects, and to try to find ways of thinking not only about the oppressed, but also about their relations with their masters—how, for example, the constant presence of slaves defined social existence in antiquity and inhered in every situation. Can psychoanalytic theory aid in this project, with its rich vocabulary of concepts for understanding identification, for example, and abjection?

For ancient philosophers and political thinkers, the fact of slavery offered an important source of analogies concerning all manner of things, from the order of the universe to the relationship between barbarians and Greeks. Although Aristotle in the *Politics* seems to acknowledge some debate about the naturalness and inevitability of slavery, and there are a few shreds of the sophists that may suggest an ancient questioning of slavery, for the most part the fact of masters and slaves was taken for granted throughout Greek antiquity (Vogt 1974; E. M. Hall 1989). Plato uses the analogy of slavery often, something discussed in an important article by Gregory Vlastos (1968). In Plato's view, even within the individual, reason must master and enslave other aspects of the self, rather than let itself be enslaved in a disruption of the harmonious and proper order of things. (Such arguments lie behind the discussion of ancient Greek sexuality in Foucault 1976–84: vol. 2. A philosophically informed subject must learn to control himself, dominating his

appetites and desires, to achieve self-mastery.) Political speakers use the threat of slavery to discredit opponents and in attempts to rouse the Athenian population. They claim that barbarians are properly enslaved to Greeks, and that citizens must not allow themselves to be enslaved to demagogues. This paradigm of relationality, involving master and slave, has shaped the western cultural tradition on such matters as the subject/object, body/mind, masculine/feminine, and mortal/divine oppositions.

26.6. The Politics of Scholarship

To misquote the medieval Alain de Lille: scholarship on slavery 'has a wax nose which can be pushed in all directions'. That is to say, classical scholars have many different perspectives on the question of ancient slavery, and it may be possible to map their political tendencies with reference to the positions they take on slavery. For those who idealize antiquity, slavery was justified because it allowed for the development of the category of freedom, so essential to liberal ideas in the West. Other idealizing scholars point to the relatively benign treatment of slaves in Greek and Roman antiquity, in contrast to that of other slave systems in world history. Advocates of slavery, some of them ante-bellum American classicists, point to the slave systems of ancient Greece and Rome as a lost paradise for the free. Other scholars have taken a more negative view of the institution of slavery in ancient history. Scholars of liberal bent have condemned it, seeing it as the blight on the rose (Cartledge 1993). Marxist or Marxizing classicists, especially of the twentieth century, have seen the inevitability of class struggle in the presence of slavery in antiquity, a mode of production based on slave labour, even a slave proletariat. The monumental study of G. E. M. de Ste Croix (1981)—a vast, capacious work, full of insight and information, and an invaluable resource for the question of slavery—argues for an ancient Greek economy that was perhaps not absolutely 'based' on slave labour, but that relied on slaves for the production of its surplus. And one of the crucial dividing-lines in scholarship on ancient slavery involves the legacy of Marx and Engels, who identified an ancient mode of production (see Marx 1859) which, elsewhere, is sometimes called a slave mode of production. Are slaves a class? And if not, what are they? Moses Finley (1980, 1999), following Max Weber, considered the ancient economy to be marked by differences of 'status' rather than class, and this debate excited much interest in earlier generations. A related issue is the degree to which ownership of slaves affected the average—poor—peasant citizen in Athens, and how important it is, therefore, in the history of the invention of democracy and its practice, especially in Athens (although of course there were

other democratic city-states, often neglected in scholarship). Is democracy dependent on slave labour in the sense that citizens could only participate in it because freed from labour performed by slaves (Wood 1988; Jones 1957; Jameson 1977–8)? In recent years some attention has shifted away from these issues, to focus more on social and cultural questions about the everyday life of slave societies, and on the coercive or subtle negotiations of power involved (McCarthy 1998).

26.7. Close and Distant Reading

The troubled history of scholarship on slavery, which implicates the politics of the present, especially in contemporary societies still marked by the legacies of modern slavery, as in the United States and the United Kingdom, argues for an especially self-conscious and reflexive stance. In relation to slavery, a divide typical of other sub-fields in classical studies between scholars of written texts, especially of literature, and more historically and materially oriented scholars persists. An effort needs to be made to bridge this gap, and to integrate studies of inscriptions, burials, excavations, and other sources of evidence for the relations between slaves and others, with more elite cultural forms such as tragedy and philosophy (Morris 2000).

Scholars who work on ancient societies need not leave the study of ancient slavery to sociologists of slavery, or even to historians of slavery, but should seek to integrate an understanding of the ubiquity of slaves and slavery in every aspect of ancient life. They must struggle against the blind-spot produced by a post-modernity oblivious to slavery in the present (Bales 1999), and to the damage done by modern slavery. Ancient slavery, like that of modernity or post-modernity, is not a phenomenon readily separable from other domains of social, economic, and political life.

One possibility is to focus very closely on particular texts, monuments, or remains from antiquity, seeking to offer a picture of how slavery enabled every project, every aspect of ancient existence, and how the perpetuation of, or resistance to, slavery occurred in every activity of ancient persons. Philosophers theorized the emotions through examples of slavery; Plato worked out his theory of *anamnēsis* by staging a scene with an ignorant slave-boy. Slaves inhabited the imaginary worlds of Greek tragedy; they served as objects of desire for poets. Houses reveal the paucity of space allowed for slaves' sleeping arrangements, and the vestiges of lives left behind in their previous existences as free persons. A detailed reading of almost any situation, object, or event in antiquity should include an assessment of the place of slaves and slavery in the environment.

But there is also the possibility, or perhaps need, for another sort of reading that is less focused on detail, on the microcosmic features of an ancient situation.

Analogies with other slave systems may offer insights that cannot be ascertained with too tight a focus on a single object. For example, the work of Orlando Patterson (1982) fruitfully reoriented much scholarship on slavery by offering a chronologically and geographically extensive comparative portrait of slavery, with a global perspective. And Patterson also altered the perspective of many scholars by presenting a model of the experience of slavery from the point of view of the persons in the ongoing process of being enslaved. Rather than seeing slaves from the position of the slave-owner, he discussed the experience of enslavement, arguing that it entails the obliteration of self. Though some have found fault with details of Patterson's work, it suggests possibilities for comparative work which takes into account the field of Hellenic studies. Patterson's later work on the development of the concept of freedom in the situation of Greek antiquity (1991) has been more controversial.

There are thorny issues implicit in the kind of comparative and analogical work done by some historians of slavery, especially when they compare ancient slavery with modern New World examples. Many centuries intervened between them, and complex cultural and economic changes as well. Modern slavery in the New World took place not only in the radically different context of Christian culture, but also in the rapidly globalizing economy of capitalism. And the issue of racialized slavery complicates the problem as well: most ancient slaves were not marked by skin-colour, for example, as different from their owners or from other free persons. Yet, even given all these difficulties, which are often not treated adequately by scholars using comparative methods, valuable insights have been achieved by scholars who attempt to draw conclusions from the study of slave systems distant in time from one another. Because the evidence of lived experience is so much richer in the modern examples, with slave narratives, abundant archaeology, and even interviews with former slaves, the temptation to use such material proves almost irresistible (Cartledge 1985). The difficulty lies in the *mutatis mutandis*: how much adjustment is needed? What must be changed? The work of anthropologist James C. Scott (1990), based in large part on New World slavery, has proven invaluable for some scholars in imagining strategies of resistance by ancient slaves.

Some of the most original and exciting work on slaves in antiquity in recent years concerns slave revolts, and often uses these very techniques of comparison. Keith Bradley (1989) uses analogies with Maroon communities in the Caribbean to analyse groups of Sicilian and South Italian slaves who fled from their masters and surrounded charismatic leaders who may have had monarchic ambitions themselves. Although the idealizing historians of antiquity of earlier generations claimed that the Greeks treated their slaves with benevolence, and pointed to the paucity of slave revolts in Greek antiquity, there may have been other causes for this phenomenon, including the lack of plantation slavery, which meant that many slaves lived either in domestic situations or on small farms, rather than in large groups working in mining or agriculture. However, the slaves of Athens did flee in

great numbers during the Peloponnesian War, and their flight suggests that slavery was not the happy condition some have imagined.

A crucial question concerns the effects of ancient slavery on the legacy of Greek antiquity. The Greeks have been celebrated as inventors of trial by jury, of democracy, of rhetoric, philosophy and history, tragedy and comedy—features of western civilization that have long survived them. How does the inseparability of slavery affect this legacy? It can no longer be omitted from our portrait of ancient Hellenic society, or acknowledged without analysis. For example, if the testimony of slaves was admissible in the Greek law-courts only when obtained by torture, how does such a practice affect the law, rhetoric, and philosophy, ideas of citizenship, freedom, and slavery (duBois 1991)? How does such a relationship of domination persist, unacknowledged, in modern and post-modern ideas of the body, the pursuit of truth, and the subject's relation to the other? Much work remains to be done, encompassing the implications of slavery for *all* work done on ancient materials.

Suggested Reading

de Ste-Croix (1981) is a massive work which provides a detailed and extremely capacious account of forms of unfreedom in Greek antiquity from a somewhat unorthodox Marxist perspective. A Weberian counter-view appears in Moses Finley's work; see e.g. Finley (1999) (including an excellent new foreword by Ian Morris). Valuable, less polemical general surveys are Garlan (1988) and Fisher (1993). A useful compendium of sources is Wiedemann (1981).

The best overview of the Greeks which takes into account problems of barbarians and slaves is Cartledge (2002). On the question of freedom, Raaflaub (2004) is an invaluable resource. An excellent collection on questions of gender and slavery in antiquity is Joshel and Murnaghan (1998). For a provocative comparative analysis of slavery extending over many historical periods and places, including classical antiquity, see Patterson (1982)—to be read along with the intellectual history of Davis (1966). See also Garnsey (1996). For a methodologically exemplary text that resists and reads beyond the Greeks' own ideological representations of slaves in war, see Hunt (1998).

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CHAPTER 27

ETHNIC PREJUDICE AND RACISM

BENJAMIN ISAAC

27.1. Introductory Remarks

Much has been written in recent years about ethnic identity and about the process of the ethnogenesis of the ancient Greeks in antiquity, in other words, about the manner in which the Greeks came into being as a group and how they saw themselves collectively (Bickerman 1952; J. M. Hall 1997 and 2002; Malkin 2001; Finkelberg 2005). This chapter deals with a related, but different topic, namely how the Greeks saw foreigners and, in particular, the nature of their negative views of non-Greeks. In this chapter, the term 'barbarian' will be avoided. Although it has the advantage of being common currency, the word has the major disadvantage of seducing us into accepting ancient Greek prejudices (the ideas proposed in this chapter are fully discussed in Isaac 2004).

There used to be a consensus that racism as such originates in modern times. Since it was thought not to be attested earlier, conventional wisdom usually denied that there was any race hatred in the ancient world (Fredrickson 2002: 17; Fredrickson cites Hannaford 1996: chs. 2 and 3, which, however, suffers from an inadequate treatment of the ancient texts). The prejudices that existed, so it was believed, were ethnic or cultural, not racist. This chapter will discuss these views and propose an alternative approach. There are several works which focus on Romans and their attitude towards foreigners (Sherwin-White 1967; Saddington 1975; Balsdon 1979; Dauge 1981: Sherwin-White fails to distinguish between ethnic prejudice and racism

in his brief and unsatisfactory study. Balsdon is entertaining, but anecdotal rather than analytical. Dauge, although published in 1981, uses Italian fascist literature for its methodological approach to racism.) The impetus behind such studies was the complex of questions regarding the relationship between the ruling Romans and their imperial subjects, an obvious topic for investigation by scholars who lived in Europe after World War II. For pre-Hellenistic Greeks, the scholarly agenda had a different emphasis: the term 'barbarian' said it all. Traditional classicists essentially agreed with the Greeks' conviction of their own superiority. At a subtler level, several studies were devoted in recent decades to Greek views of 'barbarians' (Long 1986; E. M. Hall 1989; Cohen 2000). (I do not cite partial studies analysing attitudes of Greeks towards Persians, Thracians, Scythians, etc., but note Romm 1992.) However, the focus here was still Greek self-perception through their views of foreigners as expressed in literary works, rather than views of foreigners as a form of rationalized prejudice. The starting-point for the present chapter is the supposition that it is important to understand the manner in which people handle their prejudices. It is generally accepted as an important topic in modern history and the analysis of modern societies. The same should be true for ancient Greece.

It should be clear from the outset that the aim is here to trace the history of ideas, attitudes, and concepts which gave rise in certain periods to an ideology. This is not a form of social history. It is not the intention to describe the actual treatment of foreigners and minorities in ancient Greece, but Greek patterns of thought about foreigners. There should be no need to justify this: ideas are important in politics. Nobody doubts the importance of religion in the struggle between the Jews and the Seleucids in the Hellenistic period, or between Spain and the Netherlands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Obviously, in classical antiquity racism did not exist in the modern form of a biological determinism which developed as a by-product of the spread of Darwin's ideas. However, it will be argued that there existed early forms of racism, or 'proto-racism', as a widespread phenomenon in antiquity. The term 'proto-racism' is used here like 'prototype', in the sense that it is the first appearance of anything; it is the original of which something else is a modified derivative. Thus proto-racism is not meant to be a weakened form of racism. It is racism in the full sense, but it is an early form which precedes Darwin. Early conceptions and ideas in this sense were broadly present in the ancient literature. It was read in later periods by well-educated people in western civilization, and therefore became greatly influential in various ways.

Hostility towards foreigners occurs in every society, but in widely differing degrees, social settings, and moral environments. An essential component of such hostility is always the tendency to generalize and simplify, so that whole nations are viewed as if they were a single individual with a single personality. Here it should be noted that one of the difficulties in studying group prejudices in antiquity is the lack

of any term in Greek and Latin for 'racism', for 'prejudice', or for 'discrimination'. Anticipating the conclusions of this chapter, I would like to suggest that the lack of such terminology stems from the fact that there existed no intellectual, moral, or emotional objections against such generalizations. After all, nobody would deny that prejudice existed in ancient Greece. The very existence of the term 'barbarian' shows how powerful the negative image of any non-Greek was (E. M. Hall 1989; for complex attitudes to Egypt see Vasunia 2001). It was so evident that Greeks were superior that there was no term to indicate this kind of attitude. Indeed, inequality and exclusion were taken for granted in societies which regarded the existence of slavery and violent subjugation just as natural as later thinkers regarded it a self-evident truth that all men are born equal.

We must therefore trace the development of ideas and attitudes for which there existed no terminology in the culture under consideration. The formulation of a proper definition of racism as we understand it today is a challenge, for it needs to be sufficiently flexible to encompass a phenomenon that exists among many peoples and which may change over time. It also should be sufficiently subtle to recognize relatively mild forms which are not actually translated into practice. In other words, a correct definition of racism must be valid, not only when it refers to people who espouse mass murder, but also to those who believe that mixed marriages result in the birth of inferior children.

The definition of racism accepted for present purposes is as follows: 'an attitude towards individuals and groups of peoples which posits a direct and linear connection between physical and mental qualities. It therefore attributes to those individuals and groups of peoples collective traits, physical, mental and moral, which are constant and unalterable by human will, because they are caused by hereditary factors or external influences, such as climate or geography' (Isaac 2004: 23; for a lucid discussion of racism see Memmi 2000). The essence of racism is that it regards individuals as superior or inferior because they are believed to share imagined physical, mental, and moral attributes with the group to which they are deemed to belong, and it is assumed that they cannot change these traits individually. This is held to be impossible, because these traits are determined by their physical make-up. This is a relatively broad definition which allows us to recognize forms of racism that are not steered exclusively by biological determinism. It further has the advantage that it discerns racist attitudes and ideas whether or not they are accompanied by discriminatory actions in practice.

Unlike ethnic hatred and prejudice which tend to be mainly emotional, racism is an attempt to support the illusions of prejudice with arguments. When society attaches importance to rationality this becomes an influential process. Its great force rests on the belief in the rationality of what in fact is the product of imagination. It follows that it is important to understand the forms in which societies rationalize their delusions because these have a substantial impact on social relations. Greek civilization raised abstract, systematic thought to a high level of reflective

sophistication (cf. Frankfort *et al.* 1946). I would argue that the Greeks not only contributed the first attempt to think systematically about, for example, political systems and freedom, but also the first effort to find a rational and systematic basis for their own sense of superiority and their claim that others were inferior. This chapter, then, describes the conceptual mechanisms that were developed towards this purpose and that were taken over with alacrity by later thinkers.

A word should be said about the sources. Since racism represents an attempt to rationalize the irrational, it is natural to look for its origins in the intellectual sphere. Unlike regular stereotypes which may have their basis and origins in all levels of society, racism as such spreads from top to bottom, even if its simple forms may appeal to all strata of society. Since this is the case, it is justified to study the writings of upper-class authors to trace its inception. That is precisely what we have for ancient Greece. It is true that we do not know what was said about foreigners in the agora and at home by people with little education, but we do have the literary sources which represent male upper-class attitudes. (For Greek visual art, which is not discussed in this chapter, see Raeck 1981; Cohen 2000.)

The next section of this chapter will briefly consider five concepts which, together, were in antiquity commonly held to determine the collective nature of groups or the character of peoples. These are: environmental determinism; the heredity of acquired characters; a combination of these two ideas; the constitution and form of government; autochthony and pure lineage. This will be followed by some thoughts about the connection between those ideas and the ideology of ancient imperialism.

27.2. Environmental Determinism

In both Greek and Latin literature from the middle of the fifth century BCE onwards we encounter an almost generally accepted form of environmental determinism. This is first explicitly and extensively presented in the medical treatise *Airs, Waters, Places*, written by an uncertain author, perhaps Hippocrates, at an uncertain date in the second half of the fifth century BCE. The particular form of environmental determinism first found in this work became the generally accepted model in Greece. It had a long history afterwards. According to the view here represented, collective characteristics of groups of people are permanently determined by climate and geography. Thus it is asserted, for instance, that Asiatics living in a warm, southern climate are indolent and unwarlike, while the Europeans living in a cold, northern climate are courageous and belligerent.

The implication is that the essential features of body and mind, the latter including moral qualities such as honesty, courage, and diligence, come from the outside

and are not the result of genetic evolution, social environment, or conscious choice. Individuality and individual change are thereby ignored and even excluded. This is definitely related to racist attitudes as here defined.

The concept of environmental determinism is found again in the work of Aristotle, with some interesting variations (*Politics* 1327b23–33, trans. E. Barker; on ethnocentricism see Romm 1992: 46–8, 54 f.):

> The peoples of cold countries generally, and particularly those of Europe, are full of spirit, but deficient in skill and intelligence; and this is why they continue to remain comparatively free, but attain no political development and show no capacity for governing others. The peoples of Asia are endowed with skill and intelligence, but are deficient in spirit; and this is why they continue to be peoples of subjects and slaves. The Greeks, intermediate in geographical position [Strabo 6.4.1 (286) claims the same for Italy], unite the best qualities of both sets of peoples. They possess both spirit and intelligence: the one quality makes it continue free; the other enables it to attain the heights of political development, and to show a capacity for governing every other people—if only it could once achieve political unity.

The first point to be noted is the primacy given to the environment. In spite of the supreme importance that Aristotle, like other Greek authors, attaches to political institutions and constitutions, he does not hesitate in asserting that the environment is the primary factor determining basic characteristics of societies. The second point is that such claims made environmental determinism a useful ideological tool for imperialists, because they justified the conclusion that the Greeks were ideally capable of ruling others.

27.3. The Heredity of Acquired Characteristics

A second conceptual mechanism the validity of which was generally accepted in Graeco-Roman antiquity is a belief in the heredity of acquired characteristics. In modern times this used to be popular and was identified mainly with the theories of Lamarck, but in our times it is not usually accepted as a proposition. However, it is clear from many implicit references that the principle was taken for granted throughout antiquity. It is explicitly propounded in some works, for instance in *Airs, Waters, Places*, in the work of Aristotle, and elsewhere, mostly in technical treatises. The best-known example, found in the Hippocratic treatise (ch. 14), is the case of the people who artificially elongated the skulls of their children, a feature which reputedly became hereditary after a couple of generations. The theory recurs, for instance in the work of the geographer Strabo, where he discusses the cause of

the colour of the skin of Ethiopians and the texture of their hair—assumed to have been scorched by the sun. Strabo explains: 'And already in the womb, children, by seminal communication, become like their parents...' (Strabo 15.1.24 (696)). It has, in fact, been recognized that this theory, only recently discarded, has been held almost universally for well over 2000 years (Zirkle 1946: 91).

27.4. A Combination of Hereditary and Environmental Determinism

Many authors combine environmental determinism with a belief in the heredity of acquired characteristics. When applied to human groups, this leads somewhat paradoxically to an assumption that characteristics imposed from the outside become uniform and constant. Climate and geography have definite effects on all people being born in a given region. These effects then become permanent traits because they become hereditary in one or two generations. Like modern racist theories, this approach allows the discriminator to build his case however he likes, reaching whatever conclusions suit him. Clearly the combination of these ideas is inconsistent. However, that is usually the case with prejudice. When patterns of thought and concepts which are illogical by definition are being analysed, as in the present chapter, the result necessarily reflects the lack of consistency of the original ideas.

It is worth noting that both the ideas of environmental determinism and of the heredity of acquired characteristics are most explicitly formulated in secular, non-religious works of Greek and Latin literature: medical treatises (Hippocrates and Galen), writings on political philosophy (Plato, Aristotle), architecture, and geography (Vitruvius, Strabo). The reason is not far to seek: the ideas here described were attempts at rational thinking by authors who attempted to avoid the religious traditions, that is, what may be called 'mythological thinking'.

27.5. The Constitution and Form of Government

Political and social institutions are obviously the subject of extensive discussion in Greek social thought. Indeed, Oriental kingships seemed to Greeks such as Isocrates consistently to produce inferior and slavish humans. Under a bad government

no people can function well. (The last chapter of Xenophon's *Education of Cyrus* claims that Persia was strong when it had a good king, and deteriorated when the kings did.) This is essentially a socio-political view. However, it remains true that the underlying causes of the formation of political systems according to the Greeks were climate and geography. Political institutions are the work of men and therefore extensively discussed: hence Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*, Aristotle's *Politics*, and so many other works. Yet none of these works deny the primacy of nature. Ultimately the environment determined at what level a people could function. Again, we encounter a lack of human choice and control in the determination of a person's characteristics. According to the definition adopted above, this is an essential feature of racist thinking.

27.6. Autochthony and Pure Lineage

The fifth and last concept to be mentioned here is that of autochthony and pure lineage (Isaac 2004: 74–82). The Athenians attached enormous importance to the dual myth that they had lived in their own land from the beginnings of time without ever abandoning it, and that they were of pure lineage. They saw themselves as originally having sprung from the soil itself, the earth serving as their collective mother. This myth served various purposes: (a) it was used as argument that they and only they held legitimate possession of their soil; (b) they regarded themselves as a people uncontaminated by an admixture of foreign elements, and therefore felt themselves to be superior. Indeed, a decree promulgated by Pericles in 451/50 awarded citizenship only to the children of a citizen father and a mother of full Athenian descent (cf. Cantarella above, pp. 301–2). The intention was to preserve the purity of lineage of the Athenians (Patterson 1981; Rosivach 1987; Ogden 1996: 166–73; Shapiro 1998). The uniqueness of their origins is deemed obvious by many fifth- and fourth-century authors. They are agreed that the Athenians are uniquely pure in their origins and superior to all other peoples of the world. Other Greek states have produced comparable myths, but not to the same extent as Athens.

The idea as such had a broad appeal, mostly in a negative sense, among other Greeks: intermarriage and mixed blood are considered bad and conducive to degeneration. This is the negative equivalent of the view held by the Athenians that they were superior because of their pure lineage. The belief that marriage with outsiders produces offspring of lesser quality appears firmly entrenched in Greece. A final point to be observed here is that antiquity could imagine only a process of deterioration and degeneration: the reverse possibility, of improvement by association or good breeding (eugenics in modern terms), does not occur as a concept

(Dodds 1973). Change, in fact, is always for the worse. The idea of progress is rarely encountered in Greek and Roman culture, and the view that there is a constant decline is so common that it hardly needs explanation. The characteristics that could be acquired during one's life and transmitted to posterity were all negative ones, and then became irreversible. This attitude, of course, is not common in our times. A related idea, that also is part of the complex of environmental theories, is that of decline as a result of migration. It is first attested in the work of Herodotus, where Cyrus says that the Persians, if they move from rugged Persia to a better country, should not expect to continue as rulers, 'but to prepare for being ruled by others—soft countries give birth to soft men. There is no land which produces the most remarkable fruit, and at the same time men good at warfare' (9.122).

Clearly, of all the concepts briefly described so far, the idea of pure blood is the one which most closely approaches modern racism, for it establishes a hierarchy of peoples, based on the fiction that some are of pure lineage while others are of mixed descent. It could even be said that the Athenians regarded themselves as a 'race' in modern terms.

27.7. Ancient Imperialism

The ideas here described were a significant element in ancient concepts of imperialism. As with so many other features of determinist thinking, the essence is first formulated in *Airs, Waters, Places* (16, 23): the inhabitants of Asia are soft because of their good climate and rich resources. They are less belligerent and gentler in character than the Europeans, who are more courageous and militant. Aristotle (*Politics* 1327b30–3) then claims that the Greeks, combining the best qualities of both groups, were therefore capable of ruling all mankind—an early, if not the first, text to suggest that Greeks should achieve universal rule.

27.8. Individual and Collective Slavery

In considering Greek society, we must be aware that slavery hardly represented a moral dilemma as it has done in modern history. The existence of slavery as such was not a relevant topic of discussion in antiquity, and there was felt to be no

need to justify it. However, there were arguments about specifics; notably, there was a controversy about the difference in nature between free men and slaves. If an essential difference, mentally and physically, between free men and slaves could be demonstrated, it was easier to claim that their difference in status was demanded by nature and logic. If there was no essential difference, slavery was harder to explain, for it would depend only on brute force. To solve this problem Aristotle contends that slavery was both natural and just, because some human beings were so shaped by nature that they lacked some of the essential qualities of fully fledged men (*Politics* 1.13, with Brunt 1993: 343–88; Garnsey 1996: 13). They were therefore fit only to serve as instruments for those who had all those qualities. Here we move from the sphere of the individual into that of the collective and the group.

Aristotle assigns not just to individuals, but to specific groups of people, an inferior place in society on the grounds that they are deficient in various ways and need therefore to be subordinated to their intellectual and moral superiors in a master/slave relationship. That is to say, specific, non-Greek peoples are described as collectively having the qualities which slaves of the Greeks should have. Being less than human, or even subhuman, they live best in a symbiotic relationship with fully human masters.

The arguments applied by Aristotle to entire groups and peoples reflect opinions held by many Greek authors, even if they do not discuss the matter systematically. This is clear from the terminology employed: *doulōsis* and *douleia* (i.e. 'enslavement') and related forms are commonly used by Thucydides and by other authors to express the subjection of one state to another (Thucydides 1.98.4; 1.141.1; and just above 2.63.1 on possible domination of Athens by Sparta). Slavery, *douleia*, and similar terms are frequently used to denote political subjection generally (Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81: iii. 646). It should be observed that the contrast between free man and slave, *eleutheros–doulos*, originated in the domestic sphere and was first broadened out into the realm of politics in the early fifth century. The justification of individual slavery becomes then applicable also to collective subjugation and thus becomes part of imperialist ideology, which we should now discuss briefly. Its principles are best expressed by Aristotle, *Politics* 1256b23–6: 'War then is a form of acquisition, just like hunting, and the object of this process is the procurement of slaves among those peoples who are slaves by nature, but resist Greek demands that they submit to their proper fate in the world' (cf. Schlaifer 1936; Rosivach 1999).

The Athenians assimilated the relation between imperial states and their subjects to that between master and slave. At least, they do so in a speech which Thucydides attributes to them: 'Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can' (Thucydides 5.105.2; see also 1.76.2 and 4.61.5; Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1945–81: iv. 162–4). The Athenians do not claim that this is just and right; they merely claim it is inevitable (cf. de Romilly 1963: esp. 56 f.). Callicles, speaking as represented in Plato's *Gorgias*, goes a step further

towards Aristotle in claiming that this is not merely inevitable, but indeed just and right (483c–e): 'But I believe that nature itself reveals that it is a just thing for the better man and the more capable man to have a greater share than the worse man and the less capable man [cf. Dodds 1959: 267] ... this is what justice has been decided to be: that the superior rule the inferior and have a greater share than they ...'

So far this brief demonstration shows the connection between classical ideas of slavery and imperialism. It is now proper to point to yet another influential complex of ideas in this sphere. Besides the common ancient assumption that those who have been enslaved deserve to be in that position, there is another common belief which holds that people, once enslaved, degenerate irrevocably into servile characters. Homer, later cited by Plato, says: 'If you make a man a slave, that very day | Far-sounding Zeus takes half his wits away' (Homer, *Odyssey* 17.322–3; cited by Plato, *Laws* 776e–777a; cf. Garnsey 1996: 89, 93–4). This, naturally, is connected with the general concept of decline, described above.

27.9. Conclusion

To sum up: in antiquity, as in modern times, we constantly encounter the unquestioned assumption that it is possible and reasonable to relate to entire peoples as if they were a single or collective individual. The conceptual means employed to this end were not the same in antiquity as in modern history, although they are still quite familiar. They were the environmental theory and the belief in the heredity of acquired characters, concepts broadly accepted in Greece and Rome. These hold that collective characteristics of groups of people are permanently determined by climate and geography. The implication is that the essential features of body and mind come from the outside and are stable. They do not occur through genetic evolution, or conscious choice. Social interaction plays a secondary role. Individuality and individual change are thereby ignored. When applied to human groups, these ideas lead to a belief that their characteristics are uniform and constant, once acquired, unless people migrate. The latter would lead to decline and degeneration through displacement and contamination.

The presumed characteristics that resulted were subject to value-judgements, in which the foreigners were usually rejected as being inferior to the observer. Greeks in the fourth century BCE developed the environmental theory further, adding two elements which made it an essential tool for imperialists. They claimed that Greece occupies the very best environment between Europe and Asia and produces therefore people ideally capable of ruling others. More specifically this was directed

at the Persian Empire and the inhabitants of Asia, who were said to be servile by nature, or natural slaves, and therefore suited to be subjects of the Greeks. Other relevant concepts are autochthony and pure lineage. The Athenians, in their period of imperial expansion, developed an emotional attachment to these interrelated ideas. Particularly important is the strong disapproval of mixed blood. The idea is not so much that purity of lineage will lead to improvement; the reverse is true: any form of mixture will result in something worse. This, as has been shown, is connected with the absence of a belief in progress in antiquity.

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CHAPTER 28

MARITIME IDENTITIES

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THE sea has played a key role in shaping the physical and cultural identity of Greece over millennia. In the field of Hellenic studies, the impact of the sea on the culture of Greece has been investigated from several angles, and particular attention has been paid to seafaring, trade, and warfare. Recent studies have also begun to focus on the cultural dimensions of the sea, exploring, for example, the ways in which the sea was perceived in antiquity and maritime space was culturally defined. Whereas cognitive interaction with land can be examined through tangible structures such as monuments and road networks, enabling theoretical analysis of concepts such as landscapes of power or symbolic landscapes (Bradley 1993; Bender 1993), the sea presents itself as a fluid medium and requires the development of new methodological approaches which can identify and interpret the dynamics of interaction between culture and natural environment (Westerdahl 1994).

The seascape is usually defined as a 'picture or view of the sea' (*OED* s.v.). This definition suggests, in visual and linguistic terms, a land-to-sea perspective: it not only sidelines the sea-to-land perspectives of fishermen and seafarers, but also plays down perceptions of the littoral as a place of interaction between land, sea, and sky. A challenge facing maritime studies is to resolve concerns, from within the various associated disciplines, about culturally specific perceptions of the sea that might inform, consciously or unconsciously, methodological approaches (Conlin and Murphy 1997: 374).

The historical foundations of western scholarship are imbued with a particular socio-religious perspective of the sea, derived in part from Christian doctrine

and symbolism (Dölger 1922–43; cf. Matt. 4: 19). Our knowledge and perception of the sea is also shaped by remarkable technological advances which cover vast expanses and explore extreme depths. From above, satellite pictures convey a global perspective of the oceans. In tandem with international communication, images and studies of this ecological super-phenomenon that covers 70 per cent of the earth's surface are transmitted through various media around the world (Byatt *et al.* 2001). Whilst we marvel at the beauty and extent of this deep blue void, we are also reminded, on a daily basis, of human vulnerability: the explosive power of cruel seas, tsunamis, rising sea levels, and diminishing fish stocks. The oceans, which give this planet life, are an ever-present threat to human survival at sea and on land. Whilst science reveals the size and significance of the marine context, archaeology reveals the extent and breadth of human interaction in its sphere. These different insights are not always easy to reconcile: we find it difficult, for example, to believe that Mesolithic fishermen may have been able to fish offshore in deep water; even more implausible to us is the likelihood that Pleistocene seafarers sailed to Australia. It is possible that modern perceptions of the sea blind us to the possibility that some ancient cultures possessed the technology, seafaring, and navigational expertise needed for such enterprises—ancient expertise must have been based on very different cognitive experiences (Broodbank 1989; Bednarik 1998; Pickard and Bonsall 2004).

Since the 1960s, various archaeological disciplines have focused on aspects of the maritime environment through examination of a vast wealth of material evidence and structures found on land and on submerged sites. Some of the most important advances for the interpretation of this material are based on the theoretical insights of disciplines such as social anthropology, ethnography, and maritime history. These disciplines provide a broader cultural perspective in which to interpret human activity in the maritime sphere, identify variations in social structure, and challenge many of the cultural assumptions of modern westernized societies (Binford 1967: 1; Hodder 1986: 148–9; Flatman 2003: 151). New methodologies which acknowledge sea-to-land perspectives and embrace the littoral have yielded excellent results. The perspective of the fisherman, an ancient seafarer involved in an activity that is one of the earliest, most fundamental, and enduring cultural responses to the natural environment, offers a good starting-point for maritime studies (Clark 1948).

Whilst there exist a number of ancient treatises, written specifically for wealthy recreational anglers by angling enthusiasts, there are no accounts by (or for) working fishermen (Westwood and Satchell 1883; Corcoran 1964; Conlin and Murphy 1997: 374). The elite status of angling as a recreational sport in the Graeco-Roman era is radically different from that of 'professional' fishing, which was commonly portrayed in Greek and Roman art and literature as a wretched activity practised by the poor and lowly (Oppian, *Fishing* 1.65; Suetonius, *Augustus* 83; Radcliffe 1921: 129–32). As non-mechanized fishing is still practised in many

cultures worldwide, the theoretical perspectives of social anthropology and ethno-archaeology become a prime analytical tool with which to explore ancient fishing traditions. In addition, these disciplines highlight how the natural environment defines the ecological context of fishing, the influence of the cultural context on its practice, and the importance of the fisherman's cognitive awareness of maritime space.

A study of ancient fishing provides insight into some of the complexities of sea tenure through which cultural, religious, political, and economic appropriation of the sea in antiquity was acquired. In addition, it affords a view of an activity from the perspective of those often invisible in the archaeological record, for example, the women and children who play, even now, a crucial role in the socio-economic culture of many maritime communities. Maritime archaeology has lagged behind other branches of archaeology in placing women in a maritime context, although the importance of women in this sphere is well documented in modern artisanal fishing communities (Gero and Conkey 1991). A dearth of archaeological evidence connecting women to the sea obscures their likely presence and significance in the socio-cultural order of maritime society. Comparative evidence suggests that female activities are often shore-based and hence regarded as subordinate to the masculine domain of the sea. And yet, the shore is a significant and vibrant locus of fishing practice; nets are mended, bait is gathered, and fish are sold. Whilst the men are at sea, the community and the smallholdings which provide subsistence are maintained by women and children (Warn 2000: 68). In many ancient and modern societies the role of women in maritime activities is surrounded by anxiety and often remains unacknowledged (Kalland 1995: 49–52, 163–79). In the Graeco-Roman period, gender bias is apparent in the vast number of texts which refer to seafaring and fishing. Women are rarely said to participate in fishing activities, although it appears that in certain instances allusion to women fishing was simultaneously intended as reference to female prostitution (Davidson 1993: 64). Prostitutes and seafarers have had an enduring relationship, and venereal disease was a scourge of shipboard life until the nineteenth century (Friel 2003: 192–3). Ancient literature, which was mostly written by elite male writers for a male readership, informs modern research on ancient Greece. Given this general bias, we should pay special attention to the small corpus of epigraphical and textual evidence which records female involvement in the selling of fish and participation in the murex dye industry. Women are also briefly alluded to in connection with net-making and catching stranded fish on shore (*CIL* 6.9801; Aelian, *On the Nature of Animals* 13.28; Alciphron, *Letters* 4.1.4; cf. Horsley 1982: 25–32). Sexual orientation is another issue surrounded by cultural taboos and hence difficult to investigate: only recently has maritime archaeology begun to acknowledge that homosexual and bisexual relations have, historically, been a significant feature in the lives of seafarers, including fishermen and pirates. This intimate interaction may strengthen

group cohesiveness and solidarity, promoting trust and friendship, which are valuable traits in a dangerous environment (Burg 1984: 122; Claassen 2000: 117; Dowson 2000: 162).

28.1. Fruits of the Sea

The aquatic environment of ancient Greece provided myriad alimentary and utilitarian resources such as fish, salt, seaweed, and sponge. Luxury resources included pearls, coral, and murex shellfish, from which the most prestigious dye in antiquity was manufactured. The most prominent activity involved in the gathering of these resources was fishing. In the Hellenic world down to the Roman era, fishing operated within a complex interdependent network of activities on the littoral which included boat- or ship-building; flax and hemp production used to produce materials for cordage, sails, and fishing-nets; salt manufacture used for culinary purposes and in fish processing; purple-dye manufacture; and pottery production used in the storage of salted fish products such as *garos*. The littoral also served as an interface between the natural environment and the terrestrial setting of maritime communities, the consumer, and various ruling groups, the latter accruing substantial revenue from commercial maritime activity (Edmondson 1987; Ayodeji 2003). During the Roman period, the emergence of the aristocratic hobby of pisciculture or fish-farming and the establishment of the Roman *villa maritima* enabled further control and appropriation of the maritime environment by the wealthy (Higginbotham 1997; Horden and Purcell 2000: 125).

Fish and salt-fish derivatives served not only as comestibles, but also as medicines and commodities (Curtis 1991). Throughout classical antiquity, the consumption of certain high-value fish, particularly sea-fish, was also a means of expressing complex social hierarchies and a way of articulating power, wealth, and sophistication (Davidson 1997; Purcell 1995: 132–49). Consumption had a direct influence on fishing practice: a complex value-system elevated the market value of particular fish according to factors such as rarity and size, thus influencing the target catch of fishermen (Ayodeji 2003: 69).

Expression of the significance and aesthetic appeal of fish, fishing, and the maritime environment is evident in the widespread use of fish symbolism and the proliferation of the marine genre in art from prehistory onwards. During the classical period, representation of the sea and its flora and fauna played an aesthetic and didactic role. Hellenistic mosaics of dazzling seascapes, portrayed in authentic detail, and later Roman copies, adorned the homes of the elite and provided

a complementary artistic backdrop for the lavish banquets at which expensive seafood was served. In the Roman period, a series of fish treatises were composed and read by elites (Rostovtzeff 1941: 1615; Corcoran 1964).

28.2. The Cognitive Seascape

Early archaeological evidence of fishing, hunting, and fowling is found from at least the Mesolithic era (Cleyet-Merle 1990). The implements used by early humans to exploit waterways—the line or rod used in conjunction with a hook, and the net, trap, and spear—are the same tools used to catch creatures of the land and air. They also appear almost simultaneously in the archaeological record. Three realms, sea, land, and air, may have been perceived as one vast environment, a single context for survival as in certain modern Oceanian cultures (Flatman 2003: 151). A fusion of these three realms, and the activities of the fisherman/hunter/fowler, are portrayed by ancient artists (Foucher 1957: 29, fig. 19; Donati and Pasini 1997: 13).

In the ancient Greek world, the seascape was encoded with cultural markers and physical reference-points. The physical profile of Greece, with its characteristic indented littoral studded with headlands and promontories, provided clear points of reference for navigation. Human presence within this natural environment, particularly in the Hellenistic era, was articulated by prominent architectural features such as sanctuaries, lighthouses, and watchtowers. One of the most notable examples, the Colossus of Rhodes, stood also as a towering statement of Greek identity and maritime supremacy (Semple 1931: 666). This form of monumental maritime architecture was later adapted by wealthy Romans whose *villae maritimae* served both as sea-marks and ostentatious statements of Roman power, conspicuous along the littoral and from out at sea (Horden and Purcell 2000: 125–6). The establishment of these villas along the littoral, often with artificial fishponds extending into the sea, were also a demonstration of confidence in Roman mastery of the Mediterranean and belief in the much-vaunted claim of total eradication of pirates and sea bandits who had plagued its waters. The problem was old and persistent: evidence of piratical activity at sea is reported from the age of Minoan Crete. Its impact was felt severely during the Hellenistic era, when it threatened trade, the movement of shipping, and furthermore, the security of coastal settlements, which were subjected to persistent raids by pirates in search of booty and prisoners to be sold as slaves or kidnapped and held to ransom. So devastating was the effect of piratical activity that it may have affected the location and architecture of many of the earliest Greek coastal settlements: the archaeological remains of heavily fortified settlements built at some distance from the sea testify to the threat of these sea

raiders (Ormerod 1924: 38, 56–8). Territorial markers indicating human presence and activity on the littoral were also established through the naming of coastal sites. Ancient Greek place-names such as *Halai* and *Tarikheiai*, the former referring to the sea or salt, the latter to fish-salting, testify to terrestrial activities associated with the seascape (Curtis 1991: 65).

The fisherman's cognitive relationship with the seascape was complex. Ethnographic studies have shown that successful fishing calls for a combination of the expertise and technical skill required in the operation of gear and a fishing-boat, with extensive knowledge of the natural environment and of aquatic prey. Navigational ability and knowledge of the exact location of fishing grounds significantly increase the chance of a successful catch (Igarashi 1984: 545–67). The sea itself was encoded with signs within a matrix of routes or sea-lanes which could be read on a physical and metaphysical level like a cognitive map. Through the eyes of the ancient mariner, the water, from its surface to the seabed, was perceived, understood, and defined in the same way as land is by a hunter. On the surface, protruding rocks acted as reference-points, while an opalescent oily slick was a possible indicator of shoaling fish below the surface (Lethbridge 1952: 30–2). Depth of water and the seabed profile, assessed using sounding-leads, provided some indication of the position and habitat of particular fish species (Oleson 2000: 293–310). In Mediterranean waters land is never far from the line of sight: this facilitates travel in maritime space and suggests that, in this context, landmarks define the seascape (Horden and Purcell 2000: 124–32). Observation of the sea, land, and sky enabled seamen to calculate their position, plan their route, avoid, or find a safe passage through, hazardous reaches, and locate fishing grounds.

The sky too was a significant element of the seascape providing, by day, a backdrop for the profile of coast and islands, soaring cliffs, jutting promontories, sanctuaries, and—last but not least—circling birds, which often betray the location of fish shoals (Lethbridge 1952: 30–2). By night, it provided an astronomical compass and served as a backdrop for beacons and watch-fires: those were used as landmarks and symbolized safe harbour, but were also exploited by pirates, smugglers, and wreckers, at least from the Hellenistic era onwards (Brulé 1978).

Ethnographic accounts describe an almost extrasensory awareness manifested by divers fishing in sub-surface waters, and emphasize the courage, physical stamina, and mental acuity necessary in that environment. Textual evidence from the classical era suggests that similar observation would apply also to ancient sponge- and pearl-divers (Daremberg and Saglio 1907: 1442–3; Warn 2000: 25).

The unpredictability of the elements, the treacherous coastal profile, and the potential threat of sea-banditry made fishing and sea travel fraught with danger. The numerous ancient shipwrecks around Greece are evidence of the turbulent nature of Greek waters. Fishing in particular was, and still is, one of the harshest and most perilous occupations, and tends to offer meagre financial rewards. Indeed, its unforgiving character and the strict hierarchical structure of shipboard life may

explain why many seamen resorted to more egalitarian and profitable activities, such as piracy (Rediker 1987: 254–87; Kurlansky 1997: 117–18).

The seafarer's perception of the dangerous sea was embedded in myth. In the same way that certain littoral sites were identified toponymically, so too were treacherous stretches of water such as, for example, the whirlpool Charybdis in the Straits of Messina, the Clashing Rocks (*Sumplēgades*) of the Bosphorus, and the Wandering Rocks (*Planktai*) in waters close to Mount Etna. All of these featured prominently in ancient literature. The dangers of sailing were also associated with monsters such as Scylla or the Sirens (Tripp 1974). Personification of the natural environment and the animism and anthropomorphism evident in myth can be interpreted as a means of endowing the often petrifying forces of nature with human behaviour and motives, and thus of opening the possibility of communication between human beings and the environment (Kirk 1990: 49).

Since Bronislaw Malinowski's seminal study of Trobriand Island fishermen in the Pacific, a range of coping mechanisms, articulated as ritualized behaviour and superstitious belief, are now identified as expressions of perceptions of danger at sea and are seen as a means of rationalizing the arbitrary nature of fishing—which is radically affected by several factors beyond human control, such as fluctuating fish-stocks and the weather. The role of folklore and myth is embedded in maritime activities and cultures also today. The concept of 'luck' is important even in the most highly advanced fisheries, and is felt ever more strongly as vessels travel further offshore, despite the technological sophistication of modern boats which equips fishermen with a plethora of safety devices (Malinowski 1948; Pollnac, Poggie, and van Dusen 1995). Similar behaviour in antiquity is described in several poems of the *Greek Anthology* and confirmed by epigraphical and archaeological evidence. The gods Poseidon, Artemis, Hermes, and Priapus were among the patron deities to whom fishermen would offer gifts, such as libations of wine or favoured items of fishing-gear, prior to sailing and on their safe return to shore. Fish sacrifice was rare, but is attested (Athenaeus 297e). The ancient temple of Apollo on Delos housed gifts including various types of fishing implements, many of which have been excavated in the precincts of the temple. The poems say that wooden images of the gods were placed on shore as shrines or in sea caves where they functioned as votives: they were religious guides aiding safe navigation through dangerous waters (*Greek Anthology* 6.24, 105; 10.1, 2, 4–9; cf. Plassart 1928: 122; Chapouthier 1935: 88–90; Déonna 1938: 200–1).

28.3. Sea Tenure

Plato pronounced that free access to sea was a fundamental right of all human beings, but made some exceptions to this general principle, particularly concerning

the use of poison as a means of fishing, and access to harbour areas and to certain sacred waterways (Plato, *Laws* 7, 824b). Although the ancient Greeks appear not to have made this a legal principle, the idea that the sea was common to all was adopted and modified by the Romans, and was later to form the basis of modern legal approaches to the sea (Fenn 1926). In Roman law, the sea and rivers, like the air, were deemed common to all (*res communes*), and the resources of those waterways were considered to have no owner (*res nullius*) until caught. Fishermen were permitted to spread, dry, and mend their nets on shore because the shore, too, belonged to no one (Justinian, *Digest* 41.2–3, 11; 43.12.1–4; Dumont 1977*a*: 53–7).

In reality, however, access to waterways and aquatic resources, even in the age of Plato, was controlled in much the same way as land, and was regulated through the complex dynamics of what is now considered as sea tenure: a matrix of cultural mechanisms which operate at an informal and formal level and define and limit human access to waterways (Ruddle and Akimichi 1984: 1).

The sea and inland waterways were, ostensibly, open to all fishermen, but informal customary rights and control of aquatic territory are likely to have regulated interaction between competing groups, each vying for favoured fishing grounds. Ethnographic studies reveal that the setting of equipment such as fish-traps marks territory between groups of fishermen in a localized area with the tacit agreement that, once placed, equipment will not be subject to tampering. An air of secrecy pervades fishing space: the location of fishing spots is often regarded as confidential information and is generally passed down from father to son over generations (Igarashi 1984).

The construction of large fishponds from the Hellenistic period onwards extended the concept of land tenure into the sea. Private individuals or ruling groups owned and leased large fish-traps (*pēlamudeia*): their use went together with exclusive access to an associated stretch of water and brought with it the legal right to protect the area from poaching and trespass (Radcliffe 1921: 231–4). Fishing rights and ancient privileges remained for generations under the control of Hellenistic dynasties, or the administration of individual Greek cities. Legal sanctions were imposed on those who fished and hence defiled sacred inland waterways like the Sacred Lake of Delos. Epigraphic and textual sources from the islands of Kos, Lesbos, and Mykonos reveal a plethora of taxes and tithes (*epōnia* and *enkuklia*) on fishermen: they pertained to the catch, the production of salted fish, the use of boats, and harbourage. These regulations highlight the complex arrangements between the state or ruling groups and fishermen, middlemen, tax-gatherers, harbourmasters, and consumers (Andreades 1933: 146–51; Dumont 1977*b*). On occasion, the formation of a guild or association enabled fishermen to control the off-loading and sale of fish, through the official authority of a customs house which prevented non-members from gaining access to the consumer (Horsley 1989: 95–114).

Sea tenure defined maritime space at sea and on the littoral; its most basic tenet, freedom of the seas, was severely tested, particularly in the Hellenistic period,

by rampant bouts of piracy, as mentioned above. Over centuries, piracy was to play a significant role in the economic organization of the Hellenistic and Roman world—as a major supplier of the vast numbers of slaves required by powerful and wealthy elites. Pirates had also often served the interests of various ruling groups, forming loose alliances with, for example, Mithradates VI Eupator (Rauh 2003: 14). Eventually, the sea became an unlawful domain of pirates and robbers whose activities threatened the free movement of ships and yet simultaneously expressed the dissatisfaction of maritime communities. The hardship and poverty endured by many sea-folk, and their disenchantment with the landed aristocracy, erupted into a social rebellion of alienated and disaffected groups united by what was perceived to be a common enemy (Rediker 1987: 254–80; Rauh 2003: 194–200).

The research areas discussed here are just an illustration of some of the ways in which comparative approaches to the sea and the seascape can contribute to Hellenic studies. Numerous other aspects of maritime culture deserve attention, particularly from a socio-economic and ecological perspective: the dynamics of social structure and shipboard relations among fishermen; aquatic-resource management, with the associated institutions and formal regulatory mechanisms on shore; religion and its impact on the social structure and organization of maritime culture. The more research is carried out on these diverse areas, the more realistic will be the picture that emerges of the ancient Greeks and their relationship with the sea.

Suggested Reading

A good general overview of the topic is Oliver *et al.* (2000), a compilation of thirteen papers covering diverse aspects of the ancient Mediterranean from the Bronze Age to late antiquity. The concept of a maritime landscape is analysed by Westerdahl (1992 and 1993). A useful introduction to the study of human interaction with the ancient sea from an ecological perspective is offered in Powell (1996). Morton (2001) examines in detail how the natural environment influenced sailing and seamanship in antiquity, and its effects on socio-maritime culture. There are numerous excellent anthropological publications with useful bibliographies on fishing, the most comprehensive being Gabriel *et al.* (2005). The seafaring experience is discussed in Knutson (1991), and the extreme nature of this experience by Junger (1997). Women and their role at sea in modern fishing communities are examined, for example, by Foggia (1995) and Thompson (1985). A nineteenth-century perusal of Greek folklore and ethnology, in a new edition, is Bent (2002). The roots of sea-lore and superstition are discussed by Vyse (1997).

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CHAPTER 29

TRAVEL AND TRAVEL WRITING

MARIA PRETZLER

Greeks liked to think about their world by tracing colonists' movements from the old motherland to distant Mediterranean shores: they considered mobility as a crucial factor in defining what, and who, was essentially Greek. Myth and epic poetry set the scene by depicting an earlier age of travellers, be it the Achaeans on their overseas campaign against Troy and then on their tortuous journeys to return home, or adventurous heroes such as Heracles or Jason and the many founders of Greek cities everywhere. For us, the *Odyssey* in particular provides a wide range of responses to the experience of travelling overseas in the crucial period when Greek colonization began to shape the ancient Mediterranean as we know it. In Odysseus' tales we encounter a variety of travellers engaged in friendships, diplomacy, and marriage outside their own community, and many people risking adventures for gain through trade, piracy, war, or increased knowledge. Others were forced to leave their home, either displaced as slaves or seeking refuge after conflict. Odysseus, always longing to go home to Ithaca while experiencing both the benefits and the horrors of a long overseas journey, shows how the image of the traveller could be reconciled with that other crucial aspect of Greek identity, a close and lasting connection to one's polis. Many did, however, not return home: by the end of the archaic period we find hundreds of colonies, new poleis, around the coasts of the Mediterranean, and some Greeks sought opportunities well beyond the regions settled by colonists.

It is possible to document complex and dense connections between places and regions around the ancient Mediterranean and beyond (Horden and Purcell 2000),

but most of the evidence for high levels of connectivity in the ancient world does not provide information about the actual process of travelling. The general and vague information derived from imported objects found on archaeological sites suggests the movements of people without offering much insight into the mode or direction of particular journeys. Nevertheless, the general observation that travel was not an exceptional activity in the ancient world should inform our approach to ancient texts dealing with travel experiences. The study of ancient travel focuses on the process of travelling, on individual travellers' movements and their reactions to particular journeys and places. The evidence is therefore mainly literary, with valuable additions from epigraphic sources. The remains of sites which were particularly attractive to ancient travellers, depictions of their means of transport, shipwrecks, and traces of ancient roads can add further information.

Much of what we know about ancient travel concerns the small, eloquent elite that generally dominated the ancient literary record. Throughout antiquity travel was a part of life for wealthy individuals who were involved in the affairs of their community. They were particularly active in maintaining contacts beyond their community, from the elaborate guest-friendships of the Homeric epics to embassies to the emperor in the Roman period. Throughout antiquity, members of the elite relied on widespread contacts which could include acquaintances who were not Greek. Travelling as we see it in most ancient texts was expensive, because eminent people travelled in grand style, with numerous attendants and considerable luggage (Casson 1994: 176–8). Early Christian texts, particularly the Gospels, Acts, and some of St Paul's epistles, look beyond the small, wealthy elite and offer a different cultural perspective, but this valuable source-material has yet to be fully integrated with classical scholarship.

Information about the activities and routines of ancient travel has to be pieced together from disparate references in ancient texts, and the bulk of the evidence dates from the Roman period (Casson 1974; Camassa and Fasce 1991; André and Baslez 1993). The preferred mode of long-distance travel was by ship: not only was sea travel faster and more comfortable (e.g. Pliny, *Epistles* 10.17a; Casson 1974: 67–8, 178–82), but few important Greek sites were located far from the sea. Journeys on land probably often meant walking, even for long distances, although wealthy travellers would use carriages. Mainland Greece at least had a dense road network suitable for vehicles which reached even remote, mountainous locations. Many of these roads date back to the archaic or early classical period and they were in use until the end of antiquity (Pikoulas 2007; Pritchett 1980: 143–96). These practical aspects of ancient travel are rarely the focus of modern research, but they are crucial for our understanding of how ancient travellers interpreted their surroundings. The slow pace of ancient journeys facilitated intensive encounters with landscapes, sites, and local people, while

ancient travellers were often less interested in the wider context of their location. Geographical overviews and accurate maps of large regions seem to have remained the domain of scholarly experts, while many travellers may have adopted a view which organizes the landscape along particular routes without paying much attention to a 'global' perspective (cf. the *Peutinger Table* and Pausanias, with Snodgrass 1987: 81–6).

Trade, war, and the search for opportunities may have accounted for a majority of individual journeys in antiquity (Purcell 1996), but these activities are rarely at the centre of attention. Journeys made for the sake of travelling, usually for the spiritual and intellectual benefit of a particular individual, account for much of the information about travel experiences that can be found in ancient texts, and modern scholarship reflects this emphasis on what we might call 'cultural travel'. Early Greek travellers were often engaged in new discoveries, encountering unknown regions and strange cultures. The exploration by Greeks of regions around the western Mediterranean and the Black Sea may be reflected in the epic tradition, particularly the *Odyssey*, although it came too early to leave credible traces in the literary record. Areas beyond the Mediterranean remained largely unknown well into the Hellenistic period. The Atlantic coasts of both Europe and Africa were occasionally visited by explorers who recorded their observations, for example Hanno and Pytheas of Massalia (Carpenter 1966). Egypt and the Middle East had always been more accessible to the Greeks, not least because there they encountered highly developed cultures that were much older than their own.

By the end of the archaic period Greeks had travelled widely and extended the boundaries of their known world: from Egypt they had reached the upper Nile Valley and brought news of regions further south, and, from the sixth century, knowledge about distant regions of the East as far as India could be obtained through good connections with the Persians. Herodotus criticizes the theories about the shape of the earth inferred from such information by the geographical theorists of sixth-century Ionia, but he also testifies to the usefulness of maps created in this period and he includes geographical information about distant regions in his own work (Herodotus 4.39, 5.49; Harrison 2007). Alexander's conquests in the East and the expansion of the Roman empire, especially in western Europe, provided the Greeks with opportunities to reach hitherto unknown regions and to obtain more detailed geographical information (Polybius 3.59; Clarke 1999). The edges of the earth, however, remained a matter of legends about unusual peoples and cultures and wondrous natural phenomena (Hartog 1988: 12–33; Romm 1992). All surviving ancient explorers' tales have been subjected to intense scrutiny to match them to actual regions and cultures. Recent scholarly attention, however, has been focused on the particularly Greek perspective on alien cultures which often describes strange people in terms of stark

contrasts with what was familiar to the writer and his audience. In fact, authors dealing with 'barbarians' often seem more concerned with exploring their own culture than with giving an accurate picture of a distant region and its people. (Hartog 1988: 212–59).

Most ancient travellers stayed within the familiar confines of the Mediterranean, but there was plenty of scope for 'cultural' travel in the Greek world and among its immediate neighbours. Educated Greeks would embark on sightseeing tours to visit famous places, for example a number of historical sites in mainland Greece, including Athens, Olympia, Delphi, and perhaps Sparta, some of the cultural centres of Asia Minor such as Ephesus or Pergamon, and Ilium as the main location of the Trojan War. Egypt, with its spectacular ancient sites (Casson 1974: 253–61), was also an attractive destination. These sightseeing activities are sometimes described as ancient tourism, but this term is rather misleading because it invites analogies with the seasonal mass movements of today. The Grand Tours of wealthy Europeans of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries would be a more appropriate analogy (see Cohen 1992). Most visitors were particularly interested in ancient monuments with historical connections, artworks by famous artists, and sights that could be classified as curiosities. In most places with important historical monuments a visitor could employ professional tourist-guides to explain the sights, and wealthy travellers could apparently rely on members of the local elite to provide a tour appropriate for refined tastes and educated interests (as Plutarch does in his work *On the Pythia's Prophecies*; and cf. Jones 2001).

In recent years ancient pilgrimage has attracted particular interest (Hunt 1984; Dillon 1997; Elsner 1997; Elsner and Rutherford 2005: esp. 1–30). The applicability of this term to the activities of ancient travellers is contentious (Morinis 1992: 1–28; Scullion 2005: 121–30), but valuable interpretations of ancient texts have emerged from this line of enquiry. Throughout antiquity many sanctuaries saw large numbers of visitors, and some festivals could attract considerable crowds. Many people undertook such visits on their own initiative, but states also maintained regular official links with specific sanctuaries beyond their borders. The concept of pilgrimage invites new enquiries into the function and meaning of such journeys, especially as a means of defining identities and collective memories. Pilgrimage can also be a useful category in assessing ancient attitudes to historical sites. After all, the classical texts played a dominant role in the lives of educated Greeks and determined their approach to places that were in some way linked to the literary tradition. Historical sites, such as important battlefields or places that played a crucial role in the Homeric epics, allowed visitors to explore localities with which they were intimately familiar from their reading since childhood, and which were part of a common Greek consciousness. Visits to such places could therefore have a profound effect which cannot easily be distinguished from a spiritual or religious experience (Hunt 1984). This approach to

spiritual, cultural, and emotional aspects of pagan visits to significant places also allows a new evaluation of Christian pilgrimage in late antiquity (e.g. Egeria), by considering it in the context of earlier, pre-Christian traditions (Hunt 1982; Holum 1990).

Travelling was seen as an important source of knowledge and wisdom, and it was closely linked to the ideals of Greek culture and education (*paideia*) (Pretzler 2007*b*). A traveller could learn by seeing and experiencing different places and civilizations for himself, and he might gain access to information which was not available in Greece. The Greeks were aware that some civilizations were far more ancient than their own, and they assumed that in some countries, for example Egypt, Mesopotamia, or India, travellers might be able to acquire considerable knowledge, particularly about the remote past. There were many legends about the extensive journeys of famous sages such as Solon or Pythagoras, echoed by later traditions about the adventures of Apollonius of Tyana, or Dio Chrysostom's claims about his own wanderings while he was in exile (Hartog 2001: 5, 90–1, 108–16, 199–209). In the Roman period, many aspiring young men from all over the Roman world travelled to acquire a Greek education: they would move to one of the leading cultural centres such as Pergamon, Athens, or Smyrna to study with a distinguished sophist. Prominent intellectuals could enhance their reputation by travelling to give lecture tours and to compete with their peers (Anderson 1993: 28–30). Educated Greeks were therefore expected to be acquainted with famous cities and sites, and such personal knowledge influenced intellectual debates and texts. Experience gained through travelling became particularly important to enhance the credibility of arguments and reports. Authors often stress that they have personally seen places or witnessed events they are describing, and such claims of *autopsia* became a standard literary topos, particularly in historical and geographical works (e.g. Thucydides 1.1; Strabo 2.5.11; Polybius 3.4; Nenci 1953; Lanzillotta 1988; Jacob 1991: 91–4).

While travelling and travel experiences play a crucial role in many ancient texts, there is no clearly defined genre of Greek travel literature. Modern examples of the genre often offer an insight into personal experiences on a journey, and they reflect reactions to strange landscapes, places, and people (Campbell 2002). Few ancient texts cover any of these aspects extensively, and a study of literary responses to travel experiences needs to include texts which touch upon the subject although they belong to different genres. There is no comprehensive modern study of Greek travel writing, and the re-evaluation of relevant texts as travel literature is a relatively recent phenomenon (e.g. Elsner 2001; Hutton 2005; Roy 2007); much work remains to be done in this field. As far as we can tell, the expectations of ancient readers of travel texts differed considerably from those of their modern counterparts. Few ancient writers provide a clear sense of the topography of a place, and they rarely attempt to create a comprehensive image of a location that would allow readers

to visualize what the traveller has seen. In fact, ancient travel writers are usually very selective about what to report: particular features of a landscape are usually only mentioned if they represent a curiosity or if they are relevant to the author's aims, for example sporadic topographical details in a historian's account of a battle. Detailed descriptions of objects were the subject of rhetorical exercises (*ekphrasis*), and landscape descriptions play a particular role in pastoral poetry, but they rarely take up much space in ancient travel accounts (Bartsch 1989: 7–10; Pretzler 2007*a*: 57–63, 105–17).

Ancient travel writing (in the widest sense) can be roughly divided into two categories: on the one hand there are accounts of particular journeys, and on the other hard there are texts which present facts about places or cultures without discussing the process of travelling. The tradition of such 'factual' geographical texts was traced back to the 'Catalogue of Ships' in the *Iliad* (2.484–760; cf. 2.815–77), which provides a list of Greek cities and tribes in a roughly geographical order. The earliest geographical texts probably took the form of *periploi* (e.g. ps.-Scylax), essentially seafarers' logs describing coastlines with important places and landmarks, or *stadiasmoi* which listed paces and distances along overland routes (Giesinger 1937; Janni 1984: 120–30). Hecataeus' *Periodos Gēs* developed this genre further by combining a *periplous*-style description of the world with a scientific discussion of the shape of the earth and the layout of the continents. Later geographers continued to rely on verbal descriptions of coastlines and regional topographies which were never fully superseded by maps (Janni 1984: 15–19; Jacob 1991: 35–63). As Strabo shows, geographical works could include information about the landscape, history, and culture of particular places. Texts dealing with particular regions, for example local histories (e.g. Atthidography, Arrian's *Bithyniaca*), could go into more detail and would usually rely on an intimate knowledge of landscape, monuments, and local traditions.

Most descriptions of regions and sites were probably mainly interested in historical monuments, religious sites, and significant artworks, not unlike the 'cultural' travel-guides of today (Bischoff 1937; Hutton 2005: 247–63). Only two such works survive, Lucian's *On the Syrian Goddess*, a description of the sanctuary of Atargatis in Hierapolis which is clearly not meant entirely seriously (Lightfoot 2003), and Pausanias' *Periēgēsis Hellados*, ten books describing the Peloponnese and a part of central Greece which represent the longest extant ancient travel text (Habicht 1985; Alcock, Elsner, and Cherry 2001; Hutton 2005; Pretzler 2007*a*). Pausanias, a Greek from Asia Minor carried out extensive research between about 160 and 180 CE, but he rarely refers to his own travel experiences, probably in order to maintain his credibility as an objective observer. Pausanias shows little interest in the life of contemporary communities or the natural landscape. Instead, he focuses on sites with a historical or religious significance, and he provides detailed information about the symbolic and cultural interpretations that Greeks could attach to the

landscape. The *Periēgēsis* follows a long ethnographic tradition, and particularly Herodotus, but instead of reflecting on his own identity by contrasting it with the strange customs of barbarians, Pausanias applies his observations to the heartlands of the Greek world, and he presents an intensive study of the history and state of Greek culture in his own time. A fragment of an early Hellenistic description of Greece by Heraclides Criticus offers a very different view of the landscape of Attica and Boeotia (Pfister 1951; Arenz 2006). He adopts an often humorous and somewhat flippant tone to comment on the customs and character of contemporary people and on general conditions for a traveller. Heraclides also records his impressions of the landscape and the general appearance of the cities on his route: his approach to the landscape remains unique among the preserved ancient Greek travel texts.

It seems that authors who described places without discussing a particular journey found it easier to assert their credibility. Accounts of individual journeys had a long tradition, but such stories rarely allowed clear distinctions between fact and fiction. Heated discussions about the veracity of tales about distant regions show that ancient readers were aware of this problem, but their conclusions about particular texts often do not agree with modern opinions (e.g. Strabo 1.2.2–19; Romm 1992: 184–93; Prontera 1993). Fictional travel accounts should therefore be included in any study of ancient travel literature because they add to the range of possible literary responses to travel experiences, even if they may not provide factual information about 'real' places or journeys. Greek travel writing begins with a fictional tale, namely the *Odyssey*, with its stories about monsters and incredible events (Jacob 1991: 24–30; Hartog 2001). What is more, its main narrator, Odysseus, is clearly an unreliable reporter who tells untrue stories ('Cretan tales') about himself and his adventures, and the epic demonstrates how a traveller can construct false tales which will stand up to scrutiny. Odysseus therefore was a hard act to follow: in his wake no traveller reporting adventures in distant lands could be without suspicion, and many did indeed feel free to add fantastic details to their accounts. The earliest explorers' accounts usually took the form of a *periplous* which would include some details about specific adventures and discoveries (e.g. Hanno, Pytheas of Massalia). In the Roman period, Arrian revisited the genre and demonstrated its potential complexities: he reports his activities as governor of Cappadocia in a *Periplous of the Black Sea*, which also allows him to explore his own position as a Greek with multiple identities (Stadter 1980: 32–41; Hutton 2005: 266–71; Pretzler 2007*b*: 135–6).

Few ancient travel accounts deal with emotional responses to a journey or the transforming impact of the experience on an individual's character, knowledge, or spiritual state. Aristides' *Sacred Tales* are unique in presenting the authors' personal perspective on his activities, including many journeys, in the pursuit of health and a special relationship with Asclepius (Behr 1968: 116–28). Most texts dealing with such

personal experiences are fictional, and can take the form of extensive accounts, for examples a trip to India in Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius*, or the Greek novels that usually send their main characters on convoluted journeys before they can settle down to live happily ever after (Morgan 2007; Rohde 1960: 178–310). Some travel authors make no attempt to disguise the fact that their stories are invented, and this can lead to fresh perspectives on the experience of travel. For example, Apuleius' *Golden Ass* (cf. Lucian, *Ass*) takes the opportunity to consider a journey from the point of view of a beast of burden, and it describes a spiritual transformation which turns the main character into a devout follower of Isis. The story also provides a rare chance to observe various travellers who are not members of the elite (Schlam 1992; Millar 1981). Lucian's fantastic stories (*Lovers of Lies*, *True Histories*) and other examples of ancient fiction can be seen as a humorous exploration of the many devices employed by travel writers to make their accounts believable (Ní Mheallaigh 2008).

Travel accounts could recover some credibility in the context of historiography: after all, Herodotus' *Enquiries* (*Historiai*) involved extensive travelling around the eastern Mediterranean, and autopsy remained crucial to enhance a historian's authority. Some journeys were themselves historical events, for example long military campaigns, and they inspired a new kind of travel account which owed much to historiography but could also follow some of the conventions of ancient adventurers' tales. Xenophon's *Anabasis* is the most extensive personal account of a specific journey that survives from antiquity, although the author never admits that he is in fact one of the main characters in the story. Xenophon includes specific information about distances, topography, flora, fauna, and local people, and he gives the impression that decades after the events he can draw on detailed memories, perhaps even a travelogue (Cawkwell 2004; Roy 2007). His perspective, however, is not that of an explorer whose main aim it is to describe a foreign region, but that of a historian who includes details about landscape and people when they are relevant to the events described. Alexander's conquests inspired a number of participants to write accounts which probably took the form of historical accounts in the mould of Xenophon's *Anabasis* (Pearson 1960). In the East, Alexander's military operations turned into a journey of exploration, and his scientific staff gathered reliable, factual information about areas which had hitherto been almost unknown to the Greeks (Strabo 1.2.1; 2.1.6). Well-founded knowledge could, however, be superseded by fantasy: if Strabo (2.1.9) is anything to go by, realistic reports about India did not have a lasting impact and were soon replaced by the old traditions about an exotic land full of strange wonders (Seel 1961; Romm 1992: 94–109). Alexander's campaign became itself the subject of the *Alexander Romance*, which reinterpreted historical events in the tradition of myths and fictional adventure stories: in ancient travel writing, imagination could sometimes be stronger than reality.

Like Odysseus, Greek travellers are often unreliable witnesses of places and events they have seen, but their tales offer great insights into ancient perceptions of the world. Greek travel literature had a strong influence on early modern geography and ethnography, and it still has an impact on how we understand the Greek world. Since the Renaissance, western travellers who set out to discover the eastern Mediterranean relied on ancient texts to guide them to classical sites and to help them interpret the historical landscape. They also drew on similarities between the reactions of travellers in the Roman period and their own feelings about ancient sites and the loss of Greek culture. Ultimately, our understanding of antiquity owes much to ancient travellers who contributed their observations and interpretations to the definition of Greek culture and identity. The reception of ancient travel literature, especially of major texts such as Strabo or Pausanias, deserves attention, not least in the context of the development of our own disciplines, namely Classics, Ancient History, and Classical Archaeology.

Suggested Reading

The classic account of many facets of ancient travel in English is Casson (1994). Casson gathers the ancient evidence to describe the activities and aims of ancient travellers, and his work offers a useful introduction to the subject. André and Baslez (1993) cover similar ground, but in addition to gathering and digesting the sources their work also reflects more recent developments in the study of ancient travel, and they offer more discussion of the cultural and intellectual context of their material. Two collections of articles on travel and travel writing, namely Camassa and Fasce (1991) and Adams and Roy (2007), provide a good insight into a variety of lines of enquiry that have influenced the study of ancient travel in recent years.

Ancient travel writing has mainly been covered in works about specific authors. Recently the study of Pausanias in particular has led to further investigations of travel and travel writing. Pretzler (2007*a*) offers a general discussion of ancient travel, travel literature, and attitudes to geography and landscapes. Hutton (2005) analyses methods of travel writing, with a particular emphasis on the geographical structure of texts that deal with landscapes. Alcock, Cherry, and Elsner (2001) presents a wide range of approaches, including a number of papers discussing the reception of Pausanias.

Travel to distant places and the role the edges of the known world played in the imagination has been at the centre of stimulating discussion in recent years. Carpenter (1966) provides a basic overview of ancient explorers and their discoveries on the margins of the *oikoumenē*. Ideas about distant regions are discussed in Romm (1992), and Hartog (1988 and 2001) contributes many valuable insights. Pilgrimage is another special aspect of travelling that has recently attracted a good deal of scholarly attention: much progress has been made in the analysis of pilgrimage in an ancient pagan as well as an early Christian context. Elsner and Rutherford (2005) is a collection of conference papers which offer a good overview of recent debates.

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CHAPTER 30

RELIGION*

JULIA KINDT

> Greek religion has the force to be, and probably to remain, a great and inexhaustible object of research and exploration. Not only is it the religion of one of the most important peoples of all times, but also the strangest and latest polytheism of ancient history.
>
> (Jacob Burckhardt)

30.1. General Considerations

Religion as a subject of research is a product of modern times. With monotheistic religions, in particular Christianity, in view, it is thought of as an autonomous and self-referential system with a large degree of inner coherence and a binding theology. The Greeks, however, had no word for religion as an abstract category. Religion did not exist outside the contexts in which it was lived. Participation in religion was personal, direct, and ubiquitous—for religious beliefs and practices permeated all spheres of life.

Greek religion lacks the defining features of most modern religions. It had no official church, no dogma, and (apart from a few exceptions) no priesthood in the

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sense of a specially trained and entitled group of people providing religious services. Classical scholars have frequently stressed the 'alien quality' of Greek religious beliefs and practices. This is another way of saying that modern analytical concepts derived from the great monotheistic religions of our times are inadequate to 'make sense' of Greek religion. The study of Greek religion requires its own interpretative framework.

30.2. What is Greek Religion?

There is currently an intrinsic and productive tension between two different ways of approaching Greek religion. In particular in the Anglo-American world, the standard interpretative framework prevailing in current scholarship is that of 'polis religion' (see Sourvinou-Inwood 1990). In contrast to this view, which emphasizes religious practice, a separate scholarly trend puts the emphasis on Greek theology (in the sense of a system of Greek religious beliefs and practices) via more abstract ideas and concepts (see below).

The pragmatic perspective implicit in the definition of Greek religion as polis religion makes perfect sense if the focus is on human agency, which is always, in one way or the other, related to the polis. Until the Hellenistic and Roman periods, the world of largely autonomous Greek city-states had no overarching political or administrative structure. The polis was the primary frame of reference in all spheres of life. It provided the major context for Greek cults and rituals and mediated access to the Panhellenic dimension of Greek religion: to the big sanctuaries outside the sphere of individual city-states, such as Delphi, and to Panhellenic games at Olympia and elsewhere. It was through the polis and its specific religious arrangements that the Greeks participated in the larger system of Greek religion.

The polis can thus be employed as a building-block to define the Panhellenic dimension of Greek religion. It is frequently argued that, despite its loose structure and many local differences, Greek religion constituted a single grand system common to the Greek world. Shared beliefs and practices defined what it meant to be Greek beyond membership of individual poleis. This idea can already be found in Herodotus, who lists religion, more specifically the temples of the gods and the sacrifices, as part of what constitutes a common Greek identity, alongside blood-ties and a shared language (8.144.2). The religious inventories of the individual city-states resembled each other. The Greeks shared a common set of myths (propagated by Homer and Hesiod) telling them about the characteristics of the gods and their special areas of influence. Greek religion

was polytheistic. A large number of mostly anthropomorphic gods (of which the twelve Olympian gods are the core) were worshipped. There was also something distinctively Greek about how the temples were set up and where they were placed. Finally, there were a number of shared religious practices, such as blood sacrifice, the pouring of libations, the swearing of oaths, the celebrating of religious festivals, the use (and abuse) of divination, and shared notions of purity and pollution.

Greek religion is the religious outlook and rituals specific to Greek culture. The unity and diversity of Greek religion mirrors the social and political structures of the Greek world. What, however, was its function? John Gould (influenced by Clifford Geertz's semiotic concept of culture) has provided an answer to this question that is shared by many scholars working in the field. According to Gould, Greek religion is not just any kind of system, but a 'system of signs', a 'language', allowing its speakers to articulate their experience of the external world and to communicate their responses to such experiences among each other (1985: 4). However, also according to Gould, this language cannot simply be 'decoded', that is, translated into plain language. Statements made in the language of religion are as diverse, obscure, and sometimes contradictory as the world which this language describes.

While the idea of Greek religion as a Panhellenic system, as a 'language' spoken throughout the Greek world, has proved fruitful to describe the nature of Greek religion, there is a certain danger of oversimplification and of neglecting local aspects which do not fit into the larger picture. Reacting against such tendencies, Robert Parker has explicitly adopted a local perspective. Basing two of his works on Greek religion entirely at Athens, he sets out to give a comprehensive assessment of her religious life, thus giving the model of polis religion a new dimension (Parker 1996, 2005). Other scholars have recently reminded us of differences in religious beliefs and practices throughout the Greek world (see Price 1999, who explores local beliefs and practices in their relation to the Panhellenic religious system), or have revealed the inconsistencies within the system of Greek religion (Versnel 1990–3).

Studies of local differences in religious beliefs and practices are important, but looking at regional cults of individual divinities should not result in their disentanglement from the larger social, political, and religious contexts in which they were practised. What point is there in being repeatedly reminded about Greek religion being 'embedded' in society if some classical scholars ignore the consequences (see Mylonopoulos 2003 on Poseidon in the Peloponnese, and Bonnechere 2003 on Trophonius)? Some Greek festivals, for example, connect local and Panhellenic identities (cf. König in this volume).

While the model of polis religion helps to define the unity and diversity of Greek religion, it fails to capture the aspects of Greek theology that are not primarily accessible via human agency. Some good work has been done in exploring religious

concepts such as death, prayer, sacrifice, *daimones*, *eusebeia*, and so on, that in many ways transcend the polis orientation implicit in large parts of current scholarship (some examples: Jeanmaire 1951; Lloyd-Jones 1971; Gladigow 1979; Pulleyn 1997; Bruit Zaidman 2001).

Further reservations about the model of Greek religion as 'polis religion' concern its value for studying developments beyond the classical period. To be sure, religion during the Hellenistic and Roman periods evolved from archaic and classical Greek religion. But it is important to note that the gradual transformation of the Greek world during that time resulted in new social and political structures, and thus brought forth new forms of religious belief and practice. The ruler cult originating with Alexander the Great, and the worship of Egyptian gods like Isis and Osiris, are only two examples indicating a new religious outlook, the essence of which cannot be captured by the model of polis religion. Therefore it cannot suffice to state only that people engaged in different religious practices during the Hellenistic and Roman periods from those they had engaged in before. If we want to understand the essence of religious beliefs and practices during that time, we need to explore how and why this fits into a larger theology of Hellenistic and Roman religion, a theology not necessarily grounded in the polis as the elementary unit of Greek religious life.

30.3. The Sources

The sources for the study of Greek religion are diverse and plentiful. They can be divided into three categories: literary sources, archaeological sources, and epigraphy. The literary sources constitute the largest group, providing the most detailed information on Greek religion, which permeates almost all genres of Greek literature.

Just as Greek religion has no dogma and no official church, so it lacks a canonical literature, such as a holy scripture that sets out and lays down religious beliefs and practices. Greek religion can be accessed via texts in which religion features prominently, but which are not themselves considered to be sacred. These sources include texts as heterogeneous as epic poetry, historiography, tragedy, comedy, the geographical works of Strabo and Pausanias, and the writings of Plutarch. Hellenistic times saw the coming of an exegetic literature of which very few fragments are preserved by later authors, such as Athenaeus. Early Christian writers frequently contrast ancient pagan rituals with the new creed.

The archaeological evidence consists of temples, tombs, altars, statues, vases, and different kinds of cultic and ritual equipment. These sources tell us about the set-up

and the organization of Greek cults and the nature and use of votive gifts. Much attention is currently devoted to amulets as a source for Greek magical practice. The depiction of mythological scenes on vases and coins reveals the iconography of the gods. The *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae* (*LIMC*) is a good research-tool with which to access the pictorial representation of ancient gods, heroes, demons, and other creatures populating ancient mythology. Since the early 1990s, archaeological surface survey has contributed to a better understanding of Greek religious landscapes beyond the well-researched urban or Panhellenic sanctuaries. The sacred landscapes thus revealed show an important dimension of Greek self-perception and should be considered in interaction with the social and political landscapes of ancient Greece.

Despite the great significance of the material record available, the archaeological evidence has still not been satisfactorily integrated into the study of Greek religion (for a successful, integrated approach towards the archaeology of the sacred see Osborne 1987, 1988, 1989). In some ways it is a curiosity that the pragmatics of polis religion have paid relatively little attention to dedicatory assemblages, for example. The *Thesaurus Cultus et Rituum Antiquorum* (*ThesCRA*), a fundamental work exploring religious cults and rituals by giving equal consideration to literature, epigraphy, iconography, and the material evidence, will provide important impulses for a more integrated and comprehensive study of Greek religion (four volumes have already been published; a fifth one is currently in production).

We also have a vast number of inscriptions relevant to the study of Greek religion. There are many public decrees or sacred laws organizing religious activity. They also include religious calendars, descriptions of cults or their actual records, constitutions of religious associations, and announcements of oracular utterances. Such inscriptions can provide us with information about the economy and the administration of individual cults and rituals. While important work has recently been done in assessing the epigraphic evidence, there is still much scope for further exploration. The sacred laws, for example, are particularly interesting because they demonstrate just how much ancient Greek religion differed from modern religions.

30.4. Perspectives on Greek Religion

Greek religion has been approached from a variety of perspectives. Individual 'schools' have explored different ways in which Greek religion can be studied and have shaped our understanding of what Greek religion is. The study of Greek religion has always been a highly interdisciplinary area of scholarly interest. Disciplines

from outside Classics, in particular sociology, social anthropology, and ethnography, have made significant contributions. In addition, research into Greek religion has often been methodologically innovative and has influenced other fields of research within classical studies and beyond.

Early interest in Greek religion during the nineteenth century was driven by Romantic nationalism. However, the study of folklore and ethnology and the abundant information about the religions of other people provided by the colonies soon inspired a comparative approach towards religious beliefs and practices. The early 'history of religions' school combined an evolutionary perspective with the interest in ethnographic data and sought to understand how more complex forms of religious organization had emerged from simpler earlier stages.

The challenges provided by psychology (Freud, Jung), the sociology of religion (Durkheim, Bergson), and evolutionary anthropology as practised by Frazer and others were addressed by the so-called 'Cambridge School'. This group of scholars around Jane Harrison (1850–1928) accessed Greek religion from an evolutionary perspective and via its rituals—which also gave the group the name 'Cambridge Ritualists'. While Frazer and the Cambridge School have had a lasting effect on the study of Greek religion, many of their concepts and claims are outdated today. But these are old battles, with a limited impact on recent works in the field, and to situate current debates in the larger context of scholarship it makes more sense to start from the opposing, yet in many ways related, positions of Burkert and what is sometimes called the 'Paris School'.

The Paris School was influenced by Claude Lévi-Strauss's structural anthropology. In their structuralist readings of Greek religion, Jean-Pierre Vernant, Marcel Detienne, and Pierre Vidal-Naquet start from specially highlighted elements within a given mythological narrative, such as a specific god or a particular human action. These elements are related to each other and conceptualized as a system of parallel and complementary units. The formal analysis of units such as bright and dark, male and female, gods and mortals, reveals a network of correspondences in which no element can be understood by itself but only in relation to the other elements within the system. Once the overall logic of a given narrative becomes visible behind its structure, it is placed within the social and cultural context of ancient Greece. In *Les Jardins d'Adonis* (*The Gardens of Adonis*), for example, Marcel Detienne (1972) explored myths and rituals concerning Adonis, a young hunter and offspring of the incestuous love between father and daughter, who died a premature death. Spices and smells featuring in the context of Adonis led Detienne to a network of opposed elements concerning legitimate and illegitimate sexuality. Eventually the internal logic of the Adonis myth is revealed as a tale that reflects on Greek society by presenting an upside-down image of its social and religious order.

The group around Jean-Pierre Vernant was criticized for its ahistorical analysis and for drawing indiscriminately on sources from different times and places. The

Paris School did not offer a comprehensive reading of Greek religion, but, due to their original demonstration of its interpretative powers, structuralism has become indispensable in the study of mythology. And even beyond the works of the Paris School and their readings of Greek mythology, the structuralist perspective has widely inspired the study of Greek religion. The definition of Greek religion as a system of signs, as a Panhellenic language (see above), is explicitly structuralist in nature. Representative texts of the Paris School are published together in Gordon (1981).

Although influenced by structuralism, Walter Burkert's work is a critical response to its Lévi-Straussian variant. In *Homo Necans* (1972), Burkert combines a socio-biological perspective with the imagination of a period prior to history. Rituals and the myths connected to them are now again at the centre of interest. Going back to the early days of mankind, he describes the ability and willingness to kill as part of human biology, an important but potentially dangerous skill of the hunter-gatherer society. Transformed into a collective celebration of controlled aggression in religious rituals, blood sacrifice creates group solidarity. The bio-socio-cultural perspective is also applied to initiation rites, another central theme in Burkert's oeuvre. Again, Burkert here sees these rites as relics of a much older tribal institution. They re-enact a marginal situation and its resolution as a symbol of the dangerous and 'crisis-strewn path that leads to adult life' (Burkert 1985: 264). Initiation rites are further explored in the works of Fritz Graf and Jan Bremmer; cf. also Calame in this volume.

With Burkert and Vernant, the study of Greek religion has taken a pragmatic turn. The comprehensive perspective implicit in structuralism does not single out individual elements of human agency, but seeks to explore their meaning as culturally specific collective representations in a larger system of reference. Thus, this perspective led to the simultaneous 'discovery' of blood sacrifice by both authors. With *The Cuisine of Sacrifice* (Detienne and Vernant 1979), a collaborative project of the Centre for Comparative Studies of Ancient Societies in Paris, the members of the Paris School explored the social dimensions of sacrifice. In *Homo Necans*, Burkert investigated a related but different path towards the structures of Greek sacrificial practice. While Burkert analysed blood sacrifice by focusing on the act of killing, Vernant was primarily interested in the aspect of eating the slaughtered animal.

With their joint interest in sacrifice, Vernant and Burkert made important contributions to what was already a central concern in the interdisciplinary study of religions. Interest in sacrifice originated with Robertson Smith's lectures on the religion of the Semites (see Smith 1889), which inspired Hubert and Mauss's work on sacrifice (1964), which in turn influenced the succeeding literature (see e.g. Girard 1972). In the following decades sacrifice became a central obsession of scholarship on Greek religion. In particular, the 1970s and 1980s saw the issue of

sacrifice and how to understand it dominating the questions historians were asking about Greek religion (for some examples see Rudhardt and Reverdin 1981; Durand 1986; Hughes 1991).

The holistic approach, already visible in the works of Burkert and Vernant, sought to explore religious phenomena in their larger cultural and religious contexts. It was shared by the revised history of religions school, which found its most original followers in Italy. Methodically, the works of Raffaele Pettazzoni and his students Angelo Brelich and Ugo Bianchi were a critical evaluation of the earlier history of religions school (*Religionsgeschichte*) with which they shared a comparative perspective and the interest in viewing the succession of religions historically. However, in contrast to earlier works exploring the historical succession of religions, the Italians strongly preferred cultural/historical comparison to the earlier evolutionary one (see e.g. Pettazzoni 1954). Developments took a parallel course in Sweden, with Martin P. Nilsson being the prime example (and a still invaluable source of reference) for the achievements of the revised history of religions school of the 1930s–1950s (Nilsson 1941–50).

This brief survey of past scholarship on Greek religion reveals that although the field may be international it is still strongly marked by national traditions, which drive the scholarly discourse and explain the liveliness of the debate.

Not so long ago, religion was considered marginal and far removed from the 'hard' surfaces of Greek life. The developments described above have shown Greek religion to be absolutely central to our understanding of Greek culture and society. Important research is now concerned with aspects of Greek religion, such as divination or the belief in *daimones*, that were formerly considered weird and 'unfit' for serious scholarly attention (see e.g. Johnston and Struck 2005).

30.5. Areas of Current Debate (1): Religion and Society

While the works of Vernant, Burkert, and others continue to influence scholarship, current research has seen a diversification of perspectives, without a single interpretative paradigm being dominant. Current research advances mainly thematically—there are now very few works which seek to make new fundamental methodological or theoretical claims about Greek religion and the way in which it should be studied.

An influential field of research explores Geek religion within its social and political contexts. Collective prayer, worship, and sacrifice, the celebration of religious

festivals with the participation in religious processions, and the consultation of diviners before battle are just a few examples of how religion formed part of the fabric of Greek society. In myths and rituals centred upon Dionysus, the god of intoxication, madness (*mania*), death, and the theatre, the normative aspects of identity and social order were re-established in controlled acts of transgression and reversal of the ordinary. This field of research owes much to the marvellous Maussian history of Greek religion by Gernet and Boulanger (1932) which, when it was first published, revolutionized scholarly discourse by demonstrating the way in which Greek religion developed in close exchange with social phenomena—views which have now become entirely absorbed into the mainstream scholarly discourse.

However, important questions concerning the relationship between Greek religion and society remain open to debate. One fundamental issue is how instrumental Greek religion is. Is religion just a passive mirror of social structures, or is it actively engaged in shaping society? Contemporary scholars answer this question differently. Some see Greek religion as a creative force within society. François de Polignac, for example, has argued that there was a very basic identification between the polis, the conscious political community, and the religious community which marks out its power by the foundation and use of sanctuaries in its territory (1995). Robert Garland (1992) has explored the way in which the introduction of new gods reflects changes and frictions in Greek society.

Other scholars adopt a functionalist perspective. How does Greek religion fit in with the existing structures of society? An important area of research here explores the relationship between gender and religion. Religious beliefs and practices frequently mirror and support the social structures of Greek society. But at the same time religion is one dimension of Greek society in which women could exercise a certain degree of power (see e.g. Blundell and Williamson 1998; Calame 2001; Dillon 2002). The two perspectives are by no means mutually exclusive: religious agency is an important instrument for the reproduction of social order over time and for its occasional modification.

Power and authority are recurrent and central concepts in works evaluating the relationship between Greek religion and society. Mary Beard and John North, for example, have edited a book that seeks the defining features of pagan priesthood in Mediterranean societies within the interplay of its social and political roles (Beard and North 1990). The essays collected by Hellström and Alroth (1996) approach the interaction of religious and political power from a variety of perspectives and in different contexts, extending from prehistoric Cyprus to democratic Athens, and from textual to material evidence. A comprehensive study that investigates how religious power and authority relates to other forms of social, political, and economic power in ancient Greece (drawing perhaps on Max Weber's types of leadership) is still lacking.

30.6. Areas of Current Debate (II): Continuity, Change, and Transformation

Culture is a larger concept than society. It encompasses not only the network of relationships and dependences which structure a society from within, but also its customs, language, literature, and religion: in short, everything that is specific to society. The concept of culture includes a concept of society. In the last two decades, social anthropology has been re-evaluating the concept of culture as an analytical tool. Whereas earlier studies viewed culture as consensual and relatively stable, recent scholarship works with a more dynamic and flexible concept of culture as contested and changing. In the works of Marshal Sahlins and others, social anthropology has gained a historical dimension. In addition, the meaning of culture was enlarged to include formerly marginalized areas of society besides the main seats of power. The fruitfulness of this approach for the disciplines of history and social anthropology has been demonstrated most prominently by Jean and John Comaroff in their two-volume work on colonialism and the evangelical frontier in South Africa (1991–7; a third volume is in production).

An expanded concept of culture as contested and changing might be useful for the study of Greek religion in more than one way. It could, for example, inspire us to pay more careful attention to the social frictions resulting from religious change. This concept might be particularly interesting for works exploring the origins of Greek religion. An influential field of research investigates Greek religion as a product of cultural adaptation and the encounter of different ancient cultures. Elements of archaic and classical Greek religion have been found in Minoan/Mycenaean religion, which in turn have been traced back to Indo-European origins. Walter Burkert has shown the indebtedness of Greek religion to the ancient Near East (Burkert 1999). In his controversial *Black Athena* (Bernal 1987–2006), Martin Bernal argued for the existence of Egyptian roots to Greek religion. Following in the footsteps of Edward Said, he claimed that classical scholarship constructed Egyptian culture as different and strange, thus favouring Indo-European origins of Greek religion and society. Bernal was in effect accusing classical scholarship of a racist bias. Inevitably there has been a strong reaction to his theses, and a lively debate has ensued.

What are the influences of Greek religion on Etruscan or Oriental religion and vice versa? Is Hellenistic religion a product of the fusion of two cultures, as Johann Gustav Droysen has claimed, or rather the product of a creative process during which the Greeks interpreted oriental religion (Préaux 1978)—or something different altogether? Cultural transmission is frequently a two-way process.

The study of Greek religion might be able to make an important contribution to the development of a general interpretative framework for cross-cultural exchange and transformation that moves beyond a simple binary opposition of give and take.

30.7. Areas of Current Debate (iii): Narrative and Representation

One way of getting access to an ancient culture is by way of its literary and artistic production. Some scholars have been asking how Greek religion features in the works of ancient literature. But whose religion do the ancient authors convey? Does Herodotus, for example, just reveal his own religious views or is he in any way representative of Greek society? Is literary religion always elite religion, from which popular religious beliefs and practices differed significantly? The answers given to these questions vary according to the individual scholars' interpretative paradigms. Some explore religion merely as a literary device (see Kirchberg 1965). Others again focus on the religious views of individual ancient authors (see e.g. Harrison 2000). Others use the ancient authors to reconstruct a religious reality prior to and beyond the written evidence, or combine the above perspectives (see e.g. Mikalson 2003).

Much of the disagreement here seems to result from the difficulty of distinguishing between historical (practised) religion and its literary representation. Future research in this field could turn the difficulty into an opportunity and move beyond the distinction between historical content and narrative form. Following recent trends in the humanities, there is already a considerable body of classical scholars who do not see history and literature as distinct and mutually exclusive discourses, but seek to explore how social and political structures are represented in literary texts (some examples: Foley 1981; Winkler and Zeitlin 1990; Dougherty 1993; Dougherty and Kurke 1993). The ways in which this perspective could be applied to the study of Greek religion and trigger new questions in this field are manifold. Is there a link between narrative form and ritual structure? (See Seaford 1994, on Homer and Greek tragedy; Bowie 1993 and Lada-Richards 1999 on Aristophanes.) How does the secrecy of mysteries translate into their literary representation and vice versa? What can we learn about the world-view and outlook of the ancient world from accounts of oracle consultations?

However, in order to carry more-traditional historians with them, scholars moving in this direction will have to demonstrate successfully that narrative structures are indeed part of a more general 'poetics' of Greek culture. In order not to lose 'contact with the hard surfaces of life' (see Morris 1993), and to avoid being accused

of reducing Greek religious practices to mere texts, this approach will have to establish meaningful links between literary discourses and the social and political discourses that structure Greek society. With a clear focus on representation as a central concept, this perspective on Greek religion could even be expanded to include the material evidence which, of course has a narrative of its own. *La cité des images* has moved some way towards an integrated perspective on iconographic representations of cult activity (Bérard 1984), but the only detailed studies so far are either of the Dionysiac (Carpenter 1986) or of sacrifice (van Straten 1995).

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CHAPTER 31

GAMES AND FESTIVALS

JASON KÖNIG

31.1. INTRODUCTION

THE festivals of the Greek world take us right to the heart of the concerns of this volume. Not only do they demonstrate the power of Hellenism as a unifying ideal, together with the vitality and variety of local Hellenic practice; in addition they allow us to explore with unusual vividness the problem of perspective, that is, the way in which a nuanced understanding of Hellenic identity must take account of the many different angles from which it was viewed and represented. We have access—of a sort—to a vast array of complementary views of Greek festivals, in a range of different media, which between them can help us to reconstruct the perspectives of spectator and competitor, citizen and foreign visitor, emperor and benefactor, cultural centres and cultural margins. That highly varied body of material makes the cultural history of Greek festivals a very rich one, but it also makes generalization about their function in Greek society extremely difficult. How can we pick our way through that range of involvements in order to understand why festivals mattered for Hellenism, what festivals meant for Hellenic identity?

One way of dealing with that challenge might be to turn to comparative perspectives in search of models for understanding how identity is experienced in festival or sporting situations; the two sections that follow accordingly make at least passing reference to comparative approaches. Here too, however, we should note that modern scholarship on communal celebration and sporting perfor-

mance in other places and periods has emphasized the difficulty of generalizing, the importance of intricate attention to the context of each single manifestation and representation of festive activity. (See e.g. Humphrey 2001, who exposes the oversimplifications engrained in modern scholarly generalizations about the social function of medieval carnival, which has usually in the past been characterized too straightforwardly, either as subversive—as a vehicle for challenging of social hierarchies and empowerment of the masses—or conservative—as a safety-valve for their revolutionary energies.)

My focus in what follows is on two distinct areas. First, and at greater length, I look at the variety of ways in which festivals were represented and (as far as we can tell) experienced as manifestations of various types of community. Secondly, I turn to the question of how we should read the experience and representation of athletic contest and the athletic body. Both areas raise vividly (and often frustratingly) the question of links between experience and identity: how did competitors or spectators envisage the interrelation between their own senses of self-positioning and affiliation and the performance of their own festive roles? And how did others re-imagine that interrelation after the event, in visual representations, literary writing, and civic commemoration? Moreover, both areas offer a window onto the many different competing allegiances at play within festival contexts, and the many different competing interest-groups which might have felt their own prestige and their own self-understanding to be caught up in festival activity.

31.2. Spectatorship and Community

There is no shortage of ancient theorizations and idealizations of the links between festival and identity. Herodotus' famous statement (in the mouth of Athenian envoys appealing to Sparta for cooperation against Persia) that the Greek people are held together by 'common blood and language, shared shrines of the gods and sacrifices, and similar way of life' (8.144) is echoed and intensified through later Greek literature, in representations of the great 'Panhellenic' festivals as harmonious gathering-places for the whole of the Greek world. The foundation of the Olympic festival, dated by ancient writers to 776 BCE, and the upgrading of the other three great festivals of Greece—the Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian, which between them formed, together with the Olympic festival, the 'Panhellenic' *periodos* ('circuit')—in the early sixth century BCE, are standardly taken as landmarks in the development of shared Hellenic identity. And the rapid growth of the 'Panhellenic' festival programme in the third century BCE, which saw hundreds of new foundations springing up across the

Hellenistic world, expands that 'Panhellenic' legacy for a wider geographical scope.

Local festivals, too, celebrated communal identity (for example, on the classical Athenian Panathenaia as a performance of Athenian democratic and religious identity see Osborne 1994; Neils 1996; Maurizio 1998). One of the most striking features of Greek festivals, to modern eyes, is the way in which they tend to give formal involvement to such a wide range of different participants. Most festivals involved large-scale procession through the city or sanctuary, processions which could contain representatives from many different groups within the citizen body. The culmination of the procession was sacrifice, followed by shared banquets of sacrificial meat, in some cases on a very large scale, where thousands might feast together in celebration of community (Schmitt-Pantel 1992). At the same time the festival was an occasion for the city to act out its internal divisions and hierarchies, to put itself on view. Many processions contained groups representing different regions of the city: see, for example, lines 68–87 of the long inscription recording the festival of the Demostheneia at Oenoanda (Wörrle 1988: esp. 135–50; also Mitchell 1990), where we hear that representatives of the city's surrounding villages are to process, together with various civic officials and representatives from foreign cities, with specified numbers of bulls for sacrifice, and with fines for those who refuse to participate when nominated. Other processions might contain representatives of particular professional groupings (see e.g. van Nijf 1997: esp. 191–206), or particular age-groups: see, for example, Rogers (1991*a*) on the prominent role given to ephebes in the foundation of Vibius Salutaris in Ephesus. That festival, founded in the early second century CE, can be reconstructed through instructions inscribed at length on stone, giving us a vivid glimpse of the way in which the young men of the city acted out and were initiated into their shared Ephesian heritage through procession and participation. (On this topic see further Calame in this volume.) The various benefactions ascribed to Epaminondas of Akraiphia in first-century CE Boeotia (*IG* VII. 2712; see Oliver 1971) give a similarly vivid picture of the way in which festival banquets and distributions could give prominence to different groups within the city, privileging different versions of internal unity at different times: in some cases councillors and magistrates only are invited, in other cases the whole city is feasted; on one occasion we are specifically told that Epaminondas includes resident foreigners, on another male slaves and the sons of citizens, and in one instance the wives of citizens are entertained by Epaminondas' wife, together with girls and adult female slaves. Here, the festival calendar of Akraiphia acts out different ways of dividing the city at different times.

Often, now, we reach for the language of civic unity in seeking to understand these events; often, too, we view them as events which overlaid local community with overtones of shared Greek identity. We say, for example, that a city advertises its own glory to the assembled Greek world; or we say that a city lays claim to

Hellenic identity through its festivals, a strategy which must have been particularly attractive to cities on the edge of the Greek-speaking world (see e.g. van Nijf 2001 on athletic festivals in Roman Lycia). For Rogers, the festival of Vibius Salutaris is a response to the encroachment of Roman control—a reassertion of local tradition and autonomy, an attempt to integrate Rome into the idiom of traditional Greek religion (a project which has much in common with the centuries-old use of ruler cult to accommodate the outside power of Roman emperors and before them Hellenistic kings within a traditional framework: see Price 1984). Later, in the Hellenistic and (especially) imperial periods, we see signs of the great lengths cities would go to to win Panhellenic status for their own local games (see Parker 2004 on 'Panhellenic' festivals in Hellenistic Greece). The common use of the name Olympia for local festivals (Farrington 1997: 32–43) must similarly often have been an attempt to harness the elusive Panhellenic prestige of the first great festival of Greece. It is no accident that the action of several of the Greek novels begins in a festival setting: in Chariton's *Chaireas and Callirhoe* 1.1, for example, we see the hero and heroine falling in love at a festival in their home city, before being pitched out into the hard realities of life on the edges of the Greek world, only to return home at the end of all their adventures to scenes of communal rejoicing. Here, the festival setting signals the safety of familiar local rituals as well as standing more generally for civilized, Hellenic custom, in contrast to the dangers of the outside world.

Greek concepts of spectatorship were also very different from our own. The Greek word for 'spectators', *theōroi*, was also used to refer to the sacred envoys who would travel from individual cities as representatives at 'Panhellenic' games. Correspondingly, there seems to have been a widespread concept of spectating as an active process, a performance of identity on behalf of the spectator not so far removed from modern concepts of pilgrimage (Rutherford 2000; cf. discussion in Pretzler in this volume). On that model, visitors to a *periodos* festival might view their visit as an act with religious significance, a celebration of their own Greek affiliation and at the same time an opportunity to represent their home city, as well as a chance to enjoy the entertainment and spectacle. Spectatorship could be a way of displaying group identity in one's home city too: for example, we have evidence for reserved seating for particular professional associations (van Nijf 1997: 209–40; cf. Roueché 1993: 83–128 on reserved seating, including seating for ephebes, in Roman Aphrodisias).

All of that evidence suggests an inextricable link between festival and identity in the Greek world, with Hellenic and local identity often acted out together. It is also clear, however, that we need carefully nuanced ways of stating those links for any particular case. We should pause before accepting unquestioningly Margaret McGowan's definition of festival (in the context of German festivals of the sixteenth to twentieth centuries) as 'a manifestation through which a society or group makes plain its consciousness of its own identity' (Friedrich 2000: p. ix).

For one thing, it is clear that an individual's experience of identity is rarely easy to summarize: often it has only an oblique relationship with generalizations which are made about communal identity from a distance or in retrospect; each individual's sense of his or her own identity, or the identity of his or her own community, is liable to be engrained with inconsistencies and tensions even when it is unswervingly believed in. In a festival context, moreover, we need to acknowledge the intense and highly unpredictable sensory impact of these events, which makes responses almost impossible to reconstruct in detail (cf. Hanawalt and Reyerson 1994: pp. xiv–xv).

More tangibly, we need to be aware of the fact that confident claims in our ancient sources about the significance of festivals may often be self-serving distortions of common opinion; and we need to be alert to the traces of conflict and tension which are visible even within the most idealizing representations of festival procedure. For example, as soon as we look more closely, assumptions about the universality of Panhellenic ideals start to seem problematic: even the most confident praise of Panhellenism often turns out to be highly self-serving and far from trustworthy as evidence of widespread belief. To take just one example, Isocrates' claim (*Panegyricus* 43–6) that Athens' festival culture makes it a rallying-point for the whole of the Greek world offers us a highly opportunistic and in some ways idiosyncratic version of Panhellenic ideals in order to bolster Athenian claims to political preeminence in the early fourth century. The same goes for epigraphical representations of local festivals. Proclamations of civic unity and claims about adherence to Greek tradition were often the product of opportunistic elite self-promotion, rather than self-evident reflections of any widely acknowledged reality (Bendlin 1997; cf. Hanawalt and Reyerson 1994: pp. xi–xii, on the elite interests controlling images of civic consensus in medieval festivals). The inscription recording the Demostheneia of Oinoanda, already referred to above, carries within it traces of debate between the different individuals and bodies struggling for control over the institution—benefactor, city council, imperial government—each of them trying to project its own view of what they would like the festival to signify (Rogers 1991*b*). Perhaps most significantly for this volume, there are reasons for challenging the assumption of an easy coexistence of local and Hellenic identity in civic festivals. Any detailed look at epigraphical or literary representation of local festivals—putting aside for the moment the iconic *periodos* events mentioned above—cannot fail to bring home the enormous variety of local practices, which so often leave the impression of participants immersed in the performance of local identity, with little or no explicit mention of Hellenism. None of the three enormously long inscriptions mentioned above (the festival of Vibius Salutaris, the festival of the Demostheneia, and the honours for Epaminondas) makes any specific mention of Hellenism at all, apart from a brief reference to Epaminondas' role as an envoy of the League of Panhellenes, an incident not directly connected with the festival benefactions which the bulk of the inscription celebrates.

Not only that, but it soon becomes clear that images of unified Greek festive identity are often retrojected anachronistically by both modern and ancient writers. Panhellenism, and the Greek athletic ideal, are much closer to being inventions of the Roman imperial period than modern scholarship has acknowledged. The vast explosion of athletic festival foundations in the second and third centuries CE, stimulated by the benefactions of Roman emperors—which made this period easily the heyday of Greek athletic culture—grew up hand-in-hand with ideals of festive unity which were then routinely projected back on to earlier periods. Indeed, it was the Roman Empire which made possible in their fullest form the ideals of shared Greekness (see e.g. Aelius Aristides, *On Rome* 26.97–9, for an image of the whole world celebrating festivals in harmony under the Roman peace, a passage which rewrites Isocrates' *Panegyricus* for an imperial context). The Athenian claim from Herodotus 8.144 quoted above would have seemed far from self-evident (albeit not entirely alien) to Herodotus' readers in the fifth century BCE (Hall 2002: 189–94). Much of Herodotus' work in fact dramatizes the precariousness of precisely those ideals. A reader from Roman Greece would have found it more familiar. Those idealizing images in turn inform modern consciousness, for example via the continuing influence of the early Olympic movement, which appropriated Panhellenic ideas for its own nineteenth-century priorities of social hierarchy (for example in its anachronistic view of amateurism as a principle of ancient sport) and national self-definition (for example in debates between the Greek organizers of the 1896 games and the Frenchman, Pierre de Coubertin, over whether future games should continue to be held in Greece: see Llewelyn Smith 2004).

Perhaps all we can do, then, is to resist generalization, to draw out as many of the conflicting conceptions and conflicting motives as we can for any individual festival or any individual example of festival representation, looking for the way in which familiar motifs of representation are twisted in each individual replaying of them. For now, I will look at just one example, which illustrates both the power of ancient stereotypes of festive identity, and something of the danger of taking them at face value. Pseudo-Dionysius' work *On Epideictic Speeches* (trans. in Russell and Wilson 1981: 362–81) is a handbook on speechmaking, full of sample speeches offered as models for imitation, probably dating from some time in the third, fourth, or fifth century CE. The first of his chapters is on speeches given in praise of festivals. Engrained in this text is a recognition of the fact that festivals can be viewed from different perspectives, and of the fact that the potential speakers must give close attention to local difference. At the same time, however, the text gives the impression that there is a common thread, a kind of unified festival culture underlying all of these disparate strands. To be more specific: we are told first that different contributors will contribute to the common glory of the occasion from many different angles (255–6): 'From the rich comes expenditure of funds, from the rulers comes the glory of the festival and a generous supply of provisions; athletes

honour the festival with the strength of their bodies, the followers of the Muses and Apollo with their music . . .', while the orator, finally, contributes his rhetorical skill. We are also told that we must find different ways of praising the festival, depending on the location of the city, or the identity of the god being honoured (256–7). In both of these claims, there is a sense of variety underlying shared systems and shared values The emperor is then mentioned as the appropriate climax of the speech (259)—represented as a unifying figure, in line with my earlier suggestion that festive Panhellenism is often presented as being partly under Roman control or dependent on Roman peace. The point about the value of financial contribution is then reprised towards the end, where we are advised to praise festival benefaction as 'the greatest and most Hellenic foundation of ambition for one's homeland' (259), a phrase which nicely sums up the impression of a Hellenic core lying beneath the local allegiances.

Superficially, then, pseudo-Dionysius insists that his imagined speaker should pay lip-service to local diversity. But it is hard, on reflection, to feel that he really does justice to that diversity. One reason for his failure to do so might be a desire to present rhetoric itself as an overarching Hellenic resource, a force which can bring all the subjects it treats within an all-powerful Hellenic framework. Even from the early days of the 'Panhellenic' games, it seems, orators and intellectuals had sought to harness these gatherings as vehicles for their own Panhellenic self-projection: for example, Herodotus is said to have read his works at the Olympic games (see Lucian, *Herodotus* 1–2); in the imperial period one of Dio Chrysostom's speeches, *Oration* 12, seems to have been delivered at Olympia; and in 27.5–6 he describes the difficulties a philosophical speaker has in making himself heard above all the other distractions, and all the other less praiseworthy speakers, at a festival, with the implication that the link between festival and intellectual display is now so well known as to attract enormous numbers of inferior speakers, as well as the few genuine ones like himself. In fact, the vast majority of explicit statements about the links between festival and Panhellenism occur within rhetorical texts like that of pseudo–Dionysus—and that may be one of the reasons why the Panhellenic view of festival culture has had such a strong hold on modern interpretations of ancient festival culture, despite the fact that it is so rarely given explicit and detailed attention within our other sources, epigraphical sources in particular.

Moreover, it is tempting to feel that pseudo-Dionysius is imagining his own speechmaking—or that of his imagined student—as an elevated version of festival performance. The addition of the orator to the list of contributors quoted above is one clue to that; another comes in a phrase from his final paragraph, where he recommends a varied style, and claims that this recommendation follows the example of a figure who he describes as 'the head and leader of our choir' (260). Probably he means Plato; but whether he does or not, the important point for now is that he uses the imagery of festive performance, imagining himself as a performer

in musical competition. That striking usage, in the chapter's closing lines, brings home one of the problems we face in reading literary representations of festivals—especially agonistic festivals—which is that over and over again we see authors not only depicting festive competition and festive participation, but also latching onto those images and using them for the purposes of their own self-representation. It seems to be very hard for Greek authors to write about festivals—or indeed the athletic body, on which more below—without doing so reflexively and therefore idiosyncratically. Here, pseudo-Dionysius moulds the Greek festival tradition to fit his own vision of oratory as an overarching, unifying, cosmopolitan Hellenic genre.

31.3. Competition and Performance

The difficulty of pinning down festive experiences of identity becomes even more acute when we turn to the agonistic events which were one of the main focal points for so many Greek festivals, partly because here we encounter the additional problem of how to understand the interconnection between identity and the body. (For the purposes of this section I concentrate only on athletic competition, but many of the conclusions here could be adjusted for musical and dramatic competition, which were similar in being based around physical practices, albeit practices which attracted a very different cluster of connotations.) Here too we often find confident statements: victorious athletes were often celebrated (and rewarded, on their return home) as representatives of particular cities. Literary texts often represent athletes—and sometimes the statues of athletes—as physical embodiments of moral virtue and elite, Hellenic identity. (For a vivid example of the link between statuesque athletic beauty and Greek identity see Dio Chrysostom, *Oration* 21.) Athletic victors (especially in the case of the Greek world's oldest festival, the Olympics) were living links with the Greek past, through their status as the latest in a long line of recorded winners, stretching back for centuries to very beginnings of Greek history.

It would not be surprising if some of these commonly stated assumptions filtered down to influence the self-perception of individual athletes. Once again, however, we need to be very cautious. Modern sociological theory tells us that our bodies keep us in our places—they are shaped by social and cultural forces, and they both reflect and constrain the place we occupy within the world. That point has often been made for the sporting bodies of modern society (see e.g. Hargreaves 1986); and in some ways it maps on neatly to our knowledge of ancient physicality. (For example, we might think of ancient stereotypes of the contrast between the elite

athletic body, honed in the exclusive institution of the gymnasium, in which most wealthy young men in Greek cities were trained in the Hellenistic and imperial periods, and the body of the slave.) Sociological theory also tells us, however, that we inevitably find inconsistencies and ambiguities in our attempts to pin down the significance of the human body. The body always slips away from our control, rebelling against the image we try to project on to it; and our bodies always have the potential to attract interpretations from onlookers which are very different from the ones we give to them ourselves. (See Gleason 1995 on the way in which performances of masculine identity within the highly physical practices of ancient oratory always risk negative interpretation.) The human body is also inscrutable, open to an enormous range of competing interpretations: even in the ancient world the significance of the naked, athletic body attracted debate, and the origins of the practice of exercising without clothes were lost in the past, a subject for speculation rather than certainty (Golden 1998: 65–9; Scanlon 2002: 205–10). The sporting body performs at the centre of a kind of theatrical spectacle (perhaps especially so for the ancient world, where theatre and sport sometimes even used the same spaces)—albeit a kind of theatre where the outcome of the narrative is never certain—in a way which invites us to identify with the competitors (Hargreaves 1986: 10–12). At the same time it is part of a performance which is conspicuously removed from the rules of everyday life, in a way which makes identification and analysis difficult. In that sense the very factors which make the sporting body so rich as a symbol are also precisely the factors which make it so inscrutable.

To be more specific, we should perhaps be sceptical about whether the link between athletic prowess and Hellenism would ever have registered on a wrestler as he went forward into the stadium. Inscriptions recording victory almost always celebrate their subjects primarily as representatives of particular cities, usually with no explicit mention of Hellenism at all. And the fact that some victory inscriptions for prominent athletes list multiple citizenships—sometimes a consequence of the practice of cities poaching sportsmen from each other, sometimes an extension of the practice of honouring important political or literary figures with citizenship for their achievements—suggests that even affiliation to the city of one's birth might not always have been taken for granted. The overlapping pressures of other kinds of affiliation and self-positioning—family, community, athletic guild—must often have drowned out, for individual performers, or indeed for individual spectators absorbing and interpreting the actions of athletes, any awareness of their wider civic or Hellenic communities, or of their own status as moral exemplars. Moreover, part of the difficulty here, again, is that the athletic body is so often a template onto which rhetorical and philosophical writers project their own self-image (in an elevated, textual version of the processes of spectator identification referred to above), as the omnipresence of athletic

metaphors for philosophical virtue (e.g. repeatedly in the works of Epictetus) or oratorical skill invites them to do. It is tempting to feel that some spectators would have been alert to those processes of idealizing and re-imagining athletic experience, and that the disjunction between elegant ideal and ugly reality might even have been part of the attraction of athletic spectatorship: in the Baths of Caracalla, for example, as if in an attempt to capture that disjunction through visual art, idealized, classicizing statues of semi-divine athletic figures stood close to exaggeratedly realistic mosaics of brutal and disfigured combat athletes (Newby 2005: 67–76).

Once again, pseudo-Dionysius sums up some of these ideals and ambiguities vividly. The seventh and final text of his treatise is thematically linked with the first. It is presented not straightforwardly as a festival speech, but instead as a variant of that, a speech of encouragement delivered to athletes about to compete. The first speech, quoted above, had described athletes 'honouring the festival with the strength of their bodies', and so contributing along with benefactors, rulers, and musicians to the common enterprise of celebration (255). Speech 7 reinforces that impression of a kind of community which transcends any one city or even any single occasion: the victorious athlete, we are advised to say, 'becomes through this one deed and victory a citizen not just of one city but more or less of the whole world' (288). Throughout the text, the athlete is represented as a glorious figure, the object of admiration. It is only at the very end that we begin to see some doubt about this idealized picture, some acknowledgement of the need for it to be policed and protected: the author advises that we should end with a denunciation of cheating, as a practice which makes athletes no better than slaves (290–2). Here, it seems, there is just a trace of anxiety, an implicit acknowledgement of the precariousness of elite ideals of athletic manliness—the fine line between noble and servile identity. Moreover, there is once again a strong degree of self-projection in the text: for example, the author recommends beginning the speech with a comparison between rhetoric and athletics, and advises us to argue (like Isocrates, in his praise of Athenian festival culture, in *Panegyricus* 1–2) for the superiority of the former, because of its dependence on the mind rather than the body. The athletes should be ready to face the judgement of the umpires when they see the bravery of the speaker, who has undertaken the much greater challenge of stepping forward to speak, a more intimidating prospect, given that judgement of oratory lies in the mind of the hearers. The speech gives us an idealized view of athletic performance—idealized in part in order to bolster the author's promotion of his own rhetorical expertise.

Once again, then, we see in this text the power of ancient images of athletic identity; and also, at the same time, the difficulty of reading their many and varied manifestations. It is hard to dispute that festivals and athletic contests were obsessively linked with various types of identity, Hellenic and otherwise, throughout

their long history. The variety of ways in which those links were experienced and re-imagined and exploited, in response to shifting priorities of local context and personal self-projection, is not always acknowledged.

Suggested Reading

The bibliography on this topic is huge, and there is space here to mention only a few important starting-points. For synoptic accounts of Greek festival culture in the context of Greek religion more widely see Price (1999) and Parker (2005), the latter on classical Athens specifically. Standard introductory works on athletics are Miller (2004), Golden (1998), and Philips and Pritchard (2003). On ancient concepts of spectatorship see Rutherford (2000). On the early 'Panhellenic' games see Morgan (1990). For the festival culture of the Hellenistic and Roman periods the articles of Louis Robert are essential reading: Robert (1984) is a good starting-point. On Greek sacrificial banquets in the Hellenistic and Roman periods see Schmitt-Pantel (1992). See also Price (1984) for an influential discussion of the integration of Roman imperial cult into Greek festivals in the east. For specific festivals see Rogers (1991*a*), on the foundation of Vibius Salutaris in Ephesus; Wörrle (1988) on the Demostheneia of Oenoanda, with review and English translation by Mitchell (1990). On Greek athletics in the imperial period, van Nijf (1999), (2001 and 2003), König (2005), Newby (2005). For an entertaining portrait of the first modern Olympics in Athens and its aftermath see Llewelyn Smith (2004). For useful approaches to festival culture in other periods see (again, amongst many others) Hanawalt and Reyerson (1994) and Friedrich (2000); and cf. MacClancy (1996) and Hargreaves (1986), both on sport and identity in the modern world.

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CHAPTER 32

JUST VISITING

THE MOBILE WORLD OF CLASSICAL ATHENS

CAROL DOUGHERTY

When we think of classical Athens, several images immediately spring to mind—the polished stones of the Parthenon, still standing atop the Acropolis after all these years, the enduring principles of democratic rule, or the timeless beauty of a Sophoclean ode. It is a powerful set of images, one that emphasizes the continuity and steadfastness of our connections to an Athenian past. And yet it paints a fairly static picture of a self-contained city, firmly rooted in place, immune to the allure of the foreign or the contributions of outsiders. It is also the city of Socrates, to conjure yet another familiar Athenian icon, the barefoot philosopher immortalized by Plato and parodied by Aristophanes, who loved his city too much to ever leave it. As Crito observes in the Platonic dialogue of the same name (52b): 'You never went out from the city to a festival, or anywhere else, except on military service, and you never made any other journey, as other people do and you had no wish to know any other city or other law, but you were contented with us and our city.' But Socrates did leave the city, as did Aeschylus, Sophocles, even Plato, and others—Herodotus, Protagoras, and Bacchylides, to name just a few—came to visit. The classical period was a time of widespread travel throughout the Mediterranean, and Athens was but one city among many in which residents and visitors met and jostled up against one another in the streets, at festivals, and in the harbours.

Indeed, much of what is exciting and transformative about classical Athens is a product of this lively, engaged, and occasionally disruptive movement of people in and out of the city. Some of what the cultural anthropologist James Clifford has noticed about the Paris of the 1920s captures the atmosphere of classical Athens as well. Struck by how many Surrealists were living in hotels or transient quarters, moving in and out of Paris, Clifford began to see that the artistic movement was not at the centre of Paris: 'I began to imagine rewriting Paris of the twenties and thirties as travel encounters—including New World detours through the old—a place of departures, arrivals, transits' (Clifford 1997: 30). A similar reshuffling of our images of classical Athens is in order. If we look past the non-travelling Socrates, we find figures like Ion of Chios and his contemporaries who regularly travelled in and out of Athens, and a very different set of images emerges—the noisy harbour at Piraeus, the crowds at the Panathenaia, or the debut of an Aeschylean play in Syracuse. In other words, Athens' civic boundaries were much more permeable than Plato's account of Socrates would lead us to believe, and rewriting classical Athens similarly in terms of travel encounters will reveal both sides of classical Athens—the enduring and the transient, the Parthenon and the port.

32.1. The *Visits* of Ion of Chios

Ion of Chios was well known for the incredible breadth and range of his literary endeavours (tragedy, comedy, elegy, prose, philosophy) and for his extensive travels in and out of Athens, and one of his most interesting and often overlooked works, the *Epidēmiai*, or '*Visits*', offers a good place to begin our process of revision. This fragmentary work consists, as far as we can tell, of anecdotes about many well-known Athenians whom Ion met abroad, or while he himself was visiting friends in Athens, and provides a window on the movement and encounters of many prominent literary and political figures of the classical period. Ion himself was certainly well travelled. Most scholars agree that he was born in Chios in the 480s, and he first appears in Athens, visiting the Athenian political leader Cimon, in 466. Then, in 464, he attended the Isthmian games. Back in Athens, he produced his first tragedies in 451 and was in Sparta, again with Cimon, the following year. In the 440s we find him first in Samos with two philosophers, Socrates and Archelaus, and then in Chios with Sophocles. By 428 he was back in Athens, taking third prize in the tragic competitions, and his death in Athens in 422 was mentioned by Aristophanes in his comedy *Peace*.

While the title given to the work, *Epidēmiai*, is probably not original, the verb from which it derives (*epidēmeō*, 'to visit') was in common use in classical Athens,

and many of the fragments that survive suggest visiting or short-term travels as an organizational framework. One fragment, for example, from Plutarch's *Life of Cimon* begins by noting that Ion dined with Cimon when he first came to Athens from Chios (fr. 6a Blumenthal). Another begins by explaining that Ion met Sophocles when he was in Chios as a general, on his way to Lesbos (fr. 6b Blumenthal). In his *Life of Socrates*, Diogenes Laertius mentions that Ion encountered Socrates and Archelaus while the latter two philosophers were in Samos, perhaps en route to visiting Melissus (fr. 6c Blumenthal). And yet another fragment presents the two great tragic poets, Ion and Aeschylus, sitting next to each other at a boxing match at the Isthmian games (Plutarch, *On Moral Progress* 79de): 'Aeschylus was at the Isthmian games watching the boxing contest, when the theatre roared after one of the boxers was knocked down, and nudging Ion of Chios, he said, "Do you see what training does for you? The one who is knocked down is silent, and the spectators cry out." ' Ion's *Epidēmiai*, even just the small bit that survives, offers us a series of snapshots, pictures of a world of extensive travel and personal encounters that is all too often elided from our image of classical Athens.

Indeed, Plato has drawn upon much the same scene for the settings for many of his philosophical dialogues. Plato opens the *Hippias Major* with Socrates' enthusiastic greeting: 'Hippias, beautiful and wise one, what a long time it's been since you last put into Athens!' (281a). Hippias replies by explaining that his busy travel schedule as a political envoy from his native Elis to many states, especially Sparta, has kept him away from Athens, and the ensuing conversation refers to Gorgias of Leontini's travels to Athens as well as those of Prodicus of Ceos. The *Ion* opens similarly with Socrates warmly greeting Ion of Ephesus: 'Welcome Ion. Where have you come from *now* as you pay us this visit? From your home in Ephesus?' (530a). Socrates' greeting implies both a frequency of travels on Ion's part and a broad range of other destinations.

The works of Ion and Plato reveal classical Athens, like Paris of the twenties, to be a 'place of departures, arrivals, transits'. While scholars have long acknowledged the presence of these leading intellectual figures of the Greek world in Athens, they have overlooked the short-term nature of their relationship to the city, tending to absorb them into the regular populations of Athenian citizens. Neither Bacchylides, nor Simonides, Herodotus, or Ion of Chios, however, took up permanent residence in Athens. Instead, they were visitors, moving in and out of the city, on their way home to Chios or on their way to visit Sicily. The term 'visitor' (rather than tourist or traveller) is useful here in part because it resonates with Ion of Chios' *Epidēmiai*, but also because it captures the most expansive range of contexts that can motivate travel in and out of cities. Since the term 'visitor' neither privileges one kind of travel over another nor makes any assumption about the purpose of travel, it offers the most inclusive framework for looking further at Athens as a city of movement.

If we look beyond the more visible travelling sophists who populate Plato's dialogues or Ion's *Epidēmiai*, for example, we will find visitors from every position

in the social spectrum travelling in and out of Athens. Just as present-day visitors to New York City or London are not just elite and well-educated travellers eager to see the big city—they are also middle-class businesswomen, migrant workers, and students—similarly, we find a broad range of travellers to Athens: the Athenian who travels as a political envoy or as part of a military expedition, the Ionians who visit Athens for the Panathenaia, the merchants who unload their cargo in the Piraeus. They come for different reasons; they do not all have the same resources nor do they stay for the same amount of time, but they are all equally visitors, and they all contribute to the culture of the city.

Plato's *Parmenides*, for example, reminds us that festivals like the Greater Panathenaea regularly attracted visitors to Athens from all over the Greek world. Not only could visitors attend the musical and athletic competitions or watch the parade during the festival itself, but Pausanias tells us that the great Panathenaic ship that bore Athena's robe up the Panathenaic way during the procession was on display, docked at the Areopagus, between festivals for visitors to admire (Pausanias 1.29). From Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, we know that non-Athenians were also in regular attendance at the City Dionysia held every year in the spring. Festivals, especially those like the Panathenaia that are designed to impress, entertain, and enthral a city's visitors as well as its native inhabitants, are signs of a certain social suppleness in host cities. They show a willingness to make a place for outsiders in the local festivities, and this is certainly a key aspect of Athenian festival life (Greenwood 1989). As Pericles puts it in his funeral oration: 'We throw open our city to the world, and never by alien acts exclude foreigners from any opportunity of learning or observing . . .' (Thucydides 2.39). Athenians have plenty of means for pleasure and recreation—they celebrate games and sacrifices all year round—and many of these events are open to non-Athenians as well.

People travelled to Athens on civic business as well as for festivals. It was at the City Dionysia that members of the Athenian allies were required to bring and publicly display their tribute to Athens, and allies were compelled to march in the Panathenaic procession as well. Gorgias' famous trip to Athens in 427 was part of a political embassy; Prodicus also travelled to Athens as part of many embassies from his native Ceos. From Plato's *Euthyphro*, we are reminded that Greeks living in allied cities were required to travel to Athens for legal matters. Merchants sailed to Athens to sell their goods in the city's vibrant harbour in Piraeus, and Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War reminds us of the massive numbers of combat troops moving in and out of Athens during each military season.

As we have seen, travellers in and out of classical Athens came for a variety of reasons and no doubt interacted with the city's residents in a complicated set of ways. Xuthus' account in Euripides' *Ion* of an earlier trip to Delphi, during which he engaged in the kinds of extracurricular activity that might have produced a son, suggests that trips to religious festivals or shrines in Athens might also entail entertainment of a more secular variety. Similarly, a passage from Aristophanes'

Peace describes Athenians lucky enough to embark upon a *theōria* (a trip to attend a festival or religious shrine that is usually translated as 'pilgrimage') as nothing more than a junket on state pay. One character says to the other: 'You'll be slurping quite a lot of broth in the next three days, and bolting quite a lot of hot links and tenderloin' (715–18, trans. Henderson). As this passage makes quite clear, we must broaden our conception of *theōria* to include an opportunity to travel, eat, and drink on the state's tab. In classical Greece as well, as Victor and Edith Turner observed, 'a tourist is half a pilgrim if a pilgrim is half a tourist' (Turner and Turner 1978).

Sites designed to attract visitors regularly draw residents too, and we might want to imagine the ways that the tourist infrastructure of classical Athens, as is the case with modern-day tourist cities, is integrated, even embedded, in the everyday life of the city's residents. Hotels in San Francisco or Boston, for example, regularly host wedding or business receptions for local residents as well as providing accommodations to out-of-towners, thus blurring the boundaries between tourists and residents. Similarly, when Parmenides or Hippias travelled to Athens to attend the Panathenaia or to conduct business with the state, they must also have looked for entertainment and a good meal, and the flute-girls and restaurants patronized by these visitors would surely serve Athenian clients as well during the rest of the year. An important result of this focus on short-term travel in and out of Athens is a better understanding of the ways that classical Athens was shaped by its efforts to attract and accommodate visitors as well as by the economic, spatial, and cultural impact of non-residents upon that city. It is, as Michel de Certeau has argued, the feet of a city's pedestrians on the ground that actually constitute the city: 'their intertwined paths give their shape to places' (Certeau 1984: 97). And in classical Athens, many of these feet belonged to short-term visitors as well as to long-standing residents, suggesting that these visitors belong to Athens as much as to their primary residence of origin (Hoffman, Fainstein, and Judd 2003: 243).

32.2. Athens as Tourist Attraction

Athens in the fifth century BCE, after all, had become an attraction in its own right. In addition to the characters of Plato's dialogues, a variety of travellers whose names we do not know were drawn to Athens, no doubt in part by its spectacular sights. As one mid-fifth-century comic poet put it (Lysippus 8 *PCG*; trans. Casson):

> If you've never seen Athens, your brain's a morass
> If you've seen it and weren't entranced, you're an ass,
> If you left without regrets, your head's solid brass!

In the aftermath of the Persian destruction, the Athenians completely rebuilt their city from pinnacle to port. Pericles' famous building programme, of course, restored the temples and shrines to a seriously damaged Acropolis—the Parthenon, the Odeion, the Propyleia, and the statue of Athena Parthenos. As Plutarch observed, in his *Life of Pericles*, rebuilding these sanctuaries that had been destroyed by the Persians was 'what brought the greatest pleasure and embellishment to Athens, and the greatest astonishment to the rest of men, and what is now Greece's only evidence that her vaunted power and ancient wealth is no fiction' (12.1). It was Cimon, according to Plutarch, who was the first to 'beautify the city with the so-called liberal and elegant resorts which were so excessively popular a little later, by planting the market place with trees, and by converting the Academy from a waterless and arid spot into a well-watered grove, which he provided with clear running tracks and shady walks' (*Life of Cimon*, 13.8). In addition to this public building within the city itself, the Athenians developed the harbour at Piraeus as their primary port, subsequently uniting city and port with a series of long walls and completely transforming the footprint of the city itself. The Piraeus, with its three natural deep-water harbours, allowed Athens to develop into a major naval and commercial port, and a vital and bustling port district emerged, full of people coming and going, as we can see from the following scene in Aristophanes' *Acharnians* (544–54, trans. Henderson):

> Why, on the very instant you'd have been full of the hubbub of soldiers,
> noisy crowds surrounding ships' captains, pay being handed out,
> Pallas emblems being gilded, the Colonnade groaning, rations being
> Measured out, leathers and oarloops and people buying jars, garlic
> And olives and onions in nets, crowns and anchovies and flute-girls
> And black eyes; and the dockyard full of the planing of oar-spars,
> The hammering of dowel-pins, the boring of oarports, full of flutes
> And boatswains, of warbling and piping.

The Piraeus was where people arrived and departed the city—sophists, painters, philosophers, merchants, diplomats, craftsmen all would have disembarked in the Piraeus. Likewise, when Pericles boasts that all things from the entire world come to Athens, this is where they landed and were unloaded (Thucydides 2.38.2).

An anonymous comic poet praised the cumulative effect of Athens' fifth-century efforts at civic revitalization in an expression of what the sociologist John Urry (1990) famously defined as 'the tourist gaze' (*adespota*, 155 *PCG*):

> Great Athens, queen of cities everywhere,
> How fair they show, your navy-yards, how fair
> Your harbour, and how fair your Parthenon!
> What other city, too, has groves like yours!
> The very light of heaven I look upon
> They say is something blessed, it is so fine.

Athens rebuilt itself over the course of the fifth century, and visitors of all kinds travelled to take in the city's sights—all of them, from the navy yards to the Parthenon. The visual elements of Athens' landscape and cityscape took on the extraordinary status of a tourist attraction.

And all these visitors needed a place to stay. Even though evidence about Athens' hospitality industry in the classical period is fairly scarce, a passage from Aristophanes' *Frogs* gives us an idea of what options were available to a traveller to Athens at the time. Dionysus, we remember, is determined to visit Hades to recover a tragic poet from among the dead, and so he consults Heracles to get advice about the trip (108–11, trans. Henderson): 'Well, the reason I've come wearing this outfit in imitation of you is so you'll tell me about those friends of yours who put you up when you went after Cerberus, in case I need them.' As Dionysus suggests, travel was first made possible by the extension of an elaborate network of personal relationships, and he is looking for some friends of friends to give him lodging. This is the picture we get from Plato's dialogues as well. The *Protagoras* offers an engaging portrait of the hospitality that subtends intellectual life in Athens. As the dialogue opens, Socrates tells a friend that Protagoras is in town, and he and Hippocrates proceed to the house of Callias where they find not only Protagoras, but also Prodicus of Ceos and Hippias of Elis, each surrounded by many eager students and other wise men, many of them strangers (*xenoi*). Indeed, Callias is in the habit of hosting so many out-of-town visitors, Socrates explains, that he converted a storeroom into a guest-room to accommodate everyone (315d).

But what about the non-elite, those without personal connections in Athens? If we return to Dionysus' list of questions for Heracles, we see from the second half of this passage that a public infrastructure to accommodate tourism and travel soon emerged as well, and those without personal connections must have stayed in inns or rooming-houses. Dionysus continues to pump Heracles for travel tips (*Frogs* 112–15, trans. Henderson): 'Tell me about them, about the harbours, bakeries, whorehouses, rest areas, directions, springs, roads, cities, places to stay, the landladies with the fewest bedbugs.' Dionysus, travelling for the first time to the underworld, asks the kinds of questions a novice traveller to Athens would surely pose about the public travel infrastructure: where are the best restaurants? What are the best things to do? Which is the hotel with the fewest bedbugs? The international sanctuaries were the first to establish public hotels to accommodate their visitors, and the practice was soon adopted by cities as well. Thucydides mentions an inn built onto the Precinct of Hera in Plataea—it was 200 square feet, with plenty of rooms above and below (3.68.3). Athens, too, with so many visitors coming to attend the Panathenaia or to do business, must have had some public accommodations along these lines.

The hotel industry gets a bad press from our (more elite) sources, mocked in large part as being the denizen of cheating innkeepers. In the *Laws* (918e–919b), Plato lambastes the innkeeper for making money off strangers with whom he has

no long-term relationship or sense of obligation. As we have seen, Plato prefers the aristocratic world in which friends like Callias and Hippias stay at each other's houses to the lowlife world of bedbugs and innkeepers described by Aristophanes. Theophrastus characterizes the chiselling man as the kind of guy who borrows money from his own out-of-town guests (*Characters* 30)!

Xenophon, however, has a more positive, pro-business approach when he suggests building more hotels in the port city of the Piraeus to attract more visitors (*Ways and Means* 3.12, trans. Bowersock):

> When funds were sufficient, it would be a fine plan to build more lodging-houses for ship owners near the harbours, and convenient places of exchange for merchants, also hotels to accommodate visitors. Again, if houses and shops were put up both in the Peiraeus and in the city for retail traders, they would be an ornament to the state, and at the same time the source of considerable revenue.

Athens, then, was a bustling place in the classical period, with a regular influx of people visiting the city for a short time. They came for the festivals, to trade merchandise; they stayed with friends or in rooming-houses—and they helped shape the city's culture. In classical Athens, as in many modern tourist cities, it is not just the permanent residents who define their city. In addition, visitors like Ion of Chios, Parmenides, and Herodotus, as well as the many anonymous festival-goers, civic envoys, and ship-captains who regularly travelled in and out of the city, were equally authentic members of the city and contributed to its civic culture.

32.3. Athens, a City of Visitors

Recasting Athens as a city of visitors can help counterbalance the binarism (Athenians vs. others) inherent in so much thinking about classical Athens, starting, of course, from the Athenians' own presentation of themselves as the true, autochthonous natives (discussed by Isaac in this volume). It is not just Socrates, but also the fifth-century myth of autochthony that influences our perceptions of Athens as an enduring, self-contained city. Beginning in the middle of the fifth century BCE, Athenians take great pride in describing themselves and their civic culture as firmly rooted in the Athenian soil. In a fragment from Euripides' *Erechtheus*, Praxithea boasts: 'I could not have had a better city than this; first our people were not brought in from outside, but rather we are born autochthonous ... Whoever moves from one city to another is like a peg badly fixed in wood; in name he is a citizen, but not in his actions' (fr. 50.5–13 Austin). In addition to its link to democratic ideology, the discourse of autochthony deliberately problematizes and suppresses movement in and out of the city. It erases from the public and scholarly view all those people

who regularly, if temporarily, spend time in the city of Athens, as well as those Athenians who periodically leave town and return. As James Clifford suggests, we must 'rethink cultures as sites of dwelling *and* travel' (1997: 31). The civic culture of Athens, too, was much more than its alleged autochthonous origins; it was also defined by its visitors and by the travel experiences of its own citizens.

Rather than letting the barefoot Socrates or the smooth stones of the Parthenon symbolize a static city of native Athenians content to stay put, we should also be focusing on the figures moving in and out of Athens, from the 'visits' of Protagoras, Ion, Hippias, and Herodotus on their way to Sicily or Lesbos, en route from Chios or Egypt, to the merchants who trade their wares in the Piraeus, to the innkeepers, the barbers, the prostitutes, and the restaurant-owners who catered to the tourist trade. Classical Athens, after all, was a nice place to visit.

Suggested Reading

For more on Plato's representation of Socrates' lack of travel see Nightingale (2000) and Montiglio (2005). On the travels of the sophists and other intellectual figures in classical Greece see Thomas (2000), Brown (1988), and Wallace (1998). On the myth of autochthony in Athenian discourse see Rosivach (1987). For the biographical details of Ion of Chios' life see West (1985). (For a collection of Ion of Chios' extant fragments see Blumenthal, listed under 'Editions Cited' below.) There is, of course, an extensive bibliography on the themes of travel and urban tourism. The essays collected in Hoffman, Fainstein, and Judd (2003) address the relationship between cities and visitors in a variety of contexts, while Davis and Marvin (2004) discuss Venice as a tourist city. Important contributions to the study of tourism more generally include MacCannell (1976), Cohen (1984), Culler (1988), Smith (1989), and Urry (1990). See Clifford (1997) for a discussion of how travel practices help constitute culture. See Certeau (1984) on travel, spatial practices, and the city.

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CHAPTER 33

GREEK POLITICAL THEORY

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GREEK political *thinking* is presumably at least as old as the institution, the polis, around which such thinking revolves. Greek politics is inconceivable without the polis, at least until the Hellenistic period and the aftermath of the conquests of Alexander of Macedon; and it has its roots in the gradual emergence, first of polis-like entities, perhaps from the eighth century BCE onwards, then of the full-blown thing itself. Greek political *theory*, by contrast, if that is a matter of making the polis and politics an object for systematic, theoretical study, probably starts with the sophists and rhetorical theorists of the fifth century BCE—and with their staunch opponent, Socrates of Athens, who was executed by his own city at the turn of the fourth century. But it reaches its apogee with Socrates' pupil, Plato, and with Aristotle, who studied in Plato's Academy.

At the core of all Greek political theory, not unexpectedly, is the relationship between the individual and his city (or hers—though Plato is the only theorist seriously to consider the possibility of allowing women to enter the political arena; and even he seems to lose interest in the idea). However, the central issue was less the modern one of the freedom of the individual versus the power of the state than it was the role of the state or city (the 'city-state') in the formation of the individual through its laws and institutions—or, alternatively, the formation of the individual as an effectively functioning member of the city. The city is thus seen, for the most part, in a positive light: as having the potential to improve the quality of its members, and as providing the main context for their flourishing. Even when, as in the case of some of the

sophists and rhetoricians, justice and the law are pictured—theoretically, that is, more often than not—as posing unnatural limitations on the aspirations of the individual, those aspirations themselves typically include the acquisition of power over one's fellow citizens, and so involve appropriating the city rather than undermining it.

All of this tends to reflect a salient fact about Greek culture of the classical period: that the identity of any individual—that is, of any male, free, adult individual—is bound up in his city. An Athenian will be known as the son of so-and-so, and as belonging to a certain deme, but he will very likely play some role in government or administration either at local or at city level (or both). He will be even more likely to be called on to fight for the city, and his father and his family as a whole will be known—or not—by their contribution in such roles. Through the system of 'liturgies', even the possession of wealth by itself brought obligations to the city in the form of defraying public expenditure, whether by paying for triremes or by funding performances in the theatre. As a private citizen, a free adult Athenian male would be part of the sovereign people, the demos, with the right to sit on juries, attend and speak in the assembly, even to volunteer to sit on the executive council. In non-democratic cities a similar situation would hold, only in relation to a smaller number of the citizens. Nor is there much evidence of any counterbalancing concern with the individual as a locus of rights as well as responsibilities, or as the possessor of a unique personhood or self. The individual *is*, above all, a citizen of his city. It is a symptom of this state of affairs that it could become, among the theorists, a standard question whether the best life for a human being was one of active participation or one of philosophizing—theorizing—on his own.

The sophists and rhetoricians claimed to be able to teach people 'excellence' (*aretē*: traditionally and misleadingly translated as 'virtue'), by which they had in mind whatever qualities might be required for success within the community (success being measured in terms of power and influence): a conception of justice, perhaps, and a sense of shame, but also and particularly a capacity for persuasive speaking. That, at any rate, is how Plato represents such great figures as Protagoras and Gorgias in his dialogues, while at the same time offering us portraits of those in the same tradition—Thrasymachus in the *Republic*, Callicles in the *Gorgias*: the first real, the second probably fictional—who claim to treat justice as something observed only by people either too simple to grasp nature's law that power belongs to the strong, or too weak to follow it. Plato's Socrates opposes a Protagoras and a Gorgias almost as vigorously as he does Thrasymachus and Callicles, and no doubt the real, historical Socrates did the same: none of them, in his view, understands what excellence really is, because none of them understands what it is to *succeed*, whether as citizens or in any other context (to Socrates, it makes no difference).

Socrates comments on political life while mostly having as little as possible, of a practical sort, to do with it himself; and both the nature of his comments and his detachment from politics derive from the same source. Taking political decisions, or even taking part in them, implies one's having reached firm conclusions about the most important questions: about what is just and, for Socrates even more fundamentally, about what is good or desirable—that is, for the agent—where this in fact includes what is just. This has two consequences. First, no one can properly—*successfully*—take part in politics, make decisions for the city, before having found the answers to those questions about the good and the just; and that Socrates makes his own absolute priority, while urging everyone else to do the same. Secondly, since no one appears to know the answers, the city must actually be governed rather badly, by people who lack the knowledge they would need to do the job properly (successfully). Socrates was evidently quite open about his view of the way democracy worked, and it would have done him little good if his fellow citizens had understood that he would have said exactly the same about any other form of government, whether by any smaller collection of people or—an option that the Greeks of the classical period generally seem to have found as little to their taste as the inhabitants of Rome under the republic—by some single monarch or 'tyrant'. Socrates finally rounds off his non-political career by being condemned to death by a democratic jury, having spent his life—according to Plato's account—urging the Athenians to reconsider the way they governed themselves and their city.

Plato, paradoxically, represents the non-political Socrates as the only true statesman or political expert (*Gorgias* 521d), on the basis that he is the only person who both recognizes what a statesman should do—improve his fellow citizens and their lives—and actually tries to do something about it. In his most famous political dialogue, the *Republic*, Socrates as main speaker sketches a city that is ruled by philosophers, both men and women, who have at least approximated to a grasp of the answers he himself has failed to find. What *exactly* justice is, and what the good is, we are still not told, for after all Socrates does not know, but Plato has him mount a long and complex demonstration that at any rate justice—that is, being just: being the sort of person who does not exploit his or her fellow citizens or the city—is part of what is good for us. Being *un*just is ultimately a matter of not understanding what is truly good or desirable, and so going for what in fact adds nothing to one's happiness. In any ordinary city people will often seek power, because they think power valuable both in itself and for the incidental benefits it seems to bring; Plato's imaginary city in the *Republic*, Callipolis or the Beautiful City, is instead ruled by people who would prefer not to rule, because they have something better to do: philosophy. Power, in their case, brings nothing but responsibilities—responsibilities that they willingly shoulder, but which they certainly do not actively seek. Even if there were any incidental 'benefits' available,

like wealth, or good matches for their sons and daughters, they know enough not to be bothered with them in any case.

So Callipolis is governed by rulers who reproduce the Socratic ideal; and they govern the city as experts, who know that living in cities is both a necessity (human beings are not self-sufficient) and an opportunity: an opportunity to improve the lives of the majority, by improving *them*. Not for this majority the joys of philosophy, which in Plato's eyes is something that is beyond the capacities of most; not for them, then, either, the kind of quality of 'character' or soul that the rulers have, and so of the life they live. Nevertheless the generality of the citizens may be trained and habituated into a kind of excellence—a 'civic' excellence, including justice—that at least mimics the corresponding qualities in the rulers, and so achieve a corresponding degree of happiness (success). Without the city, and without philosophy, they would be in danger of living an animal kind of life, distinguished only by their outward shape from cattle, or from more dangerous creatures. The city, on this account, even becomes a factor in the realization of humanity itself.

Towards the end of the *Republic* Socrates gives a mock-epic description of an imagined decline from the aristocratic government—rule by the best, the *aristoi*—of Callipolis, through timocracy (rule by lovers of honour and reputation), then oligarchy (rule by a few money-lovers), then democracy (rule by the demos or people), through to the 'terminal disease' of the city, tyranny (*Republic* 544c). What initiates the decline, and ensures its continuation, is a gradual loss of quality among the citizens: first, the insight of the rulers fades, and then the city's institutions, with—key among them—its educational system, follow suit. It is, clearly enough, Plato's view that, just as a lack of philosophy is always likely to endanger one's claim to being human, so a lack of philosophical insight in a city will threaten its claim even to be a city properly so-called; or at any rate, its claim to have a *constitution*, or *politeia*, worthy of the name. Such a view is directly expressed in the *Statesman*, a dialogue evidently written some time after the *Republic* but reinforcing many of its central ideas: the only true constitution is the best one, ruled by the expert statesman, and all the other so-called 'constitutions' are in truth no more than insubstantial images of the real one—all existing and pretended 'statesmen' being written off as mere 'impostors', the 'greatest imitators and magicians' or illusionists, 'the greatest sophists among sophists' (*Statesman* 303c). But if Socrates is really 'the only true statesman', that outcome is already assured in any case.

The idea of philosopher-rulers as such—like the idea of female rulers—hardly appears after the *Republic*. However, there is no weakening in Plato's insistence on the need for government to be *informed by* philosophy. The splendid inhabitants of the primitive Athens that defeated the power of Atlantis in the *Timaeus* and *Critias* were fortunate enough to live in close proximity to the gods, with Athena and Hephaestus lodging on their Acropolis; but in the absence of such good fortune—and

this heroic, fantastic Athens was herself destroyed by natural disaster not too long after her victory—any real city will need its institutions both established and maintained along philosophical lines. Thus it is with Magnesia, the imaginary city of Plato's last and longest work, the *Laws*. Socrates is absent from the cast-list, and is not even mentioned, and two of the three speakers, a Spartan and a Cretan, are no philosophers. The Visitor from Athens, however, comes to Crete with a full philosophical (Platonic and Socratic) understanding, and experience to match; and Magnesia, which he constructs in concert with the Spartan and the Cretan, is in all important respects a fully worked-out version of Callipolis. Philosophy's role is no less central, merely less visible: there are no philosopher-rulers, only a steering committee that meets before dawn—what healthy person needs all the hours of darkness for sleep?—to ensure that the city continues to be governed according to best practice, as established by the original lawgivers (led by the Athenian) and checked against experience elsewhere. The members of the council themselves are envisaged as keeping up to the philosophical mark through dialectical exercises of a type that strongly recalls the kinds of conversations 'recorded' in some of Plato's own shorter ('Socratic') dialogues.

The Athenian represents Magnesia as a kind of mixture of monarchy and democracy. But 'monarchy' here is represented by the rule of *law*, and 'democracy' by the involvement at different levels of the 5,040 property-owning male adult citizens who make up the city proper. Importantly, there is no sovereign assembly; there is no sense in which the mass of the citizens, even as restricted to those 5,040, *rules*, in the way that the Athenian demos could be said—in strict constitutional terms—to have ruled Athens ('it seemed good to the people', 'the people decided', ...). And given Plato's view that the necessary expertise, about the good and the just, will always be less widely distributed, because far more difficult to acquire, even than skill at the classical Greek equivalent of chess (*Statesman* 292e), that is no more than we should expect. There is considerable use of the ballot, but it is combined in the most important contexts with selection, and there would be no room for the idea of running for office, little even for anything resembling open political debate. With cultural activity and contact with the outside world also severely restricted, Magnesia begins to look like a blueprint for stultifying mediocrity: a collection of gentlemen farmers (for each citizen will have his farm out in the country as well as his town-house) vying for nothing more than to excel each other in a perfectly predictable civic excellence—and with the majority of the population, men as well as women, not to mention the numerous slaves that would be required to keep things running, firmly excluded even from such action as there is. If the city is what makes or keeps us human, *this* city might well prompt the question whether being human is after all worth the cost.

To respond in this way, however, would be to miss Plato's main point. Magnesia is no blueprint, any more than Callipolis was. Both represent examples of a characteristic Platonic method: one that consists in pushing certain basic insights to

the extreme, and using the often shocking outcomes to make his readers think—above all, about those basic insights. Callipolis and Magnesia, in this sense, in large part represent an expression of Plato's—Socrates'—idea that the quality of our lives, and ultimately our very humanity, depends on the correctness or otherwise of the goals that we pursue. So far so good (and even banal), one might think, apart from that reference to *correctness*, which is liable to strike us as out of place (what about choice?). But that is precisely where the heart of Socratic-Platonic thinking (theorizing) is located: in an insistence that, in principle at least, the nature of the good and successful human life can be discovered, by philosophical means, and moreover that the main outlines of such a life are indeed already visible as soon as one begins to philosophize, even if the main part of the task still lies ahead. For Socrates, this philosophical task seems in danger of becoming the only one: 'The unexamined life', he famously declares in Plato's *Apology* (38a), 'is not liveable for a human being.' He wants to change our lives by getting us to reflect, for ourselves—and if he is sceptical about the distance most of us will travel in this respect, he doesn't think he has got so much further himself. To this degree he is not just apolitical, but anti-political, though Plato is at pains to make clear that he actually represents no threat to the city's institutions and laws (this in the *Crito*). Plato, for his part, seeing no future in trying to get most people to think for themselves, goes on to enlist the city, through its potential for control of the media—cultural institutions in general—and of education, as a means to the improvement of this majority, with a correspondingly institutionalized role for philosophy. And meanwhile he writes, too, usually for the benefit of anyone who will read him: the aim is to persuade, to present alternative scenarios, to shock the reader out of his complacency.

Aristotle, himself a member of Plato's Academy until the master's death, wrote a treatise, the *Politics*—actually a collection of smaller pieces in eight books—which perpetually looks back to Plato's dialogues, as well as to Aristotle's own ethical writing. For Aristotle, the city is itself a natural entity; the human being is designed by nature, as it were, to live in a polis (no matter that most non-Greeks, as he recognized, did not). The polis was necessary not just for human survival, but for human flourishing. The end, for Aristotelian as much as for Platonic man, is to live a life of excellence, and notwithstanding the claims of the life of reflection and philosophy, this will mostly be a life that not only involves but requires others—fellow citizens—for its realization. (Even the best and most self-sufficient people, he allows, will still want to have friends.) A man without a polis will either be a monster or a god: not human, but either sub- or superhuman. Outlined in this way, Aristotle's political thinking shows obvious continuities with Plato's. While claiming mildly to disapprove of such exercises, Aristotle even sketches his own theoretical ideal of a city (in the last two books of the *Politics*), which in many respects bears a striking resemblance to the city of the *Laws*.

There is, however, one important respect in which Aristotle's best city differs from both of Plato's. This is that the philosopher is reduced to the role of outside observer, critic, and commentator; he is no longer a player. Aristotelian man—and it will be a man—with all the practical excellences, from justice to sociability and wit, may as a concept be the product of philosophical reflection (in the ethical treatises, and in the *Politics*), but his realization, to the extent that Aristotle thinks the ideal can be realized, does not presuppose the intervention in society itself of any philosopher or philosophers; and whether he himself will or will not also be a philosopher is a separate question. His possession of the practical excellences in no way depends upon it. Equally, Aristotle's treatment of his 'best city' is no more than a description of the conditions that would best produce Aristotelian man, or rather a collection of such men. (Aristotle is probably even less caring than Plato about the considerable human infrastructure that would be required to realize this society of paragons.)

Politics, then, with Aristotle, becomes more fully and exclusively an object of reflection than it was in Plato. In this respect it is no surprise that Aristotle is considerably more interested in actual political phenomena. (He evidently instigated a large-scale investigation into the constitutions of Greek and non-Greek cities, some of the outcomes of which are clearly visible in the *Politics*.) While he has no great regard for most forms of government, which he treats as 'deviations', not least because they operate with distorted notions of justice, he is at least less restrictive than Plato in what he will regard as a proper way of organizing the polis; in particular, he tends to favour what he calls *politeia* ('polity')—appropriating the generic term for 'constitution' to identify a species: a form of constitution or city-organization that he usually represents as a compromise between oligarchy and democracy, where the power lies in the hands of a large, but not too large, body of adult males, set off from the rest perhaps by some relatively modest property qualification. The 'polity' has some features in common with Aristotle's best city, but is not to be confused with it. For one thing, there are quite a number of actual cities that he is prepared to treat as at least 'polity'-like. But most importantly, the 'polity' lacks the goal or *skopos* of the best city. It is 'correct', but only in a relative way—that is, insofar as it avoids the excesses and the injustices of oligarchy on the one hand and of democracy on the other. Aristotle shares Plato's particular hostility towards democracy, which he regards as founded on a mistake: because all free citizens are equally free, they come to think they are equal in other respects. Similarly, oligarchs mistakenly suppose that because they have a greater share of wealth, they deserve a greater share of power and influence too, but—as his treatment of 'polity' suggests—Aristotle probably thinks the oligarchs' mistake a rather lesser one than the democrats'.

Particular forms of government, then, for Aristotle, tend to be associated with particular forms of living, or different mindsets. (Oligarchs have one way of looking

at the world, democrats another, and both are mistaken.) On the other hand, Aristotle shows little inclination to rule out the possibility that the *individual* may flourish, and develop the Aristotelian excellences, under more or less any regime—provided, presumably, that he avoids active participation at least in the most deviant kinds, since that would mean taking on their colouring, and their mistaken conception of justice. And for that flourishing, again, he will need his fellow citizens: society, and so the city. How else, for one thing, would he be able to measure his own worth—one of the key aspects of Aristotelian 'magnanimity' or 'greatness of soul'?

There is evidence of a continuing engagement with Plato's texts and of some new work on politics in the Academy after his death; and there seems to have been the same mix of continuity and innovation in the later Peripatos, Aristotle's school. In particular, though the available evidence is fairly thin, successive Academics and Peripatetics appear to have adapted to the new political realities brought on by Alexander's conquests. The polis does not suddenly disappear in the new age of kingdoms and empires (what we have come to call the 'Hellenistic' age); if in general poleis tended to lose autonomy, the degree of loss varied widely, so that the old questions still retained resonance and relevance. However, there now emerges a whole new genre of political literature, on kingship, alongside further developments in constitutional theory, especially around the concept of the 'mixed' constitution—associated with the Peripatetic Dicaearchus, who may have drawn in equal measure on Plato and Aristotle, and later with Polybius, who came to identify republican Rome as the 'mixed' constitution par excellence. Among other philosophical schools the defining issue was one originally raised by Socrates: whether one should take part in political life or not. (These schools tended to trace their origins explicitly back to Socrates; some, like the Stoics, pillaged Plato's writings for the purpose, while professing their distance from him.) Stoics were often full participants, especially as advisers of kings and princes, while the Epicureans preached the quiet life, and the Cynics rejected society and politics *tout court*. And here there is something quite new in the wind, insofar as in Stoicism and Epicureanism as well as in Cynicism the individual and his goals are no longer tied to the institution of the city: if the Epicurean Garden had to be physically located in a city, that might constitute as much a threat as a benefit, and the Stoics, famously, saw themselves as citizens of the cosmic community rather than of any local one. Thus, finally, the notion of humanity works itself free from that of the polis.

Suggested Reading

In general: Rowe and Schofield (2000). For Plato in particular: Schofield (2006), Santas (2006), Ferrari (2007). For Aristotle in particular: Keyt and Miller (1991), Kraut (2002). All of these items contain, in their turn, further bibliographical guidance.

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PART III

PERFORMANCE AND TEXTS

Introduction

One of the most influential aspects of Hellenic culture is its literature. Had only objects and documents survived, our interest in, and understanding of, ancient Greece would be much more limited. The Greeks seem to speak to us most directly when they write poems, discuss mathematical properties, engage in philosophical arguments, and analyse historical events. When Sappho pleads 'don't break my heart' (1.3–4, trans. Carson), or Plutarch claims that warfare brings advances, but only for men 'who define "advance" in terms of wealth, luxury, and empire rather than safety, restraint, and an honest independence' (*Comparison of Lycurgus and Numa* 4.12–13), their voices seem miraculously close. In fact, the 'Greek miracle' is perhaps precisely that: an impression of closeness. But that sense of closeness is deceptive: all the articles in this section recontextualize Greek literature and, in many cases, question its very status as a literate endeavour.

Gregory Nagy points out that many Greek texts were conceived as scripts for performance, rather than as literature designed for readers (like us): even the Greek alphabet—the first alphabetic script that recorded both vowels and consonants, and hence a crucial development towards our own literate culture—probably developed as it did out of a desire to reproduce as accurately as possible oral delivery. Undeniably, in the course of time, texts and readers became more prominent, as **Wolfgang Rösler** explains, yet all ancient texts remain part of a larger cultural context which is, in important ways, different from our own. When that wider context is explored, our sense of closeness to the Greeks becomes less secure, and the impression of a Greek 'miracle' begins to fade. For example, the Homeric poems are sometimes presented as a literary big bang: they are thought to bring European literature into existence out of nowhere; yet **Johannes Haubold** argues that recent comparisons between early Greek epic and modern oral traditions, as well as the discovery and investigation of ancient Hittite and Near Eastern texts, place Greek epic in a much wider literary and historical context. **Andrea Capra** similarly emphasizes the importance of context, and of what is lost, when we approach the study of lyric poetry: even the one complete poem by Sappho turns out to be a fragment, because we can no longer hear the tune to which it was sung, because we do not know for whom she was singing, and because we cannot pin down who might have learned and re-performed her lyrics, or why. The suggestion here is that we need to rethink quite radically ancient processes of identification between poets, performers, and audiences; while, at the same time, our own identification with the Greeks can be harnessed to understand their literature, and ourselves. For

example, the dominance of the lyric poet-scholars in nineteenth-century Italian culture explains, in part, the current flourishing of Italian scholarship on ancient Greek lyric.

Oliver Taplin and **David Konstan** take the idea of performance even further and point out that, in the case of ancient drama, the history of performance is not just a matter of ancient practices. The original context of production, the role of classical actors, the make-up of classical audiences, and the ceremonies that framed first performances are all relevant to the interpretation of the plays, but so is the re-performance of drama outside Athens, and in later times: many tragedies and comedies turned out to be neither local nor ephemeral. When discussing ancient historiography, **Carolyn Dewald** makes something of the opposite claim: Thucydides—for example—wrote 'a possession for all time', but was also a man of his age. The 'linguistic' and the 'cultural' turn in the study of historiography help situate his work in a broader fifth-century context—and acknowledge its strangeness. Among other things, new approaches enable us to rediscover the connections between rhetoric and historiography—connections that were clear to all in antiquity, but have since eluded many readers. In the next chapter, **Lene Rubinstein** investigates a related problem by asking how much we really know about ancient rhetoric. She discusses the relationship between the public speeches delivered in classical Athens, and the textual remains available to us, many of which survived because they were considered, in some respects at least, model speeches. The question here is how much the practice of oratory differed from its theory, and to what extent our texts display the concerns and abilities of a narrow elite.

Similar issues present themselves when we tackle philosophical writing. As **William Desmond** and **Dirk Baltzly** point out, philosophy was in the first place a practice, a way of life. Many philosophers did not write at all: charismatic and highly individualistic, some offered themselves, rather than any texts, as philosophical examples. This is true, for example, of the Cynics who, according to their critics, lived like dogs. It may seem easy, then, to draw a distinction between a low philosophy of the streets and a high philosophy of the written treatise, but in fact hard lines cannot be drawn. For example: cynic texts do survive, in a variety of forms; while it seems that anybody could wander into Plato's academy and listen to what was going on. It is similarly difficult to trace clear-cut distinctions between magic and medicine. **Derek Collins** points out the problems of identifying ancient magic and outlines connections between medical, magical, and religious practices. **Brooke Holmes** attempts to characterize, by contrast, a secular tradition of medicine and focuses on approaches to the body and theories of causation. It seems that, just like the street philosophers, magicians were more individualistic and charismatic than the writers of systematic treatises, and yet they too sometimes relied on texts—not just short curse tablets but, for example, collections of oracles. It is thus important to remain open to possible connections between magic and medicine: for example,

in the course of medical history, dissection and investigation of the interior of the body gradually became more prominent; similarly, ancient curses, spells, and binds became increasingly specific about the body parts and internal organs they targeted. The wider context of society is relevant here: magical and medical texts are affected by the history of torture, and of vivisection (itself a form of torture—at least from the perspective of those subjected to it).

One area where it is particularly difficult to bridge the gap between text and performance is ancient music: **Eleonora Rocconi** reminds us that we know very little about how ancient music sounded. It is much easier to relate ancient theories of music to other intellectual endeavours, such as the study of physics, mathematics, or ethics, than to investigate its connections with the work of practising musicians. There is a paradox here, because ancient musical theories later inspired the development of musical forms on the part of performing artists: modern opera, most famously, originated in an attempt at reconstructing ancient Greek music and drama. The challenge of mapping our distance from the Greeks becomes particularly acute when we consider another influential field of enquiry, the ancient exact sciences: Euclid reads like a modern mathematician, not just because he explores inevitable, mathematical truths, but because he expresses them in a style that resembles very closely indeed that of modern mathematics. And yet, as **Reviel Netz** points out, mathematical science is not at all inevitable: nobody forces a mathematician to study this rather than that, to express it this way, or to have that ultimate goal in mind. Mathematicians too are shaped by historical contingencies and, in investigating the context of ancient mathematics, some unlikely connections emerge: the Hellenistic exact sciences, with their emphasis on surprising juxtapositions, the hybridization of genres, and exclusive readerships, closely resemble the aesthetics of Alexandrian poetry.

Alexander Sens further investigates Hellenistic poetry by outlining the gradual separation between literary genres and the performance contexts within which they originally developed. The Hellenistic poets felt the gap and tried to reconstruct a literary past from which they felt separated. In a city like Alexandria, where different cultures and ethnicities coexisted, Greek identity was increasingly seen as a matter of cultural and literary competence, rather than a function of one's place of birth—that is to say: 'Greece' was becoming a place of the mind. The genres of biography and the novel were also fundamentally concerned with Hellenic identity. **As Christopher Pelling** points out, ancient biographies do not just describe individuals, they tackle a range of issues, chief among which is that crucial question, what it might mean to be Greek. The novel too flourishes at a time when Greek identity is above all a matter of cultural affiliation: **Stephen Nimis** argues that the characters in the novels are fundamentally concerned with issues of gender, ethnicity, culture, and identity—and that their readers must have been too. However, the relationship between the world depicted in the novels and that in which they were written and

read remains difficult to characterize: it is remarkable, for example, that Rome, the great imperial power of the time, is never so much as mentioned in the extant Greek novels.

The last chapter in this section asks how the Greeks negotiated issues of textuality and performance when developing their own critical approaches to (what we call) their literature. In tackling this question, **Andrew Ford** engages with some of the issues set out in the first chapters of this section and then explored, from different angles, in the articles that follow. Beyond the different subjects, perspectives, and agendas, there is a determination, on the part of all contributors, to confront theory with practice, and to compare text with context. Greek literature may seem very close, but it sets us in dialogue with a remote, sophisticated, and only partly literate society.

CHAPTER 34

PERFORMANCE AND TEXT IN ANCIENT GREECE

GREGORY NAGY

THE terms performance and text, as a pair, cannot be considered the equivalent of another pair of terms, orality and literacy (for which see Nagy 2001). Still, there is a link between performance and orality, matching the obvious link between text and literacy. In what follows, I propose to consider these matching links.

The study of orality became an important part of Hellenic studies, ever since the work of Milman Parry and Albert Lord. A basic work on orality and oral poetry is Albert B. Lord's *The Singer of Tales* (2000), which documents the research of Lord's teacher, Milman Parry, on oral traditions in the former Yugoslavia, 1933–5 (collected papers, Parry 1971). Parry was a professor of ancient Greek, seeking new answers to the so-called Homeric Question. Basically, the 'question' came down to this: were the Homeric *Iliad* and *Odyssey* composed with or without the aid of writing? Parry's project, the comparing of Homeric poetry with the living oral traditions of South Slavic heroic poetry, led him to conclude that the Homeric texts were indeed the products of oral composition. Parry's research was continued by his student Albert Lord, whose *Singer of Tales* represents the legacy of their combined efforts. The cumulative work of Parry and Lord led to crucial insights into the Homeric Question, but its ultimate success can best be measured by tracking its application to a wide range of literatures and pre-literatures beyond the original focus on ancient Greek epic (Mitchell and Nagy, in Lord 2000). These applications

have led to the formulation of an essential idea that extends to all oral traditions, both poetry and prose. The idea is this: oral traditions formed the basis of literary traditions.

There had been earlier formulations of this idea, but Parry and Lord were the first to perfect a systematic way of comparing the internal evidence of living oral traditions, as observed in their fieldwork, with the internal evidence of literary traditions. It is primarily their methodology that we see reflected in the ongoing academic usage of such terms as orality and oral theory. (On the pitfalls of using the term oral theory see Nagy 1996*b*: 19–20.) For Parry and Lord, the histories of literary and oral traditions, of literatures and pre-literatures, were interrelated. Accordingly, Lord would even speak of oral literature (Lord 1995, esp. ch. 8). Further, Lord developed the comparative study of oral and literary traditions into a new branch of Comparative Literature (Guillén 1993: 173–9; Mitchell and Nagy 2000: p. xvii). Attested in a wide variety of societies, from prehistoric times all the way into the present, oral traditions can most broadly be described as verbal systems of expression combining performance and composition.

Here we come to the element of performance, which is clearly an aspect of oral traditions. But performance in and of itself does not define any oral tradition. Not all performance involves oral tradition, even if all oral tradition involves performance. It is the relationship of performance to composition that leads to a definition of any given oral tradition. As we consider the many various oral traditions of the world, we find many variations in this relationship: besides the basic category of the performing composer who is at the same time the composing performer, we need to consider such additional categories as (1) the re-performing composer, (2) the re-composing performer, (3) the re-performed composer, and even (4) the re-composed performer (Nagy 1996*a*). The last two of these four categories are exemplified by the traditions of performing Homeric poetry in Athens during the classical period of the fifth century BCE. In this historical context, Homer is seen as the re-performed composer of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* as performed by *rhapsōidoi* ('rhapsodes') at the seasonally recurring festival of the Panathenaia in Athens (Nagy 2002). In the ongoing process of recurring performances, Homer's very identity is re-composed to make him a spokesman of the Athenians (Nagy 2008).

In this classical period, Homeric poetry is static or fixed, not fluid. This fixity has led to the inference that this poetry had always been a written text. The term written text, however, is too imprecise for describing what had been a process of gradual fixation in the ongoing tradition of performing Homeric poetry. This process can be described in terms of a progression from transcript to script. By transcript I mean the broadest possible category of written text: a transcript can be a record of performance, even an aid for performance, but not the equivalent of performance (Nagy 1996*b*: 34–6, 65–9). We must distinguish a transcript from an inscription, which can traditionally refer to itself in the archaic period as an

equivalent of performance (ibid. 34–6). As for script, I mean a narrower category, where the written text is a prerequisite for performance (ibid. 32–4).

In considering such categories, we need to ask what happens when oral traditions become written traditions—or when oral traditions come into contact with pre-existing written traditions. In the history of scholarship on this question, the work of Parry and Lord is pivotal. Their fieldwork on the living oral traditions of the former Yugoslavia gave them an opportunity to test the living interactions of oral and literary traditions. They observed that the prestige of writing as a technology, and of the culture of literacy that it fostered, tended to destabilize the culture of oral traditions—in the historical context they were studying. What they observed, however, was strictly a point of comparison with other possible test cases, not some kind of universalizing formulation (Mitchell and Nagy 2000: p. xiii). In general, the textualization or *Verschriftung* of any given oral tradition needs to be distinguished from *Verschriftlichung*—that is, from the evolution of any given culture of literacy, any given *Schriftlichkeit* (Oesterreicher 1993).

Humanists today may be tempted to romanticize literacy as the key to 'literature', often equated with 'high' culture (on empirical approaches to distinctions between 'high' and 'low' culture, as occasionally formalized in distinctions between oral and written traditions, see Bausinger 1980). And yet, the only universal distinction between oral and literary traditions is the historical anteriority of the first to the second. Beyond this obvious observation, it is pointless to insist on any universalizing definitions for the 'oral' of 'oral tradition'. 'Oral tradition' and 'oral poetry' are terms that depend on the concepts of 'written tradition' and 'written poetry'. In cultures that do not depend on the technology of writing, the concept of 'orality' is meaningless (Lord 1995: 105, n. 26). From the standpoint of comparative ethnography: 'Written is not something that is not oral; rather it is something in addition to being oral, and that additional something varies from society to society' (Nagy 1990: 8 [0§16]). The technology of writing has nothing to do with whether there can or cannot be poetics or rhetoric. Poetics and rhetoric can exist without writing.

It is needless to posit a dichotomy between orality and text in the history of Greek civilization. But the question remains: is there a dichotomy between performance and text? To find an answer, we must consider how the technology of writing relates to performance and to the production of texts. Further, we must consider the rationale behind the production of texts.

As we are about to see, in ancient Greece the text was meant not only for reading as we understand the phenomenon of reading today. It was meant also for performance. This formulation can be justified, for example, on the basis of observations made by Aristotle in his *Poetics* concerning the reading of texts. As we will see presently, these observations show that the ancient Greeks, including Aristotle himself, regarded reading as a re-enactment of live speech. Such a sense of re-enactment was driven by their writing system. When Aristotle in the *Poetics* (1456b20–38) speaks about syllables and about the consonants and vowels that

delimit them, he is doing far more than that. By hindsight, we can say he is demonstrating a remarkably accurate linguistic understanding of the sound-system or phonology of the Greek language as spoken in his time, the fourth century BCE. Just as remarkable is the phonological accuracy of the writing system inherited by Aristotle and his contemporaries in reproducing the language that went into the texts they produced. That system is what we know as the Greek alphabet, which had been derived many centuries earlier from the Phoenician alphabet. The ancient Greek text, as produced by way of alphabetic writing, was a most accurate sound-recording of the ancient Greek language.

From the very earliest times, the Greek alphabet excelled in phonological accuracy. The same cannot be said about the earlier Phoenician alphabet from which it was borrowed. The writing system of the Phoenicians, in the course of its evolution, had dispensed with the representation of vowels. We see the same principle in the writing system of Hebrew, a language closely related to Phoenician. It was a loss of phonological accuracy for the alphabets of these two Semitic languages to dispense with vowels, but there was a compensatory gain in morphological accuracy. That is because, in both Phoenician and Hebrew morphology, the consonants in the 'root' of any word were a constant while the vowels were a variable. So the morphological integrity of the individual word could be maintained by writing only the consonants in the Semitic alphabets—provided that each word was divided from the next. By contrast, in the process of borrowing the writing system of the Phoenicians, the writing system of the Greeks developed a way to represent vowels.

The historical consequences are vast. In effect, the ancient Greeks thus developed the first 'pure' alphabetic system. One linguist (Gelb 1963: 184) has described this development as 'the last important step in the history of writing'. He adds that, 'from the Greek period up to the present, nothing new has happened in the inner structural development of writing'. In other words, the Greek alphabet 'conquered the world', since 'we write consonants and vowels in the same way as the ancient Greeks did'. From one perspective, this development can be counted as a shining example of the Greek 'miracle' (for an overall critique of such a way of thinking about the Greeks see Gernet 1983). From another perspective, it is simply a contingency—or, in terms of the Greek language, a *kairos*, something that happens at the right time and at the right place. In this case, what happened is that certain consonants as pronounced in Phoenician were simply not heard in Greek, and their symbols were used to represent vowels. This enabled the Greeks to develop an alphabet which accurately captured the spoken sounds.

Another aspect of Greek writing is best understood as a way of recording oral performance: the practice of *scriptio continua*, a mode of writing that runs words together. *Scriptio continua* imposed itself in the classical period and persisted all the way through the ninth and tenth centuries CE. So the question is, why was *scriptio continua* a basic feature of ancient Greek literacy for a period that covers well over a thousand years? For the modern reader, the continuous flow of letters in *scriptio*

continua, without blank spaces between words, actually impedes the cognitive flow of reading itself: in antiquity, as well as today, the basic unit of meaning was the word. So by now the question deepens: why were words run together in *scriptio continua* if they impeded the cognitive flow of reading? The answer is simple: *scriptio continua* promoted the phonological realism of continuity in speaking or singing or reciting in ways that people really spoke and sang and recited. Stopping at the wrong place between words could impede the flow, the continuity. Stopping could only be allowed at the right place, that is, at the end of a word that coincides with the end of a phrase or a clause, with the end of a colon or a verse. That would be phonologically right. Stopping elsewhere would be phonologically wrong, ruining the rhythmic and melodic contour of the phrasing. The systematization of when to stop and when not to stop between words is evident in some surviving ancient texts. We see a striking illustration in a set of papyri dating from the second century CE featuring the songs of Bacchylides: the formatting of these texts shows most clearly that *scriptio continua* is being coordinated with the placements of line-endings that correspond to the ends of cola (Nagy 2000). Even if the process of reading such texts in *scriptio continua* was cognitively more difficult than the process of reading the more recent *scriptio discontinua* as simulated in the printed pages of modern editions, the older way of formatting offered the advantage of reading something that was far closer to the reality of live performance.

It can be said that the experience of seeing words run together in *scriptio continua* impedes not so much the general process of reading but the specific process of 'silent reading' (Saenger 1997: 11). This term silent reading refers to a way of reading that dispenses with the practice of reading out loud. There has been a long debate over the validity of such a dichotomy, without a clear outcome (Gavrilov 1997). This much is certain, however: from the standpoint of cognitive psychology, the mental process involved in reading out loud requires in its own right an element of 'silent reading'—since the sequence of cognition in reading letters one after the other is moved forward by the reader's hearing the actual sequence of what is being sounded out loud. That is because this sequence of letters serially turning into sounds is given meaning by the serial sounding out of words that take shape as the sequence continues, helping the reader keep moving ahead to the finish. What I just said applies even if the reader mechanically sounds out letters without at first 'recognizing' the meaning of what is being sounded out. For the process of reading out loud to be successful, what really matters is that the sequence of letters being read out loud must be 'recognized' *ex post facto*. The sequence of sounds being read out loud by the reader is what drives the reader's process of 'recognition'. Such is the idea expressed by the word *anagignōskein*, which means 'read out loud' and, more basically, 'recognize'. A most telling example of *anagignōskein* in the sense of 'read out loud' is a passage in the *Poetics* of Aristotle (1462a12). He is saying that *tragōidia* ('tragedy'), just like *epopoiia* ('epic'), can reveal its inherent characteristics as a genre simply by way of being read out loud, and the word he uses here for 'read

out loud' is *anagignōskein*. It is clear that Aristotle really means reading out loud here, not silent reading (Halliwell 1995: 138).

A combination of two linked passages in the *Poetics* helps clarify what Aristotle means here. In the first of these two, Aristotle is contrasting the reading out loud of tragedy with the acting of tragedy by *hupokritai* ('actors') at a public festival, that is, at an *agōn* (1450b18–19), and he is making the point that *opsis* ('spectacle') is not essential for tragedy (1450b19–20). In the second linked passage (1453b3–6), he makes the same point, but this time he adds that tragedy has the power to visualize even without making the audience 'see' (*horan*) a spectacle but simply by way of having them 'hear' (*akouein*). From these two linked passages we see that Aristotle accepts the idea that hearing is essential even for the reading of tragedy, not only for the performance of tragedy in theatre. And what is being heard is obviously what is being read out loud.

As Aristotle says, visualization is a necessity for tragedy—even when this medium is simply being read out loud instead of being formally performed in theatre. And what he is saying here is not just theory. More than that, it is an institutional reality of theatre. This reality is demonstrated by the inherent meaning of the ancient Greek word that conventionally refers to the audience of theatre. That word is *theatēs*, usually translated as 'spectator' and meaning basically the one who sees the spectacle—just as the word for 'theatre', *theatron*, has the basic meaning of the vehicle for seeing the spectacle. This meaning of *theatēs* ('spectator') is strikingly exemplified by the wording of the Athenian statesman Cleon in a speech recreated by Thucydides (3.38.4): in this speech, Cleon criticizes the Athenians as *theatai men tōn logōn ... akroatai de tōn ergōn*, 'spectators of words, audiences of deeds'. The speaker's point here is that theatre is so much a part of the lives of Athenians that they treat the real things that people say about real things that people do as if all these things were theatrical spectacles. Thus the Athenians become *theatai*, 'spectators', of real things being said as if these things were theatrical lines being delivered by professional performers, and they imagine things done offstage, as it were, by merely hearing these things instead of seeing them for themselves. Significantly, the speaker in this passage starts the wording of his criticism by saying that the Athenians are acting like perverted *agōnothetai* ('arrangers of the competition (*agōn*)'): *kakōs agōnothetountes*. We have already seen that Aristotle uses the word *agōn* in referring to a public festival that serves as the venue for the acting of tragedy by *hupokritai* ('actors'), which is an occasion of *opsis* ('spectacle') (1450b19–20). That *agōn* is evidently the festival of the City Dionysia in Athens, which was the primary venue for the spectacle of Athenian state theatre. But the speaker in the passage from Thucydides seems to have in mind another *agōn* as well. That other *agōn* is the festival of the Panathenaia in Athens, which was the primary venue for another spectacle organized by the Athenian state. And that spectacle has to do with the performance of the Homeric *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.

As we learn from the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* (60.1), ten magistrates called *athlothetai*, 'arrangers of the contests (*athloi*)', were elected every four years to organize the festival of the quadrennial or 'Great' Panathenaia, and one of their primary tasks was the management of the '*agōn* in *mousikē*' (*ton agōna tēs mousikēs*). Here the word *agōn* is used in the specific sense of 'competition', and this use is more basic than the more extended use of the word in the sense of 'festival'. According to Plutarch's *Life of Pericles* (13.9–11), the Athenian statesman Pericles reformed this competition in *mousikē* when he was elected as one of the *athlothetai*. It was at this competition that quadrennial performances of the Homeric *Iliad* and *Odyssey* took place (Nagy 2002: 36, 41–2).

What, then, does the author of the *Constitution of the Athenians* actually mean when he says *mousikē*? In Aristotelian usage, this word *mousikē* is a shorthand way of saying *mousikē tekhnē*, meaning 'craft of the Muses', that is, 'musical craft' in the etymological sense of the word musical (cf. Rocconi in this volume). It would be a misreading, however, to think of ancient Greek *mousikē* simply in the modern sense of music, since the 'musical' performers who competed with each other in separate categories at the Panathenaia included not only *kitharōidoi* ('*kithara*-singers') and *kitharistai* ('*kithara*-players') and *aulōidoi* ('*aulos*-singers') and *aulētai* ('*aulos*-players'), but also *rhapsōidoi* ('rhapsodes'). At the Panathenaia these rhapsodes competed with each other in performing the Homeric *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. And the performative medium of these rhapsodes in the era of Aristotle was recitative and thus not 'musical' in the modern sense of the word. By recitative I mean (1) performed without singing and (2) performed without the instrumental accompaniment of the *kithara* or the *aulos* (Nagy 2002: 36, 41–2). In this era, the competitive performances of the Homeric *Iliad* and *Odyssey* by rhapsodes at the Panathenaia were 'musical' only in an etymological sense, and the medium of the rhapsode was actually closer to what we call 'poetry' and farther from what we call 'music' in the modern sense of the word. Still, the fact remains that the Homeric performances of rhapsodes were an integral part of what was called the '*agōn* (competition) in *mousikē*'.

Plato's dialogue *Ion* is about such a rhapsode. At the start of the dialogue, Ion of Ephesus has just arrived in Athens in order to compete with other rhapsodes for first prize at the festival of the Panathenaia (*Ion* 530b). Plato's wording makes it explicit that the occasion for performances of Homeric poetry at the Panathenaia was in effect an *agōn* or 'competition' among rhapsodes, and that the agonistic craft of the rhapsodes was included under the general category of *mousikē* (530a).

This *mousikē* of the rhapsode at the festival of the Panathenaia was the grandest of spectacles, rivalling even the spectacle of actors acting tragedy at the festival of the City Dionysia. Aristotle gives a sense of this grand rivalry toward the end of Book 1 of the *Poetics*. In considering the question whether tragedy or epic is the best of all genres of poetry, he concludes that tragedy could easily be considered as good as epic—if it were not for all the distractions of theatricality—such as the element

of *kinēsis*, 'motion', involved in acting (1461b30). Then he makes tragedy more competitive by conceding that this genre cannot really be divorced altogether from the element of motion (1462a9–10). The concession is transparent, since Aristotle knows full well that motion is inherent in tragedy. After all, one of the basic features of tragedy is the chorus, which of course dances as well as sings (again, 1462a9–10). But then Aristotle dispenses with his own concession by asserting that tragedy does not even need the element of motion in order to be competitive with epic. Even if tragedy is deprived of motion, he says, it is still competitive with epic. All that is needed is simply to read it out loud (*anagignōskein*: 1462a11–12). In this context, it is understood that epic too is most competitive. In the case of epic as well, all that is needed is simply to read it out loud.

Having made his point about the reading out loud of epic as well as tragedy, Aristotle now lets the two genres compete with each other—but this time without putting any restrictions on tragedy. This time, he lets tragedy keep its theatrical elements. Restrictions removed, tragedy can now compete with epic in metre (1462a14) and in what Aristotle calls *mousikē* and *opsis* (1462a15–16).

We have already observed the meaning of *mousikē*, while the meaning of *opsis* as 'spectacle' is self-evident. But the combination of these two words here in the *Poetics* has troubled modern editors. Some even worry whether there has been a corruption of textual transmission. But the wording is sound and consistent if it refers to the grand spectacle of epic performance at the Panathenaia, which as we have seen represents the very best in the craft of *mousikē*. By the time Aristotle speaks of *mousikē* and *opsis*, he has reached a point of accepting the element of spectacle inherent in epic performance, just as he has accepted the element of spectacle inherent in tragic performance. Here is the only place where we see the word *mousikē* in Aristotle's *Poetics*. And we know from elsewhere, including Plato's *Ion* and the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians*, that this word *mousikē* is linked closely to the craft of rhapsodes who perform the Homeric *Iliad* and *Odyssey* at the festival of the Panathenaia.

Conceding that spectacle is inherent in both epic and tragedy, Aristotle goes on to say that both genres can be spectacular even without their having to show any spectacle to their audiences. The spectacle can happen simply by way of hearing tragedy and epic as they are being read out loud. This way, a distinctive vividness still comes through, which is a modified form of spectacle. This vividness is made possible by way of reading out loud, which is in turn a modified form of performance. Aristotle says all this explicitly about tragedy. Here is a medium that shows its true 'vividness' (*to enarges*) even when it is simply read out loud (1462a17–18: *kai en tēi anagnōsei kai epi tōn ergōn*).

The wording here is most significant. Aristotle is setting up a parallel between the performance of tragedy in its formal setting, as expressed by the idiom *epi tōn ergōn*, 'in performance' (Janko 1987: 156), and the 'reading out loud' of tragedy in a modified setting, as expressed by the noun *anagnōsis*, derived from *anagignōskein*.

Aristotle's formulation leaves it understood that the same parallel applies to that other spectacular genre, epic. In that case, he is saying it implicitly—that there is also a parallel between the performance of epic in its formal setting and the *anagnōsis* ('reading out loud') of epic in a modified setting.

As we saw earlier, the formal settings for the performances of epic and tragedy are the Panathenaia and the City Dionysia respectively. And now we see that both settings are actually understood as theatrical by Aristotle himself. He says that epic as well as tragedy is conventionally performed in front of *theatai* ('spectators') (1461b28, 1462a1). And, though he adds that the 'spectators' of epic are far less of a problem for him than the 'spectators' of tragedy, since the element of theatricality in the performance of epic is far less pronounced than it is in the performance of tragedy (1461b36–1462a4), he nevertheless goes on to say that *skhēmata*, 'poses' (1462a2), and other 'visual signs' or *sēmeia* (1462a6), characterize not only the actors of tragedy but even the professional performers of epic called rhapsodes or *rhapsōidoi*. In this context, he actually uses the verb *rhapsōidein* ('perform rhapsodically': 1462a6), citing as an example a rhapsode called Sosistratos who had a reputation for performing in an overly theatrical way (1462a7). In the end, Aristotle thinks that rhapsodes are just as theatrical as actors. Since rhapsodes, like actors, engage in theatrical poses and other such visual effects, it is clear they too are in effect practising the craft known as *hupokritikē* (1462a5), that is, the craft of *hupokritai* ('actors').

For Aristotle, however, the point remains that *poiētikē*, the craft of poets, should be kept distinct from this craft of actors (1462a4–5). As we have seen, he thinks that the craft of poets should be divorced from theatricality. But even his usage of the word *theatēs* ('spectator') betrays the impossibility of such a divorce. Aristotle himself uses this word *theatēs* to refer to the audience of epic as well as tragedy. We have already seen him speak of *theatai* with reference to an audience listening to the performance of a rhapsode (1462a1–6). We see the same pattern of wording in Plato's *Ion* (535e), where the same word *theatēs* is used with reference to a hypothetical member of an audience listening to a rhapsode performing the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* at the festival of the Panathenaia in Athens. The speaker is Plato's Socrates, who makes no distinction in this context between the audiences of a rhapsode and the audiences of an actor, specified here as a *hupokritēs* (536a).

The parallelism between epic as performed by rhapsodes at the Panathenaia and tragedy as performed by actors at the City Dionysia is evident at the very beginning of the *Poetics* of Aristotle (1447a13–15). We see there the genres of poetry listed in the following order: epic or *epopoiia* (which means literally 'the making of *epos*'), tragedy, comedy, dithyramb, lyric accompanied by *aulos* ('reed'), and lyric accompanied by *kithara* ('lyre'). All these genres, as listed by Aristotle at the beginning of the *Poetics*, correspond to genres actually performed at the two major festivals of the Athenians: (1) the Panathenaia, featuring epic accompanied by no instrument, lyric accompanied by *aulos*, lyric accompanied by *kithara*; and (2) the City Dionysia,

featuring tragedy, comedy, dithyramb, and satyr drama (Nagy 1996*a*: 81–2; 1999: 27; Rotstein 2004). In Aristotle's listing, he ostentatiously pairs the genre of epic with the genre of tragedy (the wording is *epopoiia . . . kai hē tēs tragōidias poiēsis*, which means literally 'the making of *epos* and the making of tragedy'). Elsewhere, Aristotle says that he views these two particular genres, epic and tragedy, as cognates (*Poetics* 1449a2–6). In the works of Plato as well, epic is viewed as a cognate of tragedy: more than that, Homer is represented as a proto-tragedian (*Theaetetus* 152e; *Republic* 10.595c, 598d, 605c, 607a).

What the genres of poetry as listed at the beginning of the *Poetics* all have in common is that they are forms of *mimēsis* ('re-enactment'), as Aristotle says explicitly (1447a16). This commonality needs to be viewed in the light of the fact that all these genres are also forms of performance. As we just saw, these genres of poetry are actualized as poetry by way of being performed at one or the other of the two premier state festivals of the Athenians, the Panathenaia or the City Dionysia. In the case of epic and tragedy, these two particular genres are in fact the premier forms of performance at those two festivals respectively.

In the *Poetics*, then, the concept of *mimēsis* as 're-enactment' necessarily involves the performance of poetry as well as its composition. In fact, the semantic history of the word *mimēsis* in the primary sense of 're-enactment', and even in the secondary sense of 'representation' or 'imitation', confirms the inclusion of performance as well as composition in its basic meaning (Nagy 1996*a*: 59–103).

Aristotle may prefer to concentrate on those aspects of poetry that have to do with composition, but he cannot ignore the aspects of performance. That is why he has to evaluate in terms of *mimēsis* the relative merits of epic and tragedy toward the end of Book 1 of the *Poetics*, where he confronts the question of deciding which of these two premier genres of poetry, epic or tragedy, is superior to the other. He formulates his question this way: 'which form of *mimēsis* is better, the epic or the tragic?' (1461b26: *poteron de beltiōn hē epopoiikē mimēsis ē hē tragikē*). He is forced to ask his question this way because he cannot ignore the formal performance of epic and tragedy at the festivals of the Panathenaia and the City Dionysia respectively. Still, Aristotle prefers to confront and analyse this element of performance in a modified form. This modified form of performance is by way of *anagnōsis*, that is, by way of hearing the text being read out loud. As we saw earlier, Aristotle in the *Poetics* says that the performing of tragedy and epic in this modified form of performance, *anagnōsis* ('reading out loud'), is the equivalent of performing them in their formal setting, *epi tōn ergōn* ('in performance') (1462a17–18: *kai en tēi anagnōsei kai epi tōn ergōn*).

As far as Aristotle was concerned, this modified form of performance gets it right, as it were. Simply to read the text out loud and not to act it as actors and rhapsodes do makes it possible for the listener to grasp the essence of the poetry without getting distracted by its theatricality. This way, those who hear poetry being read out loud can be as objective as possible in analysing the true

nature of poetry. Here I find it relevant to cite an ancient anecdote about Aristotle: the story has it that his teacher Plato gave Aristotle the sobriquet *anagnōstēs*, that is, 'the reader' (*Vita Marciana*, Aristotle fr. 428.2 Rose; Nagy 1996*a*: 149; see also Rösler in this volume). This same word *anagnōstēs* is attested with reference to slaves trained to read texts out loud to copyists for the purpose of mass-producing copies of a book (Nepos, *Life of Atticus* 13.3). Such a context implies that the text that is being read out loud needs to be a model text (Nagy 1996*a*: 149–50).

The question then is, how to establish such a model text in the first place. In terms of the Greek language, the basic procedure for establishing a model text is to make an *ekdosis* ('edition') by way of a process of cross-checking that leads to the *diorthōsis* ('correcting') of the text. And the word that refers to this process of cross-checking is *paranagignōskein*, which can be translated as 'read out loud for cross-checking'. In texts such as the 'Explicit' to the commentary of Eutocius of Ascalon (sixth century CE) on Book 1 of Archimedes, *On Sphere and Cylinder* (MS Laurentianus 28.4; Cameron 1990.103–7), the term *paranagignōskein* indicates that the text that is being read out loud is a model text in the making, that is, it is a text that becomes a model through the actual process of cross-checking and correcting (here I rectify what I say in Nagy 1996*a*: 175–6, n. 83, thanks to Davidson 2001: 410, n. 19).

The texts that served as models for copyists could also become models for performers, that is, model performances or scripts. There is in fact a testimony that speaks about the establishment of such a model for the classics of tragedy in Athens. This testimony, which comes from the *Lives of the Ten Orators* (attributed to Plutarch), has to do with an event that took place in the era of Aristotle, some time around the third quarter of the fourth century. According to the *Lives of the Ten Orators*, the statesman Lycurgus of Athens initiated reforms in the performance traditions of state theatre in Athens, legislating an official 'state script' for the tragedies of three poets and three poets only, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. Lycurgus introduced a law requiring that the Athenians erect bronze statues of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and that the state make official the texts of the tragedies of these three poets in the following way: 'the Athenians should transcribe their tragedies and keep them under control in common possession, and the recorder (*grammateus*) of the city should read them out loud, for cross-checking (*paranagignōskein*), to those acting in the tragedies, for otherwise it was not possible to act them' ([Plutarch] *Lives of the Ten Orators* 841F). Although this passage leaves unanswered many questions that arise concerning the interplay of script and performance in tragedy as acted in the Athenian state theatre of Aristotle's time, it makes one thing quite clear: the actors of tragedy were now bound to an Athenian 'state script'.

Quintilian (*Institutio Oratoria* 10.1.66) gives further testimony about such an Athenian 'state script':

tragoedias primus in lucem Aeschylus protulit, sublimis et grauis et grandilocus saepe usque ad uitium, sed rudis in plerisque et incompositus; propter quod correctas eius fabulas in certamen deferre posterioribus poetis Athenienses permisere; suntque eo modo multi coronati . . .

The first to bring out tragedies was Aeschylus—sublime, severe, and often grandiloquent to a fault, but unpolished in many ways and disorganized; on account of which the Athenians allowed later poets to introduce into dramatic competitions the corrected versions of his dramas, and in this way many of these later poets won the crown of victory . . .

We may note with special interest the expression *correctas*, which is analogous to the concept of *diorthōsis* ('correcting'), which as we have seen is linked to the custom of *paranagignōskein*, 'read out loud for cross-checking' (Nagy 1996*a*: 174–5).

There is evidence for other such customs as well. Even in earlier times, the Athenian state exerted its control over the production of drama by way of instituting formal occasions for reading it out loud. A piece of evidence is the expression *drama anagignōskein* ('read out loud the drama'), attested in the scholia for the *Clouds* of Aristophanes (510). This expression evidently refers to the custom of holding a formal audition for the dramas proposed for production at the dramatic festivals. The dramas of each dramatist, in competition with other dramatists, were subject to acceptance or rejection by the archon in charge of the given dramatic festival (*arkhōn epōnumos* for the City Dionysia, *arkhōn basileus* for the Lenaia). As we see from an allusion to this custom in Plato's *Laws* (817d), the archon who presided at the audition determined whether the state would or would not grant the authorization of a chorus to be trained for the production of the dramas proposed by the dramatists (Pickard-Cambridge 1968: 84). Relevant to such customs is a passage from the *Frogs* of Aristophanes (originally produced in 405 BCE), where the god Dionysus reminisces that he was once *anagignōskōn* ('reading out loud') to himself (verses 52–3: *anagignōskonti moi . . . pros emauton*) the *Andromeda* of Euripides (originally produced in 413/12). Given the self-referential jokes, throughout the *Frogs*, about Dionysus as god of Athenian state theatre, the self-representation of Dionysus as reading tragedy out loud neither to actors nor to an archon but rather to himself may be interpreted as a comic reference to a performance of the state script by the god of script himself (Nagy 1996*a*: 176, n. 86).

The idea of a script as a state script is old, going all the way back to the age of the tyrants of Athens, the Peisistratidai, who controlled Athens in the sixth century BCE (Nagy 1990: 6 §§19–20). Retrospectively, the Athenian democracy looks at this idea as dangerous—unless that script can be read out loud. That is because the process of reading out loud is a speech-act, like performance itself, and it is public, not private.

So far, I have considered only those genres that are realized in performance. The most prominent of these are epic, tragedy, and comedy. As we have seen, these and all the other genres listed at the beginning of Aristotle's *Poetics* are in fact realized in performance. But what about genres that are not performed, such as

history—or the Platonic dialogue? Those, as Rösler argues in the next chapter, are of crucial importance if we are to understand the rise of literate culture in ancient Greece. But even those texts are performative if not performable. Let us take for example the *Histories* of Herodotus, who calls his medium an *apodeixis* (Ionic *apodexis*), a 'making public', at the very beginning of his composition. Anyone in the *Histories* who is pictured as performing any *ergon* ('deed') that is worth being memorialized by history can be said to be making that deed public, as expressed by the verb *apodeiknusthai* ('make public') corresponding to the noun *apodeixis* ('making public'). There are numerous examples of this combination of *ergon* and *apodeiknusthai* in the *Histories*, and in each case we may translate as 'perform a deed'. That is because each such deed is made public by the publicity that is history (Nagy 1990: 8§5). By contrast, the text of the history composed by Thucydides is not made public. When he speaks of his *History* as a *ktēma . . . es aiei*, 'a possession for all time', he is contrasting his own private possession of knowledge about world affairs with the making public of such knowledge, which would be conditioned by the vicissitudes of public performance—and which he describes as a 'competitive effort (*agōnisma*) meant for hearing in the here and now' (1.22.4). His own knowledge, as reflected even in the speeches that he re-enacts in writing, is not to be performed. To that extent, the medium of Thucydides is private and undemocratic (Nagy 1990: 8§7). Still, it is performative, since it shows how speeches are performed. Similarly in the *Phaedo* of Plato, the dialogue with Socrates is performative, since Socrates shows how dialogues are performed. Each time there is dialogue, the word or *logos* comes back to life (Loraux 1989).

Suggested Reading

Bauman (1977) analyses various types and degrees of interaction between performance and composition as combined aspects of oral traditions. Guillén (1993) situates the study of oral traditions within the academic discipline of Comparative Literature. Lord (1995), a posthumous publication, offers a sustained rebuttal of critics who insist on the inferiority of 'orality' to literacy. Bausinger (1980) gives a historical study of culturally and ideologically determined distinctions between 'high art' and 'low art', as associated respectively with literary and oral traditions. On orality and literacy, there is a general survey, with bibliography, in Nagy (2001). Martin (1989) presents a case study of oral poetic sub-genres embedded within the 'super-genre' of Homeric poetry, with special attention to applications of speech-act theory. Bakker (1997) examines syntactical patterns typical of oral traditions and even of 'everyday' speech as preserved in the text of the Homeric poems. Graziosi (2002) and Nagy (2004*b*) analyse myths about Homeric performance in terms of Homeric reception. Examining the anthropology of reading as a cognitive process, Svenbro (1993) analyses the ancient Greek mentality of equating the activity of reading out loud with the act of lending one's voice to the letters being processed by one's eyes. Nagy (2001) examines phenomena

of literacy that defy universalization, such as the practice of *scriptio continua* in archaic, classical, and post-classical Greek, to be contrasted with the practice of leaving spaces for word-boundaries, as in the traditions of writing Hebrew. Gavrilov (1997) investigates the cultural and cognitive variables of 'silent reading' and reading out loud, concluding that a mutually exclusive dichotomy is untenable.

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CHAPTER 35

BOOKS AND LITERACY

WOLFGANG RÖSLER
(Translated by Francesca Spiegel)

THE Greeks adapted the Phoenician alphabet not long after 800 BCE. The earliest example of the Greek alphabetic script is an inscription from Gabii near Rome published in 1992. It consists of five letters and has been dated to approximately 770 BCE (Peruzzi 1992). About one hundred years later writing had developed to the point that it could be used as a means of recording longer poetic texts. When considering that development, we get the impression that the different poetic genres were not written down in successive stages—first epic, then lyric—as was previously assumed (Fränkel 1969: pp. vi, 5, 151, 167; Snell 1975: 56–81), but that all Greek poetry entered the light of written transmission in a single process and in one broad sweep. From the early to mid-seventh century BCE onward, writing exerted its attraction on all poetic genres that had formerly coexisted as purely oral forms: epic poetry (for the dating of the *Iliad* see West 1995), *melos* (Alcman), iambic and elegiac poetry (Archilochus, Callinus, Tyrtaeus). From the perspective of later generations, this was when Greek literature emerged.

In the next two centuries the use of writing expanded continually and acquired new functions (Pöhlmann 2003: 18–25; Yunis 2003; Nieddu 2004). The earliest extant public inscriptions date to the second half of the seventh century, the earliest example being a legal inscription from Dreros (ML 2). Generally, inscribing the law was one of the most important functions of early writing. Schoolteaching became established in the late sixth century. A new era of communication began at the same

time with the composition and circulation of the first prose texts, produced by the early Presocratics and by medical writers (Althoff 1993).

However, the existence of written texts by no means led to an abrupt end to the oral character of Greek culture (see Nagy in the previous chapter). Well into the fifth century, poetry was primarily intended for oral performance. Only in the late fifth century and in the fourth century BCE did individual reading, as opposed to collective listening, establish itself as the standard mode of reception. Aristotle summarizes this development poignantly when he claims that, even in the case of drama, a tragedy can retain its effect even when the text is read rather than performed (*Poetics* 26, 1462a11–13). Still, the legacy of oral performance remained alive throughout antiquity in the widespread practice of reading aloud: readers enacted for themselves a situation of oral communication. In parallel with this practice, however, and with the advance of literacy, the habit of silent reading developed—as was inevitable when practised readers tackled large portions of text on their own (Gavrilov 1997; Burnyeat 1997; Busch 2002; Rösler 2006). From the third century onward, reading was facilitated by the introduction of accents, breathings, and elements of punctuation, which found their way into ancient Greek texts and helped structure the *scriptio continua*: Greek texts did not usually mark word-breaks (Turner 1987: 8–12; see also Nagy in this volume).

Significantly, it is Aristotle who stressed the benefits of reading. According to the *Vita Marciana* 6, as a young man he was nicknamed 'the reader' (*anagnōstēs*) in Plato's Academy. Later he developed a system of scholarship which exploited the possibilities of writing to the full (Flashar 2004: 179–80, 269–70): he produced literary texts destined for the general public (all of them lost), lecture scripts (or *Prāgmateiai*, still extant), and a large collection of documents which served as a basis for research (among those, there was a collection of 158 constitutions, of which only the *Athenian Constitution* survives). Here began a decisive last phase in the development of a literate culture: the fact that writing enabled the accumulation of knowledge, and hence facilitated intellectual progress, was now being fully exploited.

Alexandria became the capital of Hellenistic scholarship. Here Ptolemy I established the Mouseion, a research institution with an attached library, which was subsequently expanded on a lavish scale (see Stephens in this volume, and Pfeiffer 1968: 96–102; Reynolds and Wilson 1991: 5–16; Seidensticker 1999; MacLeod 2004; Pöhlmann 2003: 26–40; Maehler 2004; also worth reading is Canfora's imaginative reconstruction: 1986). The foundation of the Alexandrian Mouseion was not unrelated to the school of Aristotle in Athens: Demetrius of Phaleron and Strato of Lampsacus, who had close connections with the school, acted as consultants to Ptolemy I (Wehrli, Wöhrle, and Zhmud 2004: 595, 604). The new institution made it its aim to collect and evaluate, in a systematic way, the Greek literary tradition (Pfeiffer 1968: 105–233). To this end, new methodological principles as well as suitable procedures and scholarly genres had to be developed: critical editions

and commentaries (see Graziosi in this volume; Pfeiffer 1968: *passim*; Trojahn 2002 on commentaries on Old Comedy), catalogues (Blum 1977), and lexicons (Alpers 1990; Degani 1995). These works were accompanied by a vast range of secondary literature discussing the history of culture, literature, and language. A new type of scholar was embodied in men like Zenodotus, Callimachus, Apollonius of Rhodes, Eratosthenes, Aristophanes of Byzantium, and Aristarchus of Samothrace. Callimachus and Apollonius were also poets, and we see that their poetry reflects, in different ways, their relationship to a literary tradition which they also studied as scholars.

A rival institution to Alexandria emerged at Pergamon (Pfeiffer 1968: 234–51). There, the defining influence of Stoic philosophy favoured allegorical interpretations of poetry (in contrast to Alexandria) and provoked an interest in the theory of language and grammar (Ax 2000; Frede and Inwood 2005). From the second century BCE, further centres of research emerged (Pfeiffer 1968: 252–74). Thus Dionysius Thrax, coming from Alexandria, settled in Rhodes: the influence on his *Grammatikē technē* for the later development of the field can hardly be overestimated (Law and Sluiter 1995). Scholarship flourished well beyond the domain of philology (for a general view see Lloyd 1973; Argoud and Guillaumin 1998; Rihll 1999; Irby-Massie and Keyser 2002; Tuplin and Rihll 2002; on particular disciplines see von Staden 1989; Schürmann 1991 and 2005; Wöhrle 1999; Hübner 2000; Geus 2002; see also the chapters by Holmes, Rocconi, Netz, and Ford in this volume). An extremely rich body of technical literature, in which stocktaking and systematization of the available knowledge was combined with scientific progress, evolved in the fields of mathematics (Euclid, Archimedes, Apollonius of Perge; see also Netz in this volume), astronomy (Aristarchus of Samos, Hipparchus, Claudius Ptolemaeus), geography (Eratosthenes, already mentioned for his work in philology, Posidonius, Claudius Ptolemaeus), mechanics (Archimedes, Hero), and last but not least biology and medicine (Herophilus, Erasistratus, Galen; see Holmes in this volume). Hero, Claudius Ptolemaeus, and Galen already belong to the imperial age. The monumental oeuvre of Galen—he described it as 153 works in over 500 books, and the most recent complete modern edition (Kühn 1821–33) amounts to twenty-two volumes—testifies to the state of Greek literate culture in the second and early third century CE.

In this development towards a literate culture, a period of not much more than half a century deserves special attention: it extends from the last third of the fifth to the first third of the fourth century BCE. I have already mentioned that in this period the dominant mode of textual reception underwent radical changes. Individual reading gained ground at the expense of collective listening, and eventually established itself as the 'normal' mode of reception. Prose authors ceased to write 'for immediate recitation before an audience' (*es to parakhrēma akouein*, Thucydides 1.22.4), and the scale of their writing was no longer determined by the parameters of an oral *logos*—for in earlier times that had been

an implicit norm governing the length of a prose text (*sungraphē*). The writings of the Presocratics suggest that oral delivery determined the length of written prose, as does the explicit claim made by Alcmaeon of Croton, a medical writer working in southern Italy at about 500 BCE, who presents his *logos* as the transcript of a lecture delivered to three individuals mentioned by name (24 B1 DK): 'Alkmaeon of Croton said this, the son of Peirithous, to Brontinus and Leon and Bathyllus...'

As the quotation from Thucydides suggests, the fundamental cultural change that took place at this time is reflected in the development of Greek historiography. Herodotus experienced the transition from oral to textual reception in his own lifetime. Having delivered oral lectures in his earlier life, he reworked his *Histories* in his old age and completed them during the first years of the Peloponnesian War, creating a text which surpassed the length of all previous works of prose. (Only Pherecydes of Athens, a near-contemporary, wrote a work of comparable length, a mythographical account in ten books, now lost (*FGrHist* 3). The earlier *Genealogies* of Hecataeus (*FGrHist* 1 F1–35), in four books, were already of considerable length. We must, however, bear in mind that the individual books of Herodotus' work are exceptionally long: the first three are approximately the same length as all seven books of Xenophon's *Hellenica*.) The *Histories* of Herodotus could not be intended for performance, because of their sheer length alone: they were meant to be read as a continuous work (Rösler 2002). For Thucydides, too, the traditional oral form of dissemination constituted a practice from which his own work self-consciously departed. He characterizes it as a lasting text for future generations, a *ktēma es aiei*, a possession for all time.

Like Herodotus, Thucydides wrote only one work, which he was not even able to complete. By contrast, one generation later Xenophon—whose first two volumes of the *Hellenica* complemented Thucydides' account—was a prolific author who wrote no fewer than fourteen works of varying length in the first half of the fourth century (foremost the *Cyropaedia* in eight books—though those books were rather shorter than those of Herodotus and Thucydides). Before Xenophon, Hellanicus of Lesbos (a contemporary of Thucydides) had already authored a relatively large number of works, now lost (*FGrHist* 4); they dealt with the history of myths, ethnography, and chronology, but they usually consisted of one or two, or at most three, books. In Xenophon's generation, Ctesias (*FGrHist* 688) wrote a *Persica* which already measured twenty-three books. A little later, Ephorus of Cyme (*FGrHist* 70), an author whose life falls squarely within the fourth century, composed, as well as three shorter works, a universal history (*Histories*) in no fewer than twenty-nine books: it covered events down to 341/40, and remained incomplete (his son then added a thirtieth book). The somewhat younger Theopompus of Chios (*FGrHist* 115) wrote a *Philippica* in fifty-eight books, as well as several other works. Ephorus and Theopompus were contemporaries of Aristotle: their works show no traces of the oral roots of Greek culture.

The development of historiography just sketched could give the impression that the spread of the written word in the decades before and after 400 happened smoothly and without any countercurrents; but a different picture emerges when we consider different sets of evidence. A look at Aristophanes makes this clear: any talk of books in comedy seems to be a trigger for laughter (Denniston 1927: 117–19). Apart from ridicule, there were also serious attempts to reinforce the power of the living word, and of live dialogues, against the influx of books, precisely in those contexts where books had been most successful in establishing themselves as modes of dissemination. Socrates immediately springs to mind: he pointedly refused to write any texts, and entrusted his philosophy entirely to the orality of dialogue. Paradoxically, this move inspired his pupils' generation to produce a vast plethora of Socratic literature.

In the 80s of the fourth century, the orator Alcidamas wrote a treatise which is transmitted under the title *On Those Who Write Written Speeches* or *On the Sophists* (text: Radermacher 1951; commentaries: Muir 2001 and Mariss 2002; see also the study by Schloemann 2001). In this work, Alcidamas argues against the written elaboration of speeches, and directs his criticism at two functions of writing in particular. In the opening section he criticizes the practice of writing speeches for the sole purpose of publication as written texts, a practice exemplified by Isocrates. Above all, however, he emphasizes in what follows the detrimental effects which arise from the habit of delivering speeches on the basis of a previously written and memorized text: the speaker forsakes the opportunity to respond flexibly to the demands of the situation; he runs the risk of embarrassment, if he forgets the prepared text and falters in his speech; and he faces the threat of losing the ability to speak freely altogether. Pragmatic though Alcidamas' argument may be in this context, he makes it clear that for him some wider, more fundamental issues are at stake (9): 'I think that also in people's life making speeches is always and in every respect useful, whereas it is rare that the ability to write is opportune.'

What for Alcidamas remains a mere statement, becomes a worked-out argument in Plato's critique of writing in the *Phaedrus*. Plato clearly knows Alcidamas' pamphlet: he almost quotes from it when he calls the written *logos* 'an image' (*eidōlon*) and the spoken *logos* 'living' (*empsukhos*), and when he considers that writing is legitimate only as a form of 'play' (*paidia*), if at all. Plato identifies two interconnected deficiencies of writing. The first is explored in the story of the Egyptian gods Theuth and Thamus, as fashioned by Plato (274b–275b). Theuth is the inventor of letters, Thamus criticizes the invention, adducing the following argument (275a): 'This will cause forgetfulness in the souls of those who have learnt it, as they will not exercise their memory—for, through their reliance on writing, they will let themselves be reminded from the outside, by extraneous signs, and not from within by themselves.' The other main deficiency of writing is found in its inability to answer back (275de). A written text, when questioned, always says the same thing; it is also unable to adapt to the individual reader. The obvious conclusion is that oral

instruction is superior 'whenever someone, in meeting a receptive soul, plants and sows speeches with the help of dialectics, and with knowledge' (276e).

Alcidamas is well aware that he invites an obvious objection: his argument for the superiority of the spoken word is presented in written form. At the end of the speech, he offers some long explanations aimed at rebutting that objection (29–32), but the overall impression they leave is one of ambivalence. In fact Alcidamas, the champion of orality, is so firmly rooted in a culture of writing, both here and elsewhere in his work, that—when we look at the wider context—the objection mentioned above appears even more justified, rather than losing its force: Alcidamas' most extensive work is probably a text entitled *Mouseion*, which among other things related the story of the contest between Homer and Hesiod. Plato was an even more prolific writer. It is, however, not by chance that he only wrote dialogues (to which belongs also the *Apology*, as a special case), and not a single text which presented philosophical ideas under his own name: this formal choice seems to have been informed by his position on writing. There is some ancient evidence suggesting that he expounded the core of his philosophical ideas only in an orally delivered speech (*akroasis*) 'On Goodness': the evaluation of the evidence, and of its consequences for the interpretation of the dialogues, is highly controversial (Szlezák 1993).

For Plato's pupil Aristotle, such issues were a thing of the past. Nothing would have been more unlike Aristotle than a critique of writing. It appears that there was a general, relentless development towards writing, a development against which individual dissent, as expressed by Alcidamas and Plato, proved quite ineffectual. That general development can be traced even more closely in one case at Athens, which shows that reservations about books (to which Aristophanes testifies) and support for the spread of literacy were not mutually exclusive among the population. The decisive event was the adoption of the Ionic alphabet in 403/2, that is, still within Socrates' lifetime (see Pöhlmann 1971 and 1986). The date is startling. The Athenians lost the Peloponnesian War in 404, and after that experienced the regime of terror imposed by the Thirty. Only in the summer of 403 did the situation improve, as the democracy was reinstated (Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* 34–41). One of the first measures the Athenians took, while still under the archonship of Euclides (403/2), was to reform the alphabet. It was a certain Archinus, a moderate aristocrat who supported the democracy and had been instrumental in pacifying the city after the rule of the Thirty, who led the reform. Aristotle explicitly praises his political acumen (*Athenian Constitution* 40.2; cf. 34.3). What was it, one wonders, that gave this man the idea of reforming the alphabet in such circumstances? Here we cannot but speculate: there may have been a connection with the constitutional reform on which Athens had embarked at the time. The reform resulted in the constitution which Aristotle presents as the current one, in the systematic section of the *Athenian Constitution* (42–69). As a result of the alphabet reform, the new constitution could be written in the new orthography.

Just what features of the old orthography seemed unsatisfactory? The Attic alphabet had the following characteristics: the letter *H* stood for an aspiration; the letter *E* was used for the short, the long open, and long closed e-sound; the letter *O* was used for all o-sounds; the double consonant ps was represented by two letters: *ΦΣ*; the double consonant ks was represented as *XΣ*. From a Panhellenic perspective, that alphabet had become rather obsolete by the year 403. Texts written in the Ionic alphabet, particularly poetic texts, had long been circulating in Athens, too. In the Ionian texts, the letter *H* was used for the long open e-sound, since aspiration was no longer pronounced in Ionian Asia Minor, just as it was not in the neighbouring Aeolic region (the phenomenon is known as *psilosis*). Moreover, the letter *Ω* had been created to express the long open o-sound. Finally, the double consonants ks and ps were represented by the letters *Ξ* and *Ψ*. This was the Ionic alphabet adopted by the Athenians as a result of Archinus' reform. Eventually, it became the alphabet of the Greek lingua franca, the *koinē*, which was largely based on Attic. The success of the innovation is therefore evident in retrospect, and the reform of orthography seems to have been a crucial step in the formation of Greek literate culture.

In what way, however, did the Athenians play a part in this crucial event? They had to be won over for the reform, which had to be approved by popular vote. This was obtained after Archinus had convincingly defended his initiative. He recorded some reasons for the reform in a written memorandum, of which some phonological and physiological considerations survive in a commentary to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, written in the fifth century CE by the Neoplatonist Syrianus (*Commentary on the Metaphysics* 191.29–35 Kroll). His comments refer to a passage in Aristotle (*Metaphysics N*.6, 1093a20–6) which states that there are only three places of articulation where the sound S can be added to a consonant. Aristotle is more or less quoting from Archinus' memorandum, as becomes evident from the following remarks of the commentator:

> The same argument was used by Archinus, as Theophrastus reports. For Archinus said that a sound is either produced towards the outside against closed lips, like the *Π*, and accordingly *Ψ* is produced at the tip of the tongue, as if it consisted of *ΠΣ*; or the tongue is placed in a broad position against the teeth, as is the case with the sound *Δ*, and accordingly the Z is produced in this area of the mouth; or a sound is produced by vaulting and pushing in the rear area, like the *K*, whence the *Ξ* emerges.

The obvious aim of those explanations is to prove that the Ionic alphabet rightly renders not only the combination *ΔΣ* with the letter *Z*, but also *KΣ* and *ΠΣ* with a single letter respectively (*Ξ* and *Ψ*).

The decree is said to have contained a clause which obliged teachers to teach the new orthography from then onwards (*Scholia on Dionysius Thrax* 183.16–20 Hilgard). This decision facilitated the standardization of Greek literary language and benefited the further development of a book culture. What happened next is

captured in a much-quoted sentence by Eric G. Turner (1954: 23): 'By the first thirty years of the fourth century books have established themselves, and their tyranny lies ahead.'

Suggested Reading

I offer here some brief reading suggestions in English; further references are provided in the main body of the chapter. The rise of literate culture in ancient Greece is discussed, from several different angles, in Yunis (2003), who also provides further bibliography. A rich selection of ancient Greek manuscripts is illustrated and discussed by Turner (1987). Pfeiffer (1968) is still essential reading on ancient scholarship. Morgan (1998) discusses literate education in the Hellenistic age. On the library in Alexandria see Reynolds and Wilson (1991: 5–16), MacLeod (2004), and Maehler (2004); also worth reading is Canfora (1986), who blends literary fiction and scholarly reconstruction. On the spread of literacy and the rise of literate culture in classical Athens see Turner (1954). Rösler (2002) analyses the impact of writing on Herodotus. Morgan (1999) discusses literate education in classical Athens. Further suggestions are also provided by Nagy and Ford in this volume.

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CHAPTER 36

EPIC POETRY

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THE term 'epic', when applied to ancient Greek literature, refers to a set of texts that may be loosely defined as narrative poetry about the deeds of gods and heroes. The genre was popular throughout antiquity, from Homer's *Iliad* to Nonnos' *Dionysiaca* in the fifth century CE. During its thousand-year history, epic underwent important changes but always retained its privileged position in the canon of Greek literature and learning. To a very large extent, this is a reflection of Homer's authority as the most famous epic poet. His *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were felt to be central to classical Greek culture throughout antiquity: they were performed at major public festivals and were central to school education. They gave rise to large commentaries and decisively influenced most other literary and intellectual pursuits, from drama to oratory, historiography, and philosophy. Homer was sometimes criticized and even reviled, but his authority on a range of issues—from battle tactics to religion—was deeply rooted.

The importance of epic to ancient Greek audiences was evident to outsiders: when Xerxes prepared to invade mainland Greece, he drew on the poetry of Musaios, one of the canonical epic poets, to legitimize his attack (Haubold 2007*a*). Nor was epic of interest to Greek audiences alone: once Roman audiences had developed a taste for Greek literature they kept coming back to epic, from Livius Andronicus' translation of the *Odyssey*, to Ennius' adoption of the hexameter, to Virgil's sustained imitation of Homer. Indeed, the line of Homer's heirs can be extended beyond classical antiquity, via Dante and Milton to Joyce and Walcott (Graziosi and Greenwood 2007). To this day, Homeric epic exerts a powerful influence on what we might call 'western literature'. Thus, Harold Bloom could declare

in *A Map of Misreading*: 'Everyone who now reads and writes in the West . . . is still a son or daughter of Homer' (Bloom 1975: 33).

Yet, an imaginary genealogy of *western* literature, with 'father Homer' at its head, is not the only possible way of approaching Greek epic. In fact, the twentieth century saw two major developments in the study of the genre that challenge us to look beyond the view summarized in the quotation by Bloom. First, Milman Parry and his student Albert Lord laid the foundations for the study of Greek epic as one tradition of oral poetry among other comparable traditions the world over. Secondly, the recovery of hitherto unknown texts from the Bronze and early Iron Age—chiefly the Mycenean tablets, the Hittite archives of Bogazköy/Bogazkale in modern Turkey, the literature of Ugarit in modern Syria, and a vast range of Akkadian and Sumeric texts from the third to first millennium BCE—allowed scholars to form a better understanding of the roots and literary context of early Greek epic. This chapter sketches significant developments in both areas of study, as well as suggesting some avenues for future research.

36.1. Greek Epic and the Oral-Traditional Hypothesis

In the early twentieth century the study of Greek epic was put on a new footing by the work of Milman Parry (1902–35). Parry contributed two fundamental insights which continue to shape recent research into Greek epic: first, the idea that Greek epic developed out of a long tradition; and secondly, the idea that it had its roots in oral poetry (Parry 1971). In order to appreciate the significance of Parry's work, it is helpful to go back to another great Homerist, Friedrich August Wolf (1759–1824). Until the eighteenth century most readers thought of Homer as a poet who was exceptionally talented but did not work in a radically different way from other poets. By the late eighteenth century this consensus was crumbling, and it was Wolf who decisively undermined it in his 1795 *Prolegomena ad Homerum*. Wolf argued that Homer did not know writing, that his songs were transmitted and embellished by rhapsodes, and that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* as we have them are the products of later editorial activity (Wolf 1985; cf. Turner 1997). This theory promised help with some long-standing difficulties—the famous Homeric 'problems'—that had arisen as a result of Homer's status as a classic: bluntly put, readers since antiquity considered Homeric poetry to be so outstanding that any apparent divergences from their own aesthetic norms were perceived as problematic. Thus Horace famously quipped, 'I am annoyed when good Homer nods off'; but went on to say that a long work could not always be consistently excellent (Horace, *Ars Poetica* 359–60). Wolf

suggested that the real issue was not one of artistic standards but of compositional techniques and modes of transmission: Homer himself was an oral bard, whose poetry was initially passed on through rhapsodic performance before being fixed in writing. The issue of oral composition thus became central to the study of Greek epic.

The analyst school that succeeded Wolf never developed a coherent poetics of oral composition; it was only a hundred years later that Milman Parry tackled the issue (Foley 1997). Parry started with a close analysis of Homeric diction, paying careful attention to repeated elements ('formulae'). On the basis of his linguistic analysis of the texts, he argued that Homeric poetry was essentially a traditional art form: Homer pieced together inherited building-blocks to tell a familiar story in a well-established way. In a second step, Parry suggested that the traditional elements in early Greek epic were conditioned by oral performance. Comparing Homeric poetry to the living tradition of South Slavic song, Parry argued that improvising bards rely on prefabricated phrases that help them tell their story under the pressures of performance; and that Homer was precisely such a bard. Parry's pupil Albert Lord further developed his teacher's ideas, extending the principle of traditionality to larger scenes and entire narrative themes; and emphasizing the role of performance in the development of oral traditions (Lord 1960; cf. Mitchell and Nagy, in Lord 2000). Lord also widened the remit of comparative studies to include a broad range of narrative traditions from around the world. Greek epic had become one among many traditions of oral poetry the world over.

The work of Parry and Lord had a number of important ramifications. The most immediate question for scholars of Greek epic was how traditional poems such as the *Iliad* or *Odyssey* generated meaning, and what kind of meaning. Parry had argued that traditional features of epic, such as formulae, did not encode any meaning in the conventional sense—he maintained, for example, that traditional epithets should not even be translated (Parry 1971: 171–2, 249–50; cf. Porter 2004: 338–41). Parry's view was based on the assumption that the meaning of a literary text had to be generated by an author who made autonomous decisions on what he wished to say. More recently, scholars like Gregory Nagy and John Foley have shown that it can make sense to speak of traditional meaning: formulaic expressions and larger narrative patterns encapsulate the essence of what can be said—and needs saying—about the epic world (Nagy 1999; Foley 1991, 1999). To show that this is not a hindrance to the text's expressiveness has been one of John Foley's major contributions to the study of epic: Foley introduced the concept of 'immanent' meaning, whereby a standard expression, phrase, or scene evokes a host of related patterns, generating a number of often complex associations and resonances. Traditional diction, according to Foley, is not a literary style so much as a specialized register. In other words, it functions like an exceptionally rich and expressive language (Foley 1999: 6). Thus, the standard phrase 'swift-footed Achilles' evokes the wider tradition

of storytelling about Achilles even in contexts where the hero does not move from his tent. As a result, the immediate narrative context is anchored in the wider realm of traditional song: the essence of Achilles, and the overall significance of his actions, is never lost, no matter how untraditional his behaviour might seem within a particular story.

The example of Achilles in the *Iliad* illustrates well how traditional epic achieves intensity of expression and may even play on the expectations of its audience: we would certainly expect 'swift-footed Achilles' to run, so when he refuses to leave his tent in the *Iliad*, his behaviour seems particularly problematic. Another question raised by Parry's work on Homer concerns precisely the role of the audience. Comparative studies have shown that oral performers often interact with their audience in complex and subtle ways (Finnegan 1977; Foley 2002; Skafte Jensen 2005). It has proved difficult to reconstruct specific performance contexts for early Greek epic, but Ruth Scodel, in her recent book *Listening to Homer* (2002), has shown some of the ways in which an interplay between performer and audience can be detected in the extant texts of early Greek epic, and has discussed the 'rhetoric of traditionality' (Scodel's term) which they adopt. Traditional features of epic thus no longer appear as a mere corollary of an oral art, but as part of a specific narrative contract between audience and narrator. Crucial to this contract is the enjoyment (*terpsis*) that the audience gains from a narrative that it experiences as vivid, beautiful, reliable, and resonant (Ford 1992).

Modern readers do not tend to expect these different qualities from one and the same text, but scholars have drawn attention to the fact that claims to truthfulness and beauty tend to go hand-in-hand in traditional narrative genres (Skafte Jensen 2005). This phenomenon can be observed in poetic traditions from around the globe, but is perhaps particularly marked in the case of early Greek epic: the Muses, as representatives of the genre, guarantee a vision of the world that is simultanously clearer and more beautiful than anything a mere mortal could hope to achieve. There is little room in the world of epic for the ugly or the insignificant. However, this is not merely or even primarily a matter of what we might call 'literary embellishment'. On the contrary, Greek epic self-consciously adheres to a 'poetics of truth' (Finkelberg 1998): both explicitly, in the well-known invocations to the Muses; and implicitly in the traditional language and themes it employs. Resonant language and themes suggest a 'correct' way of expressing things (Graziosi and Haubold 2005). As with all language, there is much room for manoeuvre, but the overall emphasis is on stability: a bard or rhapsode who pursues his own thoughts at the expense of tradition—as a lyric poet might do—risks alienating his audience because he cannot be relied upon to provide a vision of the world that is relevant to all listeners and hence 'true' (*alēthēs*, *e(tē)tumos*). In this context, scholars have often pointed out the Panhellenic appeal of Greek epic, and its relative reluctance to play to specific audiences or performance contexts (Nagy 1999; Graziosi and Haubold, forthcoming).

Parry and most of his successors focused narrowly on Homeric poetry, but the question soon arose of whether and how their work might affect the study of other Greek epic. Parry himself treated later Greek epic as radically different: Apollonius, in particular, was his favourite example of a non-traditional poet, someone who affected a traditional-looking idiom but did not in fact show the characteristic 'thrift' we would expect from a traditional poet (Parry 1971: 169, 429; cf. Haubold 2007*b*: 32). Parry's assessment of Apollonius has not remained unchallenged. Most scholars would now agree that the issue is not simply one of changing poetic techniques, but that we must also consider subtle shifts in performance practice and audience expectation. By the Hellenistic age Homer was very much read against the aesthetic standards developed by Aristotle and others (Fantuzzi and Hunter 2005). Where the text appeared to depart from these standards, Hellenistic readers often intervened, dismissing some of the repetitions characteristic of traditional song, and championing texts that were less obviously formulaic (Fantuzzi 2001). These changes went hand-in-hand with a major shift in the transmission and reception of epic: by the Hellenistic period new epics were written down and read. Homeric epic too, and that of other archaic poets, was largely encountered in the form of written texts.

These texts were drawn from an increasingly narrow canon of normative poems. In the course of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, the fluid story-cycles of archaic performance culture had been whittled down to only a handful of Homeric and Hesiodic epics that were accepted as 'genuine' and elevated above all other epics (Burgess 2001; Graziosi 2004). Early on in this process, considerations of content appear to have furnished an important criterion for inclusion in the canon. Thus, Herodotus claims that the *Cypria*, a poem about the early stages of the Trojan War, is not by Homer because it gives a different version of Paris' journey home from Sparta from the one we find in the *Iliad* (*Histories* 2.117). In the classical period aesthetic norms became more important, and with Aristotle's *Poetics* we encounter the first extant example of an explicit and elaborate genre theory. It is above all Aristotle's work that informs Hellenistic debates about epic, and about poetry more generally. The generic experiments of Callimachus and Theocritus belong in this context, as does Apollonius' successful attempt to revive large-scale mythological epic (see Sens' contribution to this volume).

Scholarship has come a long way since Parry drove a wedge between Homer and most other Greek poetry. Some critics have investigated the relationship between epic and other oral-derived genres of literature (Martin 1989; Nagy 1990), while others have studied the reception of Homer (Nagy 1990; Lamberton and Keaney 1992; Ford 1997; Graziosi 2002) and Hesiod (Boys-Stones and Haubold, forthcoming). There has also been much work on the diachronic development of traditional epic diction (Hoekstra 1969; Janko 1982), though the details are debated, and some of the more important 'transitional' texts, such as the *Homeric Hymn to Pan*, remain poorly understood (Germany 2005). Greek epic of the Roman era has suffered even

greater neglect: the monumental *Dionysiaca* by Nonnos has only recently become the subject of a full-length English-language monograph (Shorrock 2001). Quintus of Smyrna's *Posthomerica* is now beginning to attract significant commentary (Campbell 1981; Hopkinson 1994; James and Lee 2000). The stigma of 'lateness', however, still affects current work on these texts, and attempts to apply approaches developed for the study of archaic epic to later works have proved controversial. Thus, the notorious *Homerocentones* by the empress Eudocia (*c*.401–60 CE)—a patchwork of Homeric lines and phrases that retells the life of Christ—has recently been re-edited (Usher 1999) and analysed: Usher (1998) portrays the *Homerocentones* as the result of a sophisticated appropriation of traditional rhapsodic themes and narrative techniques. Not surprisingly, perhaps, this attempt at a Parryist reading of 'late' epic has met with some scepticism. Less controversial have been attempts at pinpointing residual orality in the practice of epic citation in oratory from the fourth century BCE to the Second Sophistic (Ford 1999; Bouffartigue 1997).

Another aspect of Parry's legacy that is only gradually beginning to attract scholarly attention concerns the impact of the oral-traditional hypothesis on the reception of Homer, and on current views of epic as a genre. Parry's idea of comparing Greek epic to non-Greek narratives had the immediate effect of wresting epic from the ivory tower of 'western literature', and of creating new interfaces with epic traditions all over the world (Graziosi and Greenwood 2007). Many of these traditions are now being studied in detail, but the methodological and political implications of such studies have not always been addressed with sufficient rigour. Thus, the question of whether there exists epic poetry in Sub-Saharan Africa has generated much controversy, but has only recently begun to be discussed in a theoretically sophisticated way (Mulokozi 2002; Graziosi 2007). It took critics even longer to pay attention to the relationship between the comparative work of Parry and Lord and post-colonial literature. Contemporary authors such as Derek Walcott have used the image of Homer as a powerful symbol of some of the tensions that pervade post-colonial literature: as a traditional bard, Homer embodies the timeless, worldwide realm of traditional storytelling; yet as 'the poet' par excellence, the same figure paradoxically stands at the apex of a literary history that is broadly experienced as 'western' (Haubold 2007*b*).

36.2. Greek Epic and the Limits of Hellenism

The second major development in the study of Greek epic in the twentieth century takes its cue from the discovery of a new set of sources, some of them Greek but

most coming from neighbouring civilizations in the ancient Mediterranean. The decipherment of Mycenean Greek in 1952 meant that the Homeric epics were no longer the earliest surviving texts written in Greek (Chadwick 1967). Although the Mycenean tablets yielded no literary texts, they enabled students of Greek epic to trace some features of the epic language back to the Bronze Age; and to argue with some degree of probability that Greek epic itself goes back to the Mycenean period (Bennet 1997; Horrocks 1997). Scholars have compared the society, religion, economy, and political geography reflected in the tablets to the world described in the Homeric poems, thus reigniting long-standing debates over the precise nature and historical context of Homeric society (Bennet 1997; Finkelberg 2005). There is much work still to be done in this area as new tablets continue to be found and published, and as scholars develop new ways of relating them to Homeric poetry.

Even more important than the Mycenean tablets was the decipherment of texts found in the archives of the Hittite capital Hattusa (modern Bogazköy/Bogazkale). Some narrative texts, such as the so-called Kumarbi Cycle, show close parallels with Greek epic, especially Hesiod's *Theogony* (Walcot 1966). Moreover, the so-called Tawagalawa letter, the Alakshandu Treaty, and other historical documents suggest that Homer's Achaeans were known to the Hittites as 'Ahhiawa', and that Homeric (W)ilios (i.e. Troy) corresponds to the Hittite vassal state 'Wilusa' (Latacz 2004). Quite how certain these connections are remains subject to debate (Heinhold-Krahmer 2003). The late Manfred Korfmann's excavations at Hisarlik (the presumed site of Homer's Troy) have done much to stimulate interest in the matter, though on the subject of Hisarlik too scholars remain sharply divided (Haubold 2002*b*; Ulf 2003). Much remains to be done in this complicated and fast-moving area of scholarship, and any attempt to make progress will need to be conducted with caution: the question of what the Hittite material can tell us about Homeric and Hesiodic epic is, of course, legitimate and important. However, as currently pursued, it sometimes runs the risk of perpetuating unhelpful intellectual habits, such as the blanket opposition between 'historical truth' and 'literary fiction'. A more promising approach to Greek epic in its ancient Near Eastern setting takes its starting-point not from historical 'reality' but from shared images, themes, and generic conventions. Hittite material has an important role to play in this context, but the main focus—when tackling those questions—must be the narrative poetry of ancient Mesopotamia.

As soon as Akkadian was deciphered, in the mid-nineteenth century, and Akkadian narrative poetry was discovered, it became clear that Greek epic was not quite as unique as was previously assumed. Akkadian poetry of the second and first millennia BCE features many of the narrative techniques, images, and motifs that we associate with early Greek epic (Burkert 1992; West 1997; Morris 1997). There are also more thoroughgoing thematic parallels. Thus, the Babylonian 'epic of creation' (*Enuma Elish*) is structurally and thematically very similar to Hesiod's

Theogony, while many of the Homeric Hymns have counterparts in Akkadian literature (Penglase 1994). The so-called *Poem of Gilgamesh* shows a number of particularly compelling parallels with the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*: Gilgamesh shares with Odysseus the need to travel and a tendency to attract the sexual interest of goddesses (cf. *Odyssey* 5.55–227, SB *Gilgamesh* VI.1–79). There are even closer parallels with the *Iliad*: Gilgamesh and Achilles both have divine mothers to whom they are particularly close. They find it hard to accept the limitations of an ordinary human existence, until they lose their closest friend (Patroclus/Enkidu) and, as a result, are confronted with their own mortality. As with the Hittite materials from the Bronze Age, the question of what we are to make of these parallels continues to generate much controversy (Haubold 2002*a*). So far, scholars have mostly tried to uncover patterns of influence running from East to West, and have discussed possible channels of communication during and before the so-called 'Orientalizing Revolution' of the early archaic period (Burkert 1992 and 2004; West 1997). There is no doubt that narrative motifs, and perhaps entire genres did travel in the archaic period, though it is possible that in at least some cases the direction of influence ran from West to East rather than vice versa. More generally, the simple model whereby text A influenced text B in a well-defined context and at a well-defined point in time may not always work—it seems particularly problematic when the texts under scrutiny belong to a wider, and now partly lost, tradition. There have been first attempts at reconciling Parry's oral-traditional theory with what we might call the 'Near Eastern hypothesis', but much work remains to be done in this area, as also on the closely related issue of audience perceptions. Here we may be about to witness the same shift from the 'hard facts' of composition to audience perception that has recently taken place in other fields: despite the fact that audiences of Greek epic do not appear to have taken an interest in neighbouring narrative traditions (Most 2003), recent work emphasizes that they did expect epic to make sense of the world beyond the boundaries of Greek culture narrowly conceived; what the Greeks thought about the gods or the origins of the universe, for example, had to be compatible with other, neighbouring traditions (Haubold 2006).

As with Parry's research on traditional epic, recent work on Near Eastern parallels has largely focused on the archaic period as the formative phase of Greek epic. What happened later is one of the most important questions being discussed in current scholarship on Greek epic, and coming decades will no doubt throw more light on the matter. Scholars of Hellenistic epic have argued that non-Greek cultures continued to play a part in the development of the genre (Stephens 2003). A similar case has been made for the classical period, which saw the rise of Greek epic on patriotic themes such as Choerilus' *Persica*, and patriotic readings of the archaic canon of Greek epic (Haubold 2007*a*). At a more abstract level, the traditionality-in-writing of *Gilgamesh* and other Akkadian epic has been compared with the seemingly 'purer' orality of Homer (Vogelzang and Vanstiphout 1992), though the process of textualization and canonization which Greek epic underwent between

the seventh and the second centuries BCE is only beginning to be considered in the wider context of non-Greek developments and practices (Tigay 1982; Eyre and Baines 1989; Schniedewind 2004). More comparative work also needs to be done on ancient reading practices (Livingstone 1986; Maul 1999; Sanders 2006), and on the institutional structures that underpin them, such as schools and libraries (Gesche 2000; Pedersen 1998; Casson 2001). The relationship between Greek and Roman epic is better understood: Roman poets never made a secret of their debt to Greek epic (Farrell 2004; Hunter 2006), though influence in the opposite direction has been more difficult to prove. (The question of Quintus of Smyrna's debt to Latin poetry in particular has been discussed in numerous publications; cf. James 2005: 368.) By contrast, our understanding of Christian Greek epic and its relationship to the pagan tradition is, as yet, unsatisfactory. I have already mentioned some of the problems surrounding Eudocia's *Homerocentones*. Problems of a different kind are posed by the hexameter *Paraphrase of the Gospel of St John* that survives under the name of Nonnos. Should we believe that the same man who composed the *Dionysiaca*, in many ways the pagan Greek epic par excellence, also composed the *Paraphrase*? If so, do we need to postulate a Damascus experience in order to keep the two texts strictly apart, or could a Christian Nonnos have composed the *Dionysiaca* (Shorrock 2005: 384)? These questions are perhaps unanswerable, but they may serve as a useful reminder of the fascinating and largely unexplored field of enquiry with which Christian Greek hexameter poetry presents us.

Suggested Reading

Foley (2005) gives an up-to-date overview of ancient Greek as well as non-Greek epic. For the work of Milman Parry and Albert Lord see Parry (1971) and Lord (2000), with the introduction by S. Mitchell and G. Nagy. More recent developments in the study of Greek epic as an oral-traditional genre are discussed in Morris and Powell (1997), Foley (1999), and Nagy (1999). Ford (1992) studies the ways in which the Homeric narrator describes his art. Janko (1982) attempts to establish a relative chronology of early Greek epic. Scodel (2002) explores Homer's 'rhetoric of traditionality', emphasizing the role of ancient audiences. For early Greek epic and other literary genres see Martin (1989). Graziosi (2002) and Lamberton and Keaney (1992) discuss the ancient reception of Homer. For Hesiod see Lamberton (1988) and Clay (2003). For Hellenistic epic see Fantuzzi and Hunter (2004), and Sens in this volume. Barchiesi (1984), Farrell (2004), and Hunter (2006) discuss the reception of Greek epic in Rome. Discussions of later Greek epic can be found in Hopkinson (1994) and Paschalis (2005). For Nonnos see Shorrock (2001). Bennet (1997) and Finkelberg (2005) explore the Bronze Age roots of Greek epic. Latacz (2004) discusses the recent excavations at Troy and makes a case for connections between Homeric epic and extant Hittite sources. For Greek epic and other Near Eastern literatures see Burkert (1992), West (1997), Haubold (2002*a*). Stephens (2003) discusses Hellenistic epic in relation to Egyptian literature and culture.

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CHAPTER 37

LYRIC POETRY

ANDREA CAPRA

In the last decades the study of lyric poetry has undergone major changes—changes that have profoundly affected our understanding of what Greek lyric poetry might have been. The label itself, 'lyric poetry', though based on two Greek words, is a posthumous category, which usually covers archaic and classical iambus, elegy, and *melos*—as well as, less frequently, later poetry, such as (post-)Hellenistic epigram, which I shall not discuss here. Those forms of poetry were clearly perceived as distinct genres, resembling one another no more than elegy resembled epic, or iambus resembled comedy. Even *melos*, a form of poetry that was usually performed to the accompaniment of a lyre, has little in common with modern lyric poetry. For all we know, it was first called 'lyric' only by Hellenistic scholars: Plato and Aristotle are strangely silent on the matter, as Genette (1979) remarks. The first literary occurrence of the term 'lyric' is as late as Horace: at *Ode* 1.1.35–6 he uses it of his own poetry as well as of his Greek models, though he is unlikely to have sung his poems to the lyre. To be sure, scholars have long been aware that there was no such thing as 'lyric poetry' in archaic Greece (e.g. Färber 1936 and Calame 1974), yet this did not prevent Romantic lyric poetry from influencing our perception of Greek verse: the scholarly consensus today can, in fact, be seen largely as a reaction against Romantic notions of the genre.

37.1. The Old Orthodoxy: Some Problems

The most influential discussion of lyric poetry in the twentieth century was arguably that of Bruno Snell, who famously defined lyric poetry as the 'first

revelation of individuality', after the supposedly objective and anonymous era of Homeric poetry. Such a teleological approach makes lyric poetry an important step in a self-congratulatory narrative which eventually leads to the European 'discovery of the mind'—as Snell put it in his seminal study of 1946 (*Die Entdeckung des Geistes*). The main assumptions underlying the Snellian model, which dominated at least until the early 1960s, can be roughly summarized along the following lines: (a) *Emotion*: lyric poetry is a direct expression of the poet's feelings; (b) *Biography*: lyric poems are rooted in the poet's life; (c) *Literature*: lyric poetry is the product of creative writing; (d) *Evolution*: lyric poetry occupies an 'era', bridging the gap between archaic epic and classical drama and philosophy.

One reason for interpreting Greek lyric poetry in terms of 'Emotion' and 'Biography' is the frequent occurrence, in the surviving fragments, of first-person statements. At least in the case of Pindar, such statements seemed puzzling already to Hellenistic scholars, and Pindar's 'I' is still a much-debated issue (e.g. Lefkowitz 1991 and D'Alessio 1994). In the modern period first-person narratives have usually been interpreted as direct expressions of personal feelings and biographical concerns on the part of the poet. In some cases, however, we cannot possibly equate the poem's 'I' with the poet him/herself. In a famous poem by Archilochus, for example, the 'I' expresses contempt for the legendary riches and power of Gyges (fr. 19 West; cf. Herodotus 1.12.2, who mentions the poem). Thanks to a passage in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (1418b), we happen to know that the first-person in the poem was not Archilochus himself, but 'Charon', an otherwise unknown carpenter (see e.g. Vox 1988). Were it not for Aristotle's testimony, the fragment would no doubt have been interpreted as yet another instance of Archilochus' own unconventional views. First-person narratives in choral poetry are particularly baffling, since the 'I' often seems to shift even within the same poem or set of poems. In Alcman's *Partheneia*, for example, the 'I' represents the viewpoint of the performing maidens (e.g. fr. 1 West, *passim*), but on occasion can also refer to poetic composition, and hence—presumably—to Alcman himself (e.g. fr. 2.76–8 West). Even more extreme are Pindar's *Odes*: for example, in the much-debated *Nemean* 7 the 'I' apparently shifts from the poet (61–3) to the father of the victor (64–8) to the Aeginetan people (84–6; see e.g. Most 1985: 199–200). It is not surprising, then, that the identity of the lyric 'I' has come to attract much scholarly attention (cf. Rösler 1985 and Slings 1990).

Biography poses a related set of problems. Increasingly, scholars have come to realize that the vast majority of our information about the lives of the archaic poets ultimately derives from the poems themselves, and in particular from their first-person statements. However, as we have seen, those are highly problematic, and even when the 'I' ostensibly represents the poet, s/he may turn out to be a fictional construct, for instance, the authoritative persona expected by the audience (Rösler 2005). Similarly, the personal names featuring in some poems may not be 'living contemporaries ... but stock characters in a traditional entertainment with some (perhaps forgotten) ritual basis' (West 1974: 27, about Lycambes and his daughters,

the target of Archilochus' attacks). Consequently, the ancient biographies of the poets are increasingly seen as Hellenistic inferences based on the poems themselves, rather than as independent evidence on the actual lives of the poets (Lefkowitz 1980 and, for a more nuanced view, Arrighetti 1987: 139 ff.). Generic considerations are also important, and have recently started to shape approaches to ancient biography and literary convention. Hipponax and Pindar—two very different poets—can be used to illustrate this new strand of criticism. Hipponax was traditionally depicted as a *poète maudit*—his violent and obscene utterances of anger, despair, and lust being taken as the expression of his alleged riches-to-rags experience. However, Hipponax is an iambic poet, and the sordid atmosphere of his poems may simply reflect the (ritual?) conventions of the genre—that is to say, the expectations of his audiences (see e.g. Miralles and Pòrtulas 1988, and cf. Irwin 1998 for similar problems in the interpretation of Archilochus). Alternatively, the peculiar virulence of his poetry may be the sign of a cultivated poet, rather than the result of unpleasant personal experiences (e.g. Degani 1984). Similarly, the lofty persona often paraded by Pindar, along with his grand maxims, may reflect the conventions of the epinician genre rather than his personality. If that is so, Pindar's poems provide information not so much about the poet or his historical circumstances, but rather reflect the relationship between the performer and his audience (see Bundy 1962, discussed below, and Lefkowitz 1991).

This approach leads directly to the question of oral performance as opposed to written literature (on which see also Nagy and Rösler in this volume). Audience expectations cannot be conceived outside a *context* for poetic performance. Lyric poetry was long treated as a written genre, but its oral nature is beyond doubt—at least to the extent that *melos* was composed, along with music, for public performance (see Rocconi in this volume). The last decades have seen a veritable explosion of studies devoted to ancient performance culture, with particular emphasis on the symposium (cf. Hobden in this volume). Most lyric poetry was composed for performance at this quintessentially Greek institution, and virtually all of it, including choral poetry such as Pindar's *Epinicia*, could be adapted for sympotic performance (see e.g. *Olympian* 1.15 ff., with von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1922: 233). The sympotic nature of lyric poetry has a number of important consequences, most of which are summarized by the key terms 'performance' and 'pragmatic' (see Gentili 1983, and D'Alessio 2004, who discusses recent developments). It is interesting, in this context, to compare Horace's bookish *Odes* to his 'oral' Greek models. The imitation may be very close, as in the case of *Ode* 1.9 and Alcaeus 338 Voigt, but clearly Horace addresses an unknown reader and reconstructs a sympotic setting by literary means, so that his poems may be called 'metasympotic' (Mindt 2007). By contrast, Alcaeus' songs address a live sympotic audience and no less clearly presuppose the actual presence of drinking companions, for whom the poet's words have a direct, pragmatic bearing (Rösler 1980: 240 ff.). Considerations of this kind have led Miller (1994) to argue that a 'lyric consciousness', that is to say, the

impulse towards lyric poetry as we know it, is fundamentally dependent on writing, and makes its first appearance in Rome, in the first century BCE.

One final issue that has attracted much discussion is the notion of a 'lyric age' as described in Bruno Snell's *Entdeckung des Geistes* (1946), Max Treu's *Von Homer zur Lyrik* (1955), or even Robert Burn's and Hermann Fränkel's more nuanced *The Lyric Age of Greece* (1960) and *Dichtung und Philosophie* (1962). Works such as Robert Fowler's *The Nature of Early Greek Lyric* (1987) and Simon Slings' *Symposium* (2000) take a consciously different stance, renegotiating the boundaries between lyric and epic poetry. For example: the long narratives of a 'lyric' poet like Stesichorus recall Phemius' and Demodocus' performances to the accompaniment of a lyre as described in the *Odyssey*. Stesichorus' poetry may thus be seen as an alternative to the rhapsodic tradition, rather than as a later development (Rossi 1983, and cf. Cingano 1990 and D'Alfonso 1994 for the problematic classification of Stesichorus' poetry). Similarly, some ancient sources describe Archilochus not as a lyric poet, but as a rhapsode—that is to say, a reciter without musical accompaniment, just like Hesiod and Homer (cf. Heraclitus 22 B42 DK and Plato, *Ion* 531a ff., with Notopoulos 1966). Moreover, the existence of lyric songs—including dirges and epithalamia—is clearly implied in the Homeric poems (cf. Nagy 1990, and Oakley and Sinos 1993). Today, some scholars believe that both epic and lyric poetry draw from an interlinked formulaic repertory—and of course hexameter poetry continued to be composed throughout the archaic period (Graziosi and Haubold 2008). It seems, then, that interaction between genres defies any rigid Hellenistic classifications. For example, the clear-cut separation between choral and monodic poetry is clearly a reflection of later editorial concerns. In the archaic world, such distinctions were determined not by book-cataloguing, but by ever-changing contexts of performance (e.g. Aloni 1998).

37.2. The New Orthodoxy: Some Problems

The new approaches outlined above have had an undeniably positive effect on our understanding of lyric poetry. Recent work on early Greek poetry seems at the same time more accurate, from a historical perspective, and more attuned to recent trends in literary criticism. This congruence should perhaps give us pause for thought: on close inspection, the emerging orthodoxy seems to be the product of two separate tendencies. The focus on the 'I', the critique of ancient biographies, the emphasis on generic conventions, the stress on oral composition, a synchronic view of epic and lyric poetry: all these trends challenge the notion of authorship

as traditionally conceived. Many scholars stress the importance of intertextuality, to the point that they see it as an essential aspect of poetry (Bonanno 1990). Some scholars, particularly in France, Great Britain, and the United States, discuss the vanishing lyric author in ways that explicitly recall poststructuralist criticism, as exemplified, for example, by Barthes' 'Death of the author' or Derrida's philosophy (for an explicit engagement with the latter, see Stehle 1997: p. ix). At the same time, the emphasis on the symposium and on oral performance stems from historical and philological considerations which are—without doubt—more rigorous than earlier attempts at explaining lyric. The notion of authorship in archaic Greece *was* indeed different from ours, yet it seems to me that a focus on authorship and authors should not perhaps be jettisoned altogether, but rather contextualized and harnessed in the light of recent scholarship. In what follows, I offer some examples of how and to what effect I believe this might be done. I start from the assumption that Greek lyric poems are 'neither the sudden inventions of a freshly liberated "archaic ego" nor the purely conventional projections of fixed communal gestures' (Pippin Burnett 1983: 6).

E. L. Bundy's *Studia Pindarica* (1962) represents a crucial turning-point in Pindaric criticism. Bundy treats epinician poetry from a generic perspective, and envisions a community of poets operating within a well-established tradition of verbal art. In his emphasis on epinician conventions, Bundy draws on linguistic anthropology, and on Schadewaldt's work (1928), who in turn follows in the footsteps of folklorists who recorded and described European traditions of verbal art. In Bundy's scholarship, the 'Pindaric flights' of the *Odes* became the product of generic convention rather than the creation of a lofty and unpredictable genius. In the ensuing decades, however, some followers of Bundy rapidly lost touch with the historical and anthropological background of Bundy's work (for a reaction, see e.g. Angeli Bernardini 1983). The emphasis on conventions easily combined with poststructuralist trends and, as a result, much recent work on Pindar shows no interest in the historical context of Pindaric poetry and is increasingly unable to explain why the odes of Pindar and those of Bacchylides are so different, even though the two poets were working within the same generic framework.

My second example concerns the scholarly effort to rescue Hipponax's 'reputation'. In recent years, thanks to the outstanding scholarship of Enzo Degani and his collaborators at the University of Bologna, Hipponax has been freed from many demeaning clichés previously associated with him ('burglar', 'debauchee', 'beggar', etc.: see Degani 1984 for a full discussion of the relevant bibliography). Back from rags to riches, Hipponax is now seen as the first great master of intertextual parody, and as a learned intellectual, highly regarded for his self-conscious and cultivated humour. However, it seems to me that the notion of Hipponax as a cultivated and learned poet needs qualification when we consider the oral society within which he worked—a society where people shared the same musical experiences and where there was surely little room, if any, for erudition (see Palmisciano

2003). Moreover, the reappraisal of Hipponax seems alarmingly similar to the recent rehabilitation of other poets working in different periods and languages, such as Cecco Angiolieri or François Villon. The hasty metamorphosis of these former *poètes maudits* into masters of the literary game may seem sensible, but it might equally reflect the preoccupations and concerns of contemporary academics. More often than not, the latter are learned intellectuals who devote their own time to refined intertextual games, and who are quite anxious to find ancient counterparts.

These examples reveal an uneasy symbiosis of ancient and contemporary concerns. On the surface, the philological and historical rediscovery of Greek orality seems to square very well with contemporary ideas about the death of the author or intertextuality. After all, oral literature is shared by the entire community, and thus leaves little room for Romantic notions of literary originality or even of individual authorship. On a deeper level, however, there are some tensions between ancient and modern concerns, which need to be confronted. The very notion of 'oral literature', so frequently invoked, testifies in fact to a profound difficulty in coming to terms with ancient Greek culture. Describing ancient verbal art as 'oral literature' is not unlike describing a horse as a car without an engine. In fact, the current emphasis on orality and the symposium should have an even greater impact on our understanding of lyric.

A case in point may be the seemingly endless debate over the identity of the 'I' in lyric poetry. Scholars often struggle to establish, in each instance, whether the 'I' is the poet, the addressee, the chorus, the city, or some other entity. Yet these different possibilities may not be mutually exclusive. Gentili (1990) and Goldhill (1991: 143 ff.) have advocated a more sophisticated explanatory model, particularly for Pindar's poetry. On a more general level, Slings (1990) relates the problem of the lyric 'I' to comparative material from pre-literate societies, only to conclude that the biographical and the fictional 'I' are two extremes of a fluid continuum. I agree with Slings that 'the opposition biographical vs. fictional I forces us to ask a number of entirely irrelevant questions' (1990: 12). Recent scholarship dealing with the identity of the 'I' may reflect modern preoccupations rather than ancient attitudes. While the modern mind tends to focus on the opposition between society and the individual, traditional cultures often revolve around the relationship between the community and its members. Anyone familiar with Mediterranean folk-songs, but also—say—with American blues, knows that the 'I' is not so much 'shifting' as intrinsically flexible. The persona of a miserable lover, for example, can fit the singer, the composer, a member of the community, someone in the audience, or a group of friends, according to the circumstances in which the song is performed and re-created. It would be pointless to scrutinize the alternatives in order to pin down, in every instance, the identity of the poetic 'I'. Similar considerations, I suspect, apply to Greek poetry, which developed in what we may call a face-to-face civilization, where musical re-performance was a key to the success and survival

of oral poems later transformed into literary classics (see Giordano-Zecharya 2003; Currie 2004; and Hubbard 2004).

Literary prejudices are hard to overcome, and sometimes they manifest themselves in an enduring concern with the individual. Although, as I have argued, recent approaches to lyric poetry undermine the notion of authorship, authors—and particularly 'great' authors—remain the main focus of current research, as in the days of Bowra's author-oriented *From Alcman to Simonides* (1936). Thus some remarkable, yet anonymous, collections of sympotic songs have received very little attention. I am thinking, for example, of the Attic *skolia*, the verses attributed to the Seven Sages, and the Panhellenic soldier-songs preserved in a papyrus from Elephantine, which only recently have become available in a proper critical edition (see Fabian, Pellizer, and Tedeschi 1991, and Fabbro 1995). A focus on those collections would not only redress the current bias in favour of named authors, but also shed light on some fundamental questions concerning the transformation of some oral songs into literary classics, the place of authors in antiquity, the development of the vocabulary of authorship, the meaning of the word *poiētēs* ('maker', and hence 'poet'), and the relationship between tradition, fiction, and authorship (on these issues see Graziosi 2002 and Aloni and Iannucci 2007).

A focus on the ancient reception of lyric seems crucial if we are to make progress in this field of study. And yet, when discussing ancient reception, narratives of development—not altogether different from those fostered by the Romantic paradigm—rear their head. Many scholars, for example, agree in thinking that, in the course of the classical period, musical symposia gradually gave way to more intellectual gatherings, such as that depicted in Plato's *Symposium*; and that this shift made traditional music sound increasingly old-fashioned, as Aristophanes seems to imply in *Clouds* 1353 ff. Thus *logos* allegedly came to supersede archaic song, to the point that the latter became obsolete in the course of the classical era (e.g. Vetta 1995: pp. lii ff.). Now, the temptation to interpret the evidence in such a straightforward and linear fashion is strong, yet I think it should be resisted—at least to a degree. In the first place, reference to *logos* can be found also in archaic sympotic contexts (e.g. Xenophanes 21 B18 DK; Theognis 981); but, more importantly, our classical sources need to be examined in light of their own preoccupations and agenda.

In democratic Athens playing the lyre was seen as a sign of aristocratic identity, and it is for that reason that some of Aristophanes' characters—for example, Pheidippides in the *Clouds*, or Philocleon in the *Wasps*—frown upon traditional symposia. Their attitude reflects a specific political stance within a single Greek city, and can hardly be used as evidence for the alleged rise and fall of sympotic poetry in the Greek world at large. In other cities the situation was different: Critias, for example, fiercely criticized Archilochus' embarrassing self-portrayal, not because he failed to understand the archaic poet or the conventions of his poetry (as some modern readers maintain), but because he was an ideologue of the Spartan-style

symposium, where emotional outbursts were kept carefully in check (see Iannucci 2002). His attitude should not be seen as an example of late classical attitudes—in fact, it can be compared to Pindar's criticism of Archilochus' at *Pythian* 2.54–6. Finally, Plato's *Symposium* reflects its author's interest in reporting a philosophical conversation rather than in presenting a collection of songs. What is more, the sober and sedate dialogue among the symposiasts is motivated dramatically in the text: Agathon's guests are still suffering from hangovers after the excesses of the previous night (*Symposium* 176ab).

What we need, in conclusion, is a more nuanced view of lyric poetry, and a far greater sensitivity to its ancient reception. We should be wary of interpreting the evidence in a narrowly historical sense also when it comes to the poets' biography. More often than not, we seem to be exclusively interested in extracting 'true' biographical information from a confused and unreliable set of anecdotes. Such an attitude has, of course, its own raison d'être, but it misses the point of ancient biographies, which focused on the *ēthos* of the poet's output rather than on 'factual' biographical truth (cf. e.g. Graziosi 2002). A clear distinction between the *ēthos* of an author and that of his poetry may be as late as Catullus, who famously wrote that the poet need not be like his poems (see Catullus 16, with Clay 1998). The biographies of ancient Greek poets reflect not only the perceived *ēthos* of their poetry, but also the widespread religious cult of poets—a phenomenon that has only recently attracted the attention of scholars (Clay 2004) and is likely to prompt new perspectives as the evidence emerges (excavations are currently being made in the island of Salamis, where the cave of Euripides, famous from the poet's biographical tradition, apparently became a place of cult as early as in the fourth century BCE: Blackman 1997–8 and Lōlos 2000). It seems that a sympathetic ear to ancient concepts of authorship and biography would facilitate our ongoing dialogue with ancient Greek culture.

37.3. Philology and Reception Studies

In the preceding section I tried to suggest that a careful exploration of some shortcomings in recent scholarship might widen our horizons and prompt new questions. By way of conclusion I would like to suggest that new insights may emerge from an alliance between the oldest and most traditional discipline in Hellenic studies, philology, and the more recent and innovative study of reception.

Many lyric texts survive as papyrus fragments, or in multilayered collections—such as the *Theognidea*—where individual poems are welded together. For this

reason alone, the study of lyric immediately raises difficult philological issues. Fragments are prone to the wildest interpretations, and it is simply impossible to tackle the problems they pose without at least an awareness of the uncertain textual status of our evidence. Yet philology should not be conceived too narrowly as the art of restoring a fragmentary text. The very notion of what might constitute a fragment is open to question: Sappho's *Ode* 1, for example, may not be a fragment because we happen to have (a version of) the whole text; but we still miss the music, which was an integral part of Sappho's creation, and we cannot retrieve its relationship with other texts, or the context of performance (on different conceptions of 'the fragment' cf. Most 1997; for the contexts of Sappho's poetry see Ferrari 2007). As Nietzsche observes in the first volume of *Human, All Too Human* (1878–80): 'lucky is the philologist who thinks he fully understands a text but for the passages where it is corrupt.'

The study of Greek lyric poetry is constantly rejuvenated by the discovery of new poems, most recently and famously by papyri containing substantial portions of Stesichorus, Simonides, Sappho, and Archilochus. New finds either confirm or disprove previous conjectures, so that we occasionally have the privilege—so rare in the Humanities—of assessing the merits of previous scholarship in plain Popperian terms of falsification. At the same time, new discoveries pose new problems. For example: the new Sappho papyrus has confirmed some conjectures made by scholars who were working with a more mutilated version of the text (see Nicolosi 2005); yet at the same time the new evidence is hard to interpret. Philologists are struggling to work out whether the new finds are compatible with or disprove the interpretation according to which Sappho 58 Voigt is optimistic about old age (on different sides of the argument, see e.g. Magnani 2005 and Di Benedetto 2005). On a more general level, the recent discovery of Simonides' Plataea elegy has apparently confirmed the existence of a sub-genre which may be labelled 'narrative elegy' (see Bowie 1986). Yet there is no consensus as to where and why the elegy was performed, nor is it clear if it is an expression of Panhellenic patriotism or reflects Spartan ideology. Occasionally, new discoveries force us to reassess our overall perception of a given lyric poet. For example, most of the new discoveries testify to a complex engagement with myth—something that in the case of Archilochus was quite unexpected. We are now in a far better position to assess how genre determines different takes on mythical narratives and, consequently, to investigate the interaction between epic and other forms of poetry in archaic Greece (e.g. Barker and Chriestensen 2006).

The relationship between epic and lyric poetry is indeed an area that deserves further exploration. According to the Romantic paradigm, lyric derives from epic; alternatively, as I have mentioned, scholars have described lyric and epic as simultaneous forms of poetry. In fact, it may be possible to go further and trace the influence of epic on lyric, as well as the reverse. In the wake of the seminal work by Conte (1974), poetic genres are now understood as ideological codes which remain stable

over very long periods of time, and we have every reason to assume that, when the Homeric poems took shape, early forms of lyric were already widely performed in the Greek world. Consequently, Homeric passages that resemble threnodic poetry, sympotic poems, or wedding songs—such as the encounter between Achilles and Priam in *Iliad* 24 or that between Odysseus and Nausicaa in *Odyssey* 6—may in fact have been influenced by early elegies and wedding songs not unlike the later ones which have survived (see Zanetto 2004; Nobili 2006a and b). Moreover, the Homeric poems show traces of specifically elegiac formulae, and it can be argued that epic poets learned from elegiac poetry, for example, the language of hoplitic warfare (Aloni and Iannucci 2007: 91 ff.). The differences between the epic passages and their putative lyric models are perhaps best explained as adjustments resulting from the process of borrowing across different genres, rather than as signs of development of the lyric genres themselves.

I now turn briefly to some statistics, which may shed light on the modern reception of early Greek lyric. The accompanying table is based on some 1,250 publications on ten major lyric poets, as listed in the *Année Philologique* for the decade 1994–2004. They are divided according to the language in which they were written.

Percentage of publications on Greek lyric poets, 1994–2004

	English	French	German	Italian	Other
Archilochus	25.8	3.1	15.5	35.0	20.6
Alcman	43.4	5.7	7.5	30.2	13.2
Stesichorus	20.0	4.6	7.7	58.5	9.2
Sappho	40.4	9.2	11.8	30.6	8.0
Alcaeus	21.5	4.3	7.1	57.1	10.0
Hipponax	27.6	6.9	6.9	55.2	3.4
Anacreon(tea)	32.2	5.1	6.8	44.0	11.9
Solon	33.3	13.3	10.0	21.7	21.7
Simonides	38.7	5.7	8.5	39.6	7.5
Pindar	36.3	11.5	9.5	32.7	10.0
Greek lyric (non-weighted average)	31.9	6.9	9.1	40.5	11.6

The data can only provide a rough indication of the distribution of scholarship on these authors, yet some general points can perhaps be made. Most obviously, what emerges from the table is that Italy has produced by far the largest volume of publications in the field of early Greek lyric: over one third of the overall output on lyric is written in Italian (the statistics do not take into account the increasing number of Italian scholars writing in English). In a context where we take academic globalization for granted, the phenomenon deserves close scrutiny. The statistics may be somewhat skewed by the occasional overflow of publications in a

particular place or on a particular topic, for example, the vast number of articles on Hipponax written by scholars in Bologna; but there are also deeper cultural reasons for the figures above: for example, the prominence of nineteenth-century lyric poet-philologists in the Italian school curriculum (such as Ugo Foscolo, Giacomo Leopardi, Giosuè Carducci, and Giovanni Pascoli); or the pervasive poetics of the fragment in mid-twentieth-century Italian poetry. The prominence of Sappho and Alcman in scholarship in English is arguably also linked to wider cultural phenomena, such as the flourishing of gender studies in the Anglo-Saxon world. In a manner that may evoke Moretti's *Graphs, Maps and Trees* (2005), the table gives numerical information; however, if wider cultural trends affect the number of scholarly publications in a specific field, it seems plausible that they also affect their content. National, linguistic, and cultural differences are still felt among contemporary readers of ancient lyric poetry; so studying early Greek poetry should also entail an engagement with the wide and diverse community of its contemporary readers.

Suggested Reading

The secondary literature on Greek lyric poetry is vast: the following publications offer comprehensive and reliable bibliographical guidance. For an excellent introduction, complete with references to previous bibliographies, see Gerber (1997). De Martino and Vox (1996) is a very informative anthology, whose first volume collects the sources relevant to most of the problems discussed in this article (see also Bartol 1993, who usefully collects and discusses the evidence on elegy and iambus). For a thematic anthology of lyric poetry see Campbell (1983) and Pavese (1997). Campbell's five-volume *Greek Lyric* (1988–93) provides a reliable text and a good translation, along with an exceptionally extensive collection of *testimonia vitae*. Campbell (1982) and Hutchinson (2003) comment on selected lyric poems in English, and Budelmann (2008) offers a companion volume to Greek lyric. For guidance on more recent publications see the very useful bibliography included in Degani and Burzacchini (2005). The journal *Poiesis* publishes detailed summaries of all works concerning ancient Greek poetry. On new texts from papyri see Bremer et al. (1987), and Boedeker and Sider (2001). Recent publications on the 'new' Sappho and Archilochus are still very much concerned with providing the 'first aid' that these damaged texts so desperately need (see e.g. Bastianini and Casanova 2007, which displays an astonishing variety of philological 'remedies'). Most of these contributions are being published in specialized journals such as *Eikasmós* and *ZPE*. Editions of lyric texts other than those cited in the text (see 'Editions Cited' below) are given in References below.

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CHAPTER 38

TRAGEDY

OLIVER TAPLIN

TRAGEDY has inspired such feverish activity over the past half-century, both in scholarship and in the theatre, that it is hard to sketch the main lines of past explorations, let alone indicate how they may develop and ramify in the future. Within the limitations of a brief chapter I shall nevertheless attempt just that: an overview of approaches to tragedy in the recent past, and some divinations about areas of study that may prove to reward interest in the future.

The period from 1950 to 1980 (and beyond) emphasized two strands, verbal texture and theatricality. The 'New Criticism' rescued tragedy from simplification and banal appropriation by emphasizing the complex patterns of themes and images; it was seen as poetry rather than primitive philosophizing or encoded history. Much of the best work emanated from the United States, epitomized by the brief and elegant books of Richmond Lattimore (1958, 1964) and the fine articles of Bernard Knox (collected in Knox 1979), along with his Sophocles book (Knox 1964). Other good examples are Lebeck (1971) on Aeschylus, and Burnett (1971) on Euripides. And, in the wake of this, a growing emphasis on the scholarly potential of performance went hand-in-hand with a burgeoning within the theatrical repertoire in Europe and beyond. At that stage the approach was primarily through the text and the original production, but at least the physicality of theatre was becoming recognized. Two examples are my book on Aeschylus (Taplin 1977), and the undervalued study of Euripides by Halleran (1985). Wiles (1997) and Rehm (2002) are sophisticated recent additions.

The period between 1980 and 2000 (and beyond) reacted against scholarship that came to be scorned as tendentiously aesthetic by shifting towards relativism and problematization; questions that dig beneath the surface, it was held, break

that surface up. And hand-in-hand with this, it was a great period for cultural contextualization, positioning tragedy within the particular thought-world of fifth-century Athens. The movement was (and still is) slanted towards an anthropological awareness of difference, towards defamiliarizing and destabilizing. This movement acknowledges the pioneering work of scholars in Paris, above all Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (collected in Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 1988) and Loraux (1986); also see the works of Gould, collected in Gould (2001). The best gatherings of this kind of study in English are to be found in Winkler and Zeitlin (1990) and Easterling (1997). Cross-currents have sometimes produced an inbuilt contradiction that is still not fully in the open: the approach subverts appeals to the author or the first performance, dismissed as the 'originary fallacy', yet at the same time it appeals to the 'originary' Athenians and to their mentality, in order to insist on their alien distance: Goldhill (1986) is an influential instance of this.

It is impossible (for me at least) to sort out, thirdly, what have been the leading threads in the last few years (up to early 2007), except to say that I detect a counter-reaction away from those dismantling strategies towards a different kind of historical grounding. The solidity of material culture provides a counterbalance to relentless object-lessons in the instability of knowledge. And so a new emphasis on the changing functions and manifestations of theatre is turning the continual changes in cultural emphasis over time into a positive heuristic resource. Hall (2006) is a good example.

What I shall now attempt is a sketchy tracing of the shapes which I think I can see looming in the mists of the present climate in Greek tragic studies. But it has to be recognized that much of this may turn out to be a mistaken reading of the signs: it is a long-range (and personal) weather forecast, not an authoritative policy statement.

38.1. Genesis

Discussions of the origins of tragedy have been obsessed by two dead-end diversions: the notion that origins somehow explain the essence of what grows from them, and the largely fictive reconstruction of pre-dramatic rituals. Recent contextualizing moves may be displacing those speculations with poetic traditions that are better testified. The chorus is clearly related to various pre-existing forms of lyric performance; and there is work to be done on how these feed into the development of the lyrics of drama—lyrics that, because they are mimetic and not tied to a real occasion, are able to subsume elements from all pre-existing genres. But tragedy surely did not grow solely from the choral tradition (although many, since

Aristotle, have supposed this): it needed the vital interleaving with spoken iambic, an element that seems to be some sort of hybrid of epic with earlier iambic poetry. This interleaving is likely to have been an unpredictable creative step rather than a 'natural' development. Herington (1985) is, in my view, an important pioneering work, whose insights have implications that have yet to be realized. A nice recent example on a small scale is the article by Swift (2006).

This metamorphosis then required a third ingredient: direct impersonation. This also is not as 'natural' as is usually assumed, since it required free male citizens to 'become' gods, women, foreigners, slaves, and so on. The mask is likely to have been a crucial enabler of this essential step in the creative dark. So this developing approach sets tragedy within the 'song culture' of Greece as a whole, while also recognizing the crucial steps which were evidently achieved solely by Athens. And it was Athens in the later sixth century BCE that seized the opportunity to bring this new art-form to life by devoting an entire major festival to its promotion.

There is also work to be done on the question of why the new narrative form still took on the traditional myths, rather than making stories out of the present or the recent past or a fresh fictional world. For one thing, epic was the great rival with which and against which tragedy had to prove itself. It was also crucially important that the myths were flexible and uncanonized, always open to variation and surprise. Another factor will have been the concern of Greek myths with certain kinds of story, about family conflict, for example, and gender issues, and the limits of political power. There was also the 'humanism' of the myths, their relative lack of the magical, the supernatural, and the exotic. And perhaps the non-centrality of Athens to the great myths (compared with Thebes or Troy or Argos or Thessaly) was an advantage rather than a drawback. Tragedy drew on the power of the distance as well as the threatening 'nearness' of its tragic stories. Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1988) remain fundamental on this topic; and Knox (1979: ch. 1) is still suggestive.

38.2. The Formative 'Golden' Context at Athens

It is the culture and ideology of fifth-century democratic Athens that have defined the perception of tragedy in the last thirty years, and turned Greek tragedy into Athenian tragedy (and even 'Athenian state tragedy'). It has become a cliché that tragedy is 'the city of Athens examining and questioning itself'. But some aspects of the context have been emphasized to the exclusion of other potential approaches.

It is beginning to be questioned, for example, how and whether tragedy is so utterly and essentially Athenian. Well over half of the surviving plays—including, not least, *Agamemnon*, *Oedipus the King*, and *Bacchae*—incorporate no explicit Athenian reference whatsoever. Their subject-matter is, arguably, no more relevant to Athens than to any other Greek city; the tragedies speak outside Athens. To put the point another way: if we did not have the external evidence that Athens was the originary metropolis, would we be able to work this out from internal evidence alone? The dialect of the iambics is ineradicably Athenian; but otherwise some plays might plausibly have been traced to Argos, or Delphi, or Thebes, or even Sparta (Euripides' *Helen*). This observation suggests that there should be a broadening of the senses in which tragedy is perceived as 'political'.

An analogous questioning might be raised over democracy. Could one really conclude on *internal* grounds alone that these plays are the product of a society where the whole citizenry held the power—let alone that they endorse that ideology? It is external evidence which certifies that it was the democratic framework of Athens which contained and organized the tragedies. The evidence for democratic celebrations that preceded the performances has been emphasized, for example. But what have those to do with the actual contents of the plays? The connections that have been proposed are far from cogent. And presumably the plays were re-performed without damage or incongruity in settings with different preliminary ceremonies, and in places that did not share Athens' political system, such as Corinth or Syracuse. There have been lively polemical exchanges between Griffin (1998), Goldhill (2000), and Seaford (2000); Rhodes (2003) provides an overview that also breaks new ground. Valuable and rather different approaches to related subjects may be found in Henrichs (1993) and in Raaflaub (1998).

There is, however, a relatively overlooked feature of the Athenian context which arguably informed the very nature of the genre. Tragedy was an inextricably popular event played before a very large, unselected audience: any citizen was entitled to be there, it was in no way the preserve of one privileged or dominant group. It may prove productive to ask whether this inbuilt inclusiveness bears on the larger understanding of the plays. And related to this is the still-unresolved question of whether women were included in the audience—and, either way, whether that affects the meaning of the plays. Two cogent but incompatible cases are made by Henderson 1991 (for the presence of women) and Goldhill 1994 (against). Perhaps, then, the questioning should move on from how tragedy was democratic to how tragedy was open and popular, and within what limits.

There has also been much emphasis on Dionysus, and on claims that the plays somehow intrinsically embody the shifting, elusive, transformative (even deconstructive) nature of the god at whose festival they were put on. But, again, if we had no external evidence, can we be so sure that we would be able to divine which god lay at their heart—if any? A case against maximizing the Dionysiac (as e.g. in Bierl 1991) is made by, for example, Henrichs (1984) and Scullion (2002). A good

case might be made for Apollo, or the Erinyes (Furies), or, maybe most plausibly, for Zeus. More thought should be given to how the events put on at festivals were related to the particular cultic occasion. And this is closely related to questions about the varying senses in which these occasions were what we would call 'religious'. Religion pervaded all aspects of life in ancient Greece, and this should make us pause before attributing to tragedy, or any other events set within festivals, some sort of transcendental spiritual qualities. In some ways, it might be maintained, the divine is distanced from the human world rather than infusing it.

38.3. Close Reading

Generally speaking, the contextualizing movement of the last quarter of the twentieth century has not paid close attention to the details of the wording or the microconstruction of the texts, with the exception of certain key terms and concepts. The niceties of wording and the precise associations of language have been regarded as traditionally the territory of 'old-school philologists', who have devoted themselves to textual criticism and to commentaries. But this division is artificial and damaging, and seriously underestimates the potential for fresh interpretation and insight that may be gained from contextually informed philology, as can be seen clearly in the commentaries by, for example, Garvie (1986) and Mastronarde (2002). There are energies that can only be released by painstakingly close attention to wording and semantics. New work may well open up approaches to style and diction, and to the politics and sociology of language, including its possible gendering. There is also work to be done both on the different tonal and associative ranges of choral lyric, which has its own life outside drama, and on the spoken iambics, and the ways in which they draw on the languages of law, science, education, and civic life.

There is some analogy in the shifts that may be beginning to happen in the exploration of lost plays, known only through fragments, including fragments discovered on papyrus. There has always been a tendency to regard these as the province of specialist philological scholars; but, building on their groundwork, the lost plays are now ready to be opened up for approaches that locate them in larger literary and cultural contexts. The old antithesis between philology and literary criticism should give way to more interdisciplinary and less distrustful integrations. For a survey see Cropp (2005). The relation between tragedy and satyr-play is another under-examined subject: good groundwork in Krumeich *et al.* (1999).

Not only will the plays themselves respond rewardingly to close reading, but so too should the sources for their contextualization—literary, historical, legal, artistic, and epigraphic. Both external written sources and the material remains uncovered

by archaeology need to be reread and regrouped and reinterpreted by careful location within their own contexts. The most significant recent developments in the right direction have been Csapo and Slater (1995) and Wilson (2000). Too much work has been based in the past on outdated and not always reliable compendia; and it has all too often unmethodically selected whatever source-material has suited a particular thesis or 'school'. But close critical attention needs to be paid to late sources that often have their own preoccupations and axes to grind.

Also the archaeology of the last forty years has brought to light much of potential importance, even some material from the fifth century, and yet more from the fourth and later centuries, that has yet to be expertly collected and situated. There are important new perspectives that may be opened up by close and well-informed attention both to texts and to material culture. Perhaps there will be a move away from conceptually and ideologically dictated frameworks towards pictures built up from putting together carefully examined and correlated pieces—more like compiling a collage than filling in pre-designed patterns.

38.4. Beyond Athens and Beyond the Fifth Century

In tension with the exploration of the particular culture that engendered tragedy in fifth-century Athens, there is an ever-growing awareness that, whenever they were recognized as of high quality, Greek poetry and drama did not die instantly at the moment of their first performance. This did not even happen with more ephemeral and topical forms, such as symposium poetry or victory odes or comedy. The cumulative evidence is clear that hundreds, even thousands, of tragedies from Athens, and probably from elsewhere as well, were preserved as written texts, and that many were re-performed. On the spread of tragedy see, for instance, Easterling (1994), Csapo (2004), and Taplin (2007).

While the evidence for re-performance in later times and over a wide geographical spread is not as plentiful or as clear as one might ideally wish, it is surely still worth thinking through what is indicated by the fact that successful tragedies, above all the fifth-century 'classics', were frequently performed throughout the Greek world in the fourth and third centuries BCE at least. Why tragedy? What was it that these plays had to offer in places and times distant and often very different from their original occasion? This whole enterprise of interrogating the continuation of tragedy suggests a range of possible routes of enquiry: through the use of tragedy in comedy, reflections in scholarship and philosophy, actors and other theatre personnel, theatre buildings and inscriptions, and artefacts with theatrical

associations, especially, but by no means only, fourth-century vase paintings from the Greek West. Such researches will reveal more about what tragedy meant in the Greek world in later centuries; but that might well, in turn, reflect some light back onto the fifth century and Athens. And the importance of tragedy at Rome, where it was one of the very first forms of literature to be transposed into Latin, has more to reveal, I suspect, about Greek tragedy, especially in the third and second centuries BCE.

Tragedy and its accoutrements held an almost obsessive grip over ancient Greek cultural consciousness; and this did not seriously loosen even in the later centuries of antiquity. It is true that a diminishing number of texts were read in their entirety, and that adaptations into other performance forms, particularly pantomime, took over in the theatres. Yet in the visual arts, in speeches, essays, and philosophy, tragedy remained central to the education of the Greeks and to their ever-changing world-view—tragedy and the theatre were woven into their ideas of what it meant to be Greek. Much of the relevant later material, which extends right down to the end of Graeco-Roman antiquity, has yet to be collected and assessed with the methods and priorities of current scholarship. On tragedy in later antiquity see, among others, Le Guen (1995), Easterling and Hall (2002).

38.5. Reception and Interdisciplinarity

This new interest in what happened to the tragedies over time, and especially in how they were re-performed and re-evaluated in the decades and centuries after their original generative context is, of course, part and parcel of what has become generally known as reception studies (on which, in general, see Leonard in this volume). And this has rapidly grown into the most obvious and vigorous development of recent times in the study of Greek tragedy, and indeed of the classical world as a whole.

It is not so long ago that a book on classical literature would conclude with a perfunctory couple of pages on the *Nachleben* of the author(s) within 'the classical tradition', as it was known. These surveys were usually superficial, capriciously selective, dilettante in tone, and often shockingly ill-informed. Those scholars who dug rather deeper and more responsibly were usually concerned to show how the reception in question was somehow 'determined' by the cultural or personal imperatives of those concerned, and how they typified or perpetuated errors and misconceptions—faults that 'we' can now set right. Reception was, then, mainly seen as teleological, revealing how the mistakes of the past have been superseded by the superior understanding of the present.

It was partly, no doubt, the realization of the temporality and inevitable imperfection of our own present views that led to a new respect for the receptions of the past. This move was essential for proper reception studies to develop. If the various pasts derived such energy from Greek tragedy (or whatever is in question)—intellectually, creatively, theatrically—then there must be value in the attempt to recover and understand these attempts to receive, however faulty we might believe them to be in scholarly terms. Foundation-laying studies include Hardwick (2000) and (2003).

Reception studies may, very roughly, be divided into documentation and interpretation. Much basic data about tragedy from many periods and many countries and in many transformations have yet to be discovered and explored. The sheer quantity of material is astonishing. To give just one indicative example, the database of the Archive of Performances of Greek and Roman Drama at Oxford has recorded well over 5,000 theatrical productions, by the strictest criteria, from the last 500 years (www.apgrd.ox.ac.uk). The range of ways in which material such as this may be interpreted is still very much in development. Clearly the setting of receptions within their temporal context can connect the work with the history of ideas, the history of literature, and the history of theatre as well as the politics and cultural movements of the time in question. And the analysis of past receptions can also inform and illuminate our contemporary reception, whether in scholarship and teaching, or in the practice of theatre and other forms of presentation. Flashar (1991) was a pioneer study; see also, among many others, Foley (1999), Hall and Macintosh (2005), Altena (2005); and, taking *Agamemnon* as a case-study, Hall, Macintosh, and Wrigley (2004).

A brief diachronic survey: the knowledge of ancient tragedy and its accompanying scholarship was not entirely lost in the Greek East at the end of pagan antiquity; and there is still, no doubt, intriguing material to be explored from the long Byzantine period. The story indisputably, however, takes on fresh vigour with the Renaissance in the West. This is founded on at least two major achievements of the period. First, the translation and printing of Latin versions of the plays and, no less, of Aristotle's *Poetics* and other ancient works of interpretation contributed vitally to the rapid growth of a new 'secular' theatre which flourishes throughout Europe—most strikingly, but far from exclusively, in Shakespeare's London and Racine's Paris. Secondly, there was development of the new theatre-musical form of opera, both in Monteverdi's Italy and then explosively throughout Europe, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Both these phenomena have, of course, long been subjects of intensive interest; but the new, more open-minded and complex approach to reception will undoubtedly open up new perspectives on these central achievements in the history of theatre, dance, and music.

The movement in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to get back to pure Hellas, without the encrustations of Rome, gave Greek tragedy another lease of life, especially in Germany, although this emerged more in poetry and

in the history of ideas than in the actual theatre. The operas of Gluck and the plays of Goethe burgeoned nonetheless. The theatre of the nineteenth century is an area of renewed interest; but it is obviously the advent of 'modernism', of psychoanalysis, and of liberal socialism that brings Greek tragedy vigorously to the centre of the intellectual scene and of the commercial stage during the period of, say, 1890–1920.

The closer that we come to the present, the more voluminous the documentation. And, at the same time, it becomes harder to form perspectives on tendencies that are often still in formation. What seems clear, however, is that the academic attention devoted to Greek tragedy at both specialist and popularizing levels has increased with high energy from the 1960s onwards. This is evidently synchronized with—though not necessarily the result of—the end of the hegemony of German scholarship on ancient Greece. And this growth industry in study has been by no means restricted to the anglophone world.

There has also been a phenomenal multiplication in productions of Greek tragedy and related performances on the stage, both commercial and amateur, and spreading out throughout the world. There has been a kind of 'globalization' of what used to be regarded as exclusively white and male and elite. The signs are that this strong flow is not diminishing in the twenty-first century—but we must wait and see.

Hand-in-hand with the maturation of reception studies goes a necessary extension of interdisciplinary approaches. Here again, old specialist intolerance is giving way to a recognition that welcoming rather than spurning those without professional training in all the subjects involved can open up new and mutually informing approaches. Obviously there has to be interdisciplinarity with modern languages and literatures; with art history; theatre studies; film; translation; and popular culture. But as well as these areas, where a theatrical connection is evident, bridges are being built between Greek tragedy and gender studies, political philosophy, and cultural history, to give just three examples. Highly stimulating and enlightening approaches emerge, as old barriers and obfuscations are torn down. Greek tragedy, instead of being an abstruse and highly specialized mystery, accessible only to those with exceptional expertise in ancient Greek, has become a central and accessible concern to all those interested in ideas and performances.

Suggested Reading

There have been two good recent collections of introductory chapters: Easterling (1997) for the contextualizing approach, and, more pluralist, Gregory (2005); both give good advice on bibliography. There are also useful collections of influential scholarship on Aeschylus in Lloyd (2007), and on Euripides in Mossman (2003); significant new essays on Euripides

are published in Cropp, Lee, and Sansone (1999–2000). There is more than one good modern edition of each tragedian in Greek; there are also serviceable new Loeb editions of Sophocles (including fragments) and of Euripides, and a new edition of Aeschylus' tragedies and fragments is about to appear. There are many respectable translations, but very few of any literary or poetic quality. There have been new commentaries on most Greek tragedies in the last twenty-five years, most of them remarkably good. These have been published (without excessive duplication) by Cambridge (the 'green and yellow' series), by Oxford, and, including translations, by Aris & Phillips. For external sources on the theatre see Csapo and Slater (1995); for related vase paintings, Taplin (2007).

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CHAPTER 39

COMEDY

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ARISTOTLE remarks in *The Parts of Animals* (673a7–8) that 'man is the only animal that laughs' (he affirms too that only man is ticklish), and comedy, the object of which is to produce laughter, is a particularly human phenomenon. As such, it is also deeply conditioned by culture: who laughs, what is laughed at, and why, reveal a great deal about social roles and structures, which is to say, about identity (cf. McClure 1999; O'Higgins 2003). These questions take on a special saliency, moreover, in the unusual context of a state-sponsored institution of comic drama, such as existed in classical Athens. One might have expected relatively harmless humour in such a medium, but both the Old Comedy of Aristophanes and his contemporaries and the New Comedy of Menander and his a century or so later are charged with acute social commentary. How to interpret these works and the light they may shed on ancient Greek ideology and society remains a lively subject of investigation, which has invited new approaches and attention to an ever-wider range of sources.

Inevitably, our principal encounter with ancient Greek comedies is via printed texts. But modern productions of the plays in translation are not infrequent, and often convey some idea of the dramatic qualities of works that may not be evident on the page, although of course even the occasional revivals of Aristophanes or Menander in classical Greek are far removed from the original performances. Rather than proceed directly to a discussion of the eleven plays by Aristophanes and the handful by Menander that survive intact or in major fragments (many excellent commentaries on these are now available), I propose to circle in by way of a consideration of the context, or rather the multiple contexts, in which ancient Greek comedy is situated. Modern performances, for example, may inform us not only

about problems of staging, in itself an important and still open area for scholarship (for tragedy see e.g. Wiles 1997; on comedy, Slater 2002 and Revermann 2006), but also about the reception of ancient comedy, which in turn has very largely conditioned how the genre is perceived today, despite the ostensibly objective methods of modern philology. Reception and re-performance are burgeoning areas of research, as witnessed by the foundation in 1996 of the Archive of Performances of Greek and Roman Drama, based in Oxford's Faculty of Classics (www.apgrd.ox.ac.uk) and, on a more modest scale, the Centre for Ancient Drama and Its Reception (CADRE) at the University of Nottingham. To take one particularly interesting case, the history of the performance and interpretation of Aristophanes' comedies in modern Greece over the past two centuries has in many ways run parallel to the evolution of its political institutions, and was implicated as well in the question of the nature of the modern Greek language itself (van Steen 2000). The fortunes of Aristophanic criticism in eighteenth-century England also reveal a connection between an appreciation of Aristophanic humour and political commitments; historians 'generally portrayed Athens as a democracy out of control, as a polis politically bankrupt and essentially corrupt. They viewed Aristophanes as an extension of this milieu' (Walsh 2007, referring to Turner 1981: 189; cf. Gillies 1822: 118, 121). The idea that official comedy, and Old Comedy in particular, has a particular association with democracy goes back to Aristotle (*Poetics* 1448a31–4), who tells us that the Megarians used this argument to support their claim to having invented comedy, and it is a view still maintained by some modern critics (cf. Goldhill and Osborne 1999).

The hermeneutic horizons within which classical comedy is interpreted have expanded not only in time but also in space. Epigraphic evidence testifies to ample theatrical activity outside of Athens from the middle of the fifth century BCE onward, and also to performances of drama in the Attic countryside; the City Dionysia of Athens by no means had a monopoly on public performances (Taplin 1993). Professional actors, perhaps already organized in companies, might make a living by touring different locales. With travelling actors came also the circulation of dramatic scripts through the Greek-speaking world; it is clear that some of the more prolific writers of New Comedy, for example, who composed upwards of 300 plays in their lifetime, cannot have intended all of them for the major dramatic festivals of Athens itself. A case has been made that some comedies that reveal a less parochial or Attic colour were destined for performance abroad rather than for a strictly local audience. This is again an area for further research that might bear on the question of regional versus Panhellenic identity. Seen in this light, we may enquire whether comic (or tragic) representations of foreigners such as Thebans or Spartans were not simply a way of parodying or distancing the 'other' (cf. Zeitlin 1990) and thereby glorifying Athens, but also a means of promoting possible productions outside of Attica itself. Perhaps a similar argument can be made concerning the occasional setting of New Comedy in cities other than Athens, such as Corinth in Menander's

Perikeiromenē. Linguistics too may have something to contribute on this score: comedy is a natural source for evidence of popular speech, after due allowance is made for literary conventions and the fact that it was composed in metre; but it also incorporates dialectal variations, and one investigator (Colvin 1999: 300) has argued that accent gives no clue as to the moral or other qualities of comic characters. Is there, then, less caricature of foreigners in Greek comedy than one might imagine? Even ordinary dramatic speech is not pure Attic, but contains a large admixture of Ionic forms and expressions. Much more remains to be said on these questions (see López Eire 1997, and the essays in Willi 2002), as well as on possible differences between male and female voices, not merely at the level of diction but of discourse as well.

Drama in Athens was, of course, part of a civic and religious festival, and recently scholars have begun to consider the possible consequences of this environment for the original reception of the plays (Goldhill 1990; sources and discussion in Csapo and Slater 1995; see also Taplin in the previous chapter). For example, the practice, at the Greater Dionysia, of displaying on stage the tribute submitted by subject cities in Athens' empire and of granting hoplite armour to the sons of citizens slain in battle may well have lent a patriotic atmosphere to the festivities. (Might the custom be relevant to understanding the triumphalism of Aristophanes' *Birds*?) It is sometimes supposed that tragedy, in contrast to the festival itself, served to expose the tensions in the civic ideology, although there is equally compelling evidence that it affirmed prevailing values; comedy too may have reflected the ambient rituals (I wonder, for example, whether the opening scene of Menander's *Aspis*, in which booty from battle is carried on stage, might be a distant reminiscence of Athens' imperial levies), even as it projected a utopian release from the restrictive norms of the classical polis—and this potentially subversive strain is as true of Menander's domestic comedies as of Aristophanes' farcical extravaganzas. But much work remains to be done to demonstrate specific connections between comedy and its performance context in the fifth, fourth, and third centuries.

Another external element relevant to the interpretation of comedy is the composition of the audience. Drama, in Athens at least, was popular entertainment, and it is assumed that theatres had to accommodate a fair proportion of the citizen body; indeed, archaeologists have used the size of theatres as a way to estimate the total population of towns. But was the public uniform? Some scholars have argued that the audience of Menandrian comedy represented a more prosperous stratum than that of Aristophanes' time, and have seen in this circumstance the motive for what is perceived as a certain conservatism in New Comedy. This is a tricky line of argument, but further investigation of the class character of spectators may help us understand the role of ancient comedy in reflecting and constructing social identities (see Dawson 1997; see also Taplin in this volume). More generally, relative increase or decline in overall prosperity might have an influence on the concerns of comedy; it has been claimed, for instance, that Aristophanes' last surviving play,

the *Wealth* (produced 388 BCE), in which the god of Wealth inaugurates a regime of universal plenty, reflects Aristophanes' genuine interest in the post-war plight of the poor (Sommerstein 1984), although others have argued that Athens was by this time already recovering economically from its defeat in the Peloponnesian War (Rothwell 1992). Yet another question, perhaps impossible to decide on the available evidence, is whether there was a difference in the average age of audiences in Aristophanes' and Menander's time. All of Aristophanes' heroes are men or women of middle age, typically married; while mature adults figure in Menander's plays, sometimes in central roles (e.g. Demeas in the *Samia*), his protagonists are more commonly younger men in love, usually still under the authority of their father, though they may be recently married (as in the *Epitrepontes*). Conceivably there were different modes of identification with younger versus older figures (for age roles in Roman comedy, based on Greek New Comedy, see McCarthy 2000); at all events, it seems a topic worthy of investigation. The perennial debate over whether women were present in the audience is perhaps unresolvable (Goldhill 1994), but new evidence may still be lurking in unexploited inscriptions, fragments, and pictorial sources.

The procedures by which comedies (or tragedies) went from script to stage in ancient Greece undoubtedly had a bearing on their reception, and scholars are now paying more attention to the entire production process and its implications for how we read the texts (sources in Csapo and Slater 1995). Scripts were submitted to scrutiny and approved (or rejected) for performance at the civic festivals; actors were assigned; choruses were trained; costumes and masks, often costly and elaborate, were designed and manufactured; composers and musicians were hired. Much of this behind-the-scenes activity was financed, in the fifth and fourth centuries at least, by well-to-do private citizens in the role of *khorēgos* or 'choral sponsor', under a system of 'liturgies' or obligatory contributions that worked as a kind of tax (on their role, Wilson 2000). Did the decline of the chorus over the course of the fourth century (if indeed it did decline: comic choruses may have lasted through the end of the century and beyond) reflect a change in civic attitudes among the rich? To what extent did competition for prestige among these patrons of drama contribute to determining the form or content of comedy, for example the elaboration and variety of costumes, or the habit of reviling citizens who may have been enemies of the *khorēgos*? Even so apparently innocuous a matter as musical accompaniment might have implications for the social attitudes reflected in comedy. Aristophanes, in the *Birds*, introduces a female character playing the *aulos*, a wind instrument somewhere between a recorder and an oboe that was essential to drama; the Athenians seem to have supposed, however, that blowing on it distorted the face, and they apparently looked with disdain upon *aulos*-players. (For the connotations of the instrument, see Rocconi in this volume.) When a humble character in a relatively farcical scene in Menander's *Dyscolus* bids the *aulos*-player to cease piping (879–80), is there some implicit comment involving social status here? The social status of

actors (see Easterling 2004), of members of the chorus, and of the comic playwrights themselves continues to invite further investigation.

Like so many aspects of life in classical Greece, drama was highly competitive, and prizes were awarded for the best play and also, from 449 onward, for the best actor. It has been suggested (Slater 1990) that the new emphasis on the actor's role may have had an effect on the nature of comedy, promoting star parts, for example, and opportunities for virtuoso numbers. Still on the issue of the actor, it has been observed that representations of actors on vases—a hugely important source for our knowledge about ancient theatre that has still not been fully tapped—differs in respect to tragedy and comedy; whereas tragic stage figures simply appear as the characters they play (only theatrical architectural features reveal that the scene is from drama rather than myth), comic actors sometimes peep out from behind their grotesque masks, thus exposing the players behind their roles (Green 1991). The visual images perhaps correspond to the breaking of dramatic illusion in Old Comedy, for example in the parabases, where an actor steps forward on stage, and may speak directly in the playwright's name, presumably having removed his mask; this practice invites a consideration of the role of metatheatre both in Old Comedy (Slater 2002) and New, for example in the prologue and in occasional direct addresses to the audience, which may be more alike in this respect that is commonly supposed. We may note too that while there has been some discussion of interpolations in our texts of tragedy, especially, and to a lesser degree of comedy as a result of actors' improvisations in later revivals of the plays (Revermann 2006), much less attention has been paid to the possibility that extemporization on the part of actors was a regular and expected feature of comedy, both Old and New (Benz, Stärk, and Vogt-Spira 1995; Revermann 2006). Direct references to characters in the audience, not infrequent in Aristophanes' comedies, seem to presuppose that the figure in question was actually present: might at least some such verses have been a result of the spontaneous ingenuity of the actors in the original performance, which then were included in the script?

Part of the context in which any drama is produced is formed by other plays in the same genre or which are popular at more or less the same time. Ancient plays did not have a 'run' in the modern sense, but they competed against other comedies and tragedies in the same festival, and a keen sense of rivalry is openly acknowledged in the comedies themselves, in which characters appeal to the audience or judges to grant their play victory. Comic parodies of tragic diction and plot, known as paratragedy, abound, and fully three of Aristophanes' eleven surviving comedies are devoted in part or in whole to making fun of Euripides. Just how the tension between the two genres informed the dynamics of comedy itself is still far from clear, despite some good contributions. But the nearer competitors of Aristophanes and Menander were other comic poets, whose works survive only in fragments. With the publication of the magisterial edition of the comic fragments by Kassel and Austin, scholars now have an invaluable tool for reconstructing—to the extent

possible—the plots, style, and other features of lost comedies (it is to be hoped that a long-awaited translation of the fragments will appear some time soon). The work has already borne fruit in conferences, collections of essays (e.g. Harvey and Wilkins 2000), and commentaries (Arnott 1996; Storey 2003) on comic poets other than Aristophanes and Menander. To take but a single example of the kind of question a broader study of fragmentary comedies may invite, it is noteworthy that in three of Aristophanes' plays women dominate the action, to the point of taking control, in the *Ecclesiazusae*, of Athens' political institutions and installing a new society based on shared property and the abolition of sexual exclusiveness in marriage. Is the prominent role of heroic women like Lysistrata a novel feature introduced by Aristophanes (Henderson 2000), or was there already a well-established comic tradition in which women played a major role, as others have supposed? Is Aristophanes' comic version of radical communism a travesty of utopian schemes such as that of Plato's *Republic* which may have been in the air at the time, or does it look back rather to an ancient myth of gynecocracy (cf. Zeitlin 1999)? Further study of the fragments will, if not resolve such questions, at least broaden the terms in which they are discussed.

The numerous fragments also indicate a much wider range of themes and styles, both in Old Comedy and New, than one would infer from the surviving plays by Aristophanes and Menander. The plays of Aristophanes, while not all cut to the same pattern, do share a certain overall plot structure and a typical characterization of the protagonist as a kind of heroic everyman, who conceives a grand idea at or near the beginning of the comedy and pursues it with single-minded determination until his or her final triumph (see Whitman 1964; *Wasps*, *Knights*, and *Clouds* are partial exceptions to this generalization). But Old Comedy also favoured mythological burlesques, for example, and indeed, even the surviving plays of Aristophanes not only allude to Athenian myths, rituals, and cult but may well be deeply informed by them (cf. Bowie 1993; Lada-Richards 1999; Zeitlin 1999; Bierl 2001). In the period following Aristophanes there were still many comedies based on mythological themes (see e.g. Nesselrath 1990), and a thorough study of the fragments may reveal far more substantial continuities between Old and New Comedy than we usually imagine (whether the ages of the protagonists in the two types of comedy differed systematically is another issue on which the fragments may shed light). While extreme caution is required in drawing inferences from fragmentary texts, they have much to offer in tracing the evolution of Greek comedy.

Not just the deep structures of ideology or culture, but also immediate political circumstances may influence, and be reflected by, comedy. There is some evidence, for example, of efforts to restrain the satirical freedom of Old Comedy, at least in regard to *ad hominem* attacks (Halliwell 1991), which is not surprising, perhaps, given the evident scurrilous nature of such slanders. The question of Aristophanes' political allegiances remains a lively area of debate, with some scholars identifying him with moderate democratic leaders (de Ste Croix 1972; Olson 1990), and others

denying any political motive at all to the plays (Dover 1972); here again, a closer examination of the fragments both of Aristophanes himself and of other Old Comedy playwrights may bring further clarity. The same holds for New Comedy: the surviving plays of Menander are in general more restrained in language, avoid personal insults to living people, and are much less fantastical in their plots than those of Aristophanes, but how typical they were of the form still remains to be determined. Besides, the contrast with Aristophanes may have diverted attention from more immediate political concerns in Menander himself, for example in relation to restrictive marriage laws, increasing class divisions, or local control of citizenship (Davies 1978; Lape 2004). Needless to say, advances in our knowledge of Athenian history and Greek history in general will contribute further to identifying political themes in the comedies, and particularly in the rapidly developing area of Greek law: it is here that the evidence of Roman comedy is especially salient, though sifting what pertains to the Greek originals from changes due to the Latin adaptations is a very delicate matter (Scafuro 1997).

I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that, despite our best efforts, the interpretation of comedy (and of all literature) is inevitably a part of the history of its reception; that is, the categories by which we understand a work are to some degree formed by our own world and our position within it (including nationality, gender, and class). It behooves us, accordingly, to be self-conscious about this limitation. In a sense, all of modern (or post-modern) criticism, as opposed to the positivist tradition, may be said to be motivated by the recognition of this problem: the context is not fully dissociable from the text, and the reader (or viewer) enters into the construction of whatever meaning is discovered in the work. Various hermeneutic strategies have been elaborated in the light of this epistemological dilemma. At the radical end, some critics maintain that all literature is contemporary with us: the way we are is the way we read. Curiously, this view has something in common with positivism, which also denies that there is a gap of intelligibility between antiquity and today, although the metaphysical premises of the two approaches are very different. More interesting, to my mind, are theories that seek to account for the way social conditions are refracted in literary works: literature does not offer a direct reflection of society (Ehrenberg 1961), nor does it create a wholly separate fictional world; rather, it operates by way of displacements, repressions, and hiatuses that may be regarded as signs of social contradictions that cannot find unmediated expression in the work itself (Macherey 1978; Konstan 1995). On this view, one reads a text symptomatically, seeking points of stress and strain within it. The emphasis is less on discovering aesthetic unity and more on the tensions that the appearance of unity conceals. Such processes of mediation are as basic to texts written today, of course, as they are to those composed in antiquity, but because the historical circumstances are disparate, it may be possible at least to observe and compare the different ways in which the construction of social identity is mapped onto literature in diverse cultures. Determining the kinds

of contradictions that subtend ancient comedy, while taking account of the rich, multiply overlapping, and never entirely consistent contexts in which it is situated, may bring us a step closer to understanding the nature of ancient Hellenism.

I conclude with two examples of how contradictions within a text may be seen as symptoms of ideological stress in the culture at large (cf. Konstan 1995). In Aristophanes' *Wasps*, the jury-mad protagonist, Philocleon, is plainly well-to-do, and his son is represented as associating with the most prominent figures of Athenian society. Yet the chorus of jurors, with whom he identifies, consists of the poorest citizens, who depend economically on the pittance paid for serving in the courts. A symptomatic reading will take this overdetermined representation of Philocleon not as evidence of comic negligence on the part of Aristophanes, but rather as a sign of how class conflict in Athenian society is disguised, and real social discord over the democratic court system is reduced to and caricatured as an individual mania. In Menander's *Dyscolus*, the misanthropic Knemon is represented as a burlesque bogeyman, hostile to one and all. And yet he is also seen as a typical farmer, whose harsh temper and mistrust of the idle rich is a consequence of hard and unrewarding toil. Which is Knemon? He is both. The play resolves the potential conflict between poor and rich in a double marriage across class lines, thus affirming the priority of citizen solidarity over differences of wealth: Knemon's suspicions are reduced to a personal quirk, as opposed to being a sign of genuine social tensions. It is worth noting that the traditional comic device of the recognition scene, by which an unmarriageable character, for example a slave or foreigner, is revealed to be an Athenian citizen and thus eligible to wed, seems never to be exploited in order to resolve a father's objection to his son's marriage with an impoverished citizen girl: for this would imply that the class barrier is insurmountable, and would run counter to the image of civic concord that New Comedy generally projects.

Issues of class, status, and identity are implicit in the plots, characterization, scenic conventions, and conditions of production of comedy, both Old or New. Just how it works remains a lively subject of investigation.

Suggested Reading

A good, brief introduction to ancient comedy is Sandbach (1977). MacDowell (1995) provides the essentials on Old Comedy, and Hunter (1985) does the same for New. Csapo and Slater (1995) provides sources and discussion of materials relating to all aspects of the production of classical comedy as well as tragedy. The Oxford commentaries on Aristophanes, which now cover virtually all the plays, are of very high quality, and are the basis for serious study of the texts; they may be supplemented by the editions, with facing translation, by Alan Sommerstein (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, multiple volumes), which contain useful introductions and bibliographies.

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CHAPTER 40

HISTORIOGRAPHY*

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THIS essay will not consider the whole field of what Felix Jacoby thought constituted ancient Greek historiography: on that topic Fornara (1983) is essential, as are Schepens and Humphreys in Most (1997). Nor will it include the modern historians of the ancient world who use the ancient narratives only incidentally, as part of their data, in pursuit of historical constructions or reconstructions of their own. I am rather focusing on some changes that have occurred during the last half-century or so in the way that classicists think and write about the narratives of four of the ancient Greek historians whose works remain largely extant.

Since at least the early nineteenth century, the works of the four great Hellenic historians, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Polybius, were regarded in the academy as foundational narratives for *Altertumswissenschaft*, the 'science of antiquity'. Moses Finley (1975*a*: 22) said it most succinctly:

> No one before the fifth century tried to organize, either for his own time or for earlier generations, the essential stuff of history... Unless a generation is captured on paper and the framework of its history fixed, either contemporaneously or soon thereafter, the future historian is for ever blocked. He can reinterpret, shift the emphases, add and deduct data, but

* Many thanks to the CUNY Classics Department, and the Classics Department of UC Irvine and the Southern California Classics Consortium, for allowing me to develop these ideas in conversation with them. The latter occasion was a conference in 2006 honouring the memory of Walter Donlan, one of the founding fathers of the 'cultural turn' in classics, and someone who many times had helped me think through the issues of textual interpretation it raised. Other friends who have saved me from error here, and sharpened my thinking, include Deborah Boedeker, Paul Cartledge, John Dillery, Art Eckstein, Emily Greenwood, Rachel Kitzinger, Peter Krentz, Don Lateiner, Joel Lidov, John Marincola, Rosaria Munson, Chris Pelling, Kurt Raaflaub, Tom Scanlon, and Seth Schein. They are of course not responsible for the errors and omissions that remain in the necessarily condensed final product.

he cannot create the framework *e nihilo*. That is why we can write the history of the Persian wars, thanks to Herodotus, and the history of the Peloponnesian War, thanks to Thucydides, but not the history of the intervening fifty years, not for all the writers of tragedy and comedy and all the inscriptions and material objects unearthed by modern archaeologists.

The ancient narratives of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Polybius, that is, provided us with a solid historical base upon which our understanding of ancient Greek history, literature, and culture could be erected. They could be supplemented and refined by a variety of other less important or less complete ancient historical texts, buttressed by the supporting disciplines of archaeology, epigraphy, numismatics, papyrology, and topography. Together, these 'sources' gave us *Realien*: the account of what really happened in the ancient Greek past. They documented the kinds of changes, political, social, and cultural, that comprised the history of Greece from the sixth to the second centuries BCE and gave the ancient classical world during that period its shape and a large part of its cultural identity for posterity.

This articulation reflected the dominant agenda of conventional academic historiography, at least in the universities of western Europe and America. One's job in studying the ancient historical narratives was threefold: to establish the narrative outline and the main themes of the text, with careful attention to its word-usage; to evaluate the particular text carefully as historical data and weigh it against other relevant ancient sources of information; and finally, to analyse the particular ancient author's investigatory methods as a historian against the standards of nineteenth-century historical values. Qualities like accuracy, comprehensiveness, impartiality, and proportionality went more or less unquestioned as scholarly virtues, and needed to be in evidence in a work of serious history; their presence or absence in an ancient historical text was to be duly noted by modern scholars concerned with that text.

This set of assumptions was still in force when I entered graduate school in 1969. In the study of the ancient historians the 1970s were a time of industrious optimism, if I may extrapolate here from the experience of being one graduate student at one American graduate school. As young graduate students, my peers and I knew that very important work was being done in editing and refining our understanding of the basic Greek historical texts, work that would in fact continue to be done through the end of the twentieth century and beyond. A. W. Gomme's long-awaited Thucydides commentary was coming out, with its later volumes carefully revised and supplemented by K. J. Dover and A. Andrewes; G. Forrest, it was hoped, would shortly follow with an equally inspiring Herodotus commentary. Though Xenophon was not yet studied with the same intensity as Herodotus and Thucydides, he was in the process of being reinterpreted as a historian, since G. Cawkwell among others had shown the need to supplement and critique his narrative with data drawn from the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* and other fragmentary fourth-century histories. The new Budé Polybius, and especially Pédech's work for it, was emerging, and F. Walbank

was producing an important Polybius commentary that would clarify the general outlines of the early Graeco-Roman world and also allow us to make use of Polybius' fragmentary later books. More data and solid readings were expected from papyri, and more ways to check and contextualize the data the ancient historians had given us were being sought and found in the burgeoning ancillary disciplines mentioned above. Important individual studies were appearing, like those of K. von Fritz on early Greek historiography, H. Immerwahr's and C. Fornara's books on Herodotus, and J. de Romilly's and H.-P. Stahl's on Thucydides. Critical essays and books were being written by K. J. Dover, H. Erbse, M. Finley, A. Momigliano, H. Strasburger, and others: for representative collections of articles, see the *Wege der Forschung* volumes edited by Herter (1968) for Thucydides, Marg (1982) for Herodotus, and Stiewe and Holzberg (1982) for Polybius. These ranged from specific, textually based investigations to more impressionistic interpretive studies, all of them allowing readers to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the ancient Greek historical authors as historians.

It is important to emphasize that the close study of the ancient historians in their textual details and for their evidentiary value continues in the present to yield insights that must be taken into account; in many instances it intersects fruitfully with the less traditional approaches discussed below. One of the strengths of classics as a discipline is that it is still largely dependent on a circumscribed set of texts to which we all more or less have access, so that classicists coming from very different theoretical positions are obliged, or at least encouraged, to continue talking to each other across various intra-disciplinary boundaries. Thanks to the labours of several generations of scholars, we are still learning things that Leopold von Ranke would have found important and interesting—about Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Polybius, about the political and military contexts they described, and about those in which they lived. Several important commentaries should be mentioned as examples here: Asheri *et al.* (2007) on Herodotus; Hornblower (1991–6) on Thucydides; Krentz (1989–95) on Xenophon; and Walbank's complete Polybius commentary (1957–79); see also the contributors, notes, and bibliographies in the second edition of the *Cambridge Ancient History*, vols. 3–7, and Marincola (2001 and 2007).

Yet our understanding of the importance of these ancient texts has in the meantime also changed. The remainder of this essay will sketch out two of the ways in which we now read historical narratives that are somewhat different from those we learned in the early 1970s. The ancient Greek historical texts no longer are seen as defining their world through the lens of their own (upper-class, male, military, and political) contexts; they are themselves, rather, seen to exist in creative tension with—even, to be themselves defined by—contexts much larger and more complex in scope than we had earlier realized. One consequence is that ancient writers not earlier included in the canon are taken much more seriously: Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Diodorus, Dio, Appian, and Arrian, for instance, are being included

in our picture of the ancient world in ways that would have been unthinkable a generation ago; see further Marincola (2007).

The second consequence, and the one on which this article focuses, is that our foundational historical texts are read now as more difficult to interpret, more foreign, than we had earlier believed, as truly the products of cultures very different from our own. They require us to read, or reread, them as the creations of men whose ways of expressing themselves we are still learning to understand. As Nicole Loraux (1980) famously put it: 'Thucydide n'est pas un collègue.' Some of the most important work on ancient historical narrative in the last several decades has been devoted to unfolding the implications of that fact, for Thucydides but for other foundational historical narratives as well. The two trends I will principally focus on here have been called by students of twentieth-century history writing the 'linguistic turn' and the 'cultural turn', and both have played a significant part in how we now read the ancient historical writers.

The 'linguistic turn' is a phrase 'used by advocates and critics alike to describe the shift in historical explanation toward an emphasis on the role of language in creating historical meaning' (Munslow 2000: 151; see Rorty 1967 for the origins of the term). In its most extreme form, articulated by theorists such as Derrida (1978) and Barthes (1981), the linguistic turn called into question the ability of language ever to represent a non-linguistic reality. In the English-speaking world, H. White (1973 and 1987) has argued that a historical narrative cannot, by its very nature, be said to represent a past set of events; it is rather a rhetorical accomplishment reflecting the author's choice of 'emplotments', using the four major tropes of metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. Among the French theorists, M. Foucault has had the most significant impact on classical historiography; his work as a whole also shows how hard in classics it is to separate the linguistic turn from the cultural turn discussed below. The most basic contribution of Foucault (1970 and 1972) was the notion of an 'episteme', or interlocking system of cultural practices, speech-patterns, types of knowledge, and structures of power and dominance, that together distinguish a given historical period. This 'episteme' is intuitively accessible to all the human beings living in that period, but it is largely inaccessible, except through a process of 'archaeology', to those of us looking back and trying to 'read' a period of history different from our own. The now common metaphor of history itself as readable text indicates the extent of the changes I am trying to describe; it has become part of our own Foucauldian episteme.

In comparison with scholars in other fields of history, classical practitioners of the linguistic turn remain somewhat conservative. Many of us who look closely at literary patterns in the ancient historians do so certainly as a way to unlock their strangeness (to understand, in Loraux's terms, the ways in which the ancient writers are *not* our colleagues). But by looking closely at the verbal patterns of the texts, using both traditional forms of literary criticism and new methodologies like reception theory or narratology, we also assume that the habits of speech

and thought so uncovered can help us understand in new ways a world and an author that existed in the past, outside and beyond words, to which the words on the page continue to point. Important work has been done on narrative points of view, construction of the authorial persona, persuasive and argumentative modes employed in the construction of causality (how does the author undertake to make his claims interesting and convincing?), and implicit sociological assumptions and elisions (what does he take for granted?). As Marincola (1997) has made very clear, in studying the language of the ancient historians more closely, we have been rediscovering the connection with rhetoric that the ancient world assumed to be present from the beginning of the genre. A number of volumes have explored the parameters of this new set of language-based studies; especially noteworthy for the four ancient authors considered here are, in addition to Marincola (1997), those of Hornblower (1994*a*), Pelling (2000), and the recent collection by de Jong, Nünlist, and Bowie (2004), which includes narratological readings of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Polybius by de Jong, Rood, and Gray. More generally, see also: Veyne (1971), Hunter (1982), Moxon, Smart, and Woodman (1986), Shrimpton (1997), Canfora (1999), Kraus (1999), Depew and Obbink (2000), and Clark (2004).

With respect to the individual authors, some works that primarily emphasize the nature of their literary habits and the mental world these habits reveal would include, for Herodotus: Darbo-Peschanski (1987), Boedeker (1987), Fehling (1989), Lateiner (1989), and a number of the articles in Bakker, de Jong, and van Wees (2002) and in Dewald and Marincola (2006). All of them, it should be noted, build on the work of Jacoby (1913) and Immerwahr (1966). Thucydides also has generated a long tradition of literary analysis of his difficult text, and Finley (1967), Parry (1981), Dover (1973 and 1983), and Macleod (1983) should preface a list that emphasizes Stadter (1973), Connor (1984), Crane (1996), Rood (1998), Dewald (2005), Greenwood (2006), and Rengakos and Tsakmakis (2006). Xenophon and Polybius have generated less work devoted specifically to their literary habits as historians, but one should note, for Xenophon, the recent work of Gray (1989), Gera (1993), and Tuplin (1993); for Polybius, de Foucault (1972), Sacks (1981), Verdin, Schepens, and de Keyser (1990), Davidson (1991), Eckstein (1995), and Champion (2004). In most of these studies, the linguistic investigations lead directly to issues of larger cultural and historical significance as well.

The 'cultural turn' is a phrase sometimes used in modern Anglo-American historiography to convey the 'medley of theories, concepts, approaches, philosophical positions, metahistorical perspectives and forms, as well as the new ranges of topics, evidences and sources' that began to dominate the field of cultural history in the last couple of decades in the twentieth century (Munslow 2000; for the term, see Jameson 1998). In classics, it arose in France principally out of the anthropologically and sociologically informed circle of J. P. Vernant, the first generation of whom included P. Vidal-Naquet, M. Detienne, and N. Loraux; Vernant was a student of L. Gernet, who was himself a student of E. Durkheim and represented in classics

some approaches analogous to those of the *Annales* school in modern European historiography; for the impact of 'the Vernant circle', see Vernant (1991 and 1996), and Loraux, Nagy, and Slatkin (2001). In Britain, the cultural turn was influenced by the work of sociologically and economically oriented historians like M. Finley and G. E. M. de Ste Croix, but also came out of a more diffuse set of influences from the 'Cambridge School', and the social and cultural studies of G. Murray and E. R. Dodds; see Finley (1975*b*: 102–19). Scholars of a largely new social-science mindset were asking questions about the organization of ancient Greek economy and society, but also about religion, morality and ethics, and the nature of Greek science, civic space, the treatment of and attitudes toward foreigners, women, children, and slaves, or even towards food, sex, hunting, or animal husbandry, as ways of investigating cultural mentalities. In a kind of feedback loop, and particularly when coupled with the tools of the linguistic turn, this new set of questions in turn began to change our basic assumptions about, and readings of, the ancient historical writers and their texts.

Herodotus was an early beneficiary of the cultural turn. In 1980 F. Hartog came out with an anthropological reading of Herodotus' fourth book, analysing Darius' attempted invasion of Scythia as an extended meditation on power and space. The volume of *Arethusa* already mentioned above, edited by Boedeker (1987), helped bring to the fore a number of ways in which the meaning of Herodotus' text would change under the cultural turn; in it, articles by Connor, Humphreys, Konstan, Meier, and Raaflaub portended how radically Herodotus would be rethought as a cultural critic in his own right rather than the somewhat undiscriminating collector of travellers' tales of some earlier scholarship. Gould (1989) and Thomas (2000) located Herodotus firmly in the intellectual vanguard of sophistic Athens, and a series of articles appearing in journals and collected volumes in the last decade have helped articulate Herodotus' interest in the broader outlines of the cultures the Persians encountered on their way to conquer Greece, and also Herodotus' own assumptions about culture in general and Greek culture in particular: see Bakker, de Jong, and van Wees (2002), Derow and Parker (2003), Dewald and Marincola (2006). Several scholars have explored Herodotus' construction of the barbarian: Nenci and Reverdin (1990), Romm (1992), Cartledge (1993), Georges (1994), Munson (2001), Vasunia (2001), and Hall (2002). Controversy at present exists about Herodotus' views of religion, Greek and foreign (see esp. Gould 1994; Boedeker 1993; Harrison 2000; Mikalson 2003; Scullion 2006). The development of ancient Near Eastern studies, especially in the light of post-colonial theorizing, will doubtless continue to change our sense of Herodotus' world and his own ways of thinking about and constructing it: *Achaemenid History*, vols. 1–8 (1987–94), is influential here, as well as Kuhrt (1995), Tuplin (1996), Briant (2002), and Sancisi-Weerdenburg (2002). For a controversial and important reading of Herodotus' ancient Near East and the development of an archaic money economy see Kurke (1999).

Anthropological work on orality by Finnegan, Goody, Evans-Pritchard, and others led to an influential article by Murray in 1987 in *Achaemenid History* and a subsequent book, edited by Luraghi (2001), exploring the extent to which appreciation of Herodotus, and the whole tradition he began, required careful consideration of how oral sources work, and the nature of human social memory. Important studies of Herodotean orality include Aly (1969, repr. of 1921), Evans (1991, repr. of 1980), and Thomas (1989). As Luraghi (2001: 10) notes, Vansina (1985) is now basic for questions of history and orality. For Herodotus' connection to earlier epic poetry and the poetry of the Persian wars, see Boedeker and Sider (2001), Boedeker (2002), and Marincola (2006). The investigation of issues relating to orality reframed the charges of widespread dishonesty and novelistic ingenuity that had been launched against Herodotus by Fehling (1989). But perhaps the extent of the transformation in Herodotean scholarship as a whole can best be measured by our current take on Herodotus' views of Athens. Where Jacoby or Immerwahr thought of him as the defender of western democracy, individualism, and liberty, opposing the slave autocracies of the East, now almost universally our picture is a much darker one, limning the account of Persian failure with reference to a thinly veiled warning directed at Athenian imperialism (Fornara 1971; Moles 1996 and 2002). In our current international political 'episteme', it is not hard to see the irony in Herodotus' depiction of imperial grandiosity—an irony to be directed at democratic empires as well as monarchical ones.

Thucydides was also an object of interest in the cultural turn, but in his case this led, at least temporarily, to a recognition not only of interests and abilities but also of rigidities and intellectual limitations. Hunter (1973) had already argued that Thucydides wrote an extremely biased and deeply ideological text; Crane (1998) took seriously how selectively his concerns as a historian reflected the attitudes of a particular social and economic class. Gomme (1956: 25–9) had already discussed 'Thucydides' self-imposed limitations'. Thucydides, it has now become obvious, tells us almost nothing that we would like to know about non-citizens, religion, women, or other issues not strictly germane to the prosecution of one dreadful war by its governing classes. Besides political and military history, he has also given us brilliant sociological and political theory, and here the cultural turn has again served us well, in elaborating the complexities of his views on political and military leadership, money as a part of political economy, and the role that ideological assumptions and group dynamics play in shaping group decision-making. Hornblower (1987, 1991, 1994*a*, 1996) in particular has used a variety of methodologies, including narratology, to enrich our understanding both of Thucydides' text and of the Peloponnesian War itself; also important are Allison (1989), Kallet-Marx (1993), Kallet (2001), and Gribble (1999), in addition to many of the works mentioned in the context of the linguistic turn above.

In the case of Xenophon and Polybius, the distinction between the categories of linguistic and cultural analysis become even less clear-cut. This is partly because

the periods they wrote in and about were so much more complex than those of the apparently straightforward and bipolar conflicts narrated by Herodotus and Thucydides; for this reason, the historical methods, literary structures, and cultural assumptions underlying their texts require much more work simply to be understood clearly. This leads to a question that remains unsettled, at least in my mind: were the worlds described by Herodotus and Thucydides really as binary as they were constructed to be—Greeks versus Persians; Athenians versus Peloponnesians? Or did the increasing sophistication of the narrative genre Herodotus and Thucydides began, seen for instance already in Thucydides' Book 8 and even more in the later historians, make the clarity of a straightforward war narrative along Iliadic lines, with its satisfying attendant drama—which side will win the struggle?—simply impossible for the writers of the fourth century BCE and beyond?

Much of the fundamental work on Xenophon and Polybius is still being done, and done in ways that make use of contemporary interpretive strategies. For each of these later authors, moreover, additional complexities present themselves. As the first sentence of the *Hellenica* indicates, Xenophon saw himself, qua historian, as a continuator of the narrative of Thucydides. As his decision to keep writing down to the battle of Mantinea also makes clear, however, he became at least tacitly Thucydides' critic, since he refused the line Thucydides drew in the sand, of 404 BCE, as the endpoint of a significant and self-contained story. In both Xenophon and Polybius, the problem of intertextuality becomes an issue even greater than it is in the earlier question of Herodotus' influence on Thucydides (Hornblower and Derow, in Hornblower 1994*b*, Rood 1999). It affects our assessment of Xenophon's work in complex ways. Xenophon made it clear that he knew he was writing in more than one genre. How much did he see his *Agesilaus* and his treatment of the same king in the *Hellenica*, or his virtually autobiographical *Anabasis* and the reference to the ten thousand in *Hellenica*, or his brief allusions to Socrates in *Hellenica* and the extensive portrait in *Memorabilia*, as part of a single interpretive project? How much do these disparate works display a clearly defined political stance or set of sociological assumptions? Are the *Anabasis* and the *Cyropaedia* historical works, displaying Xenophon's interests and values as a working historian? How much does the *Oeconomicus* or even the *Cynegeticus* reflect real fourth-century assumptions, attitudes, and practices? Tatum (1989), Dillery (1995), Gray (1989), Tuplin (1993 and 2004), Azoulay (2004), Lane Fox (2004), Pownall (2004), and others have been giving us recently a Xenophon who is, as Goldhill (1998) commented, a far cry from the Colonel Blimp of the earlier twentieth century; yet the outlines of the emerging picture are still contested.

For Polybius the picture is even more complicated, since he was himself the heir of what was, by the late third century BCE, the long-established genre of Greek historiography; more than any other Greek historical writer still extant, Polybius held strong opinions on how to write history properly, and he expressed them freely, so entering into a judgement of his methods and interpretive ends requires

us also to confront a multitude of connections to historians whose works we only possess in fragments (Sacks 1981). Even more importantly, Polybius was confronting a new world power, Rome. Ironically, the prevalence of the linguistic turn has given Polybius' text, viewed as a piece of writing, a chance to be read as seriously as any other Greek text; the extreme baldness of his style no longer obscures from us the intellectual interest and subtlety of his political, social, and aesthetic stances. New and quite complicated reconstructions of his analyses of the power politics of the Greek political communities of the third and second centuries are emerging; that Polybius' depictions of the various players in contemporary Graeco-Roman politics were not opportunistic in nature but reflected a carefully thought-out ethical stance has been well argued by Eckstein (1995). Champion (2004) focuses on the political purposes behind Polybius' construction of the second-century Roman world and its ideologies; work on the goals and values of people like Scipio Aemilianus and communities like the contemporary Carthaginians, Macedonians, the Achaean League, or those problematic Aetolians, will surely also change how we read Polybius in the future. Walbank's (2002) wide-ranging survey of current Polybian scholarship articulates a number of directions such scholarship might take.

What broader general conclusions can we draw about the way we now read, and will read in the future, the historical narratives of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Polybius? Though it is important not to romanticize the process, this whole volume suggests how the lenses through which we look at their ancient efforts to describe their worlds will continue to change. At the moment, it is fair—I think—to say that the last generation or so of scholarship has rethought for us the ancient writers as fuller historical figures themselves. In ways that are meaningful for our own Foucauldian 'episteme', we have developed some interpretive tools that allow us to articulate the intellectual drama of their struggles to understand and interpret their own worlds for their audiences, present and future. But such a claim also returns us to the observation of Moses Finley with which this essay began. The last thirty years or so of scholarship have helped us to understand better the four Greek historians as writers responding creatively to their own cultures, and trying to tell a true story with the tools available to them; in effect, we have discovered new ways of looking at their ways of writing and habits of thought, which also help us to understand better the historical periods in which they wrote. Like Mark Twain as an adult thinking about his father, we find the ancient historical writers, taken both as a group and as individual voices, much smarter and subtler than some of us used to think they were.

Suggested Reading

I have woven a great deal of bibliography into the body of this chapter, in large part because the recent story of Greek historiography is also the story of the people who have thought and

written about it. As all four of the ancient writers considered here saw, the dialogic nature of historical discourse is fundamental to the genre; a genuinely historical story contains many voices. Despite the apparent copiousness of citation, however, many important books and articles have been neglected in the foregoing account; I have tended to privilege very recent books that themselves give further bibliographic guidance. On Greek historiography, Fowler (2006) and Marincola (1999, 2001, and 2007) are now essential. For the history of modern historiography, I have found most helpful Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob (1994) and Berkhofer (1995); see further Dewald (2005: 1–22). Good bibliography for Herodotean studies can be found in Bakker, de Jong, and van Wees (2002) and in Dewald and Marincola (2006). For bibliography on Thucydides see Dewald (2005), Greenwood (2006), Rengakos and Tsakmakis (2006). For Xenophon I have found Dillery (1995) helpful and judicious; Tuplin (2004: 13–31) provides very useful bibliographical guidance. For Polybius see the review articles Walbank (1985 and 2002).

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CHAPTER 41

ORATORY

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In a direct democracy like that of classical Athens, even the most important political decisions were made as a result of debates conducted in mass meetings attended by ordinary citizens. Thus, the ability to speak coherently, engagingly, and persuasively was an important key to political influence. The appreciation of a well-turned-out speech and the importance attached to the presentation of arguments did not begin with democracy, however: it seems to have been deeply rooted in Greek culture. Already in the Homeric epics the ability to persuade others through speech rather than force is prized. Eloquence combined with the experience gained over a lifetime spanning two generations is commended particularly in Nestor (*Iliad* 1.247–53), whose ability to persuade earns him the epithet 'shepherd of the people' (*Iliad* 2.84–6). By contrast, Thersites, the only non-heroic figure in the *Iliad* to address the assembly of warriors, is reviled not only because of his ugliness and vulgarity but also because his 'mind was full of disorderly words with which to challenge the kings, recklessly and without manners, but what he thought would be amusing to the Achaians' (*Iliad* 2.113–16), and it is made clear in what follows that Thersites not only manages to provoke the Greek leaders but also fails spectacularly to win over his general audience (*Iliad* 2.222–3).

But unlike the characters in the Homeric world, where the ordinary soldiers normally respond only with collective expressions of approval and disapproval to the speeches delivered by their superiors, the Athenians were committed, at an ideological level, to a political set-up in which anyone was entitled to voice his opinion, no matter how clumsily expressed, and according to which it was the integrity of the speaker, rather than the brilliance of his oratory, that would make his advice worth listening to. This view is, at any rate, what the fourth-century orator

Aeschines expects his audience to endorse in his speech against a rival political figure, Timarchus, who is being prosecuted for having addressed the assembly despite having lived as a male prostitute: 'For the lawgiver believed that the statements made by a decent man would be useful to his audience, even if expressed very poorly and naively. But he believed that statements from a man who has both abused his own body and shamefully squandered his paternal estate would be of no benefit to his audience, however well presented' (Aeschines, *Against Timarchus* 31).

Despite this insistence that the packaging and presentation of arguments were of only marginal importance when compared to the integrity of the speaker and the actual substance of his message, it is clear that there was a considerable gap between democratic ideology and Athenian realities. And it is indicative of this gap that, in his speech *Against Ctesiphon* 169–70, Aeschines backtracks somewhat, with the admission that oratorical skills do matter when a citizen is trying to get his message across. Here he lists five qualities that, in his view, define a democratic citizen (that is, a man who is *dēmotikos*), the fourth of which is that 'he must be of sound judgement and an able speaker. For it is a good thing when his intelligence decides on the best counsel, while the speaker's education (*paideia*) and his speech persuade his audience. Failing that, sound judgement must always take precedence over oratory.'

Given the technical as well as physical demands placed on a speaker who, when addressing collective decision-making bodies, would have needed to capture and keep the attention of hundreds and, in the Assembly, thousands of his fellow citizens, it is anything but surprising that debates in both the Council of 500 and the Assembly appear to have been dominated by a limited number of very active and experienced speakers, perhaps as few as ten to twenty citizens at any one period. This could be taken to suggest that the real world of classical Athens was perhaps not so far removed from the world of the Homeric epics, where a small group of leaders effectively monopolized the army assemblies as active speakers. The importance of voice control is evident already in the Homeric epics: it is not only heralds who are given the epithet *ligus*, 'clear-voiced', but also speakers, for example *Iliad* 1.248, 4.293 (Nestor), 2.246 (Thersites), *Odyssey* 20.273 (Telemachos); cf. Demosthenes 19.199 where the adjective *lampros* is used and 18.260 (*huperlampros*) about Aeschines' voice. The advantage that an actor such as Aeschines would have had as a public speaker because of his trained voice is discussed in Easterling (1999). The discussion of the connection between public speaking and other aspects of Athenian performance culture has focused primarily on the link between oratory and acting. But it must also be noted that a good percentage of Athenian boys received vocal training in connection with their participation in choruses (Wilson 2000: 75–6 and 84). Thus, such training would have been part of the educational experience of more Athenians than just a very narrow elite.

In fact, there is epigraphic evidence to suggest that, in fourth-century Athens, a quite considerable number of citizens also addressed mass meetings on a far less

regular basis than the most prominent speakers, perhaps proposing only one or two motions in the course of a lifetime (e.g. Hansen 1984). This, in turn, indicates that at least a very basic command of the skills and techniques required for successful public speaking was not confined to just a handful of citizens who had the leisure and wealth to devote themselves full-time to acquiring them through formal training, but that other Athenians too, who had not enjoyed the same advantage, felt sufficiently confident to mount the speaker's platform in council and Assembly, if they felt strongly enough about a particular matter.

But even on the assumption that the majority of speakers in the Assembly and council did indeed belong to a very narrow, privileged section of the community, there is yet another important point of difference between Athens and the world depicted in the Homeric epics: although an Athenian without any ambitions to make his mark in the public sphere might opt never to address the Assembly or the Council of 500, he might still end up in a situation where he would have been compelled to address a mass audience made up of hundreds of *dikastai* sitting in judgement in the Athenian popular courts. An Athenian dicastic panel was made up of a minimum of 201 men in the most straightforward private disputes; in more serious private legal actions the case would be heard by 401 *dikastai*, and in public actions the number of *dikastai* on the panel could be 501, 1,001, or even 1,501.

Scholars are currently debating the extent to which the wealthiest section of the Athenian citizen population monopolized the speaker's platform in the courts, and there can be little doubt that a comparatively narrow elite was disproportionately active as litigants in legal actions of high political importance. However, the ordinary Athenian could by no means be sure that he could altogether avoid the courtroom and the oratorical demands it entailed. Even if the majority of private disputes were settled out of court through a process of arbitration, any Athenian laying claim to an inheritance other than that left to him by his father was required to have his entitlement to it confirmed by a court. This may have been a mere formality if no other claimants appeared, but whenever an inheritance was the object of competing claims the case would be decided in a process called *diadikasia*. In this procedure all claimants were required to address the court. In the second half of the fourth century each claimant would have had between eighteen and twenty-four minutes in which to justify his claim (Aristotle, *Constitution of the Athenians* 67.2; before *c*.360 BCE the time-allowance was more than double that: [Demosthenes] 43.8). To an inexperienced speaker, even such a routine case may thus have represented a formidable challenge; yet it is highly likely that it was one which many Athenians of only modest wealth and social standing were likely to have faced at some point during their adult lives.

In a community where so much depended on the ability of the individual to influence large audiences on questions ranging from war and peace, religious issues, public finance, treason, and corruption to the more mundane matters of, for example, who had the best claim to the inheritance left by Uncle Kleonymos

(Isaeus 1), or who should be held responsible for damage to a farmhouse caused by flooding (Demosthenes 55), it is by no means surprising that the techniques of oral presentation and the methods by which they might be taught attracted the interest not only of a narrow circle of philosophers, but also of other individuals whose primary concerns were practical rather than intellectual.

This interest is reflected in the rise of the genre of treatises on practical oratory, *tekhnai*, some of which offered hands-on advice on how to compose speeches for all conceivable occasions. An excellent example of such a 'Teach Yourself Oratory' from the classical period is the so-called *Rhetoric to Alexander*, conventionally attributed to Anaximenes of Lampsakos. The origin of the genre may be traced back to the mid-fifth century BCE, with the earliest attested *tekhnai* attributed in the ancient tradition to two famous Sicilian teachers of the art of persuasion, Corax and Teisias. There is serious scholarly disagreement on the nature and contents of those fifth-century texts that have been designated by later sources as *tekhnai* (e.g. Cole 1991 and Usher 1999). Many scholars believe that they took the form of model speeches offering examples for illustration and imitation, and a good number of such model speeches do indeed survive from the late fifth century. These range from speeches set in the mythical world of the Homeric heroes, such as Gorgias' *Defence Speech on Behalf of Palamedes* and Alcidamas' *Odysseus Against Palamedes for Treason*, to Antiphon's three *Tetralogies*, for which the fictional setting is a contemporary homicide court, where each prosecutor and defendant is allowed two speeches, one main speech and one rejoinder, to argue his case (on these see Gagarin 2002: 52–62, 103–34).

Whatever the nature of the earliest *tekhnai*, there can be no doubt that the method of teaching and learning by example played a very important role in the dissemination of oratorical techniques and conventions throughout the fifth and fourth centuries. From the last third of the fifth century onwards, speeches composed in writing for actual delivery and circulated afterwards sometimes appear to have served purposes similar to the model speeches mentioned above, whether or not this had originally been intended by those who had at first put the written speech into circulation. In many cases it is possible to demonstrate on the basis of surviving speeches that entire passages were later copied and recycled by other litigants and speech-writers; thus, Demosthenes is known freely to have made use of arguments previously presented by his rival and contemporary Hyperides and vice versa (Eusebius, *Preparation for the Gospel* 10.14), and several passages in Demosthenes' speech *Against Conon for Battery* (Demosthenes 54) bear a strong resemblance to passages found in Isocrates' speech *Against Lochites* (Isocrates 20) delivered several decades earlier: see Whitehead and Rubinstein (forthcoming). Likewise, the speech-writer Lysias (19.3–4) may have lifted a passage from the introduction of Andocides' speech *On the Mysteries* (1.6–7), although it must also be considered a possibility that in 400/399 BCE, when Andocides composed his speech, collections of 'stock arguments' (*topoi*) may have circulated from which both Lysias

19.3–4 and Andocides 1.6–7 may have been derived. Less surprisingly, speech-writers as early as Antiphon often recycled their own arguments (cf. Antiphon 6.4–6 and 5.87–9, and Demosthenes 24.172–86 and 22.65–78). It is therefore highly probable that the dissemination of oratorical techniques through the written medium played a significant part in the process of establishing oratorical conventions quite early on, and that many practitioners learnt by imitation as well as from personal instruction offered by individuals who claimed to have mastered the art of argumentation.

From at least as early as the 420s instruction on how best to present an argument had turned into a commodity that could be purchased in return for a tuition fee (see e.g. Aristophanes, *Clouds* 874–6), and fee-charging establishments are also well documented for the fourth century. Thus, a litigant involved in a commercial dispute against Lacritus of Phaselis (probably just before 340 BCE) refers to Lacritus' confidence in his own powers of persuasion. This confidence he has allegedly derived from a course that he has attended at Isocrates' school for a fee of 1,000 drachmai (Demosthenes 35.15, 40–2), and which, in turn, has allowed him to attract pupils of his own. Even politically prominent citizens such as Demosthenes could plausibly be represented as engaging in the business of oratorical instruction (Aeschines 1.173–5), while Demosthenes himself is taunted by one of his contemporaries with having received formal instruction on oratorical techniques from Isaeus, who was another renowned practitioner in the field (Pytheas, fr. III.2 Baiter–Sauppe).

Although there is not sufficient evidence to allow any firm generalizations as to the nature and mix of the clientele that would frequent such educational establishments in the fifth and fourth centuries, it must be considered unlikely that an individual with little or no desire to make his mark in politics would be ready to make the investment of time and money that was required (unless he, like the metic Lacritus mentioned in Demosthenes 35, was aiming to offer instruction to others as an additional source of income). But, as pointed out above, even a man who preferred to keep a low political profile, and who would never have dreamed of voluntarily addressing the Athenian Assembly or the Council of 500, might occasionally find himself in a situation where he would be forced to address a court. To him, a number of options would be available: he might be able to persuade one or more fellow citizens to undertake most of the pleading on his behalf as supporting speakers (*sunēgoroi*); he might seek advice from someone with more experience of practical oratory than he had when preparing his own case; or he might commission an entire set speech from a speech-writer, a logographer.

A litigant who went for the third option would have had to worry primarily about his oral delivery of the written text, which he would have had to perform so convincingly that his audience would believe that his words were indeed his own. It must, however, be noted that the three options were not mutually exclusive, for it was apparently not uncommon for prospective litigants to commission scripts to be delivered by their supporting speakers (Rubinstein 2000: 25–37), and the logographer may also have played an important part in coordinating the efforts of

the different speakers who were addressing the court on the same side (Rubinstein 2003).

Numerous logographers are known to have been active in Athens and to have circulated their works from the 420s onwards, of whom the earliest firmly attested is Antiphon. [Plutarch], *Lives of the Ten Orators* 832cd reports that no speeches by Antiphon's predecessors or contemporaries have survived; however, sixty speeches attributed to Antiphon were known to the rhetorician Caecilius in the first century BCE, of which only thirty-five were deemed by him to have been genuine. It must be considered possible that at least some of the twenty-five that had been circulated under Antiphon's name had been written by his contemporaries. The earliest logographic speech to have survived from a pen other than that of Antiphon is [Lysias] 20, delivered in 410 BCE, shortly after Antiphon had been executed for treason.

Today only the works of a tiny minority survive, most of which are attributable to just seven logographers: Antiphon, Isocrates, Lysias, Isaeus, Demosthenes, Hyperides, and Dinarchus. A further four orators circulated in written (and perhaps revised) form the speeches that they themselves had delivered: Andocides, Aeschines, Lycurgus, and Apollodorus the son of Pasion, but of these only Lycurgus is known with some certainty to have composed speeches (now lost) for other people to deliver. However, the extant corpus of Attic oratory also contains a number of speeches that had been wrongly attributed to Lysias and Demosthenes in antiquity, and which can no longer be attributed to any particular author (e.g. [Lysias] 6, 20 and [Demosthenes] 43, 44, 47, 58). These speeches are valuable as evidence for speech-writing as it was practised by less famous logographers, and they contribute, albeit in a very limited way, to making the surviving corpus more representative.

An important reason for the development of the—probably lucrative—business of ghost-writing forensic speeches in classical Athens was that it was a criminal offence for a litigant to pay others to plead his case on his behalf. A supporting speaker had to present his audience with a plausible reason for his contribution to the case. While he might be able to justify his intervention in a public action with reference to the general political interest that the case could command, it would be much harder for a supporting speaker to justify his participation in a private legal case concerning an inheritance, a business contract, or something similar, unless he could demonstrate a credible personal connection with the litigant whom he was assisting. While such a friend or relative might well have been better able than the main litigant to present the case, he might still benefit from a script provided in advance by a logographer. We owe the survival of many of the speeches extant in the corpus of Attic oratory to this reliance on ghost-writers by both main litigants and their supporters; and the composition of the corpus also reflects, to some degree, the practical needs of litigants involved in different types of legal action as either prosecutors or defendants.

The clear limitations on a litigant's choice of potential supporters in a private case explains why forty-six of a total of fifty-five extant speeches composed for delivery

in private legal actions were ghost-written by logographers to be performed by others. (Speeches composed for delivery in private litigation by the speech-writer himself are: Demosthenes 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, [46], [49], [50], [52]. The bracketed speeches were written by Apollodorus, son of Pasion, for delivery in his own lawsuits. Private speeches ghost-written by logographers for delivery by others are Antiphon 1 and 6, Lysias 1, 3, 4, 10, 17, 23, 32; Isocrates 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21; Isaeus 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12; Demosthenes 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, [43], [44], 45, [47], 48, 54, 55, 56; Hyperides 5 *Against Athenogenes*.)

Conversely, the fact that a litigant initiating a politically significant legal action as prosecutor would almost by definition have appeared by choice may explain why only five such prosecutors felt the need to commission their speeches from logographers (Lysias 22, 30; Demosthenes 23, 24, [58]); note that eleven public prosecution speeches were delivered by the speech-writers themselves: Lysias 12; Demosthenes 19, 20, 21, [53], [59] (which was written by Apollodoros who delivered all but sixteen paragraphs of the speech), Aeschines 1 and 3, Lycurgus 1, Hyperides 1 *Against Demosthenes*, 4 *Against Philip*. The majority of the surviving speeches ghost-written for individuals involved in public actions were written for supporting speakers (Lysias 6, 13, 14, 15, 27, 28, 29; Demosthenes 22, 25, [26]; Dinarchus 1, 2, 3), who may have been chosen for reasons other than simply their oratorical skills (Rubinstein 2003: 202–6), and for defendants who had clearly not themselves chosen to appear in court on what were often very serious charges (Antiphon 5; Lysias 5, 7, 9, 18, 19, [20], 21, 25; Isaeus 11; Demosthenes 57; Hyperides 2 *For Lycophron*). Four celebrated defence speeches were delivered by the speech-writers personally: Andocides 1, Demosthenes 18, Hyperides 3 *For Euxenippus*, Aeschines 2.

The level of literacy required if the logographer's client was to learn his script and perform his part convincingly probably restricted the clientele of even a mediocre logographer to citizens and metics whose financial resources and educational attainment were above average. Hence, it is probably no coincidence that only three speakers in the entire surviving corpus of Attic oratory declare themselves to be poor people from a poor background (Lysias 24, [Demosthenes] 44, and Demosthenes 57). Although claims about poverty are made also by other speakers, they form part of the litigants' account of their own descent 'from riches to rags' (e.g. Isocrates 18, Isaeus 2, and Demosthenes 27–8), which leaves no doubt as to the speakers' well-heeled origins.

Thus, when using the works of the Attic orators as sources for Athenian legal and social history one must constantly take into account the heavy bias towards wealth in the material. That bias also presents problems for any attempt to generalize on Athenian courtroom practices and on the extent to which knowledge of oratorical conventions was disseminated across the broader population. The litigant of limited financial means and literacy, for whom the services of a professional logographer were out of reach, may have been able to obtain advice from others as to how best

to present his case, and he may also have been able to draw on his own experience as a regular judge and assembly-goer listening to other people's lawsuits and political harangues. Such a litigant may have been able to apply certain conventions in practice without receiving extensive instruction, but his oral performance will have left no trace in our record.

It is not only when we consider the social standing of individual speakers that the corpus of surviving Attic oratory must be regarded as potentially unrepresentative of Athenian oratorical practice. By far the majority of surviving speeches were written for delivery in court, while only very few of them were written for delivery in the Assembly and before the Council of 500. As far as Assembly speeches are concerned, the surviving material is heavily dominated by the output of Demosthenes, who circulated at least twelve speeches purportedly delivered in the Athenian Assembly (Demosthenes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17). Two further speeches which circulated under Demosthenes' name, 7 and 13, may in fact have been written and delivered by less prominent contemporary political figures. The Demosthenic material further includes a collection of fifty-six short introductions (*prooimia*) to deliberative speeches. Why this collection was circulated and by whom is not known, but it cannot be ruled out that it served as educational material akin to the collections of *topoi* that may have circulated already early in the fifth century BCE.

Demosthenes' collection of *prooimia* is, arguably, an undervalued source for rhetorical conventions as applied in deliberative oratory, but they offer only limited help on the important question of the extent to which Demosthenes' deliberative speeches in their entirety were typical of the kind of oratory that would generally be performed in the Assembly and Council. Demosthenes appears to have adopted an unusual course of action when circulating his speeches in writing. Among the speeches ascribed to Lysias, only one (Lysias 28) was addressed to the Assembly—not, however, as part of a political debate, but by a prosecutor in an *eisangelia*, where the Assembly took on the function of a court. The surviving speeches addressing the Council of 500 (Lysias 16, 24, 26, 31; Demosthenes 51) were likewise performed in formal procedures that resembled litigation rather than open political debates. The only possible pre-Demosthenic example of a true deliberative speech is Andocides 3 *On the Peace with Sparta*, the authenticity of which has recently been questioned (Harris 2000). But even if it is genuine, it does not provide enough comparative material for us to assess Demosthenes' place in the tradition of Attic deliberative oratory.

Scholars tend to explain the poor representation of deliberative speeches in the corpus of Attic oratory by pointing to the need for speakers to improvise during the actual debates in Council and Assembly, which might in many cases have made a prepared script a hindrance rather than a help. This would not have been the case in a law-court, where the fixed order of the speakers as well as the pre-trial proceedings would have made the whole process far more predictable.

Similar problems arise in connection with speeches composed for public occasions of celebration and commemoration, the so-called epideictic speeches, of which only two of the surviving six are agreed by modern scholars to have been written for actual delivery (Demosthenes 60 and Hyperides 6). Here, however, the observation on preparation versus improvisation cannot adequately explain the poor survival rate of this genre of oratory (indeed, several titles of epideictic speeches have survived among the lost works of the Attic orators); it may, rather, reflect a lower degree of interest in epideictic oratory shown by later generations. But it must also be noted that the individuals elected to deliver such speeches were typically chosen because of their prominent political standing and the quality of their oratory. This would have made the services of a professional speech-writer entirely redundant and thus have reduced the chances that the speech would have been circulated in a written form.

So although the fourth-century manuals on eloquence treat the conventions of epideictic and deliberative as well as forensic oratory, it is only in the area of forensic oratory that we are in a good position to compare rhetorical theory and oratorical practice. Moreover, it is not only the unrepresentative nature of the surviving speeches that makes it difficult to generalize on the development of Attic oratory in the classical period. The very diverse nature of the extant forensic speeches also has profound implications for modern attempts to compare and contrast fourth-century theory on eloquence and Athenian oratorical practice, particularly during the period prior to the composition of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. For that period our evidence for theoretical developments is limited and difficult to interpret. For example, much interest has been devoted by modern scholars to the question when rhetorical theorists began operating with a clear scheme of oratorical division for forensic speeches (*logoi dikanikoi*), that is, the sections of introduction (*prooimion*), narrative (*diēgēsis*), proof (*pistis*), and epilogue (*epilogos*), and the extent to which the development and refinements of the theory may be reflected in the extant works of the Attic orators when subjected to diachronic analysis covering the period from *c*.420 to 322 BCE (e.g. Usher 1999).

Although many of the surviving speeches clearly conform to some of the organizational principles prescribed by later theorists, a large number testify to the flexibility of oratorical practice and the freedom with which a logographer could tailor his product to meet the actual procedural needs of a particular client. It is a characteristic of most of the speeches composed for delivery by supporting speakers that they contain no narrative section at all. This tendency persists throughout the period, and it clearly reflects the fact that supporting speakers would not normally be required to retell the story already told by the main litigant. Likewise, although many speeches do contain *prooimia* that conform beautifully to the prescriptions offered in later textbooks, many litigants involved in private actions deliver only a very perfunctory introduction before embarking on their narrative, and some of

them simply skip the introductory flourish altogether (Rubinstein 2000: 39, 59–61). Again, there is no indication that the omission of a *prooimion* from a forensic speech became either more or less frequent between *c.*420 and 322. Some later theorists regarded the absence of a *prooimion* as a mark of an unadorned ('pure') style; but the omission of a *prooimion* may further reflect the very real time-constraints of Athenian private actions, in which each of the opposing litigants were allocated a maximum of fifty-two minutes to present his case. And finally, several speeches preserved in the corpus contain no elaborate *epilogos* section in the conventional sense (e.g. Antiphon 6, Isocrates 21, Isaeus 3, Demosthenes 22, 29, 30, 31, 34, [44], 50, Dinarchus 3).

The fact that so many of the surviving forensic speeches depart from what has come to be regarded as the 'traditional' four-part division in Greek rhetorical theory might be taken to suggest that the theoretical works and manuals of oratory of antiquity should be read and interpreted by us as primarily prescriptive rather than as works that reflect upon and systematize existing oratorical conventions and practices, at least as far as Athenian oratory of the classical period is concerned. Moreover, on that basis it might be argued that a gap between rhetorical theory and oratorical practice was beginning to open as early as the fourth century BCE, at least as far as the organization of a speech was concerned. The alternative has been to maintain that surviving fourth-century forensic speeches deviating from that pattern have either been incompletely preserved (e.g. Isocrates 21 and Dinarchus 3) or else extensively revised prior to their circulation for a reading audience. This was frequently asserted, especially by nineteenth-century scholars, but, on the whole, scholars tend now to be more cautious. It is possible that the gap between fourth-century theory and practice may in fact not be as great as suggested above. To be sure, it is quite clear that theorists had been interested in the question how best to structure a speech well before these two treatises were composed. At least some of the treatises written by Anaximenes' and Aristotle's predecessors appear to have discussed the issue; but it also appears that there was an ongoing debate on this question, and that the four-part division had by no means been established as in any way 'canonical'. Indeed, some theorists proposed far more elaborate schemes, some of which operated with more than four parts.

Among the most famous attestations of the principles of arrangement as set out in earlier fourth-century rhetorical treatises is Plato's *Phaedrus* 266d–267a. In this passage Socrates makes a jibe at Theodorus of Byzantium (a theorist whose work cannot be dated with certainty) for having operated with a very complex organizational scheme with elaborate subdivision of different parts of the speech. Theodorus clearly had his followers, and in his *Rhetoric* 1414b13–15 Aristotle is explicitly criticizing their scheme which prescribed a division of the *diēgēsis* and of the proof section into several subsections. Aristotle's argumentation in this chapter as a whole (1414a30–b18) asserts that it is pointless to attempt an organizational

scheme more elaborate than that of the four parts of *prooimion*, *prothesis* (i.e. 'exposition', which in forensic orations may include a narrative setting out the facts of the case to be argued), *pistis*, and *epilogos*.

This does not mean that Aristotle himself is in any way advocating a rigid adherence to the four-part division: he states explicitly that the four parts constitute the maximum possible, and that there are only two parts which must necessarily form part of any speech, namely *prothesis* and *pistis*. Indeed, he denounces as 'ridiculous' the (alleged) attempts by his unnamed rivals and contemporaries to prescribe a four-part scheme as an absolute requirement. He points out that such a prescription ignores not only the difference between the deliberative, epideictic, and forensic genres, but also the fact that the structure of a forensic oration often needs to be adjusted according to the nature of the case in which the litigant is involved. As an example he points out (1414b5–7) that a short forensic speech, or a speech delivered in a case that is simple and easy to remember, does not require an *epilogos* section, just as a single, systematic narrative section makes no sense as a requirement in a deliberative speech. Both of these reservations correspond to practices attested in surviving examples of Attic oratory as outlined earlier, and the same is true of his later warning (1415a24–5) that *prooimia* should not be used in simple, short cases.

A similarly flexible approach is adopted in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*. For example, the advice on the organization of a prosecution speech provides the prospective speaker with a choice of either producing a sustained narrative part following the *prooimion* or distributing his exposition of the facts of the case in appropriate places across the argumentative section (1442b28–33). Interestingly, his recommended organization of a defence speech contains no narrative section at all—and this advice, too, corresponds to a practice that can be observed in a good number of Attic defence speeches. Thus, neither Aristotle's *Rhetoric* nor Anaximenes' *Rhetoric to Alexander* does in fact promote the four-part division as a rigid scheme to be adhered to in connection with forensic speeches, let alone in connection with deliberative or epideictic speeches.

As far as organizational principles are concerned, there is, then, no obvious gap between their prescriptions and the variety of practices that can be observed in surviving oratory from the period. It is more difficult to assess the extent to which Greek theory and practice continued to develop in tandem over the following centuries. No actual text of a deliberative, forensic, or epideictic speech has been preserved from the Hellenistic period; on the other hand, what we do have is a rich epigraphical record pertaining to international relations between Hellenistic city-states. Many of these inscriptions contain summaries of main points made by envoys from one state when addressing the assembly of another, of which a good number explicitly commend the speakers for the zeal and good-will that they have displayed in their oratory. This material constitutes a still under-researched source

for Greek oratory as a living tradition, which continued well into the Roman period. The inscriptions leave no doubt that well-organized, coherent, and attractive oral presentations remained of great importance, not only at Athens but across the Greek world.

Suggested Reading

Since 1998 reliable and eminently readable English translations of the works of the Attic orators have been published in the series The Oratory of Classical Greece by the University of Texas Press. Commentaries on selected speeches by Antiphon, Lysias, and Demosthenes have been published in the series Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics, which are useful to readers with a basic command of Greek. For a diachronic survey of the works of the Attic orators with brief summaries of the individual speeches, see Usher (1999). A good discussion of the earliest of the Attic orators, Antiphon, and his place in the Athenian oratorical and philosophical tradition, can be found in Gagarin (2002). Kennedy (1963) remains a classic introduction to Greek rhetorical theory and oratorical practice, although the reader will need to supplement this work with more recent scholarship. Worthington (1994) contains a wide range of contributions, accessible to the non-specialist, on Attic oratory as well as Greek rhetorical theory. For a discussion, with useful bibliographical references, of Demosthenes' deliberative oratory see Milns (2000). Loraux (1986) still provides the most comprehensive introduction to the genre of epideictic oratory and its conventions. Lavency (1964) is the most comprehensive work on Athenian logography, which has not yet been superseded by any work in English; a seminal chapter in this book was published in English as Lavency (2007).

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CHAPTER 42

LOW PHILOSOPHY

WILLIAM D. DESMOND

'WHAT do you do, Socrates?' Such is the half-exasperated question that Socrates poses to himself in Plato's *Apology* (20c), on behalf of all who might be listening to his defence speech in puzzlement. *Philosophia* is a Greek coinage of course, and from the time of Pythagoras to the end of pagan antiquity Greek cities especially were familiar with men called 'philosophers'. Yet there was often something uncanny about them. What is a philosopher? And what is philosophy? Socrates philosophized in the streets of Athens, but when he explained himself to the farmers, craftsmen, and other fellow citizens who judged him in that famous trial, they seem (at least in Plato's version) to have shouted out in anger and surprise at his bold contentions. For in my case, Socrates asserts, philosophy is a type of service to Apollo in Delphi: the philosopher does God's work on earth.

It is a remarkable statement, and fairly representative of ancient philosophy as a whole. The variety of modes of ancient philosophy should not distract one from this central commonality: the mathematician who contemplates the eternal rationality of numbers and shapes; the astronomer who studies *ta meteōra*, the visible gods of the stars and planets; the biologist who discovers divine intelligence even in the anatomy of fish and other contemptible creatures; the visionary like Parmenides who grasps the necessary unity of Being; the seer like Empedocles who recalls past lives and remembers that he is a god exiled to earth; the Platonist who 'remembers' through sensuous particulars some divine Forms and a Good 'beyond *ousia*', and so strives to 'become like God'; an Aristotle who exhorts his readers to struggle to 'become immortal', and for whom the whole cosmos is animated by a desire for the divine actuality; the Cynic who prides himself as the 'scout of God', though armed only with words and a staff; the Stoic who also strives to identify himself with the

self-sufficient, divine cosmos; the Epicurean who lives hidden in his 'Garden' like the gods in their *intermundia*, tranquil in his knowledge of the atomic causes of things—all of these are variations upon the theme that the philosopher is a 'divine man'. In multiple ways, philosophy becomes a very personal search for ways to conquer or transcend finitude—pain, suffering, loss, death.

Many of these philosophers were admired for their high-mindedness and courage. But not always: Socrates was put to death for impiety; other classical Greek thinkers were threatened with similar fates, including Aristotle; philosophers were banished from Rome several times by both Senate and emperors; equally imperiously, Petronius' freedman Trimalchio planned to end his epitaph with—*numquam philosophum audivit* ('he never studied with a philosopher', *Satyricon* 71). On the other hand, one reads of many public honours, crowns, and statues accorded to philosophers. In 176 CE Marcus Aurelius established chairs for the four major schools (Academics, Peripatetics, Stoics, Epicureans) in Athens. Busts and statues of philosophers were popular, and tended to portray the thinker in an idealizing way, as an older man, calm, alert, a commanding presence with his full beard, high forehead, and deep-set eyes. Like Rodin's 'Thinker' or Rembrandt's figure meditating in a dark room, these ancient thinkers are also powerfully introspective. Their eyes are not unseeing, but they seem preoccupied by some thought greater than immediate realities. Here are princes of thought, kings of the spirit, and their power is in words, ideas, and knowledge.

Such considerations could heighten one's suspicion that ancient philosophy was a 'high' enterprise—gravely serious, difficult, an activity for the elite and aloof 'few', not for the benighted 'many'. Philosophers ask the big questions, use big words, and fashion long, involved arguments. Nobody understands philosophers; none of Socrates' contemporaries could fathom him (Plato, *Symposium* 216c7). Most of all, one might assume that philosophy is always the high adventure of *reason*, in the sense of disciplined thought: by thinking about phenomena and about thought itself, the philosopher articulates an objective and comprehensive system of ideas that will be adequate to all experience. Such deliberate, systematic thought interprets particulars by means of universals, and contingency by reference to necessary ideas. Its abstract *skhēmata* and categories force the thinker to suppress emotion, prejudice, personality, and all that is *merely* subjective. The 'high' philosopher, therefore, is above passion, and he speaks in an abstract language above that of the ordinary patois of work and desire. Among modern thinkers, Hegel might be taken as a representative of high philosophy, but Hegel saw himself in many ways as completing Aristotle. Certainly, the average reader of Aristotle's multifaceted work senses the pull of a powerful, systematic mind struggling to understand a wide range of phenomena, both on their own terms, and in the context of a universal *skhēma*. But for all its breadth, the oeuvre betrays little about Aristotle the man—Stagirite, son of a court doctor, student of Plato, teacher of Alexander, husband, slave-owner, friend, metic. Philosophy in an Aristotelian vein speaks a language almost of its

own making, with unusual words like substance, accident, matter, form, actuality, potentiality, entelechy, and the like. As with Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy*, the ideal here seems to be that *Philosophia* herself speak directly to the mortal devotee, who loses himself in that higher music. *Mutatis mutandis*, these remarks could apply also to the Stoic, Epicurean, and Neoplatonist schools.

And yet there are other dimensions to ancient thinkers, even the systematic ones, which sit uneasily with such a high philosophy. Let us therefore sketch its opposite, and call a philosophy 'low' when it tends to focus not on a completed architectonic, but on the living thinker; not on necessary or universal thoughts, but on the lived particulars that inspire, ground, and transcend them; not on the eternal and objective, but the immediate and subjective. What a thinker is, does, and says is more important than books, formal arguments, and system-building. In brief, a low philosophy concentrates upon character and its perfection. If a high philosophy stresses reason, system, treatises, the rare intelligence of elites, and their organized work through schools, museums, and libraries, as each generation of thinkers adds to a collective, expanding tradition, a low philosophy stresses, by contrast, the irrepressible plurality of experience. Here the individual self is the foremost reality, a little world, 'city', or 'citadel' unto himself. Many different perspectives resist being unified into a single empire of thought; feelings, stray ideas, and insights resist being incorporated into an all-powerful system; the possible modes of thought and objects of experience cannot be squeezed into a single table of categories. Therefore to a high monism is opposed a low pluralism; to the organized Schools, a rag-tag of anarchic individuals; to the cult of books, the living word and the even more animate deed. Finally, because abstraction and intellectual complexity seem to have little relevance to immediate experience, a low philosophy thinks relatively humble things. Clear-headed, the low philosopher does not try to unravel the Schools' conundrums on their own terms but, like Alexander, cuts through the Gordian knot. Shunning the highfalutin claims of ontology, epistemology, and cosmology as mere 'smoke', the low philosopher is content to talk about more accessible concerns, ethics most of all.

To a high Hegel and Aristotle, therefore, one might oppose a low Nietzsche and Diogenes. For among modern thinkers, Nietzsche is distinguished by his stress on subjective disposition, motive, strength of will, and intuition. The true philosopher has character and style: he is not just a living encyclopaedia, or as Plato's Socrates says, a barrel filled with arguments and doctrines. Nietzsche himself admired many archaic and classical Greek thinkers less for their dated doctrines and *ipsissima verba* than for their energy and heroic pride—Empedocles, Democritus, Heraclitus, and even Plato, whose longing for the eternal Nietzsche hated but whose personal verve and creative imagination was 'the finest product of antiquity' (*Beyond Good and Evil*, Preface). In particular, Nietzsche and some of his post-modern successors (e.g. Foucault) admired Cynics like Diogenes—and, following Nietzsche's suggestion, one might take the Cynics as representing the antipodes of Aristotle: they

mocked logicians, dialecticians, and intellectual types; they scorned most topics other than ethics and politics; they left no systematic treatises but only a rag-bag miscellany of dialogues, tragedies, letters, and poems. Most of all, they bequeathed memories of themselves, their 'low' sayings, and shameless philosophical antics: going about almost naked (i.e. with just one worn cloak, the *tribōn*), sleeping in temples and unused wine-jars, farting and masturbating in public, preaching in the market-places, haranguing passers-by for their vanity, vices, and hypocritical attachment to socially defined norms. For such shameful behaviour Diogenes was known to Athens (even to Aristotle himself) simply as 'the Dog'. His followers in turn were called 'Dogs', the dog-philosophers, *kunikoi*, and hence in English, Cynics.

The Cynics' relative lack of respect for 'high' philosophical complexity inspired a debate in antiquity as to whether Cynicism was a philosophy, or merely a 'way of life', that is, a lifestyle without any deep justification. The debate has continued into modern scholarship. Yet these low philosophers were arguably the most faithful to some of the most potent ideals of Greek ethics: for instance, to the ideal of subjective freedom and the refusal to acquiesce blindly to mere custom and accepted opinion—an intellectual freedom also exemplified in Plato's dialectical conversations, for instance; to the ideal of virtue, which dominates attitudes from Homer's heroic *aretē* to the philosophers' 'human excellences'; and to the ideal of self-sufficiency, for it was always felt that the individual, the city, and God should be strong enough not to need others. These ideals were taken to an extreme in the Cynic philosophy of renunciation, simplicity, and a life 'according to nature'. For the motto of Cynicism was 'to deface the coinage' (*parakharattein to nomisma*), a metaphor for putting conventional customs, goods, and practices out of circulation: the Cynics renounced work, the use of money, marriage, citizenship, worship of the gods, war. No citizen of a Greek city, Diogenes claimed to be a *kosmopolitēs*, a citizen of the cosmos (perhaps a Cynic neologism); Crates claimed to be a 'citizen of Diogenes', of poverty, and of *Pēra* (i.e. 'travelling bag'). As rootless wanderers, the Cynics travelled from city to city, living off the land, begging, sleeping in the open, in temples, porticoes, or wherever they could, and preaching to all and sundry that in having little one desires little, and so can be satisfied with little. Only by stripping away unnecessary wants and ideas and by living in the fullness of the moment can one escape the pettiness, injustice, and avarice of conventional life. In living *now* and not for the future or past, the Cynic becomes strong, healthy, temperate, honest and just, wise, even generous, and noble: in a word, the Cynic is virtuous. But 'virtue is sufficient for happiness', and so the Cynic is happy. He has learned the wisdom of the dog, which is content to live as nature made it, without pride, false expectations, or doomed ambitions. But like dogs, the Cynic also lives among human beings, for *their* betterment: the Cynic claims to be both a guard-dog and an attack-dog, barking and snarling at vice, raising his hackles in defence of virtue. Dio Cassius tells the story, for instance, of how in 75 CE one Cynic was whipped

and another beheaded for criticizing Titus in the amphitheatre for his scandalous affair with Berenice. If such Cynics took their *parrhēsia* (freedom of speech) to such extremes, they could plausibly accuse other Schools, notably Stoics (e.g. Seneca), of hypocrisy.

For other reasons too, it would be superficial to dismiss these low dog-philosophers as marginal, as a merely 'minor Socratic school', or a fringe-group of rootless malcontents who really had no place in the glory that was Greece. The ideas they represented must have struck a chord, for it was a widespread and long-lived movement that exercised a manifold, if subterranean, influence. First, the place-names of the first generation of Cynics indicate that they hailed from across the Greek world of the mid- to late fourth century BCE: Diogenes was from Sinope on the Black Sea, Crates from Thebes, Onesicritus from Aegina, Monimus from Syracuse, Hipparchia and Metrocles from Maroneia in Thrace. Their social backgrounds seem equally diverse: Diogenes was the son of a banker; Crates, Hipparchia, and Metrocles came from landed wealth; Monimus was a slave, while Onesicritus was in the pay of Alexander the Great. Among later Cynics, Bion of Borysthenes was the son of a fishmonger and prostitute; Dio of Prusa inherited wealth before he was cast down by Fortune (i.e. Domitian's decree) and forced to wander Cynic-like for some fourteen years among the peasants, hunters, and fishermen of the north-eastern provinces of the empire. Given such backgrounds, it is incorrect to label Cynicism as the 'philosophy of the proletariat'—even if its ethic of frugality and self-sufficiency did tend to celebrate the virtues of the poor.

In terms of influence too, Cynicism was hardly marginal. First, the early Stoics Zeno and Cleanthes were deeply influenced by the Cynics before them: Zeno 'heard' Crates, was said to have written his scandalous *Republic* 'on the dog's tail', and thus he gave to Stoicism a core of Cynic ethics which it never lost. For the Stoics as for Cynics, the inner self (Stoic *hēgemonikon* or 'ruling principle') can be 'invincible' before external, uncontrollable Fortune: the wise are able to access this inner calm, and for them poverty, exile, dishonour, pain, and death are not evils to be feared. The influential Stoic Epictetus respected Cynicism as almost the highest vocation (*Discourses* 3.22). Stoicism became essentially the philosophy of Roman officialdom, and the wheel comes full circle when such 'philosopher-kings' as Marcus Aurelius and Julian express the highest respect for the early Cynics, or when Dio Chrysostom may have addressed his four orations on ideal kingship to none other than Caesar, son of the Divine Nerva, Trajanus Optimus Augustus Germanicus. These orations are replete with Cynic anecdotes and sentiments, and indeed the Cynics (like the Stoics) habitually claimed that only the philosopher is a true 'king'.

Of course, the inner Cynic kingdom was not exactly of this world, yet its ideas were compelling enough for a very different culture to feel their pull. From the Church Fathers back to St Paul of Tarsus, distant echoes of Cynic voices can be heard: 'the love of money is the root of all evil', says the Apostle in his first letter to

Timothy (1 Timothy 6: 10), but compare such pagan precedents as Crates' 'the love of money is the mother-city of evil' (Diogenes Laertius 6.50). Whether coincidence or not, Nazareth was some twenty miles from Gadara, home to Cynic writers Menippus, Meleager, and Oenomaus. It may be in quasi-Cynic style, then, that Jesus' parables draw wisdom from the animal world and encourage ordinary people not to envy the 'great', for the kingdom of God is within: 'Consider the lilies of the field: they toil not, neither do they spin. And yet I say unto you, that even Solomon in all his glory was not attired as one of these' (Matthew 6: 28–9).

The spread of Cynic literary influence is also noteworthy. Some Cynics seem to have been remarkably inventive writers, despite coming at the end of a rich tradition that seemed to many to have exhausted all possibilities (see e.g. Aristophanes, *Frogs* 92–7). Crates' surviving fragments are clever, funny, rich in metaphor and word-play. Cercidas of Megalopolis invented the meliambic metre for his ethico-political message. The diatribe may well have its roots in street-preaching, Cynic style, where the teacher would 'shadow-box' with interlocutors, asking and answering questions and objections in a direct, punchy style (see e.g. Epictetus' *Discourses* as well as Roman satire). Menippus of Gadara mixed verse and prose to bequeath the so-called Menippean Satire to Varro, Seneca, Petronius, Martianus Capella, and Boethius. Lucian too seems to have looked back to Menippus for his 'Dialogues of the Dead', 'Sale of Lives', and other satires. Cynic authors wrote dialogues, letters, poems of various kinds, from epigrams to Homeric parodies, and maybe even tragedies. Perhaps the Cynics were unusually inventive and eclectic both because they sought ways of expression different from accepted, conventional ones, and because they were motivated by the ideal of *philanthrōpia*, and in their love for mankind wanted all others, high and low, to recognize that one does not need many things to be happy.

Furthermore, the fact that the Cynics adopted a wide variety of literary forms should alert one to the rich pluralism of ancient philosophical expression in general, and the complex interplay between philosophers and non-philosophers. These many forms include the dialogue, the letter, the poem, the proverb and maxim, the allegory, and the fable. Dialogues are among the most famous products of antiquity, written not only by Plato but also by Xenophon and other Socratics, Aristotle, Cicero, Lucian, and Augustine. The dialogue is not always dialectical in Platonic fashion, nor is it the teacher who asks all the questions. Roles are often reversed: a student or someone in the crowd asks the wise man a question, he answers, and so wisdom passes to a new generation. One reported conversation with the sage Pittacus provides a *reductio ad absurdum* of this style: 'What is agreeable?' (Pittacus is asked) 'Time.' 'What is obscure?' 'The future.' 'What is trustworthy?' 'The earth.' 'What is untrustworthy?' 'The sea' (Diogenes Laertius 1.77). At a far deeper level, Augustine's *Confessions* might be considered a type of dialogue, for Augustine is recalling a life, thus conducting a dialogue of sorts between his present and past self, and between the totality of his self and God. Other potential variations of the

genre are more monological: Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations* are actually entitled 'To Himself'—notes to self jotted down at stray moments between labours of state. It is a rich saying of Plato, therefore, when he defined thinking as the 'soul's dialogue with itself' (*Theaetetus* 189e, *Sophist* 264a).

Another sort of one-way dialogue is represented by the letter, in which one person carefully formulates insights for the instruction or encouragement of another, often an act of love and friendship. Letters can range from the 'high' to the low. Epicurus' *Letters* to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoecus are dense philosophical statements, while Seneca's 124 *Moral Epistles* to Lucilius are more diffuse as they artfully nudge the young man towards virtue and self-knowledge. Plato's *Letters* are usually considered spurious, with the possible exception of the Seventh, yet they are nevertheless intellectually often quite 'respectable'. Diogenes and Crates may have written letters, and the genre's popularity is reflected in its many semi-philosophical practitioners. Here personality intrudes more forcefully, in works like the *Cynic Letters* or the other fictional letters included by Diogenes in his *Lives*. Here one famous philosopher is made to speak with another, or the writer imagines, for instance, what the great Aristotle might have said to Alexander the Great, or Heraclitus to Darius. Horace addresses his *Epistles* (which include the *Ars Poetica*) to a variety of individuals, as he blends ideas of different schools with his own rich experience.

If poets like Horace could borrow from philosophers, philosophers returned the compliment such that the borders between 'disciplines' could become hazy. Certain Cynics were fairly accomplished poets. Some of Crates' satirical verse is still extant, notably the Homeric pastiche in which he locates Utopia in the 'city' of *Pēra*, i.e. the Cynic's 'travelling bag'. Diogenes is said by some to have written tragedies (e.g. a *Thyestes*), while Meleager of Gadara is one of the first and most important poets to have contributed to the *Greek Anthology*. Like the Cynics, other philosophers may have criticized the poets as spokesmen of traditional religious and ethical views, but they often wrote in verse themselves, sometimes exclusively so: Xenophanes, Parmenides, Empedocles, and Lucretius wrote only in the august hexameters of epic and the oracles, while Solon with his elegies was considered one of the original Seven Sages. Boethius, 'last of the Romans', wrote philosophical songs in his *Consolation of Philosophy*. According to legend Plato wrote tragedies, but burned them after first hearing Socrates argue; several beautiful lyrics to Dion and other lovers are attributed to him, and certainly, he is one of the most poetic of philosophic writers. Aristotle wrote lyric verse in praise of Plato, and a hymn to virtue; Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus* is often anthologized. Such practices belie any notions of an 'ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry'; on the contrary, poetry is for Aristotle 'more philosophical than history' (*Poetics* 1451b4–7), and in his *Lectures on Aesthetics* Hegel makes poetry (e.g. Sophocles' *Antigone*) the most philosophical of arts. In turn, there are semi-philosophical poets like Lucan and Persius (both tutored by the Stoic, Lucius Annaeus Cornutus). Juvenal's Tenth Satire

('The Vanity of Human Wishes') could be seen as a meditation upon the good, in the teleological tradition of Socrates. Varro postulated no less than 288 possible philosophical sects, distinguished by their conception of the highest good (Augustine, *City of God* 19.1), but where might he have put Juvenal with his proverbial *mens sana in corpore sano*? Virgil and Ovid draw richly on many traditions. And poets can impress some as more genuinely thoughtful than philosophers: why did Dante choose Virgil as his guide rather than the divine Plato, or *Seneca noster*? Why, in his *Birth of Tragedy*, did Nietzsche regard Hesiod, Pindar, and Aeschylus as more profound than much post-Socratic philosophy?

Of course, the 'many' and the 'low' do not generally read the metaphysical poets, but more often find insight in those hallowed, concentrated sayings, proverbs. Proverbs inspire philosophers too, who spin around these homely truths a more complex web of higher speculation. Here are some brief examples. (1) 'Friends hold all things in common.' The proverb was particularly important for Epicurus' 'Garden' with its close circle of philosophical comrades. In Plato's ideal state, the elite will be 'friends' who share their entire lives together—property, spouses, children, education, and work. (2) 'Truth in wine' is something of a cliché, yet still indirect inspiration for much symposiastic literature: wine loosens the tongues of a variety of characters, leading to some lively exchanges, as in the *Symposium* of Plato and of Xenophon, and even Petronius' *Satyricon* and Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistae* ('Dinner of Wise Men'), which features a symposium of Cynics (almost paradoxically, they eat lentils and drink water!). All of these works celebrate a variety of views, some of them quite 'low': Plato's *Symposium* does not simply march towards Socrates' exposition of Platonic catechism, and it ends with a real drinking-party as Alcibiades nearly picks a fight with Socrates and everyone (except Socrates) gets drunk. (3) Another cliché remains philosophy's greatest challenge: 'Know thyself.' As if in response to this command from Apollo, Heraclitus states, 'I have searched myself' (22 B101 DK), and claims to have found the soul infinite (B45). Many other thinkers offer their views of what a human being truly is—whether a fallen god (Empedocles), a 'heavenly plant' and immortal soul (Plato), a 'rational animal' in which soul and its proper matter interpenetrate (Aristotle), or a mere conglutination of atoms (Epicurus). These forms of self-knowledge or self-perception, in turn, determine whole ethical and political systems. (4) Another injunction, said to have been written in gold letters on the walls of Delphi, is 'nothing overmuch'. In the same spirit, the doctrine of *metriopatheia* (moderation of the passions), Aristotle's definition of virtue as a mean between extremes, even the notion of *isēgoria* (equal right of speech) and the invention of democracy, have been located within the shared cultural milieu of a love of balance, symmetry, and harmony, where no one element dominates 'too much'. (5) Finally, one of the most common epistemological dicta is that 'like knows like'. This is almost a philosophical proverb in itself, invoked to postulate that there must be an underlying unity between mind and its object. This is a great theme of Plato's *Timaeus*, of Aristotle ('the

mind is somehow all things'), and of Hegel's absolute idealism. Could this rich philosophical dictum be seen as an extension of a great many more humble proverbs that resemble the English 'birds of a feather flock together'—'God draws like to like', 'crow to crow', 'one nail drives out another', 'thief catches thief', and 'hand washes hand'?

Proverbs and maxims like these are the crown of that final expression of 'low' wisdom which we will consider briefly—the fable, first attributed to the slave Aesop around the mid-sixth century BCE. A fable, of course, is a short story, usually about animals and illustrating a general truth or 'moral': the competition between the North Wind and the Sun to remove a traveller's cloak exemplifies the great truth, 'Persuasion over Force'; the Crow who drops stones into a jar in order to get at the water at the bottom shows how 'necessity is the mother of invention'; or the Tortoise who outruns the Rabbit demonstrates that 'slow and steady wins the race'. The Cynics, of course, admired the wisdom of animals, and it was said that Diogenes had a revelation of sorts as he watched a mouse running around, 'not looking for a place to sleep, not fearing the dark, not longing for so-called sweets' (Diogenes Laertius 6.22). Fables have been immensely popular. If it is true that the most printed of ancient works were the Bible, Euclid, and Aesop's *Fables*, then fables were probably equally popular among ancient audiences. As if catering to such demand, Phaedrus, Babrius, Aphthonius, and Avienus all collected fables, but the first collection is attributed to the Peripatetic Demetrius of Phalerum.

Student of Theophrastus, ruler, regal advisor, and possible mind behind the Alexandrian *Mouseion* (Timon's 'bird-coop of the Muses': *SH* 786)—Demetrius' activities span a spectrum and alert one to the fact that many influential thinkers have turned to 'low' types like Aesop for inspiration. Hegel compares Martin Luther and Socrates as champions of the 'introversion of spirit', but he did not note that both of them also admired Aesop. Luther translated twenty Aesopean fables, while Plato's *Phaedo* presents the astonishing scene of Socrates in prison, occupying his last days by putting Aesop's stories to verse. 'What are you doing, Socrates?' Again the answer: Socrates is obeying Apollo's command—'Socrates, practice and make music!' (*Phaedo* 60e). Very different from a Socrates proving the soul's immortality and pointing (in David's painting) with truculent confidence towards heaven is this other Socrates, quietly turning stories about ants and grasshoppers into humble poetry.

What is one to make of this? Nietzsche, for one, breaks out in anger and surprise at this Socrates: the dialectical 'lover of wisdom' is revealed at last as a plebeian moralizer always chattering about cobblers and tailors. More generally, the Platonic tradition of dispassionately systematizing 'objective' truths is just a façade, for the real insights are garnered elsewhere, often subconsciously—in the instincts and urges of the body, the mass of hunches and half-thoughts that gradually coalesce into a definite cultural outlook and so shape all but the strongest

individual minds. On the other hand, Whitehead might praise the picture of a music-making Socrates as one of those rich suggestions that make Plato's dialogues so tantalizing. The phrase 'a series of footnotes to Plato' has become almost proverbial, but one should read the entire quotation, for what is important is Whitehead's reason behind the generalization: 'The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered through them... his writing [is] an inexhaustible mine of suggestion' (Whitehead 1929: 53).

One could make similar remarks about the Greek philosophical tradition as a whole: here is a great variety of ideas, about nature and the cosmos, about thought, the self, the city, and so forth, scattered profusely through many authors, genres, and periods. Each writer is a distinct personality, and each maxim, dialogue, letter, treatise offers a wealth of consideration for the imaginative reader. The relation between personality and ideas, particular and universal, experience and reason, is a complex one, not susceptible to neat formulae. Yet if canonical 'Platonism' holds that all particulars imitate, flow from, participate in, or somehow depend upon unchanging, singular Ideas, there is opposed the view that the 'high' evolves from the 'low' and that the disjointed particulars of experience lead by complex psychological and sociological routes to various world-views which simplify and never exhaust the potentialities in experience itself. If these represent two poles of a perennial opposition, we can for the moment only suspend judgement, and end by quoting Apuleius, both Platonist and sophistic 'wise guy' (who lived by his wits), writer of the *Metamorphoses*, that fable in which Lucius drifts through the rich blooming confusion of the ancient world, an ass in search of Isis. At certain heights, or depths, the ordinary blends with the fabulous, the animal becomes godlike, truth is spoken out of the mouths of babes, the wise speak in many voices, yet all somehow say the same thing. Apuleius gestures to this continuity between great and small when he praises the Greeks in Latin, and lifts a glass to the many Muses of ancient philosophy, and above all perhaps, to himself (*Florida* 20.97–8):

> Surely the more often you drink from the mixing-bowl of the Muses and the stronger the wine becomes, the nearer you come to health of mind. The first bowl, of the *litterator*, awakens the students to the basics; the second, that of the *grammaticus*, instructs with disciplined learning; the third, of the *rhetor*, arms with eloquence. It is only so deeply that most people drink. But at Athens I drank other bowls too: the agitated bowl of poetry, the clear bowl of geometry, the sweet bowl of music, the austere little bowl of dialectic, and finally the bowl of universal philosophy—truly inexhaustible and sweet as nectar. For Empedocles sings in poetry, Plato in dialogues, Socrates in hymns, Epicharmus in verse, Xenophon in histories, Crates in satire—your Apuleius cultivates all these and the nine Muses with equal zest.

Suggested Reading

The category of 'low' philosophy, as sketched here, is not an explicit one in scholarship, though it may implicitly inform different studies, particularly more cultural and literary ones. From the vast bibliography on ancient thought, four overlapping areas might be selected as of particular relevance here: Cynicism; the importance of genre and literary form; the importance of personality in determining outlook; and philosophy as the 'art of life'. For the paradigmatically low philosophy of Cynicism see esp. Dudley (1937), Malherbe (1977), Navia (1995, 1996), Downing (1992), Branham and Goulet-Cazé (1996), Desmond (2008). For Cynic iconography see esp. Clay (1996); and for artistic representations of philosophers more generally see Zanker (1996). Interest in the ancient dialogue as an inherently pluralistic, dialogical, and non-systematic form of expression is one underlying idea behind many recent more literary studies, such as Blondell (2002), Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan (2004), Freyberg (1997), Griswold (2002), Kahn (1996), Klagge, Nicholas, and Annas (1992), Nightingale (1995), Nussbaum (1986), and Rutherford (1998). On personality and philosophy see e.g. Gill (1998) and Nails (2002). Finally, the increased interest in Hellenistic thought over the past generation has led to greater emphasis on philosophy as an *ars vivendi*, as for instance in Davidson (1997), Hadot (1995, 1998), Long (2002), Navia (2007), and Nehamas (1998). Here too there is ancient inspiration for the current trend to popularize philosophy, as in the ethical works of Alain de Botton (e.g. 2001) which draw on ancient moralists like Socrates, Epicurus, and Seneca.

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CHAPTER 43

HIGH PHILOSOPHY

DIRK BALTZLY

43.1. Introduction: Higher and Lower

The notion of higher or lower philosophy is one that we project back onto ancient Greek philosophy. It is nonetheless a useful one for making salient certain similarities and differences. In his chapter William Desmond pursues one quite legitimate way of drawing such a contrast—that between the individual philosopher *living his philosophy* and the *impersonal presentation* of what purports to be philosophical truth in written form. As he notes, on this way of thinking, there are elements of low philosophy everywhere. This chapter will draw a slightly different distinction between higher and lower within the category that Desmond regards as higher.

Some philosophers, such as Epicurus, insisted that each and every person is capable of benefiting from the study of philosophy (*Letter to Menoecus* 122). Others supposed that a relatively small part of the population really had the potential to be benefited by engagement with philosophy. Nearly all philosophers argued that the activity of philosophy was essential to a happy life. Their central ethical question was: 'What is *eudaimonia*?' (i.e. 'well-being', 'human flourishing', or, in the traditional translation, 'happiness'). In their view, my well-being or flourishing is an objective matter and something that I could be wrong about. This is why the nature of human well-being is a suitable subject for philosophy. If philosophy is essential to happiness, and if, furthermore, philosophy is restricted to an elite few, then genuine happiness too is so restricted.

Competing theories about the nature of *eudaimonia* allow us to draw the distinction between higher philosophy and lower philosophy along another,

complementary dimension. To what extent does any particular philosopher suppose that our well-being consists in the achievement of something 'higher'? To what extent does philosophy, and so well-being, take us out of the familiar world? Exact answers to these questions depend on what one means by 'higher' and 'familiar world'. A common theme that runs through the higher philosophies that I discuss is that happiness involves becoming like god. This is explicit in Neoplatonism, but implicit in other philosophers.

In what follows, I trace this double sense of 'higher'—exclusivity of audience and assimilation to higher principles—along a spectrum. The lowest point on my spectrum will be the Epicurean school. Among the philosophers I consider, the Epicureans also addressed themselves to the widest audience. Yet their moral ideal involves at least a structural similarity to the Neoplatonists' goal of becoming like god. So, on at least one of my criteria, they count as proponents of 'higher philosophy'.

43.2. Presocratic Higher Philosophy

Let us begin by pursuing these themes in Presocratic philosophy. Historians of philosophy argue about what sets the Ionians (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, and Heraclitus) apart from the Orphic and Hesiodic cosmogonies that went before. If one can trust the evidence of Diogenes Laertius, it cannot be that they *called themselves* philosophers, while the others were called poets. Diogenes Laertius (probably basing himself on the fourth-century philosopher Heraclides Ponticus) claims that it was Pythagoras who first used *philosophos* to describe himself (Diogenes Laertius 1.12). Some support for this notion may perhaps be inferred from the fragments of Heraclitus. In 22 B35 DK, he says: 'Men who are lovers of wisdom (*philosophoi*) must indeed be inquirers into many things.' This fragment is unlikely to describe Heraclitus himself; it probably belongs together with B40, a pointed reference to Pythagoras' polymathy and hence lends some support to the notion of Pythagoras' self-attribution of the term. Thus Presocratic philosophers did not share a name for their activities. It also seems unlikely that they shared some nameless self-conception that distinguished them as a group from others who also wrote prose or poetry. While Xenophanes singled out Homer and Hesiod for criticism, Heraclitus is seemingly happy to sneer at the lack of insight (*nous*) possessed by Hesiod and Pythagoras, on the one hand, and Xenophanes and Hecataeus on the other (22 B40 DK).

Certainly, both Xenophanes and Heraclitus supposed themselves to have insights into the nature of things—insights that the vast bulk of humanity lacked. In

particular, they claim as their province insight into 'higher things'—the real nature of the gods or the *logos* that runs unseen behind all things. Xenophanes rebukes the common herd for projecting human features onto the gods (21 B5 DK). Heraclitus is similarly disparaging of the values of the many ('they stuff themselves like cattle': 22 B29 DK) and their lack of critical discernment of what is written or said ('fools get turned on by every *logos*': B87). Nor can one expect much improvement. Not only are the many unable to understand (B1), but they falsely suppose themselves already to understand (B2, 17). Philosophy, for Heraclitus, will remain the preserve of the elite, for 'most people are bad, and few are good' (B104).

Presocratic philosophy in the western part of the Hellenic world adds an additional dimension to the elitism already evident among the Ionians—the hand of the divine. Parmenides' poem begins with the author being carried by chariot to the dwelling of the goddess. His conclusions are thus not only rationally necessary, but dictated to the author by a divinity (28 B2.1 DK). It is clear from Parmenides' poem that he holds a low opinion of the capacity of most people to follow the argument. Most people are incapable of grasping these implications, since habit leads them to rely on sense perception—the sightless eye, the ringing ear (B7). To attain truth, one should rather judge matters by reason (*logos*).

Pythagoras is another interesting case-study in the themes of higher and popular philosophy. Going further than Parmenides, he is said to have claimed a semi-divine status as a son of Hermes. (This anecdote is one that Diogenes Laertius credits to Heraclides Ponticus, so we may assume it to have currency at least as early as the fourth century BCE.) In addition, Pythagoras introduced the idea that admission to philosophy should require a period of testing. Some Pythagorean teachings sought to derive moral insights from mathematical facts. Asked what a friend is, Pythagoras replied: '220 and 256.' Such 'friendly numbers' are those pairs of numbers where each is the sum of the factors of the other. Pythagoras is also credited with the discovery that musical intervals like the octave or the fifth have a mathematical basis. (See further Rocconi in this volume.) From such observations, the Pythagoreans generalized to the claim that—in some sense—'all is number'. As in the case of Parmenides, the really real is abstract, contrary to appearance, and difficult for most people to grasp. An elite audience and an abstract ontology are hallmarks of what I am calling 'higher philosophy'.

The idea that mathematics is the means by which we grasp the deep structure of an abstract, elusive real has proved an enduring and powerful one. It carries with it implications for 'higher and lower'. Physics is thought to be 'higher' science than sociology because it admits of elegant formulations that are not able to be understood by those who have not done a lot of maths. The comparison with physics is relevant to Presocratic philosophy, for the latter resembles the former in being an attempt to give a unified account of everything (Long 1999).

43.3. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle

Socrates, at least as he is portrayed by Plato and Xenophon, contrasts sharply with philosophers like Pythagoras or Heraclitus. Yet it is in response to his thought that we must understand the work of Plato, the archetypal purveyor of higher philosophy.

Socrates asks his interlocutors questions like 'What is piety?' or 'What is beauty?' He thinks that we cannot pride ourselves on any great wisdom unless we can answer such questions. He assumes, without argument, that there *can* be answers to these questions that are entirely satisfactory—not merely safe generalizations, but exceptionless, true statements to the effect that 'the beautiful is the *xyz*'. As the argument in Plato's *Euthyphro* shows, it is not enough if 'the beautiful' and 'the *xyz*' apply to the same group of things or actions. The *xyz* is the cause or explanation for why things are beautiful: it is *in virtue of the fact* that they are *xyz* that they are beautiful.

What must reality contain in order that all this should be so? This is the metaphysical question that occupies Plato, but seems not to have troubled Socrates (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1078b9–17, 30–2). Plato's answer is that there must be Forms. What are these and what do they do? First, they serve as the truth-makers for the correct answers to Socratic questions. If the right answer to Socrates' question is 'The beautiful is the *xyz*', then there must be something—some *thing*—the existence of which makes it true. But this cannot be a sensible reality like some particular beautiful boy or an individual sunset. The truth-maker for the *logos* that says *what beauty is* cannot be something which is itself both beautiful and not beautiful—something to which the term both applies and does not apply (*Phaedo* 74c). Plato's bold suggestion is the non-sensible Form of Beauty. Furthermore, as the cause or explanation of beautiful things, it must be (in some sense) prior to them. Finally, perhaps because the truth of these crucial *logoi* reside in them, perhaps because they are prior causes, Plato gives the soul's grasp of these Forms a kind of overriding value. Justice and happiness, both of which consist in a proper ordering of the soul, result from the knowledge of the Form of the Good. Additionally, the pleasure of investigating the realm of Forms is, objectively, the best enjoyment.

The *Phaedrus* gives these ideas a poetic expression where they are literally presented as a higher philosophy. The immortal soul prior to embodiment is pictured as a winged chariot drawn by horses. The soul falls away from the blessed realm of the gods and the Forms, and into a body—because of a failure of reason to command the less worthy parts of the soul. Impelled by a love of beauty higher than that manifested in mere sexual desire, the soul is capable of re-growing its wings and ascending on high again.

Such, then, is the power of knowing the Forms; but then the question is how to acquire such knowledge. Plato shares with Pythagoras a respect for mathematics

and a belief in the immortality of the soul. In the *Phaedo*, our grasp of the Forms presupposes a turning away from sense perception and the body (66c). In the *Republic*, preparation for the ultimate study of philosophy—the grasp of the Form of Goodness—consists in mathematical studies (525a–533e). On the one hand, we are told that very few will survive this course of study and come to the final goal of enquiry. On the other, Plato seems inclined to insist that the basic capacity to turn from the body to the intellectual realm of Forms is inherent in every soul (518c). Considered just as a soul, any soul is potentially a philosopher. But the sad fact is that most will not make it.

In view of these features, Platonism is the archetypal 'higher philosophy'. Perhaps not in principle, but certainly in practice, philosophy is an activity restricted to an elite few. Our happiness, or *eudaimonia*, demands knowledge of abstract entities visible only to the mind, not the senses. The values we derive from the soul's naive experience of embodiment are all misguided, being constructed on the misleading deliverances of the senses. Plato's image of the prisoners in the cave (*Republic* 514a ff.) iconically encodes all these features. For philosophy's self-conception as 'higher', this is *the* seminal text.

Raphael's painting *The School of Athens* contrasts Plato—who is pointing upward—with Aristotle, hand extended, pushing the realm of Forms down into sensible things. Arguably, however, the stress on the opposition between Platonism and Aristotelianism invites us to overlook their similarities. Raphael depicts Aristotle holding his *Nicomachean Ethics*. It is true that in this work Aristotle attacks Plato's idea of a Form of the Good. There is no single intelligible object, the Good Itself, that we may contemplate with the mind's eye (1096b20–6). Thus our well-being cannot consist in an intellectual apprehension of such a thing, as Plato had supposed. Yet Aristotle concludes the *Ethics* with the claim that the finest and most self-sufficient activity open to human beings is *contemplation* (1177a11–1179a32). In engaging in *theōria*, a person resembles the eternal and blessed activity of God (1178b22). This is because Aristotle's conception of God is the pure activity of thought thinking itself (*Metaphysics* 1074b35).

It is true that Aristotle also defines well-being or *eudaimonia* as the soul's activity in accordance with intellectual *as well as moral* excellence across a whole lifetime (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1098a17). But even here, Aristotle makes it clear that only those who have had the proper upbringing have any hope of developing the moral virtues and so of participating at least to this extent in happiness. In fact, the development of moral wisdom or *phronēsis*—essential to the full development of the moral virtues—is said to be incompatible with having a job. Only gentlemen of leisure need apply (*Politics* 1329a1). Because women are not, according to Aristotle, fully rational beings and have a different virtue from men, they too would seem to be precluded from *eudaimonia* (*Politics* 1259b29 ff.).

So much, then, for the *content* of the philosophy in Plato and Aristotle. What about the *setting* in which it was communicated? Were the institutions founded by

Plato and Aristotle—the Academy and the Lyceum—elitist? It is difficult to say with any certainty. The evidence for the Academy has been recently reviewed in Dillon (2003). Lynch (1972) considers what we may know of the Lyceum. It is a mistake to compare either school to exclusive modern universities. They were physically set in public land, so that anyone could wander by and listen to what was going on. There were apparently no formal initiation procedures. Those associated with the schools were simply 'friends'. In this respect both schools contrast sharply with Pythagoras' communities. And certainly Plato did not charge for tuition, though people who joined his circle of friends needed to be able to provide for themselves. Nor was social class an issue, judging by the case of the ex-slave and son of a *hetaera* Bion of Borysthenes, who studied both at the Academy and the Lyceum in the days after Plato and Aristotle (Diogenes Laertius 4.46–7). Women were among the associates of Plato and his successor Speusippus (Diogenes Laertius 3.46), but there is no record of female members of the Lyceum.

43.4. The Stoics and Epicureans

The philosophical schools of the Hellenistic period (323–30 BCE) differ in both their character and the content of their philosophy from those of Plato and Aristotle. For example, we can certainly speak of Stoic and Epicurean 'schools of thought', since the views of the founders of these movements were treated much more authoritatively by subsequent members than were the views of Plato or Aristotle by their successors: on the institutional structures of these schools see Dorandi (1999) and, on the Stoics in particular, Sedley (2003) and Gill (2003). In their content, both schools reject absolutely the idea of incorporeal or non-particular existents such as Platonic souls or Forms. So there can be no talk of 'higher entities' in this sense.

Another contrast that we noted at the beginning is the extent to which Epicurus in particular addressed himself to a general audience: see his *Letter to Menoecus* 122. The Epicureans' engagement with a broad audience is explained in part by the explicitly therapeutic character of their philosophy. Philosophy is useless unless it brings relief from the suffering that afflicts most of mankind most of the time (Porphyry, *ad Marcellum* 31 = fr. 221 Usener). The purpose of philosophy is to help us achieve painlessness and tranquillity by purging the soul of its fears of death and divine punishment. The audience who can benefit from philosophy is as broad as these errors are widespread.

In spite of the fact that the Epicureans were materialists, they were not atheists. The gods provide us with a moral ideal to which we may aspire. According to Epicurus, the correct conception of a god is of a being who is immortal and

untroubled by anxiety. The complete assimilation of correct Epicurean doctrine will permit us to enjoy a life that is as pleasant as that of the gods, even if it does not last forever (*Letter to Menoecus* 135). We should make ourselves like these 'higher beings' in order to be happy. More concretely, the aspiring Epicurean should seek to make himself like the divine men of the school who had already emulated god—that is, ultimately, Epicurus himself: cf. Clay (1983). Thus, Epicurean philosophy shares with Platonic and Aristotelian ethics the objective of assimilation to the divine.

In spite of sharing this notion of assimilation to the divine, the school of Epicurus would have been regarded by many Greeks as distinctly low. First there is the fact that they were proponents of hedonism, and there was a distinct prejudice against pleasure in Greek thought. Compare, for example, Anaxandrides, a comic poet of the fourth century BCE: 'To make oneself the slave of pleasure—this is what randy women do, not men' (*PCG* ii, fr. 61; more generally on pleasure and weakness see Tarrant 2001). The Epicureans compounded the difficulties raised by the feminine connotations of pleasure by admitting women to the Epicurean community (Diogenes Laertius 10.7). Moreover, Epicurus criticized the pursuit of honour and reputation to a sufficient extent that he was taken to advocate withdrawal from political life. This would have been entirely counter-cultural for the Greeks (and the Romans as well), who regarded the space of public life as the place where one found real men. Finally, several texts from Epicurus excoriate 'high culture' or *paideia* as empty ostentation at best, and a source of mistaken conceptions at worst: see *Vaticanae Sententiae* 45, Diogenes Laertius 10.6, and Athenaeus 588a (= fr. 117 Usener); for high culture as a source of mistaken ideas that lead us into or keep us mired in misery, see Lucretius' remarks on the poetry of love (4.1159–70), with Nussbaum (1994: 140–91). All these attitudes marked out the Epicureans for a kind of abuse from other philosophers that had a distinctly feminizing tone. Gordon (2004) argues that it was the withdrawal from political life and the criticism of *paideia* that earned Epicurus the rebuke of *kinaidologos* ('expert in lewdness and being buggered') from the Stoic Epictetus.

In fact Stoicism resembles Epicureanism in many respects, though it would have been regarded by Greeks of the Hellenistic age as a far 'higher' philosophy. Like Epicureanism, Stoic philosophy addresses itself to every human being, at least in principle. On the Stoic view, happiness requires the perfection of that capacity for rational thought that is common to all of us (Seneca, *Letters* 76.9–10 = *SVF* iii. 200). Yet they also suppose that, in fact, almost no one will manage this achievement (Alexander, *On Fate* 199.14–22 = *SVF* iii. 659). Moreover, there is a certain sense in which the perfection of our rationality coincides with assimilation to god. Their formal definition of the goal of life is 'agreement (*homologia*) with nature' (Diogenes Laertius 7.87 = *SVF* i. 179). On the one hand, this means living in accordance with our own human nature. But in another sense, it also means living in agreement with a universal nature which they identify with god (Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.20.14 = *SVF* i. 182).

In spite of these areas of agreement, there are important divergences which had the effect of giving Stoicism a 'higher moral tone' than Epicureanism. This is because the Stoics identify the sole good with that which is fine and noble (*to kalon*) rather than with what is pleasant. Action performed in accordance with the moral virtues is, of course, fine and noble. The virtues themselves are identified with knowledge (*SVF* iii. 262–5). Such knowledge is the perfected state of our rationality. Since this rationality is the essence of our human nature, the virtuous life will be the life in accordance with our own nature. Like us, god is rational through and through, and directs the course of world events according to a script that is similarly rational (Plutarch, *On Stoic Self-Contradictions* 1056B = *SVF* iii. 997). Thus, in the perfection of my rational nature through virtuous living, I live in accordance with the divine, universal nature. This is the Stoic version of happiness as likeness to god.

This brief summary can in no way do justice to the complexities of Stoic ethics and moral psychology (for a good introduction see Brennan 2005). I have provided only the conclusions—not the arguments for them. But it should nonetheless be clear how this emphasis on self-sufficiency, self-control, and austerity speaks to deeply ingrained values of wider masculine Greek culture. Equally, it would in time come to have a similar attraction for patrician Romans (Ferrary 1988). I have tried to suggest that Stoicism and Epicureanism share structural features that qualify them as forms of higher philosophy in my sense. I also believe that the Greeks themselves saw Epicureanism as distinctly 'lower' in an important sense. I suggest that this subordination is continuous with the wider subordination of the feminine (associated with private space, corporeality, and pleasure) to the masculine (associated with public space, nobility, and self-control).

43.5. Neoplatonism: As High as Ancient Greek Philosophy Gets

To ascend to the pinnacle of higher philosophy, we need to take up the story again with Plotinus (205–69/70 CE) and the Neoplatonic school.

Plotinus' philosophy argues for the existence of a being even more abstract and unfamiliar than Plato's Forms. In Plotinus, the Platonic Forms take on some of the features of Aristotle's God. Not only is every Form an object of thought, it is also itself a thinking intellect. But Plotinus supposed that there is nonetheless a kind of duality and complexity involved in the activity of thought thinking itself (*Enneads* 5.6.1–2). Hence, Aristotle was wrong to posit such a God as the *ultimate* principle of all things. As the number one is prior to, and the origin of, all numbers, so too something absolutely simple and utterly unitary must be the source of all

that has being (5.3.12). This origin Plotinus calls either The Good or The One, evoking Plato's *Republic* and *Parmenides* respectively. This One is 'beyond being' in the sense that it does not admit of even the conceptual distinction between a thing and its characteristics. Strictly speaking, we may not even say that it exists, for this invites a distinction between it and its being (5.3.13–14). It is characteristic of what I have been calling 'higher philosophy' to posit the existence of abstract entities and generally to suppose that the most fundamental aspects of reality are not as they seem to us in sense-perception. Plotinus' One stands as the limiting case of this tendency. Not only can we not see it, or touch it, we cannot (strictly speaking) even think propositionally structured thoughts about it (e.g. that it is the cause of all things), for it is ineffable.

Much more explicitly than Plato or Aristotle, Plotinus identifies our well-being as divinization: *eudaimonia* is 'assimilation to God' (Baltzly 2004). In the first instance, this means becoming like the self-thinking intellects that are the Forms. Indeed, Plotinus supposes that there is a portion of us that has never left the realm of Forms (4.8.8), and it is essential that we distance ourselves from bodily desire and sense-perception in order to recover this origin of the self (1.2.3–6). Theoretically, divinization should be possible for every soul—although practically speaking few souls will develop the wisdom and discipline to return to God.

Beginning at least with Iamblichus (*c.*240–325 CE), Neoplatonists sought to incorporate theurgy into the methods by which philosophical souls may ascend to the divine. Meaning literally 'god-working', theurgy came to refer to the combination of forms of worship and ritual magic through which the theurgist sought to 'tap into' the power of intermediary gods and so ascend to the highest gods. This eventually introduced another dimension of elitism into this tradition of 'higher philosophy'—the selective teaching of secret forms of ritual magic. The Neoplatonist school at Alexandria apparently existed more or less at peace with the Christian authorities. However, the school at Athens under Proclus (d. 485 CE) had a more turbulent relationship with them (Watts 2006). Thus, we may conjecture that full admission to the form of Platonism taught at Athens would have been restricted to an elite who were known to be safe to receive it. This elite aspect of Neoplatonism endured through its subsequent reception in European thought. The esoteric and occult features of Neoplatonism have attracted the attention of secretive minds down to the present day.

Suggested Reading

The standard edition for the fragments of the Presocratic philosophers is Diels and Kranz (1951–2); translations in Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983). This chapter discusses Socrates as a philosopher in his own right. On the problem of disentangling the thought of the historical

Socrates from the writings of Plato, Xenophon, Aristophanes, and the fragments of other writers of Socratic dialogues see Penner (1992). The most commonly cited editions of the remains of Epicurus' writings are those of Usener (1887) and Arrighetti (1973). The most up-to-date translations are Long and Sedley (1987) and Inwood and Gerson (1997). For the fragments of the Stoics see von Arnim (1903–5; abbreviated as *SVF*). Translations of many of the texts are available in Long and Sedley (1987) or Inwood and Gerson (1997).

Academic philosophers engage with the texts that I have discussed very much as living contributions to the ongoing conversation that is philosophy. The late twentieth century saw a sea-change in contemporary moral philosophy. Feeling that utilitarian and deontological ethical theories were in a deadlock, many philosophers turned to Aristotle's *Ethics* as an inspiration for the development of 'virtue ethics' (Oakley 1996). This interest in contemporary applications of virtue ethics has, in turn, engendered very philosophically acute historical studies of ancient moral philosophy, like that of Russell (2005). The period 1970–90 was characterized by an explosion of interest in the schools of the Hellenistic period. The fruits of much of this research are drawn together in Algra *et al.* (1999). Both historians of philosophy and contemporary philosophers have found much food for thought in the therapeutic strategies employed by philosophers of this period for achieving mental tranquillity (Nussbaum 1994; Sorabji 2000). Late antiquity is now benefiting from similar attention, capped off with a sourcebook of texts and commentary (Sorabji 2005). French scholarship on Neoplatonism has a longer history than such work in the anglophone tradition, but here too there is perhaps a shift away from Plotinus and toward later Neoplatonism (Lernould 2001; Hadot 1995). Given the role of the Byzantines in the preservation and interpretation of much of this late antique philosophy, I believe we can expect more work along the lines of Ierodiakonou (2002).

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CHAPTER 44

MAGIC

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THE central problem for any student of Greek magic is that the term *mageia* (Latin *magia*), from which we ultimately derive 'magic', only emerges in the latter half of the fifth century BCE, whereas the evidence for practices and substances that were understood to be magical, as well as for individuals who were thought to be magicians, existed prior to the birth of the term. *Mageia* means on the one hand the 'activity of a *magos*' and, on the other, 'magic' in the looser sense defined by the Hippocratic author of *On the Sacred Disease* and Plato. Herodotus says that Persian priests, or the Magi proper, worshipped fire, sacrificed, chanted, sang theogonies, interpreted dreams and solar eclipses, and performed numerous other religious rites (Bremmer 1999: 4–6). There are references to them in other historians and philosophers of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, and mention of their ritual activities in the Derveni papyrus (col. VI). The Greeks regarded the activities of this Persian priestly class as relatively legitimate in comparison to those of an itinerant beggar-priest or magical salesman. But when not used directly of Persian *magoi* like the famed Zoroaster, the definition of *mageia* refers broadly to the magical activities, such as sacrifice, purification, and incantation, which are apparently covered by that term. The earliest attested use of the term *mageia* is in Gorgias of Leontini's *Encomium of Helen*, and there it does not refer to Persian *magoi*. Gorgias was said to be the pupil of Empedocles of Acragas, the renowned magical purifier, seer, and composer of the *Purifications*, and is said to have witnessed the magical feats (*goēteia*) of his teacher (Diogenes Laertius 8.58). His experiences demand that we review, in a departure from current scholarship, what Gorgias says about magic.

In the *Encomium* Gorgias argues that Helen should be exonerated if speech persuaded her. Speech in his view persuades the soul, and words are incantations

(*epōidai*: literally a 'song sung over or against') that produce pleasure and avert grief. Filled with divinity (*entheoi*), words deceive and compel the soul to do things it otherwise would not through magic (*goēteia*). He says that two types of magic have been invented, *mageia* and *goēteia*, both of which are errors and deceptions of the soul. The term *goēteia* technically refers to the activity of the *goēs*, 'magician'. The philological history of *goēs* suggests that, at some time between the archaic period and the fifth century, the term referred to a specialist in one type of lamentation for the dead, *goos*. It has been suggested that the *goēs* was adept at invoking the spirits of the dead, and in some authors a case can be made that this distinction is still relevant (Plato, *Laws* 10, 909b, *goēteuontes*). Later, often anachronistic, sources take for granted that *goēteia* refers exclusively to invocation of the dead (Johnston 1999: 100–23). But in Gorgias there is no suggestion that invocation of the dead underlies *goēteia*, a point that emphasizes the fluidity inherent in fifth-century magical terminology. Moreover, both *magos* and *goēs* are interchangeable terms of abuse in Greek drama and rhetoric, approximating something on the order of 'scoundrel' (Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannus* 387–9; Aeschines 3.137).

As he develops his case, Gorgias appeals to a magical analogy that is revealing for its connection to Empedocles in a way that has not been noticed by scholars. He writes that:

> The power of speech over the disposition of the soul is like the disposition of drugs (*pharmaka*) over the nature of the body. Just as different drugs drive out different humours from the body, and put an end either to disease or to life, so with speech: some words produce harm, others pleasure, others fear, while still others can embolden their listeners. Or again, by means of some harmful persuasion, words can bewitch (*pharmakeuein*) and thoroughly cast a spell (*ekgoēteuein*) over the soul. (Gorgias, *Encomium of Helen* 14)

The term *pharmakon* (pl. *pharmaka*) to which Gorgias refers was notoriously ambiguous in Greek, because its range of meaning covered helpful 'medicine', harmful 'poison', as well as magical 'drug' or 'philtre', all of which were plant-based concoctions with sometimes active psychotropic ingredients (Scarborough 1991: 138–74). The noun *pharmakon* gave rise to several other terms in Greek related to magic, including the noun *pharmakeia*, 'magic' and the verb *pharmakeuein*, 'bewitch', as well as the nouns *pharmakis*, 'witch' and *pharmakeus*, 'sorcerer'. In the context of Gorgias' remarks, he clearly intends both the basic, medical meaning of *pharmakon* and the magical one.

It has been overlooked that Gorgias' pharmacological analogy comes directly from the realm of purification, complete with a reference to the humours that are driven out from the body in the process. In the Hippocratic treatises more than one theory of the humours was in circulation (see e.g. *On the Nature of Man*). However, the four basic humours—blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile—which in turn corresponded to Empedocles' four 'roots' or elements—earth, water, fire, and air—are what Gorgias has in mind, likely a result of his education under

Empedocles. We are to infer that words generate powerful emotions by driving out what is already present in the soul, just as purifications drive out what is harmful to the body. Gorgias offers the first purificatory theory of magic, but it might well have been a more common one among his contemporaries than scholars have realized.

Although he uses three different terms for magic in the *Encomium*—*pharmakeia*, *goēteia*, and *mageia*—the terms *pharmakeia*, *pharmakon*, and the verb *pharmakeuein* are regularly used in Hippocratic medical vocabulary specifically to refer to purgatives and purgation ([Hippocrates], *Aphorisms* 1.20, 1.24, 2.36, *pharmakeia*; 1.22, *pharmakeuein*). Purificatory remedies that involve purgation are central to the overall theme in Hippocratic medicine, which recognizes purification as an essential restorative process for the body (Parker 1983: 213–16). The Hippocratic term for 'purification' is *katharsis*, and its verb *kathairein*, 'to purify' is from the same word-complex that gives us the term for the purifier, *kathartēs*, who is one of the itinerant purveyors of magical services who are attacked by the author of *On the Sacred Disease*. (See also Holmes's discussion of this text in the next chapter.) There is thus an inherent ambiguity in both the *pharmakon* and *katharsis* family of terms between medical and magical purgation and purification. This ambiguity could well be at the crux of the notorious professional disagreement over the treatment of epilepsy between the author of *On the Sacred Disease* and the magical specialists.

In Greek religious belief, epilepsy was a divinely sent or 'sacred' disease, and it afflicted those with whom the gods were angry or displeased. The Hippocratic author of *On the Sacred Disease* defends an approach to the treatment of epilepsy that does not involve recognizing the immediate manifestation of divinity, especially in anthropomorphic form, but rather looks to a set of naturalistic or physical causes as the basis for the disease. To distinguish his approach, he refutes the claims made by a host of penumbral characters—including magicians (*magoi*), purifiers (*kathartai*), beggar-priests (*agurtai*), and outright quacks (*alazones*)—who are able to cure epilepsy through ritualized interactions with divinity. These itinerant purveyors of magical services are like those who first called epilepsy 'sacred' in order to conceal their own inadequacy. Should their proposed remedies fail, the author suggests, they can easily blame the gods and avoid taking responsibility. Their preferred treatment regimen for epilepsy is deceptively familiar, including purifications (*katharmoi*) and spells (*epōidai*) (*On the Sacred Disease* 1.12 Grensemann).

On the basis of practice, there is no easy way to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate magic. According to the Hippocratic author, the individuals criticized also claimed to know how to draw down the moon and eclipse the sun, to make storms and fair weather, rain and drought, the sea impassable and the earth barren (ibid. 1.29). Astronomical magic of this sort was the stock-in-trade of magical stereotypes on the Athenian stage, and everyone knew that the commercial centre

for such services was Thessaly (Aristophanes, *Clouds* 749–55). According to the Hippocratic author, these claims are impious, because they imply mortal control over divinity, yet we must note that they are indistinguishable from Empedocles' claims: as well as the same list of weather-magic feats, they include the ability to defend against old age and to revive the dead (Empedocles 31 B111 DK). Although Empedocles sported a colourful persona, his biography attests to a dignified reputation as a healer (e.g. Diogenes Laertius 8.63–6, 69; Athenaeus 14, 620d). Thus it would be wrong to distinguish Empedocles' magical practices from those of other providers who did not enjoy the same intellectual or social distinction (Lloyd 1979: 37–9). Given the range of his activities, Empedocles should have been called a *magos*, since weather magic and ability to evoke the dead are skills attributed to Persian Magi.

Recent research has greatly enhanced our understanding of the shadowy existence of itinerant magicians—the religious entrepreneurs of the ancient world (Dickie 2001). Rich and poor alike sought their services when traditional temple cults and physicians were found wanting. Each group is somewhat unique except for the *alazones*, which comprised any number of quacks and braggarts, boasters and false pretenders in the ancient world.

Beggar-priests (*agurtai*) are mendicant vagabonds, often from Asia Minor, who sometimes claimed prophetic ability. The Trojan princess Cassandra in some ways typifies the stereotype of the *agurtēs* (Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 1195, 1273). Other groups of *agurtai* (known as *mētragurtai* and *mēnagurtai*) are the devotees of Rhea or Cybele, the Mother of the Gods. These groups originated in Phrygia, moved in bands, and were known for their ecstatic ravings and tintinnabular worship of the goddess (Dickie 2001: 65–7). In the few accounts that survive, however, there is little that we can discern having directly to do with magic, although as cult devotees they no doubt proclaimed some privileged relationship with the Mother of the Gods. It may be of interest that in one particular form of ancient magic, curse tablets, the Mother of the Gods is mentioned as a goddess in whose presence the curse is invoked (*DT* 72.17; cf. 79.3).

Seers or *manteis* form another heterogeneous group, but in the classical period *manteis* who were attached to temples and military factions formed a professional class of seer. The Pythia or priestess at Delphi, for example, was a *mantis* who inherited her position at the temple and occupied it for life. Military seers were known for their ability to interpret the entrails of sacrificed animals, with the aim of announcing whether the gods favoured a course of military action or not (Pritchett 1979: 73–90). Purification of epileptics through bloodshed is one of the *manteis*' activities that aggravates the author of *On the Sacred Disease*, although elsewhere in the same text he approves of purifying oneself with water before entering sanctuaries or sacred precincts (*On the Sacred Disease* 1.45–6; cf. Heraclitus 22 B 5 DK). Less is known about itinerant *manteis* who wandered from city to city offering their services for hire, but the story of Deiphonus, who falsely claimed descent from the

renowned seer Euenius of Apollonia, may be typical (Herodotus 9.93–4). Itinerant *manteis* appear to have been resourceful and unscrupulous, and it is almost certain that they were moderately literate. Authors such as Plato mention their use of texts containing oracular poetry, like that ascribed to Musaeus and the mythical poet Orpheus (*Republic* 2, 364e–365a). We may infer that, in the face of limited Athenian literacy, through their privileged access to arcane material, itinerant *manteis* exerted a considerable hold over the imagination of their clients (Dickie 2001: 72–3).

The purifiers or *kathartai* can also be divided into those who did not enjoy professional status (as in *On the Sacred Disease*) and those who did. Several dignified *kathartai*, such as Melampus, were famous. They purified individuals of illness and madness, and whole cities in the aftermath of sacrilegious activities, such as those committed by Cylon's friends. Epimenides of Crete, the famous purifier, was brought in to remove the Athenian curse that arose in that affair (*FGrHist* 457). But Epimenides might also have been a seer (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1418a23–6), a point that reinforces the care that must be taken with the hazy boundaries such terms as 'seer' and 'purifier' denote. Still, we cannot easily distinguish the practices of Epimenides or Empedocles from those of their less reputable counterparts.

Plato offers further insight into the types of magical services offered by itinerant specialists. His views about the efficacy of magic, as distinct from his contempt for its purveyors, are harder to pin down. For instance, he cites approvingly midwives who excite or relieve the pains of childbirth through drugs (*pharmaka*) and spells (*epōidai*) (*Theaetetus* 149cd), and the arsenal of physicians that includes simples, cauteries, incisions, and spells (*epōidai*) (*Republic* 4, 426b). But he condemns 'those that evoke (*psukhagōgein*) the souls of the dead, claiming to persuade the gods as if by bewitching them with sacrifices, prayers, and spells (*epōidai*)' (*Laws* 10, 909b). Paradoxically, it is not the efficacy of spells that is in question, nor the evocation of the dead, but the morality of individuals whose religious services do not serve the public interest. He reserves his harshest criticism for the begging-priests (*agurtai*) and seers (*manteis*). These men 'go to rich men's doors and persuade them that, having acquired a power from the gods through sacrifices and spells, with pleasures and festivals they can cure any misdeed by a man or his ancestors, and if a man wants to harm his enemy, for a small cost he will be able to harm just and unjust alike, persuading, as they say, the gods to aid them through spells (*epagōgai*) and binding magic (*katadesmoi*)' (*Republic* 2, 364bc).

In the context of sentencing the specialists who practice magic (*pharmakeia*) in his ideal state, Plato offers the first psychological theory of magic. He divides magic into two categories. The first (*pharmakeia*) involves harm caused by drinks, foods, or unguents, and owes its efficacy to 'harm by means of matter against matter according to nature' (*Laws* 11, 933a). The second type (*goēteia*) is based on the anxieties and fears produced in its victims, and is primarily psychological. He writes (933ab) that:

by means of enchantments and spells and so-called bindings (*katadesmoi*), it persuades those attempting to harm their victims that they can do so, and persuades the victims that they really are being harmed by those capable of bewitching (*goēteuein*). With respect to this and all such matters, it is neither easy to recognize what has happened, nor, if one knows, is it easy to persuade others. With regard to men's souls, it is not worth trying to persuade those who are suspicious of one another about such things, if some of them see moulded wax images either at their doorways or at the places where three roads meet or on the tombs of their ancestors themselves, nor to admonish those who do not have a clear belief about all such things to make light of them.

This catalogue of magical practices is not random, but includes the most common forms of magic in the classical period. Plato's characterization of magic, which entails a mistaken belief about causes, may almost be said to be anthropological in its outlook. Insofar as people perform spells and binding charms, place wax images at doorways or on tombs, Plato concedes that his fellow Greeks practise magic, although he stops short of claiming that their activities exert anything other than psychological effects. He adds that such activities reinforce the practitioner's belief in his own powers—a statement that might have been written by a James Frazer, Bronislaw Malinowski, or Stanley Tambiah.

The impression from Plato that *goēteia* produces no real effect in the world, apart from its psychological effects, brings us to a consideration of Greek causality. The general problem of causality in situations of illness, injury, or misfortune was an engaging topic for fifth- and fourth-century Greek intellectuals, and their approaches illustrate competing and, at times, incompatible views of agency (Collins 2003: 29–37). Greek magic often found itself at the intersection of multiple causal systems. Magical causation was difficult to distinguish from divine agency, and, before Aristotle, attempts to rationalize the cause of an event on the part of intellectuals typically included divinity as one possible factor. Like divinity, magic operated according to the principle of *actio in distans*, 'action at a distance', which meant, for instance, that a binding curse tablet could be buried in a grave or well and cause an orator in court—at a distance in time and space—to lose his memory and voice. The most cited example here is the prosecutor Gnaeus Sicinius, who suddenly forgot his entire case and blamed his lapse of memory on the spells and incantations of the defendant, Titinia (Cicero, *Brutus* 217). Where there is a cultural expectation that magic can exert these effects, even though other, more immediate causes for an event such as loss of memory can be found, it is impossible to exclude magic as one possible cause.

Next to *pharmaka* and *epōidai*, the bindings or *katadesmoi* (Latin *defixiones*) mentioned by Plato are the most common type of magic in Graeco-Roman antiquity. Research on curse tablets and binding spells has advanced considerably in the last decades (Faraone 1991*a*; Jordan 1985). Binding spells take two forms: (1) a curse tablet, most often made from thin sheets of lead, which are then rolled or folded and sometimes pierced with a nail, and buried in tombs, graves, and wells; and (2) a

figurine, often made of wax, clay, or occasionally lead, approximating the form of a man or woman, whose limbs can be bound or twisted. The figurines sometimes have nails or needles pressed into them, or are sometimes buried in 'coffins' made from thin sheets of lead, and these in turn can be placed in tombs. The notion of binding is found in the curse language written on the tablets, which often expressly state the desired action through the use of verbs such as *katadein*, 'to bind' and *katekhein*, 'to restrain'. The metaphor of binding is visibly illustrated by the folding, rolling up, and piercing of the lead tablet. In the case of the figurines, the metaphor of binding is achieved through the twisting, binding, and piercing of the figurines with nails.

The earliest curse tablets date to the fifth century BCE, and are found throughout Greek and Roman antiquity down through the next thousand years, from areas as far apart as Roman Britain, Sicily, Greece, North Africa, Egypt, the Levant, and Antioch. Although the most common medium is lead, binding curses have been found inscribed on potsherds, limestone, gemstones, papyri, wax, and ceramic bowls (Gager 1992: 3). Because the range of handwriting on the tablets varies considerably, from the more controlled and elegant to the semi-literate, it has been suggested that both professional and amateur scribes were responsible for writing tablets—with a tilt toward professionalism, especially during the Roman period (from the first to the sixth century CE). In addition to actuated curses, the great collection of Greek magical papyri (*PGM*) contains numerous recipes for curses, giving us precious insight into the rules and conventions of the genre. To date, upwards of 1,600 curse tablets have been found, most of which are written in Greek, with a smaller number in Latin. Although a basic binding formula is standard, the tablets have been divided by scholars into groups that deal with competition in the realm of athletics, drama, or business; with erotic matters including sex and marriage; with judicial affairs, as, for example, a pending law-case; and with pleas for revenge or justice. Regional differences are strong; so, for example, the curse tablets found in England at Bath, in the excavations of the temple of Sulis Minerva, show a marked interest in the return of stolen goods (Tomlin 1988), whereas such tablets are rare in Attica (see evidence in *DTA*).

In general, many of the earliest tablets list only the names of the intended victim, with no additional verb of binding or any of the divinities or *daimones* that figure more prominently in later tablets. Often the names are written in the nominative case, whereas on other tablets the names appear in the accusative case, which implies that a verb—one presumably to reference the action of binding—was understood. Some scholars have speculated that the verb of binding was recited in an oral rite early on, which may have accompanied the deposition of the tablet, and then only later written down, although the evidence is silent on this hypothesis. In addition to the named victim, the curses are addressed to young people who died early (*aōroi*) or violently (*biaiothanatoi*), and more rarely to those who have died 'uninitiated' (*atelestoi*, literally 'incomplete'). All told, these 'restless dead', as they

have been called (Johnston 1999), are characterized by anger and implacability, and it is these qualities which the magical practitioner hopes to channel to bring his curse to fruition.

Recent research suggests a connection between the earliest, single-named tablets and the Greek practice of ostracism in the classical period (Forsdyke 2005: 157–8). The fact that many curse tablets contain the names of well-known politicians, such as Demosthenes, Lycurgus, Xanthippus, and Phrynichus, strongly suggests that, in addition to being the targets of ostracism, they were also the targets of curse tablets. Morever, we know of several binding curses from the classical period that were written on ostraca (Gager 1992: 31, n. 5). Much later in antiquity spells written on ostraca are somewhat more common, and there are examples in the Greek magical papyri which advise writing certain types of spells on ostraca (see *PGM* ii. 233–5, Ostraca nos. 1–5; cf. *PGM* 36.187–210). Further research is needed to identify the exact relationship between curse tablets and ostracism, but the possible connection between them may indicate a magical dimension to ostracism as well as a political and democratic dimension to curse tablets.

An interesting shift in the curse tablets from the classical period onwards involves the 'fragmentation' of the victim to be bound. In our earliest tablets we find only a name, then a verb such as *katadein* or *katekhein* appears in the first-person with the name, and then in later tablets key psychological functions and body parts are mentioned: for example, the soul (*psukhē*), feeling (*thumos*), hands, and feet start to be itemized. The binding of hands and feet finds a parallel in mythology, where we have many stories that depict the binding of a divinity by other divinities (e.g. Zeus: *Iliad* 1.401; Hera: *Iliad* 15.18–24, alluded to at 1.590–3). It is also characteristic, for example in the *Homeric Hymns*, that the inability to be bound is a marker of divine status (Apollo: *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* 127–9; Hermes: *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* 156–8; Dionysus: *Homeric Hymn to Dionysus* 12–14). What has not been adequately explained, however, is the fact that in later tablets, in addition to the binding of hands and feet, a proliferation of other body parts can be bound. The most famous example is the Roman tablet found placed on the skull of a corpse that enumerates for binding, from head to toe, the victim's head, hair, shadow, skull, brow, eyebrows, mouth, nose, chin, jaws, lips, speech, face, neck, liver, shoulders, heart, lungs, intestines, stomach, arms, fingers, hands, navel, bladder, knees, legs, ankles, and the soles of the feet (*DT* 190). The usual explanation for why these features of the individual are singled out is that they capture the intellectual and physical faculties of the victim, as in the case of Gnaeus Sicinius above. Other researchers have focused on how these later tablets increasingly incorporate legal terminology and reflect methods of torture derived from judicial punishment (Versnel 1998).

One direction that has not been explored considers how the binding of a victim's mental and physical faculties is a different realization, through magic, of Greek notions of disability and impairment. The most famous disabled character on the

Athenian stage was Oedipus, whose own ankles were pinned or pierced (Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannus* 718). As noted earlier, piercing a folded tablet with a nail gives visible expression to the metaphor of binding, and some tablets expressly call for the piercing (*kentein*) of the victim's body-parts (*DTA* 97.25–6). But the culturally relevant understanding of disability extends further. We may turn to a late passage from the physician Soranus of Ephesus' *Gynaecology*, which is unique for being the only text to describe the main features of health in a newborn child (Garland 1995: 14–15). Soranus writes that the child 'should be perfect in all its parts, limbs and senses, and should have unblocked passages, namely of the ears, nose, throat, urethra, and anus. The natural movements of each limb should neither be heavy nor weak, the limbs should bend and stretch, its shape should be appropriate, and it should be very alert' (*Gynaecology* 2.10.5). If we interpret binding magic in terms of a Greek definition of health, we can see that magic inverts the very markers of health identified by Soranus. Binding spells restrain the senses and limbs and, as in the case of Sicinius, dumbfound the awareness. Further work is needed here, but this kind of direction of research illustrates the important principle that magic must be understood within available cultural categories. As a whole, the medical writers have still not been systematically compared to magical texts for the knowledge they can provide about available understandings of disease and ailment (Kotansky 1991: 132, n. 64), let alone for health.

Figurines of wax, clay, and occasionally lead used in binding spells offer another promising area of research. Good syntheses of most known figurines are already available (Faraone 1991*b*; Gager 1992). We have literary texts that depict the use of wax figurines in magic (Theocritus, *Idyll* 2), and the famous wax Louvre doll found in a clay pot with a *defixio* corresponds closely to a major papyrus that prescribes how to construct such a figurine to be used in erotic magic (*PGM* iv. 296–329; Gager 1992: 98, fig. 13). But there have been few attempts to locate the use of magical figurines within the broader context of Greek attitudes toward statuary generally (Collins 2003: 37–44). The Greeks had complicated notions of statuary—from their lifelike treatment of cult-statues (e.g. Herodotus 6.61; Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 242), statuettes (*xoana*, Aristophanes, *Wealth* 594–7), to the private and public ritual treatment of wax figurines (*kolossoi*, e.g. *SEG* ix. 3), to doll-play by Greek and Roman children with its ritual underpinnings (Hurschmann 2001; *Palatine Anthology* 6.280; Persius 2.70). Inanimate objects, such as axes, could be put on trial (Pausanias 1.24.4–5), and the Athenians reserved the Prytaneion for the trial of inanimate objects, animals, and unknown defendants. It is within this broader context that magical figurines need to be situated. One potential avenue of research regards a culture's broad class of statuary as social agents, or modified forms of person, whose personality attributes can be mapped (Gell 1998).

This kind of approach again situates magical activity within available cultural categories. Greek magic did not emerge *in vacuo*, and its practices—even

where we can detect broader Roman, Egyptian, Near Eastern, or Mesopotamian influences—can still be studied profitably in relation to Greek religious, political, and cultural institutions.

Suggested Reading

Apart from the authors cited in the main body of the article, there are very good introductions to the study of ancient magic. Graf (1994) is responsible for reviving interest in ancient magic. More imaginative, and anthropologically informed, is Gordon (1987 and 1999). For erotic magic, readers should consult Faraone (1999). The most recent survey of Greek magic can be found in Collins (2008).

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CHAPTER 45

MEDICINE

BROOKE HOLMES

A casual glance at an ancient Greek medical treatise or a fragment of one is likely to produce a sense of unfamiliarity. The author might be going on at length about the movement of something called phlegm in the body. He may be explaining disease as the leakage of blood *into* the arteries. Instead of promoting the benefits of fruit, he might seem inordinately worried about the dangers that it poses to his patients' health.

At the same time, the reader may feel rather comfortable with the ancient medical author's way of going about things. Rather than relying on his relationship with the gods to find out what is wrong with his patient, he quite sensibly asks where it hurts. Or he examines the patient's urine, and then makes an inference about the cause of any abnormality. His description of the nervous system may accord startlingly well with that found in a modern textbook. The care he puts into determining what a patient should eat in order to maximize his well-being might ring a bell for a reader in a culture similarly obsessed with dietetics and the ethical imperative of managing personal health.

That a piece of ancient medical writing generates a mix of recognition and alienation in a modern western reader is not in itself unusual: such a complex reaction seems a hallmark of our relationship to the ancient Greek world. Medicine is particularly interesting, however, because it raises the question of the common ground sustaining that relationship. We have bodies that are presumably much like those of the Greeks. Yet the familiarity of Galen's anatomical observations or a classical author's argument against daemonic causality cannot simply be explained by the relative stability of human anatomy and physiology. Rather, familiarity is fostered, too, by the fact that we share with the learned Greek medical writers a

way of thinking about diseased bodies in which vision is privileged and suffering is explained and treated in terms of material (bodily, environmental, dietary) causes, rather than divine ones. In dealing with Greek medicine, it is hard, then, to disentangle the body *qua* 'real' object of medical knowledge from our inherited ideas about what a body is. And it is because so much of the world we are thought to share with ancient Greek medicine is based on this objective thing, the body, and because the Greeks seem to us to have got something essentially right when they started treating it and thinking about it like a thing, that it is so difficult to figure out what to do with their apparent errors and points of divergence from us. The problem is a pressing one for the study of ancient medicine in times when its nosologies and therapies have been definitively discredited. Do we focus on those ties to the tradition that seem to endure into the present, such as the medical writers' interest in corporeal phenomena in their diagnoses of disease? Or should we explore the fissures in our shared terrain by emphasizing the radically different ways of seeing and diverse modes of healing in the ancient world?

In this short chapter I give a brief introduction to ancient Greek medicine that acknowledges our deep historical ties to Greek ways of thinking about human bodies and human suffering without sacrificing the strangeness of these ideas. Of course, under the rubric of Greek medicine one finds a range of ideas and practices, which cover a broad swathe of territory and vary in accordance with the practitioner's training and social status, the patient's gender and class, local healing traditions, political formations, and other historical, cultural, and geographical factors. Despite sharing a set of problems and questions from the fifth century BCE onwards, even writers within the tradition of learned, secular medicine were by no means unified in their outlook. Yet I have chosen to focus on this tradition as a tradition in order to situate medicine within broader constructions of Hellenism. I am also interested in how contemporary concerns about the relationship between the biological and the human can offer us a new angle on the old story of how Greek medicine freed itself from divine causality to describe bodies and diseases in natural terms. I wager that by denaturalizing natural causality and the body it assumes, we can get a better grip on the kinds of implication secular medicine had for the imagination of the self, the power of *tekhnē*, and the meaning of suffering from the fifth century onwards.

In the first section I offer a brief history of the history of Greek medicine and a look at the state of the field. I pay particular attention to a question that has been of great significance in this history, namely the role of the divine in Greek medicine. The second part of the chapter sketches an overview of the learned, secular tradition by focusing on the role played by the inside of the body in some major ideas about disease and health in this tradition. But before beginning, something must be said about the nature of our evidence.

Our direct evidence for the formation of a secular medical tradition lies in the sixty-odd extant treatises that have come down to us under the name of

Hippocrates. Many of these treatises date from the late fifth and early fourth centuries BCE, and were already circulating under the name Hippocrates in the Hellenistic period (Smith 1979: 177–246). The biological fragments of sixth- and fifth-century natural philosophy, together with compilations of medical opinions, such as the aetiological section of the Anonymous Londinensis papyrus (Diels 1893; Jones 1947; see also Manetti 1999), complement our understanding of the treatises of the Hippocratic Corpus, and can, in fact, serve as an important corrective to the picture these treatises give of early Greek medicine. Secular medical activity in the centuries between the mid-fourth century BCE and the career of Galen in the second century CE spans Aristotelianism, the rise of systematic anatomy, challenges to humoral pathology, and divisive debates about the value and use of reason, definition, aetiology, and physiological knowledge in medicine. Our understanding of this period is built mostly on fragments, a consequence of Galen's success in establishing his version of medicine as canonical for later generations. However, as new editions appear (Garofalo 1988; von Staden 1989; Garofalo 1997; Guardasole 1997; Masullo 1999; Mauroudes 2000; van der Eijk 2001; Tecusan 2004), we can increasingly appreciate the vitality of medical thought in the years between the Hippocratic Corpus and Galen. We can better grasp, too, the variety of medical responses to problems raised by explanations of disease and well-being that privilege the material body. With Galen, famine turns to feast. His voluminous corpus represents approximately 10 per cent of extant Greek literature before the mid-fourth century CE, and it is growing, as new fragments and even entire treatises are rediscovered in Latin and Arabic. Nutton (2002: 249–50) has pointed out that a previously unknown work of Galen has appeared nearly every two years since 1960—an incredible proliferation that has enriched our understanding of Galen not only as a physician, but also as a thinker active in a time of considerable intellectual ferment. Galen's work exhibits an ongoing, lively, and almost always polemical engagement with his predecessors and contemporaries. It also delivers a global vision of Greek medicine, generated through a creative interpretation of the Hippocratean legacy and a wealth of anatomical investigations, therapeutic experience, and philosophical reflection, a vision that decisively shapes the theory and practice of medicine in the Byzantine, Arabic, and medieval western worlds. I would like to turn, now, to how the chronological progression that I have just sketched is treated in various accounts of the history of ancient medicine.

45.1. Greek Medicine Past and Present

The Greeks saw health as the most valuable of goods—without it, no one is happy, according to a fourth-century BCE hymn by Ariphron (Athenaeus 15, 702). They also found the susceptibility to disease to be emblematic of the mortal condition.

Unsurprisingly, then, ideas about healing are steeped in cultural and religious significance. Early Greek sources trace the gift of healing to sympathetic gods (Homer, *Iliad* 4.218–19; *The Sack of Troy*, fr. 1 Davies). The late fifth-century BCE treatise *On Ancient Medicine* offers a different perspective. Its author casts *tekhnē* as the outcome of a collective attempt to overcome the pain that arises from the inability of human bodies to assimilate food from the outside world. Subsequent genealogies of the history of medicine in antiquity often conflated these two approaches, joining gods, heroes, and mortal physicians, while emphasizing the importance of empirical investigation (e.g. [Galen], *Introductio* 1, xiv. 674–6 Kühn). The first modern narratives, however, which begin to appear in the seventeenth century, hewed more faithfully to the Hippocratic author's perception of the present as the beneficiary of human achievements within a continuous tradition reaching back to Hippocrates himself. These narratives shared, too, the ancient author's commitment to progress, albeit one moulded by Enlightenment concepts of scientific advancement. While nineteenth-century nosology and pathology broke with this tradition as a system of medical theories and practices, Greek medicine retained its privileged place in early and mid-twentieth-century histories of medicine by virtue of its purported rationality and freedom from superstition. What it lacked in facts, it made up for in scientific spirit, a spirit imagined as kindred to our own.

In line with critiques of the 'Greek miracle' elsewhere, systematic contestation of this Enlightenment narrative, never unchallenged, has dominated the recent history of ancient medicine. Scholars have shown that ancient medical investigations were not beholden to the scientific method (von Staden 1975; Lloyd 1979). They have recognized the complex role of the divine within the medical writers (e.g. Boudon 1988; van der Eijk 2004). Adopting methodologies from social history and anthropology, recent research has rooted learned Greek medicine in the cultural and historical conditions of its emergence, drawing attention to its pluralism and the blindspots of its most prominent elite practitioners. The classical medical writers' interest in causality and the nature of knowledge has been read alongside similar concerns in rhetoric, philosophy, and historiography (Jouanna 1999: 177–285; Schiefsky 2005: 5–71; Thomas 2000). Its disease concepts and therapies have been traced to older healing practices and the cultural imaginary (Lloyd 1983; Dean-Jones 1991; von Staden 1992*a*; Hanson 1991; King 1998). Most scholars continue to present learned secular medicine as an epistemic shift. Yet they have justified this assessment by emphasizing the medical writers' use of signs and proof (Manetti 1993: 36–52), as well as changes to the production and circulation of knowledge in this period—the emphasis on systematization and explanation, criticism of opposing views, and the use of argument and evidence (Lloyd 1987)—that are evident in the extant treatises.

And so, superseded in pathology and physiology, excommunicated from Enlightenment secularism, the Greek medical writers have been reborn as semioticians, epistemologists, and rhetoricians. The ideas that count—about causality,

empirical knowledge and the scope of *tekhnē*, the relationship of body to mind, the patient—are not those validated by contemporary medicine, but, rather, those that continue to needle us. As a result, the field finds itself caught between two tendencies. Having only recently uprooted a tenacious presentism, scholars remain rightly committed to ancient medicine's historical specificity and strangeness (von Staden 1992*a*; Flemming 2000: 3–28; van der Eijk 2005: 1–8). Moreover, comparative study, especially of ancient Chinese medicine, continues to demonstrate the contingency of ideas once taken for granted as discoveries en route to the present's grasp of reality (Kuriyama 1999; Lloyd 1996*b*, 2002, 2004; Lloyd and Sivin 2002). At the same time, critique and logical demonstration are nearly universally taken as virtues of the modern academy, meaning that the 'new' history of medicine is as much about prized intellectual legacies as its predecessor. And the significant role of non-classicists in the field's renaissance, together with the escalation of technologies of biopower and the increasing urgency of articulating medicine's relationship to the human, suggests that teleological progressivism is not the only language in which ancient medicine 'speaks' to us.

In recent analyses of the differences between ancient and modern perspectives, perhaps the most contested point has been the status of 'magical' or 'divine' elements in Greek medicine (cf. Collins in the previous chapter). Undoubtedly, rigid polarizations (natural/supernatural, secular/divine), historically used as a litmus-test of a given thinker's scientific credibility, end up distorting our evidence. Indeed, the text that is most often made to shore up these divisions, namely the fifth-century BCE *On the Sacred Disease*, openly recognizes the gods' healing powers, at least with respect to moral errors (1.13, vi. 364 Littré). And interaction between learned and temple medicine remains lively in the first centuries BCE. The persona of the god Asclepius is often that of a brilliant personal physician (e.g. *IG* IV^2.1, no. 126 = T432 Edelstein). Galen uses his relationship with Asclepius, whom he sometimes credits for prognoses or insights transmitted through dreams, to guarantee his moral and elite credentials. The Hippocratic Oath is a religious document, which positions the physician firmly within a community founded on shared values (von Staden 1997). What matters no longer seems to be whether or not there are gods in learned Greek medical writing. What is worth exploring, rather, is what the gods—or the divine in a more impersonal sense—are doing there. There is, of course, no single answer to this question. Yet insofar as the gods seem intimately related to the question of what suffering *means*, foregrounding their presence can keep us attuned to the complications that necessarily attend the pursuit of knowledge about life, death, and the place of humans in the world around them.

The gods' absence, however, matters as well. For the differences between the secular and the magico-religious traditions are not inconsequential. In privileging the mechanics of events, rather than the social agency of gods and sufferers, and material bodies rather than suffering persons, secular physicians drive a wedge

between disease and conventional perceptions of moral error. Yet this is not to say that the patient *qua* ethical agent disappears from Greek medicine. S/he is, rather, transformed by new perspectives on embodiment. Regimen and dietetics, which are associated with the 'new' medicine of the late fifth century, allocate a position to the patient as master of his own health, while, in anticipation of Aristotle, remaining ambivalent about the agency of women (Dean-Jones 1992). The medical *tekhnē* is a moral phenomenon, capable of shaping what constitutes a liveable life (e.g. Plato, *Republic* 3, 405c–408b; Celsus, *On Medicine*, proem 4–5). Medicine's marginalization of the gods contributes to the growing autonomy and crystallization of 'the' body (*sōma*), which comes to pose a challenge to theology, metaphysics, and ethics.

In short, gods and patients connect the physician's engagement with humours and nerves to human lives and values. We are obliged neither to see these connections as prescriptive, nor to credit Greek medicine with an enviable synthesis of body and spirit—to romanticize the 'humanism' of Greek medicine is simply to court philhellenism in another guise. Rather, such relationships show how medicine begins to assume its position in the western tradition at the point of slippage between bodies and persons.

One place to locate this point of slippage is inside the medical body itself. Archaic thought takes it for granted that we think and feel with our viscera. But as secular medicine elaborates the visceral interior in terms of fluids and forces and enquires into the precise role of these fluids and forces in converting external catalysts into symptoms, the question of *how*, exactly, our viscera are related to conscious thought and voluntary action arises. Medicine introduces, too, the question of what it means to 'see' or 'know'—and ultimately to control—the corporeal interior. In light of the importance of these questions in both the learned medical tradition and beyond it, I would like to turn now to a brief overview of this tradition telescoped by ideas and debates about corporeal interiority.

45.2. Uncovering the Medical Body

Within a magico-religious world-view, not every ailment requires the intervention of a religious authority or an explanation, and therapy may unfold at either the corporeal or the sacred level—or both. However, in our early Greek sources symptoms, especially dramatic ones, tend to be blamed on angry gods, daemons, and heroes (e.g. Homer, *Iliad* 1.43–52; Hesiod, *Works and Days* 242–3, 741; see also Celsus, *On Medicine*, proem 4). This anger becomes intelligible within a framework of shared expectations about interpersonal obligations (e.g. reciprocity), concepts

of purity, and moral precepts, though it can also resist interpretation, as in Euripides' *Heracles*. In *On the Sacred Disease*, magico-religious healers correlate specific symptoms with the gods responsible (*aitioi*) for them (1.10–11, vi. 360–2 Littré) in order to determine which course of action to pursue. Curse-tablets and figurines (discussed by Collins in the previous chapter) suggest that symptoms could also be attributed to another person's desire to harm, realized through performative speech and enactment. Each of these explanations assumes that harm arrives from outside the person. In most cases, it can be traced back to the baneful intentions of somebody else, god or human. 'Hidden' causes, then, are sought in divine or magical space, rather than corporeal space. Therapy requires social negotiation, as well as practical intervention.

Secular medicine works with the belief that, together with environment and diet—ancient Greek medicine recognizes contagion or viruses only in a very weak sense (Nutton 1983)—'the things inside a person hurt him' (*On Ancient Medicine* 14, i. 602 Littré). These 'things' differ from author to author (bile and phlegm; powers or juices; residues from digestion). The kinds of explanation one finds in learned medical writing do not simply make the 'obvious' substitution of natural causes for divine ones; for disease is never 'obviously' the result of natural causes. Rather, by transferring the concept of responsibility to impersonal forces and privileging a notion of mechanical causality over divine agency, medical explanations of disease transform the very concept of causality (Vegetti 1999).

In the archaic world, explanations of what people do and suffer are often two-pronged, insofar as they refer to both a divine and a human level of action: this double determination is evident in Agamemnon's famous apology (*Iliad* 19.78–144), and is elaborated in Attic tragedy. Coming out of such a cultural context, the medical writers develop explanations of symptoms that recognize both internal and external factors. Yet what qualifies as internal in this model no longer corresponds to a human agent, however unwitting or unwilling. Between external causes and symptoms, the medical writers instead place substances and forces that lie below the threshold of the patient's consciousness—except in pain—and so outside the patient's scope of action. Unlike the *thumos* in Homer, these substances are deaf to speech. Like the basic stuffs of early Greek cosmology, they are changed by food and drink, heat and cold, and trauma. Changes to a given substance often grant it dangerous power, thereby disrupting relations inside the body and precipitating disease.

Some medical writers are particularly interested in the mechanics of these changes. Their explanations assume the cardinal principle of physical determinism: everything happens on account of something (*On the Tekhnē* 6, vi. 10 Littré). Changes to the body's fluid substrate initiate a chain of snowballing events leading first to symptoms, then to death or debility. This series *is* the disease, difficult to objectify apart from the corrupted humours; therapy is designed to thwart the onset and development of disease. Yet there are other factors that can help or hinder

the process, such as the existing quantity of a humour, or a patient's particular constitution. Interposed between catalyst and symptom, each corporeal interior must be seen, then, as a space of multiple possibilities. Daemonic or divine agency splinters into a number of small, locally motivated causes, some originating outside the body, others realized within it. The fragmentation of agency encourages the medical writers to think about the gap between what occurs necessarily and what happens only 'for the most part' (di Benedetto 1966; von Staden 2002), where 'for the most part' tacitly recognizes the heterogeneity of bodies and causal series. Given that disease is realized incrementally in the majority of cases, it becomes more difficult to assess the patient's own role in bringing it about. At the same time, the need to recuperate agency in the face of fragmented causality puts pressure on physicians and patients to master the volatile and mysterious inner body.

Medicine's own version of double determination thus introduces the inside of the body as the part of the self that participates most transparently in sixth- and fifth-century materialist cosmologies. Much of what medicine claims to know about the nature and power of the disease relies on inferences from corporeal phenomena to events inside the body; knowing the causes of symptoms is often held as key to therapy (*On Breaths* 1, vi. 92 Littré). To control his/her body and, hence, his/her well-being, the patient adopts the same strategies as the physician, that is, interpreting his/her experience and monitoring his/her behaviour in the light of medical theories. Regimen, I have noted, develops into an important technique of self-mastery in the fifth century, gaining prestige and complexity in fourth-century physicians like Diocles of Carystus (van der Eijk 2000–1), Praxagoras of Cos (Steckerl 1958), and Mnesitheus and Dieuches, both of Athens (Bertier 1972). Indeed, regimen may be taken as *the* model for the masculine 'techniques of self' analysed by Foucault in the last two volumes of his *History of Sexuality* (1986, 1988), with the material body as the original object of mastery.

Thus, secular medicine departs from magico-religious medicine in its interest in the corporeal interior, its fascination with mechanical causality, and its preference for substances and processes over social agents. This legacy unfolds in subsequent centuries as a series of cacophonous debates and sophisticated reflections about the theory and practice of medicine. These controversies converge on the nature of the body that intervenes between external catalyst and symptom, or, as it begins to emerge as a psychosomatic entity in Democritus, Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic philosophers, between stimulus and act. How is this corporeal space organized? What are its component parts and their functions? What forces operate there? What is the relationship of these forces to one another, to foodstuffs, to the environment? To the subject of pain? To the subject of reason? How do they relate to cosmic order, or to the divine? What do different constitutions contribute to disease or character? How does the physician learn about and control this space? Does he need to know anything about it at all? What is the patient's role in understanding and managing his own vulnerability?

While these questions are always evolving, they are fundamentally transformed by the practice of systematic human dissection in Hellenistic Alexandria, which encourages medicine to deal in a more hands-on way with the materiality of the bodily interior, while also producing a new set of limits on what can be seen. As has long been recognized, a basic knowledge of anatomy is evident already in Homer. Yet systematic dissection apparently begins in earnest with Aristotle and fourth-century physicians like Diocles of Carystus and Praxagoras of Cos, all of whom work with animals. Human dissection is first and apparently *only* undertaken on condemned criminals in Alexandria by the third-century BCE physicians Herophilus and Erasistratus, with Ptolemaic support (von Staden 1992*b*; Annoni and Barras 1993; Flemming 2003: 451–5). It is in large part through bodies rejected as fully human, then, that human norms are established in the Hellenistic period.

Whereas symptoms only reveal what is happening inside the body when there is a problem, dissection, like Praxagoras' 'discovery' of the pulse, furthers a growing interest in the nature of the healthy body. There is strong evidence that the anatomists turned to vivisection to observe, 'while their subjects still breathed, parts that nature had previously hidden', on the grounds that diseases often occur in those hidden parts (Celsus, *On Medicine*, proem 23–4). Some critics countered that, violently exposed to the light, the internal parts were so changed as to no longer qualify as normal: the vivisected body thus serves as a poor window onto subcutaneous life, which is destroyed by the act of seeing. Others protested that the practice was unnecessary, given the likelihood of a physician having to deal with a body already gashed open. Still others simply insisted that the practice was unconscionably cruel (proem 40–4, 74–5).

What is at stake here is not only the right of medicine to destroy life in order to save life—the argument Celsus attributes to the anatomists (proem 26)—but also the question of just what anatomy can reveal of the visceral interior. Dissection facilitates the critique of ideas such as the 'wandering womb'—which turns out to be anchored by ligaments—as well as the acquisition of new knowledge: Herophilus is credited with first mapping the nervous system and tracking its origins to the brain, thereby undermining (albeit not destroying) Aristotle's claim that the heart is the 'controlling' centre of the person. Yet anatomy also creates another layer of phenomenal traces, and so another gap between external forces and visible effects. This gap requires, in turn, an interpretation of the hidden reality that produced those effects. Herophilus himself thought that anatomical description shed little light on the faculties controlling us (fr. 57 von Staden). Galen, too, believed anatomy could tell us little about the substance of the soul (*On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* 9.9, v. 793–5 Kühn).

At the less invasive end of the spectrum of investigative techniques to see the unseen, Herophilus is credited with making the pulse the physician's key point

of contact with bodily life. To 'touch' the artery's contraction and expansion sets the anatomical body in time, while also facilitating diagnosis and prognosis. Analogy, too, offered some help in bridging the inert cadaver and the body's inner life. Herophilus, for example, argued that arteries attracted *pneuma* through their expansion, on the model of a pump (fr. 145a von Staden). Still, while analogies could supply a basic mechanics to the structures perceived in dissection, thereby helping to explain the pulse, they could account neither for changes to the pulse, nor for the causes of disease: despite his physiological speculation, Herophilus kept to the basic tenets of humoral pathology.

Herophilus' contemporary Erasistratus, on the other hand, did try to build both a physiology and a pathology based on the networked body of Hellenistic medicine. In the end, however, his presuppositions lead him to bypass the surface of this anatomical body in favour of a new set of entities that could be perceived by reason alone. Convinced that the arteries do not contain blood (the main nutritive fluid), Erasistratus 'infers' the existence of the *triplokia*, an invisible intertwining of nerves, veins, and arteries that allows blood to supply nourishment to arterial walls. This belief participates in the more general principle, developed in conjunction with Praxagoras' differentiation of the veins and the arteries and Herophilus' discovery of the nervous system, that each type of vessel—veins, arteries, nerves—has its own proper substance. Erasistratus' pathology is based on another theoretical entity: valves that leak excessive blood into the arteries and nerves, causing fever and paralysis respectively. This slide from the visible back into the invisible is repeated by the late second-century BCE physician Asclepiades of Bithynia, who reduces all corporeal phenomena to the circulation of tiny corpuscles (*onkoi*) through equally tiny passages (*poroi*). In both Erasistratus and Asclepiades, however, these entities, like anatomy's macrostructures, continue to function according to mechanical laws and find their analogies in the world of machines (Vegetti 1995; von Staden 1996).

On the one hand, then, corpuscular theories rely on inferential reasoning and hidden causes. On the other hand, causal inference is arrested at the level of mechanical explanation, with the result that the body envisioned by the Hellenistic physicians differs from the body imagined by Aristotelian vitalism (Vegetti 1998). Corpuscular theories also downplay the speculation about environmental conditions, diet, and individual constitutions that is characteristic of Hippocratic writers. Erasistratus argued, for example, that since the seepage of blood from veins to arteries (*paremptōsis*) is the only event that necessarily causes fever in *every* body, it is the only thing that can be called a cause (Celsus, *On Medicine*, proem 54 [= Eristratus, fr. 210 Garofalo]; Galen, *On Antecedent Causes*, 8.102–4 Hankinson [= Erasistratus, fr. 211 Garofalo]); anything else is irrelevant. In short, a hidden corporeal interior remains fundamental to corpuscular theories of disease. Yet rather than concealing some quasi-metaphysical level, this space is governed by mechanics alone.

This starkly mechanistic account of the body's hidden interior offers a useful point of orientation for other Hellenistic and imperial-age theories of the body. These theories can be seen as both contracting and expanding the place of a hidden gap between external catalyst and symptom in explanations of suffering. The two major medical 'sects' that appear in the Hellenistic period offer a strident challenge to the physician's reliance on entities and causes hidden inside the body. Empiricists, a sect allegedly founded by a breakaway Herophilean in the third century BCE, argued that successful therapy requires only a refined familiarity with symptoms and the effects of different treatments. While they accepted the relevance of antecedent causes, they held that hidden causes were inherently irrecoverable; speculation about unseen things was deemed useless to the physician (Frede 1987: 243–60; 1988; Hankinson 1995). Methodism, which appeared in Rome in the late Hellenistic period, claimed that the only pathological states were constriction, flux, or a combination of the two. These states were visible to the naked eye—no inference from symptoms necessary—and invariable from individual to individual. Perception of the state dictated therapy, regardless of cause (Edelstein 1967: 173–91; Frede 1987: 261–78). Both sects defended a reorientation towards clinical medicine.

In contrast to Empiricism and Methodism, other medical writers neither reduced the role of the corporeal interior in symptoms to valves and vessels, nor ignored that space altogether. Celsus distances himself from Erasistratus' views on causality even as he reports them, by stressing the role of different constitutions in explanations of why not all bodies respond in the same way to the same stimuli (*On Medicine*, proem 58–60). Galen, too, made individual constitution, together with existing imbalances in the body, crucial to his explanation of symptoms. In so doing, he treats regimen and moderation not only as preconditions of health, but also as ethical imperatives that safeguard praise and blame, insofar as the patient who neglects his body may be held responsible for his ills (*On Antecedent Causes* 15.187–96 Hankinson). While we saw that a 'double determination' model is Hippocratic in origin, Galen's attention to the individual corporeal factors may be influenced by Stoic theories of causality, which isolate alterations to the inner *pneuma*, for example, as an important step in the production of disease (Galen, *On Containing Causes* 2.2–3 Lyons). Indeed, the interference of the highest form of *pneuma* between external stimulus and individual action is indispensable to Stoic notions of human responsibility.

The massive Galenic Corpus is not only our most fertile source of these debates, but also showcases a Herculean attempt to synthesize their competing positions (Aristotelianism, Hellenistic and Roman ethics, Platonism, Alexandrian anatomo-physiology, humoral pathology) under the aegis of Hippocrates' historical authority. This encyclopedic impulse results in a conceptualization of the corporeal interior that is, by turns, nuanced and incoherent. Despite his avowed Platonism, Galen cannot reconcile his experience as a physician and anatomist,

for example, with the immortal soul. He appropriates ethics for medicine, thereby challenging the working separation of *sōma* and *psukhē* enforced by the 'medical analogy' developed in Hellenistic philosophy (Nussbaum 1994). Yet he never doubts the existence of the soul, and even claims its (Platonic) tripartite nature can be empirically demonstrated. His extraordinary respect for, and command of, anatomy, far from encouraging mechanical materialism, subsidizes teleology and vitalism. His aetiology, as we have seen, is capacious, admitting causes external and internal, contingent and constitutional, determinist and ethically salient. While the physician's authority vis-à-vis the disease is indisputable, patients and potential patients populate the treatises as spectators, obstacles, peers, sufferers, and ethical subjects: lifestyle and constitution are important causes of all diseases, even in the case of epidemics.

Galen's potent blend of dogmatism, self-confidence, and eclecticism shapes the reception of Greek medicine as a carapace of solutions, rather than a live set of problems. And yet, as scholars continue to demonstrate (e.g. Hankinson 1991, 1993; von Staden 1995; Lloyd 1996*a*; Flemming 2000; van der Eijk 2005: 279–98), medicine's capacity to disturb some of the cardinal precepts of 'classical' Hellenism—the segregation of the (rational) soul from the body, the value of definition and logical demonstration in the pursuit of truth, the autonomy of male subjects, gender difference, the systematicity of nature, the authority of *tekhnē*—emerges most clearly in the hands of a thinker deeply and passionately committed to these precepts as he struggles to map the space between what lies outside the body and the phenomena of symptoms and persons. Our own ideas about what happens in that space and how we affect those events will no doubt continue to shape what we make of Hellenism.

Suggested Reading

An up-to-date and erudite overview of all aspects of ancient medicine, from Homer to late antiquity, is now available in Nutton (2004). The essays by Jouanna, Vegetti, Gourevitch, and Strohmaier in Grmek (1998) serve as excellent, more in-depth introductions to humoral medicine and anatomy, as well as to the major periods of Greek medicine and its fate in the Roman, Byzantine, and Arab worlds; Grmek's introduction usefully surveys methodological issues in the history of medicine from the early modern period to the present. For those interested in the historiography of ancient medicine in antiquity, van der Eijk (1999*b*) furnishes a handy overview. Jouanna (1999) offers a comprehensive introduction to the Hippocratic Corpus, while expertly situating the secular medical writers in the intellectual and cultural milieu of fifth- and fourth-century Greece. Von Staden's impressive edition of the fragments of Herophilus (1989) has defined our understanding of Hellenistic medicine, while his articles (many of which are listed under 'References' below), have shaped nearly every aspect of the study of ancient medicine. Flemming (2000) includes

a thorough overview of the reception of Greek medicine at Rome. The essays gathered in van der Eijk, Horstmanshoff, and Schrijvers (1995) signalled a key turn towards the study of medicine from the perspective of social and cultural history in the 1990s. Recent work in paleopathology may be found in the essays by Arnott, Fox, and especially Roberts *et al.* (with extensive bibliography) in King (2005); the standard reference work remains Grmek (1989).

Nowhere do the lineaments of the medical writers' body emerge with greater clarity than in Kuriyama (1999), a comparative survey of early Greek and Chinese medicine. The majority of the work done on the medical writers' concepts of the body, however, has concentrated on the female body. Dean-Jones (1994) is a lucid and thorough analysis of the female body in the Hippocratic writers and Aristotle, while the collection of essays in King (1998) offers a less systematic, but equally illuminating picture of the female body in the Hippocratic Corpus. More concise surveys can be found in Hanson (1990 and 1991). Flemming (2000) provides a sophisticated analysis of gynecology and women patients in Roman medicine, including the Galenic Corpus. Extant gynecological texts in English include the Hippocratic selections translated in Hanson (1975) and Flemming and Hanson (1998) and the *Gynecology* of the Methodist physician Soranus of Ephesus, in a translation by Oswei Temkin; for an overview of Soranus see Green and Hanson (1994).

Lloyd (1979), which definitively sited early Greek medicine between the conceptual habits of archaic and classical Greece and the 'invention of nature' in the sixth- and fifth-century cosmologists, still offers stimulating insights. Pigeaud (1981, 1987) broke new ground with his alert and complex readings of the grey area between medicine's body and philosophy's mind, and the full implications of his work await further exploration. The essays collected in van der Eijk (2005) range from the Hippocratic Corpus to late antiquity, and create a nuanced portrait of the interactions between Greek medicine and philosophy; the essays on Aristotle, in particular, take an important step towards restoring the place of medicine and the body to philosophical attempts to describe the human. A more detailed examination of the concept of the corporeal interior in classical Greek medicine may be found in Holmes (forthcoming).

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CHAPTER 46

MUSIC

ELEONORA ROCCONI

46.1. Music and Hellenism

Greek music, or rather the wider Greek notion of *mousikē* (sc. *tekhnē* 'the Art of the Muses': cf. Murray and Wilson 2004), was a central aspect of Hellenic culture and identity. With this term the Greeks embraced the entire field of poetic performance, including lyrics and dance as well as music. Performances comprised of singing, dancing, and playing were a central part in many religious and social rituals; and the people who wrote lyrics also composed the music: they were called *melopoioi*, 'makers of songs'—where *melos* was a composition defined by words, tune, and rhythm (cf. Plato, *Republic* 398d). The performance contexts for *mousikē* were public festivals, such as the Panathenaea and the City Dionysia in Athens, as well as private occasions, such as weddings, funerals, or the aristocratic symposium. Those private functions had themselves a clear social and ritual dimension. (On the Panathenaea see Nagy and Haubold in this volume; on the City Dionysia see Taplin; on the symposium see Hobden and Capra.) The religious and social function of these different settings affected the musical forms and traditions associated with them; however, from early on, poet-composers, who possessed a special expertise and captivated their audiences on account of their individual talent, creatively elaborated on existing traditions. The impulse towards innovation is very clear at least from the classical period onwards.

If this conception of *mousikē* as a multimedial art seems to be peculiarly Greek, its debt to other cultures, particularly those of the Near East, is in fact significant. The Greeks themselves were at least partly aware of such influences: the geographer Strabo, for example, working in the first century CE, acknowledged

Asiatic influences on Greek musical instruments and melodic forms (*Geography* 10.3.17). Yet Greek perceptions of their music and their ethnicity do not easily map onto modern historical reconstruction. For example: the two most popular ancient Greek instruments, the lyre (in all its various forms) and the *aulos* (a reed-blown pipe, almost always played in pairs), are both Near Eastern in origin (West 1992: 387; 1997: 31). However, in Greek sources dating from the classical period onwards, they are often represented as ethnic opponents: the lyre was perceived as a quintessentially Greek instrument, and therefore fundamental to Athenian education; it was, moreover, the most important attribute of Apollo, the Greek god par excellence. The *aulos*, by contrast, was always perceived as an import from the Near East, where the practice of playing twin pipes was very widespread; it was also often (though not exclusively) associated with Dionysus and Dionysiac settings. This antagonism between *aulos* and lyre found symbolic expression in a myth that enjoyed great popularity in the classical period: the contest between Apollo and Marsyas. (The earliest reference to the story is in Herodotus 7.26.)

Marsyas was a satyr from Phrygia (a land associated with Dionysus), who picked up the *aulos* after Athena had invented and disowned it (Pausanias, *Guidebook to Greece* 1.24.1; cf. Wilson 1999). He was so pleased with his *aulos*-playing that he challenged Apollo to a musical contest, pitching his instrumental performance on the *aulos* against Apollo's singing to the *kithara*, a sophisticated version of the box lyre. The Muses judged the contest and declared Apollo the winner; as a result, the satyr was flayed and his skin hung up in a temple in Celaenae, a Phrygian town in south-western Asia Minor. Marsyas was punished for his *hubris*, his 'insolence', towards a god, and in this respect his fate can be compared to that of other hubristic artists, such as the citharode Thamyris, who challenged the Muses to a contest and was maimed as punishment for his daring (*Iliad* 2.594–600). Yet this story, which was a popular subject in classical art and literature, can also be taken as an expression of Greek nationalist feeling: it pitches Apollo the Greek against Marsyas the Phrygian, and suggests the superiority of singing to the quintessentially Greek lyre over instrumental performances on the foreign *aulos*. It may be relevant that the notion of the barbarian as the uncivilized other who literally cannot articulate speech, becomes important precisely in this period, as a response to the Persian threat (Hall 1989). Indeed, also in this period we witness arguments for the superiority of the lyre over the *aulos* in education; see Plato, *Republic* 399e and, much later but drawing on Plato, Aristides Quintilianus, *On Music* 2.18–19. (For further discussion, see Martin 2003.) Ancient arguments seem to imply that instrumental music was deemed inferior because it lacked words.

The example of Marsyas shows how important music was to the Greeks, and to their self-image vis-à-vis their perception of other cultures. Yet recent scholarship, thanks to an intense dialogue across the disciplines of philology, history, ethnomusicology, and musical archaeology, has been able to widen our perspective on Greek music and uncover many channels of communication and influence in

the ancient Mediterranean and the Near East. As a result of this concerted effort, we now think that the Greeks may have inherited and adapted from the East not just musical instruments, but also the melodic and scalar systems they used: those systems must have travelled together with the instruments on which they were played. According to a recent hypothesis, our Greek evidence preserves vestiges of the Old Babylonian version of diatonic music: this is suggested by the diatonic tuning system documented in a small corpus of Sumerian and Akkadian tablets found in Mesopotamia, as well as in the Hurrian hymns found at Ugarit, which use the Mesopotamian system. Those documents suggest that heptatony was widely practised in the ancient Near East some time before it is first attested in the Greek world (Franklin 2002).

46.2. Theory of Music: Harmonics and Acoustics

The ethnic characterization of the different regional styles survived in the names of the ancient attunements, or *harmoniai*: these were known as 'Dorian', 'Phrygian', 'Lydian', and so on. Unfortunately, we have very little information about their exact configuration in the archaic period. The earliest surviving book on musical theory (though fragmentary and incomplete) is Aristoxenos' *Harmonic Elements*, dating to the late fourth century BCE: it describes a rigorous and relatively recent scalar system, known as the Great Perfect System, where different types of tetrachords (that is to say, regularly recurring groups of four notes spanning the interval of a fourth) combined to form larger musical patterns. Within that system, cyclic reorderings of the same series of intervals were named according to the traditional labels: Myxolydian, Lydian, Phrygian, Dorian, Hypolydian, Hypophrygian, and Hypodorian. However, those terms now represented theoretical concepts, that is to say, different 'types of octave' (*eidē tou dia pasōn*), rather than the older musical structures employed by practising musicians. These types of octave were later confused with the older *harmoniai*: for modern scholars it is difficult to establish what degree of continuity there might have been between the scalar systems described in Aristoxenos and older, traditional structures.

Aristoxenos' musical analysis is the earliest full account of a complex scalar system, but he was, of course, not the first to attempt a theoretical analysis of the basic units out of which melodies were made (Barker 2007). Harmonic and acoustic studies probably date back to the late sixth century BCE: works on musical theory are attributed to archaic authors such as, for example, Lasus of Hermione, though no treatise from that period survives. By the late fifth century at least two distinct approaches to the theoretical study of music had emerged, as Plato, *Republic*

530c–531c testifies. On the one hand there were the empiricists (or *harmonikoi*, as Aristoxenos and Theophrastus later called them), who tried to account for musical phenomena as they were perceived in practice: they sought to identify the smallest interval the ear could detect—which turned out to be the quarter-tone—and then used it as a unit of measurement to describe other intervals. On the other hand there were the Pythagoreans, who found in music a cosmic order that could be expressed mathematically: as part of their investigation of universal *harmonia*, they worked out the ratios underlying the concordant intervals (*sumphōniai*): the fourth (4:3), the fifth (3:2) and the octave (2:1).

These two approaches to the study of music were, initially, just informal alliances of common attitudes and interests, rather than well-organized schools of thought: they were not originally perceived as incompatible. It was only in the Hellenistic period that two approaches to musical investigation were clearly distinguished: Aristoxenians and Pythagoreans were, by then, characterized by different assumptions, methods, and aims. In the fourth century BCE distinctions were not comprehensive: Aristotle, for example, simply pointed out that 'mathematical' harmonics (*mathēmatikē harmonikē*) and harmonics based on hearing (*harmonikē hē kata tēn akoēn*) pursued different goals: the first sought to know the reason (*to dioti*), the latter to establish the facts (*to hoti*): *Posterior Analytics* 78b32–79a6. Aristoxenos, for his part, presented the empiricists as his own predecessors (though he criticized them on various grounds), and dismissed the study of 'ratios and relative speeds' simply because he considered it entirely irrelevant (*allotriōtatos*) to his analysis (*Harmonic Elements* 32.18–28).

Aristoxenos conceived his study in Aristotelean terms: he saw it first and foremost as a 'physics' of melody, which was part of a wider and multifaceted science concerning other aspects of music, such as rhythm, metre, and musical instruments. The purpose of harmonics was that of identifying facts that could be grasped by perception (*aisthēsis*)—such as, for example, notes, intervals, and scales—and of explaining the principles that governed their melodic combination by means of reason (*dianoia*). Aristoxenos insisted that, in order to understand music, memory (*mnēmē*) was essential: 'It is in a process of coming to be that melody consists' (*Harmonic Elements* 38.31). This dynamic approach differed radically from the mathematical analysis of the Pythagoreans, who described musical intervals as static relations between fixed notes. It was not, however, necessarily incompatible with it.

From the Hellenistic age onwards, it became common practice to distinguish between different approaches to harmonic theory on the basis of the relative importance they assigned to perception and reason. In fact, perception and reason came to be seen as alternative criteria of analysis, though in Aristoxenos they had coexisted. When, after three centuries of near silence, musical theory is attested again in texts dating to the first centuries CE, Pythagorean and Aristoxenian approaches are kept strictly apart and presented as incompatible. According to Barker (forthcoming),

the development of musical theory into these two irreconcilable traditions was largely the result of Hellenistic epistemology, which focused on methodological principles and promoted a strained interpretation of Aristoxenos, transforming him into a pure champion of scientific empiricism. The philosophical debate on the criteria for musical analysis also affected some followers of Aristoxenos, such as Cleonides, Bacchius, and Gaudentius, who worked between the second and the fourth centuries CE: they were able to give only a scholastic exposition of their master's doctrines, abstracting his system from real musical experience.

Some very few writers of the first centuries CE did try to combine elements of the two traditions: the most successful was Ptolemy. Though formally rejecting both doctrines, he combined a mathematically rigorous form of analysis, close to that of the Pythagoreans, with a genuine interest in actual musical structures. As Ptolemy himself stated in the introduction to his *Harmonics* (1.1), he based his musical knowledge on both hearing and reason: the former, he thought, was concerned with the subject-matter (*hylē*) and its 'modification' (*pathos*)—that is to say, with music in all its perceptible complexity and variability; the latter was concerned with its 'form' (*eidos*) and 'cause' (*aition*)—that is to say, with the mathematical principles governing the harmonic order.

The earliest surviving discussion of physical acoustics (a field that was only occasionally approached as an independent branch of musical theory) is that of Archytas of Tarentum, a fourth-century BCE theorist working within a Pythagorean context. He articulated a principle that was to become crucial to later theories of acoustics: 47 B1 DK states that there can be no sound unless there has been an impact (*plēgē*). When a solid body (or an emission of breath) hits the air, it sets in motion some tiny air particles, or currents of air, which hit our organs of perception: those that arrive swiftly and powerfully seem to us high-pitched (*oxea*), while those that reach us slowly and weakly seem low-pitched (*barea*). Aristotle slightly modified this theory by distinguishing between pitch and volume (*On the Generation of Animals* 787a2–28), but otherwise the theory was universally accepted, even though it posed an obvious problem: that of explaining how two sounds of different pitches, simultaneously produced, could be simultaneously perceived by the listener although they were supposedly travelling at different speeds. A solution to the problem was suggested by one alternative explanation: according to the pseudo-Euclidean *Division of the Canon* (*c*.300 BCE), pitch was dependent on the frequency of the movements causing the impacts on the ear, not on their speed. The theory comes very close to the modern definition of sound as energy that propagates through matter (i.e., normally, air) as a wave characterized by a specific frequency. This short survey shows that the properties of sound were mostly of interest to those studying mathematical harmonics; however, in an Aristotelian context they became the subject of scientific investigation in their own right: cf. the Peripatetic treatise *On Things Heard*, datable no later than the mid-third century BCE.

It is clear that the Greeks explored music as part of a much wider intellectual and scientific endeavour: for that reason, ancient Greek theories of music are fertile ground not only for scholars interested in ancient music, but also for anyone concerned with the study of ancient science. The Greeks developed some very nuanced and influential perspectives on music: their most lasting contribution is, perhaps, the idea that music has a moral and emotional effect on those who listen to it. This idea, though rooted in popular culture from the earliest times, was systematically worked out as a philosophical theory from the classical period onwards—and was destined to have a huge influence on the intellectual and musical life of subsequent centuries. For this reason, the last section in this chapter is devoted to the ethics of music.

46.3. Theory of Music: Ethics

Ancient literature is full of references to the therapeutic power of music. The Greeks believed that music could cure diseases of the body as well as passions of the soul: for an early example of the former see *Odyssey* 19.457–8, where blood is stopped by way of a musical enchantment, an *epōidē* (on such enchantments see Collins in this volume). Musicians such as Terpander, Thaletas, or Tyrtaeus are said to have averted the plague (*loimos*), and were sometimes called 'surgeons' or 'purifiers' (Aelian, *Various History* 12.50). It is not clear whether these musicians were thought to have cured actual epidemics or whether we are dealing with metaphors for political discord; but it is at least possible that our sources attest to a stubborn belief in the magical influence of music on diseases and epidemics.

The Pythagoreans were the first to develop a musical therapy based on precise correspondences between melodies and rhythms on the one hand, and specific human habits and feelings on the other. According to Iamblichus (*Life of Pythagoras* 64), Pythagoras used suitable music to address and cure disturbances in the body and the soul. The underlying concept was that of musical cleansing (*katharsis*) by allopathy, that is, the curing of an illness through its opposite (ibid. 110–14). How this would have worked in practice can be seen in the famous story of the drunken man from Tauromenium: this man was so disturbed by jealousy that he decided to burn down the house of his rival. Either Pythagoras or Damon—traditions vary—realized that the man was unsettled by a Phrygian tune played on the *aulos*, and restored him to sanity by making him listen to a more dignified Dorian melody in a spondaic rhythm. Music was thus deemed to have an immediate impact on physical and mental disease.

Damon of Oa is credited with having systematically traced correspondences between musical forms and specific characters (*ēthē*). (For a reassessment of this

theory see Wallace, forthcoming). In fifth-century Athens he was recognized as a leading authority on the subject. Several Platonic dialogues attest to his fame (e.g. *Laches* 180c). At *Republic* 398e–400d Plato uses Damon's authority in order to justify his own selection of music for the education of the guardians in the ideal city: Plato only admits the Dorian and Phrygian scales; moreover, he bans instruments that can be used to play all scales (i.e. the so-called 'panharmonic' instruments), and insists on simple rhythms, to be performed at a suitable tempo (*agōgē*).

In Plato's time music was firmly believed to affect a person's character and soul. It was, in fact, considered an essential aspect of a traditional education, especially in Athens, where boys were sent to the *kitharistēs* (lit. 'the lyre player') in order to be trained not just in music, but in good citizenship. Plato also traced a close connection between music, dancing, and sport. A well-educated man did not just exercise in the gymnasium but was also able to sing and dance well—that is to say, to represent, with gesture and voice, the philosopher's conception of the good (Plato, *Laws* 654bc). According to Plato, mind and body needed to be cultivated in harmony with each other, because an education based on beautifully rhythmic (*euruthmon*) and harmonious (*euarmoston*) melodies and postures (*skhēmata*) would foster an aptitude for moral goodness (*Laws* 655a).

In a similar vein, Aristotle recommended that students actively study singing and playing, so that in later years they may become good judges of music, both from an artistic point of view and in terms of moral excellence. Unlike Plato, Aristotle believed that music could be a pastime (*paidia*) or an amusement (*diagōgē*), though the most important of its purposes was its contribution towards a liberal education (that is to say, an education that 'befitted a free man'). He too saw in music the potential to improve the character and soul of those who listened to it (*Politics* 8.3–5).

The character of music was a popular notion also with Aristoxenos. According to him, the musicians who chose a particular combination of harmonic elements determined the character of the melody they composed. Thus *melopoiïa*, or 'musical composition', was a fundamental aspect in the 'ethics' as well as the aesthetics of any given melody. According to Aristoxenos, however, the *ēthos* of a composition did not just depend on the choice of scale, or *harmonia*, but on the mixture (*mixis*) of several elements, the most important of which were notes, rhythms, and syllables. The ear perceived those elements simultaneously and was therefore unable to analyse them individually: cf. ps.-Plutarch, *On Music* 33–5 (a passage which, I argue, is based on Aristoxenos: Rocconi 2005).

In the early fourth century BCE some critics attempted to refute the *ēthos* theory of music. An anonymous writer, perhaps a sophist, wrote a speech in which he attacked music theorists (*harmonikoi*) who talked about the ethical properties of different melodies: his arguments are partly preserved in Hibeh Papyrus no. 13 Grenfell–Hunt. We know from a fragmentary work by Philodemus of Gadara

entitled *On Music* (first century BCE: Delattre 1989, 2007) that Epicurean philosophy took up, and further developed, that line of criticism: the Epicureans conceived of music purely as pleasure for the ear, and denied that it had any moral implications. In the second century CE Sextus Empiricus also argued against the ethical theory of music: *Against the Professors* Book 6 ('Against the Musicians').

Despite those criticisms, many continued to believe in the ethical power of music, in antiquity and beyond (Rossi 2000). When writing a treatise *On Music* in the third/fourth century BCE, Aristides Quintilianus drew on many earlier sources, particularly Plato and Damon, in order to discuss the characteristics of musical scales: he drew attention to the 'male' and 'female' notes that defined them, and detected several correspondences between those notes and the male/female characteristics of the soul (*On Music* 2.14). Moreover, he explained the power of music over the human soul by pointing to similarities between musical instruments and the human body as container of the soul: both, he observed, were made up of sinews and breath (cf. *On Music* 2.18). Within this vision of cosmic harmony, Aristides wove many subtle connections in an attempt to account for the profound effect of music on its listeners (cf. Barker 2005: 143–60).

46.4. Conclusion

Even if our knowledge of actual Greek music is more limited than we may wish, the ancient Greek notion of *mousikē* is of fundamental importance if we are to recognize the many connections between different artistic and intellectual fields that were, for the Greeks, inextricable. At a more practical level, the possibility of performing ancient Greek music has recently been explored by some scholars devoted to musical archaeology (see Hagel and Harrauer 2005). Though academics are careful to emphasize how much remains unknown, this practical approach can contribute to the reconstruction of Greek musical theory and practice and, at a more general level, can promote a better understanding of Greek musical culture.

A focus on Greek *mousikē* is also crucial if we are to understand the wider, later reception of Hellenic culture. Greek musical theory laid the foundations for many aesthetic and theoretical speculations of later antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance. For example, in the Renaissance intellectuals appealed to the authority of ancient Greek musical thought in order to tackle a range of issues—from empirical investigations of sound (Palisca 1993), to discussions about the crisis of polyphonic music, and the rise of more expressive monodic forms. When tackling the latter issue, some members of the Florentine Camerata appealed to ancient Greek music: their contribution played a fundamental role in that confluence of trends and events which blossomed into that new art-form called opera (Palisca 1985).

Suggested Reading

The most complete and up-to-date collection of extant melodies and fragments is Pöhlmann and West (2001). The most important critical editions of theoretical writings on music are: Hiller (1878), Jan (1895), Düring (1930 and 1932), Da Rios (1954), Janacek and Mau (1954), Winnington-Ingram (1963), Ziegler and Pohlenz (1966), Najock (1975), Pearson (1990), and Delattre (2007). For a catalogue of Greek manuscripts on the theory of music see Mathiesen (1988). A selection of Greek writings on music in English translation (including passages from Greek poets, historians, and essayists as well as texts on harmonic and acoustic theory) can be found in Barker (1984 and 1989). On the theory of musical *ēthos* see Abert (1899), Lippman (1964), Anderson (1966). A relatively comprehensive bibliography on ancient Greek music is in Mathiesen (1999: 699–783). For recent publications see the online bibliography *De musicis* at the website *MOISA: The International Society for the Study of Greek and Roman Music and its Cultural Heritage* (http://moisasociety.org).

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CHAPTER 47

THE EXACT SCIENCES

REVIEL NETZ

The Greek exact sciences formed an extremely stable genre. Starting, perhaps, with fifth-century BCE fragments, and certainly from fourth-century sources, the genre can be followed clearly through the ages of Greek literature all the way down to Byzantium and beyond. Indeed this genre can be followed no less in translation, first in Arabic (especially between the ninth and the eleventh centuries) and then in Latin and the European vernacular languages. Arguably, this is the most productive Greek genre of all. Take, for instance, David Hilbert's *Grundlagen der Geometrie*, written in German in 1899. It is undoubtedly somewhat different from the Greek exact sciences, in its more discursive structure and especially in its explicit project of making the diagrams marginal to the main text. Still, translated into Classical Greek, it would be instantly recognizable to an ancient Greek reader. Among other things, the Greek reader would notice: the articulation of the text by an axiomatic introduction followed by a series of neatly separated claims, each stated and proved; the reliance on a limited lexicon and a formulaic set of expressions based upon it; and, in particular, the use of letters as special symbols standing for objects. Even the contents would be very familiar (if strikingly original in their detail): a universe populated by points, lines, circles, and the structures they give rise to, the discussion aiming throughout at maximal, logical persuasion.

The very continuity blurs the contours of what might be 'Greek' about the exact sciences. This genre is no less Arabic or Latin than it is Greek. In time, place, and language it belongs to the bigger Mediterranean. Hilbert was rather unlike, say, the poet Friedrich Hölderlin. The latter may have consciously modelled himself upon

Pindar, trying to revive a specifically Greek form. None of this for Hilbert: he did not set out to *revive a dead Euclid*; to the contrary—he set out to *improve a live one*. Euclid was still a textbook of geometry. If Pindar, for Hölderlin, epitomized Greece, then Euclid, for Hilbert, epitomized geometry. And thus, paradoxically, the very success of the Greek exact sciences tends to blur, for us, their distinctive Hellenic character. To the extent that we view them as the expressions of pure rationality, we no longer see in them a specific Greek character. The aim of this survey is to revive, for us, the sense of the Greek exact sciences as a historically specific Greek form. In the next section I survey the main periods of the Greek exact sciences. After that, I describe the main features of the genre. Finally, I discuss how this genre may be historically situated.

47.1. The Greek Exact Sciences: A Chronological Overview

How to periodize the Greek exact sciences? Two periods stand out: the Hellenistic heyday and the late ancient recasting. Before the Hellenistic heyday the evidence is meagre; clear periodization is problematic. There is only a little more evidence for the period between the Hellenistic heyday and the late ancient recasting, and the transitions themselves may be less clearly marked.

It is not even clear where to start. Until at least the mid-twentieth century, origins were traditionally sought with Thales or, somewhat more plausibly, with the rise of Pythagoreanism (late sixth or early fifth century BCE). Criticized by Burkert (1972), this view still finds support (e.g. Zhmud 1997), and the meagreness of the evidence ensures that this debate will never find its resolution. Clearly, however, some quantitative as well as a qualitative leap did take place in the final third of the fifth century, when suddenly we hear of many more active mathematicians (Netz 2004*a*). The first substantial (though highly mediated) fragment is from Hippocrates of Chios (Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's 'Physics'* 53.28–69.34 Diels; cf. Lloyd 1987). From a generation later we have a comparable fragment from Archytas (Eutocius, *Commentary on Archimedes 'On the Sphere and Cylinder'* ii. 84.12–88.2 Heiberg–Stamatis; cf. Huffman 2005 and Burnyeat 2005 for Archytas' overall scientific project). These two fragments are suggestively similar: tours de force of spatial configuration, allowing the author to perform unlikely geometrical feats; technically ingenious and yet elementary in character. Thus, to take the simplest example, Hippocrates of Chios measured a lunule—the curvilinear figure contained by two circular arcs—by showing that the two small areas A1, A2 (Fig. 47.1) are together equal to the bigger area B, so that the lunule as a whole must




Fig. 47.1. Calculating the area of the lunule.

be equal to the triangle CDE. I would like to suggest that such displays of persuasive virtuosity can be compared to sophistic displays: to show the identity of the curved and the straight is not so different from demonstrating Helen's innocence!

A different strand of very early mathematics has to do with its connections to the rise of fourth-century Attic philosophy. There is no question that Plato and Aristotle, in their different ways, were deeply impressed by mathematics (Burnyeat 2000; Cleary 1995), and reports—which are hard to assess—suggest that among Plato's companions were important early mathematicians such as Theaetetus and Eudoxus. (For Theaetetus see Knorr 1975, Burnyeat 1978, Knorr 1979. For Eudoxus see Waschkies 1977. The upshot of those discussions is mostly to point out the limits of our evidence.) Embedded in the Aristotelian corpus are many passages that are best seen as mathematical (rather than as a philosophical reflection upon mathematics: see e.g. the optical passage discussed in Vitrac 2002). When we finally get to the earliest extant works, from the late fourth century BCE—two astronomical treatises by Autolycus as well as the works of Euclid—one of the most striking aspects (especially of some of the books of Euclid's *Elements* such as I and V) is the careful attention paid to logical detail, such as conceptual analysis and the careful setting out of one's assumptions. Indeed, it is striking—and was of course noted by ancient Platonists (Proclus, *Commentary on Euclid* 68.20–3, 70.22–71.5 Friedlein)—that Euclid's *Elements* culminates with Book XIII's construction of Plato's solids from the *Timaeus*. (The traditional dating of Euclid to the late fourth century has been challenged by Schneider 1979, and it has indeed little evidence to support it; still, I see it as the most likely.) It seems reasonable to suggest that early, 'sophistic' mathematics—where the display of one's virtuosity in persuasion is

foremost—gives way at least in part to a later, 'philosophical' mathematics, where more interest is paid to the strategic questions of order and validity. (This indeed would correspond to the overall line of Greek intellectual development detected by Lloyd 1966 and in several works since.) It appears that the forms of Greek mathematics were fully achieved by the end of this period; how much of that was already achieved by the earlier, 'sophistic' authors we cannot say, based on our evidence.

We now reach the Hellenistic heyday (from which, the reader should note, I exclude Euclid himself—and this is a controversial suggestion). From Aristarchus, in the first third of the third century, to Hipparchus and Hypsicles in the mid-second century, going through authors such as Apollonius of Perga and Archimedes, we know of many authors, almost a dozen of whom have extant works; these fill over a thousand pages in modern editions. The Greek exact sciences have reached their highest level; for nearly 2,000 years afterwards the western exact sciences developed through the impetus acquired in this period. (For a good overview of this achievement see Knorr 1986.)

The works of Archimedes stand in a class of their own. The two main themes animating his oeuvre are the measurement of curvilinear objects (an interest already apparent with the earliest Greek mathematical works) as well as the combination of pure geometry with physical approaches. In both fields, Archimedes' work is characterized by highly counter-intuitive—and yet elegant—combinations. His work is both playful, in its emphasis on surprise, yet also painstakingly rigorous.

The measurement of curvilinear objects, in Archimedes' approach, was conducted by considering such objects as, in a sense, the limit of an infinite series of rectilinear objects. His work thus was the major inspiration for the modern calculus. Further, it was this calculus applied to the physical world—following Archimedes' own combination of geometry and physics—that led to the major achievements of the scientific revolution from Galileo to Newton. In short, then, of all Greeks Archimedes' influence on our world may be the deepest. (For an overview of Archimedes' work see Dijksterhuis 1987. Netz and Noel 2007 is a popular account.)

Archimedes was not alone. From the generation preceding him, Aristarchus is perhaps the most notable. His only extant work is a fascinating study that measures the *Sizes and Distances of the Sun and the Moon*. He is now even more famous for having put forward the heliocentric model (known now only through minimal testimonies; for Aristarchus the best reference remains Heath 1913). Archimedes' younger contemporary Apollonius of Perga is famous for his *Conics*, a work that combines the systematic, foundational approach of the *Elements* with more surprising results in the spirit of Archimedes (see Fried and Unguru 2001). He was the author of many other works, some extant in Arabic translation and some reported by later testimony, and these suggest a range comparable to that of Archimedes. (For instance, counting the result of multiplying the numerical values of characters in a line of poetry!) From a generation later, the major figure was probably Hipparchus

of Rhodes. His only extant work is a polemical commentary to Aratus' *Phaenomena*, but later evidence suggests that he was, among other things, a major architect of ancient astronomy, providing the main outline of what we still know as Ptolemy's system (see e.g. the evidence discussed in Grasshoff 1990); that he was a pioneer in combinatorics (Acerbi 2003); and that he could possibly have had a hand in the construction of the most remarkable piece of mathematical machinery from antiquity, the Antikythera Mechanism (Price 1974; Freeth *et al.* 2006).

All in all, the heyday of Greek mathematics is characterized by a playful, imaginative spirit which made it especially attractive for future generations of scientists. The attraction would indeed carry scientists—not pure mathematicians alone. A major theme of the period is the emphasis on extensions of pure geometry to the physical realm, whether in the more physical applications of Archimedes, in the growth of quantitative geometrical astronomy (perhaps invented in this period? See Bowen and Goldstein 1983 and 1991), or in the rise of the discipline of mechanics (see especially the evidence in Marsden 1971).

The opening-up of pure geometry to the physical world goes hand-in-hand with a certain closing-down in its relationship with natural philosophy. In the Hellenistic world we no longer see the same philosophical concern for the exact sciences evident in the works of Plato and Aristotle. One could speculate on the role of philosophy for Euclid; there is little philosophical interest evident in the works of Hellenistic mathematicians. The evidence is minimal—and mostly *e silentio*. Still, it is of interest: Archimedes and Apollonius developed the device of an authorial introduction where much could have been said of a more theoretical, philosophical character. And yet the introductions focus on the closed world of mathematical results, comparing current theorems to previous ones. The exact sciences seem to have become self-contained as a discipline. Perhaps this has a simple historical explanation: the Hellenistic exact sciences flourish in Alexandria, away from the philosophical capital, Athens. Why the Hellenistic world should in the first place have developed such a specialization of cultural geography is a separate question which I shall not attempt to answer here.

It is clear, at any rate, that the main theme of the next few centuries of the Greek exact sciences is that of synthesis. Overarching programmatic concerns come to the fore, and the exact sciences are brought back into the fold of natural philosophy. Instead of the original, striking result, more emphasis is put on theoretical expositions that provide the science with wider cultural significance. Geminus, in the first century BCE, writes a compendium of astronomical knowledge for beginners. Possibly Stoic in approach, it is also clearly meant for a wider audience than that of the professional mathematicians (Evans and Berggren 2006). A couple of centuries later Cleomedes' introduction to astronomy is primarily a piece of Stoic philosophy, dedicated to the exposition of mathematical theory (Bowen and Todd 2004). The major extant corpus of mechanical writing from antiquity—that of Hero—was composed in the first century CE. It is noteworthy

for its recurrent apologia for mechanics as, in effect, a way of doing philosophy (Cuomo 2002; Tybjerg 2001). The major achievement of this era is the work of Ptolemy. Active in the second century CE, Ptolemy made major contributions to diverse fields such as astronomy, music, and optics. Many of his works are extant, most famously the *Almagest*. Partly a recasting of Hipparchus' astronomy, partly an original tour de force of systematization, it is also much more discursive and theoretically reflective than any other extant work from the Hellenistic era. Ptolemy's philosophy is difficult to pin down precisely (Taub 1993), but that he cared for philosophy—and that philosophers cared for him—is clear enough. It was Ptolemy the natural philosopher whom the scientific revolution dethroned.

Most authors are difficult to classify philosophically, and indeed it appears that many of them were not so much philosophers as mathematicians seeking a philosophical pedigree. Within the dominant traditions of Hellenistic philosophy this was not so easy to find. However, the revival of dogmatic Platonism made possible a much closer alliance between mathematics and philosophy. Cicero and Plutarch profess admiration for mathematics: it is interesting, in particular, to follow how these two Platonists construct, between them, the future legend of Archimedes. A group of Platonic works prepare the readers for Platonism via an immersion in elementary mathematics, such as Theon of Smyrna's *Mathematics Useful for the Understanding of Plato* and, most importantly, Nicomachus' *Introduction to Arithmetic*, both from the early second century CE. Later on, in the works of Iamblichus (third to fourth century CE) and Proclus (fifth century CE), the ontology of mathematics is at the heart of a metaphysical system: such authors read mathematical texts for metaphysical purposes that Archimedes, possibly, would not have recognized (Bechtle and O'Meara 2000). Arguably, it is through this Neoplatonist, metaphysical reading of mathematics that the exact sciences came to occupy such a central role in western culture.

By the time we have reached Neoplatonism, we have also already moved into a different intellectual terrain. Now commentary is the dominant cultural vehicle. Little room indeed for original tours de force in the spirit of Archimedes! On the other hand, the more systematic aspects of Euclid's *Elements* are close in spirit to the work produced by commentators, often emphasizing issues of order and internal coherence. The major extant author in this tradition is Pappus (fourth century CE), whose *Collection* combines critique, summary, and straight commentary so as to provide a conspectus of the state of mathematical sciences in late antiquity (Cuomo 2000). No less agonistic than the sophistic authors that precede him by nearly a millennium, Pappus nevertheless represents a new attitude to textuality as such: the various Greek works on a given topic are arranged and made to fit together in a system. This becomes even more apparent with Eutocius' commentaries to Archimedes and Apollonius (sixth century CE): cf. Nagy's contribution to this volume. Eutocius' main effort is to fit those Hellenistic authors into a Euclidean

mould: completing the argument where it was left sketchy, and anchoring it all in Euclid's *Elements*. The Hellenistic achievement—isolated peaks of displays of virtuosity—is turned into a consistent plateau. The individual mathematics of Archimedes and his contemporaries is now turned into an impersonal mathematical project—which is, of course, in line with the Neoplatonist, metaphysical tendency in the late ancient reception of mathematics. Is this the final turn in the Greek project of the exact sciences? If so, it is also the least specifically Greek: a similar transformation of mathematics into an impersonal, systematic science is evident in the Latin and Arabic traditions of the Middle Ages. The scientific renaissance would inherit this model of science—and then infuse it with new life through a rediscovery of Archimedes' original spirit. (For all this see further Netz 2004*b*.)

47.2. The Greek Exact Sciences: A Stylistic Overview

The most obvious generic feature of the Greek exact sciences is their use of lettered diagrams. Indeed, this statement is a tautology: we would typically count a work as falling under 'the exact sciences' to the extent that it makes use of lettered diagrams. (The occasional lettered diagram in, say, Galen's discussion of physiological optics would be seen as an intrusion of an argument from the exact sciences into an otherwise medical text; I would make analogous claims for many quasi-mathematical discussions in Aristotle's logic, physics, and elsewhere. The only major exception to this rule is Diophantus' *Arithmetic*, a work in algebra that contains no diagrams, though it is otherwise closely influenced by the style of Greek geometry.) The ancients themselves appear to have conceptualized the exact sciences, at least occasionally, as an act of *graphein* ('proving-by-drawing'), the texts constituted by a series of *diagrammata* ('drawing-proofs': Netz 1999). Most seriously, this definition excludes scientific work of a non-elite character: works in measurement and elementary education where, instead of lettered diagrams, more use is made of numerical examples or even diagrams inscribed by numerical values. This non-elite tradition is known mainly from papyri and did not have the same historical significance—nor does it seem to have been specifically Greek: instead, this tradition seems to reflect more widespread Near Eastern practices. (For the non-elite tradition as a whole see Cuomo 2001; for the Near Eastern tradition of doing geometry via numerical examples see Hoyrup 2002.)

While the earliest texts may not have had letters used as labels (Netz 2004*a*), their use became standard by Aristotle's or Euclid's time at the latest. There are no diagrams without letters—and no free-standing letters in the text that do not refer to diagrams. The text is constituted by a verbal sequence of a few hundred words, followed by diagrams to which it refers (that this was the order used is supported by the small papyrological evidence, and will also account for the nearly universal practice of the manuscripts: for the physical evidence for Greek mathematics see Fowler 1999). The letters stand either for points inside geometrical configuration, or for isolated quantitative values (which are then diagrammatically represented, most commonly by line segments). More complex objects—such as combinations of quantitative values or geometrical lines and figures—are represented by *ad hoc*, 'gibberish' combinations of such letters. (It is interesting that such combinations as, say, $\Gamma\Theta\beta$ are unpronounceable as words, and that diagrams cannot be read out: what does this imply for the experience of reading the text? Cf. the discussions of ancient reading practices in this volume by Nagy and Rösler.) The combinations are indeed *ad hoc*: only rarely does a letter, let alone a combination of letters, get attached to a specialized object. Instead, the typical practice is to assign letters afresh, 'reshuffling the cards', for each separate diagram, following in mostly alphabetical order the local sequence of construction for the argument. This set of practices will remain mostly unchanged for two millennia. During the scientific revolution the use of free-standing letters, referring mostly to quantitative values that are not diagrammatically instantiated, is made common; there is also a growing practice of assigning letters on a systematic basis. This, combined with the systematic use of abbreviatory symbols such as '=' for 'equals' (mostly of medieval, scribal origins), gives rise to the modern scientific formula such as

$$E = mc^2$$

— perhaps as characteristic of the modern genre of the exact sciences as the lettered diagram was of the ancient exact sciences. Still, the lettered diagram remains even today one of science's major tools, and must rank among the key Greek contributions to the forms of writing. (The Greek lettered diagram is described in Netz 1999. Several studies since have expanded our appreciation of the ancient form of diagrams, in work by the present author such as Netz 2004*c* as well as, in particular, Saito 2006.)

The Greek mathematical text is characterized by a verbal/visual duality: a text followed by a figure. The verbal side is as tightly regimented as the visual. The text is composed from a very small vocabulary of a few hundred words, which are then deployed through a small set of allowed formulaic combinations (rigidly defined down to the choice of, say, verb tense). The later survival of this generic feature has been so successful as to erase from our awareness the radical nature of its invention. A Greek mathematical text feels quite natural to a modern reader, for whom it is axiomatic that a scientific text should possess a technical language

specific to it and be written in spare, rigidly defined prose. None of this would have been obvious in the fourth century BCE. In all likelihood, the Greek exact sciences emerged in a culture where the very notion of a *prose genre* could not be taken for granted. Geometry, quite simply, was the first prose genre of them all—and the first essentially *written* genre, as is seen through its reliance upon the lettered diagram. Nor indeed would there be much point in reading aloud such dry, mechanical texts. (The Greek mathematical language is described in Netz 1999: chs. 3–4. While one can detect the rise of 'Greek diagram studies' since the publication of Netz 1999—probably because of the wider interest in questions of visual culture—the area of formulaic scientific language is still relatively untouched. See however Schiefsky 2007.) The duality of visual and verbal can be extended at several levels.

While proofs always refer to a concrete diagram, they also consistently make claims that extend beyond a particular case. This is obtained by a further duality: in many works in the exact sciences, each unit of text set between two diagrams (what we may call a 'proposition') is divided into a general part that does not refer to the diagram, does not contain labelling letters, and makes general claims about abstract objects; followed by a particular proof set in terms of the concrete diagram. Thus the Greek mathematical text is bipartite at the level of the individual proposition.

Just as each individual proposition makes a general claim followed by a concrete proof, so the text as a whole enacts a similar duality: a more general introduction, which does not use any diagrammatic lettering, is followed by the sequence of individual proofs. The more general introduction often makes statements of an axiomatic or definitional character (most notably in some books of Euclid's *Elements*: see Mueller 1991). While this bifurcation is most apparent in pure geometry, it is also operative in works such as Ptolemy's *Almagest*, where more discursive treatments, akin to natural philosophy, alternate with purely geometrical passages referring to diagrams. In the Hellenistic period introductions assume a further role, akin to that of a didactic epistle; in late antiquity they assume an isagogic function (Mansfeld 1998).

Reaching finally from form to contents, we can see the same opposition in geometrical action. Greek mathematics most typically operates by the combination of two types of argument: observations on geometrical configuration (mediated by the diagram), and observations on the manipulation of proportions (mediated by formulaic language). Since equal angles give rise to proportions between line segments, Greek mathematics often operates by constructing configurations with equal angles and then combining properties of the configuration together with the proportions to which it gives rise. The combination of those two separate domains facilitates new, surprising combinations with unexpected results.

This leads us into the subject-matter characteristic of the genre. The main theme is that of geometrical configuration: unlike many other scientific traditions, the Greek exact sciences do not produce many numerical results (astronomical tables—undoubtedly inspired by Babylonian models—form the main exception).

As already noted for Archimedes, many of the results are concerned with curvilinear objects: can they be made equal to rectilinear objects (can one 'square the circle')? This fruitful question gave rise, as noted above, to the modern calculus. Nearly as important was another set of questions arising from curvilinear objects. Looking for configurations that combine both linear and square proportions (useful for the solution of many problems), Greek mathematicians have found that the curved lines produced by planes cutting through cones give rise to just such proportions. This gave rise to a rich research tradition in conic sections, finding ever more surprising proportions and inequalities inherent in them. More than any other Greek tool, conic sections served in the scientific revolution as the key tool for the application of geometry to physics. This is because dynamic systems naturally give rise to proportions that combine linear and square measurements. In the Greek context, however—where there is much less mathematical discussion of dynamics—conic sections are studied primarily in terms of pure geometry.

The application of pure geometry to other scientific fields was characteristic of Greek mathematics, especially in the Hellenistic era but, through the models created in this period, also later on. The typical approach is determined by the tool of the diagram and its use in pure geometry: a physical object is reduced to a single point; the path or other features traced by this point are then treated as purely geometrical lines. Thus Ptolemy would study the trajectories of point-like planets—as Archimedes studied, before him, the distances and weights defined by point-like bodies. This reduction of the physical to the geometrical (rationalized by Archimedes' concept of the centre of gravity) would serve as a fundamental conceptual tool of the scientific revolution.

The stability of the genre is striking. A word should be said, however, about its historical transformations. The above should be seen as the fixed background against which a stylistic evolution may be traced.

A tension which may be inherent to science is that between surprise and certainty. Science aims to show that that which was not at all considered to be true in fact cannot fail to be so. That which was at first surprising ends up becoming banal (so Aristotle, already: *Metaphysics* 983a12–21). If surprise is foregrounded, we may have the science of the playful tour de force; if certainty is foregrounded, we may have the science of sober-minded, explicit textbooks. Historically, it appears that the generation of Archimedes—the one to make the most important contribution to the formation of the Greek exact sciences—foregrounded surprise. Late antiquity, on the other hand—the period in which Greek works were selected for transmission and repackaged by commentary and re-edition—foregrounded certainty.

Surprise must have been an intended goal of Hellenistic mathematical texts. A typical structure in scientific writing in the Archimedean tradition is the non-linear accumulation of apparently unrelated facts that finally combine in a striking result. At the level of the subject-matter itself, there seems to be a fascination with the counter-intuitive, especially as regards big numbers or complex figures: say, the

thirteen semi-regular figures of Archimedes (known only through Pappus' report: *Synagoge* v. 352 ff.; see the illustrations in Kepler's own study of the same figures, Kepler 1997: 118–23), or the number of grains of sand it takes to fill the universe in Archimedes' 'Sand Reckoner'. The very interest in the measurement of curvilinear figures appears to be related to the same fascination with the counter-intuitive: to measure a curvilinear figure is to show its equivalence to a radically different, rectilinear figure. The interest may be seen in even wider terms, as a fascination with the notion of juxtaposing incongruent elements: this is the main theme in the structure mentioned above of accumulating apparently unrelated results, or indeed in the main project characteristic of the Hellenistic exact sciences, of applying pure geometry to real-world situations.

The juxtapositions of apparently different domains can be seen at the level of discourse itself. Archimedes' 'Sand Reckoner' apparently takes its cue from the epic topos of the immeasurability of sand (McCartney 1960); Apollonius of Perga, as mentioned above, calculated the number arising from multiplying the letters of an epic line. From this it is a short way to Archimedes' cattle problem which, employing a mythical theme of the *Odyssey*, sets out numerical conditions for the number of the cattle of Helios—all in elegy form. More such cross-generic texts must have been written in antiquity (thus, for instance, Eratosthenes' elegy on his own *mesolabion*), and they go hand in hand with the use of the exact sciences themselves by Hellenistic poets—most obviously in Aratus' *Phaenomena*. The characteristic feature of the Hellenistic scientific style, in short, was surprising juxtaposition, which is formally related to the hybridization of genres, long seen, at least since Kroll (1924), as one of the dominant themes of Hellenistic poetics.

Late antiquity, of course, reveals a very different pattern. The pedagogic emphasis rules out the kind of surprising effect achieved by Hellenistic authors: Proclus, Pappus, or Eutocius make sure that the readers know how to navigate their way through the reading (related to this is the isagogic function of the introductory sections noted by Mansfeld 1998). Rather than engaging in generic experiment, the late ancient authors explicitly set out to exclude hybridization of any sort. It is fitting that Pappus offers a division of problems into three different types, demanding that solutions must always follow the rules appropriate to the type of problem (Cuomo 2000). Above all, the commentators enshrine Euclid's *Elements* as the key work of Greek mathematics—by the systematic project of explicating complex, past results as the outcome of Euclidean techniques. Since Euclid's *Elements* is already the most well-ordered, least 'surprising' work of early Greek mathematics, the upshot is a new image of mathematics as the sober science of certainty (cf. again Netz 2004*b*).

I argue, therefore, that the Greek exact sciences form a genre characterized by the duality of the lettered diagram and formulaic language—and various other dualities ensuing from that central one. Within the fundamental scientific polarity of surprise and certainty, the Hellenistic era tends much more towards surprise, late

antiquity towards certainty. I now move on to discuss the question of the Hellenic character of this science.

47.3. The Hellenic Character of the Exact Sciences

It is rare that we can show that an author in the Greek exact sciences was 'Greek'—whatever we take this term to mean. Certainly, some at least of the authors were not: the name Dositheus, which is nearly ethnically specific, allows us—in a single, exceptional case—to assert that a certain astronomer was of Jewish descent (Netz 1998). The flourishing of the Greek exact sciences was based in Hellenistic Alexandria: the ethnic character of that city is of course in itself an open question (see Stephens in this volume). It is clear that the exact sciences were among the first genres to adopt *koinē* Greek as their main form: such is the dialect already of Euclid. It is interesting, however, that Archimedes wrote at least some of his works in Doric, and that Archytas before him was considered a model of Doric prose (Huffman 2005: 279–80, Testimony A6g). Were the exact sciences at some point associated with Doric? If so, this association was eroding already in the third century BCE; both Archytas as well as the bulk of the work of Archimedes are today known through versions in *koinē* Greek.

It should also be said that the stylistic discussion above is an observer's account. The Greeks stumbled upon the first scientific genre, never realizing that they had. The Greek sense of self-identity did not include pride in having originated the first lettered diagram. What is more, the Greeks would often note that the exact sciences were in some sense alien, derived from the ancient civilizations of the Near East. So, famously, Herodotus 2.109 already (geometry from Egypt, astronomy from Babylon), and all the way down to Proclus, *Commentary on Euclid* 64.16–65.7 Friedlein (geometry from Egypt, arithmetic from Phoenicia). Such pedigree was meant to add rather than remove from the lustre of mathematics. And the claim would have some truth to it, at least from the third century BCE and with the major impact of Babylonian data and numerical models on Greek mathematical astronomy. Astrology, in particular, was truly Babylonian: it was perceived as such and formed a central component of the image of the exact sciences from Hellenistic times down to the scientific revolution (Rochberg 2004).

The genre, moreover, proved highly susceptible to translation. However much it was entrenched within specific Greek verbal practices, these could be exported as a totality into foreign languages. Arabic translators essentially composed a new technical language within literary Arabic, to mirror neatly the formulaic patterns of

the Greek. Moerbeke, in his Latin translation of Archimedes, went even further—to accommodate the important formulaic role of the definite article, he created an artificial Latin which exhibited a definite article! (In practice, this meant that the relative pronoun was used as if it were a definite article: Clagett 1976.) The verbal structures of the Greek exact sciences may have been highly specialized, but they were also very isolated from Greek literature as a whole. The reader in translation of Apollonius of Rhodes, say, would sorely miss the absent Homeric intertext. But there is no comparable intertext in the works of Apollonius of Perga. Thus Apollonius of Rhodes could be imitated to good effect in the bilingual culture of late republican Rome; but Apollonius of Perga could be imitated not only there but also in Ibn Al Haytham's Cairo, in Galileo's Pisa, in Leibniz' Hanover—or, when Euclid was dethroned, in Hilbert's Göttingen. This literary isolation may of course represent a deeper logical as well as a cognitive isolation. After all, the truths of mathematics do indeed transcend culture, and even though they happened historically to be discovered in this or that place, there is little need of culturally specific knowledge in order to acquire the tools for understanding them—especially at the relatively elementary level of the Greek exact sciences.

And yet it remains the fact that the Greek exact sciences are peculiarly Greek. I conclude this survey by trying to explain the meaning of this peculiarity, and accounting for its origins.

It must be stressed that Greek mathematics was a peculiar science indeed. Every culture devises some forms of numeracy and measurement. Indeed, in general, numeracy seems to be among the most fundamental social techniques, preceding the rise of literacy itself (Schmandt Besserat 1992; Ascher and Ascher 1981). The emphasis is on *social* technique. Such tools serve for the rise of bureaucracy and state control. This is most obvious in the civilization that may have contributed most to Greek science—the Mesopotamian (Damerow, Englund, and Nissen 1993); but it is no less clear that the most developed mathematics to evolve completely outside the Greek sphere—the Chinese—has also been closely enmeshed within the rise of imperial bureaucracy (Siu and Volkov 1999). In fact, outside of Greece, whenever sophisticated mathematics is found it is in the context of state control. It is always tightly bound up with numerical practices; it is focused on the problem-solving typical of the elite of bureaucratic practitioners eager to display their skills (Hoyrup 2002).

All of this differs markedly from the Greek case, where the numerical is marginalized and where problem-solving is less important than proof. Greek mathematics—which is about geometrical proofs—is unique among an array of civilizations where mathematics is about arithmetical algorithms. The 'geometrical' and the 'proof' seem to go hand in hand: spatial configurations are especially amenable to the kind of logical exhaustive survey through which a Greek mathematician obtains an incontrovertible argument; numerical operations are based as much on rote-learning of facts as on detailed calculation. A bureaucratic elite would

do well to choose numeracy as a field for displaying excellence. It appears that Greek mathematics, uniquely, is not driven by a bureaucratic elite. Instead, the force that animates it is persuasion: it is an attempt to provide the most incontrovertible argument possible (Lloyd 1990). Such appears to be the context for the rise of Greek mathematics, whether in the displays of persuasive virtuosity by Hippocrates or Archytas, or in the rigorous application of a method resembling the philosophical in Euclid. It is quite likely that this type of mathematics would never have come to pass without the special historical context of the Greek democratic experiment.

In several more ways, the detailed history of the Greek exact sciences is moulded by specifically Hellenic cultural forces. Our own exact sciences would have existed even without them; but our detailed image of what science is like is still shaped by this particular Hellenic history. I will briefly mention three such forces: Hellenistic poetry; Platonic metaphysics; and what I call the 'Deuteronomic' culture of late antiquity.

The major feature of Hellenistic mathematics is a fascination with surprise. This gives rise to a narrative structure where the key elements of the argument are deliberately hidden from view, as well as to counter-intuitive juxtapositions of apparently unrelated domains. This aesthetic of mathematical writing is now almost commonplace. Mathematics today is about the discovery of surprising isomorphisms between apparently unrelated fields. That this is the case, in the twenty-first century, is the result, among other things, of a historical process starting with the revitalization of Archimedean sensibilities by Italian mathematicians in the sixteenth century, and ultimately stems from a wider cultural aesthetic characteristic of Archimedes' age. In other words, today's mathematics is shaped, among other things, by Callimachus' poetry—a counter-intuitive juxtaposition of apparently unrelated domains in and of itself.

Perhaps during the fourth century BCE, and certainly from late antiquity onwards (though more in the Latin-speaking than in the Arabic-speaking world), mathematics was closely tied to Platonist metaphysics. What is mathematics about? A very natural answer would be that mathematics is about some visible and measurable aspects of the world. Such would be the natural way to conceptualize the practical mathematics of calculation seen in many civilizations: but this would be no less natural for the mathematics of spatial configuration of the Greeks. That mathematics is so often conceived as the field of pure abstraction, divorced from any real applications, is the result of what may be a mere historical contingency: namely, that Plato—the most compelling author on the philosophy of mathematics (if not the clearest)—saw this science as a model for his notion that higher abstraction correlates to ever-growing reality and beauty (Burnyeat 2000). This image remained to shape the attitudes of philosophers and mathematicians, especially through the recasting of mathematics in late antiquity by Neoplatonist philosophers such as Proclus. The growth of purely abstract mathematical theories, and the overall divide

of mathematics into 'pure' and 'applied', with pure mathematics as the core discipline, is a result of this historical contingency which is very much still alive today.

Mathematics is, of course, still a highly 'regimented' field: writers follow strict generic conventions. This is less exceptional today, as science as a whole tends to be written in clearly defined genres. However, what is most typical of mathematics today is its explicit logical structuring which extends far beyond the individual treatise. Mathematics is perceived as a single system that can, in principle, be reduced to a set of axioms from which everything else follows by a clearly defined set of derivational rules. This image of the mathematical sciences has been a driving force in western philosophy for centuries, and is at the heart of contemporary analytical philosophy. The origins of this image are complex, but at least in some part they lie with the emphasis on order and unity typical of the recasting of mathematics in late antiquity and the Middle Ages. In those cultures, which I have called elsewhere 'Deuteronomic' (Netz 2004*b*), texts typically were second-order, that is, parasitic on prior texts, as commentaries, epitomes, and encyclopaedias. The emphasis thus naturally moved from properties of the world to properties of texts. Consistency and textual structure are foremost in the mind of a commentator. The systematic practice of introducing cross-references, for instance, emerges from this cultural move—and it is at the heart of the vision of mathematics as a single network of interrelated results. The ultimate origins of this cultural move are difficult to pinpoint: they seem to correlate with the rise of scriptural religion, or with the rise of the codex. At any rate, here is another specific historical transition with apparently some consequences for the future image and practice of mathematics.

Hacking (1999) sets out a list of 'sticking points' in the culture wars, and one of them pits 'contingentism' against 'inevitabilism'. Does science have to be the way it is? The exact sciences, and especially mathematics, seem at first glance to be as inevitable as inevitable can be: they are, after all, the science of necessary conclusions. And yet no one forces a mathematician to do this rather than that, to study this, in this way, with that aim in mind. Mathematicians—like everyone else—must be led by history and by its contingencies. This survey argues for the contingentist nature of the history of the western exact sciences, which is another way of saying that it argues for their specific, historical, and ultimately, Hellenic form.

Suggested Reading

Key studies of the structure of writing of Greek Mathematics are Mueller (1981) and Netz (1999). The best general survey of the main line of development of Greek mathematics in its heyday is Knorr (1986). The best survey of the works of Archimedes, the greatest Greek mathematician, is Dijksterhuis (1987).

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CHAPTER 48

HELLENISTIC POETRY

ALEXANDER SENS

WHEN, more than half a century ago, Rudolf Pfeiffer, author of a magisterial edition of the fragments and complete poems of Callimachus, imagined 'The Future of Studies in the Field of Hellenistic Poetry', he admitted hopefully that it would be 'a sort of nice reward for much painstaking labour, if the chief works of later Greek poetry were more widely known and were one day to please and instruct the reader'. That day, he acknowledged, was far off: 'there are old, inveterate prejudices, and it may be difficult to overcome them' (1949–53: ii. 69). In the intervening years, the rigorous philological attention to detail that Pfeiffer and others applied to Hellenistic texts helped counteract not only the view of Hellenistic literature as a laboured and degenerate reaction to the burden of the grand archaic and classical traditions that preceded it, but the vestiges of the Romantic reaction that ascribed to Hellenistic poetry in general an appealing sentimentalism and passion. Indeed, the second half of the twentieth century witnessed an exciting revolution in the study of post-classical literature, facilitated and encouraged by major papyrological discoveries (cf. Armstrong in this volume). That the field continues to offer room for scholars seeking the academic path less travelled has also contributed to the remarkable upsurge of interest in Hellenistic poetry. But there may be something else at work as well: although one must always guard against reading one's own values and experiences into the literature of the past, some of the concerns and interests of Hellenistic poetry—composed in a time of multicultural contact and migration, when the institutions of the past had been transformed by more than

a generation of global conflict, and a common language and culture had spread and been pushed against local traditions—seem, *mutatis mutandis*, appealingly contemporary.

The extent to which 'Hellenistic poetry' can be conceived as a unified entity is a central and difficult question. The plays of Menander and other practitioners of Attic 'New Comedy' are Hellenistic in date, and must thus be read as the products of a specific Hellenistic cultural and historical context. But when applied to poetry, the adjective is more commonly used not merely to indicate the chronological period between the death of Alexander in 323 BCE and the battle of Actium in 31 BCE, but to connote a set of stylistic and aesthetic values associated with the (often aggressively) learned verse composed in Alexandria by Callimachus and other members of a group of poets associated with the Museum and Library, many of whom were also producing scholarship on a variety of subjects. These values are often therefore described as 'Alexandrian', though it is striking not only that a number of poets (e.g. Theocritus) had active literary careers elsewhere before making their way to Alexandria, but also that more than one poet not known to have spent time in Egypt (e.g. Aratus, Leonidas, Anyte, Nossis) shared some of the Alexandrians' basic interests and approaches. Terms like 'Alexandrian', 'Callimachean', and even 'Hellenistic' must accordingly be used with caution. Several Hellenistic poets aggressively seek to distinguish their own compositions from the work of allegedly less refined contemporaries. But the dynamics of the literary interactions among the Alexandrian literati, the relationship between the compositions of learned scholar-poets and the now mostly lost poetry composed by others, and the precise nature of Hellenistic debates about style are now difficult to pin down. Gone are the days when scholars simplistically imagined the Alexandrian Museum divided into two rival camps, with Callimachus and Apollonius of Rhodes as advocates of short poetry and epic narrative respectively; and although it is today widely recognized that the Hellenistic poets whose work is best preserved for us share basic approaches (including broad metrical tendencies) and interests (the desire, for instance, to demonstrate their knowledge of the literary tradition while differentiating themselves from it), to speak of 'Hellenistic', 'Callimachean', or 'Alexandrian' literature as a homogeneous entity runs the risk of effacing real differences in individual poetic style and approach.

Surely the most famous and widely discussed programmatic passage of Hellenistic verse is the opening of Callimachus' elegiac poem the *Aetia* (fr. 1 Pfeiffer = 1 Massimilla), where the narrator opposes the 'big' poetry written by others to his own 'thin' verse. Despite the poet's insistence on the novelty of his project, the imagery and terminology in which that distinction is framed is drawn from earlier literature, and finds contemporary parallels in programmatic passages of Theocritus (e.g. 7.45–8), in newly discovered poems attributed to Posidippus of Pella (e.g. 68 Austin–Bastianini, where the relationship of size and quality is taken up), and elsewhere (e.g. Lycophron, *Alexandra* 1–15). The *Aetia* prologue was once

taken to amount to a rejection of long poetry in general and as a denial of the viability of epic as a literary genre for the age in which the poet lived. But, despite the fragmentary state of the text and uncertainty about what precisely it sets in contrast (cf. Cameron 1992, 1995; Fantuzzi and Hunter 2004: 66–76), it is now generally recognized that the critical language of the passage reflects stylistic rather than (or in addition to) purely quantitative distinctions. In sum, the poet does not reject long, continuous poetry per se, but only length and continuity as valid criteria for judging literary achievement. Whether the speaker contrasts different genres (as the reception of the passage by Roman poets implies) or different styles of elegiac poetry, the passage amounts to an assertion of a preference for refined poetry in which every word is chosen with care and precision.

However the *Aitia* passage is understood, the speaker represents himself as a member of an exclusive group with more refined tastes than at least some of his contemporaries. Such elitism is an important feature of the self-representation found in the work of a number of contemporary Hellenistic poets, and is reflected in various aspects of their poetry, which frequently calls attention to the opposition between 'insiders' and 'outsiders'—rich and poor, Greek and non-Greek, refined and unrefined, and the like. More generally, the representation of non-elites in the language and diction of high-style poetry creates complexities of tone that play out, for example, in the poetry of Theocritus, who in some places represents the speech of goatherds in language drawn from the epic tradition, and in others adapts the themes and conventions of popular mime to dactylic hexameter verse. Indeed, the depiction of individuals of low social status, who occupied a subsidiary role in the Homeric poems, seems to have been a matter of interest to a number of Hellenistic writers. Conversely, figures from the mythological tradition, like Jason in the *Argonautica* or Amphitryon in Theocritus 24, are often 'reduced' to ordinary individuals, or at least depicted in ordinary life situations. How these aspects of Hellenistic verse should be understood is a matter of continued discussion; what was once seen as (for example) sentimentalism is now often read as an ironic engagement with the literary tradition (e.g. Effe 1978).

These issues are connected to the question of the extent to which Hellenistic writers were members of an 'ivory tower' separated from society at large. In a famous fragment, the Hellenistic parodist Timo Phliasius (*SH* 786) describes the denizens of the Museum as caged birds squabbling with one another, though the inscriptional and papyrus record suggests that at least some poets were read beyond a restricted circle of learned contemporaries, at least within a few years. However that may be, learned Hellenistic poets like Theocritus, Apollonius, Callimachus, Lycophron, Nicander, and Aratus probably composed in the first instance with an exclusive readership rather than a broad listening audience in mind (Bing 1988; for the view that these poets were more engaged in public performance than was traditionally thought see Cameron 1995), even if some of their work may on occasion have been recited publicly.

It is also unclear to what extent the qualities associated with 'Alexandrian' poetry existed beyond the limits of the elite world in which Callimachus and his contemporaries operated—or, put differently, to what extent they represented trends found throughout the Greek-speaking world. The question is made more difficult by the fact that the mobility of individuals meant that literature could be disseminated and become influential with relative rapidity: Aratus' *Phaenomena*, for example, although apparently composed at the court of Antigonas Gonatas, seems quickly to have gained admiration at Alexandria (cf. Callimachus, *Epigram* 27 Pfeiffer). But the relationship between 'popular' and 'elite' production is thornier: already early in the Hellenistic period, poets like Matro of Pitane, composing ostensibly 'low' parodies of Homeric epic probably intended for performance before a broad audience, conjoin contextually related passages of early epic poetry in ways that presuppose that listeners or readers will recognize the original context and appreciate the cleverness with which they are associated (Olson and Sens 1999). The same may be said for the author of the *Battle of Frogs and Mice*, another work of epic parody that has sometimes (and unfairly) been treated as sub-literary (Sens 2006). Such engagement with the text of Homer is different in degree from the intense erudition found in the elite poetry of the Museum and Library, but is not wholly different in kind; and that fact cautions against drawing lines of distinction too sharply. There is a further complication: apart from the final plays of Aristophanes and the comedies of Menander preserved on papyrus, very little fourth-century poetry survives in more than isolated fragments. This state of affairs complicates any attempt to gauge the relationship between the Hellenistic poets and their immediate predecessors, or to trace the development of the stylistic qualities apparent in the work of the poets of the Museum.

Despite the difficulty of reconstructing the literary history of the fourth century, the production and reception of Hellenistic poetry seem in fundamental ways different from those of earlier poetry. An important consideration emphasized in recent work is that the scholar-poets resident in the new Hellenistic cities had reduced access to the performance traditions from which the works of the distant past derived; the fact that they approached those texts from the written page alone marked a fundamental shift in how literature was conceived and experienced. The separation of poetry from its original performance context meant that the Hellenistic poets were saddled with the burden of reconstructing a literary past from which they were separated by an unbridgeable gulf (for nostalgia about an unrecoverable past, cf. e.g. Theocritus 7.86–9); at the same time, they also had the freedom to manipulate that past in innovative and daring ways, as when they blurred or extended the boundaries between previously discrete forms, or played with generic conventions in other ways—phenomena evident in one way or another in almost every surviving Hellenistic poem. At a basic level, poets in the new cosmopolitan, multi-ethnic urban capitals of the Hellenistic period,

and especially Alexandria, were engaged in a project of recovering (or inventing) a cultural tradition of which they would be heirs. Ptolemy's project of accumulating in a single library the entire literary past had the ideologically important function of showing him to be the legitimate successor to the Greek heritage, including Alexander the Great. Similarly, the Hellenistic poets both appealed to the authority, and reconstructed the nature and meaning of, the ancient poetic traditions they drew on, even as they sought to renovate them. This process has been aptly described as an 'archaeological' reconstruction of the original meaning and function of the texts on which the Hellenistic poets drew (Hunter 1996; Fantuzzi and Hunter 2004). By appealing to and reworking their literary heritage, poets placed themselves—often tendentiously—in an ongoing tradition rooted in antiquity. In this sense, one project was to suggest continuity with the past even while disclaiming dependence on it. Interest in continuity, for instance, can be seen in the prominence of foundation legends and aetiological accounts of allegedly current ritual practices in a number of Hellenistic poems, including Callimachus' *Aetia* and the fourth book of Apollonius' *Argonautica*. In the service of locating themselves in an ongoing tradition, poets also adduced (or invented) earlier poets as authorities for their own projects, as when Callimachus in the *Aetia* sets himself in a tradition he traces back to Hesiod, or when the same poet depicts himself as a successor of Hipponax in his *Iambi* (as does Herondas in his *Mimiambi*); similarly, Theocritus presents the mythical figure Daphnis as the ancestor of pastoral (cf. Fantuzzi 2008).

This tension between tradition and innovation plays out in a number of ways. One of the most helpful observations for the scholarly rehabilitation of Hellenistic verse over the past half-century is that many obscure and difficult passages make sense when read against the backdrop of Homeric 'models'. To this end, Hellenistic poets, many of whom were actively involved in contemporary discussions about the constitution and interpretation of the Homeric texts, regularly draw on, *inter alia*, Homeric rarities or passages of which the text or language was debated, while varying epic phraseology in subtle (and sometimes not so subtle) ways. Pasquali, Herter, and Giangrande, among others, played a vital role in doing away with the picture of Hellenistic poets as derivative imitators of the ancient greats. At the heart of their approach lies the assumption that the end of such engagement with Homer was in the first instance a matter of learned, competitive, and playful display, in which scholar-poets showed both their own creativity and their mastery of the literary tradition. But recent scholarship has increasingly emphasized that such play with convention was not frivolous; it was a means for Hellenistic writers to insert themselves into the literary tradition in ways that both reflect their awareness of it and their own creativity and independence. When, for instance, Theocritus tendentiously asserts (22.214–23) that the *Iliad* poet glorified Castor and Polydeuces, when in fact only their absence from the battlefield is mentioned by Homer, he both

calls attention to his own reworking of a scene from that poem and, while locating his poem in honour of the Dioscuri in a line going back to the origins of the literary tradition, implies that he has gone one better than Homer (Hutchinson 1988: 163; Sens 1997).

Scholarly work of the past generation, moreover, has shown the extent to which the Hellenistic poets' evocation of earlier literature is allusive in the richest sense, in that it invites readers to recognize the original context evoked by the poet and juxtapose it with his own re-creation of it, so that the original resonates meaningfully in the new. In a number of passages, for example, an unbridgeable gap stands between the ignorance of the speaker or narrator about the poet's model and the reader's knowledge. In cases where Hellenistic poems play on the relationship between literary chronology and mythological history, the irony can be particularly pointed: this is the case, for example, when Apollonius reworks Homeric language in telling the story of the Argonautic expedition (a voyage that preceded the events recounted in the Homeric epics), or when Theocritus evokes the *Odyssey* in reporting the love-song sung by Polyphemus to Galatea before Odysseus' arrival. Apollonius' Medea speaks words that evoke Helen's claims of regret about leaving her homeland at precisely the moment when she is deciding to betray her father for Jason (Apollonius 3.813–14; Homer, *Iliad* 3.173–5); the Theocritean Polyphemus, ignorant of the Greeks of *Odyssey* 9, expresses the hope that a stranger might come and teach him to swim (11.60–2). In such cases readers are invited to recognize the characters' folly, even if the tonal effect of the allusions is sometimes difficult to pin down.

In addition to elucidating Hellenistic poets' engagement with earlier literature, scholars in recent years have increasingly emphasized how these writers, many of whom operated under Ptolemaic patronage, actively participated in and contributed to the image-making of the royal courts that supported them. Several recently discovered texts, including the so-called *Victory of Berenice* that opened the third book of Callimachus' *Aetia*, and a long papyrus containing new epigrams that are probably all by Posidippus, have expanded our picture of the ways individual poets represented members of the dynasty. But recent work has fruitfully identified Ptolemaic values even in well-known works such as Apollonius' *Argonautica* (cf. Hunter 1993: 154–69; Pietsch 1999). Much as poets sought to define themselves in complex ways as the heirs to the Greek literary past, so too they connected the rulers who patronized them to the mythological and historical past. Thus the attention paid to figures like Heracles and the Dioscuri, who occupied a liminal position between divine and mortal realms, resonates against Ptolemaic claims to divinity (e.g. Theocritus 17.16–34; Callimachus, fr. 228 Pfeiffer). Similarly, when Posidippus in one of the newly published epigrams (87 Austin–Bastianini) compares the equestrian victory of Berenice to that of Cynisca, a member of the Spartan royal house who won chariot-races at Olympia in the early fourth century and recorded her achievement in a famous epigram (*Carmina Epigraphica Graeca*

820), he provides the Ptolemaic queen with an authentic Hellenic antecedent that justifies and even glorifies her participation in such events (Fantuzzi 2005). In large part, the Hellenistic poets' participation in the construction and dissemination of the royal image was directed at a Greek audience, as when, for instance, Theocritus (17.126–34) treats what might seem in Greek terms (cf. Sotades, fr. 1 Powell) the troubling brother–sister marriage of Ptolemy and Arsinoe as analogous to the marriage of Zeus and Hera. But scholars have also argued that Hellenistic poets represented the Ptolemaic court in ways that would have been meaningful to an indigenous Egyptian audience as well (cf. Stephens 2002, 2002–3, 2003). Stephens (2002–3), for instance, has suggested that the 'one song' (*hen aeisma*) mentioned by Callimachus in the *Aetia* prologue resonates against the fact that, according to Herodotus (2.79), the Egyptians had a 'single song' (*hen aeisma*).

It is in any case interesting to read certain Hellenistic poems as contributing to a dialogue about the relationship between Greeks and non-Greeks (for which cf. Stephens in this volume). Theocritus' hymn to the Dioscuri (*Idyll* 22), for instance, contains two central narratives, the first recounting how Polydeuces defeated the monstrous Bebrycian king Amycus in boxing and thereby taught him to be kinder to strangers, the second narrating how Castor killed his cousin Lynceus in a duel. The contrast between these paired narratives has been understood in various ways. The Dioscuri, siblings who negotiated the transition between mortality and immortality, were important figures in Ptolemaic cult (and by extension in Ptolemaic self-representation), and it is tempting to understand the poem as modelling modes of cultural interaction between Greeks and non-Greeks on the one hand, and different groups of Greeks on the other. Simple analogies are always risky. But in the light of internecine fighting between the heirs to Alexander's empire, it may be reasonable to argue that, together, the narratives reflect in a complicated way the realities of Hellenistic inter- and intra-cultural contact, in which an individual sovereign might represent himself as both civilizer of non-Greek populations and defender of his realm against other Hellenes.

Indeed, an interesting feature of Hellenistic poetry is its engagement with the question of what it means to be Greek and its negotiation of the boundaries of Hellenism. The contrast between civilized Greeks and uncultured barbarians is a familiar feature of the literary tradition from an early period. But the broad social and linguistic changes of the Hellenistic period were reflected in a play with the traditional definitions of that opposition. An epigram of Posidippus (65 Austin–Bastianini), for example, plays with the traditional Hellenic view of the Persians as cowards: in the view of the narrator of that poem, the fearsome look in the eye of Alexander, as represented in a statue by Lysippus, explains and makes justifiable the Persian flight before that king. A different sort of engagement with the conflict between Greeks and Persians is found in a tantalizing fragment of historical elegy (*SH* fr. 958), where a king, perhaps Ptolemy II, reacts to the news of an atrocity

committed by either 'Medes' or 'Galatians' by explicitly comparing the two groups. Much about this fragment, including the identity of the king and the precise nature of the comparison, remains highly uncertain. But despite the vigorous argument of Barbantani (2002–3) for identifying the king's current enemy as rebellious Galatians, the possibility remains open that by 'Medes' the poet means the Seleucids, thus tendentiously associating a rival Macedonian kingdom (whose ruling family participated in the defeat of the Persians under Alexander) with the great enemy of the Greek world in previous eras (so, tentatively, Lloyd-Jones and Parsons 1983, ad loc.).

Indeed, it is hardly surprising that Greek poets with backgrounds in the Hellenized East came to insist on cultural (and particularly linguistic), rather than ethnic, definitions of Hellenism. Thus, for example, an autobiographical epigram by Meleager of Gadara, whose *Garland* (*c.*100 BCE) juxtaposed his own poetry with the work of early Hellenistic epigrammatists, concludes with the rhetorical question: 'If I am Syrian, so what? We live in the world (*kosmos*) as a single fatherland, and one Chaos bore all mortals' (*Palatine Anthology* 7, 417.5–8 = 3988–91 Gow–Page). The reference in the final clause to Hesiod's cosmology underscores the point: Greek cultural (and in this case, also literary) competence, not birthplace, is what matters. A similar phenomenon may be seen in an epigram attributed to Herodicus of Babylon (*SH* fr. 494):

> Leave Greece on the broad back of the sea, Aristarcheans,
> More cowardly than a nimble fawn,
> Corner-whistlers, monosyllabic, to whom
> [the pronouns] *Sphin* and *sphoin* and *min* and *nin* are a concern.
> May this be your fate, surly men. But for Herodicus
> May Greece and Babylon, child of a god, always remain.

The precise date and historical background of the poem remains uncertain. But it has usually been thought that the poet is a follower of Crates of Mallos, and thus a member of the Pergamene 'school' of Homeric scholarship, which differed from the Alexandrian approach by focusing more on Homer's subject-matter than on philological detail (see Page 1981: 64). The poem is a masterpiece of irony, in that the poet both shows his knowledge of and implicitly participates in Alexandrian debates about the proper interpretation and use of several words, even as he rejects such concerns as niggling. More important, as Manetti (2002) has nicely shown, Herodicus frames his attack on the followers of Aristarchus in language used by Homer of the conflict between Greeks and Trojans. The poet thus treats the scholarly dispute about the proper approach to the Homeric epics as a clash between civilizations: those with whom the poet disagrees on matters of scholarship are represented as barbarians who must be banished from Greece. That backdrop lends special significance to the final clause, where the poet pointedly includes Babylon alongside Greece, implicitly including his own birthplace in the Hellenic world.

For him, as for Meleager, the mastery of the language, in the form of scholarship on the most important of Greek poets, is the true criterion of Hellenic status (Manetti 2002).

A central component of Pfeiffer's vision for the future of Hellenistic studies was a call for the production of commentaries on the work of individual poets. In the past half-century that call has been answered, with exciting work on individual poems (and individual sections of longer poems) and the *corpora* of various authors. Much remains to be done, especially on poets other than Theocritus, Callimachus, and Apollonius. The next few decades, in which scholars are poised to pay increased attention to individual epigrammatists and major authors such as Nicander, Lycophron, and Aratus, whose work has long suffered from scholarly neglect, promise to be exciting ones for the study of Hellenistic poetry.

Suggested Reading

An exciting and wide-ranging introduction to the study of Hellenistic poetry and the ways it engages the literary tradition is to be found in Fantuzzi and Hunter (2004). Cameron (1995), which offers a provocative and controversial challenge to many long-standing assumptions about Callimachean (and more generally, Alexandrian) poetics, marked a major milestone in the field. Hutchinson (1988) is most interested in matters of voice and tone. To questions of the intersection of Alexandrian poetry and Ptolemaic ideology, the work of Hunter (e.g. 1993) and Stephens (esp. 2003) is an accessible entry-point. The work of Giangrande (much of it collected in Giangrande 1980–5) has been important for the revival of Pasquali's idea of *arte allusiva* (often in the service of an aggressively conservative defence of the transmitted text) and for the understanding of the ways Hellenistic poets engage with Homer at a purely verbal level. For Apollonius of Rhodes the standard text is Vian (1974–81; with facing French translation). For a selective introduction to literary issues attending the author see Hunter (1993). Students of Callimachus should begin with Pfeiffer's edition, though our *corpus* has been substantially expanded since the publication of that work; the majority of the new discoveries are found in Lloyd-Jones and Parsons (1983). Massimilla's edition must also be consulted on the first two books of the *Aetia*, and a new Oxford edition of the poem by Harder is eagerly awaited. The standard edition of the corpus of Theocritus is still Gow (1952); Hunter (1999) provides commentary on select idylls. For Theocritean bucolic see now the essays in Fantuzzi and Papanghelis (2006); for the non-bucolic part of the corpus see Hunter (1996). Hellenistic epigrams have attracted a great deal of scholarly attention in recent years, in part because of the publication of P.Mil.Vogl. VIII. 309 (edited in Austin–Bastianini), containing an ancient poetry-book probably to be assigned to Posidippus. For a general introduction to the genre and its problems see Gutzwiller (1998) and Fantuzzi and Hunter (2004: 283–349); for an introduction to the 'New Posidippus' see Gutzwiller (2005). Powell (1925), Lloyd-Jones and Parsons (1983), and Lloyd-Jones (2005) are starting-points for the Greek texts of poets whose works survive only in fragments. For Apollonius in translation see Green (1997); for Theocritus, Verity (2003); for Callimachus, Nisetich (2001).

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CHAPTER 49

BIOGRAPHY

CHRISTOPHER PELLING

> For it is not history we are writing, but Lives; and the clearest indication of virtue or vice is not always to be found in the actions that are most in the public gaze, but often a small thing or a comment or a joke can convey a clearer picture of a person's character than combats where thousands die, or the biggest of battles, or the sieges of cities.
>
> (Plutarch, *Alexander* 1.2)

BIOGRAPHY is about individuals. That is what makes it interesting; it is also what leaves it vulnerable to critics who look for something more, for the big things rather than Plutarch's 'small things'. 'Biography offers the easy approach to history, and some go no further than biography', says Syme (1958: 91), and for him Tacitus' development from *Agricola* to *Annals* and *Histories* is a sign of intellectual growth, a readiness to grapple with a theme that required 'substance, insight, and intensity' (ibid. 131). In the Hellenic world, too, could biography really address the bigger questions raised by Greek society and life? 'At least for Athens,' said Momigliano (1993: 38) of the fifth century BCE, 'we can say that the cultural background as a whole did not favour the prominence of biography or autobiography.' The important decisions were taken by states rather than individuals, official ideology encouraged the suppression of individual names when a funeral orator celebrated the city, and the great achievements were those of Athens and Sparta rather than Themistocles and Leonidas. Nor, of course, should we limit that phrase 'cultural background' to simple matters of power and politics. How could biography begin to convey the immense diversity of Greek life, different between one polis and another, different even between various classes and types of people within the same city? Would it even regard such things as its concern—would it even *try*?

Yes, it would. Even Plutarch would, whatever he may say in the *Alexander* passage: most of *Alexander–Caesar*, the pair that that proem introduces, is given over to combats, battles, and sieges. But more on that later: let us first go back some 400 years earlier than Plutarch. For the most enterprising attempt to address the bigger things is also one that brings out the diversity, not merely of Greek society, but also of biography itself: Dicaearchus' three-book *Life of Greece*, written around 300 BCE and later to be the model for Varro's *Life of the Roman People*. 'How people live', not merely a narrative of individual lives, was a focus of Dicaearchus, their feasting and their dress and their political institutions: but he did not do away with a linear, temporal structure completely, for he treated 'Greece' as having a life of its own, tracing the evolution of contemporary Greek culture from an original worldwide Golden Age, and pointing out the contributions of Chaldaean and Egyptian influences as well as those of indigenous culture. So perhaps biography need not be so solely about individuals after all. Dicaearchus' other works do seem to have had more of the individual about them. His *On Lives*, in several books, treated philosophers like Pythagoras and Plato (and did not spare the polemical pen: the *Phaedrus*, he said, had elements that were vulgar), and he seems to have depicted them as men of political activity as well as intellectuals. But there too it seems likely that he discussed different ways of living, using the great thinkers as examples to illustrate a wider theme (Momigliano 1993: 71): his taste was for the life of action, the *praktikos bios* (Cicero, *Letters to Atticus* 2.16.3), and for him the Seven Wise Men were shrewd lawgivers rather than philosophers (Diogenes Laertius 1.40). And once again there is more to life than politics: the surviving fragments of his *On Alcaeus* largely concern the drinking-game of *kottabos*.

Dicaearchus' immense learning and range make him hardly typical, yet his production does suggest several wider points: first, that one Life is not enough—that the interest of a single individual's story is not just for itself but for what it tells us about something broader, about how to live, about how one might fit into a series or a category; secondly, that for all Dicaearchus' interest in politics—and this is a man who also published *Constitutions* of various Greek states—the political life was only part of the biographical interest; and lastly, that this 'something broader' can include a specifically Greek focus, what it is to be a Greek. That makes biography an especially interesting area for a handbook of Hellenic studies, all the more so if that last question was answered in a way that did justice to Greek diversity as well as Greek specialness.

There are some pointers here that may be useful, if we return to Momigliano's argument that the fifth-century cultural background did not lend itself to biography: that is a paradox (this indeed is Momigliano's point, one that leads him to trace biography back to influences from the East), because the precursors of biography are normally sited precisely at that time, with the fourth century then giving a particular forward direction. Yet Momigliano's argument is vulnerable even in its own political terms, for 'big men' played a substantial part in Athenian

and even Spartan culture, and for the Greek islands the alternative power-structure was for most of this period the Persian Empire, ruled by the biggest man of all. It also implies a rather narrow view of biography itself, one that focuses on big *political* men. One problem here is that so much of our view of ancient biography is dominated by Plutarch, whose theme was indeed such men. The origins of that sort of biography are most naturally traced back to the fourth-century *Agesilaus* of Xenophon and *Evagoras* of Isocrates—both perhaps better described as encomia than biographies, but such generic niceties assume a firmness of categories that is inappropriate for fourth-century prose; a rather different line of descent might go back to the fifth-century Stesimbrotus of Thasos, who wrote on Themistocles, Thucydides son of Melesias, and Pericles. These are very much Plutarch's sorts of figures, and indeed he wrote Lives of three of the five men concerned.

But they are also not the only types of figure that engaged Greek biography. If we were to take instead two other sets of later Lives as more normative, Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists* and Diogenes Laertius' *Lives of the Philosophers*, we find (and Momigliano goes on to find too) a different set of fifth- and fourth-century antecedents, ones concerned with people of thought rather than action. In particular, the figure of Socrates becomes critical: the fascination exercised by this charismatic personality—'personality' is indeed the right word here, with his individual quirkiness highlighted—was not usually codified into a cradle-to-grave narrative structure; but that in itself is important, alerting us to the way that cradle-to-grave is not the only way that a biographic interest can be articulated. Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (in Greek *Apomnēmoneumata*, 'stories worth remembering') is anything but cradle-to-grave, but uses a series of mini-narratives and mini-dialogues to capture what author and reader might find thought-provoking and informative about Socrates: Plato's dialogues are very different in texture from Xenophon and leave a partly different impression of Socrates himself, but are at least similar in that preference for discrete narratives and, especially, dialogues. Nor is that avoidance of cradle-to-grave narrative coincidence. It is a point about Socrates' philosophy too, that important insights and discussions could come at any time and would be triggered by particular encounters, often casual ones, or particular questions, and not owe their significance to their place in the 'trajectory' of the individual's life—or at least that is true until the significance of his final hours; and a point too about the nature of Socrates' philosophical insight, that once he has got it, once he has realized the nature of the Good, that will be timeless, not changing or developing under external circumstances, including even those final hours. To understand the acts of a Pericles or an Alcibiades one needs to integrate them into a broader picture of what they have done before or what has happened to Athens or what Athens is doing to them, and a linear narrative is needed. To understand Socrates one starts not from his experiences but from the nature of the Good itself, and that does not change. In those terms of

Plutarch from which we began, this sort of 'biographic' material may be starting from small things, those characteristic words and jests, but tells on very big things indeed.

There are other strands too. Another of those later traditions was that of Lives of the poets, seeking (as so many have done since) to use a poet's own life-experience to explain features of his work. If Euripides wrote like that about Phaedra, it must be because he hated women, and this would be because his wife had been unfaithful; or perhaps he hated everyone, in which case he must have written his works in a cave—a seaside cave, doubtless, given those beautiful lyrics about the sound of the waves (Lefkowitz 1981: 89–91). If Pindar describes a pair of crows cawing against an eagle, then evidently he is the eagle, and the crows must be Bacchylides and Simonides; and obviously Homer must have travelled as a young man to Ithaca, and have studied poetry with a teacher called Phemius. Once again, too, the diversity of material is matched by a diversity of structure: Satyrus' *Life of Euripides* was written in dialogue form, and here too that is expressive of the content, for Euripides was eminently the sort of person who started others talking and arguing about him. Here too we can find the origins early, in the construction of isolated facts and tales about Homer, even if not of whole Lives: the way he lost his singing contest with Hesiod, for instance, or how the *Cypria* served as his daughter's dowry when he was too poor to give anything else (Graziosi 2002).

Not that this distinction of 'cultural' figures as a separate group is a straightforward one. That is clear if we go back to another fifth-century figure important in biography's proto-history or prehistory, Ion of Chios. Ion's *Epidēmiai*—probably 'spells of living in' particular places—gossiped about his encounters with the great: he told a story, for instance, about Sophocles stealing a kiss from a pretty boy, just as he described a dinner-party with Cimon. Part of the point of such stories was that these social encounters embraced the good and the great of all sorts: Pericles is present at the first of those parties, and Sophocles could ask him whether he was not rather more able at this sort of 'stratagem' than the more military type, where (we infer) he had not covered himself with much glory. There is again no sign here of any overarching linear narrative, and their nearest analogy in extant literature is perhaps Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (Dover 1986). The difference, however, is that Xenophon's linking figure for his mini-narratives is Socrates, whereas Ion's was presumably Ion himself. Doubtless, indeed, part of the point was to bring out how Ion, the man of Chios, was welcome at such banquets, and part of the high life of empire. So here, right at the outset, we can also see the contact between such writing and *auto*biography: different though the subject-matter is, there are some points of contact with Xenophon's *Anabasis*, presenting a picture of Xenophon's own experiences and linking this with some forceful embedded biographies of others, especially Clearchus, Proxenus, and Menon in *Anabasis* 2.6. The one set of lives, and in this case their leadership styles, acts as a foil for the central figure.

So biography can become a way of doing *something else as well*, of conducting an enquiry that we would choose to classify with a different name. Thus telling of a march up-country can be a way of discussing leadership or political theory as well as of projecting Xenophon's own excellence; reconstructing Homer's or Euripides' life can become a mode of couching truths or conducting discussion about the poems or the plays themselves (Graziosi 2002). That is particularly true when we move on to series of Lives, where ingrained in the project will be an assumption that a crucial way of making sense of an individual is to see how he, and occasionally even she, fits into a chain of persons engaged in a similar activity. One life, indeed, is not enough: just as later cultures lapped up *Lives of the Saints* or *the Composers* or *the Artists* or even *Great Rugby Players* (Thomas 1955 was a staple of my own youth), so the Greek world too found it natural to group together those who followed in one another's footsteps: orators, philosophers, or law-givers. Diogenes Laertius' *Lives of the Philosophers* sometimes begin by specifying which earlier philosophers a figure listened to or learnt from, and can put that in an engagingly anecdotal form. Socrates dreamed of having a swan on his knees that suddenly soared away, and the next morning he met Plato; Metrocles was so embarrassed after farting during a lecture of Theophrastus that he decided to fast to death, but Crates cheered him up by visiting him and dropping a fart himself (Diogenes Laertius 3.5, 6.94). That is a way of doing intellectual history (Plato started from Socrates but took off, Metrocles found Crates' earthier approach more attractive than Theophrastus), something that we might today more naturally frame in terms of 'influences' or 'traditions' or 'the intellectual climate' of a philosopher's youth. Such anecdotal figuring can be applied in more isolated ways as well: when Marcellinus' *Life of Thucydides* tells us (§54) that the young Thucydides left a lecture of Herodotus in tears—presumably tears of joy—that too is a way of phrasing some intellectual continuity between the two, and perhaps inviting a reader to speculate on whether the grown Thucydides developed the continuity further or broke away from it. Or a series of Lives can have a bigger agenda still: Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists* not merely mount the thesis of an intellectual inheritance from the fifth-century sophists, but also build a picture of a new, coherent cultural world, that of the 'Second Sophistic', which has framed the way scholars have thought about the period ever since.

In Lives like this, and Lives which share some of their texture such as Philostratus' own *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, literal truthfulness is problematic. There may be a higher, more spiritual truth at play—what it is to be a wise man, or a great poet, or a historian, or in those more modern counterparts a saint or a rugby-player—but if we set our sights a little lower and want to find out about a real-life Thucydides or Apollonius or Socrates, we are likely to be disappointed. Hence a second *aperçu* of Momigliano, who suggested that 'the borderline between fiction and reality was thinner in biography than in ordinary historiography' (1993: 56, cf. 46). That is an overstatement, for we are already seeing that 'biography' is an extremely broad genre—indeed, it is so broad that it may be misleading to count it as a single genre at

all, rather than a range of texts linked only in that they do whatever they do through the filter of a person's life. (Theopompus' *Philippica*, incorporating one book 'On the Demagogues' in the middle of 'matters concerning Philip', shows in more than one way how complex the generic affinities of biography and biographical material can be.) Given that range, it is unsurprising that some biographies have more in common with historiography than others, and some are more truthful than others: when we return to Plutarch we shall return closer to historiography. Still, if Momigliano's claim is an overstatement for some biographies, it is fair enough for others, and particularly for a further tradition that begins in the fourth century with yet another work of Xenophon—his *Cyropaedia*, an idealized treatment of the King Cyrus who was the founder, two centuries earlier, of the Achaemenid Empire. Formally, this is a clearer antecedent of cradle-to-grave biography than any of the other styles we have so far considered. The work does begin with Cyrus' childhood, and it carries the story through to his death. And it certainly takes the historical Cyrus as a starting-point: like a modern historical novel, it builds what it has to say within a broad framework that the reader would recognize as having a basis in fact. But literal truth in detail is not the point. It is partly a treatise on ideal kingship, kingship for anyone; it is partly too an exploration of the sort of kingship that is particularly suited for the Persian Empire (hence the final emphasis at 7.5.37–47 on Cyrus' deliberate remoteness and isolation from his subjects in his palace, something that might be right for Persia—compare the Median Deioces in Herodotus 1.99–100—but would not be right in the open world of a Greek polis); and it is very largely a disquisition on the education and culture—Cyro-*paideia*—that is required for the sort of leadership one seeks.

This type of writing too had a hefty afterlife, and various works seem to have been modelled on it or at least to have built on that tradition: Onesicritus and Marsyas of Pella applied it to Alexander, and Lysimachus to Attalus; Polybius' *Philopoemen* may have not been too different, and there is something of it too in Nicolaus of Damascus' *Life of Augustus*. It would be a mistake to think that there is no truth at all in such depictions, or to assume that there is the same expectation of truthfulness in every work; but any reader who was bothered would have to work out anew what the truth-rules of this particular text were going to be. (Not so very different, perhaps, from what confronts any watcher of a biopic today.)

So Greek 'biography' spans a very wide range. That insight of Dicaearchus, that Greekness meant diversity, is reflected in the variations of figures treated, of literary forms adopted, of truth and idealism, and above all of the sorts of themes that could profitably be viewed through a biographical filter. Biography was brimful of possibilities, and that was already true when Plutarch, the 'prince of biographers', came to it. Immediately as we read Plutarch we feel ourselves to be on familiar ground. We are used today to biographies more or less on Plutarch's model, even if they are now much longer and more heavily written—political biographies, taking public figures from birth and infancy in a linear storyline to eminence and death, setting

their lives against a public background that is deftly sketched along the way. True, the sustained comparative approach, *Parallel Lives* of Greeks and Romans, has not lasted so well (though it was recently revived in Alan Bullock's parallel lives of Stalin and Hitler: Bullock 1991), but the rest leaves us comfortably at home. It is a mark of Plutarch's success that he has so moulded later political biography in his model; there is also a danger that we find the form so familiar that we fail to realize how original it was, and how the choice of that form was not at all the only one available. For some of these figures previous biographies may already have existed, and for many there would at least have been a biographical *interest*, whatever literary form it may have taken. But the works would have been very varied: Polybius' encomium of Philopoemen or Xenophon's of Agesilaus, treatments of Solon or Demosthenes as more cultural figures, hagiographic martyr-biography of the younger Cato; in other cases more mainstream historiography furnished most of Plutarch's material, Thucydides or Herodotus or Asinius Pollio or Dionysius of Halicarnassus. To shape such disparate sources into so regular a series was a considerable achievement.

In one way Plutarch was narrowing biography down, developing the strand which was closest to historiography. But even as he does so, one can see affinities with other strands: it is remarkable how many of those 'something elses' of other biographies are there with Plutarch too. His subjects are men of politics, but he found them particularly interesting if they had a cultural or philosophical dimension as well, men like Solon or Cicero or Dion or Cato—or like Epaminondas and Scipio, probably Scipio Aemilianus, who together formed the flagship opening pair of his *Parallel Lives*. If Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* had produced an idealized image of kingship, so Plutarch uses the 'indications of virtue and vice' of the *Alexander* prologue to inspire his readers ethically (*Pericles* 1–2, *Aemilius Paulus* 1, *Demetrius* 1). The difference is that the moralism is more subtle and sometimes equivocal (Duff 1999), and a firmer, more historiographic hold is kept upon truth (Pelling 2002: 143–70). If Ion interwove a level of self-depiction within his depiction of others, then so does Plutarch: we have 'the feeling of being in contact with an understanding and intellectually curious person, someone who is serious yet not stuffy, aware of life in all its manifestations, yet deliberately avoiding the unseemly and trying to present the best side of his subjects' (Stadter 1988: 292). And that infectiously attractive picture is morally inspiring too.

Plutarch's figures are certainly distinctive individuals, and many are memorably caught: the versatile, intriguing charm of an Alcibiades; the blustering but flawed and vulnerable Antony; the militarist Coriolanus; the Olympian Pericles; the intellectual Cicero, torn between the reflective and the political life. The pairings help to bring out the distinctiveness, for there is no better way, he says (*On the Virtues of Women* 243b–d), to bring out what is special about one person than to see the subtle differences from another who seems closely similar, as the courage of Achilles is different from that of Ajax. Yet the *Parallel Lives* form a broader series

as well, rather as Diogenes Laertius' or Philostratus' series do; and they combine to give a picture of cities and nations as well as of individuals, of 'Athens, fine as she was and the subject of song, and the invincible and renowned Rome' (*Theseus* 1.5), and of Greece as a whole: with a few exceptions, 'all Greece's wars had been fought internally for slavery, every trophy had been also a disaster and reproach for Greece, which had generally been overthrown by its leaders' evil ways and contentiousness' (*Flamininus* 11.6–7). So Dicaearchus' emphasis on what it is to be a Greek is here in Plutarch as well. Those characteristics of the cities can raise troublesome issues: troublesome for Greece's history, as the *Flamininus* passage shows, but troublesome for Rome's too. ' "Did not Rome make her great advances through warfare?" That is a question requiring a lengthy answer for men who define "advance" in terms of wealth, luxury, and empire rather than safety, restraint, and an honest independence' (*Comparison of Lycurgus and Numa* 4.12–13). The cities' characteristics have to be taken into account in understanding and judging individuals too. To judge Lycurgus is to judge the Spartan constitution that he established; Theseus establishes a city that already has the characteristics that may later undermine it (Pelling 2002: 171–95). To understand Coriolanus or Marcellus one needs to understand the militarism and the military crises that typified the city's experience in their day (*Coriolanus* 1, *Marcellus* 1). The verdict on Dion and Brutus must take into account the goodness or the badness of the tyrants they faced (*Comparison of Dion and Brutus* 2). That prologue to *Alexander and Caesar* puts it too simply. It is history that Plutarch is writing *as well as* Lives, and one cannot do the one job properly without the other.

So: biography is not just about individuals, but also a good way of doing other things as well. But that 'as well' is crucial: the individuals matter too, and usually matter most. The reason biography can do so much is that a human being is *both* what other human beings tend to find most interesting, *and* the mechanism and the phenomenon that other humans understand most intuitively. No coincidence, then, that even outside biography biological metaphors come readily to mind as people grapple with other complex phenomena. When a state is in trouble, it is 'sick'; Thucydides can make a speaker in a tense assembly call on the chairman to be a 'doctor' to the state, and echo a doctorly phrase in hoping that he will do good or at least do no harm (Nicias at 6.14; compare e.g. the Hippocratic *Epidemics* 1.11: 'in all diseases practise two things—do good, and do no harm'). Medical images are frequently Plato's analogy for the skill that a society should expect from its leaders but so rarely finds. The whole analysis of justice in Plato's *Republic* depends on a more sustained analogy between state and individual. Indeed, it may be too simple to think of such figures as 'metaphors' at all: if a state has a period of growth and decay that is parallel to a human life-cycle (Clarke 1999: 264–76 on Strabo), or if states, like individuals, have the seeds of their destruction planted in their own greatness (Homer's Achilles and Herodotus' Persia), these phenomena go deeper than metaphor. This is a mode of imagining that assumes that, in the absence of

any counter-indications, all mechanisms will function in a similar way, one that is most familiar to us from the experience of a single life but not at all confined to that. The proper study of mankind may not be only man, or even woman too, but that is where it starts. And if any insight is fundamental, valuable, and distinctively Hellenic, it is that.

Suggested Reading

The clearest and fullest treatment of Greek biography is Momigliano (1993); a brief survey is given by the present author in the *OCD* at pp. 241–2 (s.v. 'biography, Greek'). Lefkowitz (1981) treats the Lives of the poets; Graziosi (2002) discusses the growth of the tradition on Homer. The fragments of Dicaearchus are collected and discussed by Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf (2001). Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* has recently been the subject of several illuminating monographs: Tatum (1989), Due (1989), and Gera (1993). Studies of Ion of Chios are collected by Jennings and Katsaros (2007). For more on Plutarch see Russell (1973), Duff (1999), and Pelling (2002).

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CHAPTER 50

THE NOVEL

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The term 'Greek novel' (less frequently 'Greek romance') is used to designate a group of fictional prose narratives of love and adventure from the imperial period, of which five are extant: Chariton, *Chaereas and Callirhoe*; Xenophon, *An Ephesian Tale*; Achilles Tatius, *The Adventures of Leucippe and Cleitophon*; Longus, *Daphnis and Chloe*; Heliodorus, *An Ethiopian Tale*. Fragments and summaries of several other stories that can be loosely grouped with these extant ones have also been identified, and are conveniently collected with translation and commentary in Stephens and Winkler (1995). Two Latin examples, Petronius' *Satyricon* and Apuleius' *Golden Ass*, date from the same period as the Greek novels, but they are quite different in spirit. A number of other prose texts that combine fiction and history to various degrees also have points of similarity, especially *The Alexander Romance*, Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, and *The History of Apollonius King of Tyre*, the latter in Latin, but perhaps a translation or adaptation of a Greek original. Apuleius' *Golden Ass* is also based on a now-lost Greek text, an epitome of which survives among the works of Lucian as the 'Ass-Tale'. From here there is an ever-widening circle of texts in prose from late antiquity that share at least some themes and techniques with the ones already mentioned: for example, Jewish and Christian apocrypha, epistolary novels, philosophical dialogues, rhetorical exercises, and travel literature. Many attempts have been made to classify and distinguish this farrago of texts, but heterogeneity may be the only common thread that runs through them all. Even the papyrus finds of lost novels, despite their fragmentary state, give us glimpses of a much broader range of prose fiction (Stephens 1996; Hägg 2006). Although the five Greek texts have the best claim to constituting a genre because of their basic erotic plot, the trend in more recent criticism has been

to accent their similarities with other examples of imperial prose. Rarely mentioned in antiquity and written by authors about whom we know next to nothing, these texts remain open to a wide range of interpretations and explanations. 'Greek novel', in what follows, will refer mostly to these five erotic novels that are extant, but the reader should keep in mind that these texts existed and circulated within a much larger range of prose texts, and may not even be representative of what was most common or most often read.

There is no term equivalent to 'novel' in ancient discussions of literature. In fact, the history of modern words like 'romance' and 'novel' suggests the emergence of something new and unprecedented, and its flowering in the modern era in Europe is closely associated with the emergence of national languages, together with new national and class consciousness. One of the basic difficulties in dealing with the ancient prose texts we call 'novels', for lack of a better term, is making an imaginative leap to a time when novels were not the privileged form of creative literature, as they have become in the last two centuries. It is difficult not to project onto ancient stories of love and adventure some relationship to the mass-produced fiction of our own time, where literary genre is clearly marked by devices such as lascivious covers or series names, so that consumers are clearly pointed to books that will provide precisely the kind of reading experience they seek. There is nothing in antiquity to compare with the tight loop of marketing and consumer behaviours on a large scale that has resulted from computerized inventories and inexpensive mass-production. It is often tempting as well to read back into the ancient texts other characteristics of modern fiction, such as niche markets (youth, women, bourgeoisie), popular culture, the modern practice of silent, private reading, and the importance of realism as opposed to rhetorical topicality. Although there is virtually no evidence for how these texts were produced and circulated other than what can be inferred from the texts themselves, there is no compelling reason to believe they were read in any different way—or by different people—than the rest of ancient literature. Too large to be performed from memory, and lacking any mnemonic technology, they were probably read aloud and enjoyed variously for their deft humour, racy plots, purple passages of exotic descriptions, exciting episodes, and any of a number of other qualities for which they have been praised or condemned. However, it should be noted that these texts mark a step in a direction away from the protocols of performance which dominated ancient literature from the start. Unlike the verse genres of antiquity, or even the standard types of rhetorical prose, all of which presume some sort of performative context in which they would ideally be circulated—or at least preserve some fiction of such a performative instance—the novel is not associated with any spatial or temporal instance of enunciation. There is no festival or event associated with the reading of novels, no special time of year, no special social occasion. This can perhaps be said of other texts from antiquity, but other genres at least preserve some trace of an origin and history that begins in a public performance or ceremony. Several novels begin with grounding fictions of some

kind—historical figures, overheard conversations, or discovered documents—but these devices seem to acknowledge the sense that proper protocols for situating these texts did not yet exist.

Although scholars sometimes assert that the novels are predictable and highly generic, this is perhaps another example of reading back in time from formulaic literature like Harlequin romances. There is actually significant variation among the five extant Greek examples, even where similar themes and devices are used. There is usually a preliminary distinction between the two ideal or naive novels of Chariton and Xenophon Ephesius, and the later 'sophistic' ones (Achilles Tatius, Longus, and Heliodorus), which seem to take into account the literary renaissance of Greek literature called the 'Second Sophistic'. Chariton and Xenophon share a number of plot elements and enough exact phrases to suspect a direct relationship between them. Xenophon's novel is uneven and often faulty in motivation and characterization; indeed, the author is almost universally considered the most clumsy and inept of all of the novelists, with a handful of apologists who cite evidence of oral composition or epitomizing. In contrast, Chariton has become the good example of the naive category. His story is remarkable for its attention to the heroine's emotional responses to her complicated entanglements, as she is compelled by circumstances to make a number of unpleasant choices, chief of which is to remarry. Longus' charming and sophisticated story of Daphnis and Chloe has enjoyed the most continuous admiration of readers, but is singular in a number of important ways, particularly in its thematization of the gradual development of love (as opposed to the 'love at first sight' found in the others), and its lack of a sequence of travel. Achilles Tatius presents eccentric and unusual versions of elements and themes found in Chariton and Xenophon, and his wittiness and playfulness have been expounded by a number of critics. Heliodorus, finally, has written the most elaborate and complicated narrative, filled with flashbacks, stories within stories, unreliable interior narrators, and multiple surprises, most important of which is that the heroine is actually the white-skinned daughter of the king and queen of Ethiopia.

In the end the 'novel' remains an enigmatic category partly because of its high degree of permeability, a characteristic that Bakhtin in particular has foregrounded in his discussions of the novel's place in literary history. For Bakhtin, 'novelistic literature' (by which term he designates a whole range of prose texts going back to Socratic dialogue) is dialogic, heteroglossic, polyphonic, unfinalizable, and so on. Although Bakhtin discusses the Greek novels under the rubric of the 'adventure-time chronotope' in an essay entitled 'On the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse' (Bakhtin 1981), he also notes that these texts are weak examples of novelistic discourse in comparison with Menippean satire and other 'unofficial' literary forms. Interest in Bakhtin has certainly contributed to the greater attention devoted to the novels in the last several decades (Fusillo 1989; Branham 2002 and 2005), but writing a history that takes these ancient texts as avatars of the modern novel

tends to flatten out important differences in the name of modest or superficial similarities. Nevertheless, comparative attempts to see the novel in a global way seem to be a desirable ballast to more detailed studies of particular authors. An instance of a question where only such broad studies can lead the way is why prose fiction is selected for elaboration at certain times and not others (Whitmarsh 2006). Heroic efforts to see the big picture, such as that of Doody (1996), for example, or Fusillo's contributions to the two-volume survey of the novel edited by Moretti (2006–7), will inevitably find fault among specialists; but they do provoke important interactions. An excellent example is the exchange between Fusillo (1994) and Brioso Sánchez (2000–1) on whether or not the Greek novels can be thought of as 'literature of consumption'.

The history of scholarly opinion on the novels has ranged from dismissiveness to assertions of authorial cleverness that exceed the bounds of credulity. When estimates of the literary value of the novels were low, it was typical to denigrate the authors as incompetent and accuse them of pandering to unsophisticated readers. Critics were apt to state that the novels were symptomatic of cultural decline, weakness of spirit, or an alien intrusion into Hellenic culture. However, due in part to the impact of Bakhtin, those characteristics that were once considered flaws in decorum have become rethought in a more positive manner, as indicative of the experimental and innovative spirit of imperial literature. That change in heart has also reflected changing trends in literary criticism in general. The early focus on the obscure origins of the genre has given way to various attempts to assess the purpose and qualities of individual works. The attribution of a primarily religious purpose for the novels, recently restated by its most powerful proponent (Merkelbach 1995), has not convinced many; nor have claims of their relationship to other narrative traditions, like fairy-tales or Near Eastern literature (Anderson 1984 and 2000). There is in the end something 'novel' about these texts that cries out for an explanation in terms of the literary and cultural scene of imperial literature.

The application of narratology to the novels has had a huge impact, with key texts by J. J. Winkler changing dramatically the way these texts are now viewed. Winkler is best known for his book on Apuleius (1985), which argues that the surprising and wide-ranging novel requires a 'scrupulous reader', who reads and rereads carefully, following every clue relentlessly like a semiotic hound-dog. His earlier lengthy article on Heliodorus (1982) took a similar tack on the *Aethiopica*, beginning again with the assumption that everything is significant and that our author holds himself and the reader to the highest degree of rigour. Winkler concluded in both cases that our authors were interested in undermining the philosophical seriousness of their own works. Winkler's own dazzling reading techniques seem to have unleashed an energetic search for self-conscious artistry in the novels in those very places where earlier critics had seen the greatest flaws. For example, Bartsch (1989) argued that the use of apparently superfluous descriptions in Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus are actually at the heart of their authorial strategy, as they spring traps on the reader in

an effort to undermine his/her confidence in the conventions and presuppositions of reading. This purely literary approach strikes me as another example of projection backwards, not from mass culture this time, but from a more post-modern sensibility that seems out of place in antiquity. Be that as it may, there are a number of important works that treat these texts in their relationship to issues of narrative and intertextuality, particularly the three 'sophistic' novels. Noteworthy contributions by Goldhill, Zeitlin, Hunter, Winkler, Morgan, Whitmarsh, and Selden, among others, that trace the self-conscious reflection on the process of narration and on the status of the literary certainly show us something important about the novels. One permanent consequence has been the acceptance of the notion that narratives are always to some degree *about narrative*, and are reflections on the very rules that govern the activity of narrating. Indeed, few genres flaunt their literariness as much as the novel.

This emphasis on literariness often runs head-on into those critics who view the novels as evidence for contemporary social practices, as a reflection of the lives and times of the imperial period of Greek literature. Foucault's use of the novels as evidence for seismic changes in the landscape of sexuality in his *History of Sexuality*, for example, has provoked numerous commentaries on method, such as Goldhill (1995). Goldhill argues that the novels engage in a complex dialogue with other contemporary texts and topics in ways that make them problematic evidence for social practices of the time. Nevertheless, a consistently interesting vein of criticism has been the idea that there is something 'at work' in the ancient novels that is characteristic of this epoch. Konstan (1994), for example, has argued that the novels promote an ideal of mutual heterosexual attraction between social equals that culminates in marriage, something that is regularly contrasted in the novels with more traditional and asymmetrical homoerotic relationships. Why would such an ideal emerge at this time? The answer to this question is to be sought in the ideological positioning of the political and cultural elite of Greek cities within the Roman Empire. That is, espousing a new ideal for regulating marriage and sex reflects some kind of anxiety or desire in relationship to their success and survival under new political circumstances. Discussion of the sexual politics of the novel and its implications for a change in the dynamics of sexual difference continues to attract the attention of scholars (Cooper 1996; Haynes 2003; Burrus 2005; Lalanne 2006). In this context, the novel is clearly engaging with themes that can be found in many other genres in the imperial period, making more pressing the question of the particular contribution to these discussions made by the novelists.

This interest is one of many lines of enquiry that can be associated with the rise of 'cultural studies', which, broadly speaking, sees literature as part of a wide-ranging field of cultural contestation. In the interest of understanding the relationship between the centre and the periphery, for example, a central theme of post-colonial studies, the novel seems to hold the promise of seeing and hearing something different. Although little is known of the authors of these works,

several seem to be, like Lucian, 'Hellenized barbarians' from places like Aphrodisias (Chariton) and Emesa (Heliodorus). With the exception of Longus, all of the novels involve significant travel to exotic lands, where the heroes leave their comfort zone. Although there is generally a 'Hellenocentric bias' in these works, which takes for granted the superiority of Greek institutions over barbarian ones (in the light of Whitmarsh's discussion in this volume, it is significant that there is no direct mention of Roman institutions at all), this assumption is complicated in a number of cases, most prominently in Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*, where the polarity between Greek and barbarian is repeatedly interrogated. Is it possible to hear in these novels the voice of the 'other'? A preliminary version of the problems faced here can be gleaned from a variation of that question: can we hear in these novels the voice of the other *gender*? Although generally 'androcentric', the novels do seem to open up the possibility of female identification and to invite fantasies of female erotic power. They can be read as texts where androcentrism takes a brief vacation, even if such openings are for the most part coopted into the androcentric paradigm. Egger (1994, 1999), for example, argues that the real limitations of female life are actually exaggerated in the novels, at the same time positing an illusionary power based on women's invincible emotional and sexual fascination. In her book on women in the novel, Haynes (2003) also notes that greater attention to the feminine seems to be put to the service of issues in male identity. If it is possible to interpret certain kinds of episodes and sentiments as providing greater scope for, and interest in, women's issues or women's emotional life, it does not seem likely that this was actually a main motive of the novelists, who are generally just as misogynistic as they are Hellenocentric. No doubt it is the very heterogeneity of the novel that makes it seem more open to a variety of interpretations (or the bearer of a secret meaning), but that still leaves the question of why these Second Sophistic writers would select it as a medium.

One promising stream of thought about the novel is that it is part and parcel of the imperial period's assertion of a cultural superiority by Greek elites in the face of overwhelming Roman power. Reduced to playing a smaller role in the politics of the day, Greek elites could fall back on their *paideia* as a form of privilege and prestige as universal in the cultural sphere as the Roman army was in the sphere of power. This is certainly supported by the fact that direct reference to the presence of the Roman Empire is completely absent from any of the five extant Greek novels, and that indirect references seem to be somewhat negative (Alvarez 2001–2; Schwartz 2003). Swain (1996) argues that the novels reflect key ideological and moral assertions of the Greek elites in a format that would be comforting to them. The setting in the past reflects contemporary Greeks' sense of themselves as heirs of their classical ancestors, while the emphasis on marital bliss reflects the way imperial Greeks saw themselves as 'continuing to live their civic existence, the basic building block of which was the *oikos*' (Swain 1996: 129). At the same time, since 'being Greek' increasingly came to mean being *pepaideumenos*, it was theoretically possible for

anyone to acquire 'Greekness' as a persona: being Greek means 'appearing' to be Greek, a construction, not a representation (cf. Whitmarsh in this volume). Thus the novels share characteristics with other sophistic enterprises that make up the 'self-fashioning' of Greek literary figures of the time such as Philostratus and Favorinus. In Goldhill (2001*a*), the novel is set alongside other literary productions of the time as examples of the ways Greek authors positioned themselves in and against the reality of the Roman Empire. In his contribution to that volume, Whitmarsh insists further that the centrality of *paideia* meant not merely rehearsing or insisting on the importance of that cultural heritage, but positioning oneself against it to a certain extent in order to inscribe one's own (belated) position in it: not just imitation, but transformation. The innovative character of the novel and its boundless possibilities for redeploying the form and content of classical Greek literature position it uniquely for this Second Sophistic project. The three sophistic novels, in particular, seem to invite readings that focus on their self-conscious and strategic deployment of traditional elements of the Greek cultural legacy.

In Longus, for example, the relationship between what is natural and what is artificial is complicated and interrogated repeatedly. What should be the most 'natural' thing in the world, sex, proves, to our delight, to be something the hero and heroine are incapable of achieving—even with the example of their animals before them—without the instruction and demonstration of a city-slicker. Meanwhile, Longus emphasizes from the beginning the secondary status of his story, an imitation of a graphic imitation, filled with learned allusions to classical Greek literature. While describing and praising natural beauty and goodness, Longus is also pitting in these very descriptions his sophisticated *tekhnē* as a worthy rival to the natural. Peppered throughout the novel of Achilles Tatius we find digressions on a whole range of contemporary philosophical and rhetorical topics, from a dialogue comparing the love of boys and women to disquisitions on the character of the River Nile and other Egyptian wonders. Of particular interest are the author's witty meditations on the themes of seeing and visualization, subjects of intense philosophical debate in the imperial period. As Goldhill (2001*b*) and Morales (2004) have shown, Achilles Tatius humorously manipulates many ideas contemporaries had about the power of sight, at one point comparing it to an act of copulation. The unusual deployment of first-person narrative also seems to be designed specifically to augment the voyeuristic quality that many scholars have noted in this story. Laplace (2007) has meticulously surveyed the whole range of intertextual resources deployed and transformed in this novel, and made a strong case for the author's systematic use of a vast array of mythic and heroic legends.

Many critics have commented on the striking reversals of cultural norms and expectations in Heliodorus and the 'decentring' of Hellenism away from Athens to the peripheries of Egypt and then Ethiopia, most famously in the person of its heroine Chariclea, whose Greek/Ethiopian identity is at the heart of the novel's puzzle. Whitmarsh (1998) argues that the *Aethiopica* itself self-consciously connects

these thematic transformations with the novel's own literary pedigree, a key example of the way the heterogeneity and permeability of the novel articulates issues of identity and culture. Whitmarsh (2001) places the novel squarely in the context of imperial literature; here he gives a more comprehensive version of the relationship between *paideia* and identity, and his approach will no doubt be a key direction for future discussions of the novel. Whitmarsh notes, for example, that 'in many cases "Greekness" consists precisely *not* in revealing one's inner intentions, but rather in demonstrating an impressive facility with the manipulation, innovation, and combination of *personae*' (Whitmarsh 2001: 34). This kind of clever posturing can be seen at all levels in the novel: unexpected twists in the plot, learned disquisitions, rhetorical devices such as *ekphrasis*, displays of geographical and ethnological exotica, and so on. One of Bakhtin's assertions about the 'adventure-time chronotope', to which the Greek novels belong in his scheme, is that the main characters are not changed at all by their experiences. Although this is arguable, the novels can be seen in part as an exercise in 'being Greek' in a world that is largely 'not Greek', and in fact is often hostile to Greek values. In this way the novel has finally returned home, like one of its own characters, after a long journey abroad: long thought to exhibit a form and content that is not at all Hellenic in spirit, the Greek novels can now be seen as a strong version of Hellenism in the time of the Roman Empire.

The varied form and content of the novels will no doubt continue to prompt a variety of approaches to them in the future. Grasping the novels as cultural documents will be most successful when it takes into account the literariness of the novels and their place in imperial literature as a whole. This means seeing them not as reflections of some 'world of the novel', but as constructions that are actively seeking to engage and manage the real world obliquely and figuratively. The novels are not explicitly political, but political agendas of various kinds are figured in them by their deployment of political institutions and ideas. They are not particularly 'feminist' either, but sexuality and desire are strategic battlegrounds in the culture wars of their time. Nor is it likely that the novels promote particular religious observances, but the power of the gods to intervene in human affairs always implies a limit to the earthly power of humans over each other, and holds out the ideal of satisfaction for wrongs endured. For their varied and evolving purposes the novelists made use of religious, philosophical, and literary materials of all kinds, but the very choice of prose fiction as their medium implies a step away from more traditional forms of espousing those materials and a willingness to try something more experimental and novel.

Suggested Reading

The primary texts are edited by Garnaud (1991: Achilles Tatius), Reardon (2004: Chariton), Rattenbury and Lumb (1960: Heliodorus), Viellefond (1987: Longus), O'Sullivan (2005:

Xenophon of Ephesus). Complete fragments are edited and translated, with substantial discussion, in Stephens and Winkler (1995). The main texts and fragments are translated in Reardon (1989). For primary texts and translations of the full range of novel-like literature see the bibliography in Holzberg (2001). For surveys of the novels and relevant bibliography there are a number of excellent collections, the most wide-ranging of which is Schmeling (1996). More compact and appropriate for the classroom is Morgan and Stoneman (1994). Classic articles on issues such as origin and genre are collected in Gärtner (1984), Swain (1999), and Hägg (2004). Noteworthy conference proceedings that indicate the range and trends in novel scholarship include Tatum (1994) and Panayotakis, Zimmerman, and Keulen (2003), as well as the nine volumes of proceedings from the Groningen Colloquia on the Novel published between 1988 and 1998. Excellent general introductions to the topic include, Hägg (1983), Reardon (1991), and Holzberg (1995). The Petronius Society Homepage (www.chss.montclair.edu/classics/petron/psnovel.html) has bibliography and other information up till 2002, at which point it is superseded by the online journal *Ancient Narrative* (www.ancientnarrative.com) as a resource for keeping up with recent trends and bibliography; the journal also publishes online the proceedings of the ongoing biennial novel conference at Rethymnon, Crete, as well as other special issues. Excellent bibliographical surveys include Ruiz-Montero (1994*a*: Chariton), and (1994*b*: Xenophon), Morgan (1997: Longus), and Bowie and Harrison (1993). The fourth International Conference on the Ancient Novel was coordinated by Marília Futre-Pinhero in Lisbon in 2008; a conference volume will follow.

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CHAPTER 51

PERFORMANCE, TEXT, AND THE HISTORY OF CRITICISM

ANDREW L. FORD

As an academic subject ancient literary criticism can be traced back to 1846 and the first edition of Émile Egger's *Essai sur l'histoire de la critique chez les Grecs*. Egger named no precursors, but the topic cannot in any case be very much older since 'literary criticism' is an essentially eighteenth-century concept: 'literature' is not an ancient way of classing art but an innovation, connected with the eighteenth-century idea of 'fine arts'; and while the ancients did recognize 'expert judging' (*kritikē*), they did not, with rare exceptions, think that poetry was to be 'judged' any differently from any other form of speech, its metrical form being superficial adornment. (On the pivotal, and much-studied eighteenth century see Nisbet and Rawson 1997, especially the contributions of Douglas Lane Patey and Glenn W. Most.) Criticism was not literary, then, in the ancient world, and Egger justified his topic for its practical utility: his ample and surprisingly imaginative survey was intended to provide the context for understanding Aristotle's *Poetics*, itself recommended as the best general introduction to the study of Greek literature. Egger is the main source for ancient criticism in the first of Saintsbury's three-volume *History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe*, which he compiled to prepare himself 'to undertake the duty of a critic' (Saintsbury 1908: p. v). Since Saintsbury, work in

the field has moved away from the implication that the ancients understood their literature 'better' in some way than moderns can; these days, the glaring inadequacy of ancient criticism in dealing with its objects is more likely to be stressed, and moderns have come to realize that we cannot escape doing 'modern' criticism, whatever parts of the ancient inheritance we adopt (Feeney 1995). The scholarly trend has, accordingly, been away from 'judicial' criticism and toward treating Graeco-Roman criticism as a topic in the history of ideas, as in Grube's trenchant 1965 survey. But to reduce the subject to intellectual history is to miss understanding the many ways in which 'the critical engagement with language production and consumption functions in the ancient world' (Goldhill 1999: 84), a critique Simon Goldhill levelled against the 1989 *Classical Criticism*, edited by George Kennedy as the first volume of the *Cambridge History of Literary Criticism*. This work, the standard overview, appeared at the end of two decades in which modern and post-modern theory so dominated the academy that it is hardly surprising if at times it gives the impression that the most interesting thing the ancients did with their literature was to concoct theories about it. (A notable exception is Nagy's seventy-seven-page anthropological and linguistic account, according to which criticism evolves, like language itself, on a supra-individual level; cf. also Nagy 1990 and, for a complementary approach, Ford 2002.) Kennedy's richly informed and wide-ranging collection suggests a new reason for studying ancient criticism: not as the source of timeless literary standards or as a narrowly circumscribed philosophical problem, but as a central part of Graeco-Roman literary culture, one offering unique insight into the many vital roles that verbal art played in classical civilization. More recent studies of ancient criticism have gone in the direction of social history, considering not just ancient theories but also the practices and institutions that surrounded the creation, evaluation, and preservation of ancient literature.

The history of criticism now is thus most fruitfully pursued by sifting ancient writings about writing for more than their theories of poetry. This is not simply because histories of ideas tend to leave out so much (as any discipline must), but because what they leave out can very often help in assessing their 'ideas' properly. An example is afforded by one of the most intelligent of the mid-century surveys, Wimsatt and Brooks (1957). These great New Critics begin their story by zeroing in on the word *prepon* in Plato's *Ion*. This curious short work, of uncertain date and genre, has the honour to lead off the history of criticism because it contains the first clear articulation of the idea of 'the appropriate', some notion of specially literary propriety being a sine qua non for any concept of literature. All this is perfectly true so far as *prepon* is concerned, and Wimsatt and Brooks are quite right to point out that in one form or another an idea of decorum is the cornerstone of all classical aesthetics. Yet even as a 'short history' this leaves out rather a lot (as indeed the New Critical approach to poems as autotelic universes left out rather a lot about them). A more widely focused reading would appreciate that Plato's *Ion* is much

more than a record of concepts (as all Plato's works are); in his artful, ironic way, he provides a priceless sketch of an entire world of practices by which literary concepts were sustained. In estimating the force and importance of the interlocutors' ideas of epic propriety, for example, it can hardly be irrelevant that, as Plato attests, the throngs of professional reciters of Homeric poetry who converged on Athens at festival time might use the same word for their resplendent costumes (*kosmos*) and for the 'glorification' (*kosmeō*) they heaped on the poet in the lectures on Homeric excellence with which they supplemented their recitations.

In such a vein, much suggestive work since Kennedy follows recent literary study away from thinking of texts as autonomous objects and places them in a nest of social contexts that decisively shaped their meaning (pioneering studies by Rösler 1980; Gentili 1988); it also profits from cultural studies and its interest in how texts interact with non-verbal symbolic systems. Such perspectives can, for example, richly extend the excellent musicological history of Barker (1984–9) by considering how performative modes such as kitharody or aulody were in themselves imbued with cultural significance (Murray and Wilson 2004; Power 2006); other practices that impinged powerfully, if indirectly, on poetic production have been given renewed attention, such as the Athenian *khorēgeia* (Wilson 2000) or the management of the dramatic stage (Csapo and Slater 1995). Standard topics such as the role of literature in pedagogy have been revisited (Too 2001; Cribiore 2001), and the importance of reception, even in very early periods, can no longer be ignored (Graziosi 2002). The rhetorical tradition (re-evaluated by Cole 1991) and its once-neglected exercises (Kennedy 2003) have proven to teach much more than how to make a speech (Gleason 1995). And topics like allegory, which the philosophical tradition derogated but which had long-lasting importance, return to the research agenda (Boys-Stones 2003; Struck 2004). Finally, there is a greater appreciation of the depth and importance of later phases in the critical tradition, not only the 'Second Sophistic' (Whitmarsh 2001) but late antiquity too (Kaster 1988; Brown 1992). It need hardly be added that there remains a role for the history of ideas, since it is important to construe ancient theories aright when placing them in context. The revival of interest in specifically ancient criticism that Kennedy's book marked can be attributed to a decade of intense work explicating the *Poetics* (most of which is accessible through Rorty 1992). Since then Philodemus has emerged as a wide-open field of research, as new techniques for reading the Herculaneum papyri (discussed in this volume by Armstrong) revolutionize our understanding of a central witness to the forging of Graeco-Roman aesthetics. Reading this eclectic Epicurean (as in Janko 2000) is like being plunked down at the crossroads of Hellenistic criticism and being handed a road-map pointing to all major destinations.

These few noteworthy books that have appeared since Kennedy only begin to indicate the range of studies that can contribute to a full view of ancient literary criticism. Beneath their different agendas, I suggest that what marks this kind of work as an advance in Greek literary history is the determination to confront theory

with practice, to see how ideas work not only in philosophic texts but throughout the society, from ostraca to tapestries. In the case of archaic and classical Greece, this perspective often means confronting the idea of the work of art as text with the reality of the work of art as performance. As philologists, we are avatars of Hellenistic scholars and so perhaps are too prone to impose on earlier contexts the conditions of the Alexandrian Library—with its glossaries, commentaries, and critical editions of major authors. But we risk profoundly misconceiving the musical culture of archaic and even classical Greeks if we ignore the ubiquitous and frequent occasions for 'musical' performance, and forget that the meaning of even the most perfectly finished text depended crucially on the context in which it was performed. (Cf. Capra in this volume.) Students of ancient literature, then, stand to gain if its masterpieces are presented not so much as self-contained, timeless, and univocal works of art, but as scripts sponsoring performances in various contexts—from schoolroom to Odeon—that kept the work fully in existence and made it meaningful to audience after audience.

The difference that these social and material perspectives can make to the history of criticism can be seen by contrasting two accounts of the early history of criticism. The usual version presents it as an ongoing struggle for authority, going back to archaic Greece when Xenophanes and Heraclitus attacked Homer and Hesiod for error and impiety. This seems to fit in with what Plato calls an 'ancient war' (*Republic* 607b) between poetry and philosophy, and scholars have been fond of staging the titanic battle in this war by pitting the *Republic* against Aristotle's *Poetics*—the former being read unironically as a demand that poetry's harmful lies be banished from the state, and the latter being construed as a defence of the morally educative value of art. In my view both interpretations are distortions, except to the extent that they point out that fourth-century poetics and rhetoric bequeathed to Hellenistic and later philosophy two fundamentally antithetical attitudes toward poetry: one view was to indulge in it as one of life's pleasures (which was judged allowable even if poetry be nonsense, provided it be taken in moderation); the other was to revere poetry as the repository of profound wisdom (very often a hidden wisdom that propounders of this view were able to disclose). Despite occasional surfacings of more holistic conceptions of poetry (as in the exceptional early chapters of *On the Sublime*, but not—so far—in Philodemus), later Roman and Christian literary culture remain irreducibly, though often fruitfully conflicted about whether poetry is sound or sense, whether it claims our attention as a pleasing *form* of words or as their improving *content*. Attempts to mend this rift in one way or another are of course manifold from Hellenistic times on, and indeed might most conveniently be summed up by the term Neoclassical criticism.

Plato's war-story is altogether too neat and should be regarded as at best a partisan interpretation of literary history, if not as an outright fiction. It is dramatic (as we might expect from Plato), and it is a history of ideas (as we might expect from a philosopher). Here historians of criticism who do not wish to be marooned on a

philosophical reduction can profit from changing the terms of analysis: instead of a conflict between philosophic truth and poetic lies, an alternative account of what provoked the *Republic*—and the entire explosion in ideas about poetry that we can see from the fifth-century sophists through Aristotle's *Poetics*—might consider the radical shift in the balance of power from performance to text in classical Greece. (Cf. Rösler in this volume.) Even at Athens at the end of the fifth century, a person who read (rather than went to hear) poetry was exceptional, not to say eccentric; so much is implied in our earliest portrayal of reading Greek literature, the foppish, *moderniste* Dionysus who mentions reading Euripides in Aristophanes' *Frogs* of 405 BCE; and yet, toward 350 BCE Aristotle could casually remark in *Poetics* that a well-constructed tragedy ought to be as affecting when it is read as when produced in the theatre. Eric Havelock argued (in the matchless rhapsody that concludes his *Preface to Plato* of 1963) that Plato was attacking not so much the poets' ideas as the performative modes by which poetry was infiltrated through the citizenry (cf. Robb 1994). His argument became reductive when he described this as the defeat of 'orality' by Plato's 'literacy', but it stands to reason that criticism will change when new 'intentional objects' arise, and Havelock was the first to show that in Plato's day what had been scripts for performance were increasingly being scrutinized as self-standing artefacts. Such a historical context may help explain why the *Poetics* is so admired by moderns, for its method allows us to discern value in ancient works which have had the distractions—and enhancements—of performative context shorn away (Ford 2003).

I have argued that the study of ancient criticism is unduly narrow unless it combines an awareness of the materiality of culture—of the forms in which literary texts were produced, circulated, stored up, and accessed—with an appreciation for how strongly performance traditions could shape the reception and valuation of such texts. In the balance of this chapter I should like to add a further point: that thinking of ancient criticism as a dialectic between text and performance makes a qualitative and not just quantitative difference: it not only expands the kinds of practices we can consider criticism, but also is indispensable to appreciate the full range of functions that discourses on poetry could fill in Greek culture. To do so I propose to excavate a little of the practice underlying a small piece of Aristotelian literary theory.

Aristotle's *Poetics* is rightly esteemed for its approach to poetry as representation (*mimēsis*), which has been the fountainhead of western literary theory. (The conception '*mimēsis* in language' is virtually equivalent to 'literature', but Aristotle excludes prose in practice.) Most of the treatise is devoted to defining the genres of *mimēsis* and specifying the *telos* or 'end' of each, the particular emotional response each genre is best equipped to arouse. But toward the end of the work (in the penultimate chapter of the apparently truncated version we have) Aristotle inserts a chapter that points away from theory to practical criticism. Chapter 25, 'On Problems and Solutions', attempts to 'theorize' (1460b7) what might best be

described as a poetry game in which one player posed a 'challenge' (*problēma*) to another by citing a poet of high reputation and claiming that the poet had 'made an error' (*hamartanein*, e.g. 1454b17); the respondent tried to 'dissolve' the objection, usually by proposing an interpretation in which the cited passage was composed 'correctly' (*orthōs*, 1460b24, cf. *orthotēs* in 1460b13). Now this discussion is tied in to the theoretical burden of the *Poetics*, for Aristotle urges keeping the *telos* of the work in view when considering whether an alleged fault is blameworthy. But the philosopher is also intervening in a popular poetic pastime, one that can be detected behind the scene in *Frogs* in which Aeschylus and Euripides use such terms (*hamartanein* 1135, 1137, 1147; *orthotēs* 1131, 1181) to attack each other's verse.

For all that such objections could be petty and naive, their cultural importance is suggested by their impressive staying power. A scene from *Iliad* 1 affords an example: when a vengeful Apollo descends to visit plague on the Greeks, Homer specifies that he first slayed the mules and dogs, and then the soldiers (1.50–1). Some ancient readers were troubled by the fact that the god exacted revenge on senseless beasts, and among those who commented on this passage was Zoilos of Amphipolis, a notorious problem-poser known to Aristotle. This is the background to Aristotle's own suggestion in *Poetics* 25 that the word 'mules' (*ourēas*) might be construed as a dialectical variant of 'guards' (*ouros*, 1461a9), at least partly 'solving' the 'problem'. However, Aristotle's younger associate, Aristoxenus, pointed out a problem with this solution, for the gloss will not fit the context. The game went on, and by Roman times a cosmic explanation, involving the role of Apollo as the sun as the cause of plague, was promulgated in chapter 13 of a book called *Homeric Allegories*. Even today the somewhat silly 'problem' continues to provoke responses from Homer's teachers: the most recent commentary on the *Iliad* takes a moment at verse 50 to refer to medical-historical studies explaining that domesticated animals are commonly at risk during times of plague (Latacz, Nünlist, and Stoevesandt 2000: 45).

The game of disputing the correctness of poets also extends backward to the first half of the fifth century, for sophists were also concerned with linguistic *orthotēs*, and the great Protagoras claimed to find two blunders in the first line of the *Iliad* alone! Plato represents him as teaching 'correct expression' (*orthoepeia*, *Phaedrus* 267c) and finding fault with poets. In the *Protagoras* the sophist initiates a long scene of criticism by claiming that a poem on human excellence (*aretē*) by the sage Simonides was neither 'correctly' nor 'finely' expressed (*ouk orthōs*, 339d; *kalōs kai orthōs* 339b). Historians of ideas have attempted to extract from such indirect evidence what precisely Protagoras meant by *orthoepeia* (and how his 'correctness' differed from that of other sophists like Prodicus). But considering that criticism itself had to be a performance suggests that it is less important to nail down how this agile debater might have defined the term than to note that *orthoepeia* was displayed in a dialectical game: 'The most important part of education', Plato's Protagoras asserts, 'is being exceptionally shrewd about poetry (*peri epōn deinos*); that is, to be

able to perceive what in poetry is said correctly (*orthōs*) and what not, to know how to distinguish between the two (*epistasthai dielein*), and be able to give an account of oneself (*logon dounai*) when questioned' (*Protagoras* 339a). *Orthoepeia* may remain shadowy as a doctrine—though a high degree of scrupulousness in making verbal distinctions was clearly involved, and was a good way of arrogating distinction to oneself (Bourdieu 1984)—but we can appreciate it as practice in standing up under verbal attack. As in the game of problems and solutions, the putative object of blame—the 'wise' poet—was a stalking-horse: the one being tested for wisdom was the performer who had to defend a threatened 'correctness'.

Before summing up, we can briefly take one further step back in this history to see that in debating the correctness of poems the sophists were, as so often, revising and adapting practices for which sixth-century poets had provided different sorts of scripts. Poets like Simonides were themselves fond of debating received wisdom; indeed, in the poem Protagoras critiqued, Simonides criticized a moral pronouncement by the sage Pittacus as 'spoken out of tune' (*ouk emmelōs*; see Most 1994). The point is not that things go further back than one thinks, but that, viewed together, these different modes of 'literary criticism' are revealed as ways of playing at reciprocity: whether one is challenger or respondent, one must show courtesy and self-control, but also *parrhēsia*, self-assertive, manly free-speaking, in disagreeing with an authoritative opinion. (The wisdom popularly conceded to Homer explains the vast ancient literature on 'Homeric Problems'—to which Aristotle contributed half-a-dozen books.) There was justice in taking turns, and moderation in not attacking too fiercely. Hence, even in its later phases the blame game exhibited ethical virtues as much as aesthetic ones: in the poem quoted in *Protagoras* Simonides insists, 'I am no lover of blame' (*philopsogos*, 346c), and for Pindar the blame-poet Archilochus typified the perils of captiousness (*Pythian Odes*, 2.55); the same role was filled in Aristotle's day by Zoilos, his sobriquet 'scourge of Homer' hinting at his hubris in treating the great poet as if he were a slave.

To conclude, let us return to the *Poetics* and consider Aristotle's contribution to the game. Apart from the numerous specific strategies he suggests to responders, Aristotle lays down the general rule that an errant poetic passage that contributes to the *telos* of the work should not be blamed unless it was possible to achieve its effect without committing the fault in question. The implicit theory operating here is that poets have licence to violate normal usage if that is the only way to effect their *telos*. Indeed, Aristotle is explicit that, 'correctness in the poetic art is not the same as that in other arts' (1460b13–15). This rule of limited application is as close as Aristotle, and ancient criticism generally, gets to claiming that literature can only be rightly judged by its own 'appropriate' standards, that is, *literary* standards. But, as mentioned above, his aim in *Poetics* 25 is to put the game on a sound technical, that is, philosophical basis. There is also an ethical dimension to his teaching, for this rule in practice serves to overrule excessive fault-finding. One might seek a philosophical basis for this in the *Ethics*, but a dislike of pettifogging judgements

and captious behaviour was popular, and in fact Aristotle's most 'literary' rule is synonymous with an ethical principle enunciated by Simonides: 'I praise and love every one who does nothing disgraceful on purpose' (*Protagoras* 344c). Even as it achieves its highest philosophic form, Greek criticism remains an exercise in displaying *aretē*.

Suggested Reading

The basis for any study of ancient criticism remains the ancient texts, many of which were shrewdly selected and translated by Russell and Winterbottom (1972). A valuable companion thereto is Kennedy (1989). The collection of essays edited by Laird (2006) is an excellent guide to further research, not only for the twenty 'classic' essays he reprints but for his judicious and up-to-date appendices listing further reading.

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PART IV

METHODS AND APPROACHES

Introduction

Scholarship dealing with the past inevitably finds itself confronted with the related issues of 'originality' and 'authenticity': the *original* form taken by artefactual, including textual, evidence whose journey to us (from its 'original' context) might well have changed it beyond native recognition; the *authenticity* of the cultural picture we construct through its interpretation. It is by no means inevitable that these notions take centre-stage in our study of the past: some of the chapters in this section suggest that it might be unrealistic for them to do so, others that it might not be desirable. The extent to which they do direct our study, however, is just the extent to which our study is about an *other* culture at all—rather than the study of ourselves.

The consequences of this for any approach to the Greek world in particular are explored in the first two papers in this section—both of which, interestingly, appeal to Herodotus, who should perhaps be considered the father of cultural anthropology as much as of history. **G. E. R. Lloyd** resists an extreme position that relativizes concepts of originality and authenticity out of existence; but he shows, nevertheless, that the study of Hellenic culture always involves comparative anthropology: we can look harder and see more, but *what* we see is always the view from where we are. Indeed, we put ourselves in the frame by selecting the object of our study to begin with. **Emily Greenwood**, in her discussion of the 'dialogue' (as she calls it) between postcolonial theory and Hellenistic studies, highlights this by exploring the act of will and self-identification by which Greece is appropriated to a particular culture, made *its* history, and put to its service. (One important point to which she draws attention is the potentially universal significance that this gives Hellenic studies: just because the appropriation of ancient Greece is an act of will, it always remains available for counter-appropriation by other interests as well.)

The study of the Hellenic past understood as such always, then, involves *us* along with *them*, and particular questions require us to strike an appropriate balance between the claims of each. At one extreme, we can phrase our questions as questions just about *them*: the experience of individuals or classes in the Hellenic world: 'What was it like to be [for example] a fifth-century Athenian?' It is for the pursuit of this sort of question that the next chapters provide examples and guidance. For the most part, they deal with the application to Hellenic antiquity of questions which, in some form, might apply to any culture: how membership of society is counted and structured (**Walter Scheidel** on demography and sociology); the ('cultural') traditions through which members of a society achieve or express identity (**Jan**

Bremmer on myth, mythology, and mythography); the meaning given within these structures to human individuals whose relationship even with their own bodies is culturally determined (**Marilyn Skinner** on gender); the language they speak, and all that that might tell us—synchronically of cultural history and diachronically of social interaction (**Philomen Probert** on comparative philology and linguistics).

These questions rely in their turn on our approach to the primary evidence which, on the face it, provides the most direct contact we have with the ancients and grounds our claim to be able to answer them as questions *about* the Greeks. Among such evidence, epigraphy, discussed here by **P. J. Rhodes**, has a special place, since its material is often rooted in a particular geographical site, linked to a particular historical event, and self-consciously intended to record both for posterity. But, as **James Whitley** emphasizes, no ancient artefact can speak to us in isolation: rather, we have to consider the 'patterns' of occurrence, and the dialogue they establish with other forms of evidence (not least of all, textual evidence). And here our own perspective is found framing the picture again. The artefacts we have are partly determined by the decisions of archaeologists, and so is the knowledge we have of the context in which they were discovered. But, more than this, the significance we read into them depends to a large degree on our own hopes and expectations. **Andrew Meadows** provides, in his discussion of Greek coins, a vivid case-study of a trajectory in Hellenic scholarship observed by Whitley too. In the early days, when artistic or iconographical interests dominated, coins were often thought of as 'medals'; today more attention is paid to their social context, including not just their use in exchange, but also, for example, the circumstances of their production.

So even when we have to hand the very objects created and handled by the Greeks, the insights they provide us into Greek life are not transparent or unmediated. No more so are the ancient texts to which we might turn for commentary. Indeed, the question of 'originality' raises itself in a particularly acute form when we are dealing with texts, especially when our possession of these texts relies on their transmission through a long chain of copyists. (Their work, which is the province of Manuscript studies, is discussed here by **Natalie Tchernetska**.) But the same is true even when we are dealing with the more direct, and to that extent more 'original', sources whose study is doing so much to expand our body of textual evidence for ancient Greece today—notably the papyri scraps of Oxyrhynchus, and the book-rolls of Herculaneum. It is true that new imaging techniques constantly improve the quantity and quality of the texts we can recover, as **David Armstrong** explains in his reflection on his experience of working with the Herculaneum papyri; but it remains the case that, whether we are considering a medieval manuscript or a first-century papyrus, the evidence these provide is determined (that is, interpreted) by its reception. Even an 'ideal' text (written as the author wrote, or meant to write it) is interpreted in the process of presentation and commentary, as **Luigi Battezzato** and **Barbara Graziosi** respectively emphasize. But the 'ideal' text is, in any case, a theoretical entity: a text without error, ambiguity, or the need for emendation has

probably never existed; and the choices that we make under all these headings are inseparable from our view of what the text might or 'should' have said—*our* view of Greece, then. Even the texts of antiquity, in more ways than one, turn out to be the products of our own culture.

The fact that 'we' keep intruding in this way into our own investigations of antiquity can, depending on the questions one asks, appear to be a nuisance. But many approaches turn it into a virtue by making *ourselves*, that is, our own presence in the examination of the Hellenic world, the immediate objects of their study. Freudian psychoanalysis, as discussed by **Rachel Bowlby**, is a programmatic example of the process because, while it is fundamentally introspective, it is articulated through a reading of the classics. (It is no coincidence, then, that psychoanalytic terms recur in subsequent chapters by Lianeri and Michelakis.) To this extent, though, Freud is only applying to the individual what cultures as a whole have done through their appropriation of Greece for their own past (the 'act of will' I mentioned above). In effect, the decision to study Greece, to find it important, is on every occasion a decision to express oneself in a certain way. This is something illustrated by one activity which is so central to Hellenic studies that it can seem commonplace: translation. For, as **Alexandra Lianeri** points out, to see the need for translation is to recognize difference and distance, but at the same time to seek a means of making Greek culture our own. Film studies provides the ideal field for further reflection on the issue: it involves the translation of Greek material into a new medium, as well as a new language, a medium furthermore which is characteristically *modern* (definitively *ours*). It is also, as **Pantelis Michelakis** points out, the medium through which many moderns have their first or only self-aware encounter with ancient Greece.

Collections of scholarly articles on aspects of the ancient world often end with a token article on the later 'reception' of the topic under discussion (cf. Taplin above, p. 475). Our collection ends with a paper on reception as well: but we end with it because, as **Miriam Leonard** observes and the preceding chapters have shown, 'Reception studies' cannot be separated out as a methodology distinct from anything else done under the heading of Hellenic studies. Properly understood, it is what Hellenic studies *is*—to just the extent that the emphasis is on *us* rather than the Greeks we study.

CHAPTER 52

COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF CULTURE

G. E. R. LLOYD

THE comparative study of culture was inaugurated, so far as the Greeks were concerned, by Herodotus, although long before him a fascination with other societies, real or imaginary, is much in evidence in the *Odyssey*. The Cyclopes, the Laestrygonians, the Lotus-Eaters, are just so many cases of social groups that deviate from the norm, helping to define that norm by their very deviations. Just how far Herodotus took Homer as a model or saw himself in competition with epic are controversial issues. His aim, he tells us in his Preface, is to recount the great and marvellous deeds done by Greeks and barbarians, to preserve their fame. Opening, famously, with stories about the rape or capture of women, Io, Europa, Medea, Helen, as told to him (he says) by Persians and Phoenicians, he explicitly withholds judgement about whether these are true, but immediately contrasts what he says that he himself knows about the first man to have acted unjustly towards the Greeks, namely Croesus (*Histories* 1.5). Throughout his account he repeatedly reports alternative versions of events as he has had them from different groups of informants, sometimes siding with one group, sometimes contradicting them all, sometimes withholding judgement—although even when that is the case it is still Herodotus himself, of course, who controls the presentation of the stories in virtue of his authorial decisions as to what to include or to omit.

The detailed accounts of Egypt in Book 2 and of Scythia in Book 4 especially provide a background to the events that take place in those countries, but are elaborated for their own sakes. Those countries contain indeed many wonders (Egypt most of all: 2.35), but repeatedly the focus (as in the *Odyssey*) is on how the customs (*nomoi*) and beliefs of the people concerned differ from those of the Greeks. The chapter that opens the account of the marvels of Egypt (2.35) notes, for instance, that there women buy and sell, while men stay home and weave, and do that pushing the woof downwards, not upwards. Men carry loads on their heads, women on their shoulders. Women urinate standing, men sitting. They defecate indoors, but eat out of doors. No woman serves as a priestess to any god or goddess, but men are priests to all the gods of both sexes. Similarly in the account of the Scythians and their neighbours in Book 4, the contrasts with the Greeks include the Scythians' lack of agriculture (4.2 and 19), the burial customs of the Issedones, and the fact that among them the women have as much power as the men (4.26). The oppositions Greece–Egypt, Greece–Scythia, and Egypt–Scythia provide Herodotus, as Hartog (1998) especially demonstrated, with the principal articulating frameworks for his account of the world.

One major theme that the *Histories* drive home is, of course, the variability of *nomoi*, covering laws, customs, and conventions. The best-known and most shocking example of this is the confrontation that Herodotus says (3.38) Darius arranged between Greeks and certain Indians on the question of the disposal of the dead. The Indians are said to eat their parents (like the Issedones in 4.26), which naturally horrified the Greeks, while the Indians are equally appalled by the Greeks' practice of cremation. The historicity—or lack of it—of this anecdote does not detract from its importance as testimony for Herodotus' appreciation of the point that (as he puts it) all humans think that their own *nomoi* are best. Cambyses, Herodotus is saying, was well and truly mad to have mocked the religious customs of the Egyptians. The Darius story is cited among the many proofs there are that each people values its own customs most highly.

Custom is king, Pindar is cited as saying. And yet Herodotus is far from taking a relativistic stand himself across the board. His discussion of the gods and their names in both the Egyptian and the Scythian *logoi* is particularly revealing. On the one hand, he is well aware that there are differences in the gods of the Egyptians, Scythians, and Greeks—and in the ways they are worshipped. On the other, he is confident he can identify the *same* gods behind the diversity of their names. In the Scythian case he tells us (4.59) that the only gods they worship are Hestia, Zeus, Earth, Apollo, the Heavenly Aphrodite, Heracles, Ares, and in the case of the royal Scythians Poseidon, and he includes the Scythians' own names in the first five cases (Tabiti, Papaeus, Api, Goetosyrus, Argimpasa) and in the last (Thagimasadas).

Similarly in the Egyptian case, he first says (2.4) that he had been told by the priests at Heliopolis that the Egyptians were the first to use the names of the 'twelve

gods'. Who precisely these are is not there explained—and is the subject of some dispute among commentators—but in 2.43 we are told that Heracles was one of them. Later, in 2.50, he states that 'most of the names of the gods came to Greece from Egypt', though Poseidon and the Dioscuri are among the exceptions. As in Book 4, we are given some identifications, such as that Isis is the Greek Demeter (2.59). Obviously Herodotus does not mean that the Greeks used the same names for the gods as the Egyptians or Scythians. Rather, the point is that beneath the diversity of appellations the same divinities are being addressed.

In those differences in names Herodotus makes room for *nomos*, as he does also in the manner in which the gods are worshipped. The Scythians especially deviate from Greek norms. They only have images and altars and temples for Ares, not for any other god. In the sacrifices to the other gods the victims are slaughtered from behind, so they are not made, as Greek ones were, to bow their heads and so signify their assent to their own slaughter. The sacrifice is carried out without fire; there are no libations. The flesh of the animal is then cooked in its own stomach. Where Ares is concerned, the victims include not just beasts, but defeated enemies. Yet although Herodotus' Greek readership would be counted on to react to such practices as barbaric, no suggestion is made that there is a problem in identifying the object of this cult as the godhead the Greeks knew as Ares.

Herodotus' picture of the Egyptians and Scythians clearly reflects his own, Greek, assumptions. Those accounts are certainly not purely imaginary, but they illustrate very vividly the difficulty of the comparative study of cultures. Herodotus' Hellenocentricity has parallels that pose problems for us still. I shall return to the issue of the framework within which we can conduct our comparative analyses shortly.

But two further important points emerge from the Greek use of the *nomos/phusis* dichotomy: first the controversies over where the boundaries between them came and what values are to be attached to the two opposing terms, and secondly the exceptional nature of the dichotomy itself. The fact that, from the late fifth century BCE on, the dichotomy was widely used by writers of very different kinds did not lead to a consensus on its interpretation. Indeed, the question of where culture ends and nature begins, or conversely where nature ends and culture takes over, are disputed in a variety of fields. In connection with his discussion of the macrocephali, the Hippocratic author of *On Airs, Waters, Places* (at ch. 14) observed that what started out as a custom could end up as a part of nature. Initially the macrocephali's long heads were the result of deliberate human intervention: but in time their babies came to be born with them. (Cf. Isaac in this volume, who reflects on the consequences for Greek views of race that the line between culture and nature can be blurred in this way.) In the fourth century Theophrastus repeatedly puzzles, in his botanical treatises, over which characteristics of the cultivated plants he studies depend on human intervention, and on whether the wild or the cultivated varieties better represent the true nature of the species. His teacher, Aristotle, had been

happy enough to describe certain modes of economic exchange (barter) as natural (as opposed to the artificiality introduced by currency), and had spanned the nature/culture divide when defining human beings as *naturally* (*phusei*) political, that is polis-dwelling, animals.

The battle over the values to be associated with nature and with custom was especially intense. For some (such as Callicles, as Plato represents him), 'nature' justified the principle that in human social relations too might is right. The variation of that view which Plato puts into the mouth of Thrasymachus in *Republic* Book 1 has it that *nomoi* are the tactic the strong use to impose their view on the weak, while masking it with a veneer of legality. But for others (such as Plato himself) culture is subordinate to nature. Human lawgivers should model their codes on the work of the divine lawgiver responsible for the order, goodness, and beauty of the cosmos as a whole. For yet others, for many of the natural philosophers and medical writers especially, the domain of nature is distinct from that in which questions of right and wrong and justice and injustice arise, though it is rarely the case that nature is completely devoid of values. Aristotle, who is as keen as any thinker to distinguish 'physics' from 'ethics', uses 'nature', as we have just seen, as a normative, as much as a descriptive, term in his definition of 'human being' and often elsewhere in his zoology.

It is tempting to suppose that when the Greeks made the nature/nurture contrast explicit they were merely stating the obvious and that the distinction between the two is acknowledged, tacitly at least, by every society there has ever been. Yet such a view is open to two fundamental objections. As Descola (2005) and Viveiros de Castro (1998) have insisted, the relations between those recognized as fellow members of the group you belong to, and the creatures and spirits they interact with, are construed very differently by different societies. Animals and gods are certainly often imagined as forming societies, marrying, and practising customs similar to those of humans. In the boundary between 'us' and 'them', the 'us' sometimes includes the animals that are assumed to have wills and personalities, while the 'them' may include humans from other groups, who are not recognized as truly human. When certain spirits appear as animals, it is sometimes assumed that they have adopted their animal guise merely as a temporary 'clothing'. It is true that the pair 'nature' and 'culture' has repeatedly been invoked by anthropologists (by Lévi-Strauss especially) in their interpretations of the oppositions recognized by the societies they study. But repeatedly that turns out to be indeed interpretation, not a direct report of indigenous categories.

That takes me to my second objection. The history of the development of the explicit concept of *phusis* in ancient Greece shows clearly (so I would argue) that it often served a polemical function. We do not find that term used for 'nature' as such in either Homer or Hesiod. When it is introduced, by the natural philosophers from the sixth century BCE and the medical writers from the fifth, it is used to mark out the domain over which those authors claimed they could give, precisely,

naturalistic explanations. But that was to contrast their accounts with traditional beliefs that would have it that such phenomena as earthquakes or plagues were the work of the gods. Xenophanes insisted, for example, that what men called Iris, the rainbow (often imagined to be the messenger of the gods and the bearer of signs from heaven) was—just—a cloud (21 B32 DK). He is an authority on culture too. In his attack on anthropomorphism, he cited first the imaginary, thought-experimental, case of the gods that horses and oxen would propose (horse-like and ox-like, of course: B15), and then what he claims to be the case with the Ethiopians and Thracians, whose gods are black and snub-nosed, and blue-eyed and red-haired respectively (B16). Similarly, the writer of *On the Sacred Disease* says that that disease was no more divine than any other (all are divine because nature itself is: chs. 1 and 18 Littré), and so those who ascribed one variety of the complaint to one divinity, another to another, did not know what they were talking about. They were charlatans, exploiting the gullibility of ordinary folk.

The introduction of the explicit category of nature made a profound difference in Greece, as it served to define the area of study—the enquiry into nature—over which the naturalists claimed expertise. It is particularly striking that, as the history of both Chinese and Babylonian studies shows, enquiries into what *we* call natural phenomena could be pursued with great effectiveness without any such overarching rubric. Both those other ancient societies carried out detailed investigations into such matters as the cycles of eclipses without invoking a category of 'nature'—and indeed, in both cases, while still construing quite a number of heavenly phenomena as portentous. In China in particular the Heavens, the Earth, and Human Society form a seamless whole, each member of the triad exemplifying the same structure, the same interactions of yin and yang and the five phases. Human social relations are, indeed, the focus of much attention. But good human relations depend on and reflect cosmic order as a whole. The Emperor is the pivot on which the interrelations between the cosmic and the social domain depend. Disorder in the heavens is a sign that his Mandate is under threat. Order in government cannot be dissociated from order in the cycles of the seasons, and any disturbance in the one has repercussions on the other. Without an explicit nature/culture dichotomy, the ideological justification for existing ideas of social arrangements proceeds by representing them as directly incorporated in the cosmic dispensation.

One lesson from my brief foray into the possession or lack of an explicit concept of 'nature' is that many of the basic categories that we use, both in ancient history and in social anthropology—categories that in many cases stem from the Greeks themselves—are more problematic than we may tend to assume. This takes us to the heart of the problem of the comparative approach to the study of cultures. The philosophical or methodological difficulty may be expressed as follows. As we can see from the struggle Herodotus had to understand the Egyptian and Scythian ideas of the gods, if the observers—the historian or the anthropologist—use their own conceptual framework to interpret alien cultures, that is bound to introduce

distortions. Ideally one should use the target culture's own concepts—the actors' categories, as the anthropologists say. Yet we cannot stay with those concepts. From time to time we may transliterate a native word—like Aristotle's *to ti ēn einai* (essence), or Chinese *qi* (breath/energy)—pleading that there is no exact equivalent in English. But eventually we have to explain it and say where it fits into the conceptual schemata of which it is part. So the dilemma remains. We cannot, on pain of misrepresentation, impose our own conceptual framework. Yet sooner or later we have to have recourse to it.

Let me broaden the range of examples under discussion to illustrate the varying degrees of severity of the hermeneutic problems, proceeding from the more to the less abstract. I have noted the absence of an explicit concept of nature in China and in Mesopotamia, and should now add that the ambiguities and disagreements that I pointed to in the Greeks' own use of *phusis* make any straightforward identification with Latin *natura* or our own 'nature' more complex than I intimated. But the major issue here is whether any ancient society, Greeks included, engaged in what we call (natural) *science*. That is a particularly tricky question, given the strong positive connotations that the term 'science' has in the twenty-first century.

The first step towards clarifying the issue is to distinguish aims, on the one hand, from methods and results, on the other. Clearly the results obtained by ancient investigators often fall short of those of modern, or even of seventeenth-century, science. But then those ancient investigators did not imagine themselves exactly as 'scientists'. They were not to know what was to be the outcome of the kind of enquiries they initiated into the heavens, or the fundamental constituents of physical objects, or the structure and functioning of the human body. Yet they were certainly endeavouring to understand, to explain, and on occasion to predict, even though they entertained some uncritical ideas (we might say) about what counted as a good explanation or which predictions had a chance of success. They shared, to that extent, the *goals* of modern scientists, even if not the methods. We have to avoid teleology in our account of their work—the idea that they were trying to anticipate modern results—and yet 'science' is not a totally inappropriate term to describe what they were doing.

Similar points arise in relation to the cross-cultural study of other areas of human experience. Can we use the concepts of 'religion' and 'philosophy' as cross-cultural universals? Let me illustrate the problem by taking 'philosophy' (though 'religion' would do equally well). The dilemma here takes the following form. On the one hand, some would want to settle the definition of 'philosophy' and then see how far the existing categories of enquiries in any given culture match, or at least approximate to, it. If we start from a particular concept of philosophy as metaphysics, for instance—a concept that corresponds to the main thrust of European philosophy from the Middle Ages to the early twentieth century—we might be inclined to say that the Chinese (for example) did not do philosophy.

On the other hand, we could start from the observation that there is no consensus on what philosophy should consist of today, with very different styles and interests represented in different European countries, and indeed just within the English-speaking world. If we took as our model analytic philosophy of the type that has been dominant in England in the past few decades, then much that passed as philosophy in earlier centuries in Europe would be ruled out. If we chose rather to make ethics central, then a wider range of writers—including plenty of Chinese ones—would qualify. Since 'philosophy' and cognate terms in European natural languages remain so disputed, it seems arbitrary to follow the first route and to lay down a definition of philosophy a priori that would have the effect of excluding much western, let alone non-western, speculative thought. Yet that still leaves wide open the question of how the Chinese or the Indians construed what they were engaged in, and how they drew up the map of their various intellectual endeavours.

I shall take health and well-being and their antonyms, disease and illness, as my next examples. Modern biomedicine is able to identify the causes of many infectious and contagious diseases whose characters defied ancient doctors, whether in Egypt or Babylonia or China or Greece. We can be fairly confident, in many cases—though far from all—that ancient patients suffered from those diseases. Yet the retrospective diagnosis of ancient conditions has proved extremely elusive. Starting from their own ideas about health and disease, ancient medical writers sometimes give quite detailed accounts of individual cases which they treated. That is the case not just in the books of *Epidemics* in the Hippocratic Corpus, but also in the accounts of the patients whom the Chinese physician Chunyu Yi treated in the second century BCE (reported in ch. 105 of Sima Qian's history, the *Shiji*, itself written around 90 BCE). The Hippocratic writers were much exercised by the cycles of exacerbations and remissions in the cases they described, and that evidently corresponds to their conception that fevers can be classified as quartans, tertians, semi-tertians, and so on. Chunyu Yi has a different set of concerns, with the peccant forces that threaten to invade the patient's body, and with the disruptions in the natural movements of the *qi* (breath/energy) around it—disruptions that he detects when he takes the pulse.

One school of thought would dismiss much of what we find in ancient traditions of medicine as merely speculative and, at points, positively misguided. Yet just to match ancient ideas against modern biomedicine is to miss the point that in antiquity, for patients and healers alike, it was how the former *felt* that counted. That was a matter of illness—of not feeling well—rather than of disease, as defined by biomedicine. Of course ancient doctors endeavoured to go beyond what their patients reported about how they felt, to identify the true causes and natures of the diseases they were suffering from. But in Greece, in China, and everywhere else in the ancient world, notions of disease were part of a complex set of ideas, concerning the body and its normal and abnormal patterns of functioning, as well as about

pathogens and what made individuals liable to fall sick. Ancient medicine, in each of the ancient societies for which we have evidence, interacts with other areas of thought where notions of values and ideas of order and disorder are in play—with cosmology and, indeed, with moral philosophy. The study of Greek medicine takes us deep into Greek ideas about the person, the will, harmony, and good and evil themselves. The study of Chinese medicine similarly. Moreover, it is by juxtaposing those two studies that we can best bring to light what is distinctive about the sets of ideas in question.

It might be thought that such abstract and complex concepts as philosophy and health are exceptional, and prove particularly difficult challenges to interpretation. Yet methodological difficulties crop up even in what might seem to be far more straightforward cases, where the words in question have obvious concrete referents. When the Greeks talked of *hēlios*, we can feel confident enough of the translation 'sun'—and so too with the Chinese term *ri* (though that also means day). So too the Greek *selēnē* and *mēnē* just mean moon, though *meis*, used of the crescent moon, more usually means month, just as Chinese *yue* is used both for moon and for month. Yet even in such comparatively straightforward instances the symbolic associations of the terms may vary, not just as between one natural language and another, but even as between one author using that language and another.

Problems of precise translation, capturing the nuances of speech-acts, always arise. Yet it is important to appreciate that these are of varying degrees of difficulty. When we puzzle over how to compare 'philosophy' and 'health' across cultures, or how to translate *to ti ēn einai* and *qi*, we may be tempted to conclude that the problem is impossible—that there is no contact between one conceptual framework and another, and we must accept a radical incommensurability between them that blocks interpretation. This too is a tricky issue, where disambiguation is badly needed. First the major concession must be made. There is never a perfect translation, in the sense of an exact one-to-one correspondence between a sentence in one context in one language and a sentence in another context in another. The variety of symbolic associations that I have mentioned militates against that—as do the differences in the pragmatics of speech-acts. The contexts are never exactly the same: even to repeat the same sentence is to introduce a difference, since the repeated sentence is just that, a repetition. Besides, different readers and listeners will bring to their understanding of communicative acts their own distinctive assumptions and interpretations.

Yet none of that means that languages are hermetically sealed off from one another, that the barriers to communication preclude *any* degree of comprehension or any way in which we may move from a vaguer to a fuller understanding of what is meant. The problem of translation *between* languages is just a rather more severe case of the problem that already exists in understanding communications *within* a single natural language, given the differences between speakers/listeners and contexts that I have mentioned. But, while no understanding is perfect, and

while with complex sets of abstract ideas understanding often defeats us, it is salutary to remind ourselves that there are grades and grades of such difficulty. The persevering can hope to use the lower rungs of the ladder to make progress towards the higher.

Where does this leave the comparative study of ancient cultures? Herodotus is both a warning and an inspiration. He is a warning for the reasons I have given: his picture of the other societies he discusses is shot through with Hellenic assumptions and preoccupations. His accounts of other cultures suffer from being geared so often to his concerns with Greece. Yet at the same time he is an inspiration in virtue of the very fact that it is by way of attempting comparisons that he hopes to gain insight into his own society itself. We too can share the ambition to learn about ourselves by studying ancient cultures, even if we should focus more resolutely than he may sometimes have done on the need to use those other societies to unmask the idiosyncrasies of our own. The study of cultures whose history and institutions differed radically from those we are used to is the best and the easiest way to rid ourselves of parochial assumptions concerning the naturalness or the inevitability of the development of western thought.

Suggested Reading

In addition to the items mentioned in the text, see Detienne and Vernant (1989), Lévi-Strauss (1970), Lloyd (2002 and 2004), Lloyd and Sivin (2002).

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CHAPTER 53

POSTCOLONIALISM

EMILY GREENWOOD

53.1. Prelude: 'Our Greece'

The ambivalence that surrounds Hellenism in anti-colonial and post-colonial contexts is neatly illustrated by a quotation from the famous essay 'Our America' (1891) by the Cuban revolutionary José Martí (1853–95), who advocated and fought for Cuban independence from Spain. In the course of expounding his vision of a hybrid American society and educational system that would reflect the diversity of the Americas (i.e. not just North America), Martí has recourse to the emotive power of Greece as a symbol of Old World civilization and as the possession of a social elite (Martí 1977: 88): 'To know one's country and govern it with that knowledge is the only way to free it from tyranny. The European university must bow to the American university. The history of America, from the Incas to the present, must be taught in clear detail and to the letter, even if the archons of Greece are overlooked. Our Greece must take priority over the Greece which is not ours. We need it more.' The dry topic 'the archons of Greece' is used synecdochically to stand for the imposition of foreign syllabuses on students in the Americas. However, what strikes me about this passage is the contradictory rejection of and simultaneous dependence on 'Greece'. In the same way that Martí reconfigures America in his own image ('Our America'), Greece is also assimilated into this new ideology ('Our Greece'), showing the extent to which it was and is viewed as a cultural site worth retaining ('we need it more'). Martí's formula, 'Our Greece must take priority over the Greece which is not ours', also contains the realization that there is no unmediated Greece: the Greece that has been transmitted in scholarship and popular culture is subject to ideologies of race, class, sex, and nationality. Martí's ambivalent strategy of rejecting

and then expropriating Greece has been repeated in the works of many writers from nations that were formerly colonized. For instance, one might cite Wole Soyinka's complex engagement with Greek tragedy and mythology in the context of indigenous Nigerian drama and religious worship (Soyinka 1976: chs. 1 and 2; for comments see Budelmann 2005: 133–6). Soyinka rejects a received 'European' view of Greek tragedy but embraces a revised interpretation of Greek tragedy that sees it in relation to Nigerian drama and myth.

53.2. Locating Postcolonialism

The focus of this chapter is the dialogue between Hellenic studies and Postcolonial studies and the theoretical and methodological implications of post-colonial theory for Hellenic studies. Given the scope of this chapter, I can only hope to offer a brief series of observations about the intersections between these fields and the direction of current research. It is also beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a representative overview of postcolonial theory, which is in effect an ever-changing constellation of different theories that span several disciplines. In its current meaning, the term post-colonialism/postcolonialism began to circulate in the late 1970s. Although the term is found prior to this, in earlier uses it was used as a term of periodization to distinguish between 'pre-' and 'post-'independence phases in the histories of ex-colonies.

Much of the energy of contemporary postcolonial debate clusters around the prepositional prefix 'post', which serves as a good point of entry into the field. In the hyphenated form of this term, the 'post-' in post-colonialism can be interpreted in a temporal or an epistemological sense (see Shohat 1992). The chief objection to the temporal inflection is that, notwithstanding the tremendous significance of the independence movements and the multiple decolonizations of the twentieth century (Lazarus 2004*b*: 33–4), colonialism still persists in a variety of ways. Most obviously, there are still countries, such as the French overseas departments, which have colonial status even though they are not colonies in name. Add to this the phenomenon of neo-colonialism, or what we might more accurately call neo-imperialism, where ex-colonies continue to be exploited economically by the dominant economies of (former) imperial powers, ranging from the dependency on First World markets in cash-crop economies to the unequal distribution of so-called 'global' capitalism or globalization. Colonialism also persists in chauvinistic and racist attitudes towards other cultures—attitudes that often have their origins in the experience of imperialism, hence the topics of race and immigration also fall within the orbit of postcolonial studies.

There is another sense in which the temporal sense of the 'post' rankles with postcolonial theorists: as Anne McClintock argued in a widely cited essay, the

preposition 'post' reduces the history of ex-colonies to *colonial* history: 'Other cultures share only a chronological, prepositional relation to a Euro-centred epoch that is over (post-), or not yet begun (pre-)' (McClintock 1994: 255). Conversely, the epistemological inflection in 'post' signals a decisive critical shift in the study of imperialism and colonialism, marking an intellectual phase in which colonialism and its systems of thought are renounced and critiqued.

The discipline of Classics has an important contribution to make to the theorization of postcolonialism. Ika Willis reminds us that modern European history has often regarded the empire and civilization of Rome as synonymous with History (Willis 2007: 346, drawing on Kennedy 1999: 26); consequently, the Roman Empire never ends because it is implicated in the systems of cultural transmission that perpetuate European culture—which Willis cleverly describes as a 'postal' system, playing on the disputed prefix in postcolonialism (Willis 2007, *passim*). According to this argument, the very forms of thought that we use to conceptualize the field of postcolonialism perpetuate not just the structures of modern imperialism but the continuing authority of Rome's cultural empire. Willis' argument about the logic of Rome's cultural hegemony has implications for our understanding of the ways in which Hellenism is affirmed and contested in debates about both colonialism and postcolonialism.

It is conventional to use the unhyphenated form 'postcolonialism' to gesture towards the unease that surrounds the preposition. However, hyphen or no hyphen, the prefix remains intact and the question is not so easily dodged. For the purposes of this chapter I construe postcolonialism as a broad discipline that combines the study of colonialism as an economic and political phenomenon, with the study of colonial discourses and ways of knowledge. I take the 'post', in both the hyphenated and unhyphenated forms, to signal the critical study of colonialism in hindsight as well as the ongoing transition for both colonized and colonizers away from colonialism (see Hall 1996: 246–7). It is important to stress that postcolonial critics theorize the after-effects of empire on *both* former colonies *and* former colonial powers. In the past two decades postcolonial theory has focused increasingly on the deconstruction of colonialism as a system of knowledge. Whereas traditionally it was assumed that colonialism was a form of cultural agency and representation that flowed in one direction, with the colonizers describing the colonized the better to rule and exploit them, contemporary postcolonial theory insists on the discursive nature of colonial knowledge whereby the colonizers also have their representation shaped by the peoples whom they colonize (see e.g. Said 1993; Gikandi 1996; Bhabha 2004).

The debate about terminology reflects a deeper tension in Postcolonial studies. On the one hand are the more literary-minded theorists, who derive their postcolonialism from poststructuralism and who focus on the texts of colonialism and postcolonialism. On the other hand are those theorists who derive their postcolonialism from Marxist theories of culture or, more rarely, Marxist historical

materialism. For the latter, the most pressing questions are material and historical questions about colonialism and imperialism. The latter take issue with the centrality of poststructuralism in postcolonial theory, and argue that postcolonialism's radical, critical force is weakened by the fact that the knowledge it proclaims is the esoteric possession of a few scholars in (primarily) European and North American universities. (See e.g. Ahmad 1992, and Dirlik 1994. For a recent critical discussion of the 'institutionalization' of postcolonial studies see Parry 2004.) However, in practice very little contemporary postcolonial criticism reflects this rigid division; on the contrary, it is more often the case that postcolonial critics span and reconcile these opposing traditions (Edward Said, Robert Young, and Gayatri Spivak are three 'big name' critics of whom this can be said). I note here that the poststructuralist wing does not have the monopoly on jargon-ridden obscurity, and that postcolonial theory as a whole is extremely inaccessible to the victims of empire and colonialism in whose name it notionally exists.

53.3. Hellenic Studies and Postcolonial Studies in Dialogue

It is not obvious that Hellenic studies and Postcolonial studies have much in common. In fact, not only do the two disciplines not appear to have much in common, but they are sometimes regarded as mutually antagonistic/exclusive. Through false genealogies and cultural traditions masked as historical continuities, ancient Greece is often carelessly and erroneously linked with modern Europe, as though they shared a single, continuous history (see the salutary observations of Harrison 2000: 41–2, and Stam and Shohat 2005: 297). Although Greece may have given us the word 'Europe', as well as the idea of Europe as a geographical massif, and the cultural construct of Europe as distinct from Asia, ancient Greek conceptions of Europe do not correspond to present-day conceptions of Europe. And yet, insofar as 'Greece' makes it into contemporary postcolonial theory at all, it tends to be carelessly subsumed in loose, totalizing descriptors such as: 'the West', 'European cultural heritage', 'European history', 'European imperium', 'western history', 'western culture', 'western imperium', 'western episteme', 'occidental knowledge', or, even more loosely, phrases such as 'the imperial tradition' or 'the colonial archive'. Given the importance that postcolonial theorists place on due attention to difference and contextualization, it is ironic that such loose, totalizing terms which elide vast historical and cultural differences should be bandied around in Postcolonial studies.

These diffuse phrases can be found both in polemical treatises and in works of theoretical sophistication. As an example, I cite a passage from Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o's book *Decolonising the Mind*. Reflecting on the colonial education that he received as

a boy in Kenya, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o lists the following canon of 'European literature' (1986: 91; emphasis mine): 'First was the great humanist and democratic tradition of European literature: Aeschylus, Sophocles, Shakespeare, Balzac, Dickens, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Gorky and Brecht, to mention just a few names. But *their* literature, even at its most humane and universal, necessarily reflected the European experience of history.' The pronoun *their* and the concept of a monolithic European literature pose important questions about the position of ancient Greece in colonial and postcolonial discourses.

There are, of course, reasonable explanations for the identification of 'ancient Greece' with 'Europe' in postcolonial literature and theory. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries European colonizers appropriated the civilizational authority of Greece and/or Rome, leading later critics to align these civilizations with modern European colonialism. We can see this process of assimilation in operation in Thomas Macaulay's infamous 'Minute on Indian Education' of 1835, which effects a subtle shift: from justifying the cultural value of English literature through comparison with surviving Greek literature (English literature 'abounds with works of imagination *not inferior* to the noblest which Greece has bequeathed to us'), to supplanting the culture of ancient Greece with that of England ('The literature of England is now more valuable than that of classical antiquity', Macaulay 1995: 428–9). If we take the British Empire as an example, it is clear that the discipline of Classics colluded with imperialism (see Goff 2005*b*: 6–19; Harrison 2005; Vasunia 2005*a*, *b*).

The intervention of Classics in the administration of empire is an obvious example of the collusion between Classics and colonialism, but there are subtler examples even in what we might term 'postcolonial Classics'. A good example of the persistence of Classics in colonial legacies can be found in studies of Derek Walcott's long poem *Omeros* (Walcott 1990). There has been much scholarly debate about the Homeric allusions and wide-ranging Hellenic analogies in this work. Many critics have viewed Walcott's turn to Greece as a turn that restricts the poem's radical force. In a recent discussion of the poem Natalie Melas reminds us that 'Hellenism is a classic topos of colonial cultural assimilation' (Melas 2005: 154).

However, I would contend that although the topos of Hellenism has been freighted with European cultural chauvinism in the past, this topos has been revisited and challenged by postcolonial critics who have found ways of freeing ancient Greek literature and culture from the colonial contexts in which they first encountered them. Long before *Omeros*, Walcott referred programmatically to 'our Homer' in the poem 'Roots' (Walcott 1962: 60), perhaps echoing Martí's slogan 'our Greece' (quoted above). In an article on the reception of Greek tragedy in anti- and postcolonial drama in West Africa and the Caribbean, Lorna Hardwick has observed that: 'Some of these [post-colonial dramatists and poets] have, in their creative work, stripped away easy assumptions about the "Western identity" of ancient Greek culture. In this sense I would argue that Greek drama has not

only been a decolonizing force, it has itself been decolonized' (Hardwick 2004: 242). Following Hardwick, I would argue that to focus on the historical collusion between Classics and imperialism risks obscuring the ways in which contemporary postcolonial readings of Greek history and culture have decolonized Greece as an object of knowledge, liberating it from an anachronistic Eurocentric framework.

From the other direction, postcolonial theory has so far had a limited impact on Hellenic studies, where its influence has been felt in the sub-disciplines of classical reception and ancient Greek cultural history. Within the field of classical reception, the past decade has witnessed important work on the politics and poetics of postcolonial adaptations of Greek drama, chiefly in South and West Africa, but also in Caribbean and African-American contexts (see Hardwick and Gillespie 2007; Okpewho 1991; McDonald 2000; Hardwick 2000: 97–235, 2003: 110–11, 2004, 2005, 2006; Wetmore 2002, 2003; Budelmann 2005, 2006; and Goff and Simpson 2007). Another emerging field of research explores the imprint of empire on the discipline of Classics. Thomas Harrison has examined the historiography of the Athenian Empire in light of classicists' experiences of the British Empire (Harrison 2005), while Phiroze Vasunia has analysed the converse relationship: the uses of Classics in the active government of the empire (Vasunia 2005*a*, *b*).

In studies of the cultural history of ancient Greece the connection with postcolonial studies is seldom explicit, but nonetheless many of the discussions on topics such as imperialism and cultural identity run parallel to analyses of these topics in Postcolonial studies, sometimes through common engagement with disciplines such as cultural anthropology (see e.g. Goldhill 2001 on constructions of Greekness in the Roman Empire). In some cases the connections between Hellenic studies and Postcolonial studies can be traced to specific works. A good example of this are two books by Edward Said, *Orientalism* (Said 1995, originally published in 1978), and *Culture and Imperialism* (Said 1993), which have helped to shape research on cultural identity and the politics of cultural representation in the ancient Greek and Roman worlds.

53.4. Case-Studies from Herodotus (1): Herodotus' Scythians and the *Aporia* of the Colonized

I want to develop the dialogue between Classics and postcolonialism by considering two passages in Herodotus, both from the Scythian *logos* in Book 4 of the *Histories*. The two passages I have chosen suggest areas where the interpretation of ancient

Greek texts converges with postcolonial theory, offering opportunities for collaboration.

In the first passage (*Histories* 4.46), Herodotus professes admiration for the Scythians' ability to resist invasions of their territory. The context of this resistance is interesting because the Scythians, as they are portrayed in Herodotus' account, could also be said to be subject to the 'forces of unequal cultural representation' (this phrase is taken from Bhabha 2004: 245). François Hartog has theorized the Scythians' nomadism as a counter-strategy against imperialism. Hartog describes how the Scythian way of life is 'defined through an accumulation of negatives' (most of which constitute the inverse of Greek cultural practice), and how this is turned around through the institution of nomadism, which makes a strategic advantage out of an apparent lack of civilization (Hartog 1988: 204). Pascal Payen—a former doctoral student of Hartog's—has analysed Herodotus' interest in nomadic insularity as a strategy for resistance at even greater length. Payen argues that, in the case of the nomadic Scythians, *aporia* (a Greek noun which is predominantly passive in meaning: 'lack of means', 'lack of access', 'failure of resources'), with its corresponding verb *aporein* ('to lack resources', 'to be at a loss'), emerges as a positive quality. Because the Scythians lack the culture of their enemy (in this instance the enemy is the Persian Empire of Darius), the enemy lacks the means to deal with them (Payen 1997: 297–300), hence their *aporia* is a source of strength.

Herodotus' representation of the Scythians' *aporia* as an evasive, passive-aggressive strategy for resisting conquest may help us to clarify the trope of strategic nothingness in some postcolonial literatures, where the alleged lack of history and cultural achievement that has been put upon the colonized by various colonial discourses is assumed, pre-emptively, as a positive possession. This aporetic trope is most common in the so-called 'New World', where the colonizers wiped out the indigenous cultures and did their best to erase and humiliate the native cultures of the enslaved populations whom they transported from Africa, as well as the cultures of the indentured labourers who were transported from India in the nineteenth century.

A pervasive trope in colonial discourse is the claim that the colonized lack history and culture. In fact, the trope goes that the colonized are 'nothing' without the civilizing mission of the colonizers, who work with a supposedly blank canvas. This trope surfaces in diverse texts: witness, for example, Hegel's dismissal of Africa in his *Introduction to the Philosophy of World Literature*, first published in 1837 and based on lectures that Hegel gave in Berlin in the period 1822–31, in which he opined that Africa 'has no historical interest of its own, for we find its inhabitants living in barbarism and savagery in a land which has not furnished them with any integral ingredient of culture' (Hegel 1975: 174). Hegel's ignorant arrogance is matched by that of the Victorian scholar James Anthony Froude. In his travel account of the West Indies, first published in 1887, Froude dismissed the entire Caribbean with the statement that: 'There are no people

here in the true sense of the word' (Froude 1888: 306). This colonial refrain has been repeated by the Trinidadian author V. S. Naipaul in the self-contradicting remark that 'nothing has ever been created in the West Indies' (Naipaul 1962: 20). In colonial texts, this 'lack' of history and culture is often 'demonstrated' by the lack of any 'contact' between ancient Greece and the colonized culture in question.

In postcolonial literature the trope of the colony as blank canvas has been turned back on the former colonial powers and the ideal of civilization in which their power was enshrined. For example, in his seminal *Notebook of a Return to My Native Land* (*Cahier d'un retour au pays natal*, first published in 1939), the poet Aimé Césaire turns the colonized world's lack of hegemonic civilization—of which the symptoms are exploration and conquest, or exploration with a view to conquest—into a proclamation of victory (Césaire 1983: 68–9):

> Eia for those who have never invented anything
> for those who have never explored anything
> for those who have never conquered anything.

While there is a compelling dialogue to be had between Herodotus' Scythian *logos* and postcolonial theories of cultural representation, it is not easy to trace the flow of ideas in this dialogue. Is this Herodotus, and francophone Herodotean scholarship, 'clarifying' postcolonial theory, or does it work the other way? Commenting on the phenomenon of nomadism in travel literature, Mary Baine Campbell relates Hartog's preoccupation with the nomadism of the Scythians to French poststructuralist theory, which cherishes the nomad as a symbol of wandering and exile (Campbell 2002: 267–8). However, this connection further complicates the flow of ideas. The ideal of nomadic resistance may flow into Herodotean scholarship from Derrida, but in view of Derrida's extensive reading of ancient Greek literature, it may also flow the other way.

53.5. Case-Studies from Herodotus (2): Herodotus' Ambivalent Ethnography

In this second reading of Herodotus, I want to re-examine an aspect of Herodotus' ethnographic rhetoric. Recent scholarship has rightly challenged and modified the thesis that Herodotus' *Histories* operate a Hellenocentric bias that reduces the representation of other cultures to a series of binary oppositions (e.g. Chamberlain 2001; Moyer 2002). I would like to end by analysing another passage from Herodotus' Scythian *logos* for signs of ambivalence in Herodotus' rhetoric of ethnography.

As a general premise, the Hellenocentrism of Herodotus' account is indisputable, but there are significant gaps and moments of doubt in this Hellenocentrism. In the passage in question, Herodotus attempts to illustrate the landscape of Scythia by evoking geographical landscapes which Greek audiences are presumed to be familiar with. Drawing on postcolonial theory's understanding of the mutually transformative juxtapositions involved in empire, I want to suggest that Herodotus' use of the figure of similitude in this passage is deeply ambivalent. The analogy between the geography of Attica and Scythia can be seen to put Greece at the centre of the world, but it can also be seen to displace Greece by stressing its position in relation to other lands (*Histories*, 4.99.4–5, trans. de Sélincourt):

> For Scythia is bounded on two sides by two different seas, one to the south, the other to the east, much as Attica is; and the position of the Tauri in Scythia is—if I may compare small things with great—*as if* the promontory of Sunium from Thoricus to Anaphlystus in Attica projected rather further into the sea and were inhabited by some race other than the Athenians. Or, to give a different illustration for the benefit of those who have not sailed along this bit of the Attic coast, it *is as if* some race other than the present inhabitants were to draw a line between the port of Brundisium and Tarentum in Iapygia, and occupy the promontory seaward of it.

A key feature of this passage is the construction 'as if' (ὡς εἰ), introducing a hypothetical analogy. François Hartog and Rosaria Vignolo Munson have both discussed this construction in Herodotus' ethnography (Hartog 1988: 225–30, esp. 228; Munson 2001: 82–6). Hartog notes that Herodotus uses such constructions to 'contain' and 'control' difference, as he moves between the world familiar to Hellenic audiences and distant, different worlds, while Munson describes this relational process as Herodotus' 'active pursuit of the similar' (Hartog 1988: 228; Munson 2001: 82). As Hartog notes, Herodotus' comparisons are often far-fetched, comparing unlike with unlike; in such cases, Hartog argues that what is at work is not so much translation or transition, but rather transposition (Hartog 1988: 226–7). What the audience sees by way of this particular analogy is not the landscape of Scythia, but instead the landscape of Attica.

We might object that Herodotus is not entirely parochial, and that his rhetoric of the familiar concedes that his work addresses audiences with different geographical points of reference ('For the benefit of those who have not sailed along this bit of the Attic coast . . .'). However, Hartog prefers to interpret this statement as Herodotus showing off his knowledge, using a formula familiar from the geographical genre of the *periplous* (description of lands based on coastal circumnavigation), rather than as Herodotus responding to geocultural diversity (Hartog 1988: 228–9). I would like to modify this image of Herodotus' Hellenocentric approach to the Scythians by pointing out the subtle provocation of Greek audiences in this passage. Herodotus' flirtation with the notion of Attica being inhabited by some race other than the famously autochthonous Athenians hints at the geo-historical limits of culture and

empire. Rather than simply affirming the position of Greece at the centre of the known world, Herodotus' relational geography leaves things open to doubt: Athens may not always be inhabited by Athenians, and Greece may not always be 'ours'.

Suggested Reading

Classics and Postcolonialism is a new area of research. There are now two wide-ranging collections of essays that serve as a good general introduction to the field and raise questions for further research: Goff (2005*a*) and Hardwick and Gillespie (2007). In contrast, the bibliography on postcolonial theory is massive. One route through this bibliography is via some of the canonical works that have come to define this disciplinary field. A good starting-point is the two works by Edward Said referred to in the text: Said (1993 and 1995), followed by Ahmad (1992) and Bhabha (2004)—both of whom enter into critical dialogue with Said and develop and complicate the former's analysis. For a critical historical analysis of the theories behind postcolonial theory the reader should consult Young (2004), as well as Spivak (1999). In addition to these canonical texts, there are a number of studies that offer a more accessible overview of the field. Loomba (1998) is an intelligent and highly readable study of colonial discourse and postcolonial theory, and can be read in conjunction with the essays in Lazarus (2004*a*) as an introduction to postcolonial theory. For a recent reflection on the present and future of postcolonial theory, the reader is referred to the collection Loomba *et al.* (2005).

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CHAPTER 54

DEMOGRAPHY AND SOCIOLOGY

WALTER SCHEIDEL

54.1. INTRODUCTION

DEMOGRAPHY and sociology share a focus on group behaviour: while demography is concerned with the structure and development of human populations that are governed by collective reproductive practices and environmental factors, sociology deals more generally with all forms of social behaviour, institutions, and organization. Several other academic disciplines belong in the same category, most notably anthropology, economics, political science, and social psychology: any formal demarcations between these fields are necessarily arbitrary. Demography and sociology study fundamental features of human existence in groups—the historically specific properties of reproductive relations and other social interactions—that shaped the Greek world just as they shape the present. In principle, therefore, the value of systematic, 'disciplined' means of studying these issues can hardly be in doubt. Even so, the formal approaches and methods of current demography or sociology have only rarely been applied to any aspect of Hellenic studies. Conventional disciplinary boundaries and normative preferences for 'humanistic' perspectives are the most obvious culprits. For this reason, even a very brief survey of the contribution of Population studies and sociology must be (at least) as much prospective as retrospective in nature.

54.2. Demography

Ancient Greek population history has long been studied with scant appreciation for the questions and methods that drive demographic study of the more recent past: thus, most of the nearly 1,300 items of pertinent classical scholarship referenced by Corvisier and Suder (1996) are more antiquarian than analytical. Since the 1960s it has mostly been experts of Roman rather than Greek history who have been seeking to connect the study of ancient populations to contemporary historical demography. Moreover, progress has been impeded by the extreme scarcity of 'hard' data. In terms both of the nature of the evidence and the principal research questions, the demography of the ancient Greek world falls into discrete halves that have only little in common. Pre-hellenistic population history lacks primary documentary sources, and even the most basic properties of structural features such as mortality, fertility, or family structure are almost completely hidden from our view. Work on this period has been dominated by big questions about size and distribution: the protracted secular cycle of demographic contraction, recovery, and net growth from about 1200 to 300 BCE; the spread of Hellenism across the inner seas of western Eurasia; and the balance of population within the Greek polis. From the third century BCE, by contrast, we gain sporadic access to samples of quantifiable documentary data for the Greek, or 'Hellenized', population of Egypt which provide unique insight into family and household composition, and allow a shift in focus from size to structure. However oversimplified, this elementary distinction between Greek population history before and after *c.*300 BCE captures the main trends in this field, and is unlikely to be eroded by future discoveries.

Greek population history, in much the same way as Greek and indeed eastern Mediterranean history in general, is characterized by a conspicuous downturn in the twelfth century BCE that entailed substantial losses in social complexity and—it appears—population number. The probable underlying causes—from invasions to economic stress, climate change, and even earthquakes—are only poorly understood and continue to be debated. (Cf. Chew 2005 for a broad perspective.) The subsequent recovery process was gradual but very prolonged, resulting in some 500–600 years of population growth—well into the classical period—that raised eventual population size considerably above previous levels. Comparable phases of net demographic growth in the wake of contractions can be observed in western Europe from *c.*1000 to 1300 CE and in the sixteenth century (Scheidel 2003: 121–6). In this context, however, the Greek expansion stands out for its unusual duration and the fact that, for much if not all of this period, it was accompanied by substantial improvements in per capita consumption (Morris 2004, 2005). Taken together, these developments raise two important questions. First, we must ask which configuration of social and political institutions was capable of sustaining centuries of parallel demographic and economic growth (see esp.

Morris 2004; Morris and Manning 2005: 149–51). Such 'efflorescences' are rare in world history (Goldstone 2002) and require careful comparative analysis that situates ancient Greek history in a global matrix of historical preconditions and outcomes. Secondly, neo-Malthusian population theory predicts—and comparative evidence documents—that in pre-modern systems of production, ongoing population growth will eventually outstrip increases in economic performance and cause demographic pressures that precipitate political instability. This general model, which is increasingly well supported by evidence from a variety of historical periods (Goldstone 1991; Turchin 2003), has yet to be systematically employed to improve our understanding of the ultimate causes of endemic Greek inter-state and intra-community conflict from the 430s BCE onwards.

Starting in the eighth century BCE, demographic expansion within the Aegean coincided with Greek overseas settlement and considerable growth in these settler populations. Given the long duration of this process, it is theoretically possible to reconcile the assumption of relatively low mean rates of migration with the existence of large settler populations in the classical period (Scheidel 2003: 131–5). This suggests that emigration need not have significantly curtailed net population growth in most parts of the Aegean. Moreover, these centrifugal movements were almost certainly exceeded by (mostly later) centripetal transfers of slaves: while this influx remains impervious to more than speculative quantification, it reveals persistent demand for labour in the face of indigenous population growth, which in turn underscores the vigour of economic development in the original core area of Greek civilization. Once again, this observation raises profound questions about the performance capacity of Greek economies and casts serious doubt on minimalist models. It also highlights the need to study demographic and economic history together, a fundamental premise that has long been embraced by historians of later periods but is still disregarded by most students of antiquity (Scheidel 2007).

In addition, demographic development needs to be properly contextualized within the wider sphere of ecology and environmental history: population change is inextricably intertwined with climatic shifts, the distribution of crop species, and the ever-changing prevalence of pathogens. Unfortunately, over the past fifteen years Robert Sallares' pioneering attempt to advance the worthy cause of transdisciplinary historical ecology has failed to spur comparable initiatives among Greek historians (Sallares 1991). In the meantime new types of data have become available: biomolecular evidence in particular holds considerable promise (e.g. Sallares, Bouwman, and Anderung 2004).

The Greek demographic expansion of the archaic and classical periods resulted in the proliferation of a particular mode of socio-political organization, the polis. Over 1,000 known poleis came to form the largest city-state culture in world history (Hansen 2000; Hansen and Nielsen 2004; cf. Redfield in this volume). Extrapolating from the known surface areas of walled cities and probable city–countryside ratios, Hansen (2006) reckons there were at least 7.5 million (possibly, though less

plausibly, up to 10 million) 'Greeks' in the fourth century BCE. This number exceeds earlier estimates in part because it includes Epirotes, Macedonians, and more generally all inhabitants of polis-style settlements. However, global estimates of gross population-totals entangle demography in complex problems of defining ethnicity: to a large degree, it is our verdict on who counts as 'Greek' that determines the final tally.

The population size of individual polities has traditionally received greater attention. The case of classical Athens is by far the most prominent example. All modern estimates are extrapolated from the putative number of adult male citizens: however, as even this starting-point is subject to considerable controversy, the addition of family members, resident aliens, and slaves merely compounds our uncertainty and inevitably yields a wide range of competing totals (Scheidel, in Garnsey 1998: 195–200). As a result, the extent of Athens' dependence on imported foodstuffs remains obscure, which in turn undermines attempts to assess levels of economic performance and market exchange. Archaeological research has done little to solve these problems: by themselves, field surveys cannot reveal absolute population numbers or the scale of relative changes in density, and perforce rely on extraneous assumptions to yield even rough 'guesstimates' (Osborne 2004). While variation in the frequency of rural habitation may arguably be linked to changes in security regimes and population pressure, it remains impervious to demographic quantification. By contrast, demographic study of urban remains holds greater promise. In the most general terms, the physical size of Greek towns suggests that, by world-historical standards, Greek settlement in the classical period was unusually nucleated and a comparatively small proportion of polis members appear to have resided in small villages, hamlets, or dispersed farmsteads (Hansen 2006). Together with the prolonged duration of the archaic and classical demographic expansion, this nucleation bias may be the most noteworthy characteristic of ancient Greek population history: as Hansen (2004) observes, this allows us to identify Greek poleis as what Max Weber had called *Ackerbürgerstädte* ('farmer-citizen towns'), with all the social and political ramifications this would have entailed. It is in this area that demographic information is critical to our understanding of historically specific cultural development.

Unlike these macro-demographic features, fundamental problems, from mortality and fertility rates to family and household structures, have occupied a marginal position in contemporary scholarship, for the simple reason that they tend to be almost completely unknown. Attempts to derive vital statistics from literary or epigraphic sources are invariably doomed to failure, and contextual information permits only crude inferences. It would be easy, yet unrewarding, to burden this chapter with pertinent examples from recent scholarship. Luckily for modern observers, the fog begins to lift once we reach the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Official documents in Greek and Demotic, mostly tax lists and census returns, shed some light on the age structure, marital and reproductive practices, and household

composition of some elements of the population of Egypt under Macedonian and Roman rule. In this area, Bagnall and Frier's pioneering demographic study of the census returns of Roman Egypt in the first three centuries CE (Bagnall and Frier 1994; Bagnall, Frier, and Rutherford 1997; cf. Scheidel 2001: 118–80) has more recently been complemented by the publication and analysis of extensive tax registers from the third-century BCE Fayyum (Clarysse and Thompson 2006). In addition, Greek and Coptic epitaphs have been used to explore seasonal patterns of mortality and the underlying disease environment (Scheidel 2001: 1–117). This kind of evidence permits us to relate findings from ancient population history to the historical demography of the more recent past, and pushes the time horizon of Mediterranean population studies back into the Hellenistic period. It also enables scholars to ground debates in quantifiable data rather than probabilistic and ultimately untestable assumptions (for instance, about the representative nature of literary testimonies, or the meaning of surface scatter). Unfortunately, this kind of evidence is in notoriously short supply, and few if any additional breakthroughs are to be expected on this front. The recent surge in the presentation and sophisticated interpretation of pertinent data may well have taken us much closer to the limits of the demographic study of ancient populations. Future progress will depend on computer simulations of demographic processes to assess the logical implications and the relative plausibility of competing historical claims, and above all on biomolecular studies of ancient human remains as well as of contemporary populations that will help elucidate past migration patterns.

54.3. Sociology

Compared to demography, sociology is far less constrained in its choice of evidence and research questions, and consequently holds considerable promise for many aspects of Hellenic studies. Defined as the study of human behaviour in its collective aspects and the resultant social interactions, institutions, and organizations, sociology was first conceived as a distinct area of enquiry in the nineteenth century, and firmly established within the arena of academic discourse by luminaries such as Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, and Max Weber. Abandoning the initial quest for universal laws of social relations and developments, the discipline has long since fissioned into a growing variety of complementary or competing approaches and—like current anthropology—lacks not only a unifying paradigm but even the most basic consensus on core questions or methods (e.g. Turner 2001*a*). As once-dominant approaches such as conflict theory (focusing on the role of conflict in social change), structural-functional theory (concerned with the function of observed phenomena within larger social

systems), and symbolic interaction theory (concerned with the means of creating shared systems of meaning) have been subsumed within, or supplemented by, the proliferation of different analytical categories designed for interpretive readings, students of ancient Greek civilization who are curious about the potential contribution of sociological approaches to their own work face a somewhat confusing smorgasbord of theoretical options.

Despite—or perhaps also because of?—this plethora of choices, scholarly interaction between Hellenic studies and sociology has long been minimal. It is true that both Marx and Weber started out as classical scholars and drew liberally on ancient evidence in their later sociological works. However, the subsequent gradual speciation of disciplines curtailed further cross-fertilization: Durkheim's student Louis Gernet, an eminent historian of ancient Greek law (e.g. Gernet 1981; cf. Humphreys 1978: 76–106), and later—albeit in the field of Roman history—Keith Hopkins, who held chairs in both sociology and ancient history, remain the principal exceptions. In recent decades professional sociologists have only rarely ventured into Hellenic studies: notable instances include Alvin Gouldner's study of Plato's contribution to social theory (Gouldner 1965), Walter Runciman's 'comparative sociology' of the long-term viability of the Greek polis (Runciman 1990), and Joseph Bryant's sociology of Greek ethics that explores the social context of creativity (Bryant 1996).

Historical sociology, a branch of sociology that utilizes historical evidence for the purpose of establishing, applying, and testing more general theories through systematic comparison and causal analysis (Delanty and Isin 2003), has been somewhat more amenable to the incorporation of material from the ancient Greek world. The two best-known examples are Michael Mann's comparative study of the configurations of social power in various ancient and later societies including Greece (Mann 1986: esp. 195–230), and Orlando Patterson's attempt to link the birth of 'freedom' to the Hellenic institution of chattel slavery (Patterson 1991: 45–199). Robert Bellah will likewise include ancient Greece in a forthcoming study of religious change in the 'Axial Age' (cf. Bellah 2005). In all these cases, particular aspects of ancient Greek civilization are explicitly compared to corresponding features of other historical entities and interpreted within overarching conceptual or analytical templates that are meant to generate insights about broader patterns and causal relationships. In a sense, this approach is antithetical to the notion of Hellenic studies that privileges a single historical period and place: historical sociologists are interested not so much in the ancient Greeks per se as in their location within more general historical models. This may be one of the reasons why professional scholars of antiquity, traditionally firmly anchored in their own area of expertise, have by and large failed to become involved in this line of enquiry.

For most classicists, the use of sociological concepts in their field is associated in the first instance with the work of Moses Finley and Geoffrey de Ste Croix. Finley,

capitalizing on his early affiliation with the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* and the Institute for Social Research, introduced ancient historians to Weber's concepts of 'order' and 'status' (in preference to the Marxist 'class') for analysing social relations, and argued for the use of Weberian 'ideal types' and comparative perspectives (Finley 1978, 1981, 1985*b*, 1999; cf. Nafissi 2005). By contrast, de Ste Croix (1981) viewed the ancient Greek world—envisioned as encompassing the entire Graeco-Roman Mediterranean—through the lens of a somewhat idiosyncratic version of Marxist conflict theory.

Both scholars made an important contribution to the economic sociology of the Hellenic world. Economic sociology, established at the intersection of sociology and economics, interprets economic behaviour as social behaviour, and focuses on the social context and construction of economic action and institutions (Smelser and Swedberg 2005). This approach allows ancient historians to compensate for the dearth of 'hard' quantitative data required for formal economic analysis by exploiting the (relatively speaking) much more abundant 'soft' evidence for social relations. Weber already emphasized what he saw as the primacy of politics and stratification by status in determining economic behaviour in the ancient polis. In the 1950s Karl Polanyi went further by advancing the 'substantivist' position that pre-capitalist economics were firmly embedded in social relations and were not amenable to neo-classical economic analysis. Under his influence, Finley steered clear of Polanyi's dogmatism but similarly considered reciprocal exchange a dominant feature of the Athenian economy. In his view, social status, especially the emerging dichotomy of free citizen and slave, mediated economic activity. Morris and Manning (2005: 144–9) survey a variety of responses to this grand model of ancient Greek economic sociology. While some scholars have embraced substantivism as an organizing principle, others have criticized it on empirical grounds but have consistently failed to formulate a coherent alternative model. More fundamental critiques challenge the substantivist perspective for either over-socializing or under-socializing economic behaviour (cf. Granovetter 1985). The former camp stresses economic rationality and the pervasive influence of market forces relative to social constraints, whereas the latter focuses on the cultural construction and contingency of any economic categories and interests.

The richness of this debate marks out economic sociology as the busiest point of contact between sociology and Hellenic studies. However, even though this debate mirrors controversies within sociology itself, most notably between proponents of social exchange theory (which studies the 'gratifications persons provide one another that sustain social relations', under the premise that 'the exchange of rewards is a starting mechanism of social relations that is not contingent on norms prescribing obligations': Blau 1994: 152–6) and critics of rational choice approaches, students of ancient Greece do not normally relate their arguments to these more explicitly theoretical approaches.

Political sociology has been closer to the traditional concerns of that academic community: to name just one particularly well-known example, Ober (1989), an attempt to marry sociological framing and discourse analysis, examines the distribution of power in a society structured into groups, drawing on the problem of 'democratic elitism' raised by Robert Michels (cf. also Finley 1985*a*). More recently, Claire Taylor has used statistical methods to measure changes in the political participation of wealthy Athenians and to correlate contrasting mechanisms of selecting officials (by election and lot) to their social background (Taylor, 2007*a* and *b*). Relevant historical applications of conflict theory have followed Marxist models; however, it is striking that, for twenty-five years, de Ste Croix's account of ancient class struggle has failed to inspire additional research along these lines. In fact, the substantivist focus on 'status' has prevented any serious reconsideration of the potential utility of the concept of 'class' for ancient history, which now appears overdue (cf. Nafissi 2004).

Role theory holds that individual behaviour is organized and acquires meaning in terms of roles (in work and group activities), that people may act and feel differently in different roles, and that different people may behave similarly in shared roles (Turner 2001*b*: 233). Covering both basic roles (age, gender, class) and status roles (linked to position in organized groups), this perspective helps to link the micro- and macro-levels of social behaviour, and might arguably benefit analyses of social stratification and group behaviour in the classical polis, with its coincident roles of voters, soldiers, heads of households, and so on, and its various dichotomous social demarcations. In this historical context, structural role theory, which deals with the relationships between role and status, and between status and rights/duties, merits particular attention. So does the related field of status construction theory, focusing on how status beliefs are created and how they interact, how they become 'social facts' by constructing and justifying inequality, and how their development correlates with inequality in the distribution of material resources (e.g. Ridgeway 2001). Given the continuing popularity of status-centred explanations in Hellenic studies, these theoretical approaches deserve more attention among practitioners in this field.

Social network theory focuses on the 'ties' (connections) between 'nodes' (actors or larger entities): the strength of these ties (as well as those of specific nodes, such as 'hubs') can be used to explain the properties of the resultant networks and account for the extent to which actors' success in social interactions depends on the structure of their networks (Scott 2000). This method's potential for historical analysis is well established (Erickson 1997). In what is the most substantial pertinent contribution to date, Giovanni Ruffini analyses elite behaviour in the city of Oxyrhynchus and the village of Aphrodito in sixth-century CE Egypt with reference to network analytical concepts (Ruffini 2008): this method reveals an important contrast between a high degree of network centrality (i.e. hierarchical stratification) in the urban society and a high degree of multiplexity (i.e. multiple

interconnectedness) in that of the contemporaneous village. His study benefits from the availability of documentary evidence that is lacking for most other parts of the Hellenic world, but gives a good idea of what we can hope to accomplish even with fairly rudimentary data sets. However, with only limited opportunities for mathematical analysis, most of the very few other existing attempts to exploit network theory for Hellenic studies refer to it in a more abstract way (e.g. Chow 1992), although Remus (1996) stands out for the use of the concepts of tie-strength and directionality in his study of social connections between the incubants of the Asclepius sanctuary in Roman Pergamon. Non-quantitative approaches will be featured in Ober's latest work on the role of social networks in the organization of knowledge in Athenian society (Ober 2008).

Network theory shares certain objectives with systems theory, which explores the systemic properties of bounded sets of interrelated phenomena. Complex societies, with their horizontal and vertical subsystems, differentiation, and integration, pose a particular challenge to systems theorists who seek to study social groups in terms of all possible interrelations. Davies (2005) gives flow-charts of resource movement in ancient Greek economies which mirror some of the same concerns but lack theoretical grounding and do not deal with social relations per se. The tension between various forms of lateral and vertical differentiation within the Greek polis and the ideal of the polis as a homogeneous socio-political community would seem to warrant experimentation with a more formal system-theoretical approach to improve our understanding of social structure. World-systems theory is a related body of concepts that deals with large-scale intersocietal interaction systems and their impact on their constituent components (e.g. Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). In recent years this perspective has gained ground in the study of the ancient Near East and the Precolumbian Americas, while Greek history has lagged behind. Current thinking in world-systems theory stresses the critical role of 'semiperipherality' (that is, the interstitial position between core and peripheral regions of a world-system) in state formation and intersocietal relations: thus, the semiperipheral character of archaic Greece and later of Macedon invites systematic comparative study that incorporates Hellenic studies into more global modes of analysis.

Finally, Darwinian theorizing in the form of sociobiology or evolutionary psychology has also begun to influence sociology and cognate disciplines (Buss 2005). Evolutionary theory offers a unifying paradigm for sociological research based on the premise that organisms tend to behave so as to maximize their inclusive fitness (i.e. their differential reproductive success) or—in the case of recent humans—more precisely that they tend to exhibit innate behavioural traits that evolved as proximate mechanisms promoting this goal. Testing of Darwinian hypotheses remains rare in historical scholarship (cf. Betzig 1992), and is almost completely absent from Hellenic studies: Walter Burkert's pioneering work on the evolutionary context of early religions, and my own comparative study of reproductive inequality in ancient empires, are currently the main exceptions (Burkert 1996;

Scheidel 2009*a*). Particularly promising areas of Darwinian enquiry include the nexus between kinship and cooperation and ancient Greek practices of infanticide.

There is no denying that many sociological methods, designed for data-rich contemporary environments, are of little use to ancient historians, either because they require quantitative analysis or interviews and participant observation, or because they presuppose scope conditions that are not applicable to ancient societies. Moreover, ancient historians need to be clear about which dimensions of a social phenomenon they wish to investigate—the effect of a macro-level factor on individual internal states, how internal states affected individual action, or the emergent properties of individuals acting in concert (a framework most clearly enunciated by Coleman 1990: ch.1). Nevertheless, a variety of theoretical research strategies, properly adapted to the evidentiary constraints of Hellenic studies, have the potential to help us frame new questions and tackle old ones in new ways. Ancient population history has been transformed by input from professional demography; there is no reason to believe that recourse to sociological theory would fail to yield comparable benefits.

Suggested Reading

No comprehensive survey of ancient Greek demography currently exists. Corvisier and Suder (2000), and Scheidel (forthcoming) cover ancient population history in general, and Scheidel (2009*b*) provides a concise introduction for beginners. The bibliography of Corvisier and Suder (1996) collects earlier scholarship; cf. also Golden (2000) for more recent trends. Sallares (1991), by far the most sophisticated multidisciplinary study of ancient Greek demography, is rich in ecological context but not particularly user-friendly. Hansen (1985) and Corvisier (1991) are now the most substantial studies of regional population number. Hansen (2006), a grand model of overall population totals and urban–rural ratios based on the exhaustive researches of the Copenhagen Polis Centre, will be the starting-point for all future debates on these issues. Pomeroy (1997) conveniently synthesizes information on the ancient Greek family. Bagnall and Frier (1994), Scheidel (2001), and Clarysse and Thompson (2006) are the principal studies of the demographic evidence from Graeco-Roman Egypt.

Bruce (1999) briefly introduces newcomers to sociology, while the massive textbook by Fulcher and Scott (2003) is recommended for comprehensive coverage of the field. Turner (2001*a*), Delanty and Isin (2003), and Smelser and Swedberg (2005) provide substantial overviews of current trends in sociological theory, historical sociology, and economic sociology, respectively. Weber (1978) remains the single most useful classic treatise for students of antiquity. Finley's work is well known for its application of elements of Weberian sociology, and de Ste Croix (1981) is still the most ambitious Marxist study of the ancient Greek world (broadly defined). Morris and Manning (2005) is a compact survey of ancient economic sociology which is required reading for anyone interested in the role of sociological models in Hellenic studies.

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CHAPTER 55

MYTH, MYTHOLOGY, AND MYTHOGRAPHY*

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It is probably no exaggeration to state that myths are the best-known parts of Greek antiquity today. The stories continue to entertain and to fascinate us. Yet their entertainment value should not let us forget that their present function is the outcome of a long historical development. In the oldest period to which we can trace Greek myths, the age of Homer, the myths were still very much part of Greek religion. They helped to define the gods and they illuminated rituals. In fact, there was no specific term for them, as *muthos* in Homer still means 'a speech-act indicating authority, performed at length, usually in public, with a full attention to every detail' (Martin 1989: 12). Yet there were plenty of stories that we nowadays call 'myth'. How we define a 'myth' is a debated question. I take here a pragmatic point of view and use 'myth' as shorthand for 'tales relevant to society with gods or heroes as the protagonists'. In general, these share common traits in that they are accessible to us only via poetry, beginning with Hesiod and Homer, but they are not tied to a specific genre. Epic, lyric, tragedy, comedy, and later oratory all contained mythical accounts, although often with their own characteristics and length. Similarly, myth as a narrative is not tied to a specific culture, as the early popularity of Greek myth in Etruria and Rome shows, where noble families derived their origin from the Trojans already before the fourth century BCE.

* Kristina Meinking kindly corrected my English.

In a brief survey it is of course impossible to treat the whole subject of myth, and I shall limit myself therefore to some observations on the origin, production, and function of myth, its relation to ritual, its transformation and marginalization in the course of the archaic and classical period, its fossilization and function in the Roman/Hellenistic period, and finally its study in modern times.

The age of Greek myths is often not determinable. Some of them are clearly extremely old and may well go back to the time before the proto-Greeks entered Greece. This seems to be the case with Heracles, whose wrestling with monsters possibly pre-dates even early Indo-European times, when cattle and meat were the prime concern of the community. Hardly less old is the strange Arcadian myth that Poseidon turned himself into a stallion when Demeter fled from him in the shape of a mare, thus begetting the first horse—a type of myth with clear Indo-European parallels. Yet such primeval myths were few and far between. In general, myth had *to look* old rather than *to be* old. It could hardly be otherwise, as the public performance of myths presupposed their acceptability. In other words, myths had to be continuously adapted to new social and political circumstances: Greek mythology was basically an open-ended and ever-changing system.

Originally, most towns and communities seem to have had only a few myths, of which the majority will have focused on the figure of the first local male—the myth of the first female ever, Pandora, is clearly an invention of Hesiod—and some striking local rituals, but the existence of the world itself was generally presupposed. Such myths probably served their purposes for the relatively small communities of the Dark Ages. This world changed dramatically when the Greeks expanded their horizon from the eighth century BCE onwards. Colonization and the development of a Panhellenic culture opened up new worlds and brought the Greeks into contact with peoples with different mythologies.

These developments also raised new questions: where do we come from, and what is the hierarchical relationship of the local gods with one another? Neither question could be answered by indigenous myth, and that is why the Greeks turned to the ancient Near East. It is here that they found cosmogonies and the struggle for superiority in the divine pantheon. This indebtedness to Near Eastern mythology can already be found in Homer, where Hera announces that she wants to reconcile 'Okeanos, begetter of the gods, and mother Tethys' (*Iliad* 14.201). This couple clearly derived from the beginning of the Babylonian *Enûma eliš*, where we read (1.1–9, trans. S. Dalley):

> When skies above were not yet named
> Nor earth below pronounced by name,
> Apsu, the first one, their begetter
> And maker Tiamat, who bore them all,
> Had mixed their waters together,
> But had not formed pastures, nor discovered reed-beds;

> When yet no gods were manifest,
> Nor names pronounced, nor destinies decreed,
> Then gods were born within them.

It is interesting to note that the mention of the primordial couple occurred at the beginning of the poem. Similarly, another passage about the beginning of the world, namely the casting of lots by Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades in the *Iliad* (15.187–93), was derived from the beginning of the Akkadian *Atrahasis* (I.i.11–16).

For an explanation of the rise of Zeus and the establishment of the divine pantheon the Greeks turned to a Hittite model, the *Song of Kumarbi*, from which Hesiod, directly or indirectly, borrowed the castration of Ouranos by Kronos, as Kumarbi castrated the sky-god Anu, swallowed his penis, and thus became pregnant with three gods, amongst whom we find the Hittite equivalent of Zeus; this, too, is in the first song of the *Kumarbi Cycle*. As a related version was found in Phoenician mythology, where El castrated Sky, we can see a combination of Hittite and Phoenician mythologies exerting influence on Hesiod. The early Greeks, then, took their Oriental material mostly from the beginning of the great Near Eastern epics, poems that were especially popular in school curricula. Thus we should not postulate a solid Greek knowledge of Near Eastern mythology (though cf. Haubold's discussion of epic in this volume): apparently, the Greeks took what they needed and left it at that.

The combination of Hittite and Phoenician models seems to point to Cilicia as an important point of transmission. The amount of Phoenician inscriptions, pottery, and iconography in that region is remarkable, and recent finds have demonstrated the existence of several Luwian-Phoenician bilingual inscriptions from the ninth to the seventh centuries BCE, exactly the time when Near Eastern influence on Greek mythology was at its height. Cilicia lies opposite Cyprus, another link between Greeks and the West. The motif of overpopulation that we find in the beginning (!) of the *Atrahasis* is also present in the *Cypria* (fr. 1). And in the myth of Perseus, which contains a number of Near Eastern motifs, the hero, after he had cut off the head of the Gorgon, put it in his hunting-bag, *kibisis*. The Greek term is non-Indo-European Cypriote, and occurs virtually only in narratives of Perseus' myth. In other words, the myth of Perseus must have passed through Cyprus on its way to the Greek mainland. Yet myths did not travel only over sea. The fact that the month named Kronion, which derived from Kronos' festival Kronia, occurred only in a very small area around Samos and Kolophon, suggests that Kronos 'arrived' first in this area. Kolophon is also the first Greek town where we hear of the scapegoat ritual, another Anatolian import, and is where the Greeks built the first temple for Cybele, the Phrygian Great Goddess. This suggests that Near Eastern and Anatolian myths and rituals 'travelled' also along the later Persian Royal Road through Phrygia before arriving at the Ionian coast.

Via Ionia, if not earlier, poets will have picked up foreign plots and names—names such as Pegasus, Paris, Priamus, and Lykaon are all derived from

Anatolia—in order to spice up their poetry. Although poets remained the main producers of myths until well into late antiquity, they were not the only ones. When in Euripides' *Ion* the chorus of Creusa's maidservants enters the temple of Apollo in Delphi, it immediately recognizes the scenes on the temple's twin façades: the battle of the Gods against the Giants, Bellerophon, and the Labours of Hercules, about which one of the girls remarks (*Ion* 194–200, trans. Kovacs):

> —I see him. And near him another
> raises the blazing torch!
> Is it he whose story I heard
> as I plied my loom,
> shield-bearing Iolaos, who
> took up shared labours with
> the son of Zeus and helped him to endure them?

In fact, there are quite a few references to Greek women plying the loom whilst singing songs with a mythological content. This gendered aspect of Greek myth is often overlooked, but mistresses and mothers must have been important transmitters of myths in the Greek homes, whereas the men will have heard them more at courts, festivals, and theatres.

Different times invested mythical narratives with different contents. That is to say, the same narrative plot could be explored in several different ways, and we should be wary of ascribing only one meaning to a particular myth. For example, the colonial and commercial expeditions of the archaic period are reflected in the journeys of Odysseus with his comrades and Jason with his Argonauts. During their adventures they met all kinds of monster, such as the one-eyed giant Polyphemus and the dragon that guarded the Golden Fleece, and they braved all kinds of danger, such as sailing between Scylla and Charybdis, and through the Clashing Rocks at the entry to the Hellespont. In other words, these myths can be seen as reflecting the self-confidence of the early Greeks and their feeling of superiority over the 'barbarians'.

At the same time, these early myths also reflect certain practices. The transvestism of Achilles and his education by the Centaur Cheiron; the expedition of Jason with a group of fifty youths, accompanied by maternal uncles, in order to fetch a precious object in a far-off foreign country; and the Calydonian hunt of Meleager, during which he killed his maternal uncles: all point to male initiation. Similarly, the 'kidnapping' of Helen by Paris cannot be separated from the archaic wedding customs of Sparta where the bride had to be 'kidnapped' by her future husband. Apparently, the coming-of-age rituals of Greek boys and girls once were important 'producers' of accompanying myths (see further Calame in this volume). Myths, then, can be approached from different angles, and different approaches do not exclude one another.

The fifth century, on the other hand, no longer looked for long and detailed reports of heroic exploits. The main genre through which we see mythical

narratives, Athenian tragedy, focused its attention on extreme situations: the murder of Agamemnon, the destruction of Oedipus' family, or the human sacrifice of Polyxena. Our attention is no longer drawn to faraway peoples or heroic deeds, but we are forced to confront difficult choices, morally ambiguous problems, and unfathomable divine actions. This situation shifted once again in the Hellenistic period, when myth started to focus on personal relationships as exemplified in Apollonius of Rhodes' *Argonautica*, or on the lives of simple people, as in Callimachus' *Hekale*.

Greek myth continued to survive in the Roman period, although now emancipated from its close connection with Greek religion. In classical Athens many males must have known the main myths simply from their visits to the theatre and their own performances in choruses, but during the Roman Empire detailed knowledge of myth became the property of the educated classes. In fact, myth was never so omnipresent in the private sphere as it was in the Roman Empire. Myth now appeared on wall paintings, such as those we can still see in Pompeii, and many mythological floor mosaics have been excavated—from England to the East, where they lasted well into the Christian and even Islamic periods. Yet myth's widespread use in the theatre by the immensely popular pantomimes must have guaranteed a more rudimentary expertise also for large parts of the population. In addition to the theatre and poetry, myth became particularly popular on sarcophagi, where scenes of the lives of heroes and heroines helped to characterize the deceased, for example by displaying mythical hunters in the case of keen huntsmen, or to lessen the grief of the survivors by displaying Niobe mourning for her children.

In addition to these broad chronological shifts we can see also some constants, such as the explanatory and normative functions of myth. Greek myth illustrated the limits of acceptable male and female behaviour in showing, for example, the disastrous consequences of Helen's leaving her husband for Paris, or of Heracles' bringing a concubine into his and Deianira's home. It showed the terrible consequences of parricide in the case of Oedipus, or of discord between brothers, as in the myth of the Atreids. But it was not just men and women that were the subject of myth's reflection. Myth also illustrated the values attached to animals and plants, or to features of the landscape, such as rivers, meadows, and mountains. It showed how cities schemed to make themselves more important by 'hijacking' Hellenic myths, as in Athens' appropriation of Oedipus' grave in Sophocles *Oedipus in Colonus*, or of Iphigeneia's grave in Brauron (see further below); or how dynasties tried to shore up their crumbling positions, as when King Arcesilaus IV of Cyrene hired Pindar to bolster his monarchy with his mythical poetry (albeit in vain). Finally, foundation myths of new Greek cities claimed a place for the city in the Greek world and its mythical history as a whole. Thus, many a Macedonian colony claimed Heracles or the Argonauts as its mythical founders, just as many a Greek city in southern Italy could tie its past to the wanderings of Odysseus. In fact,

many new cities claimed to be connected to older ones via mythological 'kinship diplomacy', and poets wandered from city to city in order to sing the praise of the local founders.

It is an important difference between Greece and the ancient Near East that in Greece the cosmogonical myths no longer were connected to ritual, as, for example, they remained for a very long time in ancient Egypt and Babylon. Yet many a myth originally was connected with a specific (local) ritual. The nature of this relationship has long fascinated scholars and is not easy to analyse. One thing is clear: there are very few myths that reflect ritual on a one-to-one basis, and it is indeed hard to see what such an identical mirroring would actually add. This should not exclude the possibility that myth sometimes reflects part of the ritual. For example, it is very clear that when Demeter asked for a drink of meal, water, and mint in the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter* (206–10), this reflected the Eleusinian *kukeōn*, the drink with which prospective Eleusinian initiates apparently ended the fasting that preceded the initiation proper.

Moreover, concentration on the immediate relationship between myth and ritual obscures the fact that myths were sometimes combined with rituals that, originally, had no connection with them whatsoever. A good example is the myth of Iphigeneia. Originally, Greek myth told that Iphigeneia had been sacrificed in Aulis to end the lack of wind which was hampering the Greek fleet's voyage to Troy. However, the small hamlet of Brauron in Attica 'hijacked' the myth and adapted it to its local ritual (also discussed by Calame in this volume). It told that Agamemnon had sacrificed his daughter in Brauron and that she had been replaced by a bear—not a deer, as in the traditional narrative. Evidently, Brauron had adapted the myth to local circumstances where small girls acted out a ritual in which they were called 'bears' and priests officiated with bear masks. Such appropriations of Panhellenic myths for local rituals were not unusual and deserve more attention than they have received so far.

A search for a close connection between myth and ritual also deflects attention from the specific differences between the two categories. We may illustrate this with the myth of the Lemnian women. As they had offended Aphrodite, she made them smell terribly and the men turned to their Thracian slave-girls for sexual satisfaction. In revenge the Lemnian women murdered their men and remained without husbands. The women's sexual abstinence came to an end when Jason and his Argonauts landed on Lemnos and invited the Lemnian women to an intimate party. The ritual connected with this myth actually concerns the celebration of the New Year. To mark the transition between the Old and the New the men extinguished the fires on the island and sacrificed to the chthonian gods. The women chewed garlic to keep the men away and both parties abstained from sex (at least ideologically) for a period of nine days. At the end of that period a ship arrived from Delos with new fire, and the men re-established the social order and resumed sexual relations with their wives. As the myth of the Lemnian women

demonstrates, myth can exaggerate and picture as permanent (murder) what is only symbolic and temporary in ritual (a limited period of abstention). The same myth also demonstrates that Greek myth usually concentrates on striking details and the atmosphere of the ritual, not the whole of the ritual complex. Moreover, myth is much more fluid than ritual. Even if the plot remained relatively unchanged, every new performance and representation could introduce new accents and innovations to a much larger degree than ritual, which is relatively fixed over longer periods of time: narrativity has of course many more possibilities for variety than reality. There is, then, no fixed rule for the relationship between myth and ritual. All cases have to be judged on their own and, even so, we often lack sufficient information for a detailed study.

From around 500 BCE we see the position of myth slowly but surely changing. Due to the influence of, mainly, rising literacy, which facilitated the exchange of ideas, philosophers started to take a more critical look at traditional poetic discourse. Xenophanes, in particular, argued that the stories of Homer and Hesiod attributed ethically intolerable deeds to the gods, such as stealing, deception, and committing adultery. At around the same time Hecataeus, the oldest known historian, started to attack the credibility of the heroic myths, but simultaneously tried to save myth by historicizing it as much as possible; this method we find in particular in Plutarch's biographies of mythical heroes like Theseus and Romulus. The effect of this critique was far-reaching. Poets began now to introduce rationalizing corrections in the myths by removing the supernatural or fantastic elements, which took something away from their narrative attraction. Moreover, historians and philosophers now took over tasks that had long been performed by myth: they explained the past and started to give ethical prescriptions. At the end of the fifth century myth had lost its position in Greek life as perhaps the most important means of discourse on problems of life and society.

We can see this shift very clearly in Plato. The word *muthos* now can approach our 'fiction' and *muthōdēs* our 'fictional'. Given the frequent, if usually polemical, opposition of *muthos* and *logos*, 'myth' and 'reason', we cannot fail to note that Plato is the first in whose work we find the terms *muthologia* (eight times) and *muthologēma* (twice)—the frequency of which shows that he seems to have been rather fond of these terms. Yet we should not assume that Plato completely rejected myth. He still used mythical discourse when he wanted to talk about such difficult subjects as the soul and the mythical past. But, and significantly, Plato wanted to remove the poets from their prominent position when discussing philosophical problems. Aristotle, too, did not completely reject *muthos* but left some space for it as a means of explaining puzzling observations. Evidently, myth had been too entrenched in Greek life to disappear completely, and as a source for literature and orientation for life it would remain indispensable until the rise of Christianity—even if in intellectual and philosophical circles allegory had become the main means to salvage its content.

Given the already noted ubiquity of Greek myth in the Roman period, it should not surprise us that mythography, a term that originated in later Hellenistic times, also became very popular. As knowledge of myth was essential in functioning as an educated person or being an (aspiring) poet, many mythographical handbooks or books that summarized, and thus fossilized, myths came on the market, such as those by pseudo-Apollodorus, Antoninus Liberalis, Parthenius, Conon, and Hyginus. Papyrus fragments of them, often just scores of mythological names, have been found even in country districts in Egypt, which indicates their popularity. The fact that some of them were illustrated is another indication of their position in the higher strata of the Roman Empire. However, given the pressure to produce, some authors invented imaginary sources. Recently it has become clear that many a source-indication in these handbooks has to be looked at with some suspicion, and our knowledge of classical myths may be poorer than we would like to think.

Although most handbooks got lost in the course of late antiquity, knowledge of Greek mythology remained available in the West via Latin works such as those by Prudentius, Claudian, Augustine, and Isidore of Seville—and, by far the richest source, Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. Yet it was not until the end of the eighteenth century that the modern study of myth took off. In 1783 Christian Gottlob Heyne (1729–1812), Professor of Greek at Göttingen, introduced the term *mythus*, and posited that myth explained the admirable and frightening sides of nature. This proved to be the beginning of the modern study of Greek myth. Yet the path to a better understanding of myth has been rather tortuous. The nineteenth century was very much interested in fertility and looked almost exclusively for explanations that were rooted in natural phenomena such as the sun or thunder. This paradigm lasted until the end of the nineteenth century, when interest shifted to ritual, and agrarian customs became the main key with which to unlock the secrets of ritual—with the result that myth came to be neglected.

The interest in Greek myth returned only in the later 1960s, especially through the work of Walter Burkert and Jean-Pierre Vernant and their respective pupils (whose insights underlie this chapter). Their varying approaches have enabled us to study Greek myth from all kinds of angles, some of which are in opposition to one another. Still, ancient narratives do not always easily yield their meanings, and the investigation of Greek myth often remains a process of groping into the dark.

Suggested Reading

Good surveys of early myth are Gantz (1993) and Buxton (2004). The iconography is now available in the splendid *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae* (*LIMC*). For an introduction and an example of the varying approaches see Graf (1993) and Bremmer (1989). For the oldest Greek myths see Bremmer (1999: esp. 57, 98). For the Near Eastern influence

see now West (1997) and Bremmer (2008). For the social values of early Greek myth see Hölscher (1999); and for its role in the Roman period, Zanker and Ewald (2004). For myth reflecting the Greek *mentalité* and the natural world see Dowden (1992), Buxton (1994), and Detienne (1994). For myth between cities see Jones (1999). For the debates about 'myth and ritual' see now Bremmer (2005). For rationalizing and allegorizing approaches see Buxton (1999), Vöhler and Seidensticker (2005), and Brisson (2004). Finally, for the fragments of the early mythographers and the development of mythography see now Fowler (2000) and Cameron (2004) respectively.

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CHAPTER 56

GENDER STUDIES

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ALTHOUGH it was published as recently as 1996, long after feminist methodologies had been incorporated into the discipline of classics, the third edition of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* contains no entry for 'gender'. Readers are instead directed to a number of related articles: 'gynaecology', 'heterosexuality', 'homosexuality', 'marriage', 'sexuality', 'women' (*OCD* 629). None of those contributions, however, adequately addresses certain fundamental questions about the term itself. While 'gender' is widely understood to be a hermeneutic tool used in feminist research, its relationship to other feminist approaches is not altogether clear. When scholars speak of 'Gender studies', then, what is meant? What is distinctive about this method of enquiry, and how can it cast light on aspects of ancient Greek culture and society?

Gender studies is a relatively recent spin-off from the field of 'women in antiquity'. Investigation of ancient women, the realities of their lives and the representations of them in art and literature, began in the early 1970s as a project designed to supplement the existing historical record. In the introduction to her pioneering *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity*, Sarah Pomeroy informs us that the book was conceived 'when I asked myself what women were doing while men were active in all the areas traditionally emphasized by classical scholars' (1975: p. xiv). Combining historical and anthropological perspectives—analysis of factual information in the light of comparative cross-cultural beliefs about the female sex—the study of ancient women soon developed sophisticated methodologies to compensate for inherent biases and omissions in the data (McClure 1997: 260–2; McManus 1997: 18–19). Because they were for the most part philological and empirical in their orientation, however, such investigations were

assimilated into mainstream classical scholarship with little difficulty. Over the past thirty years, consequently, the field of 'women in antiquity' has produced an enormous corpus of scholarly literature and greatly improved our understanding of the place of women in ancient society. It continues to be a lively and prolific area of research and teaching.

Gender studies, in contrast, is heavily informed by feminist and poststructuralist theory. Starting from the premise that sexual difference provides a basic conceptual framework for organizing experience, feminist theorists in Film studies and allied disciplines initially looked at gender as a *semantic* relation (de Lauretis 1987: 3–5). Within an androcentric discursive system, disproportionately valued polarities (hard versus soft, right versus left) are mapped onto the sexes, with the more highly esteemed term, such as hardness, assigned to the 'masculine' side. This conceptual scheme serves as a litmus test of male identity: as subjects of discourse, men think of themselves as 'not-women' and thereby mentally dissociate themselves from putatively 'feminine' qualities such as softness or tenderness. In the discipline of Classics, then, work on gender frequently takes as its starting-point the question of how *masculinity* was defined by the ancient culture. Thus recent enquiries into constructions of Roman manhood in the Republican era (e.g. Gunderson 2000; Wray 2001) have identified competitive self-projection as an essential facet of elite male gender performance: men were regularly called upon to demonstrate their superiority in oratorical skills, in wit and sophistication, and even in moral fibre, by publicly besting rivals. Aggression, physical and psychological, was a highly regarded component of *virtus* (manliness). When disconcertingly exhibited by women, though, it elicited a corollary revulsion (e.g. Juvenal, *Satires* 6.252–67).

Gender is not just a category of thought, however, but also a stratifying mechanism comparable to other taxonomies such as class and ethnicity: since it is a means of exercising power over others, it has real-life effects (Flax 1990: 25–6). In antiquity, as Michel Foucault demonstrated in the second and third volumes of his *History of Sexuality* (Foucault 1976–84), the asymmetrical Graeco-Roman gender system and the hierarchical organization of sexuality formed a dense, interlocking power grid 'isomorphic' with social relations (English trans. 1986: 215), in which playing the dominant or submissive part in the sexual act was dictated by superiority or inferiority in status. Work on Greek and Roman gender structures necessarily involves the examination of these sexual protocols as well as the latent symbolic meanings culturally imposed upon masculinity and femininity. Yet the intersection of gender, regarded as a semantic system, with ancient constructions of sexuality is a site of potential confusion, because the two schemes of classification are not wholly congruous.

The symbolic operations of gender in archaic and classical Greece conform to the paradigm of male–female antithesis outlined above. Polarities defining the identity of the male citizen subject as human, in contrast to animal, and Greek, in contrast to barbarian, as well as abstract dichotomies such as order/chaos,

culture/nature, reason/madness, and pure/polluted, were commonly expressed in terms of sexual difference (Lloyd 1966: 42, 48–9; duBois 1982: 4–5). The Pythagorean table of opposites, preserved in the first book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (986a22–7), is the extreme instance of such a blueprint; its underlying rationale, which aligns the female principle with both the fluid behaviour of mathematical integers and negatively valued moral and existential attributes, rests upon the belief that *logos* (form, reason) emerges from feminine indeterminacy. Its concept of the female as the undifferentiated matrix seems organically aligned with a prevailing notion of the roles of the sexes in the reproductive act (Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 658–61; Aristotle, *On the Generation of Animals* 716a20–4): the father is the active originator who contributes life-transmitting seed, the mother the passive receptacle housing the embryo (Lovibond 1994: 90–1). Thus the Pythagorean table functions as the missing link, as it were, between a horizontally laid-out scheme of asymmetrical gender polarity and a hierarchical scheme of sexual dominance and submission: sexual and generative agency is cognitively affiliated with notions of singularity, limit, and control, while passivity is associated with the boundless, and therefore the insatiable. Below we will see the same train of thought followed to its logical conclusion in Hesiod's Pandora myth.

Classicists often employ gender as an analytical prism for examining mythic examples of conflicts between the sexes that appear to encapsulate larger tensions within ancient Greek society—battles between heroes and Amazons, or massacres of spouses like the one executed by the Lemnian women (cf. Bremmer, above pp. 683–4). It is an approach that has proved particularly useful for articulating cultural assumptions that primary sources leave unspoken. Poststructuralist thought meanwhile calls into question the postulates that gender is a natural product of sexual difference and that its configurations are shaped by biology rather than culture (Butler 1990). Notions of sexuality in Greece and Rome seem to bear out that 'constructionist' claim. In those two cultures, sex was construed as the phallic penetration of the body of another: other kinds of genital activity apparently did not count as 'sex'. Accordingly, the dichotomy of the sex act was grounded on an agonistic opposition of the active to the passive role, so that physical penetration demonstrated social supremacy. Activity and passivity were, in effect, notional genders, respectively aligned with masculinity and femininity. However, they were not the same as our own biologically based genders of 'male' and 'female', for the category of passivity cut across biological sex; the individual who played the receptive part by providing access to one or another bodily orifice might be a girl or woman, a boy or another adult male.

Above and beyond possession of male sexual organs, legitimate ownership of the active role was also a function of age and social position. Properly, this position belonged to men who had successfully negotiated the tricky passage from boyhood to full adulthood and who enjoyed the rights conferred by citizen birth, status, and economic self-sufficiency. It was, furthermore, contingent upon peer approval,

for perceived violations of the code of social masculinity constituted evidence of moral degeneracy, revealing the offender to be a paradoxically 'passive' male, the disgustingly unrestrained *kinaidos* (cf. Latin *pathicus*). Ancient masculinity was therefore embedded in a much larger scheme of political and social relations, one in which class antagonism was either mystified, as in democratic Athens (Halperin 1990: 88–112), or reinforced, as in Rome (Walters 1997). In either case, active male status was a caste as much as a sex marker.

One can argue, then, that in antiquity gender and sexuality constituted two distinct, not entirely parallel, strategies for defining male social identity, one metaphorical and abstract, the other concrete and implicated in a network of homosocial dealings. Female social identity, in turn, was relational, largely formulated in opposition to positive elements of masculinity. To cite a familiar example, Xenophon's model estate-owner Iskhomakhos, when instructing his young bride about the respective functions of the married couple, explains that women are weaker and naturally fearful precisely because these traits complement the endurance and bravery assigned by divinity to the man (*Oeconomicus* 7.23–5). In fairness, we should add that Iskhomakhos also credits women with intellectual aptitudes equal to those of men and with equal capacity for self-control. Not all Greek thinkers were willing to grant them that much: Aristotle (*Politics* 1260a12–14) expressly denies woman a fully authoritative rational faculty and, with it, the discretion sufficient to guide herself morally.

In the remainder of this chapter I will briefly demonstrate how attention to gender can cast light on underlying assumptions of ancient Greek culture. The poems of Homer and Hesiod are ideal primary materials for analysis. Widely disseminated across the Panhellenic world and accessible to a broad range of listeners—men and women, free and slave—oral epic contributed from earliest times to the project of constructing a coherent sex/gender system (Holmberg 1997). Epic storytelling not only furnished models of appropriate role-conduct for men and women but also gave articulate expression to certain ways of defining the relationship between the sexes, whether as the stabilizing core of kinship ties within the larger community (*Iliad* 6.429–30), or as a potentially ruinous encounter, against which a man must guard himself and take due precautions (*Odyssey* 10.286–347). Cosmogenic narratives employed gender and sexuality as explanatory paradigms for the workings of the natural world, investing its components with the status of elemental forces. Finally, Homeric and Hesiodic representations of male and female furnished later composers with a wealth of topics for elaboration and so exerted continuing influence upon the subsequent Greek tradition. Because archaic epic remained the cornerstone of education and Hellenization throughout antiquity, the conclusions we draw from examining these oral accounts will potentially (though subject to shifting interpretations) hold true for Greek civilization at all periods.

Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* provide instances of the use of 'male' and 'female' as notional categories to encode existential tensions and problematic social dynamics.

In the *Iliad*, which self-consciously reflects upon its own purpose of enshrining heroic action, death and oblivion are at first glance connected with women, immortality and perpetual remembrance with men. The supreme warrior is entitled to everlasting glory in song (*kleos*) as compensation for his premature end. Heroes, seeking to transcend the limits of their mortal being, distance themselves from the mundane sphere of women and domesticity. Through the figure of the grieving Thetis, mortality itself is associated with mothers, who present their husbands with the sons who will displace them (cf. Glaucus' famous 'generation of leaves' simile at 6.146–9) but endow those sons with only a brief span of life (Slatkin 1991; Murnaghan 1992: 253–4). This theoretical division of existential labour is, however, undercut by the parallel immersion of women in oral culture. Because the fact of mortality underlies the heroic code and gives it meaning (as Sarpedon observes: 12.322–8), it falls to women, who prepare the dead for burial, to recuperate the loss of the warrior: as they mourn him, they transmit to posterity a heightened memory of his deeds. Thus the epic concludes with a triple lament for Hector by his kinswomen—his wife, mother, and sister-in-law. Helen, the last of these, is not even a blood relation, but it is she, as Homer's surrogate and his emblem of the fame conferred through song (Clader 1976: 8–9), who performs the final dirge (24.761–75), ensuring that the hero's name will enter the epic repertoire (Pantelia 2002).

While the *Iliad* forges links between gender and the conditions of human existence, the *Odyssey* is concerned with the place of each sex in society. The chaotic situation on Ithaca encountered by Odysseus after his twenty-year absence reflects the disappearance of a Homeric warrior caste and the potential emergence of the polis, the city-state comprised of single-family units that vests supreme authority in the male householder. Accordingly, the *Odyssey* has been described as a charter for that developing political system (Wohl 1993: 19). Because of this radical alteration in the social structure, the parallel obligations of men and women are modified: although they still have separate domains of responsibility, the one public and the other domestic, they must display 'like-mindedness' (*homophrosunē*) in making decisions that affect the security and self-sufficiency of the family. Penelope's fidelity to Odysseus and her shrewdness (*mētis*), which is on a par with (if not superior to) his, prove her the kind of wife most suited to polis society. Conversely, the exploitative sexual autonomy of the goddesses Calypso and Circe and the undue power over husbands arguably wielded by Arete and Helen indicate that the reverse option of female domination is an undesirable one.

While a wise and competent wife can act as her husband's deputy in his absence, her capacity to betray him with another man is the weak link in the organization of polis society. The corollary examples of Clytemnestra and Helen, along with Demodocus' tale of Ares and Aphrodite (8.266–366), present contrasting perspectives on that domestic and political dilemma. Clytemnestra who, after cheating on her husband Agamemnon, conspired to murder him, is opposed throughout

to the faithful Penelope, constantly reminding us that female loyalty can never be presupposed. Restored to her former husband, Helen acts as Telemachus' hostess at Sparta, but during that visit her equivocal status is underscored: 'she comprises both versions of the wife's story'—that of Clytemnestra and that of Penelope—'poised in tense competition' (Worman 2001: 20). The adultery of Ares and Aphrodite, like the deception of Zeus in the *Iliad*, burlesques the epic action by shifting it to Olympus and transposing it into a comic vein. If the *Odyssey* is a *Bildungsroman* in which the male protagonist seeks to fashion a new identity for himself in a changed world, the figure of woman stands for all the unknown factors that make that enterprise risky.

While gender opposition is the organizing pattern of both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, in the myths of divine and human origins recounted by Hesiod the kinetic energies of sex and reproduction drive the narrative. The *Theogony*, as critics repeatedly note (Arthur 1982; Bergren 1983: 74–5; Zeitlin 1995), explains the present state of the universe as the outcome of a struggle over control of the reproductive process on the part of male and female generative principles, and justifies female subordination as a necessary precondition for the establishment of reason and law. In a biologically oriented cosmos, where divinities, natural phenomena, and even abstract entities are conceptualized as the 'progeny' of their originating forces, the capacity to bring forth offspring parthenogenetically is the hallmark of supreme power. Gaia, the Earth-goddess and the primary female cosmogenic principle, embodies spontaneous creativity. Under the stimulus of primordial Eros, but without engaging in intercourse (*ater philotētos ephimerou*: 132), she produces the principal features of the material world: her future mate Ouranos (Sky) along with the Mountains (Ourea), and the Sea (Pontos). From the subsequent coition of Sky and Earth come a second generation of elemental beings: Kronos and his siblings, the Titans.

The figure of the mother-goddess who gives birth to her own consort is emblematic of the annual vegetative cycle, and indeed the whole ontological process of child succeeding parent, whereby the species perpetuates itself at the price of individual annihilation. Obeying Gaia's request to be freed from Ouranos' persistent embrace, Kronos castrates his father, a vivid metonym of disempowerment. With his wife Rhea, Kronos then takes Ouranos' place as ruler of the universe. This pattern of succession, in which mother plots with son to defeat and replace the father, is repeated in the following generation. Warned by his parents that he is destined to be overcome by his own son (463–5), Kronos swallows his children as they emerge from Rhea's womb. With the help of her mother, Rhea tricks Kronos with a stone, saving her youngest child Zeus from being swallowed, and sends him off to be reared in Crete. Later, Zeus and his brothers and sisters, the Olympians, successfully revolt against Kronos and the Titans. Having vanquished all the children of Earth, Zeus appropriates the female power of reproduction, himself swallowing his pregnant wife Metis and giving birth to his daughter Athena from his own head. With the

emergence of this firstborn child, destined to remain a virgin, the cycle of succession is halted; time becomes a linear progression of unique events rather than an endless round of birth, insemination, and death; and natural female generativity is harnessed to serve the needs of patriarchal rule. The cunning goddess Metis herself remains within Zeus' body, devising good and evil for him (900), and allowing him to control the future through the exercise of reason.

Sexual passion had entered the cosmos with the birth of Aphrodite from the severed genitals of Ouranos (188–206). After her appearance, female sexuality assumes a twofold, contradictory character: it is linked to fecundity, which is positive and productive, but also to a deceitful and threatening seductiveness. In Greek thought, these two aspects of feminine sexuality were normally kept distinct from one another (Arthur 1982: 67). Under the Olympian regime, Zeus and other gods and goddesses are still subject to the power of Aphrodite. Since sexuality and reproduction have been dissociated from succession, though, the offspring that originate from the unions she brings about pose no danger to the established order. This is possible only for gods, however, and only because the cycle of biological necessity has been displaced onto mankind (Arthur 1982: 74). How the human race became subject to mortality is the theme of the Pandora myth, retold in both the *Theogony* (535–612) and the *Works and Days* (42–105).

In a pioneering structuralist investigation, Vernant (1974) identified the composite story of Prometheus and Pandora as an aetiological myth tracing the origins of the related social institutions of animal sacrifice, agriculture, the use of fire, and marriage-rituals. This complex of cultural behaviours defines the human condition by distinguishing it from that of the gods on the one hand, and that of animals on the other. Pandora, the evil thing given to mankind by Zeus in requital for Prometheus' theft of fire (*Theogony* 570; cf. *Works and Days* 57–8), combines elements of the divine in her outward appearance and bestiality in the traits with which she is endowed. Her own ambiguous human status permits her to embody mankind's separation from those other orders.

Nicole Loraux, however, has pointed out (1993: 73–4, 81–3) that Pandora is expressly designated as the mother of the 'race of women' (*genos ... gunaikōn*: *Theogony* 590–1; cf. McClure in this volume, p. 305), which is entirely distinct from male humanity, and that her function as first woman is to introduce sexuality, not merely reproduction, into the mortal domain. Hesiod's comparison of women to drones in beehives who, making no contribution to the colony, draw the honey produced by worker bees 'into their own belly' (*spheterēn es gaster' amōntai*: *Theogony* 599), associates the female with expenditure rather than productivity. The need for reproducing the species that Pandora inflicted upon mankind limits advancement because it drains scant male potency. Hoping to beget children, and thus ensure care in old age and the maintenance of his property (603–5), a man pours his vital strength, his liquid semen, into the bottomless abyss of the female womb, with no guarantee that his investment will bear fruit.

In the more pragmatic *Works and Days*, Hesiod cautions the landholder planning to marry that there is nothing better than a good wife and nothing worse than a bad one, 'a dinner-trapper who, no matter how stalwart he is, singes him without a torch and gives him to raw old age' (704–5). The image of scorching must be taken literally. While dryness was, according to popular Greek belief, the ideal male bodily condition, extreme dehydration wasted the frame, bringing on premature senility. Since the same word, *gastēr*, can mean both 'belly' and 'womb', the wife's sexual rapacity is here figured as gluttony. Her carnal appetite affects her husband like excessive heat, sucking away the seminal moisture that ensures youth as well as vigour. For a man, sex, unless sparingly indulged, can contribute to early old age and death. He therefore associates with females at his peril.

In Hesiodic epic, gender asymmetry is a strategy of denial, deflecting cultural anxieties surrounding the male body by projecting them onto female nature, which is regarded as distinct, even to the point of having a separate origin. Patriarchy is likewise justified as the imposition of a logical line of development upon otherwise anarchic proliferation. The Homeric poems, for their part, focus upon gender difference operating in the lives of individuals. Nevertheless, the associations drawn between maternity and the inescapable truth of mortality, and between the domestic milieu and exposure to peril, surface over and over again in later Greek thought—in Athenian tragedy, for example, where acts of womanly violence, occurring behind the closed doors of the house, create deep ruptures in the fabric of society and a breach in relations between mankind and gods.

From archaic epic, then, we have extracted certain essential symbolic oppositions between male and female figures: masculinity is associated with order, reason, authority, self-control, limitation, and the prospect of fame beyond the grave, while femininity is the avatar of boundless chaos, uncontrolled appetite, meaningless proliferation, and mortality. Male energy, which is limited, goes to nourish a female fecundity associated with unlimited desire, symptomatic of the unappeasable demands of nature. The Pythagorean table of opposites allows us to infer the hidden link between that symbolic complex of ideas and the putative mechanics of sexuality and reproduction: masculinity is formative, it has in itself that which can transmit individual form, while femininity, like the earth it resembles, receives seed indiscriminately. Similar associations, of course, permeate Aristotle's distinction between the semen contributed by the active male in the reproductive process and the matter (*hulē*) supplied by the inert female, which takes the form of menstrual fluid (*On the Generation of Animals* 729a21–32). The dominance-submission protocols of sexuality can themselves be regarded as an analogous method of exerting control over the indeterminacy characteristic of the female gender. Amorphous, receptive, pluralistic: the female in Greek thought is effectively characterized by its potential for transgressing boundaries drawn by the male—not excluding, in Homeric epic at least, the ultimate boundary of death.

Suggested Reading

Pomeroy (1975) remains the foundational study of women in antiquity; recent treatments include Fantham *et al.* (1994) and Blundell (1995). Blok (1987) surveys the methodologies employed in the historiography of ancient women and shows how nineteenth- and twentieth-century cultural assumptions have directed lines of enquiry. McManus (1997) investigates the impact of feminism on the discipline and profession of Classical studies in the United States. For a discussion of asymmetrical gender structures in Greek society and their symbolic implications, see especially duBois (1982). The second and third volumes of Foucault's *History of Sexuality* (Foucault 1976–84) have exerted a powerful influence on the study of ancient sexuality, though they have also met with severe criticisms: see Richlin (1992: pp. xiii–xxxiii; 1997). Work published under the aegis of Foucault's theories includes Halperin (1990), Winkler (1990), and Halperin, Winkler, and Zeitlin (1990). For a general review of the part sexuality played in Greek and Roman culture, consult Skinner (2005).

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CHAPTER 57

COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY AND LINGUISTICS

PHILOMEN PROBERT

QUESTIONS about the ancient Greek language arise in many areas of Hellenic studies and might include, for example, the following: (i) Which linguistic characteristics of the Homeric poems as we have them are particularly ancient? How ancient are they? (ii) Under what circumstances does Thucydides use an aorist participle in preference to a present participle? What about other authors? (iii) How did ancient Greeks address one another or make requests of one another? Did relative status or degree of familiarity or more specific social relationships play a role? Different questions demand different approaches. Comparison with related languages can provide insights into the prehistory of the language and contribute to questions such as (i). Question (i) also demands work on the internal history and dialectology of Greek. Questions (ii) and (iii) require in the first instance a synchronic approach, although a diachronic dimension may be gained through the study of texts from different periods. In what follows I attempt to highlight some (and necessarily only some) recent developments in these three areas: (1) comparative and historical grammar; (2) synchronic grammar; (3) social and stylistic diversity of Greek.

57.1. Comparative and Historical Grammar

Greek belongs to the Indo-European family of languages, which also includes: Latin (and its descendants) and the other Italic languages; Indo-Iranian languages, including Sanskrit and Avestan; Germanic languages; Celtic languages; Slavonic languages; Baltic languages; Anatolian languages, including Hittite; Armenian; Albanian; Phrygian; Tocharian. Members of this group display linguistic correspondences of a kind that points to descent from a common linguistic ancestor. (Many Indo-European languages also came into contact with one another at some period after their initial linguistic divergence, and points of correspondence due to such contact are often clearly distinguishable on linguistic grounds from correspondences due to common linguistic heritage, but in some instances the problem is more difficult. We shall not take up these issues here.) This common linguistic ancestor, conventionally called Indo-European or Proto-Indo-European, is not directly attested but prehistoric; estimates for the period for which one may speak of a Proto-Indo-European linguistic community range from at least the fifth to the third millennium BCE. There is no consensus on the region where speakers of Proto-Indo-European were to be found (see Mallory 1989).

Within certain limits and with a certain margin of uncertainty, it is possible to reconstruct linguistic characteristics of Proto-Indo-European. Methods of reconstruction rely on comparison between the attested Indo-European languages and on what is known about mechanisms and likely paths of linguistic change. The available methods allow us to reconstruct a sound system for Proto-Indo-European (although some details are highly controversial, as are aspects relating to pitch, rhythm, etc.), quite detailed information on inflectional categories with their markers and functions (again some points are controversial, as is the remote prehistory of the inflectional system within Proto-Indo-European itself), ways of deriving words from other words, and a considerable (but certainly far from complete) vocabulary. Methodological limitations make it more difficult to reconstruct Indo-European syntax, but these limitations may be diminished by an increased understanding of mechanisms and paths for syntactic change arising out of recent work in theoretical linguistics and language typology.

Greek, then, is one of the languages that is helpful if we wish to know about Proto-Indo-European. Its value for reconstruction is increased by its early date of attestation (Mycenaean Greek and Hittite provide the earliest known records of Indo-European languages) as well as by the large and relatively diverse body of texts surviving from ancient times. Conversely, the results of comparative reconstruction can shed light on Greek itself, for example by helping to distinguish linguistic archaisms from innovations. Innovations shared by some, but not all, Greek dialects

may point to periods of shared history or contact that are not always obvious from the geographical locations of the dialects in historical times (for example, Arcadian and Cyprian share significant linguistic innovations).

Homeric language may serve to illustrate further the value, as well as the potential difficulties, of distinguishing older and younger features. It is clear from Indo-European comparison combined with work on the internal history of Greek and the study of Homeric metre that the Homeric poems combine features from different chronological periods. A well-known example is the observation that words beginning with vowels but appearing to be treated metrically as if they began with a consonant are often words that originally began with *w-* ('digamma'). However, not all occurrences of these words are treated metrically as if the initial *w-* were still there: the older treatment 'with digamma' and the more recent treatment 'without digamma' appear side by side.

Since the decipherment of Linear B it has become possible to anchor some linguistic developments in time as pre- or post-Mycenaean, thus giving an element of absolute chronology. Word-initial *w-* never fails to be represented in Linear B: thus we might say that the Homeric possibility of scansion 'without *w-*' is a post-Mycenaean feature. On the other hand, certain phrases that appear to be metrically anomalous, such as *ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην* ('manhood and youth': Homer, *Iliad* 16.857 = 22.363), become metrically regular if they are replaced by earlier forms from a period when Greek still had *r̥ ('vocalic *r*', a probably rolled *r* functioning as a vowel)—so, in our example, if *ἀνδροτῆτα* is replaced by earlier **anr̥tāta* or **anr̥tātm̥*. The interpretation of Mycenaean spellings of words that originally contained *r̥ is vexed, but on current evidence it is likely that *r̥ had been eliminated by the time of the Mycenaean texts (see Haug 2002: 49–62, with bibliography). The implication, or at least the most obvious one, is that whole phrases such as *ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην* have been passed down since early Mycenaean or pre-Mycenaean times. (Such phrases have, however, received many different interpretations, including some that attribute the metrical irregularities to the prehistory of the hexameter rather than of the phrases in question. See Hajnal 2003: 46–8, 66–9, 77–9, 82–4, with bibliography. In the case of the phrase *ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην*, I return below to the question whether *καί* can have existed at such an early date.)

A syntactic archaism in Homer is 'tmesis' (the apparent 'cutting' of preverb from verb), which reflects the origin of the preverbs as syntactically independent adverbs. Tmesis has all but vanished from classical Greek except as a feature of poetic language. The Linear B texts contain not a single example of tmesis, despite numerous examples of preverbs compounded with their verbs. Again the language of Homer appears to include an element of greater antiquity than the Linear B texts, while also including post-Mycenaean elements such as the possibility of scansion 'without *w-*'. (For bibliography on tmesis, as well as a new interpretation to be mentioned below, see Hajnal 2004.)

The picture just presented is, however, based on some simplifications. One reason is that, as well as including features that cannot have coexisted chronologically in everyday language, Homeric language includes features that cannot have coexisted in the same dialect, but it is not always easy to decide whether a specific type of variation is due to chronological or dialect mixture. For example, not all Greek dialects lost initial *w-* at the same time as each other. Could the possibilities of scansion 'with *w-*' and 'without *w-*' be due at least in part to dialectal rather than chronological mixture (cf. Ruijgh 1985: 153; Latacz 2001: 197–8)? Another reason is that Greek was certainly divided into dialects already in the second millennium, even though the language of the Linear B texts is remarkably uniform across all the sites where they have been found. What we have in Linear B are records in a Greek dialect of the second millennium, not in common Greek: we know this because the language of the Linear B texts includes some linguistic innovations that characterize only some of the Greek dialects of the first millennium, for example the change *-ti-* to *-si-*, as in Mycenaean *didonsi* 'they give' (Classical Attic δίδουσι) from *didonti* (preserved as such in Classical Doric dialects). How legitimate is it to take Mycenaean as a relevant dialect for dating developments reflected or not reflected in Homer? A further simplification arises because the Linear B texts are administrative records: they are very unlikely to tell us about the whole range of stylistic registers of even the relevant dialect and period. Where Homeric language appears to be either more or less archaic than Mycenaean, there is the possibility that the differences are really dialectal or stylistic rather than chronological.

These observations are not new, but the possibilities raised are difficult to pursue further in the absence of direct records of other dialects or other stylistic registers from the Mycenaean period. Nevertheless, deductions about the dialect relationships in the second millennium may be made, cautiously, on the basis of the linguistic relationships between the dialects of the first millennium, Indo-European comparison, and the linguistic characteristics of Mycenaean, and these questions have indeed received considerable attention. Increasingly, the view that Greek dialects in the second millennium were divided into a relatively undifferentiated South Greek on the one hand (giving rise to classical Attic-Ionic and Arcado-Cyprian dialects), and a relatively undifferentiated North Greek on the other (giving rise to Classical Doric and North-West Greek dialects), with Aeolic perhaps transitional between the two, has gained considerable acceptance. If so, it may be legitimate to take Mycenaean as broadly representative of second-millennium South Greek, and as a relevant comparison for Homer insofar as there is little evidence of specifically 'North Greek' forms in Homer (though there are Aeolic elements). The extent to which the 'South Greek' dialects of the second millennium were or were not differentiated continues to be controversial, however, and new insights may change the picture for the language of Homer.

It is more difficult to find methods to determine whether a particular feature of the Mycenaean texts we have was confined to certain linguistic registers, but some

suggestions in this direction have been made. For example, it has been suggested that the lack or near lack of the augment in Mycenaean is characteristic of the stylistic or social register of the texts (see Morpurgo Davies 1985: 78, 104; Duhoux 1987). Recent work has seen attempts to uncover further evidence for dialectal or, especially, stylistic features of the Mycenaean texts we have, and in so doing to refine our picture of the linguistic relationship between Mycenaean Greek and the language of Homer. Two examples may be mentioned.

Hajnal (2004) examines the placement of preverbal and prepositional elements in Homer in the light of a hypothesis about phrase structure in early Greek, making use of insights from transformational-generative syntax, and argues that these elements are placed according to a synchronically coherent system (some secondary extensions apart), with the structures with tmesis being derived transformationally from structures without tmesis. Syntactically, then, Hajnal argues that the structures without tmesis are more basic, while those with tmesis are derived, and assumes that the syntactically derived structures are also the stylistically less neutral. He finds that the Mycenaean system lends itself to the same syntactic analysis as the Homeric system, except that the less basic or neutral structures are not found, and concludes that the whole system, including the derived structures, was known to the Mycenaean scribes, but that the derived structures belonged to a stylistic register not appropriate for administrative records. By contrast, tmesis was stylistically at home in the language of epic poetry. According to Hajnal, then, tmesis is an archaic feature with respect to Classical Greek (although there are survivals there too), but not with respect to Mycenaean (cf. also Haug 2002: 42–4, arguing a similar thesis on a different basis).

The conjunction *καί* ('and') never appears in the extant Mycenaean texts. The question of its pre- or post-Mycenaean origins arises in connection with the phrase *ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην*, mentioned above, which cannot have originated in pre-Mycenaean or early Mycenaean times unless either *καί* already existed then, or *καί* has replaced *ἠδέ* in the transmission of this phrase, or there has been some other verbal replacement (see Willi 2003*b*: 225–6, with bibliography). Willi (2003*b*) argues that *καί* originated as a sentence-connector, unlikely to appear in Mycenaean texts (which do not usually contain whole sequences of sentences) even if it existed in the Mycenaean dialect, and that when it came to connect words rather than sentences it did so first of all as a high-register variant, again unlikely to appear in Mycenaean texts. While he leaves open the question whether *καί* in fact existed already in Mycenaean times, some hypotheses about the origin and development of *καί* require the conjunction (although not necessarily its word-connecting function) to be of pre-Mycenaean origin, because they take its formation to pre-date sound changes that are themselves pre-Mycenaean. (So one of the two hypotheses Willi mentions in conclusion, ibid. 244–5.)

In the first example above we have a development that has been taken to be pre-Mycenaean (the loss of tmesis from everyday language) but may after all be

post-Mycenaean, while in the second example a feature that has been taken to be post-Mycenaean (the conjunction *καί*) may well have existed already in Mycenaean times.

The inevitable complexity of the linguistic situation in Mycenaean times, with different stylistically and socially as well as geographically defined linguistic varieties, has long been appreciated, but now there are increasing attempts to fill in the details. The indirect nature of the available evidence means that the results are likely to remain somewhat tentative, although some have a chance of being confirmed by new discoveries (for example, a single Mycenaean example of *καί* or of tmesis). More immediately, the work being done on the basis of the (indirect) evidence we do have, the formulation of hypotheses and their evaluation against each other, has a chance of leading eventually to a convincing and more refined picture of the relationship between the language of Homer and that of the Mycenaean texts—a picture that, one may say already, is unlikely to prove simple and will need to be used carefully in any debate about the prehistory of the Homeric poems.

57.2. Synchronic Grammar

Moving from diachronic to synchronic questions, we encounter partly different problems. Difficulties in the synchronic description of the Greek language at any stage, or of the usage of a particular author or genre, tend to concern cases where there is apparently a choice between two expressions for the same basic content and it is not clear what (if any) factors determine the choice of expression, or where there are inadequacies in existing accounts. Problems of textual criticism may be involved, since in order to account for choices of expression we first need to know which expression was indeed chosen in a given instance—yet manuscript variants may affect precisely the matters of interest. On the other hand, in order to resolve textual questions an editor may need to know which of two variant readings is more plausible on linguistic grounds. Avoidance of circularity here is a delicate matter (cf. Battezzato in this volume).

Areas currently receiving particular attention include the selection of verbal stem (especially the choice between imperfect, aorist, and perfect indicative, and between present, aorist, and perfect stem in the non-indicative moods); uses of middle, passive, or medio-passive forms; ordering of elements within the phrase; uses of cases and prepositions; and uses of particles. In all these areas good work was done in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and provides a solid foundation on which more recent work builds. The essential problem remains the same: to discover facts

about the distribution of apparently competing forms and expressions, and to use such facts to evaluate the contribution such forms and expressions make to the meaning of a text.

New advances are often due to new ideas about factors that *might* correlate with a choice of form or expression. Through the growth in cross-linguistic work in linguistic theory and typology, it has been possible to exploit a wealth of insights arising in work on diverse languages and to test their relevance for Greek. For example, work on a variety of languages has led to the conclusion that a sliding scale or hierarchy of 'animacy' is relevant for many linguistic phenomena, especially phenomena related to case-marking. First- and second-person pronouns fall at one end of this hierarchy, followed by third-person pronouns, human nouns, other animate nouns, and inanimate nouns. (For a summary with bibliography see George 2005: 86–7 with n. 16.) For Greek, the animacy hierarchy has been found to help describe the details of the choice between ὑπό + genitive and other markers of the agent with passive verbs, such as the dative of agent or other prepositional expressions (George 2005). Furthermore, the concept of animacy has been found helpful towards an apparently quite different problem, the syntactic and semantic behaviour of de-adjectival verbs such as στωμύλλω ('be talkative') (whose subject is στωμύλος, 'talkative'), or ποικίλλω ('elaborate') (whose subject makes an *object* ποικίλος, 'elaborate') (Barber 2005, 2006).

Work on other questions relating to the uses of middle and passive morphology has been informed by observations suggesting that the distinction between 'transitive' and 'intransitive' is not as clear-cut as traditional definitions suggest, but that prototypical transitivity is made up of several components, only one of which is the presence of a direct object. Others include the presence of a deliberately acting agent, and properties of the object such as definiteness and singular number. (Original proposal in Hopper and Thompson 1980; cf. Siewierska 1984: 15–19.) These components may be present or absent independently of each other, so that events are more or less transitive depending how many elements of typical transitivity are present. These notions, together with the related notions of 'prototypical agent' and 'prototypical patient', have inspired recent work on the uses of middle and passive morphology. Thus Allan (2003) argues that middle aorists and passive aorists are both used when the subject is affected by (i.e. undergoes a change of state as a result of) the event, but that a passive aorist is chosen when this subject resembles a prototypical patient, and a middle aorist when the subject more closely resembles a prototypical agent. As well as benefiting from cross-linguistic work relating to grammatical voice, ancient Greek is also a language with a typologically unusual voice system and has much to contribute to the typology and theory of grammatical voice (see Klaiman 1991: 82–104).

One of the most influential developments for Greek, arising in various traditions of linguistic analysis, has been the emphasis on the structuring of information

into elements with pragmatically different functions (for example into given and new information, or into topical, focal, and non-salient information), and the linguistic ways in which languages may reflect this structuring. The description of information structure provided in the theory of 'functional grammar' in particular (see S. C. Dik 1997) has inspired work on Greek word order (H. Dik 1995, 2007), the use of particles (Sicking and van Ophuijsen 1993), and, more controversially, the choice of verb stem (Sicking 1996). Following a different (transformational-generative) tradition, Devine and Stephens (2000) use concepts of information structure to describe the syntax and functions of Greek hyperbaton. There is broad agreement that information structure is relevant at least for the ordering of elements within the Greek phrase, and for the uses of some Greek particles: this much, if put in different terms, is already clear in the descriptive work of the nineteenth century. What functional grammar and other models have provided is renewed impetus to make finer distinctions between different sorts of salience or emphasis, and to determine which of these are relevant factors for example for the ordering of elements within the phrase, or for the uses of certain particles. There remains much disagreement on these details, not least because the relevant principles of information structuring are disputed, and because it is difficult to find objective means of identifying the pragmatic functions of different linguistic units in context (cf. Fraser 2001: 139, 142–6). But this is a field in which much work is being done in theoretical linguistics (see e.g. Gundel and Fretheim 2004; Ward and Birner 2004), and the study of ancient Greek has a chance of benefiting from current and future developments. At the same time, since Greek is a language for which pragmatic factors are clearly reflected in the ordering of elements and in the uses of particles, the study of Greek should itself provide valuable information for typological and theoretical work on these questions.

57.3. Social and Stylistic Diversity of Greek

Current work on Mycenaean Greek, as we have seen, takes increasingly seriously the principle that Mycenaean Greek should be expected to have had different social and stylistic registers, and seeks to uncover evidence for specific elements of such social and stylistic variation. This tendency follows naturally from a wider tendency to recognize for every period of Greek the expectation of social and stylistic variation, and of social factors in language use (e.g. the gender or age of a speaker, relationship between speaker and addressee, or type of situation). The difficulties are far less great, for example, for Classical Attic than for the Mycenaean period,

but we still rely entirely on written texts, and the social range of authors is limited. For investigations of interaction between speakers, texts in which there is little interaction are unlikely to be helpful.

A first question therefore concerns methodology: what sources and methods can we use to investigate sociolinguistic questions in a language for which we have exclusively written evidence, and what are the limits within which any conclusions may be maintained? Discussions of this question have been able to benefit from a wider debate about the use and value of written evidence for sociolinguistic work, as well as considering the particular circumstances of our evidence for Greek (see e.g. Dover 1981; Dickey 1995; 1996: 30–42; Colvin 1999: 12–26; Willi 2003*a*, esp. 1–7, 227–31). Although much caution is needed, the study of a well-defined written corpus turns out to have some methodological advantages (see Dickey 1996: 30–42), as does the availability of genres that feature parody of other genres (see Willi 2003*a*: 5–6).

Some of the areas in which the application of appropriate sociolinguistic methods has so far yielded results may be mentioned briefly. For the classical period, and in spite of the limitations of our evidence, a number of features of colloquial Attic and of socially determined variation have been convincingly identified (see López Eire 1997; 1998, with bibliography; Colvin 2004). Furthermore, at least two aspects of language that can be expected to vary with social relationships (and indeed to help maintain or negotiate social relationships) have received attention: forms of address (Dickey 1996; Brown 2006), and commands and requests (Lloyd 2006). The study of Aristophanes has yielded insights into Athenian attitudes to Greek dialects (Colvin 1999), while the study of Menander and of Aristophanes have yielded characteristics of women's language (Bain 1984; Willi 2003*a*: 157–97; Duhoux 2004). Aristophanes has now been exploited for a range of further ways in which linguistic choices reflected (or, again, helped to negotiate) social affiliations (Willi 2003*a*). More remains to be done, and there is a chance of gaining from continuing developments in sociolinguistic theory. Furthermore, it should be worthwhile continuing to broaden the range of genres and authors studied (even though some are more obviously and immediately productive of sociolinguistic insights than others) in order to produce as complete a picture as now possible of the distribution of a linguistic feature (cf. Dickey 1996: 41–2), as well as to show how the results should inform the interpretation and appreciation of a wide range of texts.

After the classical period we gain from the availability of sub-literary texts on papyrus and other materials, and from literary texts aiming at a more informal register than most of our classical literature. Increasing exploitation and better understanding of this material, as well as increasing study of the interaction between Greek and non-Greek languages in the *koinē* period, are contributing vastly to our understanding of the early and later history of the *koinē* and its regional and social diversity.

57.4. Conclusion

This survey has necessarily been selective in the extreme. I conclude by stressing what seem to me two essential points. First, typological and theoretical linguistic work has been, and continues to be, a valuable source of inspiration and hypotheses for work on Greek. Secondly, work on Greek requires not only ideas and hypotheses but their systematic testing against well-defined corpora of texts. Many of the most exciting advances of the past half-century, especially in synchronic Greek linguistics, owe much to the acquisition of new ideas and new techniques of analysis. The last decade or so has seen an increase in systematic checking of new theories, and this approach is yielding increasingly convincing, as well as increasingly sophisticated, analyses. There is much more to do, and the combination of attention to linguistic theory and typology and close work with the Greek material itself promises to yield many more results.

Suggested Reading

For an introduction to Indo-European comparative linguistics see Beekes (1995), Szemerényi (1996), and Forston (2004). For a textbook focusing in detail on Greek and Latin comparative grammar see Sihler (1995). For an external and internal history of Greek from the Mycenaean period to the present day see Horrocks (1997). For a basic introduction to Greek dialectology, with a survey of views on the relationships between the dialects and the position of Mycenaean see Duhoux (1983: esp. 7–63); cf., with more detailed bibliography, Schmitt (1977: esp. 118–33). For a concise introduction to Greek verbal syntax and semantics drawing on recent work in Greek synchronic grammar see Rijksbaron (2002). The majority of the papers in Adams, Janse, and Swain (2002) discuss interaction between Greek and other languages. For a wide range of up-to-date linguistic treatments of the *koinē* (including again interaction with other languages) see Brixhe and Hodot (1993–). For further bibliography up to 1992 on most aspects of ancient Greek linguistics see Meier-Brügger (1992).

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CHAPTER 58

EPIGRAPHY

P. J. RHODES

58.1. Inscription in Antiquity

Inscription, the writing of texts on permanent materials, is still used in the modern world. We have notices on shops and public buildings; lists of mayors in town halls and of clergy in churches; communal memorials listing those who have been killed in war and tombstones commemorating deceased individuals; engraved vessels in metal or glass celebrating a series of successes in a competition or some achievement by an individual; texts on coins and a variety of other objects. Inscription was used for comparable purposes in the ancient world; and, at a time when there was no printing or world-wide web or other modern means of disseminating texts, it was used for other purposes too: texts of laws, decrees, and treaties of peace and alliance, records of objects dedicated in temple treasuries or of expenditure on public building projects; also temporary notices, for instance, listing men called up for military service, cases to be tried in the law-courts, or business to be discussed in the assembly. Some states were more fond than others of inscribing public documents: Athens was not the earliest to do so, but from the middle of the fifth century onwards Athens did so on an exceptionally large scale, apparently on the principle that in a democratic state the *dēmos* needed to be informed (and with the implication that the average member of the *dēmos* could read inscribed texts or at worst find somebody to read them to him). But even in Athens the great majority of inscribed texts that have been found are tombstones and other private inscriptions.

Recently some people have emphasized the symbolic nature of public inscriptions—that a record of what temple treasurers had taken over from their predecessors and had passed on to their successors was a demonstration that they had done their job honestly rather than an invitation to public-spirited citizens to check the records—and have wondered how far it was seriously intended that such texts should be read. Some texts were inscribed in a style and/or in a place which will have made consultation difficult, but others were more accessible and were laid out in a way intended to help the reader. There was an awareness of what had been said in inscribed texts, so that the *stēlē* recording an alliance or a man's honours might be demolished if the alliance was broken off or the man fell out of favour. In 378 Athens founded a league of allies to uphold against Sparta the King's Peace, a settlement for the Greek states proclaimed by the Persian King in 386, but perhaps in 367 (when Thebes persuaded the Persian King to support an anti-Athenian policy) the passage in the prospectus of the league which referred to the King's Peace was erased, but not very thoroughly, so that it can still be made out (RO 22.12–15). Many published texts will not have been read often or by many people, as many texts published in the modern world are not read often or by many people; but it was still important that the texts were placed in the public domain so that those who did wish to read them could do so, and it is significant that a board of treasurers would mark its year of office by publishing a complex document rather than in some other way (and that, as a matter of routine, records were kept of a kind which made the publication of such documents possible).

Temporary notices were commonly written in charcoal on whitewashed boards (*leukōmata*, *pinakes*, *sanides*): none of these have survived, but we know of them from references in literary and inscribed texts. For inscribed texts, the most frequently used medium was stone, sometimes stone which formed part of a building, but often a free-standing slab, a *stēlē* (commonly the size of a modern tombstone, though for long texts or collections of texts larger *stēlai* could be used). Sometimes bronze plates, also referred to as *stēlai*, were used (and this was more frequent in Rome, which until the imperial period did not have easy access to suitable stone). For attractiveness, and to aid identification, the text of a public document would often have a heading in larger letters, indicating (for instance) the date and the subject of a decree, and at the top of the stone there might be a sculptured relief. Behind an inscribed text lay an original which commonly had been written on papyrus, which might be copied more or less completely and accurately by the inscriber (where we have more than one inscribed copy of a text, they tend not to be identical letter for letter and word for word), and which might or might not be stored more or less efficiently in an official archive or a private collection of documents after the inscription had been made.

Other permanent media could be used too. Texts could be scratched on sheets of lead (often used for curses and other imprecations, as discussed by Collins in this

volume; and we have a small but growing number of private letters written on lead). Coins could bear a 'legend': Greek coins are far less informative in this respect than Roman, but many Greek coins even in the classical period indicate the state which issued them (e.g. *AΘE* for Athens); and some series carry a man's name, either for dating purposes or because he was in some sense responsible for their issue. There were other kinds of tokens bearing texts: for instance, by the fourth century the official ballots used in Athens for voting in the law-courts or (on some issues) in the assembly were marked *dēmosia psēphos*, 'public ballot'; and there were inscribed tickets (*pinakia*), at first in bronze and later in wood, used with allotment machines (*klērōtēria*) for various allotments in fourth-century Athens. Painted pottery could have various kinds of text incorporated before firing: captions to elucidate the pictures, signatures of potters and painters, proclamations that somebody (usually a man) is *kalos*, 'beautiful'. Other texts might be incised on pottery at a later stage: an indication of ownership or dedication; a merchant's or dealer's mark (it is possible, but not certain, that late sixth-century Athenian vases with the mark *ΣO* found in Etruria were taken there by Sostratus of Aegina, mentioned as an outstanding trader by Herodotus 4.152.3). One special use of text on pottery is provided by the fifth-century Athenian institution of ostracism: there was no list of candidates, but each voter wrote (or had somebody write for him) on a fragment of pot the name of the man whom he wished to be banished.

It was realized to a growing extent in antiquity that inscriptions could be used as evidence to answer various kinds of question. Herodotus cites inscriptions, though sometimes problematically: inaccuracies, as on the 'reliefs of Sesostris' (2.106.2–5), suggest that a reference to an inscription (whether or not he also saw it) has come to Herodotus with a story, as something mentioned by his informant to support the story, and if he had been more critical he might have realized that in fact the inscription does not always support the story. Thucydides comes nearer to the modern use of inscriptions. He reports that the 'serpent column' set up at Delphi to commemorate the Greeks' victory over the Persians in 480–479 originally bore a couplet celebrating the role of the Spartan commander Pausanias, but this was erased and replaced with a list of states which shared in the victory (Thucydides 1.132.2–3: cf. ML 27), and he cites inscriptions to support his polemical account of the Pisistratid tyranny at Athens and its overthrow (6.54.6–55.2). Theopompus in the fourth century rejected as a forgery the inscribed Peace of Callias, allegedly made between Athens and Persia in the mid-fifth century, on the grounds that the inscription used the Ionic alphabet, which Athens did not adopt until the end of the century (*FGrHist* 115 F 153–5: those who believe in the treaty suggest that he saw a fourth-century re-inscription of an authentic fifth-century text). Craterus in the early third century (*FGrHist* 342) made a collection of decrees; Polemon of Ilium in the early second century was known as a *stēlokopas*, a 'glutton for *stēlai*' (Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 6, 234d).

58.2. The Modern Study of Inscriptions

As for the modern world, objects bearing inscribed texts are subject to the same hazards of survival and discovery as other physical objects from the past. Stones may be reused in later buildings; they may be moved elsewhere from their original location (over a considerable distance, if used to provide ballast for a ship); they may be broken in pieces, or their surface may be so damaged as to make them more or less illegible. Metal may be melted down to be reused. Pottery may be broken; or for a variety of reasons it may be taken elsewhere from the place of manufacture or inscription, either immediately or later. Although these materials cannot be totally destroyed, as papyrus, wood, and cloth can, not every piece, wherever it ends up, will centuries later be found and recognized for what it is. People who do find some of what remains may or may not be interested in what they find (and, if they want to farm the land or to erect a new building on it, they may have a positive desire not to alert those who might be interested in what they have found).

Early explorers of classical lands were quick to realize that inscribed stones were among the objects which they might find, and inscriptions were transcribed *in situ* or sometimes taken back and placed in museums and other collections. The first scholar to appreciate the possibilities of collecting inscriptions systematically and using them as evidence in the study of the ancient world was A. Boeckh (see Boeckh 1817). Before then he had already started planning the *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*, of which the first volume was published in 1828. As the volume of material continued to grow, new corpora were begun towards the end of the nineteenth century: the Academy in Berlin accepted responsibility for Greek inscriptions in Europe, and what finally became *Inscriptiones Graecae* had its first volume published in 1873; the Academy in Vienna accepted responsibility for Greek inscriptions in Asia, and the first volume of *Tituli Asiae Minoris* appeared in 1901.

Complications set in. Parts of *Inscriptiones Graecae* have reached a second edition or even a third, and there has been renewed energy since the reunification of Germany in the late twentieth century, but some gaps have not yet been filled, and some will never be filled within *Inscriptiones Graecae*. Excavators of various major sites, in Greece and in Asia Minor, have published their inscriptions in their own excavation reports rather than as part of the relevant corpus. There was a time when French scholars were unwilling to publish under German auspices, so that there has never been a volume viii of *Inscriptiones Graecae* devoted to Delphi (many Delphic inscriptions were published in *Fouilles de Delphes* iii, and publication of a *Corpus des inscriptions de Delphes* began in 1977), and the publication of the inscriptions of Delos began in *Inscriptiones Graecae* xi but continued in *Inscriptions de Délos*. Instead of *Inscriptiones Graecae* xiii, *Inscriptiones Creticae* was published in Italy. Several eastern European countries have published separate national corpora

of their own Greek inscriptions. *Tituli Asiae Minoris* has progressed more fitfully than *Inscriptiones Graecae*; in 1928 American and British scholars began a series of *Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiquae*; and since 1972 a team centred on Cologne has been proceeding city by city with *Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien*—rapidly (unlike the other corpora), aiming to make material published in many, often obscure, places easily available rather than to produce thoroughly researched new editions of the texts.

The fact that texts are published, re-edited, and reinterpreted in a wide range of books and periodicals can make it difficult for scholars to locate material which will be useful to them, but various aids have been devised. There are selective corpora, of texts which are particularly important in their own right or as examples of their kind, such as W. Dittenberger's *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum* and (from Asia) his *Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae*; or, for particular periods, the collections published in Oxford of which the most recent versions are R. Meiggs and D. M. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* (ML) and P. J. Rhodes and R. Osborne, *Greek Historical Inscriptions, 404–323 B.C.* (RO). There are collections which concentrate on inscriptions of a particular type: legal texts of the archaic period, in H. van Effenterre and F. Ruzé, *Nomima*; sacred laws, most recently in E. Lupu, *Greek Sacred Law: A Collection of New Documents*; verse texts, in P. A. Hansen, *Carmina Epigraphica Graeca*; texts chosen to illustrate the different Greek dialects, as in Buck (1955), which combines a description of the dialects with a selection of texts. Since ancient history is increasingly studied by people who have had little opportunity to learn the ancient languages, RO and some other recent collections include translations, and separate collections of translated texts are now being published: the series *Translated Documents of Greece and Rome* includes less easily available literary texts as well as inscriptions and papyri. There are two major annual surveys of newly published work: *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* (which includes texts when published elsewhere than in corpora), and the 'Bulletin épigraphique' published in the journal *Revue des Études Grecques* (which provides more discussion of the work which it chronicles). Gawantka (1977) gives references to more recent editions of inscriptions published in Dittenberger's two collections; and there is a website, *CLAROS* (www.dge.filol.csic.es/claros/cnc/2cnc.htm) which enables one more generally from a decades-old reference to track down more recent editions of the same inscription.

The study of inscriptions resembles that of papyri rather than that of literary texts preserved through the medieval manuscript tradition. The body of material includes texts of many different kinds, and it is enlarged by new finds every year. Many of the originals are fragmentary and/or hard to read, so that scholars have not merely to interpret a given text but often to establish and reconstruct the text. The traditional aids to the reading of badly worn stones have been: variations in lighting, both for direct inspection and for photography; using a mixture of water and

charcoal which can be run into the indentations to make them more clearly visible; and the making of 'squeezes', from soft wet paper beaten, or liquid rubber poured, onto the surface of the stone, to give a reverse impression of the surface (which has the disadvantage that the making and lifting-off of the squeeze may actually damage the surface). In the attempt to recover more letters of the archon's name in a much-contested Athenian inscription (ML 37 = *IG* i^3. 11), M. H. Chambers and colleagues at UCLA called in aid modern technology, using digital enhancement of photographs and shining a laser beam through the stone (Chambers *et al.* 1990; Chambers 1992/3). In this case many people were convinced by their results, though not all (I was myself one of the doubters); but light from a particular angle has now enabled A. P. Matthaiou and others to see on the stone the letters for which they argued (Matthaiou 2004). For another invocation of digital enhancement see (*IG* ii^2. 43 =) RO 22.12–15, with apparatus criticus, on the imperfect erasure mentioned above. Recently the use of another modern technique has been attempted: J. Powers and colleagues at Cornell University have used X-ray fluorescence to detect concentrations of trace elements in three inscribed stones, and have shown that this may help to recover letters which cannot be seen with the naked eye (Powers *et al.* 2005). As we await the recovery of text on rolls of papyrus at Herculaneum (discussed in this volume by Armstrong), we may wonder what the future will bring for inscriptons which are hard to read.

58.3. Inscriptions as Evidence

As with non-literary papyri, most inscribed texts are contemporary, in that usually a decree or treaty will have been published directly after it was made, financial accounts for a year will have been published at the end of that year, a celebration of victory in battle or in a competition will have been inscribed shortly after the victory, a tombstone will have been set up shortly after a person's death. There are some exceptions. When a document is published, there may be added to it earlier relevant documents which had not been published before (RO 95 contains Athenian honours decreed in 325/4, and also honours decreed for the same man in 330/29). A list of Athenian archons, from an early date, was inscribed *c.*425, but we do not know on what evidence, and how reliable how far back, it was based (ML 6). What purports to be a decree of Athens enacted on the proposal of Themistocles in 480 was inscribed in Troezen about 200 years later (ML 23). Most strikingly, what purports to be a letter of the Persian King Darius I (522–486) to a satrap or lesser official in western Asia Minor was inscribed, in Greek, in the time of the Roman Empire (ML 12). (See further Ma in this volume for the role of inscriptions in creating, as well as recording, a state's history.)

Even a contemporary text, even an official document published on the orders of the body which generated it, will often be problematic. The text of a decree will tell us what was decided, but often not (or not in a seriously informative way) why it was decided, or whether the decision was controversial, or whether the decision was implemented. The decision to honour a particular man for a particular service on a particular occasion may be of considerable significance (as when Aeschines challenged the proposal of Ctesiphon in Athens in 336 to honour Demosthenes because 'he always spoke and acted in the best interests of Athens': Aeschines, *Against Ctesiphon*; Demosthenes, *On the Crown*), but often the text will say only 'Since *X* has been a good man with regard to the people of *Y*' (e.g. RO 56, in which the city of Erythrae, in Asia Minor but not in Caria, honours the Carian satrap Mausolus). There is an Athenian decree of 386 from which only the end of the original proposal survives, but we assume that that included a bland statement of the reason for the honours awarded; but it is followed by an amendment which states the reason polemically: 'Because he passed over to the generals a message about the passage of the ships, and if the generals had believed him the enemy triremes would have been captured: it is in return for this . . .' (RO 19).

In the traditional mainstream of Greek history, inscribed texts of various kinds can fill out the picture which we obtain from histories and other literary texts, sometimes by shedding light on episodes which we already know of. ML 61 suggests that Thucydides was sufficiently fallible to misreport in 1.51.4 the commanders of one Athenian expedition; when RO 19, mentioned above, is set in its historical context, we see that Sparta's regaining control of the Hellespont in 387, which led to the making of the King's Peace, might have been avoided; and RO 22 and other inscriptions can be combined with the account of Diodorus Siculus 15.28–9 on the foundation of the Second Athenian League in 378. In other cases inscriptions reveal episodes which the literary sources omit. The 'Athenian tribute lists' (*IG* i^3. 259–90, extracts from the first list ML 39; in fact lists of the $\frac{1}{60}$ of the tribute given as an offering to the treasury of Athena, calculated not on the annual total but on the individual payments), insofar as they survive, tell us which member states of the Delian League paid how much tribute year by year. ML 72 is a record of loans from Athens' sacred treasuries to the state and interest due on them from 426/5 to 422/3, with a summary from 433/2: it does not state how much money there was in the treasuries at any date, and it ends with an arithmetical error in its totals.

As historians have stepped outside the mainstream to ask different kinds of question, they have been able to exploit inscribed texts of different kinds. We learn from Thucydides 6.27–9, 53, 60–1, Andocides, *On the Mysteries* 11–70, and other texts of the religious scandals in 415 which might have led to the abandonment of Athens' Sicilian expedition and did lead to the condemnation of Alcibiades and many others. The 'Attic *stēlai*' (so called by Pollux 10.97: *IG* i^3. 421–30; extracts at ML 79) record the sale of the property confiscated from those condemned, giving us a fascinating glimpse of what rich Athenians might own and what prices their

possessions could fetch (when sold in these unusual circumstances). Lists of members of the Athenian council enable us to trace the representation in it of the demes (local units) of Attica from the fourth century onwards—but we lack evidence for the fifth century, though we should greatly like to know whether there were major differences between the fifth century and the fourth (see in particular Traill 1975, and the collected texts in Meritt and Traill 1974). S. Brenne has made a study of the 272 Athenians against whom we have surviving *ostraka* (Brenne 2001). M. H. Hansen and his colleagues in Copenhagen have pursued various demographic enquiries on the basis of the funerary inscriptions of 4,519 Athenians (Nielsen *et al.* 1989; Hansen *et al.* 1990; Vestergaard *et al.* 1985, 1992).

There is much in inscriptions to interest students of Greek economic activity. Fourth-century Athenian laws discovered fairly recently reveal a procedure for testing what were presented as valid Athenian silver coins, and a tax in kind levied on the grain harvest of Athens' North Aegean islands Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros (RO 25, 26). An alliance of the early fourth century between Amyntas III of Macedon and the Chalcidians includes a section on trade (RO 12). Leases of agricultural land can tell us about Greek farming practices (RO 59, from Arcesine on Amorgus in the mid-fourth century, is particularly informative).

There are documents which shed light on public works: they often provide a date for works which could not otherwise be dated precisely (and which therefore help to provide a basis for dating other works for which there is not comparable evidence); they can show us how the work was apportioned among workmen and what kinds of men were employed in different capacities, how much was spent on the work, and so on. (See ML 59, 60, for fifth-century work on the acropolis at Athens; RO 45, 66, for the fourth-century rebuilding of the temple of Apollo at Delphi. Burford 1969 is a major study based on a set of records from Epidaurus.) We learn from the accompanying inscription that the well-known statue of a charioteer at Delphi is from the victory dedication of Polyzelus, brother of the early fifth-century Sicilian tyrants Gelon and Hieron: they, in their dedications after military victories, had stated their name and city without giving themselves any title (ML 28, 29); the original version of this inscription used the title 'lord (*anassōn*) of Gela', but later that was (imperfectly) erased and replaced by a text which used Polyzelus' name and no title (*Fouilles de Delphes* iii. 4. 452). The (disputed) original text and the change are of political significance; and the link with Polyzelus enables us to give a date (commemoration of victory in the Pythian games, almost certainly of 478 or 474) to a statue of major artistic importance.

For students of Greek religion there are not only the sacred laws mentioned above (RO 62, a calendar of festivals in Cos, and 73, regulations for a festival in Eretria, are examples) but many other kinds of inscribed text too. Many festivals involved athletic and musical/dramatic competitions, and these have given rise to inscriptions. Individual victors might set up commemorative monuments, as Polyzelus did at Delphi (dedications at Athens by the *chorēgoi* who were given financial

responsibility for a team of performers: *IG* i^3. 957–70, ii^2. 3025–72). Lists might be compiled of those who were victorious on successive occasions in the various competitions (at Athens, *IG* ii^2. 2318–25, re-edited in Pickard-Cambridge 1988: 101–20, with 362). If we turn to matters other than festivals, RO 102 is an extract from the records of cures of illness commemorated at the temple of Asclepius at Epidaurus; Hamilton (2000) is a study of the series of inventories of temple treasuries from Delos and, for comparison, from Athens. ML 44, prescribing in the 440s or 420s that the priestess of Athena Nike should be appointed from all Athenian women, gives us one of the few distinctively democratic features of religion in democratic Athens; RO 58, in 352/1, gives us an Athenian decree to call on the Delphic oracle to choose between two possible uses of a piece of sacred land in such a way that the god, when choosing between the proposal sealed in one vessel and the proposal sealed in the other, could not know by human means which was which.

Linguistically, inscriptions can tell us—as literary texts transmitted by generations of copyists cannot—how Greek was written in Ionia in the time of Herodotus or in Athens in the time of Thucydides, and inscriptions from the region in question can be set against Aristophanes' comic versions of Boeotian and Megarian in *Acharnians* and of Laconian in *Knights* and *Lysistrata*.

58.4. Conclusion

D. M. Lewis used to insist that epigraphy is not a distinct subject, but inscribed texts are simply part of the evidence available to us for the study of the ancient world, and we need to make the best use we can of all the evidence available to us which is relevant to whatever we are investigating: 'Every branch of classical scholarship involves inscriptions and [scholars] may have to know how to use them' (Lewis 1959: 284). The wide variety of epigraphic texts does indeed mean that epigraphy can help us in a wide variety of enquiries, and the continual increase in the body of material provides continuing opportunities to make further progress.

Suggested Reading

Woodhead (1981) is the standard English-language handbook on Greek inscriptions; a new handbook by G. J. Oliver is awaited. The most up-to-date guide to epigraphic bibliography is Bérard *et al.* (2000). The 2001 reprint of this contains a supplement which can be downloaded, along with further supplements, at www.antiquite.ens.fr/txt/dsa-publications-guidepigraphiste-en.htm. Bodel (2001), using more Roman than Greek

examples, discusses and illustrates the use of inscriptions for various kinds of historical investigation. Rhodes (2001) discusses various aspects of Greek (and also Roman) public documents. RO includes an Introduction focused on that collection of fourth-century inscriptions. Meritt (1940) stressed that an inscribed stone is a three-dimensional object, and that reconstruction needs to take account of all that is known about the stone.

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CHAPTER 59

ARCHAEOLOGY*

JAMES WHITLEY

59.1. INTRODUCTION

For many, archaeology must seem both an established and relatively straightforward methodology. Is not archaeology the study of material remains? Does not archaeology require the application of well-understood techniques, such as stratigraphic excavation, field survey, and museum study? Well, yes it does, but to what ends are these techniques being applied? Techniques only really make sense if they relate to particular research questions, questions of a broadly historical or anthropological kind. Does this then not make archaeology the 'handmaiden' of history? Well, up to a point. Archaeology is a particular form of historical enquiry, but (as I hope to show) that by no means makes it a 'handmaiden' to history. And archaeological enquiry does require the systematic coordination of a variety of techniques, of methodologies. In this short chapter I shall not try to summarize the techniques of archaeology, its methodologies, for several reasons. First, there are numerous primers on archaeological method available, which explain current techniques more fully than space allows here. Secondly, there are now simply too many techniques that require explanation. And thirdly, archaeological methodology is constantly changing, and the impact of new techniques is multifaceted. The application of chemical analysis and ceramic petrology is transforming field survey as well as our understanding of trade and exchange within the ancient

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Mediterranean. The application of soil micromorphology in settlement excavations is likely to have a profound effect on our understanding of ancient households.

Rather than being a 'handmaiden' to history, archaeology is best seen as a distinct form of historical reasoning, a form that relies primarily on material evidence. My purpose in this chapter is to give readers a flavour of how an archaeologist's reasoning (and priorities) differs from that of a historian. I must admit, however, that this view is not universally shared. What the word 'archaeology' actually entails in the field of Hellenic studies is far from clear. There are three areas of ambiguity: first, the range of material objects that archaeology examines; secondly, the question of whether 'classical archaeology' is a distinct sub-discipline, an archaeology apart; and finally, the question of the spatial and temporal scope of archaeology within the field of 'Hellenic studies'. Or, to put it another way, when does something distinctively 'Hellenic' appear that can be studied by the archaeologist? And when does the archaeology of Greece end?

59.2. The Scope of Archaeology within 'Hellenic Studies'

Classical *Altertumswissenschaft* (the scientific study of antiquity) has traditionally encompassed a variety of material sub-disciplines, of which 'archaeology' is only one. Numismatics, the study of coins, had developed a distinct disciplinary identity from as early as the eighteenth century (see Meadows in the next chapter), as has papyrology (discussed in this volume by Armstrong) from the nineteenth. The case of epigraphy is more ambiguous, since inscriptions have been studied as much by antiquarians and archaeologists as by historians. Epigraphy clearly requires specialist skills (see Rhodes in the previous chapter). But it is not immediately apparent whether inscriptions are primarily texts (which just happen to occur on objects), or primarily objects from specific contexts (which just happen to be inscribed). Insofar as epigraphic study (and publication) is moving to re-contextualize inscriptions, that is, to relate them more clearly to their original setting and to the objects (pots, stelai, bronze tablets, pins, statues) with which they are associated, epigraphy and archaeology are moving closer to one other.

More difficult to define is the relationship between archaeology and the study of visual culture and art. Traditionally, classical archaeology concentrated its efforts on the study of three categories of object: architecture (especially public and sacred architecture), sculpture, and painting. In this the subject was following the bias of ancient, particularly Roman, authors such as Vitruvius and the elder Pliny, who had particularly valued the works of famous artists such as Pheidias, Praxiteles,

and Polygnotus. Two developments changed this bias in the late nineteenth century. First, major excavations at sites such as Olympia uncovered large numbers of objects in bronze, lead, and ivory which were clearly not 'art' in Pliny's sense. German archaeologists re-labelled such objects *Kleinkunst*, 'small art' (Whitley 2001: 17–36). Gradually too, other media (such as mosaics) came to be studied. A further problem arose with painting, since most of the wall and panel paintings by ancient masters such as Polygnotus and Apelles had been lost. Numerous painted pots had survived, however, and the study of ancient painting became, by default, largely the study of 'vase painting'. Two approaches were emphasized: iconography and attribution. Both approaches were refined and practised with consummate skill in the early twentieth century by J. D. Beazley, who managed to attribute archaic and classical black- and red-figure painted pots from Attica to a number of painters on the basis of style (that is, tricks of draughtsmanship in the drawing of eyes, noses, ears, etc.). Other scholars later extended Beazley's approach to the classification and interpretation of painted Corinthian, Laconian, and East Greek pottery (Whitley 2001: 12–16 and 37–41).

By 1970 (the time of Beazley's death) classical archaeology, and in particular the archaeology of Greece, had begun to look a little strange from the point of view of archaeologists working on different periods and places. While a difference in approach between European or American prehistory and the archaeology of a historical period (such as classical Greece) might be thought to be natural, Greek archaeology's differences in approach from the archaeology of medieval western Europe, or from the archaeology of colonial North America, or even from the archaeology of Roman Britain, were more difficult to account for. Why was there so much emphasis on the classification, and in particular the attribution, of such a restricted range of objects? Should not archaeology address broadly historical questions, or deal with long-term historical processes? This disquiet prompted two very different responses. First, from about the mid-1970s onwards, some scholars consciously set out to borrow ideas, theories, and techniques from other archaeologies, and to extend the range of topics and questions that classical archaeology sought to address. In this, the objects themselves became secondary to the questions being asked and the methods being employed (Whitley 2001: 47–59). The second response was one of retrenchment. If some archaeologists were concentrating their efforts on measuring artefact densities in field survey, where did that leave classical art? Surely this subject required its own specialists? In this way classical art history was born, the traditional objects of classical archaeology receiving a light dusting of post-modernism in the process.

I myself have three difficulties with the notion of classical art history. For one thing, what counts as 'art' seems arbitrary. The objects singled out for special regard by the ancient authors do not correspond very much with those selected for 'artistic' study by modern scholars. No ancient author considered pottery (however well decorated) to be 'art', and some of the most celebrated and contested objects

of contemporary 'classical art history', such as the Parthenon frieze itself, were never mentioned by ancient authors. Secondly, the term itself is, in the field of Hellenic studies, problematic. There is no ancient Greek word for 'art'—*tekhnē* in ancient (not modern) Greek means 'craft' or 'skill', usually retaining overtones of cunning or trickery. The nearest we have to 'art' in ancient Greek is *agalma*, usually translated as 'adornment', and applied almost exclusively to votive objects. Art is a Roman term, and to use it is to look at Greek culture through the distorting lens of a Roman aristocratic collector. Thirdly, there is the implication of exclusivity that 'art' connotes. By definition, all art is material culture, but not all material culture is art. Why, then, separate the two?

Whatever one's view on this, archaeologists and art historians working in different periods have clearly responded differently to the question of where their real disciplinary affinities lie. In the process, 'Greek archaeology' has become fragmented. These different responses relate directly to the question of the temporal and spatial scope of both Greek and classical archaeology. The most extreme of these responses has been in Aegean prehistory, a field which perhaps best illustrates the problem of defining the place of archaeology within Hellenic studies.

In the heyday of 'Homeric Archaeology' the study of the prehistoric Aegean lay firmly within the boundaries of classical studies. In the earlier years of the twentieth century the question of the 'origins', both of the Greeks and of the 'Greek miracle', was paramount. For when does Hellenic studies begin? Certainly, archaeologists agreed, before 776 BCE (the traditional date for the first Olympiad). The archaeological record in Greece begins with some Lower Palaeolithic hand-axes found in the Grevena area. The earliest hominids in the Palaeolithic, and the first farmers in the Neolithic, periods in prehistory have never generally been considered 'Hellenic'. The Bronze Age of the third and second millennia BCE, however, faced two ways. Traditionally, before the 1950s, the Bronze Age has been considered both 'pre-Hellenic' but also firmly part of Classical studies. The terms 'Helladic', 'Cycladic', and 'Minoan' have been used for the Aegean in the Bronze Age. These terms refer to the archaeological cultures of three regions: 'Helladic' to the southern mainland (Thessaly and further south); 'Cycladic' to the Cyclades; and 'Minoan' to Crete. All are divided in a further tripartite manner into 'Early', 'Middle', and 'Late'. The Bronze Age ended shortly after the destruction of the major palaces *c.*1200 BCE, Greeks being thought to have arrived in the Early Iron Age (referred to as 'Early Hellenic'). But when the script of the Linear B tablets found in the Late Bronze Age palaces of Knossos and Pylos (and datable to between 1300 and 1200 BCE) was deciphered by Michael Ventris in 1953 and found to be in an early form of Greek, a reassessment was in order. The search was on for breaks in the archaeological record which would signal the 'coming of the Greeks', first in the mainland and then in the islands, 'the Greeks' being thought of as an Indo-European people who arrived from the north. The destruction of Lerna at the end of Early Helladic II (*c.*2200 BCE) and the appearance of 'warrior graves' in Knossos at the beginning of

Late Minoan II (*c.*1450 BCE) have both been seen as marking successive stages in the advance of Greek speakers across the Aegean.

After Ventris, one might have thought that 'Hellenic' archaeology would be redefined and allowed to begin sometime in the Bronze Age. Separating the Late Bronze Age out from the rest, and combining it with the study of the Iron Age and later periods, would have made most sense from the perspective of Hellenic studies. That is not, however, what has happened in recent years. Instead, 'Aegean prehistory', defined as beginning in the Neolithic period, and ending just after the destruction of the palaces (*c.*1100 BCE), has, through its extensive borrowing of theories and methods from other archaeologies, and through its own pioneering work in the fields of bio-archaeology, field survey, and the scientific analysis of ceramics, effectively been forming itself into a separate, and tightly defined, field of study (Cullen 2001). Practitioners of Aegean prehistory increasingly know more and more about scientific techniques, anthropological theory, and the archaeology of Mesopotamia, Mesoamerica, or Melanesia, and less and less about Classical studies. Aegean prehistorians and the experts on Athenian white-ground lekythoi have had little to say to each other of late. This leaves the study of the Early Iron Age in a kind of disciplinary no-man's land, half in 'classical archaeology' as traditionally understood, and half in Aegean prehistory.

In later periods it is the spatial scope of Greek archaeology that varies. At the end of the Iron Age the Greek world expands. The archaeology of archaic and classical Greek 'colonies' (the term is contested: cf. De Angleis in this volume) in the western Mediterranean, Libya, and the Black Sea, and the archaeology of Hellenistic cities and sanctuaries in Macedonia, Anatolia, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and even Afghanistan, have also been considered both Greek and classical. With the Roman conquest, the archaeology of the provinces of Achaia, Crete, Macedonia, Epirus Vetus, and Asia becomes part of Roman archaeology in general and, until recently, in the area of the modern Greek state, this archaeology has suffered from a comparative neglect. Byzantine archaeology is also clearly 'Greek', if no longer classical, but the subject is not so well developed as other fields. Investigation of the archaeology of Frankish, Venetian, and Ottoman Greece has at least begun, but has a long way to go.

59.3. What Archaeology Can Do For You: Three Case-Studies

In all this, it is difficult to view 'archaeology' as only a methodology, a tool which can be applied to address historical questions through material means. This is

not simply because relating the sequence of historical events to the archaeological sequence is rarely straightforward. Archaeological practice varies according to the 'Hellenic' status of the period and place being investigated. The more classical, and the more Hellenic, the period, the greater resistance to extraneous 'theory', and the more archaeological practice will distinguish itself from that undertaken in other parts of the world. This is not a good thing. Hellenic studies is failing to feel the full benefits that archaeology might open up to it, not only through borrowing from other archaeologies, but also from exploiting the full range of new techniques that have been developed in Aegean prehistory.

In what follows I intend to show what archaeology can do, using three case-studies. The case-studies are taken from periods, the archaic and classical, which are unambiguously Hellenic. The first, from Crete, illustrates what archaeology can do to address historical questions when the full range of new techniques is applied. This is a case of new questions creating new objects of study. The second, from Macedon, illustrates how the historical questions we ask are affected by new discoveries—not so much singly as in aggregate. Archaeology throws up many strange cases, which it is as much the historian's as the archaeologist's task to solve. The third illustrates how new ideas, particularly theories derived from anthropology, can be used to shed new light on some very familiar objects.

59.3.1. First Case-Study

One of the ways in which the ancient Greeks differed from ourselves lies in the manner of their eating and drinking. By this I do not mean that they ate different things—if we discount the impact of New World crops, the range of things they ate and drank is not that different, either from us or from their neighbours in the Near East. It is rather that the social context, and the occasions, in which they consumed meat, wine, legumes, and so forth differed radically. The occasions are related to institutions—they are socially and, to a degree, politically embedded. For classical Athens, we know from both literary sources and inscriptions about two of these institutions: the symposium and the religious festival. For it was at public religious festivals that large animals (such as bulls or sheep) were sacrificed, and their meat eaten by participants of both sexes in the festival. We know quite a lot, both from literature and iconography, about what a symposium must have been like; our sources are rich in hints as to the delicacies (chiefly fish) that were consumed. Archaeology (at least the presence of so-called *andrōnes*) indicates that symposia were primarily domestic, and so private, at least by the late classical period (and cf. Hobden in this volume). But for the Greek world outside of Athens we have to rely on archaeology. Can we assume that Athens represents some kind of 'norm'?

The answer here must be 'no', especially as regards the symposium. The archaeological record indicates that symposium sets first developed in Corinth, some time in the seventh century BCE, and were then reproduced in Athens, Laconia, and East Greece. But symposium assemblages conspicuously failed to develop elsewhere in the Aegean, particularly in Crete (Whitley 2001: 243–52; 2004). The decorated krater, the centrepiece for any symposium, almost disappears in the sixth century on the island, and the principal drinking vessel, the one-handled cup, is conspicuous by its plainness. Later literary sources suggest that a distinctly different occasion for male commensality, the *andreion*, developed on the island.

Recent excavations at the site of Azoria in Crete have shed light on this question (Haggis *et al.* 2004). Here large-scale excavations have revealed numerous houses and public buildings of a substantial settlement, which (judging from the pottery) was comprehensively destroyed around 500–475 BCE. Though we know neither the name nor the status of this settlement, the existence of public buildings indicates that it had a degree of political autonomy. The excavators have taken particular care to record both seeds and animal bones, and to relate this bio-archaeological record to the ceramic assemblages they have uncovered. This allows for an integrated approach to Cretan commensality. Marked differences from mainland practices have been revealed. First, the houses, though substantially built and with high (3 m) ceilings, are relatively simple structures, with two, three, or four rooms, but no *andrōn* (the space reserved for the symposium in mainland houses). Storage rooms with large *pithoi* are to be found in most houses, next to the main hall. Unlike earlier Geometric houses on the nearby Kastro, kitchens are separate, and burnt deposits from the hearths indicate that some meat was consumed domestically. Preliminary analysis of the seeds and bones indicate that the kinds of food being prepared in houses were quite distinct from those being prepared in these civic buildings. Elaborate storage areas are associated with public buildings. Excavation of one of them has revealed an assemblage of Cretan late archaic plain one-handled cups, coarse-ware krater stands, and kraters (together with a few Attic imports, some decorated with figure scenes): see figs. 59.1 and 59.2. This fact, together with the discovery of some fragments of bronze armour, has led the excavators to interpret this building as an *andreion*.

For the ancient historian, and for many archaeologists, the natural question to ask would be 'Is this building an *andreion*?' or 'Does this assemblage represent a Cretan symposium?' Such questions, however, framed in terms familiar from the literary record, substantially miss the point. Rather than argue about terminology, what the Azoria excavators have revealed are distinctive Cretan patterns that require explanation. First, one of the axioms of our understanding of mainland classical households is that they were autonomous economic and social units. Such an interpretation has been made forcefully in the case of two courtyard houses from Halieis (Ault 1999). But at Azoria the fact that storage areas are found both in civic and private buildings makes any interpretation that stresses the *autonomy*




Fig. 59.1. Late archaic/early classical drinking assemblage from the so-called *andreion* complex at Azoria (courtesy of Professors D. C. Haggis and M. S. Mook, the Azoria excavations, and the American School of Classical Studies at Athens).

of the Cretan household hard to sustain, especially when different forms of food preparation seem to be being practised in domestic and civic spaces. Secondly, whatever we call either the building or the assemblage, it is clear that krater-centred (male?) drinking practices took place in a quasi-public rather than a private setting in Crete. The decoration on the vessels themselves provides little stimulation for conversational prowess, of a kind glimpsed in Plato's *Symposium*.




Fig. 59.2. Second late archaic/early classical drinking assemblage from the Azoria *andreion* (courtesy of Professors D. C. Haggis and M. S. Mook, the Azoria excavations, and the American School of Classical Studies at Athens).

59.3.2. Second Case-Study

Macedon, like Crete, occupied an ambiguous position within the Greek world of archaic and classical times. Major excavations by important Greek archaeologists at Vergina, Dion, Pella, Sindos, Derveni, Archontiko, and elsewhere are designed to resolve this ambiguity to the satisfaction of modern Greeks, and so rescue the region from Demosthenes' immense disdain. And certainly, such excavations have uncovered many spectacular finds which are, stylistically and iconographically, as Hellenic as anything found further to the south. The tomb paintings from Vergina,

for example, are thoroughly 'Greek' as regards subject, technique, and iconography, and have filled a large gap in our understanding of Greek painting (Andronikos 1994). Less attention has been paid to the fact that such paintings were only preserved because they were in a tomb. It is precisely because Greeks further to the south did not expend so much energy constructing and decorating tombs for an elite group that we have this lacuna in the visual records. Or, conversely, it is precisely because Polygnotus set up his paintings in the Stoa Poikile in Athens, or decorated the walls, not of a tomb, but a symposiastic *leskhē* at Delphi—that is, in the public space of the sanctuary and the polis—that they have not survived.

For it is when we turn our gaze away from style, technique, and iconography, and look more closely at material and depositional practices, that the differences between Macedon and the regions further to the south become clearer. There seem to have been no major sanctuary sites within the territory of ancient Macedon in late archaic and early classical times—none, at least, that have left the enormous votive deposits we expect from a major Greek sanctuary (Morris 1998: 43–7; Whitley 2001: 252–5 and 406–12). Objects which, further south, we would normally expect to find ending up as dedications, in Macedon are deposited in graves. Like the tombs of Etruscan Italy, the late archaic and early classical cemeteries of Sindos and Archontiko are full of 'Hellenic' imports such as black-figure skyphoi and red-figure kraters. But the quantity of jewellery, weapons, and armour that turn up would just not be found in any contemporary grave in any cemetery associated with a major Greek polis. Before the late fourth century BCE no southern parallels can be found for the quantity of weapons and armour deposited in a number of rich warrior graves (particularly graves 131, 279, and 280) from Archontiko (Chrysostomou and Chrysostomou 2001, 2003). In Macedon, before the establishment of the sanctuary of Zeus at Dion, surplus wealth was given to the dead, not to the gods.

All this is to suggest that Demosthenes might have had a point—and the point is not the ancient (and modern) controversy of the Hellenic character of Macedon. At a fundamental level, Macedonian society, politics, and culture was distinct from that of the polis communities further south, and Macedonian material practices were the expression of this difference.

59.3.3. Third Case-Study

In central and southern Greece major deposits of armour have turned up, not in graves, but in sanctuaries, primarily in the Panhellenic sites of Olympia and Isthmia. Figure 59.3 shows a detail from a late archaic Corinthian helm from Olympia. It formed part of a large trophy of captured shields, greaves, and helmets, all inscribed, in broadly late archaic script:

ΤΑΡΓΕΙΟΙ ΑΝΕΘΕΝ ΤΟΙ ΔΙFΙ ΤΟΝ ϘΟΡΙΝΘΟΘΕΝ




Fig. 59.3. Detail of bronze helm of Corinthian type, Olympia B 4411, showing inscription (DAI Athens neg. nr. Olympia 4703, photo courtesy Deutsches archäologisches Institut, Athens; photographed by Eva-Maria Czakó).

The Argives set this up/dedicated this to Zeus from [*i.e. having taken it from*] the Corinthians.

This trophy has always posed a problem for the historians. First, there is the date of the hoplite battle at which the Argives defeated the Corinthians. Though the letter-forms indicate a date sometime in the late sixth or early fifth century BCE, the battle itself seems to have escaped the notice of Herodotus. Alastar Jackson (2000) has recently argued strongly (on both historical and archaeological grounds) for a date between 504 and 494 BCE for this trophy, and it is at this point that the priorities of the historian and archaeologist diverge.

For the historian, the find helps to fill in a gap in the political narrative of late archaic Greece. The Argive victory over Sparta's principal ally, Corinth, in the years in the run-up to the Persian wars may well be a factor in Cleomenes' subsequent harrying of Argos (Herodotus 6.76–83).

The archaeologist's interest is, however, quite different. For this trophy represents the high point of elaborate 'raw' dedications at major Panhellenic sanctuaries. 'Raw' dedications are those whose original function was not as a gift to a god, but as a useful object with a clear purpose (in this case, armour). 'Converted' dedications, on the other hand, are objects which could serve no purpose other than as a votive offering and which have no previous 'biography', such as the *korai* from the Athenian Acropolis. (For the distinction see Snodgrass 2006: 258–68; Whitley 2001: 311–13.) In general (and with many individual exceptions), the quantities of 'raw' dedications decline and the number of 'converted' offerings increase during the course of the fifth century BCE. Bronze pins and armour are seen more rarely, while




Fig. 59.4. The *Nike* of Paionios of Mende (DAI Athens neg. nr. Olympia 289, photo courtesy Deutsches archäologisches Institut, Athens).

purpose-made statues and votive terracottas increase. It is this general process that interests the archaeologist, a process most clearly seen at Olympia itself.

The end of this process saw a new kind of monument, the winged victory sculpted from a single block of marble. The *Nike* of Paionios of Mende (Fig. 59.4) has long been considered an important fixture in the history of Greek sculpture, and viewed primarily as a work of art. The setting of this monument (on a nine-metre high plinth with a triangular base directly outside the east entrance to the temple of Zeus) and its inscription—which reads:

ΜΕΣΣΑΝΙΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΝΑΥΠΑΚΤΙΟΙ ΑΝΕΘΕΝ ΔΙΙ
ΟΛΥΜΠΙΟ ΔΕΚΑΤΗΝ ΑΠΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΕΜΙΩΝ

The Messenians and Naupaktians set [this/me] up to Olympian Zeus as a tithe from the enemy

—proclaim this sculpture as primarily a monument to victory. Pausanias (5.26.1) confirms that this was set up after the Messenian/Athenian victory over the Spartan hoplites at Sphakteria (Thucydides 4.40.1). In brief, the *Nike*'s *function* is almost identical to that of the Argive trophy. It is a political sculpture (Hölscher 1974): both a thank-offering to Zeus for victory, and a painful reminder to the enemy (Corinthians or Spartans) of their defeat, in a setting which visitors to the sanctuary could hardly fail to notice. In both social and anthropological terms, both the trophy and the *Nike* act as a 'visible knot which ties together an invisible skein of relations, fanning out into social space and social time' (Gell 1998: 62).

Anthropological theory of this kind emphasizes the social role that objects play, their agency within a particular social and historical framework. Such an approach invites archaeologists to redefine their questions. In our case, what has to be explained is the late fifth-century preference for sculpted victory monuments. For in one sense, 'converted' objects of this kind were at a distinct disadvantage. A captured shield or helm, with its past biography of associations, is a more concrete insult, and reminder, of what the defeated side has lost than any sculpture, however striking or well executed. It is for this reason that the Athenians maintained on public view some of the hoplite shields that the Spartans had surrendered at Sphakteria. Representational sculpture is indirect; the *Nike* is an allegorical (not 'symbolic') reference to the Messenians' victory. Such indirectness may have been preferred by the Eleans, who were both responsible for the sanctuary and allies of Sparta. Another, more positive, factor may be simply longevity. Bronze armour decays if exposed to the elements. Unless maintained in a treasury or stoa (which the Messenians did not have), captured armour would not have lasted more than fifty years. The *Nike* lasted throughout classical antiquity, and this may have been the decisive factor in the Messenians' choice of monument and sculptor.

59.4. Conclusions

Many classicists find the intrusion of anthropological theory into the pure, aesthetic realm of classical art unsettling. Traditional classical archaeology has concerned itself primarily with the history of the genres of architecture, sculpture, and painting, and not with the historical and social processes that underlie them. But it is surely the archaeologist's task to describe, interpret, and explain the material record as a whole. That is, to attend to the patterns that the material record makes, and the processes that generate those patterns.

Archaeology is surrounded by misconceptions. One is that archaeology exists to confirm or deny the narratives of historians; another, that the material record exists

to fill in 'gaps' in the literary. My argument here is that the archaeological record has first to be explained in its own terms before it can be used for any purpose related to narrative history. One of the most frequently stated, and misleading, metaphors for archaeological endeavour is that the past is 'a puzzle' where we need to find 'all the pieces' and 'fit them together'. But it was never a puzzle—the picture was never complete. The pieces have been randomly selected for us by a combination of natural processes and human agency. Instead of pieces we have traces, which we have to interrogate as best we may. Such interrogation continues to stretch our reasoning, our technical capacities, and our ingenuity, and this is what makes archaeology so exciting.

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CHAPTER 60

NUMISMATICS

ANDREW MEADOWS

The study of coins, medals ... esp. from an archaeological or historical perspective. Also: the collection of these as artefacts.

(*OED*, s.v. Numismatics)

60.1. The Origins of Greek Numismatics

The date of the beginning of Greek numismatic study is as difficult to pin down as that of coinage itself, and depends in part upon the definition one adopts of the discipline. Like many modern academic disciplines, numismatics can trace its origins back to the Italian Renaissance. Inevitably, this means that much of the focus of early collecting and study of coins was on Rome, but Greek coinage was dragged along on Italian coat-tails, and the methods used, in the early stages, were relatively similar. The poet and humanist Petrarch (1304–74) is often credited with the first critical numismatic studies (Babelon 2004: 61; Haskell 1993: 13). The leap in imagination that Petrarch made was to compare the written sources for the ancient world with the physical evidence of the coinage. That he could do so was, of course, a sign that basic numismatic work was already under way, in the form of the collecting of ancient coins. In fact, Petrarch's observations on numismatic material had little impact on the development of the discipline. But the collecting of coins in which Petrarch and a number of his wealthy and titled acquaintances partook

would fundamentally shape the pursuit of numismatic study for the following six centuries.

During the fifteenth century there was an explosion of collecting, with many members of the royal houses and other nobility becoming fascinated by ancient coins. Jean, duc de Berry (1340–1416), brother of the French king, Leonello D'Este of Ferrara (1407–50), Pope Paul II (1417–71), King Alfonso of Aragon (1442–58), and the famous traveller and scholar Cyriac of Ancona (*c.*1391–*c.*1455), among many others, all formed collections of coins during this period. Much of this collecting was spurred, no doubt, by nothing more than the need on the part of an increasingly civilized aristocracy to display its credentials. But certain collections, perhaps like that of Petrarch, do seem to have been formed with particular aims in mind, or at least to have led their owners along new intellectual paths of enquiry. The French antiquarian Guillaume Budé (1467–1540) apparently used his collection of Roman coins as the basis for his metrological study *De Asse et Partibus Eius* of 1514. On the whole, however, the earliest published efforts at bringing coinage to a broader audience were concerned less with the substance of coinage and more with its designs.

Of foremost interest were the portraits that could be retrieved or imagined on ancient coins. First to bring this repertoire to a broad audience was the Italian Andrea Fulvio (*c.*1470–1543) who published at Rome his *Illustrium Imagines* (Fulvio 1517)—a compendium of images of the Roman emperors and illustrious individuals, including Alexander the Great and Cleopatra. A generation later, in 1553, Guillaume Rouille would produce his similarly conceived and ambitiously titled *Promptuaire des médailles des plus renommées personnes qui ont esté depuis le commencement du monde.* The work was a huge success, and was translated immediately into Latin, Spanish, and Italian. As far as the Greek world was concerned it was largely a fantasy. Numerous 'portraits' are identified or fabricated on the basis of misunderstood coins (Cunnally 1999: 101): Alexander the Great is represented by the head of Athena that appears on his gold coinage (Rouille 1553: 131). This fixation on the portrait is understandable in the context not only of the cabinets of curiosities in which coins were being kept across the continent, but also of the burgeoning interest in portraiture, for selfish reasons, on the part of the men who collected them. It is a fascination that still drives modern interest in ancient coins (e.g. Davis and Kraay 1973).

But at the same time scholars were emerging who were alive to the possibilities that the other side of the coin offered too. Coins could provide a window into the ancient world and its inhabitants as valuable as that offered by texts and inscriptions. At the forefront of this new, more serious approach to the material were the Roman Fulvio Orsini (1529–1600), Antonio Agustin (1519–86), ultimately archbishop of Tarragona, the Venetian Sebastiano Erizzo (1525–85), and the Parmigiano Enea Vico (1523–67). Between these last two an argument broke out that gives some flavour of the primitive state of numismatic study in the

latter part of the sixteenth century. The matter at issue was quite simply the function of the objects that were routinely being described by the word 'medal' and its continental cognates. For Erizzo they were commemorative medals, marking particular achievements. As such, the search for specific circumstances of issue in known political events was a legitimate activity. For Vico these medals were in fact coins, the currency of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Vico, we might say, eventually won the argument, yet the legacy of the commemorative interpretation has never fully gone away. The symbolic interpretation of ancient coinage continues to vie with approaches that emphasize its function (see e.g. Meadows 2001), and much of the use made of numismatic evidence by historians of the Greek world focuses on the depictions found on the coins (see e.g. Howgego, Heuchert, and Burnett 2005).

That views such as those of Erizzo could still be held is testament above all to the sketchy knowledge of the scope of ancient coinage in the sixteenth century. This was particularly true in the area of Greek coinage, which was not so well endowed with portraiture, less readily available to the Renaissance scholars of the West, and thus far more poorly understood than the Roman. A full overview of the extent and nature of Greek coinage would have made it clear that the medallic interpretation could not explain all instances. But the creation of an overview was still two centuries in the future. In the meantime, although the collection of coins remained the pastime of kings, princes, and the nobility, the locus of investigation into the nature of these ancient objects would begin to move into a more learned class. Wolfgang Lazius (1514–65), a doctor, was engaged to catalogue the imperial collection in Vienna. Louis Savot, the doctor of Louis XIII of France, produced in 1627 a *Discours sur les médailles antiques*.

> It was not long before physicians assumed a dominant role, and although most invalids of the period would have received far sounder advice from their doctors about their coins than about their digestions, it is tempting to speculate whether the medical training of so many numismatists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries may not have been at least partly responsible for the high standard of technical competence attained by this branch of scholarship. (Haskell 1993: 20)

60.2. The Emergence of a Discipline

The domination of Rome in the interests of collectors and scholars would continue well into the eighteenth century. However, as the East continued to open up to western travellers, the seventeenth century saw continued collecting of material

from the Greek world, particularly by the royal collections in Paris and Vienna. It is thus no coincidence that the first major steps were taken towards the creation of a distinct discipline of Greek numismatics in these two cabinets. The two key figures in this development were Joseph Pellerin (1684–1782) and Joseph Eckhel (1737–98). Pellerin was a serious collector of Greek coins, and assembled a collection of some 35,000 specimens, which was bought by the French king Louis XV. In a series of volumes Pellerin published a description of these coins. The novelty of Pellerin's undertaking lay in the organization he gave to his catalogues, dividing the material into coins of the kings in his first volume (Pellerin 1762) and of peoples and cities in the second (Pellerin 1763). Within the latter volume he abandoned the previous practice of simply listing the coins alphabetically by mint, and introduced instead a geographical arrangement adopted from Strabo, beginning with Europe, moving on to Asia, and finishing with Africa. In this way the scope of the field of Greek numismatics as well as the arrangement for describing it was established in the form in which the discipline is still broadly conceived. Greek numismatics still encompasses the coinage of the entire ancient world, excluding only Rome and northern ('Celtic') Europe. Yet, as the titles of Pellerin's works (*Receuil de médailles ... qui n'ont point encore été publiées ou qui sont peu connues*) suggest, they were still a long way from being the overviews of the field that were desperately needed. A constant preoccupation with the writings of collectors before and after Pellerin were the rarities and coins difficult of attribution. The common issues, and those less attractive to collectors, tended to be ignored. It took a professional curator to break that mould. Joseph Eckhel had been appointed Keeper of the imperial coin cabinet in Vienna in 1774. In 1792 he published the first volume of what would become a complete survey of ancient numismatics. The Greek section (parts I–IV) of his great *Doctrina Numorum Veterum* took up the geographical arrangement pioneered by Pellerin and added a depth of treatment that marks this as a watershed in the history of Hellenic studies. The attempt to provide surveys of the material—more or less complete—became an important goal of Greek numismatics for the next century. In Italy, Domenico Sestini (1750–1832), who had travelled in the Ottoman Empire and collected coins there, brought a traveller's experience to bear on the subject in his survey of 1797. Through his experience in purchasing coins in the East, Sestini was among the first to be able to bring the evidence of provenance to bear on the attribution of Greek coins to their places of production. In this sense, Sestini stands at the head of a tradition that would culminate in the discussions of coinage two centuries later by Louis Robert (1904–85). At the same time, the remarkable career of Théodore Edme Mionnet (1770–1842) was beginning in the post-revolution French national cabinet. From modest beginnings as a guide to collectors, Mionnet's *Description de médailles antiques* grew to a thirteen-volume reference work describing some 52,000 coins. Post-revolutionary not just in date, the enterprise had begun as a handlist to accompany sulphur casts of coins in the former royal collection, which Mionnet was now selling to the public. Physical

representations of coins that had previously been the province of the aristocracy were thereby available to a broader group of collectors.

Both Ekhel and Mionnet had been associated with major state collections and, as such, stand at the beginning of the move towards the creation and use of such collections to provide reference tools to an academic community. The second half of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries saw the development of national collections elsewhere in Europe. The British Museum was founded in 1753, and soon began the acquisition of a coin cabinet. In Berlin, the formation of a national collection to rival those of other states was a self-conscious movement of the following century. The collection grew by concerted acquisition, and increased tenfold in the generation from 1840 to 1875 to rival the collections in London and Paris. Such huge collections gave rise to ambitious publication programmes. In London the great British Museum Catalogue was begun in 1873, while in 1887 Barclay Head (1844–1914), curator of Greek coins at the Museum, published the first edition of his *Historia Numorum*—the first, and to date only, attempt in any language to provide a survey of every ancient mint and authority in a single volume. In the Berlin cabinet the focus was on the corpus of Greek coinage: an attempt to describe all known types. Here, the period 1878 to 1894 saw the publication by J. Friedlaender, A. von Sallet, and H. Dressel of the first, and only, three volumes of the *Beschreibung der antiken Münzen*, devoted to areas of Thrace, Macedonia, and Italy. But the project was overtaken by a bolder scheme proposed by Theodor Mommsen (1817–1903). At his behest, the Berlin Academy instigated a new corpus project which, under the general editorship of the Swiss F. Imhoof-Blumer (1838–1920), would produce five volumes, again beginning in northern Greece (Pick *et al.* 1898–1912 and von Fritze 1913), before plunging into an identity crisis under pressure from a radical new departure in the field of Greek numismatics (the die-study: see below). The French cabinet too would have its bold attempt to summarize the field in the form of the *Traité des monnaies grecques et romaines*, conceived and largely written by E. Babelon (Babelon 1901–33). Ambitious, learned, and idiosyncratic, this grand work remains, like the Berlin corpus, unfinished.

Meanwhile, a new watershed in the study of Greek coins had been marked in 1874 by the publication by Barclay Head of his conspectus of the coinage of Syracuse. Two features in particular stand out. The first is Head's explicit insistence on the need to examine the coinage of a city as a whole, by comparing issues in different metals (Head 1874: 1–2):

> It appears to me that a great drawback to the usefulness of many catalogues is the method which has been generally adopted of keeping the metals apart; for, when gold, silver, and copper are separately described, we lose sight of the minute links, such as monograms, symbols, etc., whereby I hope to be able to connect the issues in the different metals, and thus to fix the date of many coins which, for want of comparison with other pieces the date

of which is ascertained, have usually been massed together under the general heading of 'Autonomous, of Syracuse'.

Head thus abandoned the categorization by metal that had dominated the lists produced by collectors, in the quest to provide more accurate dates for the material at hand. This is an important point to stress, since Head is often, rightly, identified as a master exponent of the technique of dating by artistic style. In his process of minutely comparing details of the control marks (apparently applied by the ancient mints' administrators) on the coins, Head also moved beyond the simple concentration on the style of the main design of the coin to consider the mechanics behind its production. His close examination of the coins would henceforth be helped by the second innovation introduced in this article: the illustration of coins by photographic reproduction. The fourteen plates that accompanied his text provided the reader with the opportunity for the first time to examine the objects themselves, rather than line drawings, and thus to have access to the material directly, rather than through the interpretation of an intermediary artist.

60.3. Die-Study

The advantage of seeing a photographic reproduction rather than a drawing is obvious, and not confined to the study of coinage. But one crucial breakthrough, unique to the study of numismatic material, was now facilitated. Five years earlier, the English scholar E. H. Bunbury (1811–95) had published an observation that opened up a new avenue of approach. Comparing two coins of Lysimachus in his own collection, he noticed that while the reverse designs had different control marks and had thus been previously assigned to different mints in Thrace and Caria, the specimens with these controls in his collection had been struck from the same obverse die (Bunbury 1869: 5–6). He concluded that the coins must have been struck somewhat closer together geographically, as well as temporally. The great Imhoof-Blumer shortly afterwards made a similar observation in his study of the coinage of Acarnania, deducing this time that a shared obverse die indicated identical places of minting (Imhoof-Blumer 1878: 3). A third important tool in the dating and locating of the production of ancient coinage, alongside style and control symbols, had been mastered.

The reference to the dies used to produce ancient coins offered a further opportunity. Ancient coins were produced by the process known as striking. That is to say: a blank piece of metal, or flan, was placed on a lower die (the *obverse* die), perhaps set in an anvil, while a second die (the *reverse* die), on the end of a punch, was placed on top and struck with a hammer. Since the dies themselves were hand-engraved,

no two were ever completely identical. Thus it was possible to determine, as Bunbury and Imhoof-Blumer had shown, whether coins had been struck from the same die by comparing coins, or faithful reproductions of them, in close detail. Another feature of the hand-production of ancient coins allowed a further step to be taken. Obverse dies had a longer working life than reverse dies, probably as result of their protected position within an anvil. This being the case, it was possible to exploit this differential by examining which obverse dies were used in combination with which reverse dies, and thereby to establish a sequence of production at the mint. Figure 60.1 schematizes a sequence wherein an obverse die (A) survived in use with three reverse dies (a, b, c). When it broke, the third reverse die (c) was used with a second obverse die (B), which in turn survived it and went to be used with a fourth reverse die (d) before breaking, and so on. In theory, it was now possible to reconstruct the sequence of the production of coinage at a mint by scientific method, not simply on the basis of stylistic analysis.

The first attempt to present the output of an individual mint in terms of a categorization of the dies used came in 1906 with the publication by K. Regling (1876–1935) of his monograph on the South Italian mint of Terina (Regling 1906). A constraint in the application of this method is immediately apparent, however. In the absence of sufficient surviving specimens of a particular coinage, the full range of dies used cannot be observed, and unbroken ideal sequences such as that illustrated in figure 60.1 cannot be reconstructed. Regling, in fact, was unable to identify many die-links, but he had shown the way, and others duly followed. Four years later another German, P. Lederer (1872–1944) produced a die-study of Segesta, in 1925 W. Schwabacher (1897–1972) tackled Selinus, and two years later the American S. P. Noe (1885–1969) began his publication of the die-study of Metapontum. The medium reached what is often regarded as its apogee in the publication in 1929 by E. Boehringer (1897–1971) of his study of fifth-century BCE Syracuse. It was not simply the quality of the scholarship and the fine production standards that distinguished this work, but also the fact that Boehringer had substantial quantities of material in terms of surviving coins with which to work.




Fig. 60.1. Production sequence using obverse and reverse dies.

The development of the die-study in the early years of the twentieth century would have two important effects on the discipline of Greek numismatics as a whole. To begin with, classification by die presented a new challenge to the authors of the grand corpora and catalogues of Greek numismatic material begun at the end of the nineteenth century. A heated debate ensued in Germany as to the feasibility of recording within the scope of the Berlin corpus not just the types of all known coins, but the dies also. To most it seemed an impractically large undertaking. Yet the desirability of revealing the full history of a mint through the die-study was widely recognized. The way forward was clearly to conduct such studies on a smaller scale, yet this raised an important question about the future of corpus projects. This would be taken up in the de facto successor to the Berlin corpus, *Griechisches Münzwerk*, which from 1956 undertook to publish a systematic series of die-studies of mints as a continuation of the existing volumes of the corpus.

It was, by the 1930s, clear that the building-blocks for the creation of an overview of Greek coinage were to be die-studies, not individual specimens, or even the descriptions of rich collections of specimens. In 1927 the Catalogue of the British Museum collection of Greek coins ground to a halt, with twenty-nine volumes published and only Spain, Carthage, and North Africa left to go. E. S. G. Robinson (1887–1976), the author of the last volume, turned his attention instead to the task of publishing collections not with a view to creating monumental catalogues, but rather with the aim of providing the basic information about individual specimens, including photographic images, as quickly as possible to those who needed them for their die-studies. As Robinson himself would put it in his preface:

> The study of ancient, and particularly Greek, coins is now entering upon a new phase and must employ new methods. Most extant coins of outstanding importance, historically or otherwise, have been adequately published and discussed; and the general outlines have been laid down once for all. It remains to fill in the detail with the greatest richness possible. This can only be done through intensive work upon special periods and issues, in which large numbers of similar coins, common as well as scarce, are studied for minor varieties, and rigid chronological sequences are established on the evidence of die-identities.
>
> (Robinson 1931)

The *catalogue raisonée* was now dead. The professional presentation of numismatic material in collections now focused on the position of individual coins within the series of production of ancient authorities. The *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum* (*SNG*) series founded by Robinson under the auspices of the British Academy began the task of cataloguing, in the simplest possible format, the major public and private collections within the United Kingdom. Prior to World War II, the United Kingdom remained the only country to adopt such an approach, but during the 1940s the royal collection of Denmark began the process of publishing

Sylloges of its collection. Completed eventually in 1979 (a supplement appeared in 2002), the Copenhagen collection remains the only one to have been published thus in its entirety. Nonetheless, numerous other countries have set up *SNG* projects, formally or informally. To date, volumes have been produced devoted to collections in Germany, Italy, the United States, France, Sweden, Hungary, Austria, Greece, Switzerland, Finland, Spain, Israel, Poland, Slovenia, and Turkey. For the twenty-first century the future of this project is clearly digital. The UK *SNG* project is again leading the way, with the first web database of published collections (www.sylloge-nummorum-graecorum.org), now containing some 25,000 records.

The progress of the *Sylloge* project has been too slow, and too few of the major national collections have been included (digitally or in print) for it to have had the revolutionary effect for which Robinson hoped. Nonetheless, the die-study has continued to be the focus for much numismatic research. This has had the advantage of clarifying the chronology, both relative and absolute, of many coinages. It also holds out the prospect of the absolute and relative quantification of the monetary production of many ancient city-states, since the process of producing a die-study can reveal the total number of dies (or a statistical approximation thereof) produced by a city's mint in a given period. By comparing the numbers of dies used per annum in different cities, relative rates of production can be estimated. Two useful surveys summarizing the results of existing die-studies have been produced by F. de Callataÿ (1997 and 2003). By multiplying the numbers of dies used by a figure for the average number of coins produced per dies, it might also be possible to define mint output in absolute quantities of coin. However, there has been disagreement among numismatists about both the appropriate 'average' figure to use, and indeed the possibility of estimating an average (see De Callataÿ 1995). Perhaps as a result of this uncertainty, much of what can be deduced about the quantity of coinage produced at different places and different times in the Greek world has yet to be fully assimilated into mainstream historical discourse.

60.4. Hoards

The development of the mint- and die-study gave impetus to the growth of another branch of Greek numismatics: the study of hoards. Hoards—groups of coins buried or deposited together in antiquity—had been known and published since the eighteenth century (Kinns 1990), but played little part in the development of the discipline before the late nineteenth century. They offer two possibilities to the modern scholar. When enough hoard evidence can be gathered, then there is the possibility

of reconstructing ancient patterns of coin circulation. Sadly, the lack, even now, of an adequate body of material, and the unevenness of distribution of what is known, has prevented this form of analysis from being pursued as successfully as it has in Roman numismatics, where the hoard evidence is better suited to the task. The principal use of coin hoards to Greek numismatists has been in the establishment of chronologies for coinages. Coin hoards can provide a snapshot of the coins in circulation at the moment of their deposit, and thus allow the chronologies of the different mints included within any hoard to be compared against one another. Where an absolute date of deposit for a hoard can be established by independent means, whether by archaeological or historical context, or through the inclusion of coins of known date, then absolute dates can be assigned to the coinages included. When a mint- or die-study exists for those coinages and provides a relative chronology, then the occurrence of coins in a hoard of known date enables fixed dates to be inserted within that relative chronology.

It was in America that work began to systematize the use of hoard evidence. Following a methodological essay published in 1920, S. P. Noe produced the first survey of known Greek coin hoards in 1925, with an enlarged second edition appearing in 1937. This was further superseded by the appearance of the *Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards* (Thompson, Mørkholm, and Kraay 1973), now further supplemented by the periodical *Coin Hoards*, founded by Martin Price (1939–95) in 1975. It is a sad fact, however, that through a mixture of unenlightened nationalist antiquities laws and individual greed, many Greek hoards now pass into commerce without being adequately recorded.

60.5. The Future

The combination, since the beginning of the twentieth century, of wider publication of specimens, detailed mint- and die-studies, and the rigorous application of hoard and archaeological evidence, has resulted in a far clearer picture of the origins and development of Greek coinage from its beginnings in the late seventh or early sixth century BCE through to its demise in the reign of Tacitus (275–6 CE). A number of surveys of the history of coinage of these periods now exist to guide the non-expert. While minor changes will doubtless be required by the appearance of new die-studies and new hoards, surveys such as those of Kraay (1976), Mørkholm (1991), Crawford (1985), Carradice and Price (1988), and Butcher (1988) provide a summary of the results of two generations and more of solid, scientific advance unlikely now to be revised in their broad historical lines. There also now exist excellent surveys of the discipline's older and more recent history in the form of Babelon

(2004), Mørkholm (1980*a* and *b*, and 1984) and the superb multi-authored *Surveys of Numismatic Research*, published by the International Numismatic Commission.

Work on the detail remains a priority: many mints still do not have adequate studies devoted to them. Type-corpora and surveys are also badly needed, to provide overviews of Greek coinage in its entirety. The Berlin corpus was never finished, and the volumes that were published are now a century old. Similarly dated is the second edition of Head's remarkable *Historia Numorum*. One volume of a third edition has now been published (Rutter *et al.* 2001), but much more work remains to be done. Work has also begun on the establishment of a type corpus of the Greek coinage of the imperial period. *Roman Provincial Coinage*, an ambitious project to cover the entire phenomenon, now has three printed volumes (i–ii: Burnett, Amandry, and Ripollès 1992–5; vii: Spoerri Butcher 2006), and more are in preparation. Most significantly, the fourth volume has been published online (http://rpc.ashmus.ox.ac.uk/). The future of endeavours such as this is undoubtedly digital.

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CHAPTER 61

MANUSCRIPT STUDIES

NATALIE TCHERNETSKA

61.1. INTRODUCTION

MANUSCRIPT studies includes *palaeography*, the study of scripts, and *codicology*, the study of material properties of the manuscript, such as writing material and ink, manuscript format, and page layout. In defining the object of study as medieval books written on parchment and paper, manuscript studies is distinct from papyrology, which is concerned with books and documents written on papyrus, and from diplomatics, which considers legal and official documents. This distinction, however, is not absolute, as palaeography and codicology of papyri both exist, as well as comparative studies of book scripts and documentary hands (Cavallo *et al.* 1998). Manuscript studies is further related to book conservation, when it deals with the physical, chemical, and biological properties of parchments, papers, inks, and bindings; to art history, when it deals with manuscript illumination; to philology and textual criticism; to theology and Byzantine studies; and to history.

It was to support historical and textual research that manuscript studies was born at the beginning of the eighteenth century with the publication of *Palaeografia graeca* by Bernard de Montfaucon (1708). This treatise established the method of palaeography as the study of individual letter forms and remained the best work in the field until the early nineteenth century. Devreesse (1954), Dain (1964), and van Groningen (1967) give an overview of the history of manuscript studies up to the middle of the twentieth century, and discuss its main methods, terms, and problems. The second half of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence

of national schools in manuscript studies, in particular Italian (G. Cavallo) and Austro-German (H. Hunger, D. Harlfinger) schools, and the creation of an international forum for discussions, the International Congress of Greek Palaeography. The first congress took place in 1974 in Paris, and it was followed by others in Berlin and Wolfenbüttel (in 1983), Erice (1988), Oxford (1993), Cremona (1998), Drama (2003), and Madrid (2008). The congresses are considered the main event in the field, and the proceedings are standard works of reference for any student of Greek manuscripts.

The key questions in manuscripts studies are: *when* a particular manuscript was written, and *where*. Despite the methods and techniques developed in the last fifty years that allow us to analyse, date, and locate manuscripts with a precision unknown previously, these questions remain often unanswered. What are the objective criteria that allow us to date and locate manuscripts? What is the role of subjective opinion? Does a particular feature characterize a period, a region, a style, or a single scribe? How can palaeographical, codicological, philological, and historical criteria be combined to establish the date and location of a manuscript? Useful discussion of these questions, as well as of methods, challenges, and pitfalls, is found in Prato (2000: 671–707).

To find literature on topics relating to manuscripts studies, the bibliography of Canart (1991) is indispensable. For the period after 1990, bibliography on specific subjects is supplied in contributions to the *Proceedings* of the International Congresses of Greek Palaeography. In addition, scholars' names mentioned in this chapter are meant to be representative, and an internet search will yield further references to their work.

A word on terminology: as the main contributions to the development of manuscript studies in the last fifty years were made by scholars from the European continent, mostly in languages other than English, the field abounds in French, German, and Italian terms, for many of which there is no English equivalent (Cavallo and Maehler 1987: p. v).

61.2. Catalogues

There are more than 50,000 Greek manuscripts surviving (Dain 1964: 77), and the starting-point for their student is the catalogue of manuscripts preserved in any particular collection. The repertory of Richard and Olivier (1995), known as the Catalogue of Catalogues, lists existing Greek manuscript catalogues by library, as well as the majority of subject-specific and regional catalogues. Cataloguing is an expensive, time-consuming process that requires at the same time broad erudition and specialized skills, which explains why even important manuscript collections often have incomplete, out-of-date, or inadequate catalogues (for example, none

of the largest collections of Greek manuscripts in the United Kingdom can boast a comprehensive catalogue compiled more recently than the beginning of the twentieth century). However, shortcomings in the older catalogues should not be attributed to the negligence or ignorance of cataloguers, but should be seen rather as an indication of recent progress in manuscript studies. As a rule of thumb, the description in the catalogue should be double-checked, if possible and when it matters, against the manuscript in question.

The principle of not trusting catalogues has positive side-effects: the need to examine manuscripts *in situ* often leads to discoveries, which the field of manuscript studies still reserves for its students. In the nineteenth century, as the European manuscript collections were becoming well explored, scholars began travelling to libraries, museums, and monasteries in remote regions, such as Sinai (Bénéchévitch 1937; Géhin 1998) and Mount Athos. This trend continues to some extent today, as libraries in the Middle East, the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and even in Greece on the one hand, and private collections and museums on the other, open their doors to researchers. As recently as 1975 a spectacular discovery was made in St. Catherine's monastery in Sinai, where during refurbishment work several hundred fragments in different languages, including Greek, were found (Politis 1980; Nicolopoulos 1998). Less spectacular but still important discoveries may occur when re-examining manuscripts even in easily accessible libraries: one might find manuscripts that had been considered lost (Ševčenko 1977), reconstruct dispersed collections (Cataldi Palau 1995, 2006), or discover texts not mentioned in the catalogues (Cataldi Palau 2001).

Modern manuscript catalogues range from simple inventories, where each entry lists the essential information about the manuscript—author and title of work, size, script, date, provenance (a good example is Easterling 1966)—to detailed descriptions of scripts, material properties, and decoration, complete with bibliography and the history of the manuscript, such as in many of the catalogues of the Vatican Library (e.g. Canart: 1970–3). A model of catalogue entry that achieves a balance between fullness of coverage and clarity of exposition is set out in the catalogues of the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (Hunger, Kresten, and Hannick, 1961–94). Recent examples of successful specialized catalogues are *Aristoteles Graecus* (Moraux *et al.* 1976), and the catalogues of illuminated manuscripts in Oxford libraries (Hutter 1977–82, 1993).

61.3. Palaeography

Another essential tool for the student of Greek manuscripts is albums of script samples, collections of plates, and catalogues of exhibitions, all of which provide visual material to train the *occhio paleografico*, the palaeographer's eye. Equipped

with transcriptions (particularly useful for beginners is Follieri 1969) and with state-of-art commentaries (for the early Byzantine period, Cavallo and Maehler 1987; for the ninth to the twelfth centuries, Harlfinger *et al.* 1983; for dated manuscripts up to the year 1200, Lake and Lake 1934–45; for the thirteenth to the fourteenth centuries, Turyn 1964, 1972, 1980; for manuscripts of classical authors, Buonocore 1996), these visual aids are indispensable when learning how to read Greek scripts, to identify, date, and locate them. To find references to published visual material available on a given manuscript, the work to consult is an inventory of reproductions by Voicu and D'Alisera (1981), comprehensive for the period up to the late 1970s. The essential tool of palaeographical prosopography is the *Repertorium der griechischen Kopisten* (Gamillsheg, Harlfinger, and Hunger 1981–97), an inventory of scribes active between the eighth and sixteenth centuries, which covers libraries of Great Britain (vol. 1), France (vol. 2), and Rome (vol. 3). The fourth part, currently in preparation, will concentrate on Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. Each part identifies and lists the scribes, gives biographical data and bibliographical references, records all the manuscripts that are or can be attributed to the scribe in question, describes the scribe's style, and provides sample photographs.

Greek scripts are commonly divided into two categories: *majuscules* and *minuscules*, where the main difference lies in the way these are written. Each majuscule letter is written in a sequence of separate strokes and fits between two horizontal lines. Majuscule letters are of equal size, and each letter is separated from its neighbours, but there is no word-division (it is written as '*scriptio continua*'). Accents, abbreviations, and other reading aids are absent or sparingly used. Each minuscule letter or group of letters, on the other hand, is written in one stroke of the pen and fits between four horizontal lines, two main lines for the body and two for the upper and lower extremities. The size of the minuscule letters often varies, and there are gaps between groups of letters or between words. Accents, abbreviations, and reading aids are present or even abundant. Throughout much of the history of Greek manuscripts majuscule and minuscule coexisted, but chronologically the majuscule was predominant in the early period and the minuscule from the ninth century into the era of printing.

By the 1960s Greek palaeographers knew how to date and locate minuscule manuscripts within an acceptable margin of error, but manuscripts written in majuscules (also called *uncials* and *capitals* in older literature) were still posing a stiff challenge, and there were great divergences even between experienced scholars as to their dates and places of origin. This handicap was due to several reasons: majuscule scripts show little variation, fewer majuscule manuscripts have survived, and securely dated and located manuscripts are few.

In 1967 an Italian scholar, G. Cavallo, published his *Ricerche sulla maiuscola biblica*, in which he pioneered a method to analyse, date, and locate majuscule scripts. Cavallo started with the examples that were already dated and located, or

could be dated and located using non-palaeographical criteria, and observed the evolution of the script from its origins to the established canon and its decay. To date manuscripts, he analysed changes from one dated instance to the next, assumed that these changes were gradual and constant, and placed undated manuscripts in chronological order based upon these changes. To locate manuscripts, he discovered regional varieties with specific characteristics, and assumed that manuscripts displaying similar characteristics came from the same area.

The method should be verified by non-palaeographical criteria, but imperfect as it might seem, it has been used as a standard tool in dating and locating manuscripts written in majuscules ever since. Currently, palaeographers distinguish between the following major types of formal majuscule scripts: Biblical, Alexandrian, sloping pointed, and upright pointed (Cavallo and Maehler 1987: 4–5); there exist also manuscripts written in mixed scripts and in different semi-formal scripts.

Biblical majuscule, for which Cavallo (1967) remains the work of reference, is a square-shaped script (the round letters are written in such a way as to fit into a square), of solemn and sober appearance. Biblical majuscule was used until the ninth century for Christian and classical texts alike but particularly for biblical manuscripts.

Alexandrian majuscule (also known as Coptic uncial), for which the works of reference are Irigoin (1959) and Cavallo (1975), is characterized by alternating wide and narrow letters, all of them upright. The heyday of Alexandrian majuscule was in the sixth to eighth centuries, during which the script showed little variation, making specimens difficult to date. The clue to determine the date was discovered by Irigoin (1959: 46): the narrower the oval letters (omicron, theta, sigma, and epsilon), the more recent is the script. Alexandrian majuscule was used mainly for classical texts, and the vast majority of the specimens are of Egyptian origin.

Sloping pointed majuscule, characterized by the angular shape of the letters, the inclination of the letters to the right, and the contrast between thick and thin strokes, and between wide and narrow letters (Lameere 1960: 177–8; Cavallo 1977: 98–100), was used mainly for non-religious texts until the tenth century.

Upright pointed majuscule, for which the work of reference is Crisci (1985), characterized by the angular shapes of the letters, the contrast between thick and thin strokes, and light ornamental serifs, was frequently used in the eighth to ninth centuries and even later, mainly for religious texts (Cavallo 1977: 98, 103; Crisci 1985: 104–5). By the ninth century majuscule remained in use mainly for headings and rubrics. This function is known as *Auszeichnungschrift* (Hunger 1977).

Minuscule, which had evolved from cursive and documentary scripts, was adopted as a book-hand and, in the course of the eighth century, replaced majuscule as the main script. This is likely to have happened simultaneously in different geographical areas: scholars have noticed a special role of the Stoudios monastery in Constantinople (Perria 1993), and of Greek centres in Arab-dominated lands such as

Jerusalem and Damascus (Follieri 1974: 159–63). The main advantage of minuscule over majuscule is its economy, both in terms of time, since minuscule is faster to write, and in terms of writing material, since minuscule occupies less space on the page—something which mattered, since parchment, the main writing material of the time, was expensive and often scarce. The adoption of the new script triggered the *transliteration* or transcription of texts from majuscule manuscripts into minuscule (Ronconi 2003), which contributed greatly to the survival of classical literature.

The earlier minuscule manuscripts were written in pure minuscule letter forms, but soon majuscule-shaped letters were introduced, with a gradual increase in their frequency (Follieri 1962; Leroy 1978: 36–43). This tendency to vary and to diversify is typical for minuscule throughout its history: there are alternative forms for many letters, a variety of ligatures, and different writing styles and fashions. All of these variations provide useful hints for dating and locating minuscule manuscripts (Canart 1990).

For the ninth to tenth centuries, Follieri (1977: 143–51) describes and illustrates the main types; for the tenth–twelfth centuries, Hunger (1977: 202–4); for the eleventh to twelfth centuries, Canart and Perria (1991). Among the best-researched scripts are *Perlschrift*, a regular round book-hand, probably of Constantinopolitan origin, written upright or slightly inclined to the right (Hunger 1954), and the *bouletée*, with narrow letters inclined to the left, and hooks on the lower strokes (Irigoin 1977*a*). In the later period many writing styles coexisted, such as those known as Anastasios (D'Agostino 1997), '*en as de pique*', and Hogedon (Canart 1990). New trends appeared, such as archaizing book-hands used in religious and liturgical manuscripts, imitating earlier models (Prato 1979; De Gregorio and Prato 2003). *Fettaugen-Mode* is a script from the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries characterized by exaggerated large round letters (Hunger 1972). Different types of *Gebrauchschrift* (Hunger 1977: 208) became common.

Parallel to formal, more or less calligraphic minuscule, different informal scripts were used, mainly in the books copied for private purposes (De Gregorio 1995). Study of these scripts was pioneered by Wilson (1977), who identified the so-called scholarly hands and established that they could be dated by comparison with documentary scripts, which *are* dated. Since then, study of informal scripts and comparative study of book-hands and documentary scripts, both for majuscule and minuscule periods, has become a promising direction for research and one of the methods used to understand the evolution of Greek scripts and to help in dating and locating them (Crisci 1996; Cavallo *et al.* 1998; Messeri and Pintaudi 2000; De Gregorio 2000; Cavallo 2000).

One of the main problems of Greek scripts, as well as one of the main interests for scholars, lies in the regional varieties which existed despite a tendency to uniformity. The best-researched geographical area is southern Italy (Devreesse

1955; Canart 1978), which is partly due to large numbers of southern Italian manuscripts surviving; partly due to distinctive characteristics of these manuscripts in the matter of scripts, types of parchment, and decoration; and partly due to the progress made by the Italian school of manuscript studies in the last fifty years. Well defined are the writing styles of Rossano (Lucà 1985–6) and of Terra d'Otranto (Jacob 1977; Arnesano 2008). In recent years scholars have been concentrating on less well-known geographical areas (see contributions in Cavallo, De Gregorio, and Maniaci 1991, and in Perria 2003): these include Cyprus (Constantinides and Browning 1993), the Middle and Near East (Crisci 1996; Perria 1999), mainland Greece (Prato 1991), and Epirus (Reinsch 1991; Cataldi Palau 1997, 2006).

61.4. Codicology

Codicology deals with material properties of a manuscript book, such as: the writing material (papyrus, parchment, paper); ink; volume size, composition of quires, number of folios, signatures (Mondrain 1998), and catchwords; page layout (Maniaci 2002*a*), ruling, pricking, the number of lines and columns; and titles and headings, decoration, and binding. (Scholars working in these field include: J. Leroy, L. W. Jones, K. Weitzmann, A. Weyl Carr, L. Brubaker, S. Dufrenne, I. Hutter, B. van Regemorter, D. Grossdidier de Matons, N. Pickwoad, and G. Boudalis.) Codicology is helpful especially in the case of minuscule manuscripts: see contributions in Maniaci and Munafò (1993).

Additional criteria for dating and locating manuscripts have emerged from research on paper, which first appeared in Europe around the year 1000. Initially, paper was imported from the Orient (so-called *bombycin*); the first western paper, of Italian origin, was used in Byzantium from the middle of the thirteenth century (Irigoin 1950, 1953). Structural differences between Oriental and western papers can help to establish the date of a manuscript. For western paper, additional help is given by watermarks, attested from the end of the thirteenth century, which technically are traces left by wire patterns in paper moulds. Watermarks were used by paper producers as their trademarks: as the moulds had a short lifespan (two years maximum), and the produced paper was usually used up within three to four years, watermarks provide useful clues as to where and when a manuscript could have been copied (Harlfinger 1974, 1980*b*).

More directly than other branches of manuscript studies, codicology borrows methods and techniques from the natural sciences, including quantitative methods (Ornato 1997): the results are interesting, but often inconclusive.

The necessity of the codicological approach in manuscript studies was championed by Irigoin (1958–9). Admitting that the study of the script alone did not

suffice to date or, especially, to locate Greek manuscripts with precision and certitude, he suggested examination of all the material properties of a manuscript. Assuming that manuscript workshops had their own 'house style', one could reconstruct groups of manuscripts produced in the same workshops and subsequently identify these workshops (Irigoin 1958: 210).

This approach has become standard good practice for manuscript scholars, and has allowed some remarkable progress: for example, Irigoin (1977*b*) identified a group of manuscripts of Greek and Byzantine historians that were all of large format and had thirty-two lines to a page as having been copied in tenth-century Constantinople. Gamillscheg (1977, 1981*a*) discovered a homogeneous group of fifteenth-century manuscripts containing grammatical treatises, identified the scribe, Georgios Baiophoros, and reconstructed the contents of the library in the Prodromou-Petra monastery in Constantinople, for which the scribe worked.

Fruitful as it may be, a codicological approach should be used with prudence: even numerous similar features encountered in different manuscripts sometimes turn out to be coincidental and would not necessarily imply the manuscripts' close relationship. Phrases like 'archaeological study of the manuscript book' have been coined to define the combined approach of codicology, palaeography, philology, and history to the study of manuscripts, which are seen as witnesses to the writing and reading culture of a particular period (Maniaci 2002*b*). This approach is particularly productive in complex cases, as Ronconi (2007) demonstrates in his study of miscellaneous manuscripts of the ninth to twelfth centuries.

The combination of codicology, palaeography, philology, and history also works well in the study of manuscripts of the Renaissance and humanism, as the spread of Greek learning and the arrival of numerous Greeks in Italy multiplied manuscript production. The scribes of the period develop an individual writing style and frequently sign their manuscripts; many are prolific, write for particular patrons, and collaborate with particular paper producers and artists (Harlfinger and Harlfinger 1974–; Harlfinger 1977; Eleuteri and Canart 1991); the number of autographs increases (Gamillscheg 1981*b*). These changes allow scholars to conduct monographic studies of single scribes (e.g. De Gregorio 1991), and to research the history of libraries and manuscript collections (e.g. Mondrain 1991–2, 2000).

The second half of the fifteenth century sees the beginning of the printing of Greek texts, dominated in the early years by the search for suitable scripts to serve as models for the printing types. Practices varied: some printers adapted Latin scripts, others imitated contemporary humanist scripts rich in ligatures and abbreviations, yet others searched for usable older scripts among manuscripts and epigraphic sources (Irigoin 1992). Although early printed books share many features with manuscripts of the time, and manuscripts continued to be copied as late as the nineteenth century (though the practice was limited to

liturgical texts in remote Greek monasteries), the manuscript gradually cedes its role to the printed book, and becomes an object of collection, study, and discovery.

61.5. Palimpsests

The search for new texts gave birth in the eighteenth century to palimpsest studies. A palimpsest is a manuscript where a new text has been written over the original content (Dold 1950; Lowe 1972). As the lower scripts might have preserved unknown or rare texts, researchers have been trying to discover palimpsests in manuscript collections and to decipher the underlying script with the help of methods ranging from the philological to the forensic (Benton, Gillespie, and Soha 1979). In the nineteenth century the only efficient method of decipherment was by treating palimpsest leaves with chemicals. It was adopted by most prominent scholars in the field, such as Angelo Mai, who discovered and deciphered numerous classical texts in the Ambrosian and Vatican libraries—and damaged numerous manuscripts in the process (Timpanaro 1980: 227–30)—and Constantin Tischendorf, who brought to Europe many palimpsests of biblical texts from remote eastern libraries (some acquired in dubious ways: Tchernetska 2000).

In the early twentieth century ultraviolet photography came to assist decipherment, but at the same time, due in part to the success of papyrology, which provided a rich alternative source of previously unknown Greek texts, the study of palimpsests diminished. In the late twentieth century, however, thanks to the adoption of the all-inclusive approach to the manuscript as witnesses to Greek writing culture, palimpsest studies have seen a revival, with the focus on analysing methods of recycling, material properties, scripts, and historical backgrounds. Examples of this new approach are studies of southern Italian palimpsests by Crisci (1990) and Arnesano (1999).

Still, the original impulse of palimpsest studies, the search for unknown texts, may have surprises in store. It is in palimpsests that two new texts, probably the most important in the last ten years, have been discovered: an unknown fragment of a New Comedy, possibly of Menander, in a palimpsest from the Vatican Library (D'Aiuto 2003), and fragments of two new speeches of Hyperides in the famous Archimedes Palimpsest (Tchernetska 2005).

Both discoveries were in part made thanks to the progress achieved in the application of information and digital imaging technologies to manuscript studies. This application has been particularly successful in three areas. First, the production of electronic catalogues, databases of images, and bibliographies, including those accessible on-line. Secondly, adaptations of computer algorithms used in genetics to study relations between manuscripts (Macé, Schmidt, and Weiler 2001; Macé,

Baret, and Lantin 2004). Thirdly, experiments with digital imaging technologies—digital photography with subsequent computer manipulation of the images—to read faded, damaged, and otherwise illegible manuscripts, which began in the late 1970s (Fossier and Irigoin 1990). As digital imaging has matured and become more widely available, there have been recently some encouraging results (e.g. the digital network *Rinascimento virtuale*).

61.6. Conclusion

The case of the Archimedes Palimpsest illustrates the main points discussed in this chapter, reflects current trends in manuscript studies, and gives a foretaste of problems that contemporary scholars are trying to solve. The original manuscript containing works by Archimedes was copied in the tenth century. Since the script does not exhibit any provincial features, and mathematical treatises are most likely to have circulated in the learned circles of the capital, it is reasonable to suppose that the copying was carried out in Constantinople. Somewhere in the thirteenth century the Archimedes manuscript was dismembered and used as writing material for a Euchologion, a common prayer-book (Wilson 1999). As the leaves from the Archimedes codex did not suffice, the scribe recycled leaves from several other manuscripts, including speeches of Hyperides and philosophical commentaries. The upper text of the Euchologion is a puzzle in itself: its script seems to be of southern Italian style (Lucà 1999: 56–7 and n. 18), whereas the type of prayer points towards Palestine (Parenti 2005). The reuse of several unique classical texts in one palimpsest makes us extremely curious as to the place where the Euchologion was produced.

The further itinerary of the palimpsest illustrates the history of manuscript studies and discoveries: the palimpsest travels to the monastery of Mar Saba, then to Jerusalem and Constantinople, when it is first mentioned by western travellers (in the middle of the nineteenth century), then catalogued (late nineteenth century), and finally brought to the attention of the scholarly community, as a result of which it was partly deciphered, and published (early twentieth century). For most of the twentieth century, however, the manuscript disappears, only to re-emerge towards the end of the century in Paris, severely damaged by mildew and embellished by forged illuminations (Lowden 2003).

Sold in 1998 at Christie's to an American, who preferred to remain anonymous but sponsored the conservation and research project under the auspices of the Walters Art Museum, the palimpsest has finally received the scholarly attention it deserves. The objectives of the project are to develop dedicated multispectral imaging techniques to enhance the legibility of the underlying texts, to conduct

the necessary conservation treatment, to research the making of the book, and to decipher and study the texts—all made possible by the recent progress in manuscript studies and by increasing cooperation between manuscript scholars and scientists.

Suggested Reading

Reference works: in addition to Dain (1964), van Groningen (1967), Hunger (1973), Treu (1977), and Sirat, Irigoin, and Poulle (1990), see Devreesse (1954), Ševčenko and Mango (1975), Harlfinger (1980), and Géhin (2005). Proceedings of the international congresses of Greek palaeography are: Glénisson, Bompaire, and Irigoin (1977); Harlfinger *et al.* (1991); Cavallo, De Gregorio, and Maniaci (1991); Prato (2000). Also Atsalos (forthcoming). For bibliography, Canart (1991). Periodicals important to the field include: *Codices manuscripti*; *Gazette du livre médiéval*; *Revue d'histoire des textes*; *Scriptorium*; *Scrittura e civiltà*.

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CHAPTER 62

PAPYROLOGY

DAVID ARMSTRONG

On 24 June 2005, Martin West published for the readers of the *Times Literary Supplement* a newly discovered poem of Sappho, first identified the year before—not a fragment, a virtually complete poem (West 2005). The ageing speaker is watching a chorus of young girls and compares herself sadly to Tithonus, the withered lover of the Dawn. It was read and discussed by scholars, theorists, and critics all over the world before the next few months were over. Soon after that the University of Cologne, the owner of the papyrus, made available on the world-wide web high-resolution photographs that enable anyone who knows the ancient Greek alphabet to count over and re-analyse to the extent their knowledge allows them every letter, dot, and fibre on which the published texts are based. That's a high claim, and of course the actual papyrus will always be essential to anything but the putting of intelligent questions, but it symbolizes great changes in the field.

Papyrology might have furnished one of the most exciting, but at the same time most forbidding, topics in this book as recently as ten years ago. The texts were fascinating; but you could not participate in their making, not as a non-specialist. But it would have been an exciting article anyway, even then. Ever since the field of Oxyrhynchus papyrology was established over a hundred years ago and the first great heap of treasures became available, papyrology has been central to whatever there was of excitement and new discovery in classical literature and social history. Now, just in the last few years, it has become a field that continually grows both in importance and—quite suddenly—accessibility to students everywhere. To parallel what has been the greatest introduction to this field for decades, Eric Turner's *Greek Manuscripts of the Ancient World* (Turner 1987), there will soon be the possibility of a net-accessible text like his with high-resolution images for study and reference,

not mere printed photographs. Indeed, the website of the University of Michigan Papyrus Collection (details in 'Suggested Reading' below) is rapidly becoming something like a new Turner. This growth in importance and accessibility is not merely technological, but comes from crucial changes in focus in our studies, which without neglecting the established canon of great texts in poetry and prose, turn our attention to what was once considered marginal. Literally marginal, in some cases, for the methods and mindset of scribes and commentators, and even of the schoolchildren who copied out poems and prose texts from memory or dictation, are now objects of interest and study in themselves.

Texts from less-studied periods of antiquity and especially later antiquity become important to us. Documentary papyrology, sometimes thought pedestrian in comparison with literary papyrology, turns out to reveal what we are now most interested in, the life of the subject classes rather than the life of their governors; the life of women, children, and slaves along with the life of free male adults (indeed, women, children, and slaves are already separate categories on the Michigan website). It also supplies priceless background for later literature, like the once-neglected and now eagerly studied later Greek novels. Literary papyrology is continually revealing more about even such great authors as Archilochus and Sappho and the tragedians (since we still care and will never cease to care about the once-canonical standard authors); and is revealing, just as continually, more about authors and periods once thought minor but now seen as crucial evidence for the intellectual interests of less exalted people, literate and illiterate.

Paralleling this growth of possibilities for study and understanding, there is a technical revolution suddenly affecting the accessibility of all these texts as profoundly as the ongoing projects to digitize and make available all the holdings of major libraries round the world. In the final analysis, editing a rare book will still require looking at it and (cautiously) handling it; but knowing what is in it, and that in great detail, will not need more than a computer screen. And the same will be true of papyri, and of all ancient manuscripts: papyrus, parchment, and other media alike. Only editors and those who want to question the smaller details of text in the papyri will from time to time need actually to look at them, which will greatly extend the usable life of these fragile objects. In my own days as a graduate student forty years ago, and for a long time after, what were the chances of one's questioning a reading by the ranking experts like Lobel or Page in some Sappho or Alcaeus papyrus? The great scholars looked to in those days to publish the papyri diligently published, at least in the case of a great many of their texts, such photographs as the era's technology allowed them (unattractive and poorly detailed though they are by today's standards). But in fact not many of their equals in learning, let alone ordinary students of the classics, would have ventured to contradict their opinion of what the text said on such a basis. Unless you were at a university with its own large papyrus collections, you mostly took all papyrus texts as given from on high.

This is suddenly no longer the case (and the same goes for the whole world of ancient manuscripts on all materials), with the explosion of imaging technology in the last decade. I do not mean that all the difficulties that used to make papyrology a *hortus conclusus*, a closed garden for specialists, are gone in an instant. Documentary papyri are written in all sorts of more difficult Greek script and require a lot of knowledge of technical business and government formulas to fill in correctly where there are fillable gaps. Literary papyri are mostly in uncials, that is, require you to know the Greek alphabet. It is only when (as is admittedly all too often the case) the text is damaged that a more developed eye for palaeography and scribal habits is called for, not to mention a feeling for the author's style and for what is possible or plausible Greek to fill in gaps. But even here image manipulation software makes it comparatively easy, and even pleasurable, to test out hypothetical supplements against the spaces and letter traces in the manuscript, and questions about Greek usage and stylistic habits that would in earlier generations have called for months of reading and deterred all but the hardiest can be answered in seconds with the aid of computerized resources such as the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* (*TLG*), which makes possible searches in the whole of Greek literature, and not merely that of the periods formerly most favoured by the authors of traditional grammars and other print reference works. For editing, though, there is still required a patience for setting and proofreading texts, and a gift for supplementing damaged ones with the missing words required by context that excludes all but (to say the least) the truly persistent and truly thoughtful.

Of course, that is still an issue. Longinus said that verbal criticism is πολλῆς ... πείρας τελευταῖον ἐπιγέννημα, the final epiphenomenon of long experience with language (*On the Sublime* 6.1). In my own case, and many another American scholar's, even hard study of Greek and Latin was not enough without adding teaching to reading, without years of explaining every word of many a text from many different periods of prose and poetry to a class of undergraduates. For most of us that is the necessity which leads one to the apparently unappealing but really very rewarding study of grammar and stylistics, a study in which even old paladins of verbal learning from generations ago, like J. D. Denniston's *Greek Particles* or W. Goodwin's *Greek Grammar*, suddenly become fascinating and indispensable companions. Accounting for every word makes you many times better as a literary critic; but at every stage, unless writing a full commentary, and especially in a classroom, mistakes, at least minor ones, are forgivable. Inseparable from papyrology is rigorous accounting for every letter or fragment of a letter, whether or not it even belongs to an intelligible or recoverable word, making, at least in principle, *no* mistakes, whether minor or major. It is your text and it is all new, and no one else can profit from it if the details are wrong or the supplements tactless or overambitious. Even the rules of accent come in play. As a great papyrologist, Anne Hanson, once said to me: 'Graduate students can skip the rules of Greek accents if they like when they study literature, but not in papyrology, because it's your text,

and you have to put them all on yourself.' Since all Greek literature, or nearly, is on the web in the form of the great *TLG* databank, she meant that you can generally cut the accented form into your paper or thesis—but not here. Every niggling detail of philology, stylistics, and proofreading comes up in papyrology, magnified into the all but back-breaking and eye-blinding, and it takes all the Greek you have and more even to try.

But many another difficulty is suddenly vanishing. The difficulties I mentioned in setting and proofreading text with not just every accent but every one of the papyrological symbols original and correct are more than halved by the ease with which computer commands are made for every one of the accents and symbols. The finding of words which not merely complete the sense, but can be shown by their appearance in similar and contemporary writing to belong securely to the period and style of one's text, has been remarkably accelerated by *TLG* programmes, which sort all or nearly all Greek known from Homer to late Byzantine texts to an ever-increasing number and subtlety of specifications. Most of all, we can be grateful for the increasing detail of digital photographs of our texts and in particular for the new multi-spectral imaging (MSI), which can reveal text unreadable even to the magnifying glass or the microscope on burnt or damaged papyrus. No one will ever again have to go actually blind over a papyrus or a manuscript, as Ritschl famously did over the Ambrosian Plautus palimpsest in the 1870s. Nor, of course, will it all now be done merely by computer images. No one even now should edit a papyrus without becoming intimately familiar with the object itself. But I think such things as learning the techniques, in a basic graduate seminar, and offering alternative suggestions of one's own to an editor's readings, are now in principle open to students and scholars on an equal basis everywhere. With the MSI images at hand, even the most challenging carbonized texts from Herculaneum become relatively easy to read. We can blow images up to large size; change contrast; blow them up still more to the largest size the pixels will currently allow; see clearly the original shape of ambiguous-looking letters that the best microscopes available, stared through in the brightest Naples sunlight the great skylights in the Officina dei Papiri at the Naples National Library could let through, had never been remotely sufficient to discern. Most excitingly, we can digitally cut misplaced fragments off it, the little *sovrapposti* and *sottoposti* familiar to Herculaneum students that glued themselves onto preceding or following columns of the papyrus, and paste them into another place on it one or two columns earlier or later. In places where our guess is right, the tiny but now completely visible fibres of the papyrus itself match up on the screen, to show that this or that bit really was torn off when it was opened in the age of Napoleon from another part of the papyrus, and really belonged here or there. The process had been done before, physically (with all the danger to the papyrus that that suggests), or by calculation with callipers; but it can now be done in the ghostly world of the computer screen without touching the original at all.

The problems of ordinary papyrus are less dire, but the technological revolution is coming to all. *Non sunt ad caelum elevandae manus neque exorandus aedituus*, as Seneca says of searching one's own soul (*Letters* 41.1): you need neither raise your hands to heaven nor beg the temple custodian—of a papyrus collection, in this case: it is all coming onto the world-wide web. Before long, scholars will be able to read for themselves, as well as their knowledge of the language allows them, every papyrus that has been digitally photographed and transcribed by some qualified researcher assigned to it. And with still better photography. Multi-spectral imaging, the current state-of-the-art technique, is not yet three-dimensional, for example, and doesn't let you see round corrugations and folds in the surface—but that will happen, and soon; digital flattening of papyri is already in prospect.

I won't attempt to catalogue the vast results of two centuries and more of papyrology in this space. It's not even a start to say that almost all the wonders of Greek lyric poetry are the gift to us of these years, and that more appears yearly, like the new Archilochus elegy (*P.Oxy.* 4708), and the new Sappho. Even more striking is the immense and ongoing addition to our knowledge of once-lost ancient dramatic literature—previously known largely by sententious quotations, and now known by generous passages of action and dialogue from previously unknown plays thanks to papyrology, so that no one understands the real, astonishing complexities of Aeschylus' or Sophocles' or Euripides' stage presentation, psychology, or thoughts about gender and class without them. Or the wondrous fragments of lower genres like mime. But to talk about what I do not work on is nothing compared to talking about what I do, the Herculaneum papyri. When I first contemplated joining the international group of new readers of these who, thanks to the late Marcello Gigante's enthusiasm and leadership, were being welcomed to the study of the precious originals at Naples in 1990, I remember how Elizabeth Asmis said: 'Don't be afraid: any good scholar who has the patience can read them.' Sixteen years later, I realize that she might have added: 'and the lifespan.' But she was still perfectly right.

The Herculaneum papyri, like other ancient Greek literary papyri, present one only with uncials and no, or only one or two simple, abbreviations, depending on the scribe, and are mostly very beautifully and clearly written. On the other hand, they are very fragmentary, presenting what approximates most nearly to continuous text (for many gaps remain) only from the more malleable and less burned insides of rolls. Another difficulty is that they give us very nearly our only surviving examples of Greek prose—not just philosophical prose but any formal prose—from the age of Cicero, and their idiosyncratic vocabulary is sometimes only paralleled by Greek words casually dropped, as being current and conversational, by Cicero into his Latin letters. Most of them come from an Epicurean philosophical library that probably belonged to Philodemus of Gadara *c.*110–30 BCE. His patron, L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, consul in 58 BCE and father-in-law

to Julius Caesar, probably owned the great Villa of the Papyri after which the Getty Villa museum in Los Angeles is modelled (though there were two floors, recent excavation has revealed, below the atrium terrace that Getty's architect had never heard of). The whole family were devout Epicureans, including Piso's daughter Calpurnia, whose dream before Caesar's death Plutarch (*Caesar* 63) characterizes as a brief excursion into superstition that startled Caesar because she had never before exhibited a tendency to believe in dreams, gods, or omens in all the years of their marriage. Philodemus taught them and others (under their sponsorship) Epicureanism and the history and doctrines of other current philosophies that competed with it. These others included, as was guessed in the nineteenth century and confirmed in 1989, Virgil and three of his, and Horace's, closest friends: Quintilius, Varius Rufus, and Plotius Tucca. (The latter two edited the *Aeneid* after Virgil's death.) Some of the books (again, most probably) were acquired by Philodemus in Athens, where he studied before he came to Italy, and were intended to last his own teaching lifetime. They include works of the Master himself, Epicurus, otherwise not preserved. Very many are lectures and treatises he himself wrote and first-rate scribes transcribed for him. Just as his language tells us about Greek prose of a period otherwise unrecoverable, his philosophy, or as much as we can read of it, tells us how Epicureans adapted their philosophy for Roman audiences of the days of Cicero, who knew Philodemus himself, and liked him personally even though he had violent political quarrels with Caesar and Piso.

Catullus also knew his work; at least he imitates one or two of Philodemus' clever epigrams, which we know Cicero also enjoyed, two-dozen of which survive in the manuscripts of the *Greek Anthology*. These poems—so typically of today's world of discovery in papyri—have recently been enlarged by the opening four or five words of twenty-seven more epigrams previously unknown, in a papyrus index like the 'index of first lines' in an *Oxford Book of Verse*. The papyrus was published in 1987, and is now available in high-quality images on the Oxyrhynchus Papyri website (see 'Suggested Reading' below).

Philodemus, the author of most of the Herculaneum papyri, ought to be a prime example of the kind of interesting new character added by papyri to classical history. He was a person risen from the masses at the fringe of the Roman Empire to associate with the classes at the centre, a writer with unusual and liberal and unconventional opinions and touches of style that influenced the canon of certified great writers, though he wrote poetry (as far as we know) only in the 'minor' genre of epigram, and rarely makes use of an elaborate or rhetorical style in his prose. But Philodemus' writings have had an unusual fate. They were discovered in the 1750s at the Villa, but what can be read now was mostly opened by the best machines available in the late eighteenth century. It was a hundred years before scholarly editions of them started to appear, and not all of these can be cited with confidence. It takes a specialist to know which of them can be cited and what parts are better

than others. Still important in editing are the drawings (*disegni*) made of them at first opening by artists who, it was supposed, would do better for knowing nothing of Greek but the alphabet, or not even that. These contain much significant text that was lost in the processes of opening, mounting, and hanging them for display on museum walls. (They are now kept more responsibly in cabinets.) Though remarkably well done, particularly in representing proportion and space in the lettering, they contain many errors. A remarkable number of editions of Philodemus—nearly until Marcello Gigante's day in the 1970s, when microscopes were first introduced into Herculaneum study—were done from the drawings, either alone, or with the help of examinations of the papyrus itself that seem in most cases to have taken nothing like what we would now think enough time to produce results. The standards of papyrology in those days allowed for liberal and unconvincing supplementation in ill-considered Greek, and the snobbery against Philodemus as a minor and subcanonical writer led to a search for fantasy-fragments created by these supplements alone of everything from tragedy to Xenophon, in the assumption that these would give the poor man's text an interest it did not have in itself. As great a man as Hermann Diels could produce two-dozen columns of an important text, *De Dis* Book 1 (Diels 1916), in which hardly a single sentence was perfect and many whole pages made only something like sense, just because he read the papyrus and supplemented in contradiction to the drawings wherever he liked. Discarding this sort of thing wholesale and starting over as the photographs dictate, producing a cleaner text consisting only of dots for what is lost, supplementing only with Greek that makes sense and precisely fits the traces for what remains, is one of the great pleasures of a Herculaneum scholar's life. The whole world of international work on Herculaneum texts started changing for the better under Gigante from the 1970s. I myself am grateful beyond words for my seven years of study with him at various times *before* the new MSI photographs came along in 2000 and revolutionized Herculaneum work at once. They gave me a respect for the importance the original has for an editor, which I would not otherwise have known. But digital photography makes a better world for the fragile papyri as well as the scholar: they can be consulted as little as possible for the work and thus survive as long as possible.

If Philodemus was to be cited with confidence there had to be a text the world of scholarship could control and, hard as we laboured between 1993 and 2000, we were making some but not enough appear; nor did we really see how, without the same number of visits to Naples on their part, our texts could be talked back to by other scholars. Now at last we do. The papyri have all been done (and continue to be redone) in MSI photography by the team headed by Roger Macfarlane of Brigham Young University, and the 'N' (or 'Naples') *disegni* have also been imaged by them. The earlier 'O' *disegni*, taken to Oxford late in the Napoleonic wars, have already been made accessible in high resolution (enough to show even letters erased and written over by the copyists) on the Herculaneum Society's site. The details of

access by low- or high-resolution images to the whole collection are soon to be resolved.

Philodemus has more interesting writings soon to be citable with confidence than I can list here. In particular, there are attractive writings on emotions such as the fear of death and anger, on Epicurean logic, on music and poetry, on the history of Hellenistic philosophy—in all of which there really are, even when one subtracts for the imagination of nineteenth-century scholars overwriting their text, crucial fragments both of famous authors and of many authors who, but for him, would be only names or not even names.

Perhaps I could conclude with one concrete sample (to parallel the Sappho discovery with which I began) of the kind of thing that turns up all the time as we work, and that scholarship makes use of the minute we turn it up. In *P.Herc.* 403.5, from Philodemus, *On Poems* Book 5, Philodemus is opposing the Stoic theory that the true explanation of (apparently immoral) myth and plot in poetry is allegorical and mystical. Rather, he says, what is strange and surprising about poetic language comes in origin from the sorts of twist on language made in early times to name new inventions:

> For in general the strange language (*xenophōnia*) of the poets appeared among men for no other reason than envious imitation (*zelotupian*) of those using new words for new useful inventions...

Before, editors had printed *Xenophōnta* for *xenophōnia* and imagined a work of Xenophon on poets. Now that Richard Janko and I have reconstructed it, we can be sure of the text from the photographs, and a new stage, unknown before, is added to the Epicurean theory of the development of human language set out in Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things* 5: the origin of the distortion of language toward the 'poetic'. This text made its impression so quickly that its first appearance was in an article taking account of it (Holmes 2005: 567).

Discoveries of this sort are constantly being made even in what had seemed the better-established Herculaneum texts. The resources now available make improvements possible, small and large, in virtually every paragraph. And many thousands of texts remain unpublished, both from the Herculaneum collection and from Egyptian mummy stuffing (cartonnage) and rubbish dumps, such as those at Oxyrhynchus. Still more may yet emerge from renewed excavations at the Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum. Theodor Mommsen is reported to have said that the twentieth century would be the century of papyrology. But now, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the discipline may be said to be flourishing and generating new discoveries more than ever before. And the publication of these discoveries, plus the imaging of what already has been given the world, will at last allow for interaction by all interested and qualified readers.

Suggested Reading

There are more collections visible on the web every year: there are the records and images of papyri, and many related links, accessible through the APIS project (Advanced Papyrological Information System): see www.columbia.edu/dlc/apis. The resources listed on APIS' Papyrological Resources page are especially helpful; outstanding among them are the Duke Data Bank of Documentary Papyri (DDBDP), the Leuven Database of Ancient Books (LDAB), and the Mertens-Pack 3 catalogue of literary papyri, with continually updated bibliographical aids. Easily findable through APIS in turn, or any non-specialist search engine, are attractive collections sites. A few of the most interesting are: the University of California Tebtunis Papyri (http://tebtunis.berkeley.edu); the University of Michigan Papyrus Home Page (www.lib.umich.edu/pap/), which includes a number of educational items for beginners; the sites for the Oxyrhynchus papyri (www.papyrology.ox.ac.uk/POxy); the Friends of Herculaneum Society (www.herculaneum.ox.ac.uk); and Die Papyrus-Sammlung in Köln (http://uni-koeln.de/phil-fak/ifa/NRWakademie/papyrologie). A way into all of these and many more, with information about no fewer than 1,096 collections, with homepage links to all that have them, can be had at the Leuven Homepage of Papyrus Collections (currently www.trismegistos.org/coll.php).

There are many papyrological journals listed and with available indexes on these sites. Especially valuable for the literary and documentary student is the tracking of new appearances in the *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* series (1898–), and *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* (*ZPE*) (1967–) (many volumes, and full indexes, available at http://uni-koeln.de/phil-fak/ifa/zpe/). For Herculaneum work, central items are the annual *Cronache Ercolanesi* produced at the Centro Internazionale per lo Studio dei Papiri Ercolanesi (CISPE), with its *notiziario* in each issue enabling scholars to follow ongoing work; and the series of Herculaneum texts *La Scuola di Epicuro* (so far 17 volumes). For full details of both: www.cispegigante.it/, the CISPE website.

Any selection of the literature geared as introductory must be a little arbitrary, but here is mine (the introductions to the volumes by Janko and Obbink set out with remarkable clarity what is unique about the parameters of Herculaneum work): Bagnall (1995) (does not require Greek: discusses the use of papyri for historians); Bagnall and Cribiore (2006) (does not require Greek); Capasso (1991, 2005); Cribiore (2001) (very accessible to non-classicists); Hurtado (2006) (helpful, up-to-date survey of questions related, but not limited, to Christian papyri); Janko (2000); Johnson (2004); Obbink (1996); Pestman (1994); Sider (2005) (besides a fine survey of what is known about the library, this includes a good chapter on the ancient book and the ancient book trade); Turner (1973) (a pamphlet-sized treatise—*c*.50 pages: more 'introductory' than Pestman's but like it requiring Greek), (1980, 1987).

Turner (1973) said that we live in the age of the 'Manuscript Explosion', with greater discoveries in the last 100 years (now 130) 'than at any time since the Renaissance'. That continues to be true. I can only mention as examples two or three discoveries that are generating new interest and scholarship as I write: the website for the new Milan papyrus epigrams of Posidippus, first published in 2001 and generating an ever-increasing volume of study and interest, which offers an introduction, continually updated bibliography and other resources (http://chs.harvard.edu/publications.sec/classics.ssp/issue_i_posidippus.pg/issue_i_introduction.pg); the new elegiacs of Archilochus, *P. Oxy.* 4708 (see www.papyrology.ox.ac.uk/POxy/monster/demo/Page1.html); the new elegiacs, *P.Oxy.* 4711, giving fragments

of a Hellenistic Metamorphoses, and also available at the Oxyrhynchus website (www.papyrology.ox.ac.uk/POxy/papyri/4711.html). Also, the Derveni papyrus, an important early religious and philosophical text of controversial date and authorship discovered in Greece in 1962, already intensively studied on the basis of partially unreliable preliminary transcriptions, has finally appeared in a complete authorized edition with images as Kouremenos, Parassoglou, and Tsantsanoglou (2006).

These are just examples of work ongoing. Regularly updated bibliographies for these and the other literary texts preserved in ancient manuscripts can be found in LDAB and Mertens-Pack 3 (see above).

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CHAPTER 63

TEXTUAL CRITICISM

LUIGI BATTEZZATO

63.1. INTRODUCTION

AFTER the resurrection, Christ appeared several times to the disciples. These crucial scenes are not present in the oldest account of the life of Jesus, the Gospel according to Mark. The ending we normally read in ancient and modern translations (16: 9–20) is absent from some of the most important manuscripts of the Greek text of Mark. Is the ending authentic?

Martial narrates that a show in the amphitheatre represented the story of Orpheus. Unusually, 'Orpheus was killed by a boar' (Housman 1972: 537). Martial comments: *haec tamen res est facta ita pictoria* (*Liber Spectaculorum* 21.8). The Latin does not make sense.

These are two typical problems in textual criticism: deciding whether a passage is authentic, and deciding what the original wording was. In fact, every reader of Greek texts is a textual critic, in so far as he/she makes interpretative decisions: each reader examines the sense and wording of each sentence in order to interpret it.

We could say that textual criticism is the branch of literary interpretation that aims at reconstructing the original wording of a text. This aim is achieved through the examination of extant copies of the text and through the study of the language, style, sense, and, if relevant, metre of the text itself and of other comparable texts.

It is important to stress that textual criticism is an interpretative process: understanding the grammar and syntax of the text, the literary effects, aims, and

techniques, is an essential part of textual criticism, as much as questions of manuscript affiliation, textual transmission, and spelling conventions. Its practitioners are called textual critics (*kritikoi*, 'people who judge') or philologists ('people who love words': Pfeiffer 1968: 156–9).

The aim of reconstructing the 'original' is based on a virtuous hermeneutic circle. Critics form an idea of the style, language, and (if relevant) metre of an author on the basis of the very manuscript readings they emend or discard when the style, language, or metre does not satisfy them.

The chapter will cover the concepts of 'original' text, recension, emendation, 'open' and 'closed' textual transmission, and the basic elements of stemmatic theory.

63.2. Editing Greek Texts: The 'Stemmatic' Method

The greatest theoretical achievement of textual criticism is a set of rules that is often called 'stemmatic method' or 'Lachmann's method', after Karl Lachmann (1793–1851) (see Timpanaro 2005).

Lachmann's method was designed to deal with fairly long texts that have come to us in multiple complete medieval manuscripts. Ancient copies are normally preserved in relatively short fragments, which rarely cover complete texts (for the special case of Philodemus see Obbink 1996: 24–80; Blank 1998; Janko 2000: 11–119; and Armstrong in the previous chapter). Maas (1958) offers the best concise discussion of this line of approach, and I shall follow it with some modifications.

In order to reconstruct the 'original' wording of a text, Maas argues that scholars must take the following steps:

(a) complete *recensio* ('census') of information about the text:
  (a1) collecting information, by listing both complete and fragmentary manuscripts, partial quotations, commentaries, etc.;
  (a2) preparing a *collation* of all extant information, that is, listing all variant readings of all extant sources;
  (a3) *stemmatic* examination: assessing the interrelationship of the witnesses. This involves eliminating manuscripts that are copies of other extant manuscripts (*descripti* or *apographi*: 'copies'), and trying to draw a stemma of the remaining witnesses, grouping them into families.

In order to accomplish step (a3), scholars must look for shared *mistakes*: if two or more manuscripts share the same (glaring, and not easily repeated) mistakes, they

must be related. Agreement in correct readings must *not* be used to infer that a group of manuscripts is closely related. It simply proves what we already know: that all manuscripts descend from an original text. It is wrong readings that link manuscripts together.

The oldest manuscript is obviously independent of later ones, but the relative age of manuscripts does not influence their relative value. Pasquali (1952: 43–108) coined the famous phrase *recentiores non deteriores*: 'more recent manuscripts are not (necessarily) worse', that is, than older ones. Individual late manuscripts and even printed editions derived from lost manuscripts may be of exceptional importance.

These steps allow the editor to reconstruct the 'archetype', that is, the single most recent ancestor of all the surviving manuscripts (on the concept see Maas 1958: 2–3; Timpanaro 2005: 49–51 and 208–9; Reeve 1985 and 1986; Irigoin 2003: 37–53). In some cases the editor will remain uncertain as to which of the variant readings was in the text of the archetype. For instance, if only two sources are extant, and they give different, but equally plausible, readings, we cannot reconstruct with certainty the text of the archetype. Note also that the archetype itself may have carried variant readings in the margins.

After the *recensio*, the editor must examine the text:

(b) *examinatio*:
  (b1) *selectio*: the editor must select between transmitted readings;
  (b2) conjectural emendation.

The stemma will help the editor in task (b1). When the stemma does not help in establishing the reading of the archetype, the editor can rely on other principles: *usus scribendi*, *lectio difficilior*, and *utrum in alterum*. The editor should examine the *usus scribendi* ('way of writing, style') of the author: in cases where the reading is uncertain, he or she should look for 'parallels', that is, passages in the author (or in other authors writing at the same period in the same genre) that display similar style, phrases, metre (if applicable), or concepts. This is a very important principle also for conjectural emendation (for some applications see Diggle 1994b). The *lectio difficilior* principle says that one should give preference to the 'more difficult reading'. A rare word is likelier to be original than a common one, and an unusual phrase or construction than a usual one. However, one should be careful not to use this principle to justify awkward or impossible syntax or word-choice. The *utrum in alterum* principle tells us that we should try to understand which of the two attested readings is likelier to have been corrupted into the other (e.g. because of the evolution of the language). In their traditional formulation, these principles apply when the choice is between *two* and no more than two readings (note the comparative: *difficilior*).

These steps will give the editor the *paradosis*, that is, 'what is handed down' by the sources, after elimination of redundant witnesses and obvious mistakes. Note that

accents and punctuation are *not* part of the *paradosis*. They were rarely present in ancient Greek texts, and word division was normally absent. These writing practices were systematized from the ninth century CE, with the introduction of the minuscule script (for which see Tchernetska in this volume). Modern scholars are free to obtain a better sense, grammar, style, and (when applicable) metre by dividing the letters in a different way from the medieval manuscripts, or by changing the accent or the punctuation. This is not an intervention with respect to what is transmitted, but an interpretation of the evidence. (This should not lead us to think that the Greek accentual system—or, for that matter, word division—as a whole is arbitrary: it continues a set of conventions invented in the Hellenistic era. See Probert 2006: 1–124.)

The editor should then scrutinize the *paradosis*, looking for passages where difficulties in sense, language, style, and/or metre (in poetry) or rhythm (in some types of prose) make clear that the *paradosis* cannot represent the 'original' text. The editor should then proceed to step (b2) and 'conjecture' what the original wording of the text might have been. 'Conjectures' are words written by a modern scholar that substitute, modify, or supplement the *paradosis*. Several conjectures have been confirmed by later discoveries of ancient papyri or medieval manuscripts.

The conjectured reading must be a word or group of words that satisfies the requirements of sense, language, style, and metre of the text. It should also be close to the *paradosis*: the scholar who advances a conjecture has the duty to explain how this could be transformed into the text of the extant manuscripts. Impossible sense, language, or metre should be corrected, but there is often ample scope for disagreement on what is impossible.

Some decisions cannot be grounded simply on linguistic or philological interpretation: the editor's idea of the genre, and of the literary quality of the text, affect decisions on what should stand or fall. Deciding whether the endings of Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes* and Euripides' *Phoenician Women* are authentic does not simply rest on linguistic points, but on our ideas about the flexibility of the tragic genre, both at the level of plot and themes, and at the level of stylistic diversity (see Hutchinson 1985: 209–11; Mastronarde 1994: 635–7). All textual decisions, from major questions of authenticity to minutiae of spelling convention, are affected by the literary quality of a text; they are linked with historical questions of transmission, genre, and conventions.

When the editor has completed this whole process, he or she has arrived at establishing what he or she thinks is the 'original' text. This is the final step:


(c) preparing the edition:
  (c1) preparing the text;
  (c2) preparing the preface;
  (c3) preparing the 'apparatus criticus'.

The edition must present the evidence that allowed the editor to arrive at the printed text. The editor must state in a preface which manuscripts he or she considers independent witnesses, and what is their reciprocal relationship. Below the text, the 'apparatus criticus' must report the manuscript support for each word of the text. The apparatus will list all cases where a modern conjecture is printed instead of the manuscript text; it will report the name of the modern scholar who has advanced the conjecture (and will possibly help readers to locate the publication where the conjecture has been advanced). Editors normally also draw attention to passages where modern scholars have modified the accents and word divisions of (most or all) medieval manuscripts. Editors occasionally report major changes in punctuation (e.g. turning a statement into a question).

Readers assume that each word of the text that is not commented upon in the apparatus is printed as it appears in the manuscripts selected by the editor. The apparatus will inform readers about all manuscripts readings that might point to a different choice of text from the one made by the editor. Trivial blunders (e.g. incorrect spelling or accentuation) and obvious mistakes present in a minority of manuscripts go unreported. Scholars may publish extensive collations listing *all* readings that diverge from a published text, including spelling mistakes. (See e.g. Mastronarde and Bremer 1982, in contrast with the more selective practice in Mastronarde 1988 and 1994, and Diggle 1994a; Dawe 1973–8: vol. ii in contrast with e.g. Dawe 1984, and Lloyd-Jones and Wilson 1990.) Collations are useful for checking textual choices, stemmatic affiliations, and for familiarizing oneself with the scribal habits of medieval scholars.

63.3. 'Closed Traditions' and 'Mechanical Recensions'

Let us illustrate the method by means of an example. The *Historical Miscellany* by Aelian (*c.*170–235 CE) survives in six independent sources, whose relationship is reconstructed by Dilts (1974: p. ix) as follows (I omit all later *descripti*):



Manuscript x, the source of manuscripts d, g, a, and b, is not extant. It can be easily reconstructed from the readings of its descendants. Manuscript Φ presents excerpts from the work. It is clear that whenever two of these three sources (V, x, Φ) agree, the third one must be wrong: how could two different manuscripts make the same mistake, except for trivial blunders? For instance, in 1.15.30 (Dilts 1974: 6, lines 4–5) *ἀφανεῖς ἐκ τοῦ χώρου* ('distant from that place') manuscripts d, g, a, and b read *ἀπὸ*, whereas V and Φ read *ἐκ*. There is no great difference in meaning, and one would think that four manuscripts (d, g, a, b) should count more than two (V and Φ). But manuscripts d, g, a, and b have been proven to descend from a single ancestor, manuscript x, and it is unlikely that both V and Φ would make the same mistake. That is why Dilts (and Wilson 1997: 36) print *ἐκ*.

Many scholars call this state of affairs a 'mechanical recension' (Pasquali 1952: 126; Alberti 1979: 18; see the passages quoted in Fiesoli 2000: 367, 380, 438, 441, 448): the textual decisions are made on the basis of the stemmatic relationship of the witnesses. In fact the decision is anything but mechanical. It is true that 'stemmatic' reasons help editors in choosing the right reading, but questions of meaning and syntax always come first in deciding which of the variants is correct. Moreover, it is up to the editor's judgement to decide whether different scribes could have made the same mistake independently, or could have guessed a successful correction of a wrong reading. And of course, when the three witnesses carry different readings, the stemma does not help in the decision either.

63.4. Open Traditions: The Problems of Stemmatic Method

So why is textual criticism a branch of literary criticism, or an 'art' rather than a science (Housman 1972: 1058; Lachmann, cited in Fiesoli 2000: 361; Timpanaro 2005: 43)? Several scholars have stressed the 'objective', even 'mechanical', rules of textual criticism. Textual criticism makes use of 'objective' rules and of scientific methods: palaeography, codicology, the study of syntax, metre, and style. The steps in Lachmann's method have convenient neo-Latin or Greek names (*recensio*, *examinatio*, *selectio*, *emendatio*, *paradosis*) that give them the dress of immortal truths. All these steps run into practical and theoretical problems.

Collecting *all* evidence is easy in the case of the very many Greek texts that depend on a single manuscript (e.g. Lysias, *Orations* 3–31; Aeschylus, *Choephori*). When the number of witnesses is small, scholars may be able to prove that all late manuscripts derive directly or indirectly from a well-defined, identifiable group of codices. In the case of Demosthenes, only five manuscripts have independent

value; all later ones derive from them (MacDowell 1990: 39–80; 2000: 32–53). It is also clear that these five independent manuscripts derive from a single source: an ancient edition which collected all works attributed to Demosthenes, including some speeches which are clearly not by him (Dilts 2002: pp. v–xii; Pasquali 1952: 269–94).

In the case of texts which have come to us in several dozens of copies (e.g. Sophocles, *Oedipus Rex*), collecting all the evidence is a time-consuming and complicated affair (Matthiessen 1974; West 1978: 108; Mastronarde and Bremer 1982; Diggle 1991; Battezzato 2006: 91–3). In the case of texts that have survived in hundreds of copies (Homer; the New Testament), the study of unexplored recent manuscripts is unlikely to add evidence that will change our view of the original text. For Homer we also have very large remains of ancient commentaries on the text (see Erbse 1969–88), and about 1,600 papyrus fragments. A papyrus or commentary note may transmit the correct reading—or a completely wrong reading. It is interesting to note that early Homeric papyri, before the uniformity created by Hellenistic editions, show a text that has extra lines, and in general a more prolix appearance. These 'wild' papyri (Haslam 1997) give us a text that is aesthetically inferior to that of the medieval manuscripts: early does not necessarily mean 'original' (see also Battezzato 2003 for tragedy).

In the case of Homer, the pool of variants that are likely to reflect ancient tradition does not increase with the study of more recent manuscripts, and it is unlikely that late medieval witnesses will carry original (or simply ancient) readings that are not yet known (West 2001: 157). That is why recent editions of Homer reasonably limit the number of medieval manuscripts that are consistently quoted (van Thiel 1991, 1996; West 1998, 2000, 2001: 168–9; contrast Allen 1931).

It is not, however, just a question of quantity. Stemmatic theory works only for texts that are not 'contaminated'. This medical metaphor applies to manuscripts that have not been copied from a single source, but that mix readings from different sources. This was in fact the ordinary method in many scriptoria: a supervisor would check the copied manuscript not only against its model, but also against yet another manuscript of the same work, to minimize error (see Browning 1954: 419–20, 438–9, 449–50; Zuntz 1965; Lemerle 1971: 248; Makropoulos 1982). Variant readings could be introduced from a different type of text (a different branch of the transmission). When the number of variant readings introduced into a manuscript is high, it is difficult to detect its precise affiliation. Extensive contamination makes it impossible to draw a stemma of the whole tradition. It may be possible to discern small groups of manuscripts, but it is not possible to arrive at a complete stemma, nor to make a 'mechanical' decision between variants: manuscripts show agreements in error but shift allegiance too many times. Errors and correct readings were passed on 'horizontally', not just from model to copy, but from models that were used for other copies (Pasquali 1952: 140–1). Whenever we cannot determine the reading of the archetype by mechanical means, we have what Pasquali named

an 'open tradition' (1952: 126; Alberti 1979: 1–18). Scholars have given up the idea of attempting to draw a stemma when extensive contamination affects the textual tradition (see e.g. Dawe 1964; Di Benedetto 1965 against Turyn 1957; Dawe 1973–8: vol. i; vol. iii. 3–75; West 1990; van Thiel 1991, 1996; West 1998, 2000, 2001: 168–9). In these texts each reading must be judged on its merits.

Even when contamination does not come into the picture, arranging manuscripts into a stemma is a step very fraught with difficulties. For one thing, manuscript affiliations can be discovered only by common mistakes. How do we find out a mistake, though, if we have to apply stemmatic method in order to establish the original text? We have to rely on glaring mistakes (omissions, nonsense words, insertion of spurious material, etc.) and we must disregard all mistakes that could occur independently (e.g. banal mistakes in spelling or accent).

This is not all. A stemma is especially useful only if it has more than two branches. Bédier has famously observed that almost all editors reconstruct stemmas with only two branches—and this leaves them free hand in choosing the 'correct' reading when the two branches have two different readings (see Bédier 1928). The reason for this preference of editors for two-branched stemmata is disputed: it could be due to faulty reasoning or to unconscious Manichaeism of the editors (who divide manuscripts into 'good' and 'bad'). On this debate see Maas (1958: 42–9); Alberti (1979), Reeve (1985, 1986, 1989, and 2000), Lapini (1994), and Timpanaro (2005: 157–87 and 207–33). The stemmatic method of systematic *recensio* is designed to minimize subjective judgement, but in fact gives an automatic (or, as some scholars put it, a 'mechanical') answer only in a minority of cases.

The practical and theoretical problems of stemmatic theory do not prove that scholars should abandon all attempts at collecting all the evidence, and at reconstructing manuscript affiliation. Bédier suggested that the best way to edit a text was to reproduce a single manuscript, with minimal adjustments. In this way, the reader would have access to a version that reflected an actual literary practice and communication: the version prepared by a scribe for his readers. Bédier, however, stressed that this solution was appropriate for a particular class of literary works, that is, French medieval texts. This was due to the condition of literary communication and to the type of evidence: authors and scribes would prepare different versions of the same work. This is not normally so for classical texts, which came to us in a single version (for possible exceptions see Pasquali 1952: 397–465; Emonds 1941; and further below). Normally, the manuscripts of all classical works have in common some obvious mistakes. This guarantees that the tradition is unified: there is normally an 'archetype', a single (ancient or medieval) ancestor that is the basis of the whole tradition.

It is curious to note that editors of the Hebrew Bible have resorted to a 'Bédieresque' method: the complete edition commonly used (Rudolf, Elliger, *et al.* 1990, building on Kittel and Kahle 1937) is a reproduction of a single manuscript (the St Petersburg Codex, written in 1009). It faithfully reproduces

the spelling and accentual convention of this single manuscript, even though we have large fragments of several earlier manuscripts (and the documentation of early translations, such as the Greek Septuagint). The apparatus points to different solutions. The Oxford Hebrew Bible project (see Hendel 2006) aims at offering a complete picture of the evidence, and at reconstructing the earliest state of the Hebrew text. Some scholars point out that such a text is a modern invention, and consider this an objection to the project per se; but all manuscript copies are a later re-creation of the 'original' text. The application of thought and judgement is especially important in the study of the Bible, and modern scholars should not give up their duty to take decisions on the meaning and reading of a text, and leave it to medieval scholars or scribes.

63.5. Several 'Original' Versions: Scholarly Commentaries and 'Popular' Narrative

Some types of text were transmitted with care for the content, but with less consideration for reproducing the exact wording of the original. This is the case with commentaries. Scholia (marginal commentaries in medieval manuscripts: see Wilson 1967; 1983: 33–6) are constantly abridged, rephrased, and conflated. Their editor is in a quandary: it is impossible to reconstruct the ancient commentaries that were at the origin of the scholiast tradition, because additions and rewritings have effaced the original shape, and yet it is absurd to leave all the mistakes of the manuscripts that have come to us. Editors must emend the most obvious errors, trying not to reconstruct a 'classical' form of the notes—which is irrecoverable and, for some of the notes, may never have existed.

Editors of glossaries and of gnomological collections face similar problems. So do editors of biblical texts. 'In the case of the Hebrew Bible it is difficult to define what the "original text" means, since each book is the product of a complicated and often unrecoverable history of composition and redaction ... At some point in time, the process of textual production became the process of textual transmission' (Hendel 2006: 6; cf. Tov 1992: 155–97). Some sections of the Old Testament are transmitted in Greek only; for a few (less religiously crucial) Old Testament books we have widely divergent ancient Greek versions. In those cases, the process of textual production is 'frozen' for us in different stages: the oldest manuscripts (Sinaiticus, Alexandrinus, and Vaticanus, from the fourth or fifth centuries: see Rahlfs and Hanhart 2006: pp. xli–xlii) give us different rewritings of the same text. In some cases (the books of Tobit and Daniel) it is absurd to conflate the different manuscripts into a single 'original'. Rahlfs prefers to print the (two) Greek texts side by side.

A similar situation occurs with the Greek text of the *Life of Aesop*, which has come to us in two main versions (and a few minor later ones). These two versions, called G and W, though strictly related, cannot be unified into a single text (see Perry 1952; Papathomopoulos 1991, 1999; Ferrari 1997; Karla 2001; Jouanno 2006). Scribes and authors had more of an incentive and fewer qualms about rewriting a piece of popular fiction than about rewriting highbrow literature. The Aesop novel is indebted to the very popular Middle Eastern narrative cycles on the life and sayings of Ahiqar, a proverbial 'wise man' at the Assyrian court in the seventh century BCE (see Charles 1913: ii. 715–84; Ginsberg 1955; Lindenberger 1985; Luzzatto 1992). It is not by chance that 'Achichar' (= Ahiqar) is the cousin of Tobit (see Tobit 1: 21; Charles 1913: i. 189–92): the biblical book signals its literary genre and affiliation by means of a family tree. The kinship in literary genre also affects the type of textual transmission. Tobit, like other 'Jewish fictions' or 'novels' (see Johnson 2004; Wills 1995), exists in different 'versions' because people thought that reproducing its text verbatim was not essential: it was more important to give a version that would accommodate the needs of the intended readership or audience. And this multiplication of versions was exactly what happened to the Greek life of Aesop (and to the Aramaic, Syriac, and other versions of life of Ahiqar). Surprising as it may be, even the text of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* has survived in two different versions, which are the product of conscious alterations and adaptations (Jaeger 1957: pp. vi–xix). In the case of these texts, a philological study is also a study of literary genre, reception, and literary adaptation in antiquity.

63.6. Conclusion

When textual critics edit a classical text, they are strongly indebted to the choices of their Hellenistic predecessors, both in the choice of variants (Hellenistic editions strongly influenced the medieval manuscript tradition), and in the linguistic appearance of dialect works (Cassio 1993). Modern editors, however, adopt the classical Ionic alphabet, even for works written in different alphabets (Jeffery 1961). They adopt Byzantine spelling and writing conventions, introducing consistently word division, accents, and breathings. They follow late nineteenth-century typographical conventions in printing the apparatus at the foot of the page (not, for instance, with the help of a digital medium). Finally, they follow contemporary judgement on syntax, style, and metre. The presentation of the text must be designed for modern readers, rather than aiming at reconstructing the 'original'.

A critical edition, by listing manuscript readings, offers the evidence for the way in which a Greek text was read (and, by implication, interpreted) in antiquity and/or the Middle Ages. Reconstructing the 'original' is at times impossible, but not always. In fact we do have solutions for the problems listed at the beginning of this chapter.

The ending of Mark is spurious. It is not spurious simply because it is absent from some manuscripts: the last page could have been damaged or lost, and it is indeed likely that the original ending of that Gospel *is* lost. The decision to consider Mark 16: 9–20 as spurious is based on grounds of language and literary technique (Metzger 1975: 122–6).

Housman (1972: 537), following a suggestion by Buecheler, saw that the line of Martial quoted at the beginning does not make sense in Latin because the last words are actually in Greek (ITAPICTORIA = *ΠΑΡΙCΤΟΡΙΑΝ*): *haec tantum res est facta παρ' ἱστορίαν* ('this is the only detail that diverged from the story').

Surprises are in store for those who look at ancient texts. Textual critics have to find a fine balance between opposing temptations: a love for unusual sense and language, and a craving for normalization. There are no hard-and-fast rules: and this is because textual criticism is a branch of literary and historical interpretation rather than a science.

Suggested Reading

Maas (1958) is the classic short treatment of the matter. Pasquali (1952) is still the fullest and most subtle discussion of problems in textual transmission. Timpanaro (2005) is a fundamental discussion of philological theory and practice since the Renaissance. Cf. also Timpanaro (1959–60, 2005). On Maas and Timpanaro see now Fiesoli (2000), E. Montanari (2003); and Di Benedetto (2003), esp. Di Benedetto's contribution (Di Benedetto 2003). West (1973) offers a practical introduction to problems of editorial technique. Valuable general discussions of theoretical and practical problems in Greek (and Latin) textual criticism are to be found in: Renehan (1969), Grant (1989), Irigoin (1997), Most (1998), and Irigoin (2003).

Reynolds and Wilson (1991) offers the standard concise overview of textual transmission of Greek and Latin text from antiquity to modern ages. On textual transmission and scholarship in antiquity see Irigoin (1952), Pfeiffer (1968), Zetzel (1981), Timpanaro (1986 and 2001) (Latin texts), F. Montanari (1994), Dorandi (2000), Lomiento (2001), and Cavallo (2002). On Byzantine scholarship see Rizzo (1973) Lemerle (1971), Wilson (1983). On Renaissance scholarship see Kenney (1974), Pfeiffer (1976), Feld (1978), Grafton (1983 and 1991), Wilson (1992), and Battezzato (2006). On the history of philology see also Sandys (1903–8) and Wilamowitz (1982).

On the philological study of the Bible see Metzger (1975), Aland and Aland (1981), Tov (1992), Chiesa (2000), and Hendel (2006).

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CHAPTER 64

COMMENTARIES*

BARBARA GRAZIOSI

COMMENTARIES are a contested aspect of classical scholarship: 'a battleground' (Kraus 2002: 5) 'a fierce arena' (Goldhill 1999: 381). One reason for this must be that they have traditionally played a major role in the classroom—and issues of pedagogy tend to inspire passionate debate. But that is not the only reason. Commentaries are important research tools in the field of Hellenic studies: even classicists who are most critical of them tend to use them frequently (as Budelmann 2002: 142 shrewdly observes). More fundamentally still, commentaries seem to be inextricable from the very notion of classical literature. Scholars have long been preoccupied with the question of how a text becomes a classic. One possible approach to this question consists in accepting, as a premise, that the classic text has some intrinsic qualities, which explain its status and appeal over time and space. Many commentators have adopted this line of thought: from antiquity to the present, commentators have thought it their task to point out to readers the qualities—beauty, moral excellence, truth, originality, wisdom, humanity, humour, outrageousness, sophistication, and so on—which characterize their text and which justify the great effort (made by both the commentator and her/his readers) to understand it. Yet, at least since the 1960s, another line of thought has been gradually gaining ground. Readers have been increasingly prepared to argue that a text becomes a classic when readers repeatedly evaluate it positively over time. On this view, the commentary, far from being parasitic on the classical text, actually shapes its status as a classic. Herrnstein Smith (1983: 30) gives a succinct summary of this view:

* I would like to thank Pat Easterling for many detailed comments on this piece. Ingo Gildenhard also made useful suggestions.

The value of a literary work is continuously produced and re-produced by the very acts of implicit and explicit evaluation that are frequently invoked as 'reflecting' its value and therefore as being evidence of it. In other words, what are commonly taken to be the *signs* of literary value are, in effect, also its *springs*. The endurance of a classic canonical author such as Homer, then, owes not to the alleged transcultural or universal value of his works but, on the contrary, to the continuity of their circulation in a particular culture.

Commentaries, then, are not only fundamental tools of Hellenic studies—both in teaching and research—but, in a sense, contribute to the very creation of classical literature. The history of the classical commentary is simultaneously an account of how ancient Greek texts were read and valued from antiquity to the present day, and of how, in the course of that process, they became classics.

Commentaries have made an enormous contribution to the study of ancient Greece. They are so central, indeed, that they are often thought of as models for other sub-disciplines and methodologies within the field of Hellenic studies. Vallance (1999: 224), for example, writes: 'Textual criticism is a particularly artful and radical form of commentary [in which] the critic comments on texts by rewriting them.' Others have argued that the study of reception, which is gaining momentum within Hellenic studies (see Leonard in this volume), ought to inform the work of the commentator (cf. Hall 1996 for an attempt to include a study of reception within the format of the classical commentary). It seems that appeals to the commentary can help to explain and justify both traditional disciplines, such as textual criticism, and more innovative ones, like Reception studies. The relationship between commentaries and other aspects of classical scholarship has been much discussed recently (cf. in particular Gibson and Kraus 2002) and is implicitly at stake whenever a new study of an ancient Greek text is published. Some commentaries, moreover, attempt to offer a comprehensive summary of all earlier work on the text they discuss, and thus explicitly present themselves as the summary and culmination of other types of scholarship: good examples of this kind of commentary are Bollack's four-volume edition of Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* (1990), and Bollack and Judet de la Combe's multi-volume commentary on Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* (Bollack and Judet de la Combe 1981–2, and Judet de la Combe 2001). In this short chapter I cannot hope to offer a comprehensive discussion of the place of the commentary in Hellenic studies. Instead, I propose to focus on four fundamental issues which are likely to confront anybody who plans to use—or, indeed, write—a commentary. The first section considers the historical relationship between classical commentaries and classical literature. The second section discusses the commentary both as an act of reading and as a text in its own right. The third investigates how commentaries establish relationships between texts and between readers. The fourth and final section raises some issues of value: the value of commentaries and of the texts they seek to elucidate, but also the valuable role played by readers of the classical commentary.

64.1. A Historical Perspective

In a sense, the history of the commentary is as long as that of classical literature itself. Already within the *Iliad*, we find that some obscure and archaic-sounding words are glossed with more ordinary synonyms. Clearly, epic bards were in the habit of explaining, for their audiences, traditional words and formulas which they had inherited from earlier singers (Graziosi 2007). Because poems were mostly appreciated in performance, explanations were geared towards making performances intelligible and enjoyable; thus glosses and rewordings became, in some cases, an integral part of the poems that were being performed. When the Homeric poems became the foundation of formal, literate education, schoolteachers and scholars provided glosses, paraphrases, explanations, and more sophisticated comments as aids to their students (Morgan 1998). The great scholars working in the library of Alexandria wrote particularly rich and influential commentaries on Homer and other ancient authors (Montanari 1979–95). Those commentaries, or *hupomnēmata*, referred closely and in detail to the ancient texts but usually circulated in separate papyrus rolls. Except for a few papyrus fragments, they have not survived as free-standing texts. Summaries and excerpts have reached us, however: some of the marginal notes found in medieval manuscripts (known as 'scholia': cf. Battezzato above, p. 781) derive from Hellenistic and later works of scholarship. From the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries onwards, substantial numbers of manuscripts once again started to carry commentaries separately from the ancient texts; but notes on the same page as the main text remained the standard format for commentaries until the nineteenth century (Budelmann 2002: 143–8). Today, printed commentaries generally appear after the text, or even in free-standing volumes which do not print the text at all (as, for example, Kirk *et al.* 1985–93). Meanwhile, electronic publishing offers new opportunities for the commentary, especially in terms of format, scope, arrangement, interaction with readers, and updating (see further Fowler 1999; McCarty 2002).

Despite these significant changes in size and format, there are remarkable continuities between ancient and modern commentaries, both in terms of the basic help they offer, and concerning larger issues of interpretation. At a basic level, it is easy to see how modern commentaries rely on earlier ones. To take a simple example, modern commentators will point out to readers that the Homeric epithet *daiphrōn* may either mean 'warlike, brave', or 'prudent, clever'. In doing so, they rely on the explanations given in the ancient scholia, and may refer to them explicitly (by writing, for example, 'cf. Schol. bT Erbse *ad Iliad* 2.23a'). The explanations found in the scholia in turn derive from internal glosses contained within the Homeric poems themselves: for example, at *Iliad* 5.277 we read 'strong-hearted, *daiphron*' (*καρτερόθυμε δαίφρον*) and at 11.482 '*daiphrona*, of varied wiles' (*δαίφρονα ποικιλομήτην*). A traditional and mysterious epithet is thus interpreted or glossed

within the *Iliad*, then in the margins of the medieval manuscripts, and then again in contemporary commentaries. Even when modern commentators differ from earlier ones in the explanations they give, they often attempt to answer the same questions, and preserve the answers of earlier 'colleagues'. For example, since antiquity commentators have been much preoccupied with the nature of Zeus's plan at *Iliad* 1.5. In order to explain it, the scholia refer to a fragment of the *Cypria* (an early epic poem now largely lost) which also mentions a 'plan of Zeus' (fr. 1 Davies). Even when modern commentators disagree about the relevance of that fragment to the interpretation of the *Iliad*, they generally still quote it, thus presenting their comments as an alternative explanation to one favoured in the ancient scholia (cf., for example, Mirto, in Paduano and Mirto 1997: 799–800; another example is discussed by Ford in this volume, p. 633).

It is never easy to determine the origin of the questions commentators pose themselves, but it is clear that they sometimes inherit them from their predecessors, rather than from an independent reading of the text. In fact, their determination to find better answers rather than drop the questions leads to a (generally) understated but very real sense of one-upmanship. As a result, the shelf-life of a commentary on a central classical text is generally a good indication of its authority and success. If a commentary is well regarded, scholars will think twice before writing a new one on the same text: we may, for example, note the way in which Denniston and Page acknowledge Fraenkel's *Agamemnon* (1950) in their own commentary of 1957.

While good commentaries are difficult to replace, it is also a commonplace to say that each age, and each major European language, needs its own commentary on the canonical Greek texts. Prefaces and advertising materials often include statements like: 'This is the first commentary in English on text X for Y number of years.' This kind of comment not only emphasizes the need for new commentaries, but also spells out the assumption that English readers will need commentaries in their own language. This is not a trivial detail: classical scholars are expected to be familiar with articles and monographs published in many European languages; yet commentaries are also aimed at other readers (for example, students and schoolteachers) and are thus more heavily influenced by the institutional contexts and national traditions within which they are produced. Griffin expresses his admiration for the (indeed, excellent) British tradition of commentary-writing, together with an anxiety about foreign perspectives on it (1995: 14): 'The British reader, unless contaminated by Continental notions, will generally feel well content.' Griffin alludes to a significant difference between the British and the German tradition in particular. Already in 1831, Friedrich August Wolf defined the scientific aspirations of *Altertumswissenschaft* against dilettante Anglo-Saxon notions of 'classical learning' (Wolf 1831–5: i. 11). For him, the study of antiquity was meant to embrace all aspects of the Graeco-Roman world, rather than privilege canonical texts. His work shaped later approaches to Hellenic studies. In an inaugural speech of 1882,

for example, Usener declared: 'The true philologist must be a knight without fear'—one willing, that is, to take on any text, no matter how arcane or unappealing (Usener 1907: 28; for further discussion, see Momigliano 1982; Gildenhard 2003, esp. 174–9). To this day, PhD students in continental Europe are often encouraged to write commentaries on the less-frequented texts of Graeco-Roman antiquity. Yet, if we ask ourselves why those texts are privileged over other possible texts stemming from different times and cultures, we must ultimately return to notions of classical excellence, and interrogate ourselves on the place of ancient Greece in the history of European culture, as argued in Part I of this *Handbook*.

As well as alluding to different national traditions, Griffin's remark draws attention to a crucial ingredient in the making of a commentary: the role of the reader. Although commentators are influenced by the long history of the classical commentary, and by colleagues working in different national traditions, they are also guided by their ideal reader. In order to understand the nature of commentaries, it thus makes sense to look closely at the relationship commentators seek to establish between their readers and the ancient text they seek to elucidate for them.

64.2. Between Reading and Writing

Since the 1960s, critics have engaged in a complex debate over the location of a text's meaning. At one end of the spectrum, some maintain that the author largely determines what the text signifies. At the other extreme, critics will subscribe to the view that 'in a text only the reader speaks' (Barthes 1975: 151). It is difficult to place classical commentaries anywhere on this spectrum. On the one hand, commentators often see themselves as elucidating, for the modern reader, what the ancient author wrote. On the other, they are acutely aware of their intended readers and let themselves be guided by what they perceive to be their questions. Stated more generally, the issue is this: commentaries are simultaneously acts of reading and texts in their own right. This double identity is not easy to characterize. For the purposes of this chapter, a pragmatic starting-point may be given by what commentators themselves think about their work: their formulations may sometimes seem naive, but they have the advantage of enabling the writing of commentaries—an activity which, as I have argued, is important both to Hellenic studies and to the classical tradition more generally.

Commentators tend to be remarkably explicit about the role of their intended readers in the process of writing. Prefaces, for example, often include detailed descriptions of their ideal readers. Such descriptions can contain an element of

idealism or false modesty (learned commentaries are often disguised as basic help for students), but are clearly intended as a serious guide to the aims, method, and mode of presentation adopted. It seems, then, that commentaries are conceived as acts of mediation between ancient texts and contemporary readers. Sometimes, such attempts at mediation can be very difficult. At *Odyssey* 3.464, for example, we read that Polycaste, the youngest daughter of Nestor, gave Telemachus a bath when he came to Pylos to visit her father. The ancient scholia offer the following comments on this line: 'She saw to it that he had a bath; she did not wash him herself. Or because it was a custom for heroes to be washed by virgins' (Schol. HMQ Dindorf; cf. T, *ad Od.* 3.464). As often, the scholia as transmitted give alternative readings without expressing a preference between them. Yet the explanations offered differ radically: the first makes demands of the text (which cannot be saying what it seems to be saying), while the second puts a strain on the readers (who must accept that heroes who visited a home could expect to be bathed by their host's virgin daughters). As modern commentators, we might feel tempted to offer a compromise position between these two answers: a modern entry on that line might ask readers to 'cf. *Od.* 7.296', where Odysseus tells Nausicaa's parents that the girl gave him a bath, meaning that she arranged for him to wash himself; but it might also point out that in Homer girls are allowed closer contact with unrelated men than was deemed appropriate in, for example, classical Athens. What the ancient and modern explanations have in common is a desire to protect the text from malicious or obscene readings. We know that some ancient readers thought that the bath Polycaste gave Telemachus actually resulted in the procreation of Homer himself (see *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi* 3 West). It is perhaps in the commitment to protect the text from undesirable readings that the voices of commentators can be heard most clearly; otherwise their work may seem to be dictated by the problems posed by the text and by the concerns of their readers. (I can hear the ancient students: 'But it says here that she gave him a bath!')

Generally, and through time, commentators are loyal to their ancient texts (Fantham 2002), even though they do occasionally offer flippant or subversive comments (cf., for example, a scholion on *Theocritus* 1.3 which reports the view that the god Pan was the son of Penelope and all her suitors). Commentators are also greatly influenced by the institutional contexts in which they work. Most of them were and are teachers and, for this reason, tend to present ancient authors as valuable sources of education: Sluiter (1999) discusses some excellent examples of how commentators turn Homer into a teacher of grammar, morals, rhetoric, etiquette, and so on. Still, despite the commentators' tendency to present ancient authors in their own image, their voices are not easy to identify. As Gumbrecht points out (1999: 449): 'the discourse of commentary is normally anonymous.' In the case of ancient commentators, that is often quite literally the case. The material found in the scholia remains, more often than not, unattributed, and is usually difficult to date. Even in the case of famous ancient and medieval scholars,

such as Aristarchus or John Tzetzes, it is not at all easy to identify their exact contributions (on Tzetzes see Wendel 1948, Hunger 1978: 59–63, and Budelmann 2002; on Aristarchus see Lehrs 1882 and Ludwich 1884–5; on the vexed question of whether Aristarchus made conjectures or inherited them see the good discussion by Rengakos 2002, with further references). Modern commentaries are not literally anonymous: the name of their author appears on the cover, though it is usually less prominent than that of the ancient author to whom the commentary is devoted. Even in the case of modern commentators, however, it is not always easy to distinguish their contribution from those of their predecessors and colleagues. Debts to other scholars are not recorded as scrupulously in commentaries as they are in other genres of academic writing. Conversely, commentators often refrain from drawing attention to their own input. In fact, they are often discouraged from doing so by their publishers or series editors: for example, classicists working on a 'Green and Yellow' (that is to say, a commentary in the Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics series) are discouraged from using the pronoun 'I'. There are two main reasons for this recommendation: first, it inhibits personal quirks or excessive boasting on the part of the commentator; secondly, it encourages readers to focus on the ancient text, rather than on those who seek to elucidate it.

It is tempting to conclude that the needs of readers, the guidelines of publishers and series editors, the institutional context, and—last but not least—the ancient texts themselves largely determine the format, style, and content of commentaries. For example: commentaries on philosophical texts tend to focus on questions of philosophical interest; those that elucidate ancient historiography privilege questions of sources, reliability, and historical truth; literary commentaries emphasize issues of language, style, characterization, allusion, and intertextuality. Commentators often present themselves as pragmatic and eclectic readers, guided by the questions posed by their text and readers rather than by particular critical approaches or schools of thought (cf. Rowe 1993, in the preface to his commentary on Plato's *Phaedo*: 'The commentary claims to belong to no particular school of interpretation'). Yet, despite the proverbial elusiveness of commentators, it remains important to ask what they do to the ancient texts, and to their readers.

64.3. Communities of Texts and of Readers

Commentaries divide up ancient texts into separate *lemmata*, that is, portions of text that are used as headings for detailed explanations. Some critics worry that the splitting up or 'atomization' of the text into *lemmata* can obscure its unity;

although, as Hunter (2002) points out, some commentaries retain a clear sense of that unity, even when they discuss points of detail. A more fundamental worry is that commentaries inhibit readers from approaching ancient texts in an unself-conscious or idiosyncratic manner. They discuss a series of problems and possible meanings, and place them in between readers and their direct appreciation of the text. As a result, reading no longer seems natural (Kraus 2002: 15). Conversely, it is also true that readers can choose which entries to read, so that their reading preferences in turn fragment the commentary. Anybody with practical experience of commentary-writing will testify that the choice of *lemmata* is a difficult task. There are often several convincing ways in which an ancient text can be articulated, and commentators must choose which larger sections deserve their own separate discussion, as well as providing line-by-line notes. *Lemmata* guide readers, and commentators often want to cater also for those who are only interested in a particular passage, line, or word, but have no intention of reading the commentary (or, indeed, the ancient text) from beginning to end. Commentaries must thus strike a balance between the needs of 'hit-and-go' readers, and a sense of unity, or of connection between different *lemmata*. In some cases it seems that *lemmata* are held together exclusively by the ancient text: that is, all of them are somehow motivated by it but are otherwise very disparate. In others, there is a strong sense that individual entries add up to a coherent reading—although commentaries always encourage readers to intersperse that reading with an engagement with other useful or 'parallel' texts.

Typically, commentators invite readers to compare specific passages with other relevant ones. Usually, such invitations are expressed in the most succinct form: I have already mentioned that my ideal entry on *Odyssey* 3.464 would contain the indication 'cf. *Od.* 7.296'. The use of parallels in the classical commentary has attracted much attention recently. Goldhill (1999) points out that commentators often cite parallels without specifying the questions those parallels are meant to answer; and without offering a clear argument for their relevance. In this way, he claims that commentators 'avoid the duty of interpretation' (397)—a comment which perhaps underplays the process through which parallels are selected. Other readers rejoice in the miscellaneous richness of parallels they find in commentaries. Fowler (1999: 436), for example, observes: 'K. J. Dover's commentary on Aristophanes' *Clouds* is rigorously selective, and everywhere shows evidence of its author thinking clearly about what should and should not be included: which is why it is a much less interesting and useful commentary than the ragbag of craziness which is W. J. M. Starkie's edition.' Kraus (2002) and Gibson (2002) similarly celebrate the citation of parallels, arguing that they open up the process of reading. They maintain that parallels indicate new avenues of interpretation, and enable readers to use the connections already made in the commentary to their own ends. One problem with this position is that commentaries must be selective: even electronic publications, which can in principle expand ad infinitum, must profit from some

restraint. The limit is not necessarily in the format of the commentary, but in the situation of the reader: people have a limited amount of time and energy to devote to an ancient text and will appreciate a commentator who exercises some judgement. (In his edition of Sophocles' plays, Jebb uses parallels in a particularly economical and illuminating way: see Jebb 1883–1908, with the excellent discussion offered by Easterling 2005.) Apart from this practical consideration, the citation of parallels raises a more fundamental issue.

Even the most exuberant list of parallels is based on a process of selection, which does not just stem from the personal choices of the commentator, but is determined by the tradition within which s/he works. Gibson (2002) revels in the richness and diversity of parallels, while at the same time assuming that they will all be drawn from Greek and Roman texts. This assumption deserves some thought: it is so widely accepted that it has largely escaped critical attention. Some commentaries include occasional references to canonical authors of a later period, such as Milton—though such references have become increasingly rare in recent years. Others offer comparisons with ancient texts which do not belong to the cultures of Greece and Rome, but those too are infrequent: West (1997) insists on the relevance of Near Eastern parallels for the study of early Greek epic (cf. also Haubold in this volume), but it is not yet clear what impact his study will have on future Homeric commentaries. The tendency to draw parallels mainly from Greek and Roman literature creates a community of related texts, which is simultaneously a community of readers.

Those who use a commentary on Homer are expected to know about, and be interested in, other Greek and Roman texts too, but their knowledge of other traditions is not put to the test to the same extent. In her novel *On Beauty*, Zadie Smith offers the following description of a boy listening to rap music (2005: 241–2):

> It was a beautiful song by the fattest man in rap: a 400-pound, Bronx-born, Hispanic genius. Only twenty-five years old when he died of a coronary, but still very much alive to Levi and millions of kids like Levi. Out of the coffee shop and down the street Levi bounced to the fat man's ingenious boasts, similar in their formality . . . to those epic boasts one finds in Milton, say, or in the *Iliad*. These comparisons meant nothing at all to Levi.

Parallels between Homer and rap music have no place in the classical commentary. Readers of Homer are not supposed to have any knowledge of rap; while the 'millions of kids like Levi' are not expected to be interested in Homer: classical commentaries are not designed to explain things to them. Yet the limited range of parallels found in commentaries is not simply a matter of social and cultural exclusion. For example, it is a commonplace of classical scholarship to say that 'Homer is cinematic' (Saunders 1999: 363), and it would make sense for the commentator to use metaphors borrowed from film, such as 'zooming in' and 'zooming out', in order to illustrate how Homer does battle scenes. Yet commentators are usually reluctant to introduce such innovations in their critical language even when they

are immediately intelligible to all their readers (de Jong 2001 is an exception). This is probably because commentators take a very long view of literature: they know of a time when Homer was read and the cinema did not exist, and perhaps they can imagine a future in which Homer is still cherished and the movies are not. After all, the surviving scholia are notoriously difficult to date: they do not refer to the details of their author's life or experience. In fact, they have survived because they are helpful to later readers and do not distract them with unwanted information about their own origin and immediate cultural context. It is the belief in the value of classical literature through time and space that motivates commentators and, in some measure, governs their choices.

64.4. Issues of Value

A commentary, as reviewers constantly remind us, needs to be useful. Two questions naturally follow from that: for what purposes, and to whom, is it meant to be of use? The first issue has preoccupied scholars since antiquity. In the margin of papyri we often find a χ intertwined with a ρ, an abbreviation which stands for $\chi\rho\eta\sigma\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$ 'useful' (see further Turner 1987: 15). The scholia sometimes tell us more about what ancient readers found helpful and admirable. As Easterling (2006) shows, the ancient scholia on Sophocles contain many evaluations of the plays' usefulness to the reader. Some of them remark on the persuasiveness of a particular passage. Others show a concern for language and style: speeches, for example, are commended for being appropriate to the sex, age, and status of the characters that make them. It is easy to see an affinity between such comments and rhetorical instruction: studying the plays will be an advantage in preparing for public speaking. In other cases the scholia draw attention to the moral value of a passage: for example, the comments on *Ajax* 118–21 point out that the lines are useful because they warn readers about the power of the gods. (It is noteworthy that such comments were acceptable also to the Christian readers who transmitted them.) Issues of morality and of style often converge: Hunter (2002) argues that discussions of a text's authenticity tend to involve value-judgements, and that those judgements can, in some contexts, involve moral issues. Even when they do not, debates about authenticity easily become problematic: 'The crucial distinction between "not in the manner of X" and "not very good" proves, in practice, almost impossible to maintain, with potentially ruinous consequences for the writing of commentary' (Hunter 2002: 91). Value-judgements always reveal something of the people who make them, and of their historical contexts. This is one reason why classical commentaries are very rich sources for the cultural historian (the work of

Anthony Grafton abundantly shows how interesting they can be from a cultural perspective: see esp. Grafton 1983–93, 1990, 1997).

As for my second question—'For whom are commentaries meant?'—it seems that in some ways they address a wider readership than other forms of scholarship. Some commentaries are simply meant to be guides for inexperienced readers, others address themselves to professional scholars; but some at least attempt to be useful to a wide range of readers. In order to do so, they adopt different strategies: Latacz (2000–) divides comments into sections aimed at different readers; Dodds (1960) puts his more technical notes in square brackets; commentators working for the 'Green and Yellow' series attempt to cater for diverse readers within a single text. Despite some significant differences between readers, especially in terms of linguistic competence and previous knowledge, it is important to note that they all share a crucial characteristic: a commitment to the ancient text. Commentaries are not entertainment scholarship: they demand discipline, effort, and patience. This is a detail of some importance, because it enables cultural critics to measure with some degree of objectivity which texts are valued, and by whom. Readers are prepared to invest their energy in some texts, but not in others. For example, the monumental commentary on the Babylonian epic of *Gilgamesh* recently published by George (2003) affirms its status as a classic. In western culture, only classicists and theologians are prolific writers and avid consumers of commentaries; otherwise, commentaries tend to be common only on texts which are absolutely central to the canon of later European literature, such as Dante or Shakespeare. Investigations about commentaries in other cultures, for example on Buddhist or Islamic texts, always tell us something fundamental about the cultures in which they are read and produced (Most 1999 includes some studies of non-western commentaries). It is perhaps for this reason that commentaries are a vexed aspect of Hellenic studies: they unabashedly proclaim, and contribute to, the value of classical literature.

Suggested Reading

Some important modern commentaries are quoted in the main text of the article; the richest collection of ancient comments on a Greek text is Erbse (1969–88). I offer here some brief suggestions for further reading in English: Pfeiffer (1968) (fundamental for anybody interested in ancient scholarship); Morgan (1998); Reeve (1998) (for a brief introduction to the ancient scholia). Meijering (1987) offers a broader thematic study. Reynolds and Wilson (1991) is a fundamental guide to the history of classical texts, as is Kenney (1974). For the Byzantine period see Wilson (1983); for the Renaissance see Kraye (1996: esp. ch. 2); Reeve (1996). Sandys (1903–8) is still useful, especially for information on individual commentators and for the dates of *editiones principes*. Henderson (2006) discusses a series of modern

commentaries on Latin texts, but raises issues also pertinent to Hellenic studies. Most (1999) and Gibson and Kraus (2002) offer excellent studies of modern commentaries and their history.

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CHAPTER 65

PSYCHOANALYSIS

RACHEL BOWLBY

THE relationship between psychoanalysis and Hellenic studies has never been one of easy friendship or mutual respect. How could it have been otherwise? For unlike the more established connections and cross-fertilizations between psychoanalysis and other fields—history, literature, or anthropology, say—the case of psychoanalysis' relationship to Greek studies involved a crucial and specific appropriation by the newer discipline. The two are as if joined at the hip, dividing and contesting their use of a central classical source. Without Freud's radical reinterpretation of Sophocles' *Oedipus*, psychoanalysis might never have come into being. Drawing directly on the tragedy, Freud famously argued that it confirmed a scandalous truth about infantile human passions. 'It is the fate of all of us, perhaps,' he said, 'to direct our first sexual impulse towards our mother and our first hatred and our first murderous wish against our father' (Freud 1953–74: iv. 262). The force of Sophocles' play, he claimed, lies in its evocation of precisely those infantile urges which the repressions we have subsequently undergone will normally prevent us from remembering or acknowledging. At a stroke, an ancient and idiosyncratic destiny is rewritten as a universal condition.

Perhaps a better image for the fraught relationship between psychoanalysis and Hellenic studies would be not so much that of a deathly sibling rivalry, the impossible fraternal struggle of the conjoined twins, but rather—with all-too Oedipal echoes—that of an inter-generational struggle between fathers and sons. Just at the moment when Classical studies, and Greek more than Latin, was beginning to lose its educational pre-eminence, along came Freud and gave one Greek myth a whole new modern identity. *The Interpretation of Dreams*, in which Freud made his first published claims about the meaning of Sophocles' *Oedipus the King*, was published

in 1900, as if symbolically marking the turning-point that would soon mean that 'Oedipus', to most ears, meant a 'Freudian' idea rather than a mythical character. Psychoanalysis the usurper took Oedipus away from his Attic origins, where ancient horrors had their place, and made him into a household name in the age of the suburban nuclear family. Classical Oedipus, meanwhile, was relegated to an understudy and understudied role—subordinate, and of interest only to the declining number of enthusiasts for (or schoolboy recruits to) the study of ancient Greek literature and culture. Thus Freud's transformation of Oedipus had the effect of giving an old myth, known only to the cultivated few, a new lease of contemporary life: the compensation for the waning of classical Oedipus was his Freudian reinvention or reincarnation as the famous emblem of an allegedly ubiquitous reality.

Freud himself was no casual or second-hand consumer of classical literature. Born in 1856 and growing up in Vienna, he had benefited from an elite state education that combined scientific and humanities subjects, the latter including an intensive programme of Latin and Greek (see Le Rider 2002: 41–68). Freud went on to become a scientist and doctor in his university studies and professional life, but his fascination with *Oedipus* was that of someone who knew and loved Sophocles' original, which he had studied for his graduating secondary-school examinations. Throughout his life he continued to read (and write about) classical works. He was also passionately interested in archaeology, and had a much-loved collection of ancient *objets*, some of which were on display in his consulting room. (They made the journey from Vienna to London when the founder of psychoanalysis had to move because of the Nazi annexation of Austria at the end of the 1930s.) Of course, not every Austrian pupil of the nineteenth-century *Realgymnasium* system became a revolutionary thinker; but still, it does seem reasonable to suppose that, without Freud's exceptional multidisciplinary education, the new polymathic field of psychoanalysis would not have come into existence.

By taking his exemplary figure of psychoanalytically fallen man from Greek culture, and indeed from a work by the most revered of the three tragedians in the nineteenth century, Freud was being both safe and scandalous. He was relying on the cultural authority of all things Greek, but using it to promote an iconoclastic view of the underlying unsocial nature of everyman, ancient Greek man included. Freud set up his argument on traditional, even holy, ground, but used its security to shake up the very foundations of human self-understanding. Nietzsche, a philologist himself, had done something comparable a few decades earlier in *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), with its radical view of classical tragedy as divided between civilized and more authentic, primitive elements. There is a sense in which Freud might have been going one stage further—out-Nietzsching Nietzsche, perhaps—in his own Hellenic upheaval, with its new challenge to the complacencies of the nineteenth- or post-nineteenth-century world.

Freud was also continuing what was by then a well-established tradition in German-speaking intellectual culture of using a particular literary form, Greek

tragedy, as matter for philosophical exploration and analysis: Hegel is as Antigonal as Freud is Oedipal (see Silk and Stern 1981). There is an irony here, in that tragedy in its own fifth-century time was a popular art form; its nearest cultural equivalent in the late nineteenth century would have been the novel. But no 'Forsyte complex', for instance, ever suggested itself to Freud (who was, as it happens, a fan of the work of John Galsworthy). Whereas an ancient drama provided Freud with an inescapable demonstration of the theory he claimed to be true for all times, modern literature, far from being able to perform an equivalent service, could be actively detrimental to scientific argument. Early on, he worried that his lively, suspenseful case histories read too much like novellas, and thus that 'they lack the serious stamp (*des ernsten Gepräges*) of science' (Freud 1953–74: ii. 160). Modern genres, this implies, are lightweight compared with the enduring force of the ancient; Freud eternalizes the meaning of Sophocles by, in effect, reaffirming for tragedy the privilege that it had held for those nineteenth-century literary and philosophical thinkers for whom it had functioned as the secular replacement for religion.

Apart from its thematic potency, *Oedipus the King* attracted Freud by a dramatic resemblance. 'The action of the play', he wrote, 'consists in nothing other than the process of revealing, with cunning delays and ever-mounting excitement—a process that can be likened to the work of a psycho-analysis—that Oedipus himself is the murderer of Laius, but further that he is the son of the murdered man and of Jocasta' (Freud 1953–74: iv. 261–2). The quick, unelaborated parenthesis is suggestive in all sorts of ways. It is clear, first of all, that *Oedipus* lends itself to the comparison with analysis better than any other tragedy because of the way it is structured as an urgent enquiry into past events. From the investigation, unexpected new truths emerge which irrevocably transform people's understanding of their own identities and histories. Oedipus knew he killed a man and married a woman; he did not know that they were his father and mother. But if *Oedipus* is the only tragedy to enact such a personal discovery as its very plot, other tragedies do something comparable in their use of familiar myths to make something new that may subtly or overtly alter the meaning of the story. Psychoanalysis can help us to think about the ways in which meanings are changed, whether consciously or unconsciously, in the retelling of both personal and public stories.

A second resemblance between psychoanalysis and tragedy is the way that both focus on words and the emotions that accompany them. Again, this is most evident in *Oedipus*, because it is words alone that lead to Oedipus' conviction, in both senses (he is found guilty of regicide, and he comes to believe he has committed the crimes of murder and incest). In tragedy as in therapy, words have extraordinary powers. The quickfire exchange of line-by-line stichomythia is close to the exciting, unravelling atmosphere of therapeutic engagement and discovery in a conversation between two people that Freud conjures up. Greek tragedy has no sword-fights, only messenger speeches which represent what has occurred with the heightened vividness of verbal rather than visual representation.

Another connection between tragedy and psychoanalysis is their dramatic and ritualized form. A tragic performance, with actors performing roles and enacting or telling stories, conforms to given parameters of time and space: it lasts an expected length of time, and is performed as part of a religious festival. Likewise, a therapeutic session is set apart from ordinary life by its own special norms (including the injunction, or freedom, for the patient to say anything that comes into her head). The fifty-minute hour, as it most often is, is also an explicitly dramatic space in which both patient and therapist take on roles which are other than the ones they perform in their ordinary lives. In discussing the practice of therapy, Freud regularly uses an analogy with drama. The patient talking her uncontrolled talk, and encountering a listener who does not respond in the ways to which she is accustomed, will, it is hoped, come to gain an insight into how she habitually carries on—keeps going, or complains, or both—and the kinds of assumption she unthinkingly makes about the people she relates to. 'Transference' is Freud's name for how the patient automatically places the therapist in particular roles and acts towards her or him in ways that seem to be pre-scripted but which, in the course of the analytic process, can then come to be seen as such and thus as open to change.

The connection of therapy and tragedy also goes by way of another significant psychoanalytic borrowing from Greek, in addition to the seminal use of Sophocles' *Oedipus*. Behind and before the crucial passage in *The Interpretation of Dreams* is Freud and Josef Breuer's deployment of Aristotelian 'catharsis' in the *Studies on Hysteria* (1895). The 'cathartic' method was the technical name they gave to the new treatment that 'Anna O.', a patient of Breuer's, had brightly named—in English—the 'talking cure'. Her witty invention has had a longer life than the doctors' technical coinage, but their choice of word (which they do not discuss) is significant in suggesting the broad influence at the time of debates within Classical studies. Freud and Breuer's therapeutic model of catharsis as a form of release from a pent-up and unrecognized source of mental and physical distress derives from a controversial and influential interpretation of Aristotelian catharsis by the Greek scholar Jacob Bernays (who, as uncanny coincidence would have it, was Freud's own uncle by marriage). Bernays (1857) had made a detailed case against the prevailing understanding of catharsis in quasi-spiritual terms, as a form of purification. For Bernays, catharsis was more a kind of purgative therapy in which emotional and bodily reactions were not clearly separated. This was the perspective that Freud and Breuer developed when they proposed that a special kind of conversation, ultimately releasing the memories that the patient had blocked off as too hard to bear, was a means of relieving the physical sufferings that had arisen, they argued, as a consequence of this suppression. In a combination that was remarkable in the context of the usual modern separation between the scientific and the literary, this new medical treatment was inspired, essentially, by classical literary criticism (see Le Rider 2002: 177–89).

Given the runaway success of psychoanalysis in its appropriation of a legendary Greek figure—twentieth-century Oedipus was known to all, but as a complex not a king—it is perhaps not surprising that classical scholars have normally been slow to take an interest, whether in the form of enthusiasm or resistance, in the various applications of psychoanalysis to humanities subjects that have developed since Freud. If you look at the classical journals and scholarly literature of the post-war decades, the time when psychoanalytic criticism was becoming significant in the reading of modern literatures, you find not so much hostility as silence: the topic barely exists. In this context the exceptions stand out all the more. In 1957, in a lecture to mark the centenary of Freud's birth that was published in the *Classical Journal*, Norman O. Brown proclaimed that Freud's discoveries would be at the centre of man's coming exploration of his own psychology, a direction in which classics too must boldly go. With a nod to E. R. Dodds' own post-Freudian work, psychoanalysis was co-opted as pointing towards the significance of 'the irrational factor' in human cultures (Brown 1957: 244), and also as insisting on the importance of 'sex and the family' (ibid. 243). Less dramatically and more modestly, the 1970s saw the appearance of a number of journal forums and bibliographies on Classical studies and psychoanalysis which, in comparison with the indifference to psychoanalysis on either side of that decade, seem now to have indicated a possible turning-point that never quite occurred, even though all sort of other changes of classical critical orientation were in the making at that time. Some journals—*Arethusa* deserves mention here—were consistently more open to psychoanalytic discussion, as they were to other innovative approaches such as feminism. Some individual critics, and some national critical cultures, were more open than others to psychoanalytic influences, not always or necessarily explicit.

In France, in particular, the general culture has been both far more 'normally' psychoanalytic and far more 'normally' classical than it is in Britain or the United States (or in Germany, for that matter). Post-Freudian psychoanalysts, notably Jacques Lacan, could follow Freud in drawing on Greek tragedy for their arguments with a knowledge of the language that their English-speaking counterparts were unlikely to share. At the same time, French classical scholars had to engage with a psychoanalytically inflected way of thinking that was almost second nature to Parisian intellectuals. It is no doubt because of the combination of the two knowledges among more readers and scholars than is the case elsewhere that France has produced the most interesting classical discussions and deployments of psychoanalysis. In the wake of Freud's own provocative use of Sophocles, psychoanalytically sympathetic Hellenists have been drawn to extend the questions his theories invite about the relationship between a specific culture and its myths of personal and civic identity. The work of Nicole Loraux, for instance, though she rarely quoted Freud or Lacan directly, is imbued with psychoanalytic thinking in its study of the connections between politics, tragedy, and myth (see e.g. Loraux 1981). More adversarially, Jean-Pierre Vernant's detailed work on sixth- and fifth-century

Athenian cultural changes that may have their echo in tragedy are often in dialogue with simplifying, unhistorical assumptions about Greek myths and culture made by psychoanalytic critics, among others. In particular, Vernant objected to what he called the 'Oedipalization' of all Greek myths on the part of some psychoanalysts who, he argued, refer and reduce all stories to the only one that they deem significant: behind every mythical story is an 'Oedipal' struggle between father and son.

Despite the predominance of psychoanalytic interest in France, the Hellenist whose work was most marked by the new twentieth-century field of thought is arguably an Oxford professor of Greek. E. R. Dodds' *The Greeks and the Irrational* (1951) does not cite Freud many times, but it implicitly draws on psychoanalytic modes of thinking for the case it makes for reinterpreting the dominant understanding of fifth-century culture in terms of a progress from primitive to rational thought, writ large in the modern tendency to see this development as the emergence of 'the' mind—or at least the western mind—itself. When he writes, for instance, about the uses of Dionysiac ecstatic religion, Dodds first makes a historical point about how 'the individual, as the modern world knows him, began in [the archaic] age to emerge for the first time from the old solidarity of the family' (Dodds 1951: 76), and then a more general one: 'its psychological function was to satisfy and relieve the impulse to reject responsibility, an impulse which exists in all of us and can become under certain social conditions an irresistible craving' (ibid. 77). Dodds retains—as too does Vernant, for instance—the wish to find in ancient Greece the origins of nothing less than modern individuality; but following Freud, he does not take rationality as the only or the superior part of cultural or individual minds. In effect, he takes Freud's own insights about the divisions and multiform nature of mental life back to the culture from which he derived one element of his theory, and shows how a psychoanalytically informed historian and critic might turn his attention to the ways in which ancient Greek cultures imagined the forces acting within and upon their thinking and unthinking selves.

In Anglo-Saxon criticism there have been worthy successors to Dodds in the task of using, but not crudely applying, psychoanalysis in the study of Greek literature and culture; Ruth Padel's work is particularly suggestive in its Doddsian attention to how the elemental categories of Greek psychology are represented in tragedy (Padel 1992, 1995). Charles Segal argued for the compatibility of Freudian and other psychoanalytic theories, such as that of Melanie Klein, with a rigorous classicist's approach to tragedy. Feminist critics such as Anne Pippin Burnett, Page duBois, and Froma I. Zeitlin have used or developed psychoanalytic modes of thinking—in duBois' case, postulating an alternative symbolic model of sexual difference in Greek mythology, *contra* Freud's masculine bias. DuBois (1988) is unusual in the small field of studies explicitly linking classics and psychoanalysis, in that it does not draw mainly or exclusively on tragedy. For as J. P. Sullivan once put it, in his editorial introducing a journal special issue on the subject in the 1970s: 'Although psychoanalytical insights cannot be applied wholesale to every aspect of the ancient

world, some areas, notably Greek Tragedy, cry out for it' (Sullivan 1974: 8). Mythology, one focus of duBois' study, comes a close second, however; and the two fields are obviously linked through tragedy's own incorporation and adaptation of myths.

Recently a number of larger-scale studies have brought together psychoanalysis and Hellenism from a new temporal perspective, by re-examining Freud's own relationship to the classical past that inspired him. In this connection, Freud's work may be seen as symptomatic of a broader return to ancient Greece during the period of modernism—or, more specifically, at a time of artistic and intellectual innovation in Vienna (see Goldhill 2002). Or else, Freud's Hellenism may be seen as the complement and counterpart to his interest, especially towards the end of his life, in his Jewish roots and the Egyptian figure of Moses (see Le Rider 2002). Richard H. Armstrong and Peter L. Rudnytsky, in particular, have demonstrated the intimate links between the mythical and tragic paradigm that Freud found in Oedipus and in other Greek sources and the psychoanalytic theory and practice of interpretation and retranslation that Freud, and his followers, developed (see Rudnytsky 1987; Armstrong 2005). In a different key, Miriam Leonard's *Athens in Paris* (Leonard 2005) highlights the significance in France of Hellenic studies to psychoanalytic culture, and vice versa.

Books like these testify to a developing interest in psychoanalysis' debt to and interaction with Greek antiquity. But many of their authors are not, or not primarily, classicists. Today more work deserves to be done by Hellenists who can bring to their study of Freud a classical knowledge equivalent to his. There is scope, perhaps, for operating at a double historical distance, not only revisiting the gap that separated and animated Freud's passion for Greece, but also thinking about the social and cultural changes of the past hundred years that now, in some respects, give Freud the status of a thinker from past times. The scandal of Freud's Oedipalization of human development was not only its assertion of forbidden familial desires and hatreds, but also its claim to universality and its fencing off of other possible ways of understanding Sophocles' tragedy. *If* the play moves us still, as it did the first Athenian audience, *then*, Freud argues, in a strikingly dogmatic conditional, that can *only* be because it arouses in us the infantile feelings of aggression and love that we have long learned to put out of our minds (see Freud 1953–74: iv. 262).

In the twenty-first century Sophocles' Oedipus might offer some other points of correspondence with contemporary as well as allegedly universal conditions of identity. In particular, Oedipus' multiple origins as the child of four parents (two adoptive, two by birth) and, by the same token, as having two home countries, resonates with contemporary experience of post-nuclear family set-ups and the effects of migration. Much of the richest and most innovative work in Greek studies over the past two decades has been concerned with the second of these issues: with ethnic and civic identity, and with the figure of the *xenos*; tragic and other sources have been reread in this context. Less attention, however, has been given to the study of the complexities of family identities and intra-familial politics which preoccupy

many tragedies, and which, from another point of view, prompted Freud's reinterpretation of *Oedipus*. Despite its consciously twentieth-century destiny, Freud's monumentalization of an Oedipal Oedipus paradoxically follows the nineteenth-century tendency to find in ancient Greek culture a point of fixity and certainty to hold against the evident flux and change of the present time. Psychoanalytic studies today are beginning to explore the implications for both therapy and theory of the momentous changes in the forms and conditions of family and subjective life that have occurred in the past hundred years, since Freud's own time. Moving beyond the Freudian Oedipus, classical scholars too could turn their twenty-first-century attention to ways in which Greek literature may offer new insights into post-Freudian subjective predicaments (for beginnings in this direction see Bowlby 2007*a* and *b*; Jacobs 2007; Pedrick 2007).

Suggested Reading

Freud's own *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (Freud 1953–74: vols. xv–xvi) and *New Introductory Lectures* (vol. xxii) offer a lively, accessible account of psychoanalytic thinking, including the Oedipus complex. For students of literature, Ellmann (1994) presents a representative range of contemporary approaches, among them Felman (1994) on the pivotal importance of Sophocles' Oedipus (including *Oedipus at Colonus*) as a psychoanalytic paradigm. Within classical studies, Dodds (1951) shows the influence of Freud's modern demotion of the ratiocinative, conscious aspects of mental life, here returned to the study of the Greeks themselves, from whom Freud took his first inspiration for his theory of the persistence and pervasiveness of unconscious mental forces. Some recent psychoanalytically influenced classical works (e.g. by Armstrong, duBois, Loraux, Padel) are discussed in the main text. Two useful bibliographies of earlier work on classics and psychoanalysis appeared in journals in the 1970s: Caldwell (1974) and Arthur (1977). Sullivan (1974) remains illuminating on the history of the relationship between psychoanalysis and the classics.

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CHAPTER 66

TRANSLATION STUDIES

ALEXANDRA LIANERI

> I translated the most famous orations of the two most eloquent Attic orators, Aeschines and Demosthenes . . . And I did not convert them as a translator, but as an orator (*non converti ut interpres sed ut orator*).
>
> (Cicero, *De Optimo Genere Oratorum* 14)

Thus Cicero defined the interface of Hellenic studies and translation theory as the site of an idiosyncratic contradiction. On the one hand, translation is considered here as the means by which the Romans could engage with the Greek orators, apprehend their style, and capture their qualities within the frame of a new language. On the other hand, this very operation is powerfully denounced as one which the student of Greek needs to suppress and efface. I translated, Cicero says—yet the name appropriate to this act is not translation, but rhetoric. In other words, translation is deemed to lack a distinctive property. This happens both with the word and with the product (and process) named translation. Both are denied, almost by necessity, a specified conceptual space. The space attributed to them is rather defined only negatively, as that which approaches the source text, but nevertheless fails to attain its peculiar qualities—hence the conflict between the craft of translation and the name attributed to it: rhetoric. Translation approaches Greek rhetoric by mediating its survival in the shape of tradition and memory. Yet this move is immediately forgotten by the category of translation which Cicero's statement helps to establish. This oblivion of the mediating role of translations in encountering Greek culture returns in the form of aporias centred on the meaning

of a word, and the traits of a practice which never enjoys a peaceful identity with its name.

To be sure, both the Latin *translatio* and the word's 'translations' into most European languages (translation, *traduction*, *traduzione*, *traducción*, *Übersetzung*) seem to lay claim to a stable meaning. All of these terms evidently signify the act of carrying across, the process of transposition and transfer implied by the word's etymological meaning (*trans-* 'across', and *fero* 'carry'). However, nothing could be further from describing the condition of translation than the category of transfer, at least if the word denotes the movement of something that was already there—fully shaped—from the beginning. Translation is called upon to move the source text (the original) from its own linguistic and cultural context into a new one, conventionally described as target language and context. Yet, as Walter Benjamin observes: 'any translation which intends to perform a transmitting function cannot transmit anything but information—hence something inessential. This is the hallmark of bad translations' (1992: 70). Cicero's paradox is repeated here in its full dramatic force. Translation as a word is intended to signify a process of transfer; yet to fulfil this intention is to betray the promise of translation. To transmit the source text, Benjamin says, amounts to producing a bad translation, a disentitled translation or one that does not quite realize its potential. It is therefore as if an ineffaceable self-negation sets the foundation of translation's promise. How is one to understand this troubled identity? What kind of text is entitled to the name translation? And what kind of movement takes place in the practice of translating? Is translation to be seen as a kind of transparent clothing put on the stable body of the Greek tradition? What is it that translations articulate and dramatize in their naked meaning and beauty?

66.1. Mediating the Foreign, or the Limits of Translation

Translation studies investigates the power of translations to communicate a text across linguistic boundaries, and thus across both temporal and spatial domains in the history of cultures. That means that the study of translations, as Antoine Berman observes, begins as reflection on the encounters between these domains. It explores the modalities and overtones of the 'experience of the foreign' (1992). There is translation—a process and matter of translation—because there is an interest in a text, and because that text is recognized as foreign to a community. However, the senses in which translation would signify and approach the foreign prove to proliferate and to breach the opposition between it and the local.

At the most immediate level, the engagement with a foreign text implies what Roman Jakobson (1959) called 'translation proper'—that is, from one natural language to another—as opposed to 'intralingual translation', which takes place between idioms of the same language, and intersemiotic translation or transcoding. Still, the divides between these categories are far from straightforward. Foreignness, as mentioned already, is the product of recognition, rather than the manifestation of clear-cut language boundaries. This entails that what is seen as 'foreign' and in need of translation may be a distinctive social or cultural idiom alongside the entire frame of semiosis that is linked to it. Popular rewritings of the classics, for instance, may be described as an act of dual translation: that of the Greek or Latin texts and that of the canonical image constructed for those texts in the linguistic and wider semiotic contexts of 'high' culture. Edith Hall's 1999 study of the mid-Victorian genre of 'classical burlesque' offers an illuminating example. Hall has examined how burlesque productions acted to appropriate classical subjects for an audience that included working-class people with no access to the cultural privileges of classical education. Both translations and performance conventions deployed for this purpose were formed in relation to two distinct categories of source text. The first was delimited by the tradition of Greek drama itself (though we shall see that, in a sense, there is no such tradition *itself*, outside the mediation of a certain translation process). The second was constituted by canonical representations of the classics, and specifically theatre productions associated with Victorian high culture. As Hall notes, classical burlesques, such as J. R. Planché's *Golden Fleece or, Jason in Colchis and Medea in Corinth*, or Edward Leman Blanchard's innovative *Antigone Travestie* of 1845, engaged directly with such productions and offered a witty appropriation of the linguistic and performance codes articulated by them. Classical burlesque may thus be said to have 'translated' not merely the Greek texts, but also an upper-class discourse of translation into a new and subversive discourse addressed to those banned from the social idioms of high culture.

This dual engagement exemplified what Friedrich Schleiermacher has perspicaciously described as an ever-expansive continuum, where the translation operation is discernible in the interface of languages and social dialects—and even in conversation within a single discourse, where we are 'required to translate the speech of another for ourselves, even if he is totally our equal but possesses a different frame of mind or feeling' (1977: 68). Moreover, the limits of those translations are not confined to linguistic material, but extend to the field of performance as shaped by both actors and spectators. Indeed, insofar as dramatic performance was comprised of a unity of speech, action, and setting, it involves multiple translations: that of written texts into spoken words and action, that of actors and viewers into the imaginary situation of the plays, and that of codes of semiosis associated with high culture into different ones. As John Sallis put it epigrammatically: 'Theatre abounds in translation.' Each of its constitutive modes is played out as a translation operation and thus extends the limits of translation as concept (2002: 34–6).

The constitutive role of recognition in defining foreignness requires us to question, or at least qualify, Jakobson's category of 'translation proper' in yet another way. The peculiar power of translations to demarcate what lies beyond a given cultural domain implies that resistance to translations can indicate opposition to or even direct denial of the form of foreignness posited by language boundaries. Let us think for instance that the first English translation of the New Testament made from the Greek was only published in 1525 and entered England illegally. The majority of copies were burned in public, while the translator, William Tyndale, was arrested and executed on the grounds that the language of the Bible was not, strictly speaking, a foreign tongue, but a universal one, whose status would have been vulgarized if reduced to the local terms of vernaculars (cf. Ellis and Oakley-Brown 1998; Jasper 2005). Likewise, the translation of the New Testament and the *Oresteia* into the modern Greek vernacular (demotic) at the dawn of the twentieth century instigated violent riots, with both the translators and those who sustained their initiative being denounced as traitors serving a foreign cause. At a time when both antiquity and the Byzantine (Christian) past were put forward as the founding pillars of modern Greek national identity, the very act of translating threatened to present as 'foreign' what was claimed to provide the frame of the local. Thus the kind of translation that conservative circles promoted in the period was the reverse one. It was a translation from the modern Greek vernacular into an archaic linguistic form (*katharevousa*) based on ancient Greek and aimed at putting antiquity at the centre of the nation's identity and historical memory (cf. Connolly and Bacopoulou-Halls 1998; Maronitis, forthcoming). In both examples, translation stands far from being the unavoidable product of a distance between languages defined a priori; it is rather the means by which this distance is conceptualized, re-cognized, or resisted—and possibly effaced.

Translations can thus be said to operate as a medium which enables the experience of foreign works, but also as a discursive demarcation of foreignness, an act of delimiting cultural languages in relation to an externality. The paradox of translation highlighted by Cicero lies precisely in this duality. To identify the foreign is to catch sight of a cultural language that manifests itself as untranslatable, that is to say, resistant to the process of transfer. Yet the very possibility of conceptualizing this untranslatability requires that a form of translation ultimately takes place. To grasp the foreign as such and distinguish it from the local requires a translation that would allow the comparison between the two (see Davidson 2001). In other words, translation is both presupposed and produced by the recognition of the foreign. Cicero's oscillation between naming and unnaming translation serves to articulate this paradox. His encounter with Greek rhetoric is the move that defines the Greek as external to Roman culture and thus in need of translation. His unnaming of translation both sustains this definition and acts to undermine its claims. The disentitlement of translation practice reconfigures the gap between Greek and Roman oratory in the shape of a unity: the space where translation becomes unnecessary

(reduced to rhetoric) not despite, but because of its attestation. To translate as an orator attests to the potential of Latin to break the silence of a foreign idiom as well as the potential of that idiom to move itself beyond the realm of foreignness. But this act leaves open the possibility of restating the initial recognition of Greek literature as a domain of externality. It thus falls short of expunging the division between translation as encounter with the foreign and translation as repetition or transfer affirming the unity of source and target culture. In this regard, the translation operation puts forth a paradoxical manifestation of the untranslatable as the very medium through which the practice of translation can be formulated.

66.2. Translations in History: Places and Displacements

The history of translations from the Greek is marked by this coincidence of the translatable and the untranslatable, and the disruption it effects on the original meaning of translation as a concept. This implies that the mode in which translations manifest themselves needs to be seen as inherently conflictual, in the sense that the translation operation posits the distance between source and target language as unbridgeable and at the same time closed—even though provisionally—by every act of translation. The various resolutions to this paradox, formulated by prioritizing one of its opposing elements, provide the frame for the concrete historical articulation of translations and the respective delimitations of translation's name.

This condition is evidenced even when translation is called upon to recover the Greek tradition by constructing target forms and meanings that purport to correspond to the source text directly. In the period of the great translation movement of the Renaissance, the English humanist Thomas Elyot urged his contemporaries to translate into their tongue the 'wisdom' of the Greek and Roman classics. As he put it in his treatise *The Boke, Named The Gouernour* (which was first published in 1531): 'That lyke as the Romains translated the wisedome of Grecia in to their citie, we may, if we list, bringe the lernynges and wisedomes of them both in to this realme of Englande, by the translation of their warkes' (Elyot 1580: 78). Elyot himself strove arduously to attain this goal. His pioneering translations into English engaged with Plutarch, Lucian, and Isocrates, and some were the first to have been made directly from the Greek. He was also the compiler of one of the first Latin–English dictionaries, in which he coined several English terms as equivalents to Latin, and the corresponding Greek, ones (Hogrefe 1967: 221, Lathrop 1933: 41). A number of important terms in the humanities and social sciences

were introduced into English by Elyot's imaginative acts of what may be called translational lexicography and translation practice. Among those was the term 'democracy', which was deployed by Elyot as equivalent to the Greek *dēmokratia*. As he wrote (1580: 5): 'An other publique weale was amonge the Atheniensis, where equalitie was of astate amonge the people ... whiche moughte well be called a monstre with many heedes: nor neuer it was certeyne nor stable ... This maner of gouernaunce was called in greke *Democratia*, in latin *Popularis potentia*, in englisshe the rule of the comminaltie.' The form of translation attempted here both upholds and questions the translatability of the Greek word. The transcription of the Greek—cited by the *Oxford English Dictionary* as the first English attestation of the modern term 'democracy'—is already a translation insofar as the term becomes entangled in the language which would subsequently absorb and appropriate it. Yet this rendering also points to the absence of English equivalent to the Greek *dēmokratia*. The recourse to transcription not only suggests the impossibility of the term's transposition, but also questions the establishment of the periphrastic rendering 'the rule of the comminaltie' as translation proper. As Neville Morley has argued, the insistence on the ultimate untranslatability of ancient experience, implicit in the use of transliterated Greek and Latin terms, is itself an interpretive—or even translation—strategy acting to preserve antiquity from appropriation and reduction to modern vocabularies (Morley, 2008). Such a move thus interrogates the attempt to rewrite ancient terms under the sign of modern ones. It emerges as countertranslation, that is to say, a translation which directs itself against a different one, and in doing so also puts forth the peculiarity of the word or text that is being translated.

Countertranslation, a category derived from Sallis' philosophical account of translation (2002: 6, 8), needs to be distinguished here from the idea of retranslation, in that it is not merely a further attempt to translate a work, but one that is addressed—explicitly or implicitly—to other translations which it claims to complement or supersede. It is possible to argue that the history of translations, and especially translations of classical literatures, is comprised in its totality of countertranslations. A quick reading of translators' comments and prefaces to their works is enough to demonstrate that the great majority of them feel compelled to justify their enterprise by explaining its relation to other renderings of the same text. The same intention underlies the practice of translation, where specific linguistic choices derive not only from the translator's reading of the source text, but also from the need to locate her work within a wider translation discourse. Finally, many translators follow Elyot's practice of offering alternative versions of the same word or passage in a single text.

These internal encounters within translation discourse can be usefully explored to map out the historical diversity of translations, their shared claim to the translatability of their source material, and recourse to an opposition between translations that are, and those that are not, entitled to the name. Contempo-

rary Translation studies has shown persuasively how repetitive attempts at translating are not to be viewed as isolated endeavours, but belong to a continuum which follows its own dynamic, and is relatively independent from the translators' engagement with the source text or tradition. A wide number of case-studies across various literatures suggest that key to historical translation analysis is not merely the focus on the relation between source text and translation, but also—and perhaps predominantly—a focus on the ways in which translations follow norms and conventions that link them to each other in groups shaped by demands and conditions of their own literary and social context (Toury 1995; Hermans 1999).

Such an approach has significant implications for accounts of the reception of Greek literature and of the shaping of the Hellenic tradition. If translations are not to be subsumed under the idea of recovering Greek texts, or the Greek historical experience, in terms of modern languages, but are formed within frames that position them for or against each other, then we are faced with 'battles of translation', to use Lorna Hardwick's apt term (2000: 9–22), which indicates that an ineradicable *displacement* of Greek works was the founding move in the history of Hellenic studies. To translate would mean to allow the entrance of Greek tradition into a new historical scene, wherein actors and spectators, translators and readers, attach to it new meanings and resonance. Benjamin depicts the process powerfully by means of a metaphor (1992: 80–1): 'Just as a tangent touches a circle lightly and at but one point, with this touch rather than with the point setting the law according to which it is to continue on its straight path to infinity, a translation touches the original lightly and only at the infinitely small point of the sense, thereupon pursuing its own course according to the laws of fidelity in the freedom of linguistic flux.'

But this image of movement and displacement is not to be understood as direct appropriation, a means of taking hold of the source text which leaves the translating community unaffected and unaltered. Elyot's rendering of *dēmokratia* was not inconsequential for modern political thought. As part of a long tradition of translations going back to William of Moerbeke's important version of Aristotle's *Politics*, which introduced *democratia* into Medieval Latin, and including numerous other renderings in both European and non-European languages, the translation helped to create nothing less than a political category, one which was to dramatically affect modern political thought and practice. The very decision to translate a work and the inflection given to translations cannot be separated from the potential that translation opens up for the reshaping of the target culture. As Heidegger observed, echoing Schleiermacher's reflection on translation: when we translate we conventionally presume the transposing of the foreign language into another one; yet we fail to recognize how the process also involves the translation of the latter language and, indeed, that of ourselves into a transformed stage of being and a new realm of truth (1992: 12–16). Paul Ricoeur meets Heidegger on this very point. Drawing on several examples of translations, including the translation

of early Greek philosophy during the Renaissance, he considers the externality (or what he calls 'distantiation') of the source text articulated by translation as a means of moving the translating language and community beyond its current condition. Yet unlike Heidegger, who locates this capacity in a form of etymological translation that brings to the present the forgotten meaning of a text, Ricoeur speaks of the restitution of the force (*pulsion*) of the text, its capacity both to transcend its original addressees and to *create* an audience within the stage of world history (2004).

Finally, we need to observe that the limits of this move are not confined to what we conventionally call translation. For a translation operation is already at work in the process of understanding Greek works and deciphering their contextual significance. Are we not entangled in translation when we speak of Greek ideas of 'history' and the 'political', no matter whether we distinguish these terms from their modern equivalents or not? That is not to say that such distinctions are unnecessary or misleading. It is rather to suggest that a realm of non-translation, a zero-degree point, as Sallis puts it, where translation comes to an end and discourse contracts into a purely monolingual operation, is itself impossible to reach insofar as translation inevitably arises from the very movement of language—even before the transition from one language to another (Sallis, 2008). A reader who abstains from translation is no less contaminated by what she rejects than Cicero's translating orator is contaminated by what she *does*.

66.3. Translation 'Proper': The Ethics and Politics of Translating

But does all this imply that no appraisal is to be formulated of the links between translations and the Greek texts? If the idea of translation is to be extended to every act of understanding those texts, are we to conclude that all attempts at evaluating translations are inevitably misleading, insofar each of them manifests nothing more than a mode of displacing the Greek tradition? What, other than a recognition of hermeneutical finitude, are we to note when called upon to produce and judge translations?

In an analysis of Hölderlin's translations of Greek philosophy and literature, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe observed that the craft of translation is to make the Greek text say that which it does not itself stop saying and yet never says (1986: 83). The paradox serves as the conclusion to a discussion in which Lacoue-Labarthe argues that what is proper to the Greeks is impossible either to grasp or to imitate. As he notes, this is not the case because the Greeks are ineradicably alien to us (for being

alien, as we saw, is predicated on the possibility of translation and thus precludes the idea of a radical divide between us and ancients). It is rather because what is proper to the Greeks never took place as such. The force of this contention lies in its ethical and political implications, rather than its descriptive potential. In other words, Lacoue-Labarthe does not simply argue that the Greeks lacked distinctive historical properties which can be discovered and accounted for by historical research. He rather interrogates the move by which the determination of these properties is unavoidably implicated in the classical status of Greek literature, and therefore the definition of what is 'proper'.

The ways in which the Greeks questioned this move becomes evident by following the act of translation. In his translation of the *Antigone*'s 'Ode to Man', Lacoue-Labarthe notes, Hölderlin rendered *deinon* at lines 332–3 by the term *ungeheuer*, thus stressing the coupling of the human and the non-human, the finite with the limitless or divine, the cause of both wonder and terror (Lacoue-Labarthe 1986; Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1997: 72–3). Other translations voice the same paradoxical coincidence. Reginald Gibbons and Charles Segal spoke of man in terms of wonder and terror (2003: 68):

> At many things—wonders,
> Terrors—we feel awe,
> But at nothing more
> Than at man.

Seamus Heaney's rendering evoked the idea of a 'creature' (a living thing, either man or beast) alongside the term 'wonder' (Heaney 2004, ad loc.):

> Among the many wonders of the world
> Where is the equal of this creature, man?

Finally Heidegger's translation, explicitly addressed to Hölderlin's version, offered *unheimlich*—strange, uncanny—as alternative to *ungeheuer* (1984: 76–8, 84–6). The intention of all translations is to capture a liminality in which the author locates himself and his contemporaries, and through which he questions the finality of any determination of what is proper to human beings. The implications of this move are revealed in the translations. The text's significance lies not merely in relativizing what is 'proper', but in its contradictory duality, in the power of words to imply that which they do not say and which acts to question their apparent meaning.

The distinctive quality of Sophocles' verse is manifested as a kind of translatability in the sense given to the term by Benjamin. 'Translatability', he writes, 'is an essential quality of certain works, which is not to say that it is essential that they be translated; it means rather that a specific significance inherent in the original manifests itself in its translatability' (1992: 71). In other words, translatability signifies the capacity of the text to transcend itself, to say more than what it says, and thus allow the reader to turn words against themselves. It would follow that a proper

translation of such a text would highlight precisely this capacity. It would be one which articulates the modes in which Greek writing brings that interrogation into play and thus makes it possible for its reader to consider the ethical and political conditioning and force of reading and writing.

Suggested Reading

For an introduction to Translation studies see Bassnett (1991), Munday (2001), and the series *Translation Theories Explored* published in Manchester under the editorship of T. Hermans. On translation in relation to Classical studies see Hardwick (2000), Lianeri and Zajko (2008), and the relevant chapters of France, Gillespie, *et al.* (2005–). For research models and methods in Translation studies see Bassnett and Lefevere (1990), Lefevere (1992), Toury (1995), Venuti (1995) and (1998), Pym (1998), Hermans (2002 and 2006), and Tymoczko (2006). For philosophical and anthropological approaches to translation see Derrida (1988), Clifford (1997), Montgomery (2000), Davis (2001), Sallis (2002), Eco (2003), and Ricoeur (2004). On the didactics of translation see Hatim (2001). Reference works and anthologies include Schulte and Biguenet (1992), Shuttleworth (1997), Baker (1998), Robinson (2002), and Venuti (2004).

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CHAPTER 67

FILM STUDIES

PANTELIS MICHELAKIS

SINCE the early 1900s hundreds of films have been inspired by ancient Greek mythology, literature, drama, and history. Cinema has turned to ancient Greece to visualize some of the oldest and most famous stories in western culture, thus participating in ongoing debates about the meanings of classical literature and culture and their place both within the modern world and against it. The stories of the Greek world have also functioned as meta-narratives or metaphors for cinematic plots: from road movies to science-fiction films and westerns, cinema has persistently explored the themes of the journey, of homecoming, and of identity, whose archetypal force has come to be associated with Homer and Greek tragedy. Moreover, film theory has drawn on Greek philosophy, especially on theories of representation and perception, to articulate and debate phenomenological, cognitive, and narratological approaches to cinema. The aim of this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive overview of the Greek world in cinema but to focus on selective aspects of the multifaceted relationship between them. In doing so, it seeks to move beyond taxonomical surveys based on different degrees of faithfulness to classical texts and their authors, and on to question approaches which reduce films to vehicles reflecting the preoccupations of their directors or their cultural contexts.

For all their diversity, films on the Greek world have engaged only with a relatively small group of canonical texts, stories, and themes from ancient Greece. Similarly, not all films on the Greek world are equally well known—some types of film and director have enjoyed a more canonical status than others. The heterogeneity of what has received attention is as interesting as the diversity of what has been neglected. For instance, the cinematic reception of Greek mythology is

usually associated with the continued dominance of 'Hercules' in popular cinema, from blockbusters of the silent era to the sword-and-sandal films of the 1950s and the animation pictures and network television series of the 1990s. Yet other mythological characters such as Orpheus have provided the subject-matter for some of the most poetic, avant-garde, and self-reflective films inspired by classical antiquity: for instance, Jean Cocteau's *Blood of a Poet* (1930), *Orpheus* (1950), and *Testament of Orpheus* (1959); and Marcel Camus' *Black Orpheus* (1959). On the other hand, many of the divine and heroic characters encountered in university courses on Greek mythology (from Hesiod's *Theogony* to Apollodorus' *Library*) have been largely ignored by cinema. In the same way, some cinematic representations of the Greek world are well known and have received much critical attention, with those of realist cinema being the most obvious ones, whereas films of non-western cinematic traditions and of silent cinema such as those on Prometheus from eastern Europe (e.g. Ivan Kavaleridze's *Prometei*, 1935; Vatroslav Mimica's *Prometej s otoka Viševice*, 1965; or Todor Dinov's *Prometey*, 1970) and on Alexander the Great from Asia (e.g. Sohrab Modi's *Sikandar*, 1941; and Kedar Kapoor's *Sikandar e Azam*, 1965) have been largely neglected. Which visual, textual, or cinematic narratives become canonical depends not only on a direct engagement with them but also on canonizing processes which range from the reputation of their creators and readers to the mechanisms of artistic production and dissemination, and the changing and competing conceptualizations of the Graeco-Roman past in contemporary popular culture, in the arts, and in scholarship. The reasons for which some aspects of the Greek world have established themselves as 'cinematic', and the meanings and values attributed to them in different moments in their cinematic reception, are neither fixed nor self-evident (cf. Michelakis 2008).

The relation between ancient Greece and its cinematic representations often comes to us textualized and shaped by the metaphors of authenticity and fidelity. Questions such as 'Is it true to Homer?' or 'Is it Greek tragedy?' are very persistent in critical discourses around films on ancient Greece, informing interviews with actors and directors, film reviews, and academic studies. Rather than rehearsing arguments against the promises and certainties of such metaphors, one can seek to broaden the debate by addressing two distinct issues. First, the rhetorical function and political work performed by anxieties regarding what is 'lost in translation'. The search for a fixed, singular meaning and the return to a single textual source and its author show methodological positivism and betray a range of unquestioned assumptions about cinema and ancient Greece which call for reflection. Such assumptions range from a misplaced nostalgia for wholeness and lost origins projected onto the Greek world, to the reinstatement of hierarchies between forms of artistic expression which privilege texts over images, or older art forms over newer. In doing so, these assumptions confuse styles and techniques with the essence of media: Greek theatre cannot be reduced to the use of masks, nor cinema to the realist conventions and stratagems of commercial films.

Looking beyond the tropes and workings of fidelity and authenticity—and this is the second issue that needs to be addressed here—one may seek to explore the rich and complex interplay of translation and analogy that informs the relation between cinematic and other types of reception of ancient Greece in modern scholarship, the performing arts, philosophy, and culture. Moving away from judgemental notions of adaptation as compromise or betrayal towards questions informed by the methodological preoccupations of intertextuality and cultural translation, one can find a more productive and critically sound ground for assessing the principles that inform the processes of selection and transmission from one culture and medium to another, and for measuring the success or failure of film adaptations. Adaptation informs a wide range of approaches to the encounter between cinema and ancient Greece, from formalist studies of narrative and style to historical preoccupations with issues of gender, race, ethnicity, class, and technology (Stam and Raengo 2005, with further bibliography).

The cinematic reception of the *Odyssey* is rich and diverse, ranging from Giuseppe de Liguoro's silent *Odissea* (1911) to Jean-Luc Godard's meta-cinematic *Contempt* (1963), Stanley Kubrick's futuristic *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968), Theo Angelopoulos' modernist *Ulysses' Gaze* (1995), and the Coen Brothers' comedy on the Great Depression *O Brother, Where Art Thou?* (2000). The *Iliad*, on the other hand, has never quite enjoyed the same influence and recognition: its blending with, and lack of autonomy from, other literary and artistic sources on the Trojan War is evident to see even in the titles of films such as Giovanni Pastrone's *La Caduta di Troia* (1910), Manfred Noa's *Helena* (1924), Alexander Korda's *The Private Life of Helen of Troy* (1927), Marino Girolami's *L'ira di Achille* (1962), and Wolfgang Petersen's *Troy* (2004). Similarly, films on Jason and the Golden Fleece, among which Don Chaffey's *Jason and the Argonauts* (1963) is arguably the most successful commercially and most acclaimed critically, draw as much on Apollonius' *Argonautica* as on other literary, dramatic, and visual versions of the story (Paul 2004). Cinema and the world of epic intersect in ways which transcend the body of films drawing on Homer and Apollonius. 'Epic' is a well-established term in cinema history and criticism, used for a whole genre of fictional and historical films inspired by the civilizations of the ancient Mediterranean as well as the history and mythology of more recent cultures (Elley 1994; G. A. Smith 1991). From the technological experimentations of early cinema to the introduction of colour and cinemascope in the 1950s and the advent of digital animation in the 1990s, the epic past has served as a favourite platform not only for the launch of innovative new technologies but also for the display of the stylistic and aesthetic changes which accompany such innovations: the wide screen, for instance, is a technical format closely bound up with theatricality and pictorialism, techniques that slow down the pace of the filmic narrative (epic is not all about action) and focus instead on the space inhabited by the characters (Rousseau 2000). Commercial cinema may privilege associations of epic films with size and spectacle, action, and romance, but

the popularity and generic parameters of such films do not exclude other definitions of epic. Film adaptations of Homer and Apollonius often flirt with the western literary canon and the central role of epic literature in it (Paul 2004). Recent work on oral epic traditions outside the western canon provides further scope for links to be explored between the rediscovery of archaic Greek epic as traditional oral literature and the different uses of epic in popular cinema as both a generic label and a heuristic tool.

The reception of Greek history in cinema has been almost single-handedly shaped by the Persian wars, especially the self-sacrificial bravery of the Spartans at the Thermopylae (e.g. Rudolph Maté's *The 300 Spartans*, 1962; and, more recently, Zack Snyder's *300*, 2007) and the life and conquests of Alexander the Great (whose representation by Robert Rossen in 1956 and Oliver Stone in 2004 should not overshadow the Hindi ones mentioned above, or Alexander's presence in television series, computer games, and animation films) (Levene 2007; Nisbet 2006; Lane Fox 2004). Other aspects of ancient Greek 'history', ranging from the fictions around the archaic poetess Sappho to those around the Byzantine empress Theodora, are not totally absent in cinema (see relevant entries in the index of Solomon 2001), and Plutarch's *Lives* have served as an important reservoir of information for cinematic representations of both Greece and Rome (e.g. Bourget 2000). However, well-known periods such as the Peloponnesian War, and influential texts such as those by the fathers of history Herodotus and Thucydides, are confined almost exclusively to television programmes offering re-enactments of historical events for educational purposes. (Notable exceptions include the uses of Herodotus' narrative in films such as D. W. Griffiths' *Intolerance*, 1916, and Anthony Minghella's *The English Patient*, 1996.) The screen presence of Greek history is limited when compared to that of Rome, Egypt, and the other empires of the ancient world (on which see Solomon 2001 and Wyke 1997*a*): one of the reasons for this is no doubt the fact that Greece does not satisfy the fascination of the twentieth century with religion and empire as readily as other ancient cultures do (Nisbet 2006). Even so, films and documentaries on ancient Greece encapsulate succinctly some of the dilemmas that all historical films face. Being caught as they are between competing definitions of history, films on the Greek past often conceal their oscillation between history as past events, processes, and facts, and history as engagement with and understanding of the past (Barta 1998; Rosenstone 2006); history as a drive for a realistic representation of a bygone age, and history as the drive to draw lessons from the past for the present by exploring and exploiting similarities and parallels between the two (Bourget 2000). Hidden behind the veil of the timelessness and universality of the classical past or, alternatively, its complete otherness, the resulting ambiguities and tensions often go unrecognized and unacknowledged in historical film practice and criticism.

The belief in cinema as an open window into a retrievable past can hold its sway even in fictional films drawing on myths or literary and dramatic texts: consider,

for instance, the misplaced debates about historical accuracy which accompany the release of every new film on Greek epic. When, on the other hand, fictional films manage to loosen the grip of historical conventions, they often provide powerful reflections on the 'classical' past. Film adaptations of tragedy and comedy, for instance, rather than problematizing the representability of ancient Greece or celebrating it as an antidote for the anxieties and conflicts of the present, have repeatedly explored its modern configurations as analogies for history and as models through which to make sense of its triumphs and horrors. Surpassing the understanding of history as history of events, they both question and perform history as a social and political project for imposing order, resolving conflict, transcending suffering, and achieving transcendent awareness and aesthetic completeness. Revisiting the roles of agency, responsibility, pain, and fate, they have provided ways in which to demystify power relations, critique the civilizing power of progress and rationality, and expose the heterogeneity, fragmentation, and conflict of history hidden beneath the surface of order and integration (e.g. Theo Angelopoulos' *Travelling Players*, 1975; Rainer Simon's *Der Fall Ö.*, 1991; and Tony Harrison's *Prometheus*, 1998). It is perhaps not surprising that among the most commonly adapted Greek plays in cinema are Sophocles' *Antigone* and *Oedipus the King*, Euripides' *Medea*, and Aristophanes' *Lysistrata*. However, the qualities of these plays cannot fully account for the radically different preoccupations and styles of the films that they have inspired. Two contrasting takes on Sophocles' Oedipus that may drive this point home are Woody Allen's semi-autobiographical *Oedipus Wrecks* (1989), a comic adaptation set in New York, and Jorge Ali Triana's political *The Mayor Oedipus* (1996), a violent adaptation set in a Colombia torn apart by civil war. Other well-known dramas, such as Aeschylus' monumental *Oresteia*, have been largely, though not completely, neglected by cinema, whereas less popular plays, such as Euripides' *Electra* and *Iphigenia at Aulis*, have inspired two of Michael Cacoyannis' most successful films (in 1962 and 1977 respectively). Greek tragedy and comedy have been adapted in a variety of cinematic genres and traditions, providing an understanding of Greek theatre in modern culture not only as a body of dramatic texts but also as a living theatrical tradition, as a group of powerful stories and plots, as the origin of modern performing arts, and as a model for thinking about modernity—often in direct competition with the paradigms of history and philosophy (Michelakis 2003).

The Greek world has been translated into a number of filmic types and genres which range from comedy to melodrama, musical, period drama, thriller, adventure, film noir, science fiction, documentary, and animation. Such types and genres comprise a wide range of cinematic styles, methods, and techniques, and belong to different cinematic traditions, from Hollywood and commercial cinema to European avant-garde cinema, world cinemas, early cinema, and amateur cinema. To say that Greece is the prerogative of, say, epic cinema, Hollywood, or the documentary to the exclusion of other genres and cinematic traditions would be

reductive. To assume that each genre and tradition is fixed and rigid would also be problematic. One of the most misunderstood and under-researched types of cinema is the animated film. Animated representations of ancient Greece, dating at least as far back as the Aesop's Fables Studio in the 1920s, do not only help problematize twentieth-century gender and race categories but also question hierarchies of cinematic genres and distinctions such as those between 'naive' and 'sophisticated', or 'difficult' and 'accessible' types of film (Wells 1998). At present, Walt Disney's *Hercules* (1997) may be one of the best-known cinematic representations of the hero, and its penetration among younger audiences around the world may be a sign of the global domination of family entertainment and values as shaped by Hollywood film studios. However, recent animation pictures also include the much darker and more challenging Asian animated series *Alexander Senki* (1997) by Yoshinori Kanemori, a retelling of the story of Alexander the Great in the genre of science fiction. Earlier animated films, such as Aleksandra Snezhko-Blotskaya's Soviet cartoons on Prometheus, Jason, Perseus, and Theseus in the 1970s, show how neoclassical aesthetics can be put at the service of socialist realism, whereas Barry Purves' short animation *Achilles* (1996) illustrates how clay figures can be used to challenge mainstream gender categories and to appropriate the epic tradition through a homoerotic retelling of the *Iliad*. Finally, avant-garde animation such as Kostas Sfikas' Greek *Prometheus Retrogressing* (1998) demonstrate ways in which animated films can resist mainstream conventions of character development and enable instead the construction of experimental, non-objective, and non-linear narratives preoccupied with abstract rhythm, movement, and sound.

Another category of cinema awaiting further research, with thematic ties not only with Greek mythology but also with epic and history, is that of sword-and-sandal and 'peplum' films. A sub-genre of mostly Italian films from the 1950s and 1960s, sword-and-sandal films are often dismissed for their simplistic or implausible plots, poor acting, and low-budget sets and costumes. Rather than criticize such films for their factual errors and anachronisms, one can explore the ways in which their 'mistakes' structure the thematic preoccupations of the genre with spectacle and romance, or, alternatively, one can expose the ideological and sociological role they perform in legitimizing conservative (heterosexual, patriarchal, white, nationalistic, and western) values in relation to gender, class, and race. To think of such films only in terms of how cultural influences impact on them would of course obscure some of their most creative aspects, for instance, their often self-consciously parodic, intertextual, and experimental style, and their ongoing appeal to non-mainstream audiences, from gay communities to cult-film buffs. As products of popular culture, sword-and-sandal films may not provide the radical social critique of avant-garde cinema, but this is not to say that they do not effect or enable social change at all. For instance, sword-and-sandal films can display and perform cultural hybridity: Hercules fights side by side with or against Roman gladiators, the biblical Samson, the Italian strongman Maciste, Assyrian and Babylonian rulers, bronze giants,

moon monsters, the Three Stooges, and New York criminals. Sword-and-sandal films bring together and display as spectacle a dizzying range of conceptualizations of Greek antiquity: even when set in a temporally distant and distinct Greece, they often combine the material remains of the Greek *and* Roman civilizations with Minoan and Mycenaean architecture, Egyptian-looking monumentality, Spanish or Italian landscapes, neoclassical façades, Victorian art interiors, and twentieth-century special effects. In doing so, sword-and-sandal films engage not only with the literary and visual sources of tightly intermingled layers of the Graeco-Roman past but also with representations of this past since the Renaissance: the western literary canon, Renaissance and nineteenth-century painting, neoclassical sculpture and architecture, theatre and other performing arts, and so on.

The hybridity displayed by sword-and-sandal films is not only thematic but also generic, combining as it does adventure with romance, horror, and comedy. The primarily Italian peplum may be a minor cinematic genre, but it should also be seen as an important antecedent of Hollywood epics, as well as of the western, the horror film, and science fiction, in ways that invite a more cautious evaluation of the interactions and exchanges between Hollywood and other traditions of popular cinema. It was through the peplum that directors such as Sergio Leone explored the issues of myth-making, heroism, and masculinity, before directing their energies towards more mainstream genres (Lagny 1992; Eloy 1995; Wyke 1997*b*; Aziza 1998; Nisbet 2006).

The encounters between Greece and cinema do not confine themselves to film-making. Greek philosophy has a prominent position in scriptwriting and in film theory. Attempts to produce films based on Socrates' life and on Plato's philosophical dialogues may be few. Likewise, Aristotle's screen presence limits itself to cameo appearances in films on his most famous pupil, Alexander (see relevant entries in the index of Solomon 2001; Nisbet 2006). However, both Plato and Aristotle have often found themselves involved in debates around the nature, structures, functions, and effects of cinema. Aristotle's emphasis on imitation as the primary function of art, and his interest in the emotional impact of literature and drama on the spectator, especially his views on pleasure and on catharsis, have been central to affective readings of cinema (e.g. by André Bazin, the 'Aristotle of film', according to the film-director François Truffaut: see Andrew 1978), including those drawing on the teachings of cognitive psychology and neurology in more recent years (G. M. Smith 2003, with bibliography at 195, n. 2). They have also been related, either as inspiring predecessors or dispossessed antecedents, to the psychoanalytic notion of desire, which has dominated Film studies since the 1970s (e.g. Metz 1977; Mulvey 1989). Another area where Film studies has returned to Aristotle for inspiration is that of formalism in many of its different forms and guises. The narrative logic and structures favoured by Aristotle, his emphasis on chronological cause-and-effect chains of events, and his interest in self-contained stories with a beginning, middle, and end have all been employed to describe, define, analyse,

and sanction what is now widely known as the 'classical' Hollywood narrative (Bordwell, Staiger, and Thompson 1985). What is more, Aristotle's *Poetics* has been a foundation text for scriptwriting, not only for commercial feature films, but also for television drama and even computer games (Hiltunen 2002; Tierno 2002). Action, conflict, suspense, the three-act structure, the correspondence between storytelling techniques and emotional experience, coherence in characterization, narrative closure, recycling of narrative structures and patterns: these are concepts central to storytelling in commercial cinema whose 'timelessness' has been sanctioned through a direct link with the authority of Aristotle and a 'universal' tradition of storytelling into which Aristotle has been thought to have tapped first.

If classical film theory and screenwriting have engaged primarily with Aristotle's *Poetics*, the theories of cinema of the 1960s and 1970s, with their emphasis on ideology and psychoanalysis, have turned their attention towards Plato. The Platonic myth of the cave in the *Republic* (7, 514a–517a) has been used as a powerful metaphor for an understanding of the workings of cinema as a perceptual and ideological apparatus. The darkened and enclosed space of the cave, the projection of moving images and shadows which produces the illusion of reality, the emission of sounds whose echo gives the impression that they come from the projected images, the forced immobility of the prisoners, and the hidden source of artificial light behind them have provided grounds on which to build not only analogies between the technologies and ideologies of cinema and the Platonic cave but also a direct historical link between the two, enabling as they have done a teleological explanation of the emergence and popularity of cinema in the twentieth century. ('The history of cinema starts with Plato': Baudry 1999: 767. For a critique of the analogy, and especially the attempt to historicize the relation between the two, see Carroll 1999: 791–4.) A different take on Plato's cave has been provided by psychoanalytic film criticism, whose preoccupation with the workings of film spectatorship has led to readings of Plato's prisoners through Freud and Lacan. On the one hand, psychoanalytic studies of cinema have seen the myth of the cave as a model for thinking about the misrecognition that takes place when the cinema spectator identifies with the otherness of the images on the screen—just as the infant misrecognizes itself when it encounters its image in the mirror. On the other hand, psychoanalytic film criticism has explored the ambiguities and complexities of the journey out of the cave that the captives undertake: if Plato himself depicts this journey as one of emancipation and progress, Freud reads it more equivocally, as a journey into the unconscious (Baudry 1999: 760–8).

The relationship between cinema and ancient Greece is a reciprocal one. Cinema theorists and practitioners have turned to ancient Greece to make sense of, and sometimes legitimize, cinema as an art form and as an institution. At the same time, cinema, as one of the most public arenas of twentieth-century cultural activity, has also shaped the ways in which the modern world has come to think about ancient

Greece. Through its thematic engagement with history, epic, drama, and myth, cinema has contributed to ongoing debates about the 'classical' status of Greek literature and culture. Cinematic technologies of viewing and narrative techniques have also shaped the way modern literature and poetry construct their dialogues with Greece: Christopher Logue's *War Music* (Logue 2001), Tony Harrison's poetry, and many of the recent historical novels on ancient Greece such as Steven Pressfield's *Gates of Fire* (Pressfield 1998) are full of filmic elements, metaphors, and concepts, and are often seen as film scripts in waiting mode. Modern critical discourses on ancient Greece have also been indebted to the narrative and technological possibilities opened up by the medium of cinema. Terms such as 'angles' or 'framing', and categories such as montage and focalization, are not only illustrative of modern scholarly methods but also constitutive of them (Jameson 1992; Murphet and Rainford 2003; cf. Graziosi above, pp. 796–7). At the end of Jean-Luc Godard's *Contempt*, the scene entitled 'Odysseus' first sight of his homeland' is shot as a silent take of the emptiness of the vast sea and the sky. Similarly, at the end of Theo Angelopoulos' *Ulysses' Gaze*, the *Ur*-film that the protagonist searches in his journey through the war-torn Balkans is eventually glimpsed as a blank screen. In cinematic representations of the *Odyssey*, homecoming is again and again enacted as a double return to the origins of cinema and of western civilization, which is at once nostalgic and compulsive. Like Ithaca, ancient Greece itself may be irrecoverable but its dissemination into and interactions with a cluster of competing and overlapping narratives, technologies, and ideologies, and their diversity and persistence testify to an ongoing journey of repetition and change that resists fixity and closure.

Suggested Reading

Verreth (2003) and the Internet Movie Database (www.imdb.com) provide information on hundreds of films related to ancient Greece. Comprehensive overviews and detailed lists of titles can also be found in MacKinnon (1986), G. A. Smith (1991), and Solomon (2001). In recent years several studies have appeared on the different aspects of the cinematic reception of ancient Greece: Bertini (1997), Winkler (2001), Eigler (2002), Boschi and Bozzato (2005), Nisbet (2006), Berti and Morcillo (2008). On Greek mythology in cinema see also the studies of sword-and-sandal films by Lagny (1992), Eloy (1995), Wyke (1997*b*), and Aziza (1998), and the studies of Cocteau's and Camus' films on Orpheus in Evans (1977), Popkin (1980), Schifano (2002), and Williams (2006: esp. 110–36). For discussions of the cinematic reception of Greek epic see Elley (1994), Marie (1990), Bersani and Dutoit (2003), Woods (2000), Paul (2004), and Winkler (2006). On Greek tragedy in cinema see the monographs by McDonald (1983), MacKinnon (1986), and more recently, on Pasolini, Fusillo (1996). Also articles in books and academic journals such as McDonald and MacKinnon (1993), Hall (2002), Hardwick (2003), and Michelakis (2001 and

2003). Different aspects of the reception of Greek history in cinema have recently been examined by Lane Fox (2004) and Levine (2007), both with useful bibliography. On the more general issue of the relation between cinema and history see Sorlin (1980), Landy (2000), and, with emphasis on the cinematic reception of ancient Rome, Wyke (1997*a*) and Joshel, Malamud, and McGuire (2001). For discussions of generic and formal similarities between the literature and mythology of ancient Greece and mainstream cinematic genres such as the western, science fiction, and the thriller see the contributions in Winkler (2001), as well as Blundell and Ormand (1997) and Schulze-Gattermann (2000). A useful overview of current debates in film adaptation theory and practice can be found in Stam and Raengo (2005).

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CHAPTER 68

RECEPTION

MIRIAM LEONARD

> Philology as a science of antiquity does not, of course, endure for ever; its elements are not inexhaustible. What cannot be exhausted, however, is the ever-new adaptation of one's age to antiquity.
>
> (Nietzsche, *We Philologists*)

It was the German hermeneutic tradition formulated by Hans-Georg Gadamer and later developed by Wolfgang Iser and Hans Robert Jauss which put the term 'reception' on the map for literary studies in the twentieth century. Many of the debates about Reception studies which have been in currency in Classics in the past decade or so owe a great deal to Jauss and Iser, but classicists have rarely engaged directly with the questions of history and appropriation which hermeneutics has put on the agenda. Similarly, those who have seen themselves as promoting the intellectual legacy of Jauss and Iser's so-called *Rezeptionästhetik* have largely ignored work in the field of Classical studies. Machor and Goldstein make the claim, in their 2001 collection *Reception Study: From Literary Theory to Cultural Studies*, that 'over the last ten years the number of British and American articles, book chapters, and full-length works in reception study has marked a virtual explosion in the field' (Machor and Goldstein 2001: p. ix). Yet none of the examples they cite, and none of the essays they include in their own collection, deal with the reception of the ancient world per se. The story of why reception, as opposed to 'classical tradition', 'classical heritage', or 'classical legacy', has become the accepted denomination for research into the post-classical dialogue with antiquity has yet to be told, but it seems likely that when it is, Jauss and Iser are paradoxically unlikely to play more than supporting roles.

One reason for this might be signalled by the title of Machor and Goldstein's collection. Classical studies, like many of its cognate disciplines in the humanities, has seen a move away from the literary flavouring of Jauss and Iser's emphasis on readers, texts, and authors towards a more Cultural studies-inflected investigation of intellectual, social and political history. Jauss's inaugural address: 'What is, and for what purpose does one study, literary history?' clearly marks out the field of literary studies as the remit of his theoretical investigation. Jauss's *Rezeptionästhetik* sets itself up as a corrective to the opposing literary theories of Russian Formalism and Marxism. Reception, then, was a way of thinking about literature—in crude terms, a way of understanding the relative importance of the 'aesthetic' response of the reader in the present versus the historical context of the author in the past. In many accounts, Jauss and Iser's reception theories seem to have more in common with New Criticism than with a generalized theory for studying the past. Of course, in the field of Classical studies such a dichotomy might not hold: the textual nature of our relationship to antiquity suggests that constructing a hard opposition between literature and history is likely to be unconvincing. In a discipline which has so often taken the written text as the starting-point of analysis, all classicists—even archaeologists—can be said to be literary scholars of a certain sort.

And yet, despite its overt identification with literature, it would be a mistake to ignore the role that history plays in even Jauss's formulation of reception. The title of Jauss's manifesto famously echoes Friedrich Schiller's own inaugural: 'What is, and for what purpose does one study, universal history?' Jauss's 'poetics of reception', as Paul de Man has suggested, have more in common with the traditions of hermeneutics and phenomenology than with the formal study of poetics. In particular, his interest in the development of historicism shows the extent to which reception theory is embedded in a wider history of ideas. For Jauss sets out to show how the increasing dominance of positivism in the nineteenth-century German academy negated one of the most valuable insights of universal history (Jauss 1982: 9): 'In its turning away from the Enlightenment philosophy of history, historicism sacrificed not only the teleological construction of universal history, but also the methodological principle that, according to Schiller, first and foremost distinguishes the universal historian and his method: namely, "to join the past with the present".' The Enlightenment philosophers—most notably Hegel—saw the present as the teleological outcome of the past. But, as Jauss asks (1982: 7): 'when one rejected the solution of the philosophy of history—to comprehend the course of events from an "end, an ideal high point" of world history—as unhistorical, how then was the coherence of history, never given as a whole, to be understood and represented?' Jauss here introduces Gadamer's concept of the hermeneutic circle to explain the challenge faced by all historians (Gadamer 1975: 176): 'Even the "historical school" knew that fundamentally there can be no other history but universal history, because the unique significance of the detail can be

determined only from the whole. How can the empirical researcher, to whom the whole can never be given, manage without losing his rights to the philosopher and his *a priori* arbitrariness?' To Gadamer and Jauss, the triumph of positivism over universal history was not only illusory, it also deprived history of a self-awareness which had been intrinsic to its practice. By forever banishing the present from the examination of the historical process, the positivist historian denied him/herself a crucial narrative structure for understanding his/her own investment in the past. In his exploration of the competing modes of nineteenth-century historicism, Jauss reveals how his theory of reception is more than an intervention into the narrow field of literary studies: it rather proclaims itself a theory of historical epistemology.

But despite his defence of universal history, Jauss adds a crucial element of suspicion to the Enlightenment position. Jauss rather controversially developed Gadamer's notion of the 'fusion of horizons' between past and present by positing what he would call a 'horizon of expectation'. (On the difficulties of this term see Holub 1984: 59.) This horizon refers to the complex dialectic between text and reader: the mediation between the expectations 'formed by a convention of genre, style, or form' and the response of an individual reader to a specific text. By laying its emphasis on the singularity of each reading encounter, Jauss criticizes tradition-based models of literary enquiry (1982: 9): 'The research into the tradition neutralized the lived praxis of history when it sought the focal point of knowledge in the origin or in the atemporal continuity of tradition, and not in the presence and uniqueness of literary phenomenon.' 'The presence and uniqueness' of these literary encounters, however, does not return Jauss to a simple model of historicism. Jauss is not exposing the dangers of an 'atemporal continuity' merely to argue for a self-transparent understanding of temporality. As Paul de Man argues: '"The horizon of expectation" brought to a work of art is never available in objective or even objectifiable form, neither to its author nor to its contemporaries or later recipients.' For de Man, 'a dialectic of understanding as a complex interplay between knowing and not knowing, is built within the process of literary history' (1982: p. xii). De Man compares the dialogue between the horizons of text and reader to the dialogue between an analyst and his analysand:

> The situation is comparable to the dialogical relationship that develops between the analyst and his interlocutor in psychoanalysis. Neither of the two knows the experience being discussed; they may not even know whether such an experience ever existed. The subject is separated from it by mechanisms of repression, defence, displacement and the like, whereas to the analyst, it is available only as a dubiously available symptom. But the difficulty does not prevent a dialogic discourse of at least some interpretative value from taking place.

De Man argues that any encounter between past and present is subject to the 'mechanisms of repression, defence, and displacement'. The 'horizon of expectation' is singular precisely because one could never reconstruct in a mechanical way the

ingredients of past and present which combine to make up the reading experience of a given reader in time. In this version, the text (literary or historical) is only a 'dubiously available symptom' of the past. We could not be further here from von Ranke's *wie es eigentlich gewesen ist* ('how it really was') (de Man 1982: 5):

> On the other hand it is not only rare but almost forbidden that a literary historian should hold judgements of quality concerning the works of past ages. Rather, he prefers to appeal to the ideal of objectivity of historiography, which only has to describe 'how it really was'. His aesthetic abstinence has good grounds. For the quality and rank of a literary work result neither from the biographical or historical conditions of its origin, nor from its place in the sequence of the development of a genre alone, but rather from the criteria of influence, reception, and posthumous fame, criteria which are often difficult to grasp.

Jauss's aesthetic turn in this passage gives a further dimension to the 'poetics of reception'. The emphasis on the judgement of value and quality does not appear to be a necessary extension of Jauss's reception. If Jauss's reception theory can give us a compelling model of historical epistemology, it does not have to follow that the aim of reception will be the *aesthetic* judgement of a particular text. Indeed, the question of the intrinsic value of a text seems to sit uneasily with the dynamic model of literary appreciation which would seem to be the concomitant of reception theory. Presumably it is not just the meaning of a text which evolves over time, but also its aesthetic 'value'. But in Jauss's aesthetics the question of quality is decidedly not a property of the work of art itself, but rather of its subsequent reception. In other words, Jauss moves away from the dehistoricized (and depoliticized) flavour of a more traditional aesthetics to make a claim for the necessary historicity of aesthetic judgements. In Jauss's version, it seems, it would be impossible to say of a work of art that it was beautiful outside of the context of its reception. Jauss thus adds a historical and social dimension to the judgement of taste.

Despite its self-positioning within literary studies, Jauss's theory of reception seems to provide us with something more than a tool of literary criticism. As scholars of the ancient world whose relationship to the past is not just mediated through a highly partial textual record (texts written for the most part by a small number of elite men), but a textual record which has also come down to us via complex processes of transmission, it is difficult to see the past as anything more than a 'dubiously available symptom'. At its most basic level, all Hellenists deal on a daily basis with questions of reception, as other chapters in this volume (notably those by Tchernetska, Armstrong, Battezzato, and Graziosi) make clear. When we decide which edition of a text to read, when we set our students a particular bibliography of secondary material, or even when we accept one papyrological reconstruction over another, we are actively involved in constructing our own, and others', 'horizons of expectation'. But while there are Hellenists who have attempted to make this process of reception explicit, the debate about the methodological implications of studying the *Nachleben* of classical antiquity is still, surprisingly,

in its infancy. Such a debate would need to examine the theoretical premises of a field which has attracted scholars from a surprisingly wide range of methodological sympathies—from the avowedly conservative to the self-consciously avant-garde. But the absence of a self-conscious engagement with Jauss's and Iser's writings has led many practitioners of reception to avoid confronting one of the most fundamental questions facing classicists today: should reception be seen as a separate subdiscipline within Classics or rather as fully constitutive of the way we study every branch of the ancient world? There is a growing acknowledgement of 'reception' as a topic within classical studies, but at the same time (and insofar as it is thought of as just one topic within the discipline) a desire to bracket off its findings. A certain positivism continues to reign in Hellenic studies, the desire 'to join the past with the present' remains a minoritarian pursuit.

And yet, while a direct engagement with the reception theory of Jauss and Iser remains largely absent (in contrast see, within Latin studies, Edmunds 1992; Galinsky 1992; Martindale 1993, among other works; Nauta 1994), it is possible to identify several strands within Hellenic studies which develop the themes of reception theory. As we have seen, one of the most striking insights to emerge from Jauss's essay is the necessity of historicizing particular meanings and understandings attributed to texts and practices from the ancient world at a given time. Within Hellenic studies one can witness the proliferation of analyses of the historical phenomenon of 'Hellenism' in the post-classical period. Such explorations would include the growing interest in the reception of competing forms of 'Hellenism' within antiquity itself (see Hall 2002). One could think here of discussions about the reception of Homer in tragedy and elsewhere (Michelakis 2002; Graziosi 2002), or perhaps more obviously the complex reception of Greece in Rome and the dialogue with 'classical' Hellenism in the so-called Second Sophistic (Alcock 1993; Whitmarsh 2001; Goldhill 2001; cf. Barchiesi and Whitmarsh in this volume). While these studies have borne ample witness to a complex 'fusion of historical horizons' at work in each of these historical periods, few scholars have made the Jaussian move of arguing that such insights from later periods fundamentally change our understanding of Homer or classical Athens per se. Plutarch's dialogue with Plato, for sure, tells us a lot about Plutarch or more generally the Second Sophistic's relationship to classical Athens, but is reading Plutarch essential to understanding Plato or the fifth-century democracy? Or, to follow Jauss down his aesthetic route, is Plutarch's reception of Plato a crucial element in determining the quality and value of Plato's writings?

Many of the most interesting writings on the Second Sophistic are alive to the imbrication of political events in the reading encounters of their protagonists. Thus Plutarch's relationship to Plato is only rarely examined outside of the context of the political landscape of the late first century CE. This political context is seen as crucial to making sense of Plutarch but, again, there is less interest in how the

grand-scale historical events of this period might shape our understanding of a Hellenic legacy. Does Rome's political conquest of Greece mean that for the western classical tradition the writings and cultural achievements of Greece are inescapably mediated through Rome? Is there, indeed, a discipline of Hellenic studies which can exist separately from the political struggles which carved out the 'Hellenic world' as an entity at various moments in the history of the West? And beyond Europe's construction of its unique relationship to its classical past, what about the Greek world's (always too close) relationship to the East? Should we not follow Jauss's scepticism in uncritically accepting the self-serving narratives of tradition (in this case, the western tradition) and avoid the neutralization of 'the lived praxis of history'? Can we read Aristotle without Averroes, or Homer without Gilgamesh, without reifying a certain 'horizon of expectation' which transcends 'the presence and uniqueness' of each reading encounter? The historical investigation of 'Hellenism' has certainly revealed the changing meaning of what it means to be Greek over time, but it has all too rarely examined how this history of reading might challenge a conception (still held by many Hellenists) of the Athenian audience watching the *Trojan Women* in 415 BCE, *wie es eigentlich gewesen ist.*

Perhaps, if only by virtue of its sheer historical sweep, Simon Goldhill (2002)—*Who Needs Greek?*—seems to tackle the Jaussian challenge more directly (although, while the term 'reception' is discussed, Jauss is never named as an interlocutor). By examining 'contests' in the history of Hellenism, from Plutarch and Lucian via Erasmus right up to Strauss and Wagner, Goldhill gives some sense of the kinks and chinks in the chain of reception extended over the millennia. By bringing his narrative firmly into the modern era, Goldhill manages to turn the issue of Hellenism's value back onto his readers (Goldhill 2002: 299): 'The question "who needs Greek?" is not a classicist's triumphalism or despair, but rather an injunction towards self-aware and informed exploration of one's place in history and culture—one's own stake in cultural value.' But despite all his emphasis on our self-implication in the process of transmission, Goldhill ultimately evades the full implications of Jauss's reception theory in his conclusion (ibid.): 'The needs, cares, obsessions about Greek and Greekness which I have been tracing from the ancient world to today, certainly show how impoverished a perspective it would be to turn to the paradigmatic figures of Erasmus, Hofmannsthal, Wagner, Keats, Shelley, Arnold, Lowe, Mill, Rousseau, Emerson (let alone Lucian and Plutarch) *without* (their) Greek.' Goldhill has harsh words for the 'blinkered presentist' who would persist in reading 'Erasmus without (his) Greek learning, Arnold without (his) Homer, Derrida without (his) Plato' (ibid.), but has little to say about the Hellenist (who would surely represent most Hellenists) who feels sanctioned in reading Greek without Erasmus, Homer without (his) Arnold, and Plato without (his) Derrida. As Duncan Kennedy has commented: 'Often in reception studies, the point of reception is shunted one place back ... This is where the challenge

to self-understanding of the reading subject comes acutely relevant: we do not yet understand ourselves' (2006: 291).

It has perhaps been the desire to understand ourselves which has been behind the large number of studies devoted to the most recent centuries of Hellenic reception. (Indeed, the relative neglect of the medieval and early modern period by professional classical scholars in the last decades is striking.) The year 1755 inaugurates the period of 'modern' Hellenism. The publication of Johann Joachim Winckelmann's *Reflections on the Imitation of Greek Masterpieces in Painting and Sculpture* (Winckelmann 1755) and his slightly later *History of Ancient Art* (Winckelmann 1764) set the scene for a Graecophilia that would hold the German intelligentsia in its grips for well over a century. But if an aesthetic attachment to Greece was sealed by Winckelmann's immersion in Greek sculpture, it was Friedrich August Wolf's *Prolegomena to Homer* (Wolf 1795), described by Winckelmann as the completion of 'the conquest of the ancient world by scholarship' (quoted in Marchand 1996: 17), which founded the modern academic discipline of Classics. Both the literary-aesthetic yearning for Greek and the development of a rigorous philological method took place against the background of violent changes in the political landscape of Europe. The French Revolution and the Enlightenment philosophies which had inspired it gave rise to a new sense of what it was to be a subject and a citizen in history. But in the words of James Porter (ch. 1 in this volume, p. 13), this new modernity '*requires* the cultivation of antiquity for its own self-definition'. From Hegel to Marx, it was against the citizen of antiquity that the progress of the modern subject was constantly measured. Similarly, in the British context, debates about political reform and the extension of social and economic rights to its citizens at home and in the empire were often linked to hotly contested questions of classical education and the organization of the ancient polity (see Jenkyns 1980; Turner 1981; Goldhill 2002; Vasunia 2005).

This dialogic relationship between antiquity and modernity subtends the very creation of *Altertumswissenschaft*—that monument to the triumph of positivism. It is here that studies of the institutional history of Greek and Roman studies (I am thinking here of the work of Marchand 1996 on Germany; of Stray 1998, Beard 2000, and Henderson 2006 on England; and Hummel 2000 and Waquet 2001 on France) intersect with Jauss's own interest in the development of historicism. For the thirst for historical enquiry emerged from a very contemporary cultural immersion in the classical past, and yet it is precisely at this moment that the horizon of modernity is written out of the equation. For Nietzsche, as Porter's classic study (2000) has shown us, modernity's passion for the past was nothing more than a Narcissus-like self-reflection. The triumph of nineteenth-century scholarship was to write out the process of Classics' institutionalization, to write out the story of the complex operations of transmission and reception involved in its institutionalization, at the very moment when the 'fusion of horizons' was at its most productive. It was, in

essence, to reify a past and a method of investigating the past in which the present had no place.

It is against this background of historical enquiry that Sigmund Freud's famous remarks from the *Interpretation of Dreams* must be read (Freud 1953: iv. 262):

> His destiny moves us because it might have been ours—because the oracle laid the same curse upon us before our birth as upon him. It is the fate of all of us, perhaps, to direct our first sexual impulses towards our mother and our first hatred and our first murderous wish against our father. Our dreams convince us that this is so. King Oedipus, who slew his father Laius and married his mother Jocasta, merely shows us the fulfilment of our own childhood wishes.

What Freud says is shocking not just because he makes incestuous murderers of us all, but also because he violates the injunction to historicize at the core of the scholarly investment in the classical past. As Richard Armstrong's recent account of Freud's antiquity (Armstrong 2005) has shown us, Freud's Oedipus stands as the culmination of a century-long Graecophilic yearning. But Freud's 'compulsion' is the mirror-image of the positivist's pathology. Freud's reading enacts the ultimate fusion of horizons between past and present, but in his fusion it is the horizon of history which seems to be effaced. By making the Oedipal condition the paradigmatic condition of *modernity*, it is antiquity which appears to disappear. (Cf. Bowlby's remarks in this volume.) And yet, as de Man's analogy between reception theory and psychoanalysis suggests, it is perhaps Freud who best understood the 'mechanisms of repression, defence, displacement' which cloud the horizon of expectation. When Freud says that Oedipus' fate is the 'fate of all of us', he is not so much denying the role of the past in the present as revealing its insurmountable power. Oedipus' fate is the trace of the past which structures each life in the present. History is an uncanny presence which like the oracle lays a 'curse upon us before our birth'.

In many ways, the journey from Wolf to Freud exemplifies one of the paradoxes at the heart of Jauss's reception theory, a paradox which many practitioners of reception within the field of Hellenic studies have reproduced. A desire to highlight the historical locatedness of all meaning (in the past and present) sits side by side with a claim that historical narratives can transcend their historicity to transform the present. We have seen how, too often, the desired 'fusion of horizons' is not so much a fusion as an erasure. The dialogue between past and present is more often than not a zero-sum game. When Goldhill warns us not to read Arnold without (his) Homer, it is Goldhill's attempt to read Homer without (his) Arnold which is occluded. Others have seen in Freud's coercive Oedipalization of modernity a violent denial of the specificity of the past—a failure to give due attention to 'the presence and uniqueness' of each reading encounter. The power of Jauss's reception theory may lie precisely in its ability to keep in productive tension the historical

and the unhistorical. Jauss, like Nietzsche before him, recognized that 'we need history, certainly, but we need it for reasons different from those which the idler in the garden of knowledge needs it, even though we may look nobly down on our rough and charmless needs and requirements. We need it, that is to say, for the sake of life and action, not so as to turn comfortably away from life and action' (Nietzsche 1997: 59).

Suggested Reading

The chapter has focused on the theory of reception, and various examples of its practice within Hellenic studies. For general introductions to classical reception see Hardwick (2003), Martindale and Thomas (2006), and Hardwick and Stray (2008). For the reception of Hellenism from antiquity to the twentieth century see Goldhill (2002). For explicit engagement with Jauss and Iser's reception theory within Classics see Martindale (1993). A useful collection of Jauss's essays in English can be found in Jauss (1982). For Iser see Iser (1978). On reception theory see Holub (1984) and Machor and Goldstein (2001). For the history of scholarship see Pfeiffer (1976) and Momigliano (1994); for Germany in particular see Flashar, Gründer, and Horstmann (1979); for England, Stray (1998); for France, Hummel (2000). Turner (1981) and Jenkyns (1980) deal with Victorian Hellenism. For German Philhellenism see Marchand (1996). For the turn to Greece in post-war France see Leonard (2005). For studies of individual modern figures see Beard (2000), Porter (2000), and Armstrong (2005). Prins (1999) is a good example of a monograph on the reception of an individual ancient author. Space prevented me from discussing the important field of performance history of Greek and Roman drama: for exemplary studies see Hall and Macintosh (2005), and Macintosh *et al.* (2005).

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